brondial Special Civil Actions Cases

PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988 ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST SPECIAL CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents. PARAS, J.: This is a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeking to set aside the two resolutions of public respondent First Special Cases Division of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 04869 entitled "North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists versus Hon. Antonia CorpusMacandog, Presiding Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation, (a) dated September 5, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 21-25) reconsidering its Decision 1 of February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48) and ordering petitioner to deposit whatever amounts due from it under the Land Development Agreement, and (b) dated February 13, 1986 (Rollo, p. 27) denying for lack of merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and private respondent North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists (MISSION for short) are corporations duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. They executed a Land Development Agreement (Rollo, pp. 179-182) on October 6, 1976 whereby the former undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility necessary improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot. Out of the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through a designated depositary trustee bank. On the same date private respondent executed in petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage (Rollo, pp. 183-186) on the lots with titles involved in the land development project. The deed was supplemented by a Sale of Real Property with Mortgage and Special Conditions dated October 28, 1978 (Rollo, pp. 189-194 The amounts totalling about P984,110.82 paid by petitioner were to be considered as part of the 40% due private respondent under the Land Development Agreement. All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for interpleader (Rollo, pp. 169-179) against private respondent MISSION and Maysilo Estate, docketed as Special Court Case No. C-9556 of the then CFI of Rizal, Branch XII, Caloocan, alleging among others, that in view of the conflicting claims of ownership of the defendants (herein private respondent and Maysilo Estate) over the properties subject matter of the contracts, over which plaintiff corporation (herein petitioner) has no claim of ownership except as a purchaser thereof, and to protect the interests of plaintiff corporation which has no interest in the subject matter of the dispute and is willing to pay whoever is entitled or declared to be the owners of said properties, the defendants should be required to interplead and litigate their several claims between themselves (Rollo, p. 177). An order was issued by the presiding judge 2 requiring defendants to interplead on October 22, 1981. MISSION filed a motion to dismiss dated November 10, 1981 for lack of cause of action but also presented an answer dated November 12, 1981. The motion to dismiss was denied in an Order dated January 12, 1982. The heirs of Maysilo Estate filed their own answer dated November 11, 1981 and an amended answer dated October 20, 1983 thru the estate's special receiver. The heirs of Pedro Banon filed an "Answer in Intervention with Special and Affirmative Defenses" dated October 24, 1983, while Lilia B. Sevilla and husband Jose Seelin filed their "Answer in Cross-claim" dated October 31, 1983 (Rollo, p. 30). The heirs of Sofia O'Farrel y Patino, et al. filed their Answer in Intervention dated November 10, 1983. However, earlier on November 21, 1982, private respondent presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from petitioner. Acting on such motion, the trial court 3 denied judicial deposit in its order dated February 13, 1984, the decretal portion of which reads: PREMISES CONSIDERED, all or the full amount the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation have already paid the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventist is hereby ordered to deposit the same to

this Court within thirty (30) days from receipt of this order considering that real or true owner of the subject properties in question, due hearing of this court has yet to be undergone in order to decide as to who is the true owner which is a prejudicial question. Hence the motion dated November 21, 1983 of the NPUM for the Eternal Gardens Corporation to deposit the balance due and unpaid is hereby ordered denied and the opposition thereto dated December 19, 1983 is hereby ordered granted. The contract between the Eternal Gardens Corporation and the North Philippine Union Mission dated October 16, 1976 is ordered and declared ineffective as of today, February 13, 1984 because the subject matter of the sale is not existing between the contracting parties until after the question of ownership is resolved by this court. The court will order the revival of the contract if the North Philippine Union Mission will win. If not, the declared winner among the intervenors will be the party to enter into a contract of sale with the plaintiff as aforementioned. (Rollo, p. 66). Another order dated October 26, 1984 was issued amending the February 13, 1984 order and setting aside the order for private respondent's deposit of the amounts it had previously received from petitioner, thus: WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS the order of February 13, 1984, is hereby ordered amended, reconsidered and modified by this same Court as follows: (a) The order directing the NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION CORPORATION OF SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS to deposit the amounts it received under the implementation of the LAND DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT which is not questioned by the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens, is hereby ordered set aside for the reason that the titles to ownership, the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of Seventh Day Adventists on the lots subject matter of the aforesaid agreement is not established invalid, and the alleged titles of intervenors are not proven yet by competent evidence; (b) The motion to require Eternal Gardens to deposit the balance under the Land Development Agreement is likewise hereby ordered denied considering the fact the aforesaid plaintiff had not denied its obligations under the aforesaid contract; and (c) The trial or hearing is hereby ordered as scheduled to proceed on November 29, 1984 and on December 6, 1984 at 8:30 in the morning per order of this Court dated October 4, 1984 in order to determine the alleged claims of ownership by the intervenors and all claims and allegations of each party to the instant" case will be considered and decided carefully by this court on just and meritorious grounds. (Rollo, p. 39) Said Orders were assailed twice in the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals) and in the Supreme Court as follows: In G.R. No. 73569 it appeared that on January 11, 1985, MISSION filed a motion to dismiss the Interpleader and the claims of the Maysilo Estate and the Intervenors and to order the Eternal Gardens to comply with its Land Management with MISSION. On January 28, 1985, the trial court passed a resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court, after a lengthy, careful judicious study and perusal of all the stand of each and everyone of all the parties participating in this case, hereby orders the dismissal of the interpleader, and the interventions filed by the intervenors, heirs of Pedro Banon, heirs of O'Farrel, heirs of Rivera, heirs of Maria del Concepcion Vidal, consolidated with the Maysilo Estate as represented by receiver Arturo Salientes the heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion, and Lilia Sevilla Seeling This Court likewise orders the plaintiff, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation to comply with the Land Development Agreement dated October 6, 1978, it entered into with the North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh-Day Adventists. (Rollo. p. 68)

The heirs of the Maysilo Estate moved for reconsideration of the aforementioned order of dismissal, the hearing of which was requested to be set on February, 28, 1985. However, the trial judge, on February 14, 1985 issued the following orders: Considering Motions for Reconsideration filed, the Court resolves that the same be GRANTED and instead of a hearing of the said motions on February 20, 1985, at 8:30 a.m., a hearing on the merits shall be held. (Rollo, p. 68) In spite of the February 14, 1985 order, MISSION filed on March 6, 1985 a motion for Writ of Execution of the resolution of January 28, 1985. This was denied on June 25, 1985. The said court further set the case for pre-trial and trial on July 18, 1985. It was elevated on certiorari and mandamus to the Intermediate Appellate Court (Court of Appeals), docketed as AC-G.R. Sp No. 06696 "North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, vs. Hon. Antonia Corpus-Macandog Presiding Judge, Branch CXX, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation, and Heirs of Vicente Singson Encarnacion It was raffled to the Second Special Division. MISSION assailed the February 14, 1985 and June 25, 1985 orders as violative of due process and attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The petition was however dismissed in the decision of said Appellate Court, promulgated on December 4, 1985, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, for want of merit the petition for certiorari and mandamus under consideration cannot be given due course and is accordingly, DISMISSED, without any pronouncement, as to costs. The restraining order embodied in Our Resolution of July 31, 1985, is hereby lifted. (Rollo, G.R. No. 73569 p. 232) The private respondent challenged the above decision in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569. In its resolution dated June 11, 1986, the Supreme Court denied the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, as follows: G.R. No. 73569 (North Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day Adventists vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.) considering the allegations, issues, and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolved to DENY the same for lack of merit. (Ibid p. 263) Said resolution has become final and executory on July 16, 1986. (Ibid p. 269) Earlier in 1983, the heirs of the late spouses Vicente Singson Encarnacion and Lucila Conde filed Civil Case No. C-11836 for quieting of title with Branch CXXII, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, where petitioner and private respondent were named as defendants. Said case is still pending in the lower Court. In the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794, MISSION, herein private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as AC-G.R. No. 04869 praying that the aforementioned Orders of February 13, 1984 and October 26, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court be set aside and that an order be issued to deposit in court or in a depositor trustee bank of any and all payments, plus interest thereon, due the private respondent MISSION under the Land Development Agreement, said amounts deposited to be paid to whomever may be found later to be entitled thereto, with costs. (Rollo, G.R. No. 73794 p. 38) The Intermediate Appelate Court, acting through its First Special Cases Division 4 dismissed the petition in its decision on February 27, 1985 (Rollo, pp. 38-48). In its Resolution 5 promulgated on September 5, 1985, the Court however, reversed its decision, thus: WHEREFORE, the Court reconsiders its decision of February 27, 1986, and sets aside the questioned portions of the respondent Court's orders of February 13 and October 26, 1984. The private respondent is hereby ordered to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court to be the depository trustee of the said amounts to be paid to whoever shall be found entitled thereto. No costs. (Rollo, p. 25)

Eternal Gardens moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but it was denied for lack of merit in a resolution promulgated on February 13, 1986, which states: The private respondent Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's resolution promulgated September 5, 1985 requiring it "to deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement of October 6, 1976 ...," which was strongly opposed by the petitioner North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists, is hereby denied for lack of merit, reiterating as it does, the very same issues and arguments that were passed upon and considered by the Court in the very same resolution sought to be reconsidered. (Rollo, p. 27) Hence, this petition. On July 8,1987, the Third Division of this Court issued the following resolution: ... the court RESOLVED to give due course to this petition and require the parties to file memoranda. In the meantime, to avoid possible wastage of funds, the Court RESOLVED to require the private respondent 6 to DEPOSIT its accruing installments within ten (10) days from notice with a reputable commercial bank in a savings deposit account, in the name of the Supreme Court of the Philippines, with the details to be reported or manifested to this Court within ten (10) days from the time the deposit/deposits are made, such deposits not to be withdrawn without authority from this Court. (Rollo, p. 162) Petitioner's Memorandum With Prayer for the Deferment of Time to Make Deposit (Rollo, p. 218-236) was filed on July 14, 1987. Its prayer was granted for a period of ten (10) days for the purpose, in the resolution of July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 238). Private respondent filed its Opposition to Deferment of Time to Make Deposit (Rollo, pp. 239-253) on July 24, 1987 to which petitioner filed its Reply to Opposition on August 4, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 256-267). Both were noted by the Court in its resolution dated September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 270). On August 25, 1987, private respondent filed its Rejoinder to Petitioner's Reply to Opposition (Rollo, pp. 271292). Petitioner filed its Supplemental Memorandum with Reply to Opposition (To Deferment of time to Make Deposit) on August 31, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 294-313) and a Sur-rejoinder on September 1, 1987 (Rollo, pp. 304315). The main issues in this case are: I Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the respondent court. II Whether or not the dismissal of AC-G.R. SP No. 06696 (North Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventists vs. Hon. Macandog, et al.) by the Second Special Cases Division of the IAC which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 73569 constitutes a basis for the dismissal of the case at bar on the ground of res adjudicata. I There is no question that courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgments have not yet attained finality (Villanueva v. Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro, Pinamalayan Branch II, 119 SCRA 288 [1982]). In fact, motions for reconsideration are allowed to convince the courts that their rulings are erroneous and improper Siy v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 543-544 [1985]; Guerra Enterprises Co., Inc. v. CFI of Lanao del Sur (32 SCRA 317 [1970]) and in so doing, said courts are given sufficient opportunity to correct their errors. In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay whoever is declared entitled to said amounts. Such

admissions in the complaint were reaffirmed in open court before the Court of Appeals as stated in the latter court's resolution dated September 5, 1985 in A.C. G.R. No. 04869 which states: The private respondent (MEMORIAL) then reaffirms before the Court its original position that it is a disinterested party with respect to the property now the subject of the interpleader case ... In the light of the willingness, expressly made before the court, affirming the complaint filed below, that the private respondent (MEMORIAL) will pay whatever is due on the Land Development Agreement to the rightful owner/owners, there is no reason why the amount due on subject agreement has not been placed in the custody of the Court. (Rollo, p. 227). Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).

propriety of the order of respondent appellant court that petitioner Eternal Gardens should deposit whatever amounts are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be designated by the Court. In fact, there is a pending trial on the merits in the trial court which the petitioner insists is a prejudicial question which should first be resolved. Moreover, while there may be Identity of parties and of subject matter, the Land Development Contract, there is no Identity of issues as clearly shown by the petitions filed. PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit; (b) this case (together with all the claims of the intervenors on the merits) is REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings; and (c) the resolution of the Third Division of this Court of July 8, 1987 requiring the deposit by the petitioner (see footnote No. 6) of the amounts contested in a depositary bank STANDS (the Motion for Reconsideration thereof being hereby DENIED for reasons already discussed) until after the decision on the merits shall have become final and executory. SO ORDERED.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity: "that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto." (Rollo, p. 24). The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court. (Rollo, p.-25) Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turn-about, presently claiming in its memorandum that there is a novation of contract so that the amounts due under the Land Development Agreement were allegedly extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit of said amounts in a depositary bank should be held in abeyance until after the conflicting claims of ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTCCaloocan City, has finally been resolved. All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, riot only in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such deposit was required in "the resolution of July 8, 1987 to avoid wastage of funds. II The claim that this case should be barred by res judicata is even more untenable. The requisite of res judicata are: (1) the presence of a final former judgment; (2) the former judgment was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is between the first and the second action identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action Arguson v. Miclat 135 SCRA 678 [1985]; Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344 [1984]). There is no argument against the rule that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once and when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate (Sy Kao v. Court of Appeals, 132 SCRA 302 [1984]). But a careful review of the records shows that there is no judgment on the merits in G.R. No. 73569 and in the case at bar, G.R. No. 73794; both of which deal on mere incidents arising therefrom. In G.R. No 73569, the issue raised is the propriety of the grant of the motion for reconsideration without a hearing thereon and the denial of the motion for execution, while in the case at bar, what is assailed is the

G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976 WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.

LEE E. WON alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees. Leonardo Abola for appellant. Alfonso V. Agcaoli & Ramon A. Barcelona for appellee Lee E. Won. Bienvenido A. Tan in his own behalf.

complaint, instead of compelling the appellees to interplead because there actually are conflicting claims between the latter with respect to the ownership of membership fee certificate 201, and, as there is not Identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action, between civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila and the present action, the complaint should not have been dismissed upon the ground of res judicata.

CASTRO, C.J.: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in civil case 7656, dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's complaint of interpleader upon the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and res judicata.

On the other hand, the appellees argue that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint, because, having the effect of reopening civil case 26044, the present action is barred by res judicata.

In its amended and supplemental complaint of October 23, 1963, the Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal (hereinafter referred to as the Corporation), alleged, for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc." and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963 by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank & Trust Company as transfer agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201; that under its articles of incorporation and by-laws the Corporation is authorized to issue a maximum of 400 membership fee certificates to persons duly elected or admitted to proprietary membership, all of which have been issued as early as December 1939; that it claims no interest whatsoever in the said membership fee certificate 201; that it has no means of determining who of the two defendants is the lawful owner thereof; that it is without power to issue two separate certificates for the same membership fee certificate 201, or to issue another membership fee certificate to the defendant Lee, without violating its articles of incorporation and by-laws; and that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199 held by the defendant Tan and the membership fee certificate 201-serial No. 1478 issued to the defendant Lee proceed from the same membership fee certificate 201, originally issued in the name of "Swan, Culbertson and Fritz". For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued by the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan, holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of his refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate action to protect his rights despite the fact that he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject matter of this litigation; and that he is made a part so that complete relief may be accorded herein. The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee. In separate motions the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon the grounds of res judicata, failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, and bar by prescription. 1 These motions were duly opposed by the Corporation. Finding the grounds of bar by prior judgment and failure to state a cause of action well taken, the trial court dismissed the complaint, with costs against the Corporation. In this appeal, the Corporation contends that the court a quo erred (1) in finding that the allegations in its amended and supplemental complaint do not constitute a valid ground for an action of interpleader, and in holding that "the principal motive for the present action is to reopen the Manila Case and collaterally attack the decision of the said Court"; (2) in finding that the decision in civil case 26044 of the CFI of Manila constitutes res judicata and bars its present action; and (3) in dismissing its action instead of compelling the appellees to interplead and litigate between themselves their respective claims. The Corporations position may be stated elsewise as follows: The trial court erred in dismissing the

