Case 7 Jollibee

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Jollibee Foods Corporation LEONARDO R. GARCIA, JR., CHRISTOPHER LOVELOCK, AND JOCHEN WIRTZ

The Philippines’ leading food service company has grown both organically and through acquisitions. Ranked among Asia’s top companies, it now dominates the fast-food market in its home country, where it offers four separate fast-food concepts under separate brand identities, led by the original Jollibee stores. However, despite international aspirations, it has made only modest progress overseas, where recent growth has come primarily from purchase of the Yonghe King chain in China. Around the world, when someone says “fast-food restaurant” the chances are high that the first name that comes to mind will be McDonald’s, the world’s largest quick-service restaurant chain. In 2005, McDonald’s held a 20 percent share of the U.S. fast-food market, triple that of its nearest competitor Burger King. This was not the case, however, in the Philippines where, for more than two decades, fast-food had been synonymous with the name Jollibee. In the global business arena, Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) was not exactly a household name. But in its niche, the Philippines, where it controlled four brands—Jollibee, Delifrance, Greenwich Pizza, and Chowking—it dominated the market. During the 1990s, JFC extended its sights overseas, opening a small number of restaurants in several Asian and Middle Eastern locations. The company’s chairman and CEO, Tony Tan Caktiong, observed: Internationalization remains a key component of our business strategy, even as we continue to reinforce our domestic network of stores. Our goals of continued growth, profitability and market leadership, as well as our contribution to the development of our country, may lie not just in continuing to expand aggressively at home but also in becoming a truly multinational Filipino corporation. By June 2005, the total number of stores worldwide in the JFC Group had grown to 1,200, of which 1,079 were located in the Philippines and the balance in several other countries, led by the recently acquired Yonghe King chain in China. Jollibee had recently beaten 31 other entrepreneurs from around the world to win the 2004 World Entrepreneur of the Year award, sponsored by Ernst and Young, one of the world’s top accounting firms.

J OLLIBEE : T HE E ARLY Y EARS Humble Beginnings In 1975, Tony Tan Caktiong, a Filipino of Chinese ancestry, and his brothers opened two ice- cream parlors in Manila’s commercial districts of Cubao and Quiapo. These icecream parlors were an instant hit among food-loving Filipinos, who came to associate the stores with special occasions such as birthdays and holidays. In no time the Tan brothers had decided to expand their menu and began offering other quick-meals such as hot sandwiches, spaghetti and burgers. After its second year of operations, the Tan brothers noted that the store was actually earning more from the side orders, specifically their burgers, than from the ice-cream. Following the taste and feel of the market, the Tan brothers decided to develop their own unique brand by coming up with a menu that would appeal to the Filipino palate. Jollibee was conceived as a fast-food outlet of highquality but reasonably-priced food products tailored especially for Filipinos, who were served by a jolly, “busy-as-abee” restaurant crew. Hence the birth of the bright red and yellow “Jolly Bee” mascot, which had since become a favorite among Filipino children. In response to the growing popularity of their sweet homemade burgers—made from their mother’s secret recipe—and the other hot meals, Tony Tan and his brothers formed Jollibee Foods Corporation (JFC) in 1978 to exploit the possibilities of a hamburger concept more fully. By that time the firm had seven outlets. When McDonald’s entered the Philippine market in 1981 and began opening stores in Manila, some industry observers questioned whether the little 11-store local chain could survive. However, Jollibee’s management team decided to see this as an opportunity that would allow them to benchmark the American giant’s operations and then bring their own chain up to world-class standards. In particular, they focused on learning about the sophisticated operating systems that enabled McDonald’s to control its quality, costs, and service at the store level—an area of weakness in the local firm that had constrained its further expansion. As Tony Tan gained a better understanding of McDonald’s business model, he recognized not only strengths but also specific

© 2007 Leonardo R, Garcia, Jr., Christopher H. Lovelock, and Jochen Wirtz. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Kristine Abante. This case is based on published sources, student research, and personal experience. It was prepared solely for use as a learning tool and is not intended to serve as an endorsement, source of primary data, or illustration of effective or ineffective management. Financial data are in Philippine pesos (exchange rates in mid-2004 were PHP 1 = US$0.018, or US$1 = PHP 56).

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and adults from all walks of life—been offered so much in a single location.

areas of weakness in the latter’s strategy, reflecting its standardized product line and a U.S.-dominated decision processes.

