Case Digest Agra

CONTENTS: 1. LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 161796 2. DAR vs. BERENGUER, GR 154094 3. ALANGILAN REALTY vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 180471 4. REPUBLIC vs. LOPEZ, GR 178895 5. DAR vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE, GR 152640 6. ARNAIZ vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 170623 7. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT vs. MATEO, GR 175485 8. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. DARAB, GR 175200 9. ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 168164 10. GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 185669 11. HEIRS OF REYES vs. GARILAO, GR 136466 12. MAGO vs. BARBIN, GR 173923 13. MAYLEM vs. ELLANO, GR 162721 14. ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 176091 15. LANDBANK vs. DARAB, GR 183279 16. LANBANK vs. COLARINA, GR 176410 17. LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, GR 164025 18. LANDBANK vs. KUMASSIE PLANTATION, GR 177404 19. DAR vs. TONGSON, GR 171674 20. AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs. ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 169331 21. ROXAS & COMPANY INC. vs. DAMBA-NFSW, GR 149548 22. LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD S. VDA. DE ARIETA, GR 161834 23. APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LANDBANK, GR 164195 24. LANDBANK vs. SUNTAY, GR 157903 25. LANDBANK vs. LISTANA, GR 168105 26. SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 184282 27. MENDOZA vs. GERMINO, GR 165676 28. OCTAVIO vs. PEROVANO, GR 172400 29. MONTANEZ vs. PARAD, GR 183142 30. SEARBEMCO vs. DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., GR 154048 31. HEIRS OF SPS. VIDAD vs. LANDBANK, GR 166461 32. CONCHA vs. RUBIO, GR 162446 33. HEIRS OF CERVANTES vs. MIRANDA, GR 183352 34. LAKEVIEW GOLF CLUB vs. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG NAYON, GR 171253 35. CREBA vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR 183409 36. PVB vs. BASES CONVERSION DEV’T AUTHORITY, GR 173085 37. PO vs. DAMPAL, GR 173329 38. RURAL BANK OF DASMARINAS vs. JARIN ET AL, GR 180778 39. HACIENDA LUISITA INC. vs. LUISITA IND’L PARK CORP., GR 171101

HACIENDA LUISITA INC vs LUISITA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP, GR. 171101 FACTS: On 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI‘s Stock Distribution Option Plan (SODP). The SDOA was formally entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848 qualified FWBs. This attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of HLI‘s SDP, which was eventually approved by the PARC after a followup referendum conducted by the DAR, in which 5,117 FWBs, out of 5,315 who participated, opted to receive shares in HLI. On 1995, HLI applied for the conversion of 500 hectares of land of the hacienda from agricultural to industrial use, pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 6657. The DAR approved the application subject to payment of three percent (3%) of the gross selling price to the FWBs and to HLI‘s continued compliance with its undertakings under the SDP, among other conditions. On 1996, HLI, in exchange for subscription of 12,000,000 shares of stocks of Centennary, ceded 300 hectares of the converted area to the latter. Subsequently, Centennary sold the entire 300 hectares for PhP750 million to Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), which used it in developing an industrial complex. Later, LIPCO transferred these 2 parcels to RCBC in payment of LIPCO‘s PhP431,695,732.10 loan obligations. LIPCO‘s titles were cancelled and new ones were issued to RCBC. Apart from the 500 hectares, another 80.51 hectares were later detached from Hacienda Luisita and acquired by the government as part of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway (SCTEX) complex. Thus, 4,335.75 hectares remained of the original 4,915 hectares Tadeco ceded to HLI.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657, which allows stock transfer in lieu of outright land transfer, unconstitutional? HELD: There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority in the board. Before the SDP is approved, strict scrutiny of the proposed SDP must always be undertaken by the DAR and PARC, such that the value of the agricultural land contributed to the corporation must always be more than 50% of the total assets of the corporation to ensure that the majority of the members of the board of directors are composed of the farmers. The PARC composed of the President of the Philippines and cabinet secretaries must see to it that control over the board of directors rests with the farmers by rejecting the inclusion of non-agricultural assets which will yield the majority in the board of directors to non-farmers. Any deviation, however, by PARC or DAR from the correct application of the formula prescribed by the second paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6675 does not make said provision constitutionally infirm. Rather, it is the application of said provision that can be challenged. Ergo, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 does not trench on the constitutional policy of ensuring control by the farmers.

SORIANO vs. REPUBLIC, GR 184282 FACTS: Spouses Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo, Maco, Compostela Valley Province. The first parcel had an area of 5.2723 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-8935) T-3120, while the second parcel had an area of 4.0887 hectares and was covered by TCT No. (T-2906) T-749. In October 1999, the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. The LBP made a preliminary determination of the value of the subject lands. Petitioners, however, disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the DARAB for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation. On September 30, 2000, the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBP‘s preliminary determination. Notices of the decisions were duly received by counsel for petitioners. But petitioners belatedly filed a petition before the RTC acting as SAC, for the fixing of just compensation. Thus, the DAR moved to dismiss the petition arguing that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11, Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. On June 27, 2001, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the "DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code." The DAR sought reconsideration of the order, but its motion was denied. Thus, the DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. The CA granted the petition. ISSUE: Whether or not an action to fix just compensation for lands placed under R.A. No. 6657 is outside the purview of the ordinary rules on prescription as contained in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. HELD: The court ruled that the RTC acted without jurisdiction in hastily dismissing said refiled Petition. Accordingly, the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the dismissal should be granted. Under the law, the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to §16(a) of R.A. No. 6657, the DAR makes an offer. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, fixes the price to be paid for the land. If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657. In accordance with it, the private respondent‘s case was properly brought by it in the RTC, and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. In the terminology of §57, the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners." It would subvert this "original and exclusive" jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Consequently, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from §57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to §57 and therefore would be void. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question.

LANDBANK vs. ARANETA, GR 161796 FACTS: At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land with an area of 1,645 hectares, more or less, which was originally registered in the name of Alfonso Doronilla (Doronilla) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7924 of the Rizal Registry. On June 21, 1974, then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283, carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo, Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite purposes, "subject to private rights, if any there be‖. In 1978, the OSG filed with the then CFI of Rizal an expropriation complaint against the Doronilla property. Meanwhile, on 1979, Doronilla issued a Certification, copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office, among other agencies, listing seventy-nine (79) "bona fide planters" he allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. On 1987 or nine (9) years after it commenced expropriation proceedings, the OSG moved for and secured the dismissal of the expropriation case. Earlier, or on March 15, 1983, J. Amado Araneta, now deceased, acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. A little over a week later, he had OCT No. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-70860 in his name. ISSUES: Whether or not the disputed lots are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. HELD: The primary governing agrarian law with regard to agricultural lands, be they of private or public ownership and regardless of tenurial arrangement and crops produced, is now RA 6657. The provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property, during the period material, no longer falls, having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation 1637. It ceased, following Natalia Realty, Inc., to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance. Before Proclamation 1637 came to be, there were already PD 27 tenant-farmers in said property. In a very real sense, the "private rights" belong to these tenant-farmers. Since the said farmer-beneficiaries were deemed owners of the agricultural land awarded to them as of October 21, 1972 under PD 27 and subsequently deemed full owners under EO 228, the logical conclusion is clear and simple: the township reservation established under Proclamation 1637 must yield and recognize the "deemed ownership rights" bestowed on the farmer-beneficiaries under PD 27. Another way of looking at the situation is that these farmer-beneficiaries are subrogated in the place of Doronilla and eventual transferee Araneta. Section 4 of R.A. 6657 provides that CARL shall ‗cover, regardless of tenurial agreement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands.‘ As to what constitutes ‗agricultural land,‘ it is referred to as ‗land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.‘ The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission confirm this limitation. ‗Agricultural lands‘ are only those lands which are ‗arable and suitable agricultural lands‘ and do not include commercial, industrial and residential lands.‘ "Indeed, lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL. These include lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than respondent DAR.

GALOPE vs. BUGARIN, GR 185669 FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of land located in Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, while petitioner farms the land. Parties respective contentions are as follows: (a) respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement, that what she receives in return from petitioner is insignificant, and that she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own; (b) petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4,000 to P6,000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. Respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession, ejectment and payment of rentals before the DARAB, claiming that respondent lent the land to petitioner in 1991 and that the latter gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. It was also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land. After due proceedings, the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. On appeal, the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land. Petitioner appealed, but the CA affirmed DARAB‘s ruling that no tenancy relationship exists; that the elements of consent and sharing are not present; that respondent‘s act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy; and that no receipts prove petitioner‘s payment of rentals.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties. HELD: The court found the petition impressed with merit and held that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement, respondent‘s act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefor indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Section 5 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. Thus, all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Respondent is the landowner; petitioner is her tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. Respondent‘s motion to supervise harvesting and threshing, processes in palay farming, further confirms the purpose of their agreement. Lastly, petitioner‘s personal cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest.

LANDBANK vs SUNTAY, GR 157903 FACTS: Respondent Suntay owned land situated in Sta. Lucia, Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3,682.0285 hectares. In 1972, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948.1911 hectares of Suntay‘s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4,497.50/hectare, for a total valuation of P4,251,141.68. Rejecting the valuation, however, Suntay filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV, DARAB, docketed as DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00; his petition was assigned to RARAD Miñas. After summary administrative proceeding, RARAD Miñas rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated portion at P157,541,951.30. Land Bank moved for a reconsideration, but RARAD Miñas denied its motion. Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC (Branch 46) in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court, impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. The petition essentially prayed that the total just compensation for the expropriated portion be fixed at only P4,251,141.67. Suntay filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the petition had been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period as required by Section 11, Rule XIII of the Rules of Procedure of DARAB. After the RTC granted the motion to dismiss, Land Bank appealed to the CA, which sustained the dismissal. As a result, Land Bank came to the Court (G.R. No. 157903)

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition for the determination of just compensation. HELD: The Court has declared that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation under Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL) pertains to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) as a Special Agrarian Court; that any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTC into appellate jurisdiction is void for being contrary to the CARL; and that what DARAB adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to the landowners, leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. Thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the Land Bank‘s petition. It bears stressing that the petition is not an appeal from the RARAD final Decision but an original action for the determination of the just compensation for respondent‘s expropriated property, over which the RTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. The procedure for the determination of just compensation cases under R.A. No. 6657, as summarized in Landbank v. Banal, is that initially, the Land Bank is charged with the responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking under the voluntary offer to sell or compulsory acquisition arrangement. The DAR, relying on the Land Bank‘s determination of the land valuation and compensation, then makes an offer through a notice sent to the landowner. If the landowner accepts the offer, the Land Bank shall pay him the purchase price of the land after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer and surrenders the certificate of title in favor of the government. In case the landowner rejects the offer or fails to reply thereto, the DAR adjudicator conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the Land Bank and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the Decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. In determining just compensation, the RTC is required to consider several factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657.

AGAPITO ROM ET AL vs ROXAS & COMPANY INC., GR 169331 FACTS: Respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by TCT No. T-44664 from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 6, Series of 1994. Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area. Petitioners likewise aver that since respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject parcels of land to the DAR, it can no longer withdraw the same from the CARP‘s coverage. Respondent refutes petitioners‘ contention that a landowner can no longer withdraw his property from the coverage of CARP once he has voluntarily offered to sell the same to the DAR. ISSUE: Whether or not a voluntary offer to sell a land under the CARL may be subsequently withdrawn. HELD: The court upheld that DAR‘s Order which granted respondent‘s application for exemption. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already reclassified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL. "Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. Respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell to the DAR Hacienda Caylaway, where the properties subject of this case are located. However, this offer to sell became irrelevant because respondent was later able to establish before the DAR that the subject 27 parcels of land were reclassified as non-agricultural (residential) by virtue of (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4 prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988. "In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR." This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARP‘s coverage. ROXAS & COMPANY INC. vs. DAMBA-NFSW, GR 149548 The case involves three haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas, namely, Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, owned by herein petitioner Roxas & Company, Inc. At issue there was the validity of the haciendas‘ coverage under the CARP as well as Roxas‘ application for their conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural use. For failure to observe due process, the acquisition proceedings over the haciendas were nullified. With respect, however, to the application for conversion, the Court held that DAR is in a better position to resolve the same, it being the primary agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. In its Decision dated December 17, 1999, this Court ordered the remand of the case to the DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of Roxas‘s application for conversion.

ANTONIO vs. MANAHAN, GR 176091 FACTS: Subject of the instant petition are two (2) parcels of agricultural land situated at Gitnang Bayan I, San Mateo, Rizal, with an aggregate area of 30,906 square meters, and registered in the name of private respondent Manahan under Original Certificate of Title Nos. 9200 and 9150 of the Rizal Provincial Registry. Manahan and Antonio entered into a Leasehold Agreement whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos. Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement as non-payment/remittance of the stipulated rentals despite demands. Specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint, Antonio averred, among others, that he remitted the stipulated rentals regularly, except for the year 1993 when Manahan refused to accept the same. Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision in favor of Manahan. On appeal, DARAB ordered respondent to respect tenant‘s peaceful possession and cultivation of the said land. However, DARAB subsequently set aside its initial ruling and reinstated PARAD‘s decision. CA likewise upheld the same. ISSUE: Whether or not tenant petitioner is justified to be ejected from his peaceful possession and cultivation of the disputed land. HELD: An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Once the tenancy relationship is established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided by law. In recognition and protection of the tenant‘s right to security of tenure, the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession. The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. Perusal of the record shows that Antonio‘s failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate. The foregoing disquisition notwithstanding, the Court found Antonio‘s dispossession, however, still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited, among other matters, the cultivation of other plants on Manahan‘s properties, the expansion of the tenant‘s dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests thereon. Fealty to the fact that "R.A. No. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner‘s rights to his land" or "authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogation of the landowner‘s rights" impelled the court to uphold Antonio‘s dispossession. "Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others, a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated, in whatever small way, by those benefited by them. Hence, the petition was denied.

CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT vs. MATEO, GR 175485 FACTS: The subject of this case is a registered parcel of land with an area of 6,693 square meters, more or less, located in Barrio Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City, that was originally owned by Isaias Lara, the respondent‘s maternal grandfather. Upon the death of Lara, the property passed on to his children, and a grandson. The co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to one of the surviving sibling and who was the mother of herein respondent. Thereafter, with the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family, a deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of daughter Laura, who applied for land registration. After the application was granted, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 6386 was issued in Laura‘s sole name. In due course, the property now covered by OCT No. 6386 was used as collateral to secure a succession of loans. In the end, China Bank foreclosed the mortgage, and consolidated its ownership of the property after Pe failed to redeem. Thus, TCT No. (99527) T-11749-A was issued in the name of China Bank. Petitioner CDC and China Bank negotiated and eventually came to terms on the purchase of the property, with China Bank executing a deed of conditional sale for the purpose. In the meanwhile, Felicidad died intestate. CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the MTC of Las Piñas City against the respondent‘s siblings and the other occupants of the property. Therein, the defendants maintained that the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural; that the jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); that they had been in continuous and open possession of the land even before World War II and had presumed themselves entitled to a government grant of the land; and that CDC‘s title was invalid, considering that the land had been registered before its being declared alienable. MTC ruled in favor of CDC. On appeal, RTC resolved against CDC but CA found favor in it. ISSUE: Whether or not the title of Laura over the subject land is indefeasible. HELD: There is no doubt that the land in question, although once a part of the public domain, has already been placed under the Torrens system of land registration. The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves. The objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the covered land. The land in question has been covered by a Torrens certificate of title (OCT No. 6386 in the name of Laura, and its derivative certificates) before CDC became the registered owner by purchase from China Bank. In all that time, neither the respondent nor his siblings opposed the transactions causing the various transfers. In fact, the respondent admitted in his complaint that the registration of the land in the name of Laura alone had been with the knowledge and upon the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. It is unthinkable, therefore, that the respondent, fully aware of the exclusive registration in her sister Laura‘s name, allowed more than 20 years to pass before asserting his claim of ownership for the first time through this case. Making it worse for him is that he did so only after CDC had commenced the ejectment case against his own siblings.

LANDBANK vs. LISTANA, GR 168105 FACTS: Respondent is the owner of a 246.0561-hectare land located at Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, which was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. Petitioner (LBP) valued the 240.9066 hectares for acquisition at P5,871,689.03. Since the respondent rejected the said amount, a summary proceeding for determination of just compensation was conducted by the (DAR). Respondent wrote LBP requesting the release of payment of the cash portion of the "accepted x x x 151.1419 has. with an equivalent valuation of P5,607,874.69." Consequently, a Deed of Transfer was executed by respondent over the said portion of his landholding in consideration of payment received from the transferee Republic of the Philippines consisting of cash (P1,078,877.54) and LBP bonds (P2,747,858.60). DAR Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision fixing the amount of just compensation at P10,956,963.25 for the entire acquired area of 240.9066 hectares. Almost a year later, petitioner filed before the RTC of Sorsogon, a petition for judicial determination of just compensation. Petitioner argued that the PARAD‘s valuation is unacceptable. The trial court issued the order dismissing the petition for having been filed almost one year from receipt of the copy of the PARAD‘s decision. The CA dismissed petitioner‘s appeal from the SAC‘s dismissal of its petition for judicial determination of just compensation for failure to adequately explain its failure to abide by the rules and "its loss of appellate recourse cannot be revived by invoking the mantra of liberality. ISSUE: Whether or not the SAC may take cognizance of the petition for determination of just compensation which is filed beyond the prescribed 15-day reglementary period after the PARAD rendered its valuation in a summary administrative proceeding. HELD: While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator‘s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator‘s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property. Although the land valuation cases decided by the adjudicator are now appealable to the Board, such rule could not change the clear import of Section 57 of RA No. 6657 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine just compensation is in the RTC. Thus, Section 57 authorizes direct resort to the SAC in cases involving petitions for the determination of just compensation. However, herein petitioner LBP admitted its "thoughtless" filing of the petition before the SAC more than 100 days after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the PARAD‘s decision fixing the just compensation for the subject property. Petitioner did not offer any explanation for its tardiness and neglect, and simply reiterated the great prejudice to the agrarian reform fund with the erroneous inclusion in the PARAD‘s valuation of the 151.1419 hectares already conveyed to the government.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM vs. PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE, GR 152640 FACTS: PHILCOMSAT is the owner of a parcel of land situated in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, where its Philippine Space Communications Center (PSCC) is located. The PSCC, which principally consists of herein respondent‘s satellite earth station, serves as the communications gateway of the Philippines to more than two-thirds of the world. Incidentally, the property had been planted with fruit trees, rice and corn by farmers occupying the surrounding areas of the PSCC. Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARP‘s compulsory acquisition scheme. PHILCOMSAT then wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, but the latter denied the same. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP. HELD: P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The law, in effect, by declaring the area a security zone, has granted to the Ministry of National Defense the control and administration of the same. Upon the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which became effective on July 15, 1988, all public and private agricultural lands, and other lands of public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, were declared subject to its coverage. Although the area in question which is included within the security zone is agricultural, the same should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT‘s operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption. Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facilities is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK vs. BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, GR 173085 FACTS: BCDA filed several expropriation actions before the branches of the RTC of Angeles City for the acquisition of lands needed to construct the SCTEX. The defendants in this case are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the CARP. Ten of these cases were raffled off to Branch 58 of the RTC of Angeles City. Upon learning of the expropriation cases filed, PVB filed a motion to intervene and alleged that the properties actually belonged to Belmonte Agro-Industrial Development Corp. which mortgaged the lands to PVB in 1976. PVB bough the land upon foreclosure but was not able to consolidate ownership in its name. PVB‘s motion was denied on the ground that the intervention amounted to a third-party complaint that is not allowed in expropriation cases and that it will only serve to delay the proceedings. PVB‘s motion for reconsideration was also denied by the CA. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC. HELD: PVB's point regarding the authority of the court in expropriation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reasons: 1. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases, its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs, EPs, or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC Branch 62, a co-equal branch of the same court. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it. 2. Of course, subsequently, after the CA dismissed PVB's petition on January 26, 2006, the latter filed a motion for reconsideration, pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca, that jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB.