Although res judicata or bar by a prior judgment was the principal ground availed of by the appellees in moving for the dismissal of the complaint and upon which the trial court actually dismissed the complaint, the determinative issue, as can be gleaned from the pleadings of the parties, relates to the propriety and timeliness of the remedy of interpleader. The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 2 is a remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is entitled to tone or the one thing. The remedy is afforded to protect a person not against double liability but against double vexation in respect of one liability. 3 The procedure under the Rules of Court 4 is the same as that under the Code of Civil Procedure, 5 except that under the former the remedy of interpleader is available regardless of the nature of the subject-matter of the controversy, whereas under the latter an interpleader suit is proper only if the subject-matter of the controversy is personal property or relates to the performance of an obligation. There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining. A stakeholder 6 should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. 7 He need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of interpleader. 8 He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. 9 Otherwise, he may be barred by laches 10 or undue delay. 11 But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred. 12 Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader. It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the latter. 14 In once case, 15 it was declared: The record here discloses that long before the rendition of the judgment in favor of relators against the Hanover Fire Insurance Company the latter had notice of the adverse claim of South to the proceeds of the policy. No reason is shown why the Insurance Company did not implead South in the former suit and have the conflicting claims there determined. The Insurance Company elected not to do so and that suit proceeded to a final judgment in favor of relators. The Company thereby became independently liable to relators. It was then too late for such company to invoke the remedy of interpleader The Corporation has not shown any justifiable reason why it did not file an application for interpleader in civil case 26044 to compel the appellees herein to litigate between themselves their conflicting claims of ownership. It was only after adverse final judgment was rendered against it that the remedy of interpleader

was invoked by it. By then it was too late, because to he entitled to this remedy the applicant must be able to show that lie has not been made independently liable to any of the claimants. And since the Corporation is already liable to Lee under a final judgment, the present interpleader suit is clearly improper and unavailing. It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has not become independently liable to any of the claimants. 25 Tex. Jur. p. 52, Sec. 3; 30 Am. Jur. p. 218, Section 8. It is also the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when it is filed after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, this being especially true when the holder of the funds had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and had an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which the judgment was rendered. United Procedures Pipe Line Co. v. Britton, Tex. Civ. App. 264 S.W. 176; Nash v. McCullum, Tex. Civ. 74 S.W. 2d 1046; 30 Am. Jur. p. 223, Sec. 11; 25 Tex. Jur. p. 56, Sec. 5; 108 A.L.R., note 5, p. 275. 16 Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. And it offered no satisfactory explanation for its failure to implead Tan in the same litigation. In this factual situation, it is clear that this interpleader suit cannot prosper because it was filed much too late. If a stakeholder defends a suit by one claimant and allows it to proceed so far as a judgment against him without filing a bill of interpleader, it then becomes too late for him to do so. Union Bank v. Kerr, 2 Md. Ch. 460; Home Life Ins. Co. v. Gaulk, 86 Md. 385, 390, 38 A. 901; Gonia v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. It is one o the main offices of a bill of interpleader to restrain a separate proceeding at law by claimant so as to avoid the resulting partial judgment; and if the stakeholder acquiesces in one claimant's trying out his claim and establishing it at law, he cannot then have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. 4 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. No. 162; Mitfor's Eq. Pleading (Tyler's Ed.) 147 and 236; Langdell's Summary of Eq. Pleading, No. 162' De Zouche v. Garrizon, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A/450. 17 It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefore is delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and that this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered. (See notes and cases cited 36 Am. Dec. 703, Am. St. Rep. 598, also 5 Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. Sec. 41.) The evidence in the opinion of the majority shows beyond dispute that the appellant permitted the Parker county suit to proceed to judgment in favor of Britton with full notice of the adverse claims of the defendants in the present suit other than the assignees of the judgment (the bank and Mrs. Pabb) and no excuse is shown why he did not implead them in the suit. 18 To now permit the Corporation to bring Lee to court after the latter's successful establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of success in said civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the consequences of defeat. The act providing for the proceeding has nothing to say touching the right of one, after contesting a claim of one of the claimants to final judgment unsuccessfully, to involve the successful litigant in litigation anew by bringing an interpleader action. The question seems to be one of first impression here, but, in other jurisdictions, from

which the substance of the act was apparently taken, the rule prevails that the action cannot be resorted to after an unsuccessful trial against one of the claimants. It is well settled, both by reasons and authority, that one who asks the interposition of a court of equity to compel others, claiming property in his hands, to interplead, must do so before putting them to the test of trials at law. Yarborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. 291 (41 Am. Dec. 626); Gornish v. Tanner, 1 You. & Jer. 333; Haseltine v. Brickery, 16 Grat. (Va.) 116. The remedy by interpleader is afforded to protect the party from the annoyance and hazard of two or more actions touching the same property or demand; but one who, with knowledge of all the facts, neglects to avail himself of the relief, or elects to take the chances for success in the actions at law, ought to submit to the consequences of defeat. To permit an unsuccessful defendant to compel the successful plaintiffs to interplead, is to increase instead of to diminish the number of suits; to put upon the shoulders of others the burden which he asks may be taken from his own. ....' It is urged, however, that the American Surety Company of New York was not in position to file an interpleader until it had tested the claim of relatrix to final judgment, and that, failing to meet with success, it promptly filed the interpleader. The reason why, it urges, it was not in such position until then is that had it succeeded before this court in sustaining its construction of the bond and the law governing the bond, it would not have been called upon to file an interpleader, since there would have been sufficient funds in its hands to have satisfied all lawful claimants. It may be observed, however, that the surety company was acquainted with all of the facts, and hence that it simply took its chances of meeting with success by its own construction of the bond and the law. Having failed to sustain it, it cannot now force relatrix into litigation anew with others, involving most likely a repetition of what has been decided, or force her to accept a pro rata part of a fund, which is far from benefits of the judgment. 19 Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment. The jurisprudence of this state and the common law states is well-settled that a claimant who has been put to test of a trial by a surety, and has establish his claim, may not be impleaded later by the surety in an interpleader suit, and compelled to prove his claim again with other adverse claimants. American Surety Company of New York v. Brim, 175 La. 959, 144 So. 727; American Surety Company of New York v. Brim (In Re Lyong Lumber Company), 176 La. 867, 147 So. 18; Dugas v. N.Y. Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572; 15 Ruling Case Law, 228; 33 Corpus Juris, 477; 4 Pomeroy's Jurisprudence, 1023; Royal Neighbors of America v. Lowary (D.C.) 46 F2d 565; Brackett v. Graves, 30 App. Div. 162, 51 N.Y.S. 895; De Zouche v. Garrison, 140 Pa. 430, 21 A. 450, 451; Manufacturer's Finance Co. v. W.I. Jones Co. 141 Ga., 519, 81 S.E. 1033; Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lawder, 22 R.I. 416, 84 A. 383. There can be no doubt that relator's claim has been finally and definitely established, because that matter was passed upon by three courts in definitive judgments. The only remaining item is the value of the use of the land during the time that relator occupied it. The case was remanded solely and only for the purpose of determining the amount of that credit. In all other aspects the judgment is final. 20 It is generally held by the cases it is the office of interpleader to protect a party, not against double liability, but against double vexation on account of one liability. Gonia v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787. And so it is said that it is too late for the remedy of interpleader if the party seeking this relef has contested the claim of one of the parties and suffered judgment to be taken. In United P.P.I. Co. v. Britton (Tex. Civ. App.) 264 S.W. 576. 578, it was said: 'It is the general rule that a bill of interpleader comes too late when application therefor is delayed until after judgment has been rendered in favor of one of the claimants of the fund, and this is especially true where the holder of the fund had notice of the

conflicting claims prior to the rendition of such judgment and an opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit in which such judgment was rendered. See notes and cases cited 35 Am. Dec. 703; 91 An. St. Rep. 598; also 5 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence No. 41.' The principle thus stated has been recognized in many cases in other jurisdictions, among which may be cited American Surety Co. v. O'Brien, 223 Mass. 177, 111 N.E. 787; Phillips v. Taylor, 148 Md. 157, 129 A. 18; Moore v. Hill, 59 Ga. 760, 761; Yearborough v. Thompson, 3 Smedes & M. (11 Miss.) 291, 41 Am. Dec. 626. See, also, 33 C.J. p. 447, No. 30; Nash v. McCullum, (Tex. Civ. App.) 74 S.W. 2d 1042, 1047. It would seem that this rule should logically follow since, after the recovery of judgment, the interpleading of the judgment creditor is in effect a collateral attack upon the judgment. 21 In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes of an interpleader suit, with the possiblity that the benefits of the final judgment in the said civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay. ACCORDINGLY, the order of May 28, 1964, dismissing the complaint, is affirmed, at appellant's cost.

G.R. No. 136409 March 14, 2008 SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA, Petitioners, vs. DON LUIS DISON REALTY, INC., Respondent. DECISION NACHURA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution2 dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739 dismissing the petition filed by petitioners Josephine and Subhash Pasricha.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows: Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of Lease3 whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals, as follows: For Rooms 32/35: From March 1, 1991 to August 31, 1991 – P5,000.00/P10,000.00 From September 1, 1991 to February 29, 1992 – P5,500.00/P11,000.00 From March 1, 1992 to February 28, 1993 – P6,050.00/P12,100.00 From March 1, 1993 to February 28, 1994 – P6,655.00/P13,310.00 From March 1, 1994 to February 28, 1995 – P7,320.50/P14,641.00 From March 1, 1995 to February 28, 1996 – P8,052.55/P16,105.10 From March 1, 1996 to February 29, 1997 – P8,857.81/P17,715.61 From March 1, 1997 to February 28, 1998 – P9,743.59/P19,487.17 From March 1, 1998 to February 28, 1999 – P10,717.95/P21,435.89 From March 1, 1999 to February 28, 2000 – P11,789.75/P23,579.484 For Rooms 22 and 24: Effective July 1, 1992 – P10,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.5 For Rooms 33 and 34: Effective April 1, 1992 – P5,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.6 For Rooms 36, 37 and 38: Effective when tenants vacate said premises – P10,000.00 with an increment of 10% every two years.7 Petitioners were, likewise, required to pay for the cost of electric consumption, water bills and the use of telephone cables.8 The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34 and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts.9 While the contracts were in effect, petitioners dealt with Francis Pacheco (Pacheco), then General Manager of private respondent. Thereafter, Pacheco was replaced by Roswinda Bautista (Ms. Bautista).10 Petitioners religiously paid the monthly rentals until May 1992.11 After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment of the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58.12 Because petitioners still refused to comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed by private respondent through its representative, Ms. Bautista, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila.13 The case was raffled to Branch XIX and was docketed as Civil Case No. 143058-CV. Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment.14 To further justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the units (rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35. Petitioners eventually paid their monthly rent for December 1992 in the amount of P30,000.00, and claimed that respondent waived its right to collect the rents for the months of July to November 1992 since petitioners were prevented from using Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, and 34.15 However, they again withheld payment of rents starting January 1993 because of respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38.16 To show good faith and willingness to pay the rents, petitioners alleged that they prepared the check vouchers for their monthly rentals from January 1993 to January 1994.17 Petitioners further averred in their Amended Answer18 that the complaint for ejectment was prematurely filed, as the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. For failure of the parties to reach an amicable settlement, the pre-trial conference was terminated. Thereafter, they submitted their respective position papers. On November 24, 1994, the MeTC rendered a Decision dismissing the complaint for ejectment.19 It considered petitioners’ non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The court held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation; petitioners should have deposited their payment in the

name of respondent company. On the matter of possession of the subject premises, the court did not give credence to petitioners’ claim that private respondent failed to turn over possession of the premises. The court, however, dismissed the complaint because of Ms. Bautista’s alleged lack of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. Deciding the case on appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 9472515, reversed and set aside the MeTC Decision in this wise: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and set aside and another one is rendered ordering defendants-appellees and all persons claiming rights under them, as follows: (1) to vacate the leased premised (sic) and restore possession thereof to plaintiff-appellant; (2) to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of P967,915.80 representing the accrued rents in arrears as of November 1993, and the rents on the leased premises for the succeeding months in the amounts stated in paragraph 5 of the complaint until fully paid; and (3) to pay an additional sum equivalent to 25% of the rent accounts as and for attorney’s fees plus the costs of this suit. SO ORDERED.20 The court adopted the MeTC’s finding on petitioners’ unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment. It, however, faulted the MeTC in dismissing the case on the ground of lack of capacity to sue. Instead, it upheld Ms. Bautista’s authority to represent respondent notwithstanding the absence of a board resolution to that effect, since her authority was implied from her power as a general manager/treasurer of the company.21 Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for review on certiorari.22 On March 18, 1998, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion23 to cite Ms. Bautista for contempt; to strike down the MeTC and RTC Decisions as legal nullities; and to conduct hearings and ocular inspections or delegate the reception of evidence. Without resolving the aforesaid motion, on May 26, 1998, the CA affirmed24 the RTC Decision but deleted the award of attorney’s fees.25 Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the aforesaid decision.26 Thereafter, they filed several motions asking the Honorable Justice Ruben T. Reyes to inhibit from further proceeding with the case allegedly because of his close association with Ms. Bautista’s uncle-in-law.27 In a Resolution28 dated December 10, 1998, the CA denied the motions for lack of merit. The appellate court considered said motions as repetitive of their previous arguments, irrelevant and obviously dilatory.29 As to the motion for inhibition of the Honorable Justice Reyes, the same was denied, as the appellate court justice stressed that the decision and the resolution were not affected by extraneous matters.30 Lastly, the appellate court granted respondent’s motion for execution and directed the RTC to issue a new writ of execution of its decision, with the exception of the award of attorney’s fees which the CA deleted.31 Petitioners now come before this Court in this petition for review on certiorari raising the following issues: I. Whether this ejectment suit should be dismissed and whether petitioners are entitled to damages for the unauthorized and malicious filing by Rosario (sic) Bautista of this ejectment case, it being clear that [Roswinda] – whether as general manager or by virtue of her subsequent designation by the Board of Directors as the corporation’s attorney-in-fact – had no legal capacity to institute the ejectment suit, independently of whether Director Pacana’s Order setting aside the SEC revocation Order is a mere scrap of paper. II. Whether the RTC’s and the Honorable Court of Appeals’ failure and refusal to resolve the most fundamental factual issues in the instant ejectment case render said decisions void on their face by reason of the complete abdication by the RTC and the Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes of their constitutional duty not only to clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which a decision is based but also to resolve the decisive factual issues in any given case. III. Whether the (1) failure and refusal of Honorable Justice Ruben Reyes to inhibit himself, despite

his admission – by reason of his silence – of petitioners’ accusation that the said Justice enjoyed a $7,000.00 scholarship grant courtesy of the uncle-in-law of respondent "corporation’s" purported general manager and (2), worse, his act of ruling against the petitioners and in favor of the respondent "corporation" constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of petitioners’ property without due process of law.32 In addition to Ms. Bautista’s lack of capacity to sue, petitioners insist that respondent company has no standing to sue as a juridical person in view of the suspension and eventual revocation of its certificate of registration.33 They likewise question the factual findings of the court on the bases of their ejectment from the subject premises. Specifically, they fault the appellate court for not finding that: 1) their non-payment of rentals was justified; 2) they were deprived of possession of all the units subject of the lease contract except Room 35; and 3) respondent violated the terms of the contract by its continued refusal to turn over possession of Rooms 36, 37 and 38. Petitioners further prayed that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued enjoining the CA from enforcing its Resolution directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Thus, in a Resolution34 dated January 18, 1999, this Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective immediately until further orders. The petition lacks merit. We uphold the capacity of respondent company to institute the ejectment case. Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) suspended and eventually revoked respondent’s certificate of registration on February 16, 1995, records show that it instituted the action for ejectment on December 15, 1993. Accordingly, when the case was commenced, its registration was not yet revoked.35 Besides, as correctly held by the appellate court, the SEC later set aside its earlier orders of suspension and revocation of respondent’s certificate, rendering the issue moot and academic.36 We likewise affirm Ms. Bautista’s capacity to sue on behalf of the company despite lack of proof of authority to so represent it. A corporation has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code and those that are implied from or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.37 Thus, any person suing on behalf of the corporation should present proof of such authority. Although Ms. Bautista initially failed to show that she had the capacity to sign the verification and institute the ejectment case on behalf of the company, when confronted with such question, she immediately presented the Secretary’s Certificate38 confirming her authority to represent the company. There is ample jurisprudence holding that subsequent and substantial compliance may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure in the interest of justice.39 In Novelty Phils., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court faulted the appellate court for dismissing a petition solely on petitioner’s failure to timely submit proof of authority to sue on behalf of the corporation. In Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan,41 we upheld the sufficiency of a petition verified by an employment specialist despite the total absence of a board resolution authorizing her to act for and on behalf of the corporation. Lastly, in China Banking Corporation v. Mondragon International Philippines, Inc,42 we relaxed the rules of procedure because the corporation ratified the manager’s status as an authorized signatory. In all of the above cases, we brushed aside technicalities in the interest of justice. This is not to say that we disregard the requirement of prior authority to act in the name of a corporation. The relaxation of the rules applies only to highly meritorious cases, and when there is substantial compliance. While it is true that rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, and while the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, we should not insist on strict adherence to the rules at the expense of substantial justice.43 Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice; and a deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective, for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.44 As to the denial of the motion to inhibit Justice Reyes, we find the same to be in order. First, the motion to inhibit came after the appellate court rendered the assailed decision, that is, after Justice Reyes had already rendered his opinion on the merits of the case. It is settled that a motion to inhibit shall be denied if filed after a member of the court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case, the rationale being that "a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate on the action of the court x x x (only to) raise an objection of this sort

after the decision has been rendered."45 Second, it is settled that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to one of the parties is not enough; there should be evidence to substantiate the suspicion. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, especially when weighed against a judge’s sacred pledge under his oath of office to administer justice without regard for any person and to do right equally to the poor and the rich. There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source, resulting in an opinion on the merits based on something other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.46 We would like to reiterate, at this point, the policy of the Court not to tolerate acts of litigants who, for just about any conceivable reason, seek to disqualify a judge (or justice) for their own purpose, under a plea of bias, hostility, prejudice or prejudgment.47 We now come to the more substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners may be validly ejected from the leased premises. Unlawful detainer cases are summary in nature. In such cases, the elements to be proved and resolved are the fact of lease and the expiration or violation of its terms.48 Specifically, the essential requisites of unlawful detainer are: 1) the fact of lease by virtue of a contract, express or implied; 2) the expiration or termination of the possessor’s right to hold possession; 3) withholding by the lessee of possession of the land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to possess; 4) letter of demand upon lessee to pay the rental or comply with the terms of the lease and vacate the premises; and 5) the filing of the action within one year from the date of the last demand received by the defendant.49 It is undisputed that petitioners and respondent entered into two separate contracts of lease involving nine (9) rooms of the San Luis Building. Records, likewise, show that respondent repeatedly demanded that petitioners vacate the premises, but the latter refused to heed the demand; thus, they remained in possession of the premises. The only contentious issue is whether there was indeed a violation of the terms of the contract: on the part of petitioners, whether they failed to pay the stipulated rent without justifiable cause; while on the part of respondent, whether it prevented petitioners from occupying the leased premises except Room 35. This issue involves questions of fact, the resolution of which requires the evaluation of the evidence presented. The MeTC, the RTC and the CA all found that petitioners failed to perform their obligation to pay the stipulated rent. It is settled doctrine that in a civil case, the conclusions of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal by the Supreme Court.50 Albeit the rule admits of exceptions, not one of them obtains in this case.51 To settle this issue once and for all, we deem it proper to assess the array of factual findings supporting the court’s conclusion. The evidence of petitioners’ non-payment of the stipulated rent is overwhelming. Petitioners, however, claim that such non-payment is justified by the following: 1) the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the leased properties, except room 35; 2) respondent’s refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondent’s refusal to accept payment tendered by petitioners. Petitioners’ justifications are belied by the evidence on record. As correctly held by the CA, petitioners’ communications to respondent prior to the filing of the complaint never mentioned their alleged inability to use the rooms.52 What they pointed out in their letters is that they did not know to whom payment should be made, whether to Ms. Bautista or to Pacheco.53 In their July 26 and October 30, 1993 letters, petitioners only questioned the method of computing their electric billings without, however, raising a complaint about their failure to use the rooms.54 Although petitioners stated in their December 30, 1993 letter that respondent failed to fulfill its part of the contract,55 nowhere did they specifically refer to their inability to use the leased rooms. Besides, at that time, they were already in default on their rentals for more than a year. If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine (9) rooms subject of the contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a business purpose, we cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their right. If we believe petitioners’ contention that they had been prevented from using the rooms for more than a year before the complaint for ejectment was filed, they should have demanded specific performance from the lessor and commenced an action in court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners were already in a position to exercise their right to the use and enjoyment of the property according to the terms of the lease contract.56 As borne out by the records, the fact is that respondent turned

over to petitioners the keys to the leased premises and petitioners, in fact, renovated the rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the right to the use and enjoyment of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act of intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property, even as against the lessor itself. Yet, they did not lift a finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the contract by the lessor. What was, instead, clearly established by the evidence was petitioners’ non-payment of rentals because ostensibly they did not know to whom payment should be made. However, this did not justify their failure to pay, because if such were the case, they were not without any remedy. They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. Article 1256 of the Civil Code provides: Article 1256. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it, the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the consignation of the thing or sum due. Consignation alone shall produce the same effect in the following cases: xxxx (4) When two or more persons claim the same right to collect; x x x x. Consignation shall be made by depositing the things due at the disposal of a judicial authority, before whom the tender of payment shall be proved in a proper case, and the announcement of the consignation in other cases.57

subject rooms to petitioners. Thus, petitioners cannot use the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as an excuse for their failure to pay the rentals due on the other rooms they occupied.1avvphil In light of the foregoing disquisition, respondent has every right to exercise his right to eject the erring lessees. The parties’ contracts of lease contain identical provisions, to wit: In case of default by the LESSEE in the payment of rental on the fifth (5th) day of each month, the amount owing shall as penalty bear interest at the rate of FOUR percent (4%) per month, to be paid, without prejudice to the right of the LESSOR to terminate his contract, enter the premises, and/or eject the LESSEE as hereinafter set forth;62 Moreover, Article 167363 of the Civil Code gives the lessor the right to judicially eject the lessees in case of non-payment of the monthly rentals. A contract of lease is a consensual, bilateral, onerous and commutative contract by which the owner temporarily grants the use of his property to another, who undertakes to pay the rent therefor.64 For failure to pay the rent, petitioners have no right to remain in the leased premises. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and the Status Quo Order dated January 18, 1999 is hereby LIFTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 26, 1998 and its Resolution dated December 10, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 37739 are AFFIRMED.