Addition of New Brands Capturing Filipinos’ Taste buds

By 1989, Jollibee had become the first Philippine fast-food chain to break the one billion peso sales mark. In 1993, Jollibee Food Corporation (JFC) went public on the Philippine Stock Exchange to broaden its capital base, laying the groundwork for expansion both within and beyond Philippine shores. Over the years, the size, geographic expanse and breadth of the company’s operations had continued to grow. In addition to the original chain of Jollibee burger restaurants, several new brands had been added through acquisition. Even as the Jollibee brand achieved market dominance, the firm was also pursuing a strategy of diversification as a hedge against both competition and downturns in specific market niches. Reaching out to other segments, Jollibee Foods Corporation had acquired a portfolio of other fast food concepts, to which it applied its carefully honed operational and marketing skills. In 1994 it purchased Greenwich Pizza, the Philippines’ leading pizza and pasta chain. The following year, seeking to cater to the changing taste preferences of the Filipinos, JFC acquired the right to operate the Philippine’s franchise of Délifrance, an international chain of French bakery-cafés headquartered in France. In 2000, JFC bought Chowking Foods Corporation, which operated the Philippines’ top chain serving Chinese fast-food. Although Chowking had reported excellent sales and performance since its purchase, it took time before Greenwich Pizza was able to establish a strong position in the market. By the end of 2003, JFC was the Philippines market leader in three segments. In the hamburger and chicken segment, Jollibee had 467 outlets to only 240 for its nearest rival, McDonald’s. In Chinese fast-food, there

In the Philippines, people love to eat and are used to doing so up to five times daily, enjoying snacks in between meals and a comfortable place to chat with friends and loved ones. As a result the nation had become an attractive market for global players such as McDonald’s, KFC, Wendy’s, Burger King, and Pizza Hut. Yet despite growing competition, Jollibee had managed to maintain its dominant position as the leading fast-food chain in the Philippines with a menu tailored specifically to the Filipinos’ preferences. Jollibee’s keen insight and understanding of the Filipino psyche had brought to everyone’s lips the promise of langhap-sara (freely translated, this means “smells good so it must taste good”). In addition to meals with fries, Jollibee offered rice or spaghetti with its entrees. Its moist burger patties and spicy sauces were so distinctly Filipino that Jollibee’s burgers were often likened to what a Filipino mother would cook at home. This strong understanding of Filipinos’ taste and preferences set Jollibee apart from its competitors. Although long-time favorites like Chickenjoy, Spaghetti Special, Jolly Hotdog, French fries and Yumburgers still continued to hold their appeal, over time Jollibee had broadened its product range to create more excitement and variety. The enlarged menu included more rice-based products like Honey Beef Rice and Shanghai Rolls; a variety of burger choices from mushroom to garlic and cheese, a variety of chicken dishes, more flavorful desserts like the Ice Craze in Buko pandan (coconut and jelly) and mais con yelo (sweet corn) served with milk and crushed ice; traditional Filipino breakfast rice meals, and options such as the Tuna Pie and Pies-to-Go. Never before had Filipinos—children, families, EXHIBIT 1

Trends in Number of Stores by Brand, 1998–2005 DECEMBER 31

Philippines Jollibee Greenwich Chowking Delifrance Subtotal International Jollibee Chowking Tomi’s Teriyaki Yonghe King Subtotal TOTAL

JUNE 2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

508 228 310 33 1,079

499 232 303 31 1,065

467 213 245 30 955

436 191 216 28 871

408 194 194 24 832

374 193 164 13 744

350 191 159 6 712

302 169 142 4 617

22 11 — 88 121 1,200

22 10 — 88 120 1,185

21 9 3 — 33 988

21 8 2 — 31 902

23 7 1 — 31 863

22 6 — — 29 772

21 6 — — 27 739

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Source: Fourth quarter reports, 1998–2004.

