Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai

Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai G.R. No. L-20392. December 18, 1968. Petitioners: Marcial T. Caedo, Juana Caedo and their children, riding in the Mercury Car Respondents: Yu Khe Thai (owner of car), Rafael Bernardo (driver), in a Cadillac Norberto Quisumbing for Petitioners. De Joya, Lopez, Dimaguila, Hermoso & Divino for private respondents. Facts: At 5:30 in the morning, on Highway 54 (now EDSA) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village, Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car from QC to the airport (southbound) to bring his son who was going to Mindoro. Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, driven by Bernardo, going to Wack Wack from Parañaque (northbound.) Considering there was no traffic at that time, both cars were traveling a fairly moderate speeds—Caedo at 40-50kph, Bernardo 48-56kph. In front of the car of Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai was a carretela going in the same direction. The carretela was towing another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the carretela’s post. The carretela had two lights, one on each side. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did, his car caught the rim of the carretela’s left wheel, wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded to the other land, colliding with Caedo’s car. Caedo, tried to avoid the collision by going farther to the right, but was unsuccessful. Caedo and the members of his family were injured because of the accident, so they filed this suit for recovery of damages from Bernardo and Yu Khe Thai. Issue/s: 1. Who was responsible for the accident? 2. If it was Bernardo, was his employer, Yu Khe Thai solidarily liable with him? Held: 1. Bernardo in the Cadillac. The collision was directly traceable to Bernardo’s negligence. He tried to beat Caedo’s car or squeeze between Caedo’s car and the carretela. He should have known that passing the carretela was a risky maneuver, but he still took a gamble. The first clear indication of his negligence was his claim that he was almost upon the carretela when he saw it in front of him, only 8 meters away. The carretela had two lights, one on each side, which should have given him sufficient warning to take necessary precaution. Even if he claims he didn’t see the lights of the carretela, the carretela should have been visible to him if he had been careful, as it must have been in the beam of his headlights. 2. No, Yu Khe Thai cannot be held solidarily liable with Bernardo. Art 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months. Under Art. 2148, if the causative factor was the driver’s negligence, the owner of the vehicle who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence. However, in the case of Chapman vs. Underwood: (important) An owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts, both criminally and civilly, for the results produced by the acts of the chauffeur. On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the act was

committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his driver act his own. The basis of the master's liability in civil law is the relationship of paterfamilias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. In this case, Bernardo has been Yu Khe Thai’s driver for around 20 years prior to the accident and Bernardo has had no record of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed by him at all may be imputed to his master. The car was not running at an unreasonable speed. Yu Khe Thai had reason to rely on the skill and experience of his driver. The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks involved and warn the driver accordingly. According to Yu Khe Thai, he thought that if he sounded a sudden warning it might only make this driver nervous and make the situation worse. The test of imputed negligence under Art. 2184 is, to a great degree, necessarily subjective. Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional drivers. The test of his (the car owner’s) negligence, within the meaning of Art. 2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident.