Egypt Exploration Society
Some Notes on the Battle of Kadesh: Being a Military Commentary on Professor J. H. Breasted's Book, "The Battle of Kadesh" (University of Chicago Press, 1903) Author(s): A. H. Burne Source: The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, Vol. 7, No. 3/4 (Oct., 1921), pp. 191-195 Published by: Egypt Exploration Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3853565 . Accessed: 05/09/2011 18:02 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
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SOME NOTES ON THE BATTLE OF KADESH BEING A MILITARY COMMENTARY ON PROFESSOR J. H. BREASTED'S BOOK, THE BATTLE OF KADESHI (UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS, 1903). BY MAJOR A. H. BURNE,
R.A.
THE Battle of Kadesh is of peculiar interest to students of military history, inasmuch as it is the first battle in history of which we have the details recorded with any approach to accuracy and precision. The work. by Professor Breasted on the subject is thus of the greatest possible interest. If I venture, therefore, to offer a few comments on the book it is not to disparage it, but rather to bring it to the notice of military students, encouraged thereto by Prof. T. Eric Peet, who has himself helped me with one or two suggestions. Naturally a layman. cannot call in question Professor Breasted's facts, but one is not under the same obligation to accept all the inferences he draws from those facts, and there are one or two of these inferences which to a soldier would appear at least open to doubt, if not to criticism. Taking them in chronological order, my first point, which is of no great moment, concerns the position of the Hittite army when Ramesses reached the ford eight miles south of Kadesh. I understand that the word translated "behind" in the passage " drawn up behind Kadesh " may equally well mean " around." If this were the meaning in this passage, it would read "round about Kadesh." But whichever meaning is the right one here, I think the Hittite army was then not north-west of Kadesh, but north-east or east of it. It is true the Poem states that he was north-west, but what means would the recorder of the Poem have of ascertaining the exact position of the hostile army before they came into contact ? We are not told that they captured any prisoners at this point, and if they did it is clear that the prisoners lied to them. Now the Record constantly uses the words " behind Kadesh " later on in the day to indicate " east of Kadesh." The reliefs all view the battlefield from Pharaoh's camp, whence " behind Kadesh " meant " to the east of Kadesh" which, I submit, is the correct meaning to be attached to the passage under discussion. What would be the most likely place for the Hittite king to post his army ? The two Beduins who met him south of the ford must have directed him (in accordance with instructions) over the ford and by the westerly erroute, leaving Kadesh on his right have would been in doubt as to which side not done so the Hittite had hand. If they king of the Orontes the Egyptians would approach Kadesh by, and he would have had to send out patrols to establish contact and report the route taken. But there was no sign of any hostile patrols until Ramesses came level with Kadesh. If the Beduins had these instructions it must obviously have been the Hittites' intention to lie on the eastern side of the town hidden partly by the houses, but more by the prominent hill which rises in the centre of the town. If we are to believe the Poem in its statement that the Hittite army was north-west of Kadesh that morning it is inconceivable that Ramesses could have encamped on the same spot a few hours later, as Professor Breasted makes him do, without some traces of the enemy's carnp being left. To move an army of 20,000 men across a broad river by a ford
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would be a considerable military operation, and at 2.30 p.m. there would probably still be some laggards and camp-followers moving across. No, I think we can give the Hittite king credit for doing the right thing, and doing it in the right way. His plans appear to have been well conceived and well carried out, up to a point. Next, let us consider Ramesses' march on this great day. We are asked to believe that when he heard that the Hittites had refused fight and were posted round Aleppo, Pharaoh was so elated by the news that he pushed on in desperate haste, casting military precautions to the winds. What was the situation ? The Egyptians had been marching continuously for thirty days, covering on an average thirteen miles a day. This was no mean achievement and amounted almost to a forced march for the infantry. Aleppo is still a hundred miles distant. The troops are getting footsore and weary, whereas the enemy is supposed to be stationary, and hence presumably fresh. What object will Pharaoh achieve by pushing on at still greater speed, while there are still a dozen marches in front of him, and with no prospect of effecting a surprise at the end of it ? But it may be asked, in that case how do you account for the undoubted fact that Pharaoh's host was strung out over many miles of country? I think it can be explained in the following way. The strength of his army is taken to be about 20,000 men, in four divisions of 5000 each. Half this force consisted of chariotry. Now each chariot contained only two men, and allowing it a road space in column of route of ten yards, 5000 chariots would occupy a space of 50,000 yards (over 28 miles) if all were together and closed up. On an open plain they could of course advance in line, but at defiles they might have to go in single file, and there were two defiles in this day's march, namely (1) the river Orontes, (2) the forest of Baui. As a matter of fact 5000 is probably an over-estimate of the numnber of chariots; but assuming that the chariots could cross the river and traverse the forest two abreast they would still extend over a matter of seven or eight miles. If the infantry marched ten abreast they would require about two miles. Then there are also flocks and herds to be considered. It is clear from the reliefs that each division took with it sheep, oxen and goats. On the whole, if we say that the entire army would require ten miles of road space when all the divisions were closed up, we shall probably not be far wrong. Travelling at 21 miles per hour it would take the column four hours to pass a given point. But we know that the divisions were not closed up. A gap of about 1 I miles existed between Amnunand Rec, and this can be easily accounted for by the ford. At the previous night's camp there was no water. It is almost certain that there would be a halt to water and feed on reaching the ford. The rear divisions as they came up would probably have to wait until the divisions in front had finished their meal and moved on. Not knowing that another defile, in the shape of the forest, was in front of them the commander of division Re( might wait until his whole force was closed up before moving on. Thus the gap of 1I miles between him and Amiiunwould arise. And it is natural to suppose that the same would occur in the case of Ptah and Setekh. The total length of the column from the head of Amuin to the head of Setekh would thus approximate to ten miles, without Pharaoh unduly forcing the pace in front. Now the distance from the ford to the evening's camp is about eight miles, so we should expect to find that as Rarnesses was entering camp the head of division Setekh would be still two miles short of the ford, and division Ptah would be in the act of crossing the ford. This in fact is apparently the actual situation, and is substantially borne out by the Poem.
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If Pharaoh had any inkling of the proximity of the enemy this would be a faulty formation to adopt, but assuming that his information was reliable there does not seem much to criticise. His army is doing a long and trying march and has yet another 100 miles to do before it expects to give battle. Ramesses endeavours to lighten the journey by keeping his columns strung out. Everyone knows how it adds to the comfort and marching powers of troops to give them " elbow room " on the march. On reaching a favourable camping ground which happens to be close to a walled city (Kadesh) Pharaoh omits no precautions but erects a zariba round his camp and sends out patrols towards the city. Up to date he can congratulate himself that he has done pretty well. He has made a satisfactory march and is looking forward to his tea. But what a surprise is in store for him! From now onwards I think it would be a mistake to follow too closely the various accounts of the battle which ensued. Historical accuracy is more than we can expect. The battle was evidently a confused melee, a sort of Inkerman, and it is not to be expected that the subsequent historian would have sufficient data to put facts in their correct chronological order. A battle destroys all sense of time, indeed important events in the Battle of Waterloo are still in dispute and times for a given stage in the fight vary by as much as 1i hours! So that I think all we can say for certain is that the Hittite charioteers struck ReCin the right flank, dispersed it and overran the Egyptian camp, and began to plunder it. Now comes a very important event-" the arrival of the recruits " (lit. "youths "). The court historian naturally makes out that Ramesses by his personal valour turned the scale and drove the enemy into the river. I take leave to doubt this. I attribute the turn in the tide to the arrival of the "recruits." If they played the decisive part in the battle that I believe they did, it is as well- to try and discover who they were and how they came to arrive " at the right place at the right time." First of all, then, who were these "recruits ? I see no reason whatever to suppose that they are the division Amun returning to the fight. They are marching in perfect order and serried ranks in the reliefs, and are obviously fresh troops. They could hardly be a draft of real recruits just arrived from Egypt, because it was the opening of the campaign, and even if they had been sent after the army so soon they could he would have been incorporated in the ranks of the older up. They hardly have caught thethem soldiers before the army ever set out from Egypt. Can they have been a friendly tribe from Amor, arriving in the nick of time from the west ? Evidently that was the direction they did arrive from. But their dress and appearance in the reliefs does not differentiate them from the Egyptians. Also they would have joined Ramesses south of Ribleh instead of coming in from the west. The road through Hurmel (Map III) looks too mountainous for the chariots which they are shown as possessing. If they had come from the sea by the Nahr el-Kebir (Map I) they could have had no sort of previous communication with Ramesses, and to have struck in at precisely the right time and place of the whole campaign would be such a strange coincidence that the Egyptians would have had a little more to say on the matter. Also the Record says distinctly that they were Pharaoh's troops, which they look like on the reliefs. What, then, was this force ? I suggest that they were part of the garrison which Pharaoh had left behind at his sea-base the previous year; that he had picked them up on his advance and attached them to one of his divisions. The Record mentions that he put the divisions into their order of march on the shore of Amor (his base), and what more natural Journ. of Egypt. Arch. vii.