Jollibee Foods Corporation

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EXHIBIT 2 Jollibee Foods Corporation: Selected Annual Financial and Operational Data, 1998–2004*

Consolidated Systemwide Sales Gross Revenues Income from Operations Net Income Number of Personnel (000)

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

35.5 26.2 2.0 1.6 26.5

28.9 21.6 1.4 1.3 21.6

26.8 20.3 1.5 1.0 22.0

24.1 18.8 0.8 0.5 21.8

20.3 15.7 1.1 0.9 20.6

18.1 14.1 0.9 0.6 14.2

16.7 12.9 1.2 0.8 13.9

*All financial data in billions of pesos. Source: Annual Reports, Jollibee Foods Corporation, 1998–2004.

were 245 Chowking restaurants, compared to 136 for its nearest competitor, Luk Yuen. And finally, JFC’s pizza and pasta outlet, Greenwich, had 213 stores as compared to 113 for its nearest rival, Pizza Hut.1 Exhibit 1 shows trends in the number of stores by brand between the end of 1998 and September 2004. By that time, Jollibee had become had become an international brand that, as management declared, made Filipinos proud. Forbes, Far Eastern Economic Review, and Asian Business had all ranked JFC among Asia’s top companies. It was recognized as the number one food company in Asia by Euromoney and as the best-managed company in the Philippines by Asiamoney, and was consistently ranked among Asia’s best employers in the Far Eastern Economic Review’s annual survey. In 2004, Jollibee Foods Corporation topped the “Asia’s Most Admired Company” (AMAC) survey, conducted by Hong Kong-based Asian Business Magazine. Exhibit 2 shows annual financial and operational data for JFC from 1998 to 2004. Exhibit 3 reproduces the company’s values, vision, and mission. Twenty-nine years after Jollibee was founded, JFC controlled about 55% of the quick-service restaurant market in the Philippines based on “visit shares” and held 70% of the burger-based meals market. One million customers ate at JFC stores daily, averaging a per capita

EXHIBIT 3

spending of about 40 pesos (US$0.71). Each day, JFC bought or produced 40,000 packs of chicken (with eight pieces in each pack), 320,000 pieces of burger, and 44,250 eggs. With more than one thousand stores across the Philippines, JFC’s four brands enjoyed substantial economies of scale, gaining leverage in terms of retail site selection and operations, procurement, manufacturing, distribution and marketing at levels unavailable to most industry players. Despite a recent economic slowdown in the Philippines and unfavorable business conditions, JFC had continued to deliver same-store sales growth. Exhibit 4 shows a modern Jollibee store.

M ARKETING , O PERATIONS , AND H UMAN R ESOURCES Jollibee’s ‘FSC’ Commitment The acronym FSC, described by the company on its website as “a byword in all of Jollibee,” represented its commitment to meeting high standards in three key areas: Every Food (F) item served to the public must meet the company’s excellent standards or it will not be served at all; the Service (S) must be fast and courte-

Jollibee Food Corporation: Values—Mission—Vision

Values • Always put customer first • Excellence through teamwork • Spirit of family and fun • Frugality, Honesty and Integrity • Humility to listen and learn Mission We bring great taste and happiness to everyone Vision Become the most dominant and best tasting QSR . . . . The most endearing brand that has ever been. We will be within reach of every Filipino . . . We will lead in product taste at all times We will provide FSC excellence in every encounter . . . Happiness in every moment Source: www.jollibee.com.ph, accessed July 2004.

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Typical Jollibee Outlet in the Philippines

in an environment where the crew talked to them in the local language, unlike other outlets where the crew spoke in English and where the atmosphere might be perceived by some as projecting an elitist appeal. The Jollibee chain had tailored its marketing strategies to suit the Filipino culture and lifestyle. “What happens in the normal Filipino family is that weekends are reserved especially for children,” noted a Filipino business analyst, “and parents try to ask their children where they want to eat.” Jollibee appealed to children with in-store play activities and a cast of captivating characters. Its hamburger-headed Champ, complete with boxing gloves, went head-to-head against McDonald’s Hamburglar. Industry observers reported that Jollibee’s giant smiling red and yellow bee and a blond spaghettihaired girl named Hetti (a mascot for Jollibee restaurants) were better known and loved in the Philippines than Ronald McDonald. Jollibee endeavored to maintain its dominance in the children’s segment by promoting its Jolly Kiddie Meals and offering a choice of Regular Yum, Spaghetti Special or Chickenjoy. Having an advertising strategy that was deeply rooted in the traditional values of family, with a tinge of national pride, allowed Jollibee to position itself as the destination for family outings.

The DLSU Survey A survey conducted by advertising management students from De La Salle University in Manila in mid-2004 contrasted Jollibee’s value proposition against that of McDonald’s operations in the Philippines (Exhibit 5) and revealed the main rational and emotional factors that drove Filipino consumers’ choices in fast food restaurants. ous; and Cleanliness (C) from sidewalk to kitchen, from uniforms to utensils, must be maintained at all times. The company recognized that maintaining high standards required that employees be committed to FSC. Jollibee Foods Corporation paid the highest compensation and benefits package in the Philippine fast foods industry. All employees underwent comprehensive training programs based on the underlying standards. In addition, managers received ongoing training in the latest operations systems and in people-management skills. Opportunities existed for qualified crew members to pursue a career path into management positions.