In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him.58 Petitioners claim that they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount. Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order that the effects of payment may be produced.59 Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides: Section 1. When interpleader proper. – Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves. Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability.61 Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making payments. Neither can petitioners validly invoke the non-delivery of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 as a justification for nonpayment of rentals. Although the two contracts embraced the lease of nine (9) rooms, the terms of the contracts - with their particular reference to specific rooms and the monthly rental for each - easily raise the inference that the parties intended the lease of each room separate from that of the others.lavvphil There is nothing in the contract which would lead to the conclusion that the lease of one or more rooms was to be made dependent upon the lease of all the nine (9) rooms. Accordingly, the use of each room by the lessee gave rise to the corresponding obligation to pay the monthly rental for the same. Notably, respondent demanded payment of rentals only for the rooms actually delivered to, and used by, petitioners. It may also be mentioned that the contract specifically provides that the lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 was to take effect only when the tenants thereof would vacate the premises. Absent a clear showing that the previous tenants had vacated the premises, respondent had no obligation to deliver possession of the

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES EN BANC [G.R. No. 101783. January 23, 2002] MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., EDGARDO S. ISIP, HON. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., and HON. JUDGE TIRSO D'C. VELASCO, Respondents. DECISION SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Interest republicae ut sit finis litium[1 - it is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties and their privies over a subject fully and fairly adjudicated. From this overwhelming concern springs the doctrine of res judicata an obvious rule of reason according stability to judgments.

Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari are the a) Decision in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 dated January 16, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City; [2 and b) its Order dated September 10, 1991[3 denying the motion for reconsideration of the said Decision. The pertinent facts are: On September 11, 1974, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates "within the reach of consumers",[4 promulgated Presidential Decree No. 551[5 providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of the franchise tax paid by electric companies, thus:

No. 551, have done nothing to seek relief from or to appeal to the appropriate forum, the said Order of March 10, 1980. As a consequence, the disposition contained therein have long become final. xxxxxx "That Meralco has been authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 is, therefore beyond question."[7 (Emphasis supplied) PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the BOE. Hence, PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 63018. In a Resolution dated October 22, 1985, this Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit, holding that: We see no grave abuse of discretion warranting the setting aside of the BOE order.

SECTION 1. Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall be two (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. On February 5, 1982, the Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance, Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551"[6 against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco), docketed as BOE Case No. 82-198. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551. It moored its petition on Section 4 of P.D. No. 551 which provides: Sec. 4. All the savings realized by electric franchise holders from the reduction of the franchise tax under Section 1 and tariff reductions and tax credits under Sections 2 and 3, shall be passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Secretary of Finance shall promulgate rules and regulations and devise a reporting systems to carry out the provisions of this Decree. In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly authorized by the BOE in its Order dated March 10, 1980 in BOE Case No. 79-692 to retain the disputed savings; and that the said Order had long become final. On November 25, 1982, the BOE issued its Decision dismissing PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was indeed authorized by the BOE, in BOE Case No. 79-692, to retain the disputed savings under P.D. 551, thus: It is at once evident from the foregoing controlling facts and circumstances, particularly the Order of this Board dated March 10, 1980, as confirmed by the reply-letter dated March 3, 1981, that Meralco has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. 551. The authority granted in the said Order and letter is so clear and unequivocal as to leave any room for contradictory interpretation. This Board, therefore, holds as untenable petitioners claim that respondent Meralco was never authorized under the said Order and letter to hold on to the savings realized under the said decree. "The Board likewise finds to be devoid of merit petitioners contention that pursuant to Opinion No. 140, Series of 1979, of the Minister of Justice, it is absolutely mandatory on the part of respondent Meralco to pass on to its customers the savings under consideration. It must be pointed out that the Order of March 10, 1980 was issued by this Board on the basis of the recommendation contained in the Memorandum dated November 30, 1979 of the Minister of Finance, which was approved by the President of the Philippines in his directive to this Board dated December 11, 1979 issued thru Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo Clave. This Board believes and so holds that the approval by the President of the Philippines of the aforesaid Finance Ministrys recommendation had the effects of (a) reversing or modifying the aforementioned Opinion of the Minister of Justice; and (b) confirming the promulgation by the Ministry of Finance, conformably with the specific authority granted it under P.D. No. 551, of an additional rule or regulation for the implementation of the said decree for the guidance of this Board. In issuing the Order of March 10, 1980, therefore, the Board has done no more than follow and be guided by the said additional rule or regulation. "It is noteworthy to mention also that the registered oppositors in BOE Case No. 79-692 (formerly BPW Case No. 72-2146), where the respondent herein originally filed its motion requesting for authority to defer the passing on to its customers of the franchise tax reduction benefits under P.D.

"P.D. No. 551 ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and regulations. The Minister authorized all grantees of electric franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate bases were below the legal allowable level to either ask for increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits under the decree to consumers until just and reasonable returns could be had. Lengthy investigations, audits, hearings, and determinations over practically an eight year period preceded the questioned decision. The petitioners failed both below and in this petition to successfully refute the facts ascertained in the audits and examinations. The BOE approved option formed the basis of subsequent determinations of Meralco rates and the adopted formula became the basis of computations. When this petition was filed on January 27, 1983, the November 25, 1982 ruling was already final and executory. Moreover, the March 10, 1980 judgment rendered in BOE Case No. 79-692, where Meralco had filed a motion for authority to defer passing on to customers the savings from the reduction of franchise taxes, was not appealed or questioned by the petitioners. Instead, they filed BOE Case No. 82-198 on February 5, 1982 or almost two years later, raising the same issues against the same parties. BOEs questioned decision in Case No. 82-198 used the facts in BOE Case No. 79-692 for its conclusions. Not only had the March 10, 1980 decision confirmed the findings of the Minister of Finance on Meralcos accounts and finances but in filing the second case, the petitioners were asking for a readjudication of the same issues in another challenge to these same findings .x x x.[8 (Emphasis supplied) Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private respondents herein, filed with respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief, docketed as Civil Case No. Q89-3659. Private respondents prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. Once again, they insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings belong to the ultimate consumers. Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata, citing this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 which affirmed the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198. On January 16, 1991, respondent RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 63018 and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings belong to the consumers, thus: Respondent Meralcos theory is devoid of merit. As correctly stated in the dissenting opinion of the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee in the October 22, 1985 resolution of the Supreme Court in SC G.R. No. 63018, the decision of the Board of Energy is ultra vires, hence, null and void. x x x. "It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, it leaves no room for interpretation. The memorandum issued by the Minister of Finance which was made the basis of the decision of the Board of Energy has no legal effect because Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 551 is clear and unequivocal. xxxxxx "Since the law is clear, what is left to be done by the administrative body or agency concerned is to enforce the law. There is no room for an administrative interpretation of the law. In the instant case, the Board interpreted PD 551 and chose not only to enforce it but to amend and modify the law on the basis of a Memorandum and the authority issued by the Minister of Finance to all grantees of electric-franchises, not Meralco alone, whose rates of return on their rate basis were below the legal allowable level, to either ask for an increased rates or to defer the passing on of benefits under the decree to consumers, until just and reasonable return could be had. This is beyond the authority granted by PD 551 to the Minister of Finance. PD 551 merely ordered the Minister of Finance to issue implementing rules and regulations. He cannot amend or modify the clear mandate of the law. The act therefore of the Minister of Finance was ultra

vires, hence, null and void. Considering that said act became the basis of the Board of Energys decision, it follows that said decision is likewise null and void and the Supreme Court resolution affirming said decision is also null and void having proceeded from a void judgment, hence, cannot be considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action."[9 (Emphasis supplied) Meralco moved for a reconsideration of the above Decision but was denied by respondent court in its Order of September 10, 1991. Hence, Meralco's petition for review on certiorari anchored on the following grounds: "I RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CIVIL CASE NO. 89-3659 IS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT. II RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID A RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT. III RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REMEDY OF DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS STILL AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS. IV RESPONDENT JUDGES ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF."[10 Meralco contends that Civil Case No. Q -89-3659 is already barred by prior judgments, referring to a) this Courts Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 sustaining the BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198; and b) the Order dated March 10, 1980 of the same Board in BOE Case No. 79-692, both holding that Meralco is authorized to retain its savings realized under P.D. 551. Meralco likewise argues that respondent RTC cannot annul the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 63018 considering that trial courts cannot set aside decisions of a superior court. And lastly, Meralco maintains that private respondents can no longer avail of the remedy of an action for declaratory relief in view of the rule that such action should be filed before a violation of the statute occurred.[11 In their comment,[12 private respondents argue that this Court's Resolution in G.R. No. 63018 cannot be a bar to Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 for declaratory relief considering that it did not delve on the essential issue raised in the latter case, i.e., who is entitled to the savings. Further, they claim that public interest would be defeated by the application of res judicata. The petition is meritorious. The issue - whether or not Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12 % allowable rate recognized in this jurisdiction has long been settled. Thus, the relitigation of the same issue in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 cannot be sanctioned under the principle of res judicata. Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.[13 In res judicata, the judgment in the first action is considered conclusive as to every matter offered and received therein, as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose, and all other matters that could have been adjudged therein.[14 For a claim of res judicata to prosper, the following requisites must concur: 1) there must be a final judgment or order; 2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[15 All the above requisites are extant in the records and thus, beyond dispute. Re: FIRST REQUISITE - there must be a final judgment: It is beyond question that this Courts Resolution dated October 22, 1985 in G.R. No. 63018, sustaining the BOEs Decision dated November 25, 1982 in BOE Case No. 82-198 which dismissed PCFI's petition, attained finality on December 4, 1985. As a matter of fact, this Court had long ago issued an Entry of Judgment

stating that the said Resolution "became final and executory and is x x x recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgements." Prior thereto, or on March 10, 1980, the BOE's Order in BOE Case No. 79-672 became final when the oppositors therein did not appeal. Re: SECOND REQUISITE - the court which rendered the final judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties: There is no question that the BOE has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties herein. Under P.D. No. 1206,[16 The BOE is the agency authorized to "regulate and fix the power rates to be charged by electric companies."[17 As such, it has jurisdiction over Meralco, an electric company, and over the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. It bears stressing that P.D. No. 551 was passed precisely to enable the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their rates within the reach of consumers. Clearly, the matter on how the disputed savings should be disposed of in order to realize a reduction of rates is within the competence of the BOE. Re: THIRD REQUISITE - it must be a judgment or order on the merits: The BOE's Decision in BOE Case No. 82-198 is a judgment on the merits. A judgment is on the merits when it determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections. After according both parties the opportunities to be heard, the BOE disposed of the controversy by resolving the rights of the parties under P.D. No. 551. In its Decision, the BOE declared in clear and unequivocal manner that Meralco "has been duly authorized to retain the savings realized under the provisions of P.D. No. 551" and that private respondent PCFIs argument to the contrary is "untenable." The BOE's Decision was upheld by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. Re: FOURTH REQUISITE - there must be between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action: There is identity of parties between the two cases. BOE Case No. 82-198 was a contest between private respondent PCFI, as petitioner, and Meralco, as respondent. Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 involves the same contenders, except that respondent Edgardo Isip joined PCFI as a plaintiff. But his inclusion as such plaintiff is inconsequential. A party by bringing forward, in a second case, additional parties cannot escape the effects of the principle of res judicata when the facts remain the same. Res judicata is not defeated by a minor difference of parties, as it does not require absolute but only substantial identity of parties.[18 The subject matters of BOE Case No. 82-198 and Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are likewise identical since both refer to the savings realized by Meralco from the reduction of the franchise tax under P.D. No. 551. The subject matter of an action refers to the thing, wrongful act, contract or property which is directly involved in the action, concerning which the wrong has been done and with respect to which the controversy has arisen. [19 In both cases, the controversy is how the disputed savings shall be disposed of - whether they shall be retained by Meralco or be passed on to the consumers. With respect to identity of causes of action, this requisite is likewise present. In both cases, the act alleged to be in violation of the legal right of private respondents is Meralco's retention of the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551. While it is true that BOE Case No. 82-198 is one for specific performance, while Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 is for declaratory relief - in the ultimate - both are directed towards only one relief, i.e., the refund of the disputed savings to the consumers. To seek a court's declaration on who should benefit from the disputed savings (whether Meralco or the consumers) will result in the relitigation of an issue fairly and fully adjudicated in BOE Case No. 82-198. Clearly, the test of identity of causes of action lies not in the form of an action. The difference of actions in the aforesaid cases is of no moment. The doctrine of res judicata still applies considering that the parties were litigating for the same thing and more importantly, the same contentions.[20 As can be gleaned from the records, private respondents arguments in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 bear extreme resemblance with those raised in BOE Case No. 82-198. Respondent RTC's Decision granting PCFI and Isip's petition for declaratory relief is in direct derogation of the principle of res judicata. Twice, it has been settled that Meralco is duly authorized to retain the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551 as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate. The pronouncement of the BOE in BOE Case No. 82-198 finding such fact to be "beyond question" is clear and not susceptible of equivocation. This pronouncement was sustained by this Court in G.R. No. 63018. In finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the BOE, this Court saw the wisdom of its assailed Decision. Thus, this Court held: "[I]n dismissing the petition for specific performance, the BOE authorized

Meralco, in lieu of increasing its rates to get a more reasonable return on investments while at the same time refunding to consumers the benefit of P.D. No. 551, to instead defer the passing on of benefits but without the planned increases. Instead of giving back money to consumers and then taking back the same in terms of increased rates, Meralco was allowed by the BOE to follow the more simplified and rational procedure."[21 Private respondents now argue that G.R. No. 63018 merely decreed the postponement of the passing of Meralco's savings to the consumers until it could increase its rate charges. On this point, this Court categorically ruled: "X x x. And finally, as stated by the Solicitor General, if only to put the issue to final rest, BOEs decision authorizing Meralco to retain the savings resulting from the reduction of franchise tax as long as its rate of return falls below the 12% allowable rate is supported by P.D. No. 551, the rules and administrative orders of the Ministry of Finance which had been duly authorized by the decree itself and by directives of the President to carry out the provisions of the decree, and most of all by equitable economic considerations without which the decree would lose its purpose and viability."[22 Corollarily, let it not be overlooked that the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract etc. for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof. It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract etc., to which it refers.[23 The petition gives a practical remedy in ending controversies which have not reached the stage where other relief is immediately available. It supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights, and the commission of wrongs.[24 Here, private respondents brought the petition for declaratory relief long after the alleged violation of P.D. No. 551. Lastly, we are dismayed by respondent RTC's adherence to the Dissenting Opinion, instead of the Majority Opinion, of the members of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, as well as its temerity to declare a Resolution of this Court "null and void" and "cannot be considered as valid judgment that will be a bar to the present action." A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, especially of this Court, for to do so will negate the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation."[25 "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as eloquently declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.[26 Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower courts, ought to be reminded that a final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.[27 In setting aside the Resolution and Entry of Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, respondent court grossly violated basic rules of civil procedure. In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as determined by the BOE and sustained by this Court, have acquired the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated January 16, 1991 and Order dated September 10, 1991 in Civil Case No. Q-89-3659 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC G.R. No. 159357. April 28, 2004 Brother MARIANO MIKE Z. VELARDE, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, Respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: A decision that does not conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution and the law is void and deemed legally inexistent. To be valid, decisions should comply with the form, the procedure and the substantive requirements laid out in the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars/orders of the Supreme Court. For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court hereby discusses these forms, procedures and requirements. The Case 1

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the June 12, 2003 Decision2 and July 29, 2003 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 49).4 The challenged Decision was the offshoot of a Petition for Declaratory Relief5 filed before the RTC-Manila by herein Respondent Social Justice Society (SJS) against herein Petitioner Mariano Mike Z. Velarde, together with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano as co-respondents. The Petition prayed for the resolution of the question whether or not the act of a religious leader like any of herein respondents, in endorsing the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or in urging or requiring the members of his flock to vote for a specified candidate, is violative of the letter or spirit of the constitutional provisions x x x.[6

Alleging that the questioned Decision did not contain a statement of facts and a dispositive portion, herein petitioner filed a Clarificatory Motion and Motion for Reconsideration before the trial court. Soriano, his corespondent, similarly filed a separate Motion for Reconsideration. In response, the trial court issued the assailed Order, which held as follows: x x x [T]his Court cannot reconsider, because what it was asked to do, was only to clarify a Constitutional provision and to declare whether acts are violative thereof. The Decision did not make a dispositive portion because a dispositive portion is required only in coercive reliefs, where a redress from wrong suffered and the benefit that the prevailing party wronged should get. The step that these movants have to take, is direct appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, for a conclusive interpretation of the Constitutional provision to the Supreme Court.7

1.Whether or not the Decision dated 12 June 2003 rendered by the court a quo was proper and valid; 2.Whether or not there exists justiceable controversy in herein respondents Petition for declaratory relief; 3.Whether or not herein respondent has legal interest in filing the Petition for declaratory relief; 4.Whether or not the constitutional question sought to be resolved by herein respondent is ripe for judicial determination; 5.Whether or not there is adequate remedy other than the declaratory relief; and, 6.Whether or not the court a quo has jurisdiction over the Petition for declaratory relief of herein respondent.15 During the Oral Argument, the issues were narrowed down and classified as follows: A.Procedural Issues Did the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?Did it state a cause of action? Did respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief?