REPUBLIC vs. LOPEZ, GR 178895 FACTS:

Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657. Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) an Application for Exemption, as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner‘s 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos, 11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the (CARL). The MARO then conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, denied the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area, and such was affirmed by the DAR on appeal. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved. The CA partially granted the SNLABC Petition and excluded the two (2) parcels of land from coverage of the CARL. However, it upheld the Decisions of the Regional Director and the DAR Secretary denying the application for exemption with respect to Lots 1454-A and 1296. These lots were already covered by a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines (RP T-16356). ISSUE:

Whether the subject lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. HELD:

In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural" showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. Thus, lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Under the rules then prevailing, it was the (MARO) who was primarily responsible for investigating the legal status, type and areas of the land sought to be excluded; and for ascertaining whether the area subject of the application for exemption had been devoted to livestock-raising as of 15 June 1988. As the primary official in charge of investigating the land sought to be exempted as livestock land, the MARO‘s findings on the use and nature of the land, if supported by substantial evidence on record, are to be accorded greater weight, if not finality. The Court generally accords great respect, if not finality, to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction. Hence, the Court looks with favor on the expertise of the MARO in determining whether livestock-raising on the Lopez lands has only been recently conducted or has been a going concern for several years already. Absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or bias, the findings of the MARO - as affirmed by the DAR Regional Director - are to be accorded great probative value, owing to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duties.

MENDOZA vs. GERMINO, GR 165676 FACTS: THE petitioner fileda complaint with the (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry, claiming that they were the registered owners of a fivehectare parcel of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property). On his answer, respondent claimed, among others, that his brother, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. After several postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. The MTC issued an order remanding the case to the DARAB for further proceedings. PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages. On appeal to DARAB, respondent argued that the case should have been dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. DARAB affirmed the PARAD decision. CA, however, set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings. ISSUE: Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different from that of administrative agencies. It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Furthermore, allegation of tenancy does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction. Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. For a case to involve an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

APO FRUITS CORPORATION vs. LANDBANK, GR 164195 FACTS: Petitioners are registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands located in Davao Province, which they voluntarily offered to sell to the government. Upon initial valuation of the LBP, petitioners considered such as unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties and thus rejected the valuation. DAR then requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent to the LBP valuations in the names of petitioners. Thereafter, new TCTs over the lands were issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and CLOAs were subsequently issued to farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioners, then, filed a complaint for the determination of just compensation with the DARAB but despite the lapse of 10 years, the latter failed and refused to render decision on the valuation of the disputed lands, which prompted petitioners to proceed with the RTC as Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation. The trial court set the just compensation to be paid and fixed the interest due on the balance of the compensation due at 12% per annum. CA reversed the decision on appeal. ISSUE: Under whose jurisdiction is the determination of the final just compensation proper? How is the value of just compensation determined? HELD: It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. On the issue determination of just compensation, Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation, reads, as follows: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision: The recommendation of the Commissioners’ Report for a value of P85.00 per sq.m. or P850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is founded on evidence. The schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibit "J-6" and "CC-6") give the lowest value for residential land at P100/sq.m. for 4th class residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of P80.00/sq.m. for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain portions of the land in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District (Exhibit "J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest value as for industrial land, 3rd class in a barangay is P130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the lowest values in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields the figure of P103.33 which is even higher by 22.2% than that recommended by the Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that assessments made by local governments are much lower than real market value. Likewise, the value of the improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of P103.33. If considered, this will necessarily result in a higher average value.

Thus, the value of just compensation as determined by the trial court is deemed proper and equitable.

LAKEVIEW GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB vs. LUZVIMIN SAMAHANG NAYON, GR 171253 FACTS: Petitioner was the registered owner of a 60-hectare parcel of land located Cavite, as evidenced by TCT No. T-11026. On July 6, 1991, the MARO issued a Notice of Coverage under the CARP of the subject property for acquisition and distribution to private respondents as farmerbeneficiaries. On March 17, 1992, the DAR Regional Director for Region IV served a Notice of Acquisition on petitioner. Petitioner protested the coverage on the grounds that the subject property is not agricultural having been projected as a golf course prior to 1988, that the development for its conversion and utilization has already been commenced, that it is generally mountainous with major portions having a slope of over 18% and minimal topsoil, and that it has no tenant or farmworker since the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are mere intruders who entered the subject property after the enactment of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in violation of Section 73 thereof. The DAR Secretary denied petitioner‘s protest and directed to proceed with the acquisition of the subject property. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner‘s petition for review with this Court was also denied. Meanwhile, the DAR issued collective CLOA No. 00141945 in favor of private respondents, and was subsequently registered with the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner thereafter filed with the Office of the PARAD a petition for cancellation of certificates of land ownership award and reconveyance of the subject property. Private respondents prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds of res judicata and lack of cause of action. Respondents appealed to the DARAB, but the latter ruled that it has no jurisdiction to adjudicate regarding the issue of the coverage of the subject property under the CARP, the same being within the exclusive prerogative of the DAR Secretary. It also declared as valid the CLOA issued in favor of private respondents due to petitioner‘s failure to overcome the presumption of regularity of official functions by government employees and officials. ISSUE: Does the DARAB have jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue regarding the coverage of the subject property under the CARP? HELD: It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law. Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 17 of E.O. No. 229 vests in the DAR the primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through E.O. No. 129-A, the President of the Philippines created the DARAB and authorized it to assume the powers and functions of the DAR pertaining to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. At first glance, in the present case, it would appear that jurisdiction lies with the DARAB. The petition before the PARAD sought the cancellation of private respondents‘ collective CLOA which had already been registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite. However, the material averments of the petition invoking exemption from CARP coverage constrained the court to have a second look. Significantly, the DAR Secretary had already denied petitioner‘s protest and determined that the subject property was covered by the CARP. Such ruling was even affirmed by the Court of Appeals and this Court. Absent palpable error by these bodies, of which the Court finds none, their determination as to the coverage of the subject property under the CARP is controlling. Thus, petitioner cannot now invoke the jurisdiction of the DARAB to pass upon this issue under the guise of having the issued collective CLOA cancelled.

LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF HONORATO DE LEON, GR 164025 FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the registered owner of an agricultural land situated at Nueva Ecija with an area measuring 36.1238 hectares. It was acquired by the DAR and placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. Respondents received the notice of coverage sometime in 1988. DAR adopted petitioner‘s exhibits, among them a DAR order for petitioner to pay respondents the amount of P195,971.60. Also submitted in evidence were a Certification showing that the total compensation in the amount of P195,971.60 due respondents had been deposited in cash and bonds and a letter informing respondents that the balance of their claim remained at P706,754.00, inclusive of interest. In arriving at the amount of just compensation, the SAC used a value of P175.00 or a total compensation value of P1,896,499.50, as the government support price for palay based on the certification by the provincial manager of the NFA in Cabanatuan City. Petitioner filed an appeal arguing that just compensation should be fixed based on the formula in P.D. No. 27 in relation to Executive Order No. 228, providing a government support price of P35.00. Using the said formula petitioner prayed that just compensation be fixed at P706,754.90. Respondents questioned the authority of the Court of Appeals to give due course to the appeal, considering that the compromise judgment had not been set aside under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed its jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner‘s appeal. ISSUE: How is the value of just compensation determined in the instant case? HELD: On 15 June 1988, the CARL or R.A. No. 6657 was enacted to promote special justice to the landless farmers and provide ―a more equitable distribution and ownership of land with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation.‖ Section 4 of the same act provides that the CARL shall cover all public and private agricultural lands including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Section 75 states that the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and other laws not inconsistent with R.A. No. 6657 shall have suppletory effect. Furthermore, in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Domingo, the Court stressed the duty of the Court to balance the interests of both the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries, to wit: I.

II.

Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. As a concept in the Bill of Rights, just compensation is defined as the fair market value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell. Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the redistribution of agricultural lands shall be ―subject to the payment of just compensation.‖ The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission on this subject reveal that just compensation should not also make an insurmountable obstacle to a successful agrarian reform. Hence, the landowner‘s right to just compensation should be balanced with agrarian reform. In Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, we declared that it is the duty of the court to protect the weak and the underprivileged, but this duty should not be carried out to such an extent as to deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on his side.

When the passage of R.A. No. 6657 supervened before the payment of just compensation, the provisions of R.A. No. 6657 on just compensation would be applicable. Pertinently, Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 provides: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation.—In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessments made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court ruled that the factors enumerated under Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 had already been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. Thus, the Court held in Celada that the formula outlined in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998 should be applied in computing just compensation.