Marketing Strategy JFC’s marketing philosophy was based on being closer to Filipino families than its competitors. There was wide awareness that Jollibee was a local Filipino service business establishment that had captured the unique Filipino taste, so it appealed to patriotic or “pam-Pinoy” instincts. The chain also appealed to a broad cross-section of the population that felt comfortable and very much at home

Rational Attributes Of the top ten rational attributes underlying selection of a fast food restaurant, the most significant, cited by 90 percent of respondents, was for it to be “affordable and/or cheap.” Next came “faster service” (cited by 78 percent), followed by “accessibility,” (70 percent). Other attributes mentioned were “tasty,” “variety of food,” “accommodating personnel,” “delivery services,” “promotional items are useful,” “frequent and effective ads,” and “offers seasonal products” (Exhibit 6). Among Jollibee’s patrons, affordable/cheaper prices was ranked top, with 94 percent mentioning this attribute, followed by accessibility/many outlets (72 percent) and tastier (66 percent). However, only 44 percent of respondents cited “faster” as a desired attribute.

Emotional Attributes For fast-foods in general, the three most dominant attributes were friendly atmosphere (76 percent), familyoriented pampamilya (74 percent), and hang out or tambayan (66 percent). (Exhibit 7). The other emotional attributes considered by respondents were mass appeal, Jollibee Foods Corporation

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Value Proposition of Jollibee Versus McDonald’s in the Philippines VALUE PROPOSITION

TARGET MARKET

Business Operations Menu Promotions

No. of Stores in the Philippines (mid-2004) Mode of International Expansion

JOLLIBEE FAMILIES & CHILDREN

MCDONALD’S FAMILIES & CHILDREN

To provide high quality food, fast and friendly service in a clean and comfortable environment. Tailored to the Filipino palate. E.g., peach-mango pie, meals with spaghetti or rice. • Langhap Sarap Value Meals • Jolly Kiddie Meal (with premium items and toys) • Eats for Free purchase rewards program • Bestsellers Campaign (20 percent discounts on various combinations of the popular Langhap Sarap Value Meals)

To provide outstanding quality, service, cleanliness and value. Standardized Fare E.g., meals with fries.* • Extra Value Meal • Happy Meal (with premium items and toys)

472

241

Franchising

Franchising

*McDonald’s subsequently bowed to the pressure of conforming to Filipino taste preferences by introducing menu items such as McSpaghetti and McDo, a heavily seasoned burger. Source: DLSU student research project, 2004.

better environment for kids, patriotic or pam-Pinoy or lasang Pinoy, “brings you closer to home,” “likeable Filipiso selections” or “putaheng Pinoy”/”sangkap Pinoy,” “use of Filipino language” particularly by the service crew, and the use of “wholesome” or “cute” endorsers. Broadly similar ratings of these attributes were achieved for Jollibees, although “family-oriented” was ranked first and “friendly,” second.

Organizational Structure By concentrating on a country market with distinct preferences, Jollibee had been able to tailor its menu and marketing strategies to better reach and satisfy the customers. While global players like McDonald’s and KFC chose to

EXHIBIT 6

spread their resources among their fast-food chains worldwide, for many years Jollibee focused its efforts only in the Philippines. During the 1980s, when political instability hit the Philippines, McDonald’s had to curtail its expansion process. Jollibee, on the other hand, continued with its strategic plans of expansion. By the time the country was back on track, Jollibee had already gained the upper hand in terms of store locations, thus leaving the global giant trailing behind. The unique geographical structure of the Philippines with its many islands made it a challenging market for fast-food companies. Among all the fast-food chains competing in the Philippines, Jollibee was the only one that operated nationwide. In some locations, it faced no competition from other fast-food chains.

Rational Attributes Filipinos Look for in Fast-Food Restaurants/Jollibee FAST-FOOD MARKET OVERALL

RANK

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

ATTRIBUTE

Affordable/Cheaper Faster Service Accessibility/“Maraming” (many) outlets Tastier Variety of food chains Accommodating personnel Delivery Services Promotional items are useful Frequent and effective ads Offers seasonal products Total N = 50

Source: DLSU student research project, 2004.