The Antecedent Proceedings On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief (SJS Petition) before the RTC-Manila against Velarde and his aforesaid co-respondents. SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional provisions,8 specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.

B.Substantive Issues 1.Did the RTC Decision conform to the form and substance required by the Constitution, the law and the Rules of Court? 2.May religious leaders like herein petitioner, Bro. Mike Velarde, be prohibited from endorsing candidates for public office? Corollarily, may they be banned from campaigning against said candidates?

The subsequent proceedings were recounted in the challenged Decision in these words: x x x. Bro. Eddie Villanueva submitted, within the original period [to file an Answer], a Motion to Dismiss. Subsequently, Executive Minister Erao Manalo and Bro. Mike Velarde, filed their Motions to Dismiss. While His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, filed a Comment and Bro. Eli Soriano, filed an Answer within the extended period and similarly prayed for the dismissal of the Petition. All sought the dismissal of the Petition on the common grounds that it does not state a cause of action and that there is no justiciable controversy. They were ordered to submit a pleading by way of advisement, which was closely followed by another Order denying all the Motions to Dismiss. Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo moved to reconsider the denial. His Eminence Jaime Cardinal L. Sin, asked for extension to file memorandum. Only Bro. Eli Soriano complied with the first Order by submitting his Memorandum. x x x. x x x the Court denied the Motions to Dismiss, and the Motions for Reconsideration filed by Bro. Mike Velarde, Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Executive Minister Erao Manalo, which raised no new arguments other than those already considered in the motions to dismiss x x x.9 After narrating the above incidents, the trial court said that it had jurisdiction over the Petition, because in praying for a determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents are violative of Article II, Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, [the Petition] has raised only a question of law.10 It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of the principle. Through its discourse, the court a quo opined at some point that the [e]ndorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.11 After its essay on the legal issue, however, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus, Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier, were denied by the lower court. Hence, this Petition for Review.12 This Court, in a Resolution13 dated September 2, 2003, required SJS and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to submit their respective comments. In the same Resolution, the Court gave the other parties -impleaded as respondents in the original case below --the opportunity to comment, if they so desired. On April 13, 2004, the Court en banc conducted an Oral Argument.14 The Issues In his Petition, Brother Mike Velarde submits the following issues for this Courts resolution:

The Courts Ruling The Petition of Brother Mike Velarde is meritorious. Procedural Issues: Requisites of Petitions for Declaratory Relief Section 1 of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which deals with petitions for declaratory relief, provides in part: Section 1. Who may file petition.- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder. Based on the foregoing, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The purpose of the remedy is to interpret or to determine the validity of the written instrument and to seek a judicial declaration of the parties rights or duties thereunder.16 The essential requisites of the action are as follows: (1) there is a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue is ripe for judicial determination.17 Justiciable Controversy Brother Mike Velarde contends that the SJS Petition failed to allege, much less establish before the trial court, that there existed a justiciable controversy or an adverse legal interest between them; and that SJS had a legal right that was being violated or threatened to be violated by petitioner. On the contrary, Velarde alleges that SJS premised its action on mere speculations, contingent events, and hypothetical issues that had not yet ripened into an actual controversy. Thus, its Petition for Declaratory Relief must fail. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[18] The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief fell

short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the Constitution. As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment,19 what exactly has he done that merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) yields nothing in this respect. His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003, the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively involved in partisan politics. An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x.20 Yet, the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts. Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders, the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement will enable [them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders, enabling them to control the government[;]21 and pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious leaders determine the ultimate result of elections,22 which would then be violative of the separation clause.

The failure of a complaint to state a cause of action is a ground for its outright dismissal.30 However, in special civil actions for declaratory relief, the concept of a cause of action under ordinary civil actions does not strictly apply. The reason for this exception is that an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.31 Nevertheless, a breach or violation should be impending, imminent or at least threatened. A perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect. We can only infer the interest, supposedly in its favor, from its bare allegation that it has thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters and who are keenly interested in a judicial clarification of the constitutionality of the partisan participation of religious leaders in Philippine politics and in the process to insure adherence to the Constitution by everyone x x x.32 Such general averment does not, however, suffice to constitute a legal right or interest. Not only is the presumed interest not personal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain.33 The Rules require that the interest must be material to the issue and affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from simple curiosity or incidental interest in the question raised.34 To bolster its stance, SJS cites the Corpus Juris Secundum and submits that the [p]laintiff in a declaratory judgment action does not seek to enforce a claim against [the] defendant, but seeks a judicial declaration of [the] rights of the parties for the purpose of guiding [their] future conduct, and the essential distinction between a declaratory judgment action and the usual action is that no actual wrong need have been committed or loss have occurred in order to sustain the declaratory judgment action, although there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded.35

Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate, or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a time-honored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right. Obviously, there is no factual allegation that SJS rights are being subjected to any threatened, imminent and inevitable violation that should be prevented by the declaratory relief sought.The judicial power and duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights that are legally demandable and enforceable23 cannot be exercised when there is no actual or threatened violation of a legal right. All that the 5-page SJS Petition prayed for was that the question raised in paragraph 9 hereof be resolved.24 In other words, it merely sought an opinion of the trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state. SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage of any threatened violation of its declared rights.Courts, however, are proscribed from rendering an advisory opinion.25

SJS has, however, ignored the crucial point of its own reference that there must be no uncertainty that the loss will occur or that the asserted rights will be invaded. Precisely, as discussed earlier, it merely conjectures that herein petitioner (and his co-respondents below) might actively participate in partisan politics, use the awesome voting strength of its faithful flock [to] enable it to elect men to public office x x x, enabling [it] to control the government.36 During the Oral Argument, though, Petitioner Velarde and his co-respondents below all strongly asserted that they had not in any way engaged or intended to participate in partisan politics.They all firmly assured this Court that they had not done anything to trigger the issue raised and to entitle SJS to the relief sought. Indeed, the Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents. Not even the alleged proximity of the elections to the time the Petition was filed below (January 28, 2003) would have provided the certainty that it had a legal right that would be jeopardized or violated by any of those respondents. Legal Standing

Cause of Action Respondent SJS asserts that in order to maintain a petition for declaratory relief, a cause of action need not be alleged or proven. Supposedly, for such petition to prosper, there need not be any violation of a right, breach of duty or actual wrong committed by one party against the other. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that the subject matter of an action for declaratory relief should be a deed, a will, a contract (or other written instrument), a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. But the subject matter of the SJS Petition is the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse the candidacy of a candidate for elective office or to urge or require the members of the flock to vote for a specified candidate.26 According to petitioner, this subject matter is beyond the realm of an action for declaratory relief.27 Petitioner avers that in the absence of a valid subject matter, the Petition fails to state a cause of action and, hence, should have been dismissed outright by the court a quo. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of another, causing injury to the latter.28 Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.29

Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged act.37 Interest means a material interest in issue that is affected by the questioned act or instrument, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the question involved.38 Petitioner alleges that [i]n seeking declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of an act of a religious leader to endorse, or require the members of the religious flock to vote for a specific candidate, herein Respondent SJS has no legal interest in the controversy;39 it has failed to establish how the resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it. Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must show not only that the law [or act] is invalid, but also that [they have] sustained or [are] in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that [they] suffer thereby in some indefinite way.40 They must demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.41

First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation.42 A taxpayers action may be properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.43 In the present case, there is no allegation, whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being illegally disbursed. Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved. There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents. Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they are seeking. Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of members who are citizens-taxpayers-registered voters is too general44 and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.45 Transcendental Importance In any event, SJS urges the Court to take cognizance of the Petition, even sans legal standing, considering that the issues raised are of paramount public interest. In not a few cases, the Court has liberalized the locus standi requirement when a petition raises an issue of transcendental significance or paramount importance to the people.46 Recently, after holding that the IBP had no locus standi to bring the suit, the Court in IBP v. Zamora47 nevertheless entertained the Petition therein. It noted that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.48 Similarly in the instant case, the Court deemed the constitutional issue raised in the SJS Petition to be of paramount interest to the Filipino people. The issue did not simply concern a delineation of the separation between church and state, but ran smack into the governance of our country. The issue was both transcendental in importance and novel in nature, since it had never been decided before. The Court, thus, called for Oral Argument to determine with certainty whether it could resolve the constitutional issue despite the barren allegations in the SJS Petition as well as the abbreviated proceedings in the court below. Much to its chagrin, however, counsels for the parties -- particularly for Respondent SJS -made no satisfactory allegations or clarifications that would supply the deficiencies hereinabove discussed. Hence, even if the Court would exempt this case from the stringent locus standi requirement, such heroic effort would be futile because the transcendental issue cannot be resolved anyway. Proper Proceedings Before the Trial Court

When an answer fails to tender an issue or admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading (except in actions for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation).61 Meanwhile, a party seeking to recover upon a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim -- or to obtain a declaratory relief -- may, at any time after the answer thereto has been served, move for a summary judgment in its favor.62 Similarly, a party against whom a claim, a counterclaim or crossclaim is asserted -- or a declaratory relief sought -- may, at any time, move for a summary judgment in its favor.63 After the motion is heard, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if there is a showing that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.64 Within the time for -- but before -- filing the answer to the complaint or petition, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss based on any of the grounds stated in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. During the hearing of the motion, the parties shall submit their arguments on the questions of law, and their evidence on the questions of fact.65 After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleadings. It shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is not indubitable. In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor.66 If the motion is denied, the movant may file an answer within the balance of the period originally prescribed to file an answer, but not less than five (5) days in any event, computed from the receipt of the notice of the denial. If the pleading is ordered to be amended, the defendant shall file an answer within fifteen (15) days, counted from the service of the amended pleading, unless the court provides a longer period.67 After the last pleading has been served and filed, the case shall be set for pretrial,68 which is a mandatory proceeding.69 A plaintiffs/ petitioners (or its duly authorized representatives) non-appearance at the pretrial, if without valid cause, shall result in the dismissal of the action with prejudice, unless the court orders otherwise. A similar failure on the part of the defendant shall be a cause for allowing the plaintiff/petitioner to present evidence ex parte, and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.70 The parties are required to file their pretrial briefs; failure to do so shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pretrial.71 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue an order reciting in detail the matters taken up at the conference; the action taken on them, the amendments allowed to the pleadings; and the agreements or admissions, if any, made by the parties regarding any of the matters considered.72 The parties may further avail themselves of any of the modes of discovery,73 if they so wish. Thereafter, the case shall be set for trial,74 in which the parties shall adduce their respective evidence in support of their claims and/or defenses. By their written consent or upon the application of either party, or on its own motion, the court may also order any or all of the issues to be referred to a commissioner, who is to be appointed by it or to be agreed upon by the parties.75 The trial or hearing before the commissioner shall proceed in all respects as it would if held before the court.76

To prevent a repetition of this waste of precious judicial time and effort, and for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the Court reiterates the elementary procedure49 that must be followed by trial courts in the conduct of civil cases.50 Prefatorily, the trial court may -- motu proprio or upon motion of the defendant -- dismiss a complaint51 (or petition, in a special civil action) that does not allege the plaintiffs (or petitioners) cause or causes of action.52 A complaint or petition should contain a plain, concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense.53 It should likewise clearly specify the relief sought.54

Upon the completion of such proceedings, the commissioner shall file with the court a written report on the matters referred by the parties.77 The report shall be set for hearing, after which the court shall issue an order adopting, modifying or rejecting it in whole or in part; or recommitting it with instructions; or requiring the parties to present further evidence before the commissioner or the court.78 Finally, a judgment or final order determining the merits of the case shall be rendered. The decision shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by the issuing magistrate, and filed with the clerk of court.79 Based on these elementary guidelines, let us examine the proceedings before the trial court in the instant case.

Upon the filing of the complaint/petition and the payment of the requisite legal fees, the clerk of court shall forthwith issue the corresponding summons to the defendants or the respondents, with a directive that the defendant answer55 within 15 days, unless a different period is fixed by the court.56 The summons shall also contain a notice that if such answer is not filed, the plaintiffs/petitioners shall take a judgment by default and may be granted the relief applied for.57 The court, however, may -- upon such terms as may be just -- allow an answer to be filed after the time fixed by the Rules.58

First, with respect to the initiatory pleading of the SJS. Even a cursory perusal of the Petition immediately reveals its gross inadequacy. It contained no statement of ultimate facts upon which the petitioner relied for its claim. Furthermore, it did not specify the relief it sought from the court, but merely asked it to answer a hypothetical question.

If the answer sets forth a counterclaim or cross-claim, it must be answered within ten (10) days from service.59 A reply may be filed within ten (10) days from service of the pleading responded to.60

Relief, as contemplated in a legal action, refers to a specific coercive measure prayed for as a result of a violation of the rights of a plaintiff or a petitioner.80 As already discussed earlier, the Petition before the trial court had no allegations of fact81 or of any specific violation of the petitioners rights, which the respondents had a duty to respect. Such deficiency amounted to a failure to state a cause of action; hence, no coercive

relief could be sought and adjudicated. The Petition evidently lacked substantive requirements and, we repeat, should have been dismissed at the outset.

shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him and filed with the clerk of court.

Second, with respect to the trial court proceedings. Within the period set to file their respective answers to the SJS Petition, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo filed Motions to Dismiss; Cardinal Sin, a Comment; and Soriano, within a priorly granted extended period, an Answer in which he likewise prayed for the dismissal of the Petition.82 SJS filed a Rejoinder to the Motion of Velarde, who subsequently filed a Sur-Rejoinder. Supposedly, there were several scheduled settings, in which the [c]ourt was apprised of the respective positions of the parties.83 The nature of such settings -- whether pretrial or trial hearings -- was not disclosed in the records. Before ruling on the Motions to Dismiss, the trial court issued an Order84 dated May 8, 2003, directing the parties to submit their memoranda. Issued shortly thereafter was another Order85 dated May 14, 2003, denying all the Motions to Dismiss. In the latter Order, the trial court perfunctorily ruled: The Court now resolves to deny the Motions to Dismiss, and after all the memoranda are submitted, then, the case shall be deemed as submitted for resolution.86

In the same vein, Section 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

Apparently, contrary to the requirement of Section 2 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the Motions were not heard.Worse, the Order purportedly resolving the Motions to Dismiss did not state any reason at all for their denial, in contravention of Section 3 of the said Rule 16. There was not even any statement of the grounds relied upon by the Motions; much less, of the legal findings and conclusions of the trial court. Thus, Velarde, Villanueva and Manalo moved for reconsideration. Pending the resolution of these Motions for Reconsideration, Villanueva filed a Motion to suspend the filing of the parties memoranda. But instead of separately resolving the pending Motions fairly and squarely, the trial court again transgressed the Rules of Court when it immediately proceeded to issue its Decision, even before tackling the issues raised in those Motions. Furthermore, the RTC issued its Decision without allowing the parties to file their answers. For this reason, there was no joinder of the issues. If only it had allowed the filing of those answers, the trial court would have known, as the Oral Argument revealed, that the petitioner and his co-respondents below had not committed or threatened to commit the act attributed to them (endorsing candidates) -- the act that was supposedly the factual basis of the suit. Parenthetically, the court a quo further failed to give a notice of the Petition to the OSG, which was entitled to be heard upon questions involving the constitutionality or validity of statutes and other measures.87

Sec. 2. Form and contents of judgments. -- The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based. x x xx x xx x x. Pursuant to the Constitution, this Court also issued on January 28, 1988, Administrative Circular No. 1, prompting all judges to make complete findings of facts in their decisions, and scrutinize closely the legal aspects of the case in the light of the evidence presented.They should avoid the tendency to generalize and form conclusions without detailing the facts from which such conclusions are deduced. In many cases,89 this Court has time and time again reminded magistrates to heed the demand of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. in Yao v. Court of Appeals,90 discussed at length the implications of this provision and strongly exhorted thus: Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. In People v. Bugarin,91 the Court also explained:

Moreover, as will be discussed in more detail, the questioned Decision of the trial court was utterly wanting in the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the Rules of Court. All in all, during the loosely abbreviated proceedings of the case, the trial court indeed acted with inexplicable haste, with total ignorance of the law -- or, worse, in cavalier disregard of the rules of procedure -- and with grave abuse of discretion. Contrary to the contentions of the trial judge and of SJS, proceedings for declaratory relief must still follow the process described above -- the petition must state a cause of action; the proceedings must undergo the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court; and the decision must adhere to constitutional and legal requirements. First Substantive Issue: Fundamental Requirements of a Decision The Constitution commands that [n]o decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor.88 Consistent with this constitutional mandate, Section 1 of Rule 36 of the Rules on Civil Procedure similarly provides: Sec. 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or final order determining the merits of the case

The requirement that the decisions of courts must be in writing and that they must set forth clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which they are based serves many functions. It is intended, among other things, to inform the parties of the reason or reasons for the decision so that if any of them appeals, he can point out to the appellate court the finding of facts or the rulings on points of law with which he disagrees. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processes of legal reasoning. x x x. Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.92 In Madrid v. Court of Appeals,93 this Court had instructed magistrates to exert effort to ensure that their decisions would present a comprehensive analysis or account of the factual and legal findings that would substantially address the issues raised by the parties. In the present case, it is starkly obvious that the assailed Decision contains no statement of facts -- much less an assessment or analysis thereof -- or of the courts findings as to the probable facts. The assailed Decision begins with a statement of the nature of the action and the question or issue presented. Then follows a brief explanation of the constitutional provisions involved, and what the Petition sought to achieve. Thereafter, the ensuing procedural incidents before the trial court are tracked. The Decision proceeds to a full-length opinion on the nature and the extent of the separation of church and state. Without expressly stating the final conclusion she has reached or specifying the relief granted or denied, the trial judge ends her Decision with the clause SO ORDERED.