OCTAVIO vs. PEROVANO, GR 172400 FACTS: Respondent filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Damages and Prayer for Immediate Issuance of TRO or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against petitioners, and (MARO) Dolores Dolores before the MTCC. In his complaint, respondent alleged he is the lawful and registered owner of lot subject of this case, comprising an area of 48,693 square meters, more or less. He averred that petitioners, upon the instruction and direction, and in connivance and conspiracy with Dolores, by threat, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered the land, plowed it and started planting sugarcane plants inspite of efforts to prohibit them from trespassing on the property. In their Answer, petitioners denied respondent‘s allegations and argued that the land was voluntarily offered for sale by respondent‘s mother, to the DAR. By reason of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS), the landowner placed the land under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657. They further alleged that they were among those identified and qualified as farmer-beneficiaries of the land. Accordingly, petitioners argue that respondent‘s mother ceased to be the owner of the land and it is not true that respondent is still the lawful and registered owner of the landholding. Petitioners add that a Memorandum of Agreement was executed between the landowner and the farmer-beneficiaries wherein they agreed that the farmer-beneficiaries are free to take possession and cultivate the landholding after payment was made to the landowner by the Land Bank of the Philippines. They posit that there is no iota of doubt that the landholding is within the coverage of CARP and it is only the PARAD which has original and exclusive jurisdiction to entertain any action as per Section 50, Rep. Act No. 6657. They argue that regular courts were already divested of their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters, and the filing of the case is pure and simple harassment with the purpose of preventing or obstructing the implementation of the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case is an ejectment suit within the exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court or an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR. HELD: Under BP 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Under Section 50 of R.A. 6657, the DAR is vested with ―primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform.‖ Under Section 3(d) of Rep. Act No. 6657, an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers‘ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. DARAB ruled that complainants-appellants were not recognized as farmer-beneficiaries of the subject landholding. Their continued possession thereof was through stealth. Even if they were not identified as farmer-beneficiaries and not awarded any CLOA, they arrogated unto themselves the portions of the subject landholding. As admitted by them in the hearing, they came into the land on the premise that they are farmer-beneficiaries. Without waiting for an award of any CLOA, complainants-appellants occupied the landholding. In the process, ―expropriating‖ the property of the landowner without due process of law, prejudicing the rights of the landowner and the legitimate farmer-beneficiaries who were duly awarded with CLOA.The acts of the complainants-appellants are similar to that of land grabbing. The agrarian reform law is not enacted to give license to anybody to grab somebody else‘s land. Neither is it enacted to protect the land grabbers or the squatters. Petitioners‘ argument that the case involves an agrarian matter divesting the regular courts of jurisdiction therefore has no merit. They are not farmer-beneficiaries but mere usurpers of the land. Clearly, therefore, the action is one for ejectment and the MTCC has jurisdiction over it.

LANDBANK vs. KUMASSIE PLANTATION, GR 177404 FACTS: Kumassie Plantation Company Incorporated (KPCI) is the registered owner of 802.2906 hectares of agricultural land situated in Davao del Sur. In 1982, KPCI and Philippine Cocoa Corporation (PCC) entered into a contract of lease whereby the former agreed to lease the said land together with the improvements thereon to the latter for a period of 25 years beginning 15 May 1982. Subsequently, PCC executed a deed of assignment transferring all its rights as lessee under the said contract of lease to Philippine Cocoa Estates Corporation (PCEC). A portion of the aforementioned land, measuring 457.9952 hectares, planted with coconuts and cocoa (subject land), was compulsorily acquired by the DAR, for distribution to farmerbeneficiaries pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. The DAR then requested the LBP to determine the value of the subject land. LBP pegged the value of the subject land at P19,140,965.00 or equivalent to P41,792.94 per hectare. DAR offered to KPCI said amount as compensation for the subject land, but it was rejected by the latter for being "unreasonably low." Despite the rejection, the amount was deposited by LBP, upon the instructions of DAR, in the name and for the account of KPCI. KPCI withdrew from LBP the entire amount in cash and bonds. KPCI filed with the RTC, acting as a Special Agrarian Court, a Complaint against LBP and the DAR for determination and payment of just compensation, and implored the RTC to render judgment fixing the just compensation for the subject land at P160,000.00 per hectare, or equivalent to a total amount of P73,279,232.00, less the amount which KPCI had previously withdrawn from LBP. RTC valued the subject land at P100,000.00 per hectare. The appellate court sustained the finding of the trial court. ISSUE: Whose computation of just compensation is valid: that of the LBP or the RTC? HELD: The procedure for the determination of compensation cases under Republic Act No. 6657, as devised by this Court, commences with the valuation by the LBP of the lands taken by the State from private owners under the land reform program. Based on the valuation of the land by the LBP, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a written notice. In case the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding is held and, afterwards, depending on the value of the land, the PARAD, RARAD, or DARAB, fixes the price to be paid for the said land. If the landowner still does not agree with the price so fixed, he may bring the matter to the RTC, acting as Special Agrarian Court. In the process of determining the just compensation due to landowners, it is a necessity that the RTC takes into account several factors enumerated in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, to wit: Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.

Special agrarian courts must resolve just determination cases judiciously and with utmost observance of Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 and the administrative orders issued by the DAR to implement said statutory provision. The special agrarian court cannot ignore, without violating Republic Act No. 6657, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation. Thus, the Court rejected the valuation fixed by the RTC because it failed to follow the DAR formula.

MAYLEM vs. ELLANO, GR 162721 FACTS: Since 1963, Bonifacio Abad had been tenanting a piece of private agricultural land less than a hectare in size (0.8497 hectare) and situated in Santiago City, Isabela under a leasehold agreement he had entered into with petitioner‘s husband and the latter‘s parents. Eight months before Segundino‘s demise, the property was awarded to Abad by operation of P.D. 27. An emancipation patent was issued by virtue of two certificates of land transfer. It appears that petitioner had instituted a certain Morsiento as tenant-farmer to cultivate the subject land after Abad surrendered his possession, and that petitioner had been attempting to spare her landholdings from the operation of the agrarian reform laws. Petitioner refused to return possession of the property. It came to Abad‘s knowledge that the same was mortgaged to a third person, so he filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with the Provincial Adjudicator of DAR. On appeal, the DARAB adopted the findings and conclusions of the Provincial Adjudicator. Undaunted, petitioner lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeals (CA), but to no avail. The appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the DARAB. ISSUE: Whether or not Abad is justifiably disposed of possession of the subject land on his alleged abandonment of such. HELD: Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or certificate of land award, according to Castellano vs. Spouses Francisco, requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or to abandon a right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. Intention to abandon, as held in Corpuz v. Grospe, implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. It consists in any one of these conditions: (a) failure to cultivate the lot due to reasons other than the non-suitability of the land to agricultural purposes, for at least two (2) calendar years, and to pay the amortizations for the same period; (b) permanent transfer of residence by the beneficiary and his family, which has rendered him incapable of cultivating the lot; or (c) relinquishment of possession of the lot for at least two (2) calendar years and failure to pay the amortization for the same period. None of the instances cited above obtains in this case. As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the surrender of the land by Abad could be interpreted as abandonment in contemplation of the law, in view of the understanding between him and petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merely temporary. Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by the undisputed fact that Abad actually demanded the return of the property to him after the lapse of the one-year period. Indeed, petitioner‘s act of dispossessing Abad of the land awarded to him was merely calculated to impair the latter‘s vested right of ownership. More importantly, as holder of an emancipation patent, Abad is bound by the proscription against transfers of land awards to third persons, which is prohibited by law. Paragraph 13 of P.D. No. 27 materially states: As a final note, it is useful to reiterate the appellate court‘s conclusion that the registration of Abad‘s emancipation patents with the Register of Deeds in accordance with law had indeed put petitioner on notice of the fact that Abad had already acquired a vested right of ownership of the landholding under the agrarian reform law.

DAR vs. TONGSON, GR 171674 FACTS: Respondent is the owner of four parcels of agricultural land located in Davao City. Since the properties were primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of lease-tenancy agreement, the same were brought under the coverage of PD 27, otherwise known as Tenants Emancipation Decree. Sometime in 1988, the petitioner offered to pay respondent P9,000.00 per hectare for three of her properties. Respondent, however, did not act on the offer as she was then leaving for the United States for her husband‘s medical treatment. In 1989, upon her return to Davao, respondent was surprised to learn that, except for the portions devoted to orchards and planted with coconuts, all her properties were taken over by petitioner. Respondent alleged that petitioner summarily took her properties without any notice and had fixed the acquisition cost for the same at P1,500.00 per hectare and P800.00 per hectare. Lastly, respondent alleged that petitioner subsequently issued Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries. Petitioner denied the allegations and averred that the properties were placed under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, not summarily taken. Likewise, petitioner claimed that respondent was notified of the proceedings when they made the initial offer to her. Lastly, petitioner claimed that the acquisition cost was arrived at based on PD 27 in relation to EO 228, and that the subsequent issuance of Emancipation Patents was part of the implementation of the program. Respondent thereafter filed a Petition for the determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) of Davao City. The SAC, in the determination of just compensation, applied the provisions of PD 27 and EO 228. On appeal, CA ruled that RA 6657, was applicable in the determination of just compensation.

ISSUE: In the determination of just compensation, what law shall govern: PD 27 or RA 6657? HELD: Clearly, PD 27 and RA 6657 provide different factors for the computation of just compensation. The former uses average crop harvest as a consideration, whereas, the latter uses the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors as factors for consideration in determining just compensation. In the case at bar, it is undisputed by the parties that the lands were acquired under PD 27. Moreover, it is also undisputed that just compensation has not yet been settled prior to the passage of RA 6657. The issue, once the subject of a number of cases, has finally been settled by this Court in recent years. It has been ruled that, if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with the said law, although the property was acquired under PD 27.