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than that he should pick up every available man there ? These troops would in a sense be "young men," i.e. "fresh" troops. They would be placed in the centre of the army and attached to either the rear of Re¢ or the van of Ptah. Let us try to reconstruct the scene. And to do so we must go back a little. Passage No. 18 over one of the Reliefs has a sentence which Professor Breasted translates, "Now the division of ReC and the division of Ptah were (still) on the march; they had not (yet) arrived, and their officers were in the forest of Baui." From this the Professor infers that their officers had somehow got separated from their troops. This is unconvincing; it is, moreover, now known that the word here rendered "officer"means no more than "soldier." We may therefore translate (with a slight AKADESH AmnUn grammatical deviation due to Erman), "their ~J6'y,men ^ w) had not yet come out of the wood of Baui." In other words these two divisions had n / I/nfantry nnotyet debouched from the forest. This fits ~/ ,^' g^ "1.\H InrE < ~X ~Chariotry R. / ar X\ ~C _ (h ?/
in with probabilities, and I think we may take
it that when the vizier (or his messenger) went back the "recruits" would be about in the position shown in the accompanying rough I / sketch. As they debouched from the forest they would see the plain to their right front alive "Recruits"l with hostile chariotry: the rear of division fg9 nJ?.O16 Forest , 'Q ReC would come running back into them with ] wild stories. Their obvious course would be BOui Qq / 8f _ to bear away to the left, being too few in numbers to attack in front. About that time ,11 \ the vizier would pass them, on his way to P~tah~ bring up Ptah. He would say to them "skirt round to the left, avoiding the battle in your P\tah~~ immediate front and see if you can help Pharaoh, who is in dire straits. Meanwhile I am /p Ard \ going back to bring up Ptah. While you ~ attack in flank I will attack frontally with Setekh (outspanned) Ptah." We know that this is what he did E-----! gyptians gyptians actually do, and the above seems to me the 7 Hittites natural and probable course of events. J There remains one more interesting study before us-that of the Hittite king. It is indeed unfortunate that we have not his account of the battle. He would have had some caustic remarks to make if he could have seen Ramesses' version. Up to a point his work was brilliant. Then, suddenly and unaccountably he seems to become paralysed. He commits a portion of his chariotry to the attack. Then he pauses apparently irresolutely. Then he sends the remainder of his cavalry. Then he hesitates again, and dares not commit his infantry. Why ? Possibly the ford was over deep for infantry and he could not induce them to cross. But I think the most likely reason is lack of that higher gift in a leader-nerve and resolution at the critical moment. Lacking _4ri
f_
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this I think he just falls short of being a really great commander. A squadron of cavalry are enlarged upon the enemy. They disappear in a cloud of dust. The situation becomes " obscure," the commander waits for it to clarify. Alas, fatal delay ! the enemy recovers his Many equilibrium, puts a bold face on it, refuses to believe he is beaten, and-wins! instances of this could be cited from the late war. The post-war edition of Field Service Regulations formulates the eight "principles of war." It is an interesting task to apply them to the campaign of Kadesh, with the object of seeing how they stand the test. That task is outside the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that the Hittite king observed the first seven of those principles and was consequently in a winning position, but threw away his chances of success by violating the eighth, while Pharaoh by regarding the eighth principle pulled off the victory.
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