What were the antecedents that necessitated the filing of the Petition? What exactly were the distinct facts that gave rise to the question sought to be resolved by SJS? More important, what were the factual findings and analysis on which the trial court based its legal findings and conclusions? None were stated or implied. Indeed, the RTCs Decision cannot be upheld for its failure to express clearly and distinctly the facts on which it was based. Thus, the trial court clearly transgressed the constitutional directive. The significance of factual findings lies in the value of the decision as a precedent. How can it be so if one cannot apply the ruling to similar circumstances, simply because such circumstances are unknown? Otherwise stated, how will the ruling be applied in the future, if there is no point of factual comparison? Moreover, the court a quo did not include a resolutory or dispositive portion in its so-called Decision. The importance of such portion was explained in the early case Manalang v. Tuason de Rickards,94 from which we quote: The resolution of the Court on a given issue as embodied in the dispositive part of the decision or order is the investitive or controlling factor that determines and settles the rights of the parties and the questions presented therein, notwithstanding the existence of statements or declaration in the body of said order that may be confusing. The assailed Decision in the present case leaves us in the dark as to its final resolution of the Petition. To recall, the original Petition was for declaratory relief. So, what relief did the trial court grant or deny? What rights of the parties did it conclusively declare? Its final statement says, SO ORDERED. But what exactly did the court order? It had the temerity to label its issuance a Decision, when nothing was in fact decided. Respondent SJS insists that the dispositive portion can be found in the body of the assailed Decision. It claims that the issue is disposed of and the Petition finally resolved by the statement of the trial court found on page 10 of its 14-page Decision, which reads: Endorsement of specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation clause.95

may be a summation of the important principles applied to the resolution of the issues of paramount public interest or significance. It may also lay down an enduring philosophy of law or guiding principle. Let us now, again for the guidance of the bench and the bar, discuss the essential parts of a good decision. 1.Statement of the Case The Statement of the Case consists of a legal definition of the nature of the action.At the first instance, this part states whether the action is a civil case for collection, ejectment, quieting of title, foreclosure of mortgage, and so on; or, if it is a criminal case, this part describes the specific charge -- quoted usually from the accusatory portion of the information -- and the plea of the accused. Also mentioned here are whether the case is being decided on appeal or on a petition for certiorari, the court of origin, the case number in the trial court, and the dispositive portion of the assailed decision. In a criminal case, the verbatim reproduction of the criminal information serves as a guide in determining the nature and the gravity of the offense for which the accused may be found culpable.As a rule, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime different from or graver than that charged. Also, quoting verbatim the text of the information is especially important when there is a question on the sufficiency of the charge, or on whether qualifying and modifying circumstances have been adequately alleged therein.

We cannot agree.

To ensure that due process is accorded, it is important to give a short description of the proceedings regarding the plea of the accused. Absence of an arraignment, or a serious irregularity therein, may render the judgment void, and further consideration by the appellate court would be futile. In some instances, especially in appealed cases, it would also be useful to mention the fact of the appellants detention, in order to dispose of the preliminary query -- whether or not they have abandoned their appeal by absconding or jumping bail. Mentioning the court of origin and the case number originally assigned helps in facilitating the consolidation of the records of the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, after entry of final judgment.

In Magdalena Estate, Inc. v. Caluag,96 the obligation of the party imposed by the Court was allegedly contained in the text of the original Decision. The Court, however, held:

Finally, the reproduction of the decretal portion of the assailed decision informs the reader of how the appealed case was decided by the court a quo.

x x x The quoted finding of the lower court cannot supply deficiencies in the dispositive portion. It is a mere opinion of the court and the rule is settled that where there is a conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion, the former must prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion is merely a statement ordering nothing. (Italics in the original) Thus, the dispositive portion cannot be deemed to be the statement quoted by SJS and embedded in the last paragraph of page 10 of the assailed 14-page Decision. If at all, that statement is merely an answer to a hypothetical legal question and just a part of the opinion of the trial court. It does not conclusively declare the rights (or obligations) of the parties to the Petition. Neither does it grant any -- much less, the proper -- relief under the circumstances, as required of a dispositive portion. Failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Decisions or orders issued in careless disregard of the constitutional mandate are a patent nullity and must be struck down as void.97 Parts of a Decision In general, the essential parts of a good decision consist of the following: (1) statement of the case; (2) statement of facts; (3) issues or assignment of errors; (4) court ruling, in which each issue is, as a rule, separately considered and resolved; and, finally, (5) dispositive portion. The ponente may also opt to include an introduction or a prologue as well as an epilogue, especially in cases in which controversial or novel issues are involved.98 An introduction may consist of a concise but comprehensive statement of the principal factual or legal issue/s of the case. In some cases -- particularly those concerning public interest; or involving complicated commercial, scientific, technical or otherwise rare subject matters -- a longer introduction or prologue may serve to acquaint readers with the specific nature of the controversy and the issues involved. An epilogue

2.Statement of Facts There are different ways of relating the facts of the case. First, under the objective or reportorial method, the judge summarizes -- without comment -- the testimony of each witness and the contents of each exhibit. Second, under the synthesis method, the factual theory of the plaintiff or prosecution and then that of the defendant or defense is summarized according to the judges best light. Third, in the subjective method, the version of the facts accepted by the judge is simply narrated without explaining what the parties versions are. Finally, through a combination of objective and subjective means, the testimony of each witness is reported and the judge then formulates his or her own version of the facts. In criminal cases, it is better to present both the version of the prosecution and that of the defense, in the interest of fairness and due process. A detailed evaluation of the contentions of the parties must follow. The resolution of most criminal cases, unlike civil and other cases, depends to a large extent on the factual issues and the appreciation of the evidence. The plausibility or the implausibility of each version can sometimes be initially drawn from a reading of the facts. Thereafter, the bases of the court in arriving at its findings and conclusions should be explained. On appeal, the fact that the assailed decision of the lower court fully, intelligently and correctly resolved all factual and legal issues involved may partly explain why the reviewing court finds no reason to reverse the findings and conclusions of the former. Conversely, the lower courts patent misappreciation of the facts or misapplication of the law would aid in a better understanding of why its ruling is reversed or modified. In appealed civil cases, the opposing sets of facts no longer need to be presented. Issues for resolution usually involve questions of law, grave abuse of discretion, or want of jurisdiction; hence, the facts of the case are often undisputed by the parties. With few exceptions, factual issues are not entertained in noncriminal cases.Consequently, the narration of facts by the lower court, if exhaustive and clear, may be

reproduced; otherwise, the material factual antecedents should be restated in the words of the reviewing magistrate. In addition, the reasoning of the lower court or body whose decision is under review should be laid out, in order that the parties may clearly understand why the lower court ruled in a certain way, and why the reviewing court either finds no reason to reverse it or concludes otherwise.

earlier, the Court deems this constitutional issue to be of paramount interest to the Filipino citizenry, for it concerns the governance of our country and its people. Thus, despite the obvious procedural transgressions by both SJS and the trial court, this Court still called for Oral Argument, so as not to leave any doubt that there might be room to entertain and dispose of the SJS Petition on the merits.

3.Issues or Assignment of Errors

Counsel for SJS has utterly failed, however, to convince the Court that there are enough factual and legal bases to resolve the paramount issue. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General has sided with petitioner insofar as there are no facts supporting the SJS Petition and the assailed Decision.

Both factual and legal issues should be stated. On appeal, the assignment of errors, as mentioned in the appellants brief, may be reproduced in toto and tackled seriatim, so as to avoid motions for reconsideration of the final decision on the ground that the court failed to consider all assigned errors that could affect the outcome of the case. But when the appellant presents repetitive issues or when the assigned errors do not strike at the main issue, these may be restated in clearer and more coherent terms.

We reiterate that the said Petition failed to state directly the ultimate facts that it relied upon for its claim. During the Oral Argument, counsel for SJS candidly admitted that there were no factual allegations in its Petition for Declaratory Relief.Neither were there factual findings in the assailed Decision. At best, SJS merely asked the trial court to answer a hypothetical question. In effect, it merely sought an advisory opinion, the rendition of which was beyond the courts constitutional mandate and jurisdiction.99

Though not specifically questioned by the parties, additional issues may also be included, if deemed important for substantial justice to be rendered. Note that appealed criminal cases are given de novo review, in contrast to noncriminal cases in which the reviewing court is generally limited to issues specifically raised in the appeal. The few exceptions are errors of jurisdiction; questions not raised but necessary in arriving at a just decision on the case; or unassigned errors that are closely related to those properly assigned, or upon which depends the determination of the question properly raised.

Indeed, the assailed Decision was rendered in clear violation of the Constitution, because it made no findings of facts and final disposition. Hence, it is void and deemed legally inexistent. Consequently, there is nothing for this Court to review, affirm, reverse or even just modify.

4.The Courts Ruling This part contains a full discussion of the specific errors or issues raised in the complaint, petition or appeal, as the case may be; as well as of other issues the court deems essential to a just disposition of the case. Where there are several issues, each one of them should be separately addressed, as much as practicable. The respective contentions of the parties should also be mentioned here. When procedural questions are raised in addition to substantive ones, it is better to resolve the former preliminarily. 5.The Disposition or Dispositive Portion In a criminal case, the disposition should include a finding of innocence or guilt, the specific crime committed, the penalty imposed, the participation of the accused, the modifying circumstances if any, and the civil liability and costs. In case an acquittal is decreed, the court must order the immediate release of the accused, if detained, (unless they are being held for another cause) and order the director of the Bureau of Corrections (or wherever the accused is detained) to report, within a maximum of ten (10) days from notice, the exact date when the accused were set free. In a civil case as well as in a special civil action, the disposition should state whether the complaint or petition is granted or denied, the specific relief granted, and the costs.The following test of completeness may be applied. First, the parties should know their rights and obligations. Second, they should know how to execute the decision under alternative contingencies. Third, there should be no need for further proceedings to dispose of the issues. Fourth, the case should be terminated by according the proper relief. The proper relief usually depends upon what the parties seek in their pleadings. It may declare their rights and duties, command the performance of positive prestations, or order them to abstain from specific acts. The disposition must also adjudicate costs. The foregoing parts need not always be discussed in sequence. But they should all be present and plainly identifiable in the decision.Depending on the writers character, genre and style, the language should be fresh and free-flowing, not necessarily stereotyped or in a fixed form; much less highfalutin, hackneyed and pretentious. At all times, however, the decision must be clear, concise, complete and correct. Second Substantive Issue: Religious Leaders Endorsement of Candidates for Public Office The basic question posed in the SJS Petition -- WHETHER ENDORSEMENTS OF CANDIDACIES BY RELIGIOUS LEADERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL -- undoubtedly deserves serious consideration. As stated

Regrettably, it is not legally possible for the Court to take up, on the merits, the paramount question involving a constitutional principle. It is a time-honored rule that the constitutionality of a statute [or act] will be passed upon only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned.100 WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review of Brother Mike Velarde is GRANTED. The assailed June 12, 2003 Decision and July 29, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 49) are hereby DECLARED NULL AND VOID and thus SET ASIDE.The SJS Petition for Declaratory Relief is DISMISSED for failure to state a cause of action. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator to evaluate and recommend whether the trial judge may, after observing due process, be held administratively liable for rendering a decision violative of the Constitution, the Rules of Court and relevant circulars of this Court. No costs. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO P. TAMBUNTING, ' G.R. No. 144101 JR. and COMMERCIAL HOUSE OF FINANCE, INC., Petitioners, - v e r s u s - SPOUSES EMILIO SUMABAT and ESPERANZA BAELLO, Respondents. Promulgated: September 16, 2005 x-------------------------------------------x DECISION CORONA, J.: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the February 11, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 120, in Civil Case No. C-16822. This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. (87655) 18837. It was previously registered in the names of respondents, spouses Emilio Sumabat and Esperanza Baello. On May 3, 1973, respondents mortgaged it to petitioner Antonio Tambunting, Jr. to secure the payment of a P7,727.95 loan. In August 1976, respondents were informed that their indebtedness had ballooned to P15,000 for their failure to pay the monthly amortizations. In May 1977, because respondents defaulted in their obligation, petitioner Commercial House of Finance, Inc. (CHFI), as assignee of the mortgage, initiated foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property but the same did not push through. It was restrained by the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Caloocan City, Branch 33 (now RTC Branch 123) in Civil Case No. C-6329, a complaint for injunction filed by respondents against petitioners. However, the case was subsequently dismissed for failure of the parties to appear at the hearing on November 9, 1977. On March 16, 1979, respondents filed an action for declaratory relief with the CFI of Caloocan City, Branch 33, seeking a declaration of the extent of their actual indebtedness. It was docketed as Civil Case No. C7496. Petitioners were declared in default for failure to file an answer within the reglementary period. They moved for the dismissal of the action on the ground that its subject, the mortgage deed, had already been breached prior to the filing of the action. The motion was denied for having been filed out of time and petitioners had already been declared in default. On January 8, 1981, the CFI rendered its decision. It fixed respondents' liability at P15,743.83 and authorized them to consign the amount to the court for proper disposition. In compliance with the decision, respondents consigned the required amount on January 9, 1981. In March 1995, respondents received a notice of sheriff's sale indicating that the mortgage had been

foreclosed by CHFI on February 8, 1995 and that an extrajudicial sale of the property would be held on March 27, 1995. On March 27, 1995, respondents instituted Civil Case No. C-16822, a petition for preliminary injunction, damages and cancellation of annotation of encumbrance with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, with the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. However, the public auction scheduled on that same day proceeded and the property was sold to CHFI as the highest bidder. Respondents failed to redeem the property during the redemption period. Hence, title to the property was consolidated in favor of CHFI and a new certificate of title (TCT No. 310191) was issued in its name. In view of these developments, respondents amended their complaint to an action for nullification of foreclosure, sheriff's sale and consolidation of title, reconveyance and damages. On February 11, 2000, the RTC issued the assailed decision. It ruled that the 1981 CFI decision in Civil Case No. C-7496 (fixing respondents' liability at P15,743.83 and authorizing consignation) had long attained finality. The mortgage was extinguished when respondents paid their indebtedness by consigning the amount in court. Moreover, the ten-year period within which petitioners should have foreclosed the property was already barred by prescription. They abused their right to foreclose the property and exercised it in bad faith. As a consequence, the trial court nullified the foreclosure and extrajudicial sale of the property, as well as the consolidation of title in CHFI's name in 1995. It then ordered the register of deeds of Caloocan City to cancel TCT No. 310191 and to reconvey the property to respondents. It also held petitioners liable for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the trial court's decision but it was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioners claim that the trial court erred when it affirmed the validity of the consignation. They insist that the CFI was barred from taking cognizance of the action for declaratory relief since, petitioners being already in default in their loan amortizations, there existed a violation of the mortgage deed even before the institution of the action. Hence, the CFI could not have rendered a valid judgment in Civil Case No. C-7496 and the consignation made pursuant to a void judgment was likewise void. Respondents also fault the trial court for holding that their right to foreclose the property had already prescribed. True, the trial court erred when it ruled that the 1981 CFI decision in Civil Case No. C-7496 was already final and executory. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order, regulation or ordinance before breach or violation thereof. [1] The purpose of the action is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, contract, etc. for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from its alleged breach. [2] It may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, contract, etc. to which it refers. [3] Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the court can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. [4] In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject, i.e., the statute, deed, contract, etc., has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action. Under such circumstances, inasmuch as a cause of action has already accrued in favor of one or the other party, there is nothing more for the court to explain or clarify short of a judgment or final order. Here, an infraction of the mortgage terms had already taken place before the filing of Civil Case No. C-7496. Thus, the CFI lacked jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case in 1979. And in the absence of jurisdiction, its decision was void and without legal effect. As this Court held in Arevalo v. Benedicto: [5] Furthermore, the want of jurisdiction by a court over the subject-matter renders its judgment void and a mere nullity, and considering that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out of are void, and considering further, that the decision, for want of jurisdiction of the court, is not a decision in contemplation of law, and, hence, can never become executory, it follows that such a void judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.