MONTANEZ vs. PARAD, GR 183142 FACTS: Petitioner was the owner of two (2) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 35.5998 hectares, both located at Negros Occidental. In October 1999, the DAR caused the publication of a Notice of Land Coverage for Negros Occidental, and later, the DAR notified petitioner that her property, to the extent of 32.4257 hectares, has been placed under CARP and offered to compensate her the amount of PhP 5,592,3001.60 based on the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), subject to price adjustment to conform to the actual area coverage. Albeit petitioner rejected the offer, LBP later issued in her favor a certification of deposit, in cash and in bonds, corresponding to the amount aforestated. DAR secured from the Negros Occidental Registry the cancellation of petitioner‘s titles and the issuance, in lieu thereof, titles in the name of the Republic. Later on the same day, CLOAs were issued. Evidently, such notations on the CLOAs were erroneous, the aggregate land area stated in the CLOAs being larger than what was reflected in the titles whence the CLOAs emanate. In any event, said CLOAs were registered in the name of, and delivered to, individual respondents as CARP beneficiaries. Petitioner forthwith filed a Petition PARAB for the annulment/cancellation of titles in view of the CLOAs on the ground of irregular and anomalous issuance thereof. However, said petition was denied. Therefrom, petitioner went straight to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Section 54 of RA 6657. Public respondents sought the dismissal of this recourse on the ground of nonexhaustion of administrative remedies. CA, on the holding that the petitioner is entitled to the rectification of the technical error referred to above, but that the DAR is the proper office to effect the correction, rendered a decision. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. HELD: Following the lessons of Paat and Asia International Auctioneers, Inc., the denial of the instant petition is clearly indicated. It bears to stress at the outset that, as aptly observed by the CA, there is no challenge from either of the parties to the jurisdiction of the PARAB or the provincial agrarian adjudicator to take cognizance of the basic petition of petitioner for annulment/cancellation of titles. Just as well. For, the DARAB and its regional and provincial adjudication boards have jurisdiction to adjudicate all agrarian disputes and controversies or incidents involving the implementation of CARP under RA 6657 and other agrarian law and their implementing rules and regulations. Such jurisdiction of DARAB includes cases involving the issuance, correction, and cancellation of CLOAs and EPs which are registered with the Land Registration Authority. For the purpose of applying the rule on exhaustion, the remedies available to the petitioner are clearly set out in the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure, which took effect on January 17, 2004. Under Section 1.6, Rule II, the ―adjudicator shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate x x x cases x x x involving the correction, x x xcancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of [CLOAs] and [EPs] which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.‖ According to the succeeding Section 2 in relation to Rule XIV, the proper remedy from an adverse final resolution, order, or resolution on the merits of the adjudicator is an appeal to the DARAB Proper which, among others, require the filing of a notice of appeal and payment of an appeal fee. And from the decision of the DARAB Proper, an appeal may be taken to the CA pursuant to Rule XV. Given the above perspective, the CA acted correctly and certainly within its sound discretion when it denied, in its amended decision, petitioner‘s petition for certiorari to nullify the PARAD‘s decision. Under the grievance procedure set forth in the DARAB Rules of Procedure, PARAD Alegario‘s decision was appealable to the DARAB Proper. The CA‘s appellate task comes later– –to review the case disposition of the DARAB Proper when properly challenged.

MAGO vs. BARBIN, GR 173923 FACTS: Respondent filed with the PARAD of Camarines Norte an action for Cancellation of Emancipation Patents, Disqualification of Tenant-Beneficiary, Repossession and Damages, alleging that she is the owner in fee simple of the subject irrigated Riceland, with an area of 4.7823 hectares, and that petitioners were tenants of the subject landholding. Respondent further alleged that petitioners violated the terms of their leasehold contracts when they failed to pay lease rentals for more than two years, which is a ground for their dispossession of the landholding. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer program of the government pursuant to PD 27. Respondent‘s original title was then cancelled and the subject landholding was transferred to petitioners who were issued Emancipation Patents by the DAR. The Transfer Certificates of Title issued to petitioners emanating from the Emancipation Patents were registered with the Registry of Deeds. Petitioners averred that prior to the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, they already delivered their lease rentals to respondent. They further alleged that after the issuance of the Emancipation Patents, the subject landholding ceased to be covered by any leasehold contract. DARAB held that when the subject landholding was placed under the Operation Land Transfer, the tenancy relationship between the parties ceased and the tenant-beneficiaries were no longer required to pay lease rentals to the landowner. However, when petitioners entered into an agreement with respondent for a direct payment scheme embodied in the Deeds of Transfer, petitioners obligated themselves to pay their amortizations to respondent who is the landowner. CA held that the mere issuance of an Emancipation Patent to a qualified farmer-beneficiary is not absolute and can be attacked anytime upon showing of any irregularity in its issuance or non-compliance with the conditions attached to it. The Emancipation Patent is subject to the condition that amortization payments be remitted promptly to the landowner and that failure to comply with this condition is a ground for cancellation.

ISSUE: Whether or not herein petitioners violated the emancipation patent. HELD: The Court has already ruled that the mere issuance of an emancipation patent does not put the ownership of the agrarian reform beneficiary beyond attack and scrutiny. Emancipation patents issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries may be corrected and cancelled for violations of agrarian laws, rules and regulations. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 02, series of 1994, which was issued in March 1994, enumerates the grounds for cancellation of registered Emancipation Patents or Certificates of Landownership Award. There is no substantial evidence on record that the petitioners had remitted the amortizations due to the landowner in accordance with their agreed direct payment scheme embodied in their deeds of transfer. In view thereof, the Court has no recourse but to sustain the findings of fact of the agency below. Well-settled is the rule that only questions of law can be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided they are based on substantial evidence. More so in this case where the findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of the DARAB, an administrative body with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction. In the first place, the Emancipation Patents and the Transfer Certificates of Title should not have been issued to petitioners without full payment of the just compensation. Under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 266, the DAR will issue the Emancipation Patents only after the tenantfarmers have fully complied with the requirements for a grant of title under PD 27. Although PD 27 states that the tenant-farmers are already deemed owners of the land they till, it is understood that full payment of the just compensation has to be made first before title is transferred to them. Thus, Section 6 of EO 228 provides that ownership of lands acquired under PD 27 may be transferred only after the agrarian reform beneficiary has fully paid the amortizations. In this case, both the Court of Appeals and the DARAB found that petitioners have not fully paid the amortizations for the land granted to them. The PARAD had a similar finding when it recommended that the proper recourse of respondent is to file a claim for just compensation. Clearly, the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to petitioners is proper under the circumstances.

RURAL BANK OF DASMARIÑAS vs. JARIN ET AL, GR 180778 FACTS: Respondents were awarded Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) over portions of a parcel of land in Dasmariñas, Cavite. Before respondents could be issued Emancipation Patents (EP), they obtained a loan from petitioner, in whose favor they executed a Real Estate Mortgage, the owner thereof Campos, executed a Special Power of Attorney in respondents‘ favor authorizing them to encumber the farm lots. Respondents undertook to surrender their EPs as soon as they were released. In 1990, respondents obtained additional loans from RBDI, secured by a mortgage over the same farm lots. Respondents failed to settle their loans, hence, the mortgages were foreclosed and RBDI purchased the farm lots as the highest bidder. As at that time the EPs were still not yet issued, respondents authorized RBDI to receive them. ISSUE: Whether or not a CLT or an EP can be transferred other than through hereditary succession or to the government. HELD: Upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 27 on October 21, 1972, petitioner was DEEMED OWNER of the land in question. As of that date, he was declared emancipated from the bondage of the soil. As such, he gained the rights to possess, cultivate, and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his successors. x x x The prohibition against transfers to persons other than the heirs of other qualified beneficiaries stems from the policy of the Government to develop generations of farmers to attain its avowed goal to have an adequate and sustained agricultural production. With certitude, such objective will not see the light of day if lands covered by agrarian reform can easily be converted for non-agricultural purposes. Respondents‘ farm lots subject of the mortgages are thus not subject to foreclosure, except by the Land Bank, because foreclosure contemplates the transfer of ownership over the mortgaged lands

HEIRS OF REYES vs. GARILAO, GR 136466 FACTS: Petitioners are the registered co-owners of a parcel of land known consisting of an area of 99.1085 hectares and situated in Bataan. Said property was originally owned by the spouses Antonia Reyes and the late Aurelio Reyes (Aurelio), who died in January 21, 1972 (before the effectivity of Presidential Decree No 27). Upon the death of Aurelio, said property passed by succession to petitioners, who divided the same as shown above. On September 21, 1988, emancipation patents were issued to respondents as farmer-beneficiaries over the entire landholding in question. On August 2, 1993, petitioners lodged a petition for the cancellation of the emancipation patents issued to the respondents before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board San Fernando, Pampanga. Earlier, however, petitioners filed with the DAR, their respective applications for retention at five (5) hectares each, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (RA No. 6657).

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners‘ right to retention of portions of their landholdings is not foreclosed by any vested right that farmer-beneficiaries may claim. HELD: In order to understand the case at bar, this Court shall hereunder discuss the various laws and administrative order pertinent to herein petition and their relation to one another. PD No. 27 decreed the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, transferring to them the ownership of the land they till. To achieve its purpose, the decree laid down a system for the purchase by tenant-farmers, long recognized as the backbone of the economy, of the lands they were tilling. Owners of rice and corn lands that exceeded the minimum retention area were bound to sell their lands to qualified farmers at liberal terms and subject to conditions. More importantly, PD No. 27 also provides that, "in all cases, the landowner may retain an area not more than seven (7) hectares if such landowner is cultivating such area or will now cultivate it." However, LOI No. 474, amended PD No. 27 by removing "any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families." RA 6657 also provides the right of retention of landowners reduced to 5 hectares, but further provides that xxx landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder. The Court disagrees with the theory that RA No. 6657 has impliedly repealed LOI No. 474. The congressional deliberations cited by petitioners are insufficient to indicate an intent to repeal LOI No. 474. A perusal thereof shows that said deliberations were confined only to the matter of retention limits (i.e., 3, 5 or 7 hectares), and no mention was made of the restrictive conditions found in LOI No. 474. As a matter of fact, what is clear from said deliberations is that the framers of RA No. 6657 had intended to distribute more lands. While both laws may have the same subject matter, i.e. agrarian reform and its mechanism, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at a reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the statutes, so that both can be given effect. To stress, RA No. 6657 is a social justice and poverty alleviation program which seeks to empower the lives of agrarian reform beneficiaries through equitable distribution and ownership of the land based on the principle of land to the tiller. RA No.6657, however, allows landowners to retain five hectares of their landholding. LOI No. 474, on the other hand, imposes restrictive conditions on the exercise of the right of retention by mandating that landowners who possess other lands used for residential, commercial, industrial, or other urban purposes, from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families are disqualified from exercising their right of retention.

STANFILCO EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE vs. DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., GR 154048 FACTS: On January 29, 1998, petitioner as seller, and respondent as buyer, entered into a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement (BPPA). The BPPA provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the latter shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required specifications to be planted on the land owned by SEARBEMCO. On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the RTC against SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna Abujos (spouses Abujos), and Oribanex Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for specific performance and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and of a temporary restraining order. DOLE alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and delivered to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos, the bananas rejected by DOLE, in violation of paragraph 5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited the sale of rejected bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE further alleged that Oribanex is likewise an exporter of bananas and is its direct competitor. ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint of DOLE, considering that the case involves an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. HELD: DOLE‘s complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts, not the DARAB. SEARBEMCO mainly relies on Section 50 of RA No. 6657 and the characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute or as an agrarian reform matter in contending that the present controversy falls within the competence of the DARAB and not of the regular courts. The BPPA, SEARBEMCO claims, is a joint venture and a production, processing and marketing agreement, as defined under Section 5 (c) (i) and (ii) of DAR AO No. 2-99; hence, any dispute arising from the BPPA is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. SEARBEMCO also asserts that the parties‘ relationship in the present case is not only that of buyer and seller, but also that of supplier of land covered by the CARP and of manpower on the part of SEARBEMCO, and supplier of agricultural inputs, financing and technological expertise on the part of DOLE. Therefore, SEARBEMCO concludes that the BPPA is not an ordinary contract, but one that involves an agrarian element and, as such, is imbued with public interest. Additionally, the inclusion of third parties in the complaint supports our declaration that the present case does not fall under DARAB‘s jurisdiction. DARAB‘s quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of RA No. 6657 may be invoked only when there is prior certification from the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (or BARC) that the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation, without any success of settlement. Since the present dispute need not be referred to arbitration (including mediation or conciliation) because of the inclusion of third parties, neither SEARBEMCO nor DOLE will be able to present the requisite BARC certification that is necessary to invoke DARAB‘s jurisdiction; hence, there will be no compliance with Section 53 of RA No. 6657.

PO and MUTIA vs. DAMPAL, GR 173329 FACTS: On December 19, 1984, two farm lots located in Bukidnon with an approximate area of 2.5773 and 2.0651 hectares, respectively, were mortgaged for P33,000.00 by the spouses Florencio and Ester Causin, through their attorney-in-fact Manuel Causin, to the now-defunct Rural Bank of Tagoloan, Inc. For failure to pay the obligation, the bank foreclosed the mortgage and sold the lots at public auction to petitioner who was the highest bidder. The original certificates of title were subsequently cancelled and TCTs in their stead were issued in favor of Po, following the spouses Causin‘s failure to redeem the property. On September 13, 1993, petitioner sold one of the bought lot to her herein co-petitioner Mutia who was issued new TCT. On September 29, 1994, the spouses Causin and their tenant-herein respondent Dampal filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint against the bank for Annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage and Sale. While the civil case was pending or on June 16, 1997, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners before the DARAB for Legal Redemption with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. DARAB disallowed the redemption prayed for on the ground of prescription, albeit he declared that Dampal is entitled to security of tenure as a tenant; and that although Dampal was not given notice in writing of the public auction sale, he was deemed to have knowledge thereof because of the civil case for annulment, hence, there was substantial compliance with the rules. DARAB Central Office reversed the Adjudicator‘s ruling. On appeal, the appellate court held that petitioners should have appealed the DARAB Decision via Rule 43, instead of Rule 65, dismissed petitioners‘ petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the need for sending him notice in writing could be dispensed with. HELD: In its disquisition, the DARAB held that absence of written notice to the tenant of the sale, as well as to the DAR, is indispensable, particularly in view of Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, which mandates that the 180-day period must be reckoned from the notice in writing upon registration of the sale. Sec. 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, otherwise known as the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines, provides: Sec. 12. Lessee’s right of redemption. – In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That where there are two or more agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the sale. (emphasis supplied)

The admitted lack of written notice on Dampal and the DAR thus tolled the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioners‘ contention that Dampal must be considered to have had constructive knowledge thereof fails in light of the express requirement for notice to be in writing.

LANDBANK vs. DARAB, GR 183279 FACTS: Private respondents, namely, the heirs of Vicente, Romeo, and Cesar, all surnamed Adaza, were owners of a tract of land with an area of 359 hectares situated in Zamboanga del Norte, of which the DAR identified a 278.4092-hectare portion as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the CARP. In August 1991, the DAR sent out a notice of coverage. The claim folder profile was then endorsed to petitioner LBP to determine the value of the land. The DAR then subdivided the property into smaller lots and, in December 1992, distributed them to identified beneficiaries. Pursuant to the pertinent provision of the then governing 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure in relation to Section 16(d) of RA 6657 in case of contested valuation, the PARAD of Zamboanga del Norte conducted a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation. In the course of the hearing and on its preliminary estimation that the computation was unconscionably low, the PARAD, by Order of December 22, 2003, asked the LBP to undertake another landsite inspection and recomputation of the value of the subject landholding in accordance with the latest formula on land valuation. The Adazas found the reevaluated amount level still too low, prompting them to appeal to the DARAB. Pending resolution of their appeal, the Adazas interposed a Motion to Withdraw Amended Valuation on August 9, 2005, seeking the release to them of the amount representing the difference between the initial valuation and the second valuation. The Adazas alleged having long been dispossessed of the subject property, while the farmer-beneficiaries installed on it are enjoying full possession of it. ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB can order the release to the landowners, by way of execution pending appeal, of the incremental difference of a landbank recomputation upheld in a decision of the DAR adjudicator a quo within the purview of section 16, et seq. of RA. 6657 and its implementing rules. HELD: Three points need to be emphasized at the outset. First, the amount of PhP 3,426,153.80 the Adazas want to be released pending appeal, or pending final determination of just compensation, to be precise, was arrived at by LBP, its reevaluation efforts taken pursuant to Executive Order No. 405. After effecting the transfer of titles from the landowner to the Republic of the Philippines, the [LBP] shall inform the DAR of such fact in order that the latter may proceed with the distribution of the lands to the qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries x x x. Second, the LBP, no less, had asked the PARAD to adopt LBP‘s recomputed value of PhP 3,426,153.80 as just compensation for the subject property. And third, the Adazas‘ landholding had already been distributed before full payment of just compensation could be effected. In fact, the Adazas have been deprived of the beneficial use and ownership of their landholding since 1992 and have received only PhP 786,564.46 for their 278.40-hectare CARP-covered lands. In light of the foregoing considerations, it is but just and proper to allow, with becoming dispatch, withdrawal of the revised compensation amount, albeit protested. The concept of just compensation contemplates of just and timely payment; it embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the landowner, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot, asLand Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals instructs, be considered "just," for the owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for years before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

DAR vs. BERENGUER, GR 154094 FACTS: The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and industrial lands with a total area of 58.0649 hectares located in Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon. In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR notices of coverage of their said landholdings by the Government‘s CARP pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657. They protested the notices of coverage, filing on October 5, 1998, in the office of DAR Regional Director, their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP coverage, and praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage. In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the respondents‘ application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not to the respondents‘ workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not impleaded in the respondents‘ application for exclusion. In an order dated February 15, 1999, Regional Director denied the respondents‘ application for exclusion. Thus, they appealed the denial to the DAR Secretary. On March 9, 1999, pending a petition seeking to implement the February 15, 1999 order of Regional Director denying the respondents‘ application for exclusion. On March 15, 1999, RARAD issued an implementing writ placing Baribag in possession of the respondents‘ landholdings. She denied the respondents‘ motion for reconsideration on March 22, 1999. On March 24, 1999, the respondents appealed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board by filing a notice of appeal with the office of RARAD. On April 6, 1999, then Acting DAR Secretary Conrado Navarro denied the respondents‘ appeal of the order of Regional Director denying their application for exclusion and petition to lift the notice of coverage. In an order dated April 8, 1999, RARAD noted the respondents‘ notice of appeal, and issued the writ of possession sought by Baribag. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondents‘ landholdings were exempt from the coverage of the CARP for not being agricultural, and were presumed due to their being part of the poblacion to have been reclassified into residential/commercial or non-agricultural area. HELD: That the Constitutional Commission never intended to include lands used for raising livestock and poultry, and commercial, industrial and residential lands within the coverage of the Agrarian Reform Program of the Government is already settled. In Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Court pointed this out: The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word ―agricultural‖ clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the Government. xxx It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes ―private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising‖ in the definition of ―commercial farms‖ is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform.

Moreover, the policy objective of DAO No. 9 was to prevent landowners from taking steps to convert their agricultural lands to lands devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in order to accord with Luz Farms. Nonetheless, the CA also correctly clarified that the respondents‘ landholdings, even if they were not devoted to cattle raising, would still be excluded from the coverage of the CARL, because the DAR failed to establish that the landholdings were agricultural. Likewise, the CA correctly concluded that the DAR erred in designating Baribag as the beneficiary of the landholdings. The DAR did not show how its choice of Baribag as beneficiary, to the exclusion of the actual workers.

ALANGILAN REALTY & DVT CORP vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 180471 FACTS: Petitioner is the owner/developer of a 17.4892-hectare land in Batangas City (Alangilan landholding). On August 7, 1996, petitioner filed an Application and/or Petition for Exclusion/Exemption from CARP Coverage of the Alangilan landholding with MARO-DAR. It averred that, in 1982, the Sangguniang Bayan of Batangas City classified the subject landholding as reserved for residential under a zoning ordinance, which was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. It further alleged that, on May 17, 1994, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Batangas City approved the City Zoning Map and Batangas Comprehensive Zoning and Land Use Ordinance, reclassifying the landholding as residential. Petitioner thus claimed exemption of its landholding from the coverage of the CARP. On May 6, 1997, then DAR denied petitioner‘s application for exemption. The DAR Secretary noted that the Alangilan landholding remained agricultural, reserved for residential. It was classified as residential only on December 12, 1994 under Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 709, series of 1994. Clearly, the subject landholding was still agricultural at the time of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. The qualifying phrase reserved for residential means that the property is still classified as agricultural, and is covered by the CARP. On appeal, the Office of the President (OP) affirmed the decision of the DAR Secretary. Petitioner went up to the CA via a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the OP decision but CA dismissed the petition. The CA noted the report of MARO, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), and Regional Agrarian Reform Office (RARO) that the Alangilan landholding was devoted to agricultural activities prior to the effectivity of the CARP on June 15, 1988 and even thereafter. Hence, this appeal by petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner‘s Alangilan landholding is subject to the coverage of CARP, notwithstanding that the property has been converted to non-agricultural uses by the zoning ordinance of the city of Batangas prior to the law. HELD: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner‘s assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residentia. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. In this case, however, petitioner failed to establish that the subject landholding had already been converted into residential use prior to June 15, 1988. The court noted that the subject landholding was still being utilized for agricultural activities at the time of the filing of the application for exemption. The ocular inspection, jointly conducted by the MARO, PARO and RARO, disclosed that the landholding was planted with mangoes and coconuts. Finally, it is well settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally accorded respect and even finality by this Court, if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. The factual findings of the DAR Secretary, who, by reason of his official position, has acquired expertise in specific matters within his jurisdiction, deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not to be altered, modified, or reversed. In this case, petitioner utterly failed to show justifiable reason to warrant the reversal of the decision of the DAR Secretary, as affirmed by the OP and the CA.