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PERCENT

90 78 70 68 60 34 42 38 34 28 100

JOLLIBEE ATTRIBUTE

Affordable/Cheaper Accessibility/Many outlets Tastier Frequent and Effective Ads Variety of food chains Faster service Promotional items are useful Accommodating personnel Delivery Services Offers seasonal products

PERCENT

94 72 66 56 50 44 40 38 38 36 100

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Emotional Attributes Filipinos Look for in Fast-Foods/Jollibee FAST-FOOD MARKET

RANK

JOLLIBEE

ATTRIBUTE

N

PERCENT

RANK

1

Friendly Atmosphere

38

76

1

2

37

74

2

3

Family togetherness (“Pampamilya”) Hang-out (“Tambayan”)

33

66

3

4 5

Mass Appeal Better environment for kids

27 27

54 54

4 5

6

Patriotic (“Pam-Pinoy”/ ”Lasang Pinoy”) Brings you closer to home selections Likeable Filipino selections (“Putaheng Pinoy”/ “Sangkap-Pinoy”) Use of Filipino language Wholesome/”cute” endorsers N:50

22

44

6

Patriotic, “Pam-Pinoy,” “Lasang Pinoy” Mass Appeal Likeable Filipino selections, “Putaheng Pinoy,” “Sangkap Pinoy” Better environment for kids

17

34

7

16

32

8

13 8

26 16

9 10

7 8

9 10

ATTRIBUTE

N

PERCENT

Family togetherness (“Pampamilya”) Friendly atmosphere

39

78

32

64

30

60

30 28

60 56

28

56

Use of Filipino language

20

40

Wholesome/”cute” endorsers

13

26

Hang-out/”Tambayan” Brings you closer to home N:50

12 11

24 22

Source: DLSU student research project, 2004.

JFC’s strategy included a focus on achieving operational efficiency in its commissary and hiring the right candidates to manage its operations and strategy planning. To meet the challenges of a more intensely competitive market and to manage business more effectively, the company had undertaken a major initiative in 2000 to re-align the structure of Jollibee Philippines, decentralizing the organization into four autonomous Regional Business Units (RBUs) that corresponded to the country’s major geographic markets: Mega Manila, Luzon, South Luzon, and Visayas-Mindanao. This structure ensured a more manageable business size and span of control. Key support functions like human resources and administration, finance and network development were transferred to the RBUs for greater efficiency in the delivery of products and services, quicker coordination, and more timely decision-making. The Head Office/Corporate Services functions (Marketing, Finance, Restaurant Systems, Engineering) were re-aligned as a Support Center to provide corporatelevel direction and continuing assistance to the RBUs. Top management believed that the new structure had resulted in better execution of programs and renewed enthusiasm and commitment from JFC’s managers and employees. The continuing growth in the number of Jollibee, Chowking, and Greenwich restaurants obscured the fact that each year some stores were closed, either because they were underperforming or because they were being replaced by newer and larger stores in better locations. Over time, a higher percentage of stores were being operated by franchisees instead of company-owned.

I NTERNATIONAL O PERATIONS Building on its success in the Philippines, Jollibee turned its sights overseas. Initially, the company focused on reaching communities with a large Filipino population to capitalize on its brand awareness, targeting markets where there were substantial numbers of “OFWs” (Overseas Filipino Workers). By the early 1990s, Jollibee restaurants were operating in Hong Kong, Saipan and Guam (both islands in the NW Pacific), Vietnam, Brunei, Indonesia, Dubai, and Kuwait. In 1998, the firm entered one of the most demanding fast-food markets in the world, the United States, which had at that time an estimated two million Filipino immigrants. But aside from Jollibee’s popularity among Filipinos, the brand also sought to appeal to other ethnic groups in its U.S. outlets. Other immigrants from Asia came with their families to eat at Jollibee’s. One AfricanAmerican customer stated that the chicken is “excellent, almost like my mother’s Southern fried chicken!” And white Americans enjoyed delicacies not offered by competitors, such as Peach Mango Pie. The company’s international expansion strategy focused on markets where management believed it “could successfully develop the Jollibee brand and put up the supply chain to support the critical mass of stores in these selected markets.” In the U.S., the first state targeted was California, with plans to expand into Nevada, Hawaii, and New York in future years. By adopting a franchise mode in the U.S., JFC was able to draw on local capital and entrepreneurial drive. In 2001, the firm purchased a