Nonetheless, the petition must fail. Article 1142 of the Civil Code is clear. A mortgage action prescribes after ten years. An action to enforce a right arising from a mortgage should be enforced within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. [6] Otherwise, it will be barred by prescription and the mortgage creditor will lose his rights under the mortgage. Here, petitioners' right of action accrued in May 1977 when respondents defaulted in their obligation to pay their loan amortizations. It was from that time that the ten-year period to enforce the right under the mortgage started to run. The period was interrupted when respondents filed Civil Case No. C-6329 sometime after May 1977 and the CFI restrained the intended foreclosure of the property. However, the period commenced to run again on November 9, 1977 when the case was dismissed. The respondents' institution of Civil Case No. C-7496 in the CFI on March 16, 1979 did not interrupt the running of the ten-year prescriptive period because, as discussed above, the court lacked jurisdiction over the action for declaratory relief. All proceedings therein were without legal effect. Thus, petitioners could have enforced their right under the mortgage, including its foreclosure, only until November 7, 1987, the tenth year from the dismissal of Civil Case No. C-6329. Thereafter, their right to do so was already barred by prescription. The foreclosure held on February 8, 1995 was therefore some seven years too late. The same thing can be said about the public auction held on March 27, 1995, the consolidation of title in CHFI's favor and the issuance of TCT No. 310191 in its name. They were all void and did not exist in the eyes of the law. WHEREFORE , the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 150806 : January 28, 2008 EUFEMIA ALMEDA and ROMEL ALMEDA, petitioners, v. BATHALA MARKETING INDUSTRIES, INC., Respondent. NACHURA, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 3, 2001, in CA-G.R. CV No. 67784, and its Resolution 2 dated November 19, 2001. The assailed Decision affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 136, dated May 9, 2000 in Civil Case No. 98-411. Sometime in May 1997, respondent Bathala Marketing Industries, Inc., as lessee, represented by its president Ramon H. Garcia, renewed its Contract of Lease4 with Ponciano L. Almeda (Ponciano), as lessor, husband of petitioner Eufemia and father of petitioner Romel Almeda. Under the said contract, Ponciano agreed to lease a portion of the Almeda Compound, located at 2208 Pasong Tamo Street, Makati City, consisting of 7,348.25 square meters, for a monthly rental of P1,107,348.69, for a term of four (4) years from May 1, 1997 unless sooner terminated as provided in the contract. 5 The contract of lease contained the following pertinent provisions which gave rise to the instant case: SIXTH - It is expressly understood by the parties hereto that the rental rate stipulated is based on the present rate of assessment on the property, and that in case the assessment should hereafter be increased or any new tax, charge or burden be imposed by authorities on the lot and building where the leased premises are located, LESSEE shall pay, when the rental herein provided becomes due, the additional rental or charge corresponding to the portion hereby leased; provided, however, that in the event that the present assessment or tax on said property should be reduced, LESSEE shall be entitled to reduction in the stipulated rental, likewise in proportion to the portion leased by him; SEVENTH - In case an extraordinary inflation or devaluation of Philippine Currency should supervene, the value of Philippine peso at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment;6 During the effectivity of the contract, Ponciano died. Thereafter, respondent dealt with petitioners. In a letter7 dated December 29, 1997, petitioners advised respondent that the former shall assess and collect Value Added Tax (VAT) on its monthly rentals. In response, respondent contended that VAT may not be imposed as the rentals fixed in the contract of lease were supposed to include the VAT therein, considering that their contract was executed on May 1, 1997 when the VAT law had long been in effect.8 chanroblesvirtuallaw libary On January 26, 1998, respondent received another letter from petitioners informing the former that its

monthly rental should be increased by 73% pursuant to condition No. 7 of the contract and Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Respondent opposed petitioners' demand and insisted that there was no extraordinary inflation to warrant the application of Article 1250 in light of the pronouncement of this Court in various cases.9 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Respondent refused to pay the VAT and adjusted rentals as demanded by petitioners but continued to pay the stipulated amount set forth in their contract. On February 18, 1998, respondent instituted an action for declaratory relief for purposes of determining the correct interpretation of condition Nos. 6 and 7 of the lease contract to prevent damage and prejudice. 10 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-411 before the RTC of Makati. On March 10, 1998, petitioners in turn filed an action for ejectment, rescission and damages against respondent for failure of the latter to vacate the premises after the demand made by the former. 11 Before respondent could file an answer, petitioners filed a Notice of Dismissal. 12 They subsequently refiled the complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati; the case was raffled to Branch 139 and was docketed as Civil Case No. 53596. Petitioners later moved for the dismissal of the declaratory relief case for being an improper remedy considering that respondent was already in breach of the obligation and that the case would not end the litigation and settle the rights of the parties. The trial court, however, was not persuaded, and consequently, denied the motion. After trial on the merits, on May 9, 2000, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent and against petitioners. The pertinent portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court renders judgment on the case as follows:cra:nad 1) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of Value-Added Tax (VAT) of 10% of the rent for [the] use of the leased premises; 2) declaring that plaintiff is not liable for the payment of any rental adjustment, there being no [extraordinary] inflation or devaluation, as provided in the Seventh Condition of the lease contract, to justify the same; 3) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the total amount of P1,119,102.19, said amount representing payments erroneously made by plaintiff as VAT charges and rental adjustment for the months of January, February and March, 1999; and 4) holding defendants liable to plaintiff for the amount of P1,107,348.69, said amount representing the balance of plaintiff's rental deposit still with defendants. SO ORDERED.13 The trial court denied petitioners their right to pass on to respondent the burden of paying the VAT since it was not a new tax that would call for the application of the sixth clause of the contract. The court, likewise, denied their right to collect the demanded increase in rental, there being no extraordinary inflation or devaluation as provided for in the seventh clause of the contract. Because of the payment made by respondent of the rental adjustment demanded by petitioners, the court ordered the restitution by the latter to the former of the amounts paid, notwithstanding the well-established rule that in an action for declaratory relief, other than a declaration of rights and obligations, affirmative reliefs are not sought by or awarded to the parties. Petitioners elevated the aforesaid case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the RTC decision. The fallo reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed decision in Civil Case No. 98-411 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the order for the return of the balance of the rental deposits and of the amounts representing the 10% VAT and rental adjustment, is hereby DELETED.

The appellate court agreed with the conclusions of law and the application of the decisional rules on the matter made by the RTC. However, it found that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting affirmative relief to the respondent, particularly the restitution of its excess payment. Petitioners now come before this Court raising the following issues: I. WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 1250 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. II. WHETHER OR NOT THE DOCTRINE ENUNCIATED IN FILIPINO PIPE AND FOUNDRY CORP. VS. NAWASA CASE, 161 SCRA 32 AND COMPANION CASES ARE (sic) APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. III. WHETHER OR NOT IN NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE IN THE CASE OF DEL ROSARIO VS. THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, 164 SCRA 562, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY THE 10% VALUE ADDED TAX IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF RA 7716. V. WHETHER OR NOT DECLARATORY RELIEF IS PROPER SINCE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS IN BREACH WHEN THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF WAS FILED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. In fine, the issues for our resolution are as follows: 1) whether the action for declaratory relief is proper; 2) whether respondent is liable to pay 10% VAT pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 7716; and 3) whether the amount of rentals due the petitioners should be adjusted by reason of extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Declaratory relief is defined as an action by any person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, executive order or resolution, to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute, and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The only issue that may be raised in such a petition is the question of construction or validity of provisions in an instrument or statute. Corollary is the general rule that such an action must be justified, as no other adequate relief or remedy is available under the circumstances. 15 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Decisional law enumerates the requisites of an action for declaratory relief, as follows: 1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2) the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3) there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.16 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary It is beyond cavil that the foregoing requisites are present in the instant case, except that petitioners insist that respondent was already in breach of the contract when the petition was filed. We do not agree. After petitioners demanded payment of adjusted rentals and in the months that followed, respondent complied with the terms and conditions set forth in their contract of lease by paying the rentals stipulated therein. Respondent religiously fulfilled its obligations to petitioners even during the pendency of the present suit. There is no showing that respondent committed an act constituting a breach of the subject contract of lease. Thus, respondent is not barred from instituting before the trial court the petition for declaratory relief. Petitioners claim that the instant petition is not proper because a separate action for rescission, ejectment and damages had been commenced before another court; thus, the construction of the subject contractual provisions should be ventilated in the same forum. We are not convinced.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.14

It is true that in Panganiban v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation17 we held that the petition for declaratory relief should be dismissed in view of the pendency of a separate action for unlawful detainer. However, we

cannot apply the same ruling to the instant case. In Panganiban, the unlawful detainer case had already been resolved by the trial court before the dismissal of the declaratory relief case; and it was petitioner in that case who insisted that the action for declaratory relief be preferred over the action for unlawful detainer. Conversely, in the case at bench, the trial court had not yet resolved the rescission/ejectment case during the pendency of the declaratory relief petition. In fact, the trial court, where the rescission case was on appeal, itself initiated the suspension of the proceedings pending the resolution of the action for declaratory relief. We are not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated in Teodoro, Jr. v. Mirasol18 where the declaratory relief action was dismissed because the issue therein could be threshed out in the unlawful detainer suit. Yet, again, in that case, there was already a breach of contract at the time of the filing of the declaratory relief petition. This dissimilar factual milieu proscribes the Court from applying Teodoro to the instant case.

intention, once ascertained, is deemed an integral part of the contract.21 cra While, indeed, condition No. 7 of the contract speaks of "extraordinary inflation or devaluation" as compared to Article 1250's "extraordinary inflation or deflation," we find that when the parties used the term "devaluation," they really did not intend to depart from Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Condition No. 7 of the contract should, thus, be read in harmony with the Civil Code provision. That this is the intention of the parties is evident from petitioners' letter 22 dated January 26, 1998, where, in demanding rental adjustment ostensibly based on condition No. 7, petitioners made explicit reference to Article 1250 of the Civil Code, even quoting the law verbatim. Thus, the application of Del Rosario is not warranted. Rather, jurisprudential rules on the application of Article 1250 should be considered. Article 1250 of the Civil Code states:

Given all these attendant circumstances, the Court is disposed to entertain the instant declaratory relief action instead of dismissing it, notwithstanding the pendency of the ejectment/rescission case before the trial court. The resolution of the present petition would write finis to the parties' dispute, as it would settle once and for all the question of the proper interpretation of the two contractual stipulations subject of this controversy. Now, on the substantive law issues. Petitioners repeatedly made a demand on respondent for the payment of VAT and for rental adjustment allegedly brought about by extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Both the trial court and the appellate court found no merit in petitioners' claim. We see no reason to depart from such findings. As to the liability of respondent for the payment of VAT, we cite with approval the ratiocination of the appellate court, viz.: Clearly, the person primarily liable for the payment of VAT is the lessor who may choose to pass it on to the lessee or absorb the same. Beginning January 1, 1996, the lease of real property in the ordinary course of business, whether for commercial or residential use, when the gross annual receipts exceed P500,000.00, is subject to 10% VAT. Notwithstanding the mandatory payment of the 10% VAT by the lessor, the actual shifting of the said tax burden upon the lessee is clearly optional on the part of the lessor, under the terms of the statute. The word "may" in the statute, generally speaking, denotes that it is directory in nature. It is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. In this case, despite the applicability of the rule under Sec. 99 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. 7716, granting the lessor the option to pass on to the lessee the 10% VAT, to existing contracts of lease as of January 1, 1996, the original lessor, Ponciano L. Almeda did not charge the lessee-appellee the 10% VAT nor provided for its additional imposition when they renewed the contract of lease in May 1997. More significantly, said lessor did not actually collect a 10% VAT on the monthly rental due from the lessee-appellee after the execution of the May 1997 contract of lease. The inevitable implication is that the lessor intended not to avail of the option granted him by law to shift the 10% VAT upon the lessee-appellee. x x x.19 In short, petitioners are estopped from shifting to respondent the burden of paying the VAT. Petitioners' reliance on the sixth condition of the contract is, likewise, unavailing. This provision clearly states that respondent can only be held liable for new taxes imposed after the effectivity of the contract of lease, that is, after May 1997, and only if they pertain to the lot and the building where the leased premises are located. Considering that RA 7716 took effect in 1994, the VAT cannot be considered as a "new tax" in May 1997, as to fall within the coverage of the sixth stipulation. Neither can petitioners legitimately demand rental adjustment because of extraordinary inflation or devaluation. Petitioners contend that Article 1250 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case because the contract stipulation speaks of extraordinary inflation or devaluation while the Code speaks of extraordinary inflation or deflation. They insist that the doctrine pronounced in Del Rosario v. The Shell Company, Phils. Limited20 should apply. Essential to contract construction is the ascertainment of the intention of the contracting parties, and such determination must take into account the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. This

In case an extraordinary inflation or deflation of the currency stipulated should supervene, the value of the currency at the time of the establishment of the obligation shall be the basis of payment, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. Inflation has been defined as the sharp increase of money or credit, or both, without a corresponding increase in business transaction. There is inflation when there is an increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods, resulting in a substantial and continuing rise in the general price level. 23 In a number of cases, this Court had provided a discourse on what constitutes extraordinary inflation, thus: [E]xtraordinary inflation exists when there is a decrease or increase in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency which is unusual or beyond the common fluctuation in the value of said currency, and such increase or decrease could not have been reasonably foreseen or was manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time of the establishment of the obligation.24 The factual circumstances obtaining in the present case do not make out a case of extraordinary inflation or devaluation as would justify the application of Article 1250 of the Civil Code. We would like to stress that the erosion of the value of the Philippine peso in the past three or four decades, starting in the mid-sixties, is characteristic of most currencies. And while the Court may take judicial notice of the decline in the purchasing power of the Philippine currency in that span of time, such downward trend of the peso cannot be considered as the extraordinary phenomenon contemplated by Article 1250 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, absent an official pronouncement or declaration by competent authorities of the existence of extraordinary inflation during a given period, the effects of extraordinary inflation are not to be applied. 25 cra WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 67784, dated September 3, 2001, and its Resolution dated November 19, 2001, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 137794 : August 11, 2010] ERLINDA REYES AND ROSEMARIE MATIENZO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, PRESIDING, BRANCH 49, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY; SPOUSES BERNARD AND FLORENCIA PERL, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT BENJAMIN MUCIO; HON. JUDGE VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES, PRESIDING, BRANCH 124, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY AND SEGUNDO BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 149664 ] SPS. ALBERTO EMBORES AND LOURDES EMBORES, SPS. ROBERTO AND EVELYN PALAD, DENNIS HENOSA AND CORAZON LAURENTE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RAYMUNDO G. VALLEGA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 52, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY; HON. ELEANOR R. KWONG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 51, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY; HON. JUDGE BELEN B. ORTIZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 49, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY; VICTORIA C. SALIRE-ALBIS, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEYIN-FACT MR. MENELIO C. SALIRE; MA. FE R. ROCO, ALFREDO TAN, MANUELITO ESTRELLA; AND HON. JUDGE ANTONIO FINEZA, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 131, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, CALOOCAN CITY, RESPONDENTS. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: [1]

The instant cases are consolidated Petitions for Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition. The petitioners in G.R. No. 137794 seek to declare null and void the proceedings in Civil Case No. 23477, an ejectment case, before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Caloocan City, Branch 49, and Civil Case No. C17725, a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Caloocan City, Branch 124;[2] while the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 pray for the nullity of the following ejectment proceedings before the different branches of the Caloocan City MeTC: (1) Civil Case No. 9925011, Branch 52; (2) Civil Case No. 22559 and Civil Case No. 18575, Branch 49 and its appeal to the RTC, Branch 131; (3) Civil Case No. 00-25892, Branch 51; and (4) Civil Case No. 00-25889, Branch 51.[3] G.R. No. 149664 was considered closed and terminated by the Court's Resolution dated August 30, 2006.[4] The parcels of land which are the subject matter of these cases are part of the Tala Estate, situated between the boundaries of Caloocan City and Quezon City and encompassing an area of 7,007.9515 hectares more or less.[5] In G.R. No. 137794, respondents Segundo Bautista and spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl sought the ouster from the contested lots of Erlinda Reyes, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo and Sergio Abejero, who are occupants of separate home lots in Camarin, Caloocan City. The first case was commenced on December 11, 1996, by respondent Segundo Bautista, a registered owner of the parcel of land occupied by spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo. The case was a complaint for Recovery of Possession and/or Ownership of Real Property (Recovery case) against the latter spouses with the RTC Caloocan City, Branch 124.[6] This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-17725.[7] Shortly thereafter, a separate but related action, was initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands on December 27, 1996, before the Quezon City RTC, Branch 85 (re-raffled to Branch 93).[8] This was a complaint for Annulment of Title/Reversion (Annulment/Reversion case) against

Biyaya Corporation and the Register of Deeds of the Cities of Pasig, Caloocan, and Quezon, the City of Manila, and the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority involving the Tala Estate. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-29810, sought to declare null and void the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Biyaya Corporation, and all derivative titles emanating therefrom, and to declare the land in suit to be reverted to it as part of the patrimonial property of the State, and the same be awarded to the actual occupants. One of the intervenors therein is Samahan ng Maliliit na Magkakapitbahay (SAMAKABA) of which petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo are members.[9] On May 28, 1997, the Quezon City RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case issued a Preliminary Injunction (Injunction) freezing all ejectment cases involving the Tala Estate pending in the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City.[10]

On April 28, 2003, this Court resolved to consolidate the two cases. On July 28, 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a Motion to Withdraw and/or Dismiss Instant Petition[31] stating that since a decision in the Annulment/Reversion case (Civil Case No. Q-96-29810) was already issued (although they did not attach a copy thereof), the petition is therefore rendered moot and academic as the injunction order was effective only pending determination of the merits. On August 30, 2006, the Court granted the motion to withdraw petition in G.R. No. 149664 and considered the same closed and terminated.[32] On October 11, 2006, G.R. No. 149664 became final and executory. What remains to be resolved, therefore, are the issues raised in G.R. No. 137794.

