Butoy Consti Digest - Self Incrimination

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SELF INCRIMINATION CASES

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VILLAFLOR vs SUMMERS (1920) 41 Phil. 62 P: Malcolm, J

handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

FACTS: The Petitioner prays that a Writ of Habeas Corpus be issued to restore her liberty. Petitioner Emeteria Villaflor here was charged with adultery. She was then asked to submit to a physical examination to determine if she was pregnant or not. She refused to obey and challenged the order on the ground of being in violation of the constitutional provision relating to self incrimination.

RATIO: Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his own hand, he may or may not, on cross-examination, write in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare his handwriting with the one in question. Here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may identify him as the falsifier. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain a specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained, that is not reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. In the case of People vs. Badilla (48 Phil., 718), it does not appear that the defendants and other witnesses were questioned by the fiscal against their will, and if they did not refuse to answer, they must be understood to have waived their constitutional privilege. “The privilege not to give self-incriminating evidence, while absolute when claimed, may be waived by any one entitled to invoke it."

ISSUE: Whether or not the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined violates the Bill of Rights and the Code of Criminal Procedure. HELD: No it does not. Writ of habeas corpus being prayed for was denied. RATIO: The court in this case cited the decision of J. Holmes in Holt v. US, where he said: "The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The Supreme Court also noted that the law means "simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.” This explanation is believed to be a deterrent to “repulsive methods of interrogating an accused person by which to extort unwilling confessions with the ever-present temptation to commit the crime of perjury.”

PEOPLE vs OLVIS (1987) 154 scra 513 P: Sarmiento, J BELTRAN vs SAMSON (1929) P: Romualdez, J FACTS: The petitioner complains that Judge Samson ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified. The respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for. The fiscal under section 1687 of the Administrative Code, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear. The petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General Orders, No. 58 which reads: "Nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence. ISSUE: Whether or not compelling the petitioner to write, which was dictated by the Fiscal, for the purpose of comparing the petitioner’s handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, violates the petitioner’s right against self-incrimination. YES. The writ of prohibition was GRANTED and it is ordered that the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his

FACTS: On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, siblings, went to the Police Station of Zamboanga to report their brother, Discredit (Deosdedit) Bagon, missing for 2 days, who was last seen together with Dominador Sorela (one of the 4 accused). The police picked up all the 3 accused and it was discovered that the body of the victim was left in the rice field. The necropsy report disclosed that the victim suffered several stab and hack wounds. Investigators found out, after ordering the accused to re-enact the incident, that the killing was ordered by Anacleto OLVIS, mayor, for a reward of P3,000 each (through separate written confessions). The court charged OLVIS as principal by inducement and the other 3 as principal by direct participation, for the crime of murder. On appeal, the court acquitted OLVIS for having no evidence that tend to establish his complicity in the case, and sentenced the 3 to suffer the penalty of DEATH. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements made by the 3 accused-appelants, as an extrajudicial confession, can stand up in court. HELD: No. The extrajudicial confessions made by the accused are inadmissible in evidence because it suffer from a Constitutional infirmity when the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to counsel; and the forced re-enactments ordered by the investigating officers violates their right against self incrimination which is, that “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself”. Decision of the lower court was MODIFIED; Cademas and Sorela were ACQUITTED, only Romulo Villarojo was found guilty of HOMICIDE plus P30,000 indemnity to the heirs.

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SELF INCRIMINATION CASES

RATIO: As held in the case of People v. Decierdo, prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. CHAVEZ vs CA (1968) 24 scra 663 P: Sanchez, J FACTS: Petitioner, together with 5 accused and 3 Does (who were not apprehended) after being charged for the crime of Qualified Theft of a motor vehicle [Thunderbird Car], pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. However, only Roger CHAVEZ was found guilty for the crime, after hearing 2 versions of the incident from the persons involve, in his failure to pay Johnson Lee. On appeal, the CA dismissed the appeal due to the delay in filing by the petitioner’s counsel. After having been granted the alternative remedies of certiorari, the petitioner argued that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial, which resulted in his conviction; he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against himself. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner's assertion, that he was compelled to testify against himself, entitles him to be discharged from custody. HELD: Yes. Section 1, Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself." In the case at bar, petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary, he claimed the right upon being called to testify. The Supreme Court ordered the Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons to discharge petitioner from custody. RATIO: Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense counsel "could not object to have the

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accused called on the witness stand." The cumulative impact of all these is that accusedpetitioner had to take the stand. He was thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence. Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, and accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any and all questions. For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for the People would be to incriminate him. The rule positively intends to avoid and prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction." This rule may apply even to a co-defendant in a joint trial. CABAL vs KAPUNAN, jr (1962) 6 scra 1059 P: Concepcion, J FACTS: Col. Maristela filed w/ Secretary of National Defense a complaint charging Manuel Cabal, then AFP Chief of Staff, with “graft and corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, conduct unbecoming… dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements as to financial life, etc.” A month later, the President created a committee (3 former justices, 2 generals) to investigate the administrative charge and submit a report ASAP. Upon request of Maristela, Cabal was asked to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for Maristela. Cabal objected, invoking his right against self-incrimination. Committee insisted he take the witness stand subject to his right to refuse to answer incriminatory questions. Cabal still refused. Committee referred matter to City Fiscal of Manila who filed with the CFI a charge on Cabal of contempt. Respondent judge Kapunan ordered petitioner to show cause. Instead petitioner tried to have charges against him quashed. Note that an accused in a criminal case may refuse to answer incriminatory and take the witness stand. ISSUE: Whether or not the proceedings before the committee is civil or criminal, determining whether or not Cabal may invoke right against self-incrimination. HELD: Yes. Although technically a civil proceeding, as a consequence of forfeiture being in the nature of a penalty, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal in substance and effect. Hence, exemption of Cabal in criminal case from obligation to be witnesses against him is proper. The writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction was GRANTED and respondent Judge hereby enjoined permanently from proceeding further in Criminal Case. RATIO: The purpose of the charge is to apply RA 1379 Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture of the State of property of a public officer or employee which is out of proportion of his salary and other lawful income. Such forfeiture is of the nature of a penalty as it is a divestiture of property w/o compensation, imposed by way of punishment by the lawmaking power to insure a prescribed course of conduct. It restrains the commission of an offense,