CONCHA vs. RUBIO, GR 162446 FACTS: The controversy involves the determination of who between petitioners and respondents are qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land with an aggregate area of 33.5006 hectares, more or less. The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. On June 16, 1993, a Notice of Coverage was sent to the landowners. On March 24, 1995, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. On April 26, 1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approved the landowners‘ application for conversion. On August 9, 1999, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) rendered a Decision dismissing the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the DARAB is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by CARP. HELD: The conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute, as it was a purely administrative function of the DAR. The PARAD was, thus, correct when it declared that it had no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute, to wit: In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. x x x

While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies − such as the DARAB − which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts. Care should be taken so that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In the case at bar, the DARAB has overstepped its legal boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioners and respondents in deciding who should be declared the farmer-beneficiaries over the land in dispute. The CA thus erred in affirming the decision of the DARAB, which was rendered in excess of jurisdiction.

HEIRS OF SPOUSES VIDAD vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, GR 166461 FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Isabela, with an area of 589.8661 hectares, which land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under Republic Act No. (RA) 6657. Of the entire area, the government only acquired 490.3436 hectares. By virtue of EO 405 vesting LBP with primary responsibility to determine the valuation and compensation for all lands covered by RA 6657, LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2,961,333.03 for 490.3436 hectares, taking into consideration the factors under Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 06, series of 1992, and the applicable provisions of RA 6657. Petitioners rejected the valuation. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The DARAB dismissed the petition. Undaunted, petitioners filed a second petition for review asking for a re-evaluation of the land. Acting on the petition, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order directing LBP to re-compute the value of the land. In compliance with the PARAD‘s Order, LBP revalued the land at P4,158,947.13 for 402.3835 hectares and P1,467,776.34 for 43.8540 hectares. LBP used the guidelines in DAR AO No. 5, series of 1998 for the revaluation. Petitioners similarly rejected this offer and thereafter instituted a case before RARAD for the purpose of determining the just compensation for their land. The RARAD directed LBP to pay petitioners P32,965,408.46 as just compensation for 446.2375 hectares. LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC, sitting as a SAC. The SAC rendered a decision, based on LBP‘s evidence alone, fixing the just compensation at P5,626,724.47 for the 446.2375 hectares of the land. Petitioners filed an appeal questioning the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP, claiming that the RARAD has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation cases involving lands covered by RA 6657. Furthermore, petitioners insisted that LBP has no legal personality to institute a case for determination of just compensation against landowners with the SAC. The CA rendered the assailed decision, dismissing the appeal for lack of merit, and affirming the valuation of the SAC.

ISSUE: Whether or not SAC exercises concurrent jurisdiction with DARAB on cases involving determination of just compensation, and since it was the DARAB, through the RARAD, which first assumed jurisdiction on the issue of just compensation for petitioners‘ land, then the SAC is precluded from assuming jurisdiction on the same issue. HELD: The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657, as summarized by this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Spouses Banal, commences with LBP determining the value of the lands under the land reform program. Using LBP‘s valuation, the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner, pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657. In case the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. Contrary to petitioners‘ argument, the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. In fact, RA 6657 does not make DAR‘s valuation absolutely binding as the amount payable by LBP. A reading of Section 18 of RA 6657 shows that the courts, and not the DAR, make the final determination of just compensation. It is well-settled that the DAR‘s land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. The courts will still have the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State‘s power of eminent domain. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation, only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties. On the other hand, the determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. Unless the parties agree, there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB, except if the aggrieved party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. LBP thus correctly filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC, which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. DAR‘s valuation, being preliminary in nature, could not have attained finality, as it is only the courts that can resolve the issue on just compensation. Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of LBP‘s petition for determination of just compensation.

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY vs. DARAB, GR 175200 FACTS: Sometime in 1960, the administrator of the estate of the late C.N. Hodges (the Estate) asked respondent Mateo Villaruz to work as tenant of the Estate‘s seven-hectare ricefield in Bacolod, designated as Lot 916. The Estate wanted to prevent the land from falling into the hands of squatters. It had a house constructed on the lot for Villaruz and engaged his daughter and son-in-law to serve as co-tenants. In 1976, however, squatters settled into Lot 916, occupying four of its seven hectares. Villaruz was thus left with only three hectares for planting rice and corn. As it later turned out, the Estate mortgaged Lot 916 to a bank, resulting in its foreclosure when the loan could not be paid. Petitioner NHA bought the lot on September 11, 1985. Later that year, the DPWH constructed roads and bridges that passed through a portion of the lot. As a result, some plants and crops had to be cut down, prompting respondent Villaruz to demand payment of their value. When the demand was not heeded, respondent Villaruz filed an action for damages and disturbance compensation against petitioner NHA and the Estate before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City. But the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the NHA was not liable for disturbance compensation as provided in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1472. Villaruz did not appeal from the court order. Later on, respondent Villaruz filed a complaint with PARAD, seeking recognition as tenant beneficiary of the lot he tenanted under P.D. 27 and praying that his possession of its three-hectare portion be maintained. After hearing, the PARAD ruled in Villaruz‘s favor with respect to such portion provided he paid 25% of his net harvest to petitioner NHA until a fixed rental could be set. But he could not be declared owner of the lot since it had ceased to be private agricultural land, having been bought by the government. It was already outside the coverage of P.D. 27. Petitioner NHA appealed the PARAD decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the same. Undaunted, the NHA appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On September 21, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the questioned decisions of the PARAD and the DARAB. This prompted the NHA to file the present petition for review.

ISSUE: a) Are all lands acquired by the National Housing Authority (NHA) for its resettlement and housing efforts beyond the scope of agrarian laws? b) Whether or not Lot 916 is exempt from the coverage of the agrarian reform laws, the same having been acquired by petitioner NHA for its housing program. HELD: The Court disagrees. P.D. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that petitioner NHA acquired for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or afterwards. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers ―lands or property acquired x x x or to be acquired‖ by NHA. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land petitioner NHA acquired is tenanted or not. When the law does not distinguish, no distinction should be made. In addition, Section 1 of P.D. 1472 provides that petitioner NHA shall not be liable for disturbance compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation, the exemption assumes that NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing program. If the exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only to untenanted lands, then such exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity. Thus, petitioner NHA is not bound to pay disturbance compensation to respondent Villaruz even if he was the tenant of Lot 916. The NHA‘s purchase of Lot 916 for development and resettlement transformed the property by operation of law from agricultural to residential. If the ruling of the CA were to be upheld, petitioner NHA would have to allow Villaruz and his successorsin-interest to work on Lot 916 as agricultural tenants for as long as they liked without any chance of getting an emancipation patent over it under P.D. 27. This would be antithetical to the objectives of the agrarian reform program. As for the NHA, it would become an agricultural lessor with no right to use the land for the purpose for which it bought the same. This, in turn, would become prejudicial to the government‘s housing projects. The Court is mindful of the plight of tenant-farmers like respondent Villaruz. But it is also incumbent upon it to weigh their rights against the government‘s interest in meeting the housing needs of the greater majority. It is in this light that P.D. 1472 has to be interpreted.

CREBA vs. SEC. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, GR 183409 FACTS: This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum No. 88, for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. 07-97, entitled ―Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses,‖ which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. Subsequently, DAR AO No. 01-99, entitled ―Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses,‖ was also issued amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, among others, (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other non-agricultural purposes. The Secretary issued another Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled ―2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use Conversion,‖ which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. Thereafter the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development, the Secretary further issued Memorandum No. 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion applications. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the DAR Secretary has jurisdiction over lands that have been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial, or for other non-agricultural uses. HELD: Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level (―inferior‖) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court‘s time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court‘s docket. In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance. The present petition should

have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of this petition. Executive Order No. 129-A vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the CARP. Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation. Section 4(k) thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses. Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by law. Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that ―the authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x.‖ Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, ―lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988‖ have been included in the definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657. Any reclassification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial, industrial or other nonagricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before agricultural lands may be used for other purposes. It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2) issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DAR‘s jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988. Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use conversion procedure or that DAR‘s approval or clearance must be secured to effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs. It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.

ADRIANO vs. TANCO, GR 168164 FACTS: Respondent Alice Tanco (Alice) purchased a parcel of land consisting of 28.4692 hectares located in Bulacan. The land was devoted to mango plantation. Later on, it was partitioned among the respondents (Alice and her three children, namely, Geraldine, Ronald, and Patrick), each receiving 7 hectares, except Alice who got an extra 0.4692 hectare. Controversy arose when Alice sent letter to petitioner Vicente informing him that subject landholding is not covered by CARP and asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible. Seeing the letter as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant, Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession. He averred that in 1970, the husband of Alice, instituted him as tenant-caretaker of the entire mango plantation. Since then, he has been performing all phases of farm works, such as clearing, pruning, smudging, and spraying of the mango trees. The fruits were then divided equally between them. He also alleged that he was allowed to improve and establish his home at the old building left by Ang Tibay Shoes located at the middle of the plantation. Presently, he is in actual possession of and continues to cultivate the land. Respondents denied having instituted any tenant on their property. Insofar as Alice is concerned, respondents asserted that Vicente is not a tenant but a mere regular farm worker. PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente. It opined that since Vicente was performing functions more than just a mere caretaker and was even allowed to live in subject landholding with his family, he is therefore a tenant. Thus, respondents appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. It held that since the landholding is an agricultural land, that respondents allowed Vicente to take care of the mango trees, and that they divided the fruits equally between them, then an implied tenancy was created. The case was then elevated to CA via a Petition for Review. They contended, among others, that the essential elements of tenancy relationship are wanting in the instant controversy. They claimed that their property is not an agricultural land, but lies within a mineralized area; Alice hired Vicente as a caretaker and, therefore, the nature of their relationship is that of an employer-employee relationship; and, there is no proof that the parties share in the harvest. The CA rendered a Decision in respondents‘ favor. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is a bonafide tenant-farmer. HELD: Laws which have for their object the preservation and maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and the underprivileged. They apply with equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them. The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not supported by substantial evidence. Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree, expressly or impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner, as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. For tenancy relationship to exist, the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject matter is agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal. After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case, we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking.

ARNAIZ vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, GR 170623 FACTS: Petitioner A. Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc. filed a Petition for Exclusion from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage dated April 25, 1994 before the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of an aggregate area of 843.3990 hectares, situated at Barangay Asid, Sinalugan, Masbate, Masbate on the basis that (1) the said parcels of land had been devoted to cattle-ranching purposes since time immemorial; (2) said lands are not tenanted; and (3) said lands have more than 18% slopes. On January 24, 1995, the DAR Regional Director issued an Order denying the petition, to wit: In view of the foregoing, the instant petition for Exclusion is denied and it is hereby ordered that the acquisition of the properties under the coverage of CARP be pursued subject to the retention right of the landowner accordant with existing laws, rules, regulations and DAR policies.

ISSUE: Whether or not said parcel of land is excluded from the CARP coverage? HELD: Anent the findings that the subject properties are not excluded from the coverage of the CARP, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA. As aptly found by the CA: Hence, from the foregoing disquisitions, petitioner‘s contention that the respondents failed to apply the doctrine laid down in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform is without merit. In said Luz Farms case, it was held that Section 11 of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. Thus, the High Court declared as null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage, as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith. As clearly found by the respondents, the petitioner, in the instant case, failed to show that the subject lands have been devoted for commercial livestock-raising. (Emphasis supplied.)

Moreover, petitioner cannot argue that the findings of the DAR Regional Director, the DAR Secretary, and the OP were unfounded, baseless, and unjustifiable. A perusal of the Order of the DAR Regional Director denying the petition for exclusion would reveal that it was based on the findings of the Chief of Regional Field Task Force V, the Municipal Agricultural Officer, the representative of the Land Bank of the Philippines, the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police, and various documents. Surely, these institutions did not whimsically conclude not to exclude the properties of petitioner from the coverage of the CARP. However, in the present case, the fact remains that based on the findings of the DAR, the OP, and the CA, the subject properties do not fall within the ambit of the Constitutional exemption as petitioner failed to establish its contention that the subject lands are excluded from the coverage of the CARP.

HEIRS OF CERVANTES vs. MIRANDA, GR 183352 FACTS: Respondent was a holder of Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. 160774 covering a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 1532 in the name of Jesus Panlilio, located in Pampanga measuring about 2.8070 hectares. In 1981, Arturo executed a waiver surrendering his CLT in favor of his cousin Jose Cervantes, predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners. In 2002, respondent plowed through the land by force and stealth. As mediation between Jose and respondent failed to settle the matter, Jose filed a complaint at the PARAB before which he submitted documentary evidence including Arturo‘s waiver and the Samahang Nayon Resolution approval of the surrender of the CLT to him; tax declarations of the subject land in Arturo‘s name, and affidavits from various individuals stating that he (Jose) is a tenant of the land whereas respondent was not, the latter being a bus driver and, therefore, could not have cultivated it. PARAB Adjudicator, ruling in favor of Jose, held that the land is covered by the operation land transfer scheme of the government and as between the two parties, Jose had shown through documentary evidence that he had a better right as tenant; and that assuming arguendo that respondent indeed cultivated the land prior to its being submerged in water in the 1960s, his non-payment of rentals and he having returned to the country only in 2002 amounted to abandonment. Before the CA, respondent challenged the DARAB Decision raising, among other issues, the DARAB‘s lack of jurisdiction over the case. CA set aside the decision saying it lacked jurisdiction over the case as it was essentially one for forcible entry and unlawful detainer that should have been lodged with the MTC. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over a similar dispute, the appellate court held, ―there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties‖ which is lacking in the present case. Hence the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not DARAB has jurisdiction over the dispute? HELD: The DARAB has jurisdiction over agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers‘ associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy relating to, among others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. In the present case, although there is admittedly no tenancy relationship between Jose and respondent and the complaint filed before the DARAB was denominated as one for forcible entry, it is the DARAB and not the regular courts which has jurisdiction of the case. As to the DARAB‘s disquisition of the case on the merits, the Court has consistently held that the findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, like the DARAB, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded respect. In the present case, there is no ground to disturb the DARAB‘s findings, which affirmed those of the PARAB after due hearing and appreciation of the evidence submitted by both parties.

LANDBANK vs. HEIRS OF TRINIDAD S. VDA. DE ARIETA, GR 161834 FACTS: Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural land situated in Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte with an approximate area of 37.1010 hectares, 14.999 hectares of which was covered by RA No. 6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the CARP. Private respondent offered to the DAR the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the land covered by CARP. Petitioner bank valued and offered as just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by private respondent. In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the property. Thereafter, DARAB conducted summary administrative proceedings and rendered a decision fixing the compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per hectare. Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court. Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court.

ISSUE: What is the correct amount of provisional compensation which the LBP is required to deposit in the name of the landowner if the latter rejects the DAR/LBP‘s offer: Landbank‘s initial valuation of the land subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) or the sum awarded by the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary administrative proceeding pending final determination by the courts? HELD: In both voluntary and compulsory acquisitions, wherein the landowner rejects the offer, the DAR opens an account in the name of the landowner and conducts a summary administrative proceeding. If the landowner disagrees with the valuation, the matter may be brought to the RTC, acting as a special agrarian court. But as with the DAR-awarded compensation, LBP‘s valuation of lands covered by CARL is considered only as an initial determination, which is not conclusive, as it is the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, that should make the final determination of just compensation, taking into consideration the factors enumerated in Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 and the applicable DAR regulations. It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is essentially a judicial function, which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. Although under the CARL of 1988, the landowners are entitled to withdraw the amount deposited in their behalf pending the final resolution of the case involving the final valuation of his property, the SAC may not, as in this case, order the petitioner to deposit or deliver the much higher amount adjudged by the RARAD considering that it already complied with the deposit of provisional compensation by depositing the amount of its initial valuation which was rejected by the respondent. And while the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides for execution pending appeal upon ―meritorious grounds,‖ respondent has not established such meritorious reasons for allowing execution of the RARAD decision pending final determination of just compensation by the court. As the Court had previously declared, the LBP is primarily responsible for the valuation and determination of compensation for all private lands. It has the discretion to approve or reject the land valuation and just compensation for a private agricultural land placed under the CARP. In case the LBP disagrees with the valuation of land and determination of just compensation by a party, the DAR, or even the courts, the LBP not only has the right, but the duty, to challenge the same, by appeal to the CA or to this Court, if appropriate. Both LBP and respondent filed petitions before the SAC disputing the RARAD judgment awarding compensation in the amount of P10,294,721.00. In view of the substantial difference in the valuations -- the initial valuation by the LBP being only P1,145,806.06 -- the more prudent course is to await the final resolution of the issue of just compensation already filed with said court.

LANDBANK vs. COLARINA, GR 176410 FACTS: Respondent is the registered owner of three (3) parcels of agricultural land which he acquired from their former owner, Damiana Arcega. The parcels of land have a total area of 972,047 square meters. Upon acquisition thereof, respondent manifested his voluntary offer to sell the properties to the DAR for coverage under R.A. No. 6657. Respondent‘s assessment value of the properties was P45,000.00 per hectare. The DAR, through petitioner LBP assessed the properties and offered to purchase only 57.2047 hectares out of the 97.2047 hectares voluntarily offered for sale by respondent. The excluded area (40 hectares) fell under the exemptions and exclusions provided in Section 10 of the CARL, i.e., all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over. As the LBP‘s assessment and valuation of the properties was unacceptable to, and rejected by, respondent, he elevated the determination of just compensation of the properties to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). Unfortunately for respondent, the PARAD affirmed the valuation set forth by the LBP. Disappointed with the low valuation by petitioner and the DAR, respondent filed a Complaint before the RTC, for the judicial determination of just compensation. During pre-trial, LBP manifested that the subject properties may be reassessed and revaluated based on the new guidelines set forth in DAR A.O. No. 11, Series of 1994. Intent on finding a common ground between petitioner and respondent and to amicably settle the case, the SAC ordered the revaluation. However, the valuation was still rejected by respondent. Hence, trial ensued. ISSUE: How should the value of ―just compensation‖ be computed? HELD: Citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Celada, the Court declared: While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA No. 6657. As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR‘s duty to issue rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely ―filled in the details‖ of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to implement the said provision. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

While the Court commends respondent in readily participating in the government‘s agrarian reform program, our previous rulings preclude us from validating the valuation of the subject properties proffered to, and affirmed by, the SAC. The government cannot be forced to purchase land which it finds no need for, regardless of Oliva‘s unschooled opinion. Considering respondent‘s belief that the properties are worth more than the valuation made by the DAR, he can proceed to develop the land excluded by the DAR from expropriation into its potential use as assessed by Oliva.