Believing that the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC can be beneficial to them in the Recovery case pending before the Caloocan City RTC, on June 27, 1997, spouses Rene and Rosemarie Matienzo filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the Recovery case.[11] On December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied said motion.[12] Spouses Matienzo moved for the reconsideration of the motion, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998.[13] The spouses received the order denying their motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998.[14] Trial on the merits started on December 2, 1998.[15] The second case, an ejectment complaint, was commenced by spouses Bernard and Florencia Perl on June 25, 1997, against Erlinda Reyes before the Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[16] It was docketed as Civil Case No. 23477. Shortly thereafter, on July 8, 1997, spouses Perl filed the third case, an ejectment action against Sergio Abejero. The case, which was raffled off to Branch 49 of the Caloocan City MeTC, was docketed as Civil Case No. 23519.[17] Subsequently, these two ejectment cases were consolidated (Ejectment cases).[18] In her Answer and during the preliminary conference, Erlinda Reyes moved for the suspension of the proceedings and/or for the dismissal of these cases citing the Injunction issued in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810.[19] In its Order[20] dated January 22, 1999, the MeTC did not entertain Reyes's motion, instead, it required her to submit a position paper. Erlinda Reyes received the order on March 11, 1999.[21] On April 16, 1999, the trial court issued a Decision ordering Erlinda to vacate the contested property.[22] The Recovery case and the Ejectment cases converged when petitioners Rosemarie Matienzo and Erlinda Reyes, joined on March 25, 1999 in filing directly with this Court the instant petition denominated as "Declaratory Relief, Certiorari, and Prohibition," mainly assailing the denial of their respective motions for suspension.[23] Petitioners Matienzo and Reyes asked that the proceedings in the Ejectment cases and the Recovery case be declared null and void for violating the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC. This case is docketed as G.R. No. 137794. During the pendency of G.R. No. 137794, certain events supervened when the Ejectment cases ran their course and petitioner Reyes appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC. In the RTC, the Ejectment cases were docketed as Civil Cases Nos. C-18904-05.[24] Apparently, respondent-spouses Perl moved for the execution of the MeTC decision pending appeal, which the RTC granted as the Writ of Execution was thereafter issued on October 20, 2000.[25] Petitioner Erlinda Reyes and company, thus, filed with this Court a motion to suspend the proceedings in the RTC. [26] On October 25, 2000, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining the implementation of the said writ of execution.[27] G.R. No. 149664, on the other hand, emanated from four distinct ejectment complaints filed against petitioners Corazon Laurente, spouses Alberto and Lourdes Embores, spouses Roberto and Evelyn Palad, and Dennis Henosa.[28] The parcels of land from which petitioners were sought to be evicted were located in Camarin, Caloocan City and within the Tala Estate.[29] Petitioners were members of Alyansa Ng Mga Naninirahan Sa Tala Friar Lands (ALNATFRAL), an intervenor in the Reversion case.[30] These ejectment cases were all filed after the Injunction order was issued on May 28, 1997 by the Quezon City RTC in the Annulment/Reversion case. Thus, petitioners separately invoked the said injunction in seeking the dismissal or suspension of the four ejectment cases. Petitioners' motions for suspension were dismissed and the trial court proceeded to render judgments on these cases. Petitioners resorted directly to this Court in seeking the declaration of nullity of the proceedings of these ejectment cases for violating the prevailing injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC. Meanwhile, on March 4, 2003, the petitioners in G.R. No. 149664 filed a motion for consolidation asking that the said case be consolidated with G.R. No. 137794.

In their bid to declare null and void the proceedings in the Recovery case and the Ejectment cases, petitioners argued that the Caloocan City MeTC, where the Ejectment cases were filed, and the Caloocan City RTC where the Recovery case was pending, were divested of jurisdiction since the Quezon City RTC acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter.[33] Petitioners specifically alleged that the MeTC's refusal to suspend the Ejectment cases despite the Injunction order is tantamount or amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. As to the Caloocan City RTC, its desistance to heed the Injunction is unjustified and contrary to well-settled jurisprudence.[34] Petitioners were of the view that the interference by the Quezon City RTC was justified since no third-party claim is involved.[35] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopts the position of petitioners in praying that the orders denying the motion to suspend proceedings and the proceedings that transpired in the Ejectment cases be set aside for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.[36] Citing Honda Giken Kogyo-Kabushiki Kaisha v. San Diego,[37] where it was held that a writ of injunction may be issued to a court by another court superior in rank, the OSG maintains that the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC in Civil Case No. Q-96-29810 covers all metropolitan trial courts including the Ejectment cases in Caloocan City MeTC, Branch 49.[38] The OSG also maintains that the Injunction was in accordance with the settled jurisprudence where the reversion case is being filed by the State. Respondent Segundo Bautista contends that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy. He argues that the action for declaratory relief can only prosper if the statute, deed, or contract has not been violated.[39] Hence, where the law or contract has already been breached prior to the filing of the declaratory relief, courts can no longer assume jurisdiction since this action is not geared towards the settling of issues arising from breach or violation of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, and contract, but rather it is intended to secure an authoritative statement for guidance in their enforcement or compliance of the same. [40] Since the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC had already been violated as early as December 8, 1997 by the Caloocan City RTC in the Recovery case, or before the filing of this instant petition, resort to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court would not lie. Respondent Bautista insists that the instant recourse of petitioner Matienzo was resorted to as a ploy to substitute the filing of certiorari under Rule 65, which she already lost since the 60-day period had already expired.[41] Respondent points out that direct resort to this Court violates the rule on the hierarchy of courts. Since it was the Caloocan City RTC which denied petitioner Matienzo's motion to suspend proceedings, the petition for declaratory relief should have been filed with the Court of Appeals. Direct filing with this Court is not justified as, other than making motherhood statements, petitioner Matienzo failed to state clearly the exceptional and compelling circumstances to justify the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction.[42] He likewise contends that the Caloocan City RTC did not err in not suspending the proceedings in the Recovery case, notwithstanding the Injunction issued by the Quezon City RTC, since the said injunction applied only to the MeTCs of Quezon City and Caloocan City so the RTC was excluded from the injunction order. He avers that it is the Caloocan City RTC which is vested with the jurisdiction to hear and decide the case until its final conclusion since it had acquired the same ahead of the Quezon City RTC. He states that being co-equal, the Quezon City RTC had no authority to stop by injunction the Caloocan City RTC and even though there are instances where another court may exercise coordinate jurisdiction in cases where there are justifiable grounds, here, petitioner Matienzo has not alleged any of those circumstances. Petitioners insist that this is mainly a petition for declaratory relief. Section 1, Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. -- Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. The foregoing section can be dissected into two parts. The first paragraph concerns declaratory relief, which has been defined as a special civil action by any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument or whose rights are affected by a statute, ordinance, executive order or regulation to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, executive order or regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The second paragraph pertains to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument; (2) an action to quiet title; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership in a sale with a right to repurchase.[43] The first paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 63 enumerates the subject matter to be inquired upon in a declaratory relief namely, deed, will, contract or other written instrument, a statute, executive order or regulation, or any government regulation. This Court, in Lerum v. Cruz,[44] declared that the subject matters to be tested in a petition for declaratory relief are exclusive, viz: Under this rule, only a person who is interested "under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or statute and for a declaration of his rights or duties thereunder." This means that the subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance, to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius. (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing holding was reiterated in Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[45] wherein this Court stressed that court orders or decisions cannot be made the subject matter of a declaratory relief, thus: Judge Querubin's query is not an action for declaratory relief. Section 1 of Rule 64 [now Rule 63] of the Rules of Court provides the requisites of an action for declaratory relief. In interpreting these requisites, the Court has ruled that:

The proper remedy that petitioner Erlinda Reyes could have utilized from the denial of her motion to suspend proceedings in the Caloocan City MeTC was to file a motion for reconsideration and, if it is denied, to file a petition for certiorari before the RTC pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, petitioner Matienzo should have filed a special civil action on certiorari also under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals from the denial of her motion by the Caloocan City RTC. The necessity of filing the petition to the RTC in the case of Erlinda Reyes and to the Court of Appeals in the case of Matienzo is dictated by the principle of the hierarchy of courts.[48] Both petitions must be filed within 60 days from the receipt or notice of the denial of the motion to suspend proceedings or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Section 4 of Rule 65 partly provides: Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of said motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court x x x, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed with the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the court's appellate jurisdiction. Despite this procedural remedy available to them, petitioners, under the pretext that they were in a quandary as to their rights under the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC, directly filed the instant case here. Petitioners did not bother to proffer a compelling reason for their direct resort to this Court. This procedural faux pas proves fatal. The Court's exhortation against taking a procedural shortcut cannot be overemphasized. In Ortega v. The Quezon City Government, [49] the Court accentuated: At all events, even if this petition delves on questions of law, there is no statutory or jurisprudential basis for according to this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over declaratory relief which advances only questions of law. Finally, while a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition if it has far reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, there is no allegation of facts by petitioner tending to show that she is entitled to such a writ. The judicial policy must thus remain that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it, except when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Court's primary jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx The letter of Judge Querubin pertained to final orders and decisions of the courts that are clearly not the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief. Thus, the requisites prescribed by the Rules of Court in an action for declaratory relief are not applicable to the letter of Judge Querubin.[46] (Emphasis supplied.) Then again in a recent ruling of this Court, it was emphasized: A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have a court decision as its subject matter. In Tanda v. Aldaya [98 Phil. 244 (1956)], we ruled that: [A] court decision cannot be interpreted as included within the purview of the words "other written instrument," as contended by appellant, for the simple reason that the Rules of Court already provide for the ways by which an ambiguous or doubtful decision may be corrected or clarified without need of resorting to the expedient prescribed by Rule 66 [now Rule 64].[47] (Emphasis supplied.) In the instant case, petitioners Erlinda Reyes and Rosemarie Matienzo assailed via Declaratory Relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, the orders of the trial courts denying their motions to suspend proceedings. This recourse by petitioners, unfortunately, cannot be countenanced since a court order is not one of those subjects to be examined under Rule 63.

To make matters worse, petitioner Matienzo obviously availed of the instant declaratory relief to substitute for a petition for certiorari, a remedy which she sadly lost by inaction. It must be recalled that on December 8, 1997, the Caloocan City RTC, Branch 124 denied Matienzo's motion to suspend proceedings.[50] She moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied on May 14, 1998.[51] She received the Order denying her motion for reconsideration on June 9, 1998.[52] She had 60 days therefrom to question the same before the Quezon City RTC. It was only on March 25, 1999 that petitioner Matienzo assailed the order denying her motion for reconsideration, albeit wrongly before this Court.[53] From this, it can be inferred that petitioner Matienzo's recourse is a belated attempt designed to salvage her lost opportunity to assail the order denying her motion to suspend proceedings. Also unavailing are the contentions of petitioners that the Caloocan City RTC and MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion when they denied petitioners' motions to suspend proceedings. The pertinent portion of the Injunction order of the Quezon City RTC reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court has to grant, as it hereby grants the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. Let a writ of preliminary Injunction be issued ordering defendant representing Biyaya Corporation, its agents, assigns, and transferees, as well as all other persons representing themselves as owners of certain portions of the land in question, otherwise known as the Tala Estate, to immediately cease and desist from doing or causing to do, further acts of disposition of the lots subject of the present complaint, such as the filing of ejectment cases in the Municipal Trial Courts of

Quezon City and Caloocan City and, the demolition and ejectment therefrom of the members of the herein Intervenors. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Courts of Quezon City and Caloocan City are specifically ordered to cease and desist from further conducting trials and proceedings in the ejectment cases filed and to be filed involving the lots of the present complaint, until further orders from this Court.[54] (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing order is not addressed to the Caloocan City RTC. Neither can it be inferred from the language thereof that the Quezon City RTC intended to enjoin the Caloocan City RTC from further proceeding with the Recovery case. The order merely mentions the Caloocan City MeTCs. Nothing more. But more importantly, the Quezon City RTC could not have validly enjoined the Caloocan City RTC without violating the doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction.[55] Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals[56] justifies this rule in this manner: Beginning with the case of Orais v. Escaño, down to the subsequent cases of Nuñez v. Low, Cabigao v. del Rosario, Hubahib v. Insular Drug Co., Inc., National Power Corp. v. De Veyra, Luciano v. Provincial Governor, De Leon v. Hon. Judge Salvador, Cojuangco v. Villegas, Darwin v. Tokonaga, we laid down the long standing doctrine that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied.) In Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Court of Appeals,[57] two civil cases with identical causes of action were filed in different RTCs, one ahead of the other. The second RTC which acquired jurisdiction over the case issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the proceedings in the RTC which first acquired jurisdiction of the case. Ruling against the injunction issued by the RTC, this Court stressed: Hence, nothing can be clearer than that Judge Rapatalo had indeed issued the questioned writ of preliminary injunction with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for the blatant disregard of the basic precept that no court has the power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or orders of a co-equal and coordinate court of concurrent jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief sought by injunction. This Court explained in Parco vs. Court of Appeals that: x x x Jurisdiction is vested in the court not in any particular branch or judge, and as a corollary rule, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a judicial district are a coordinate and co-equal courts one branch stands on the same level as the other. Undue interference by one on the proceedings and processes of another is prohibited by law. In the language of this Court, the various branches of the Court of First Instance of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction should not, cannot, and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments x x x. Needless to say, adherence to a different rule would sow confusion and wreak havoc on the orderly administration of justice, and in the ensuing melee, hapless litigants will be at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause.[58] (Emphasis supplied.) While there are recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, other than citing said cases, [59] petitioners did not explain the applicability of said exceptional cases to their petition. Bereft of merit too is petitioners' argument that the Caloocan City MeTC cannot disregard the injunction order of the Quezon City RTC hearing the Annulment/Reversion case. The established rule is that a pending civil action for ownership such as annulment of title shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding.[60] The Court explained that the rationale for this is that in an ejectment case, the issue is possession, while in an annulment case the issue is ownership.[61] In fact, an ejectment case can be tried apart from an annulment case.[62] Although there is an exception to this rule, petitioners failed to justify that this case falls within said exception. The words of the Court on this matter are instructive:

In the absence of a concrete showing of compelling equitable reasons at least comparable and under circumstances analogous to Amagan, we cannot override the established rule that a pending civil action for ownership shall not ipso facto suspend an ejectment proceeding. Additionally, to allow a suspension on the basis of the reasons the petitioners presented in this case would create the dangerous precedent of allowing an ejectment suit to be suspended by an action filed in another court by parties who are not involved or affected by the ejectment suit.[63] (Emphases supplied.) Hence, petitioners' posture that the Ejectment cases should be suspended due to the pendency of the Annulment/Reversion case is not meritorious. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order dated October 25, 2000 issued by this Court is LIFTED. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 181303 : September 17, 2009 CARMEN DANAO MALANA, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, EVELYN DANAO, FERMINA DANAO, LETICIA DANAO and LEONORA DANAO, the last two are represented herein by their Attorney-in-Fact, MARIA DANAO ACORDA, Petitioners, v. BENIGNO TAPPA, JERRY REYNA, SATURNINO CAMBRI and SPOUSES FRANCISCO AND MARIA LIGUTAN, Respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders1 dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007, and 31 October 2007, rendered by Branch 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City, which dismissed, for lack of jurisdiction, the Complaint of petitioners Carmen Danao Malana, Leticia Danao, Maria Danao Accorda, Evelyn Danao, Fermina Danao, and Leonora Danao, against respondents Benigno Tappa, Jerry Reyna, Saturnino Cambri, Francisco Ligutan and Maria Ligutan, in Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages2 against respondents on 27 March 2007, docketed as Civil Case No. 6868. Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1279373 situated in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate.4 During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.5 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelo's family members,6 continued to occupy the subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent materials. Petitioners also learned that respondents were claiming ownership over the subject property. Averring that they already needed it, petitioners demanded that respondents vacate the same. Respondents, however, refused to heed petitioners' demand.7 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting their claim of ownership. According to petitioners, respondents' documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable of proving the latter's claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a cloud upon petitioners' title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title.8 Petitioners additionally sought in their Complaint an award against respondents for actual damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, resulting from the latter's baseless claim over the subject property that did not actually belong to them, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.9 Petitioners likewise prayed for an award against respondents for exemplary damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, since the latter had acted in bad faith and resorted to unlawful means to establish their claim over the subject property. Finally, petitioners asked to recover from respondents P50,000.00 as attorney's fees, because the latter's refusal to vacate the property constrained petitioners to engage the services of a lawyer.10 cra Before respondents could file their answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners' Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The RTC referred to Republic Act No. 7691,11 amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which vests the RTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00. It found that the subject property had a value of less than P20,000.00; hence, petitioners' action to recover the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC. The RTC decreed in its 4 May 2007 Order that:cra:nad The Court has no jurisdiction over the action, it being a real action involving a real property with assessed value less than P20,000.00 and hereby dismisses the same without prejudice.12 cra Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their Complaint.