Jollibee Foods Corporation

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EXHIBIT 8 Location of JFC Group Stores by Brand, June 2005

Philippines Co-owned Franchised Subtotal Hong Kong U.S.A. China Co-owned Franchised Others TOTAL

JOLLIBEE

GREENWICH

CHOWKING

DÉLIFRANCE*

YONGHE KING

TOTAL

207 301 508

122 106 228

99 211 310

29 4 33

— — —

457 622 1,079

1 10

— —

— 8

— —

— —

1 18

— —

— —

— —

— —

82 6

82 6

11 530

— 228

3 321

— 33

— 88

14 1,200

*JFC was a master franchisee for Délifrance, a French-owned franchise, in the Philippines but not in other countries.

majority interest in Tokyo Teriyaki House, a Japanese restaurant in California, with the objective of expanding into the Japanese QSR segment and developing it into another major chain; it renamed the restaurant Tomi’s Teriyaki House. The annual report for 2002 noted that the overseas stores were providing the company “the experience in the know-how that we need in gearing up to the realities of international competition and in reorienting ourselves to the global environment.” JFC had identified several markets in Asia for its expansion activities. In 2004, the company was looking at the possibility of expanding its three-store network in Vietnam. There were also plans to introduce the Chowking brand to Indonesia, responding to the growing market for Chinese food in that nation. Despite an earlier, unsuccessful experience operating a now-closed Jollibee’s store in Xiamen, eastern China, JFC saw huge potential in the People’s Republic. In March 2004, the company signed an agreement to purchase 85 percent ownership in the Shanghai-based Yonghe King chain, which offered Chinese style fast-food in ten cities. The number of Yonghe King stores grew from 77 at the end of 2003 to 89 by the end of the third quarter of 2004, by which point this brand accounted for 6 percent of JFC’s system-wide sales and was more profitable than the domestic operation, which had been hit by rising costs. The strategy for Yonghe King was to open 20 new stores a year in each of the next three years, increasing to another 50 in year four and 100 additional stores in year five.

In May 2004, Mr. Ysmael V. Baysa, the company’s chief finance officer, announced that during the first quarter of the year JFC had opened 21 new stores but closed 13, of which seven were in foreign locations. It closed all three Chowking stores in Dubai, one Jollibee store in the US, and shuttered its 3-store Tomi’s Teriyaki operation in the US. Said Mr Baysa: “Tomi’s Teriyaki business did not grow according to expectations. Its basic concept is sound, but there is still much work to be done to turn it into a strong brand. We are keeping the brand trademark and the recipes for possible future use. In the meantime, management is placing its priority on brand development of Yonghe King in China.” Over the course of the following 12 months, most of JFC’s growth came from within the Philippines, led by the Jollibee and Chowking brands, both of which were dominated by franchisee-operated units (Exhibit 8). The number of Yonghe King stores in China had remained almost unchanged, but was expected to increase to over 100 stores by early 2006. Summarizing the company’s strategy, the chairman, Mr. Tan, noted: There are still major challenges to address to ensure the long-term soundness of the business—we have to improve our cost structure particularly in the support groups, we have to sustain positive growth in same store sales, and we have to win big in foreign operations if we are to become a truly World Class Business.

R EFERENCES 1

“Jollibee beats McDonald’s at its own game,” PJI Journal, www.journal.com.ph, accessed January 17, 2005. Additional sources consulted for this case include: Jollibee Foods Corporation Website (www.jollibee.com.ph).

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Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, “Going Global: Lessons from Late Movers,” Harvard Business Review 78 (March–April 2001) 132–145.

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S TUDY Q UESTIONS 1. Evaluate Jollibee Food Corporation’s performance in the Philippines. What are the secrets of its success in terms of marketing, operations, and human resource strategies? 2. In what ways does JFC’s strategy of adding new brands leverage or dilute the strengths of the original Jollibee concept? 3. What rational and emotional attributes do you look for in a fast-food restaurant? Do these attributes fit your favorite food establishment in your country?

4. Evaluate JFC’s performance overseas. To what extent can the company transfer its core competency to its international operations? Should it modify its consumer-driven strategies to suit foreign markets, even if that means Jollibee becomes much less ‘Philippine’ in nature? 5. Should Jollibee continue in its efforts to go international or concentrate on expanding and consolidating its foothold in the Philippines only? Why?

Jollibee Foods Corporation

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