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SELF INCRIMINATION CASES

the effect of which is to transfer the title to the specific thing from owner to the sovereign power. Moreover, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, as in the case at bar, he may invoke the right against selfincrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. PASCUAL vs BME (1969) 28 scra 344 P: Fernando, J FACTS: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court and prohibited respondent Board from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself" he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by the respondent Board. ISSUE: Whether or not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause. HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. Decision of the lower court is AFFIRMED. RATIO: The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

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with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens. GARRITY vs NEW JERSEY (1967) 385 US 493 FACTS: Appelants, police officers in NJ, were questioned concerning alleged “traffic ticket fixing”. Each officer was warned that anything he said might be used against him in a state criminal proceeding; he could refuse to answer if the disclosure would tend to incriminate him, however, if he refused to answer he would be subject to removal from office. The officer’s answer to the questions was used against them which resulted in their convictions. The State Supreme Court on appeal also upheld the convictions despite the claim that the statements of the officers were coerced by reason of the fact that if they refused to answer they could, under the New Jersey forfeiture-of-office statute, lose their positions. ISSUE: Whether or not the statements of the appellants were coerced by reason of the fact that, if they refused to answer, they could lose their positions with the police department; and whether or not a State, contrary to the requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, can use the threat of discharge to secure incriminatory evidence against an employee. HELD: Yes. The threat of removal from public office under the forfeiture-of-office statute to induce the petitioners to forgo the privilege against selfincrimination secured by the Fourteenth Amendment rendered the resulting statements involuntary and therefore inadmissible in the state criminal proceedings. US Supreme Court GRANTED the certiorari and REVERSED the decision. RATIO: The choice given to the petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate them. The option to lose their means of livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 464 -465, is "likely to exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice." We think the statements were infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions. We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic. SPEVACK vs KLEIN (1967) 385 US 511

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along

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SELF INCRIMINATION CASES

FACTS: In a proceeding to discipline petitioner, a member of the New York bar, for professional misconduct for failure to produce demanded financial records and for refusal to testify at a judicial inquiry, petitioner defended on the ground that production of the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court ordered him disbarred, holding that the privilege against self-incrimination was not available in light of Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed on the authority of Cohen v. Hurley, and on the further ground that the Fifth Amendment privilege does not apply to a demand, not for oral testimony, but for records required by the Appellate Division to be kept by an attorney. The Court of Appeals alternately affirmed the judgment disbarring petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the principle of Malloy vs Hogan (the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence) is inapplicable because petitioner is a member of the Bar. HELD: No. The court finds no room in the privilege against self-incrimination for classifications of people so as to deny it to some and extend it to others. Lawyers are not exempt from the words "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself"; and we can imply no exception. Like the school teacher in Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 , and the policemen in Garrity v. New Jersey, lawyers also enjoy first-class citizenship. The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been absorbed in the Fourteenth, that it extends its protection to lawyers as well as to other individuals, and that it should not be watered down by imposing the dishonor of disbarment and the deprivation of a livelihood as a price for asserting it. These views, expounded in the dissents in Cohen v. Hurley, need not be elaborated again. Judgment REVERSED. MCKUNE vs LILE (2002) 536 US 24 FACTS: A few years before his release, prison officials ordered Robert Lile, who was convicted of rape, to participate in a Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP). As part of the program, participating inmates are required to complete and sign an "Admission of Responsibility" form, in which they accept responsibility for the crimes for which they have been sentenced, and complete a sexual history form detailing all prior sexual activities, regardless of whether the activities constitute uncharged criminal offenses. The information obtained from SATP participants is not privileged. By refusing to participate, a prisoner's privileges are reduced. Lile refused to participate in the SATP on the ground that the required disclosures of his criminal history would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The District Court granted Lile summary judgment. In affirming, the Court of Appeals held that the compelled self-incrimination can be established by penalties that do not constitute deprivations of protected liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. The appellate court concluded that the SATP could treat inmate admissions as privileged.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Kansas Sexual Abuse Treatment Program violate inmates' Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination. HELD: No. In a plurality opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held that the SATP serves a vital penological purpose, and that offering inmates minimal incentives to participate does not amount to compelled self-incrimination prohibited by the Fifth Amendment. Filing an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, while noting that the Court was divided over the standard for evaluating compulsion for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting, agreed that Lile's argument was unpersuasive. Justice O'Connor reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's text does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person's refusal to incriminate himself; it prohibits only the compulsion of such testimony. Justice John Paul Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer joined, arguing that the Court's decision “characterized a threatened harm as 'a minimal incentive.”