They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from Respondents. Petitioner's Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court13 states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC.14 cra In an Order dated 30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.15 Petitioners filed another pleading, simply designated as Motion, in which they prayed that the RTC Orders dated 4 May 2007 and 30 May 2007, dismissing their Complaint, be set aside. They reiterated their earlier argument that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. They also contended that there was no obstacle to their joining the two causes of action, i.e., quieting of title and reivindicacion, in a single Complaint, citing Rumarate v. Hernandez.16 And even if the two causes of action could not be joined, petitioners maintained that the misjoinder of said causes of action was not a ground for the dismissal of their Complaint.17 cra The RTC issued an Order dated 31 October 2007 denying petitioners' Motion. It clarified that their Complaint was dismissed, not on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action, but for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC dissected Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, which provides:cra:nad Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. The RTC differentiated between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. The second paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.18 The dispositive part of the 31 October 2007 Order of the RTC reads:cra:nad This Court maintains that an action to quiet title is a real action. [Herein petitioners] do not dispute the assessed value of the property at P410.00 under Tax Declaration No. 02-48386. Hence, it has no jurisdiction over the action. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Motion is hereby denied.19 cra Hence, the present Petition, where petitioners raise the sole issue of: I WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE PETITIONERS MOTU PROPRIO. 20 Petitioners' statement of the issue is misleading. It would seem that they are only challenging the fact that their Complaint was dismissed by the RTC motu proprio. Based on the facts and arguments set forth in the instant Petition, however, the Court determines that the fundamental issue for its resolution is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The Court rules in the negative. An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of

the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder.21 Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, describes the general circumstances in which a person may file a petition for declaratory relief, to wit: Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis ours.) As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court further provides in its second paragraph that:cra:nad An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis ours.) The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right to repurchase. These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the judgment into effect.22 cra To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended. It is important to note that Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court does not categorically require that an action to quiet title be filed before the RTC. It repeatedly uses the word "may" - that an action for quieting of title "may be brought under [the] Rule" on petitions for declaratory relief, and a person desiring to file a petition for declaratory relief "may x x x bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court." The use of the word "may" in a statute denotes that the provision is merely permissive and indicates a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option.23 In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended, uses the word "shall" and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000.00, thus:cra:nad Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.-Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: x x x (Emphasis ours.) As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners' Complaint involving title to and possession of the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the

instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder.24 Since the purpose of an action for declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers. A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.25 cra Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.26 cra In the present case, petitioners' Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was filed only subsequent to the latter's express claim of ownership over the subject property before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners' title. Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief. An accion publiciana is a suit for the recovery of possession, filed one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. An accion reivindicatoria is a suit that has for its object one's recovery of possession over the real property as owner.27 cra Petitioners' Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same. The RTC, therefore, did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, without prejudice, petitioners' Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868 for lack of jurisdiction. As for the RTC dismissing petitioners' Complaint motu proprio, the following pronouncements of the Court in Laresma v. Abellana28 proves instructive:cra:nad It is axiomatic that the nature of an action and the jurisdiction of a tribunal are determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the law at the time the action was commenced. Jurisdiction of the tribunal over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by law and not by the consent or waiver upon a court which, otherwise, would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of an action. Lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action or the subject matter of an action cannot be cured by the silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent of the parties. If the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of an action, it may dismiss the same ex mero motu or motu proprio. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) Since the RTC, in dismissing petitioners' Complaint, acted in complete accord with law and jurisprudence, it cannot be said to have done so with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to have been committed in grave abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment, which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.29 No such circumstances exist herein as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DISMISSED. The Orders dated 4 May 2007, 30 May 2007 and 31 October 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Branch 3, dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 6868, without prejudice, are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to REMAND the records of this case to the Municipal Trial Court or the court of proper jurisdiction for proper disposition. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED

CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION, MANDAMUS

G.R. No. 157659 Petitioner, January 25, ELIGIO P. MALLARI, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on March 17, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his petition for certiorari. Antecedents In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling P34,000.00 from respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To secure the performance of his obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallaris names. However, he paid GSIS about ten years after contracting the obligations only P10,000.00 on May 22, 1978 and P20,000.00 on August 11, 1978.1cralaw What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the petitioner to delay the efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the unhampered possession of the foreclosed property. After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May 2, 1979, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a telegraphic demand to him to update his account. On November 10, 1981, he requested a final accounting, but did not do anything more. Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984, GSIS applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. On November 22, 1984, he requested an updated computation of his outstanding account. On November 29, 1984, he persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance, to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments of P30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). On December 13, 1984, GSIS responded to his request and rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of account. On July 21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further payments. On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, in San Fernando, Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 7802,2cralaw ostensibly to enjoin them from proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for preliminary injunction). The RTC ultimately decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating TCT No. 61171-R and TCT No. 54835-R in his and his wifes names.3 GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996.4cralaw The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 124468).5cralaw On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for review.6cralaw On January 15, 1997, this Court turned down his motion for reconsideration.7cralaw As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R in the name of GSIS. GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a writ of possession on September 2, 1999.8cralaw Granting the ex parte motion on October 8, 1999,9cralaw the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999,10cralaw ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the properties. The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioners request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. It is noted that GSIS acceded to the request.11 Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution on March 27, 2000.12cralaw Also, the petitioner commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case No. 12053),

ostensibly for consignation (coupled with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order). However, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 12053 on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling him to appeal the dismissal to the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No. 70300).13 In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April 5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et al.14cralaw in contempt of court for painting the fence of the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.15cralaw He filed another motion in the same case, dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to cut off the electric services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.16> To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 7802, GSIS moved to inhibit him for alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, motions for contempt of court, and motion for issuance of break open order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be reraffled to another branch of the RTC.17cralaw Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then denied the motions for contempt of court on July 30, 2001, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated October 21, 1999.18 The petitioner sought reconsideration,19cralaw but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for reconsideration on February 11, 2002.20cralaw Ruling of the CA By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999.21 22

On March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, cralaw stating: We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This Court is not unaware of the legal tactics and maneuvers employed by the petitioner in delaying the disposition of the subject case (Civil Case No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the final resolution by the Supreme Court affirming the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. We construe the actuation of the petitioner in resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the Rules of Court, through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions in litigating this case, as running counter to the intendment of the Rules to be utilized in promoting the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The issues raised in the present controversy have already been settled in our existing jurisprudence on the subject. In the case of De Jesus vs. Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that "generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ of execution is issued when a decision has already become final." The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has established the principle of law, as enunciated in Buaya vs. Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. that "once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court." The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya case that "the effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments." As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court is emphatic in saying that "the finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party." We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the court below. Thus, we sustain the assailed Orders of the court a quo since no abuse of discretion has been found to have been committed by the latter

in their issuance. Moreover, this Court finds this petition to be part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.23 Issues Hence, this appeal. The petitioner insists herein that the CA gravely erred in refusing "to accept the nullity of the following orders" of the RTC, to wit: 1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1999, GRANTING THE EXPARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION AND/OR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS; 2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 21, 1999 GRANTING THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GSIS; 3. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30, 2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS; and 4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2002, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO THE COURT ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.24 Ruling of the Court The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit. I Petition for Certiorari in CA Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following orders of the RTC, to wit: 1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession of GSIS);25 2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in favor of GSIS);26 3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the reimplementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession, and dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);27cralaw and 4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the reconsideration of the order dated July 30, 2001).28cralaw The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac, et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in contempt; and declared GSISs motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the order of July 30, 2001 had merely challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course). Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,29cralaw which requires a petition for certiorari to be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution," or, in case a motion for

reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion." It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases.30cralaw II Nature of the Writ of Possession and its Ministerial Issuance The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of the motion seeking the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; hence, the writ was invalid. As earlier shown, the CA disagreed with him. We sustain the CA, and confirm that the petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as amended, and its pertinent jurisprudence to any prior notice of the application for the issuance of the writ of possession. A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real property, may be issued in: (1) land registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.31cralaw Anent the redemption of property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power referred to in Section 132cralaw of Act No. 3135,33cralaw as amended, the debtor, his successor-in-interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold has the right to redeem the property at anytime within the term of one year from and after the date of the sale, such redemption to be governed by the provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the extent that said provisions were not inconsistent with the provisions of Act 3135.34cralaw In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the registration of the sale, not from and after the date of the sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the original Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its Section 25 (Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27 (Section 466) of Rule 39, with Section 27 still expressly reckoning the redemption period to be "at any time within twelve months after the sale;" and although the Revised Rules of Court (effective on January 1, 1964) continued to provide in Section 30 of Rule 39 that the redemption be made from the purchaser "at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale,"35cralaw the 12-month period of redemption came to be held as beginning "to run not from the date of the sale but from the time of registration of the sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds."36cralaw This construction was due to the fact that the sheriffs sale of registered (and unregistered) lands did not take effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds.37cralaw

purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount of such other lien, with interest. Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60) days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest. Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a) (Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the Register of Deeds in order to avoid the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor loses all interest over the foreclosed property.38cralaw The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends beyond the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no redemption is made,39cralaw that it is no longer necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, considering that the possession of the land becomes his absolute right as the lands confirmed owner.40cralaw The consolidation of ownership in the purchasers name and the issuance to him of a new TCT then entitles him to demand possession of the property at any time, and the issuance of a writ of possession to him becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name. The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue the writ of possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to determine whether or not to issue the writ, for the issuance of the writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a ministerial function.41cralaw Verily, a marked distinction exists between a discretionary act and a ministerial one. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.42cralaw The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person against whom the relief is sought.43cralaw Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ of possession a non-litigious proceeding.44cralaw

Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court (1940 and 1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning of the redemption period in judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated in Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial construction of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, to wit:

It is clear from the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession upon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could not also impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not undo the consolidation in GSIS of the ownership of the properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R, which consolidation was already irreversible. Hence, his moves against the writ of execution cum writ of possession were tainted by bad faith, for he was only too aware, being his own lawyer, of the dire consequences of his non-redemption within the period provided by law for that purpose.

Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. The judgment obligor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after

III Dismissal of Petitioners Motion for Indirect Contempt Was Proper and In Accord with the Rules of Court

The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in dismissing his charges for indirect contempt against GSIS, et al.; and that the CA should have consequently granted his petition for certiorari. The petitioners insistence is plainly unwarranted. First of all, Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n) (Emphasis supplied). Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or (2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly made by the court against which the contemptuous act is committed. Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the filing of a verified petition for contempt is mandatory:45 1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in the second paragraph of this amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of unregulated motions for contempt, said incidents sometimes remain pending for resolution although the main case has already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects but, at any rate, the same may now be eliminated by this amendatory procedure. Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph of this section. (Emphasis supplied). Clearly, the petitioners charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions was not permitted by the Rules of Court. And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have tendered filing fees. The need to tender filing fees derived from the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil action. Yet, the petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the omission to tender filing fees would have also warranted the dismissal of the charges. It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without regard to the requisites of the Rules of Court simply to vex the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse of procedures. IV Petitioner Was Guilty of Misconduct As A Lawyer The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA was "part of the dilatory tactics of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil

Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the highest tribunal of the land."46cralaw The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence. Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the dulyissued writ of possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser GSIS. His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyers Oath, particularly:47 xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients xxx We stress that the petitioners being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to resort to dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had and to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients."48cralaw His true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court processes.49cralaw Consequently, he must be made to account for his misconduct as a lawyer. WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 17, 2003, with the costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner. The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. SO ORDERED

Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 04-122, Ramon C. Gonzalez v. Alabang Country Club, Inc., for damages (the civil case). Complainant was later disqualified as a candidate and ousted as a member of the ACCI. He thus amended his complaint in the civil case by impleading the members of the Board at the time material to his expulsion, the newly elected members, and the members of the Nomination and Election Committee. And he added, as cause of action, the nullification of his disqualification and expulsion in the reliefs prayed for. Branch 256 of the Muntinlupa RTC decided the civil case in complainants favor, and issued a writ of execution allowing him to resume his rights as a member of ACCI. The defendants in the civil case assailed the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via petition for review with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 89358. 1cralaw This case was consolidated with related cases in which herein complainant was the respondent. It is gathered that the appellate court issued on April 29, 2005 a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the execution of the decision in the civil case, drawing complainant to move for its lifting, alleging that ACCI had already voluntarily executed the decision in the civil case. His motion was, however, denied. When the TRO expired, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals composed of Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios, Vicente S.E. Veloso, and Justice Amelita Tolentino as ponente directed the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction as in fact one was issued on July 11, 2005.2cralaw Complainant challenged the appellate courts issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction via petition for certiorari filed before this Court on September 8, 2005.3 In the meantime, complainant, through counsel, filed on September 29, 2005 before the appellate court a Motion for Inhibition of respondent because, by his claim, the issuance of the writ was against the law. By Resolution of April 11, 2007, the Court dismissed complainants petition for certiorari 4cralaw "for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned [appellate courts] Resolution is tainted with grave abuse of discretion." More than a year later or on August 20, 2008, complainant filed a letter-complaint before this Court, alleging as follows: On September 29, 2005, or almost three (3) years ago to date, I asked my lawyer to file a Motion for Inhibition against the ponente, Justice Amelita G. Tolentino because the issuance of the injunction was obviously against the law. Up to the present, the [motion for] inhibition has not been acted upon. I also understand that cases involving intra-corporate controversy must be resolved as soon as possible because of [their] nature. The affairs of corporations cannot be suspended or left undecided longer than is necessary. In my case, I ran x x x for the term June 2004-June 2006 and a decision was rendered on April 4, 2005. The decision was raised to the Court of Appeals in May 2005. At that time, if the Decision was not restrained, or the case acted upon quickly as should have been the case, there was still an opportunity for me to have been duly elected and to have served as director. Because of the inaction of Justice Tolentino which is against the rule governing intra-corporate dispute, this opportunity was forever lost to me. A.M. No. CA-10-49-J : January 28, 2010 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-142-CA-J] RAMON C. GONZALES, Complainant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: The facts that spawned the filing of the present administrative case are as follows: Ramon C. Gonzales (complainant), then a member of Alabang Country Club, Incorporated (ACCI) who was vying for a seat in its Board of Directors (the Board), was charged by the Board with having falsified proxy forms for the 2004 election of Board members. That drew him to file a complaint before the Regional Trial

As can be seen in the Resolutions issued in the cases, they were also furnished to a certain Atty. Felisberto Verano [Atty. Verano] who is not even a counsel of record in the case nor has he entered formally his appearance. Atty. Verano is the brother of then Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap of Parañaque and she was instrumental in having Justice Tolentino appointed to her present post. In fact, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was even addressed to Atty. Verano and not to any of the two (2) counsels of record for the Club. This is highly suspicious and anomalous. x x x x x x I am bringing this matter to your attention because I have reason to believe that Justice Tolentino is not innocent when she granted the Writ of Injunction and totally failed to act on the petitions. This is a favor to Atty. Verano to whose sister Justice Tolentino owes a debt of gratitude for her position. In view of the scandal now besetting the Court of Appeals, and recalling the removal of another associate justice last year, the taint of dishonesty and corruption may not be isolated, and in this case, the questionable inclusion of Atty. Verano should be immediately investigated, especially when there exists a link between

Justice Tolentino and the Veranos. The inclusion of his name may be there to remind Justice Tolentino about his interest in the case.5cralaw (underscoring supplied) In a parallel move, complainant filed on August 21, 2008 before the appellate court an Urgent Verified Motion Reiterating Motion for Inhibition (of Ponenteherein respondent Justice Amelita G. Tolentino).6cralaw This Court referred the letter-complaint to Court of Appeals Presiding Justice Conrado V. Vasquez for appropriate action.7 By Order of October 8, 2008, respondent inhibited herself from CA-G.R. SP No. 89788.8cralaw On October 14, 2008, she filed her Comment9cralaw on the letter-complaint. She claimed that there was nothing anomalous in furnishing Atty. Verano with a copy of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals, since he signed as collaborating counsel in the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 89788. She added that she did not know Atty. Verano and "former Parañaque Congresswoman Lorna Verano Yap" (Lorna) who she claimed was never a congresswoman of Parañaque. Respecting the delay in resolving the Motion for Inhibition, respondent claimed that in view of complainants filing (on September 8, 2005) of the petition for certiorari before this Court, she deemed it appropriate to defer any action on the motion (which was filed on September 29, 2005) in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised before it.10

Respondents justification for the delay in resolving the motion for inhibition ─ in deference to the authority of this Court to resolve the issues raised in the petition for certiorari ─ does not impress. Section 7 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for certiorari shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further proceeding with the case. This rule must be strictly adhered to by appellate and lower courts notwithstanding the possibility that the proceedings undertaken by them tend to or would render nugatory the pending petition before this Court.15 But even gratuitously crediting respondents justification for the delay, since the Court resolved complainants petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007, still, given the nature and history of the cases, respondent unduly delayed the resolution of a mere motion for inhibition ─ only on October 8, 2008, after the Court referred the present complaint to the appellate court and after complainant filed a reiterative motion. Under Section 9 (1) of Rule 14016cralaw of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious charge. Under Section 11 (B) of the same rule, the following sanctions may be imposed on judges of regular and special courts and justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan who commit less serious offenses: 1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.

In his letter-reply,11cralaw complainant stated that Atty. Verano signed no pleading other than the petition for review in CA-G.R. SP No. 89358.

Under the circumstances, this Court deems it appropriate to impose a fine of P15,000 on respondent.

In sum, the present administrative case complains against 1) the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, 2) the delay in the resolution by respondent of the Motion for Inhibition, 3) the furnishing of copies of Resolutions of the appellate court to Atty. Verano, and 4) the delay in the resolution by respondent of the cases on the merits.

WHEREFORE, respondent is found GUILTY of undue delay in rendering an order, and is FINED Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000), with WARNING that commission of the same or similar infraction shall be faulted strictly. SO ORDERED

Since the Court has, as reflected above, found in herein complainants petition for certiorari that the issuance by the appellate court of a writ of preliminary injunction was not attended with grave abuse of discretion, the Court shall dwell on the other specified complaints against respondent. The records show that indeed Atty. Verano signed the Petition for Review in CA-G.R. SP No. 89358 as collaborating counsel.12cralaw He was, therefore, entitled to receive a copy of the appellate courts resolutions including that which directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. In any event, the order to issue the writ of preliminary injunction was the collective act of the members of the Ninth Division of the Court. Bautista v. Abdulwahid enlightens:13 x x x The Court of Appeals is a collegiate court whose members reach their conclusions in consultation and accordingly render their collective judgment after due deliberation. Thus, we have held that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper. Consequently, the filing of charges against a single member of a division of the appellate court is inappropriate.14 Respecting the complaint about the delay in resolving complainants Motion for Inhibition, the Court notes that the motion was filed on September 29, 2005 after complainant filed before this Court on September 8, 2005 a petition for certiorari to assail the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. As earlier stated, the Court resolved the petition for certiorari on April 11, 2007. It was only on October 8, 2008, however, or only after complainant filed on August 20, 2008 the letter-complaint which this Court referred to the Court of Appeals, and after complainant also filed on Augsut 21, 2008 a reiterative motion for inhibition, that respondent resolved the motion by granting it. Article VIII, Section 15 (1) of the Constitution directs: All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twentyfour months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (underscoring supplied)

It appears from the records that on May 14, 2004, Pineda entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MayMOA)[2] with Lakandula High School (LHS) represented by its principal, Dr. Alice B. Blas (Dr. Blas), for a five-year lease of the school canteen with a monthly rental of P20,000.00 and an additional P4,000.00 monthly for the school’s feeding program as well as medicines for the school clinic. Thereafter, Pineda renovated the canteen and equipped it with new utensils, tables, chairs, and electric fans.[3]cralaw On August 5, 2004, the faculty and personnel of LHS sent a letter to the Division School Superintendent, Dr. Ma. Luisa Quiñones (Dr. Quiñones), questioning the validity of the May-MOA.[4] Dr. Blas sent a letter-reply on September 17, 2004 and an exchange of correspondence followed.[5] Meanwhile, on August 14, 2004, Pineda and Dr. Blas executed another MOA (August-MOA)[6]superseding the May-MOA. This time, the August-MOA followed the standard form under Department Order No. 95, Series of 1998[7] or the “Revised Implementing Guidelines for the Turnover of School Canteens to Teachers Cooperatives.” In this regard, on October 20, 2004, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent Isabelita M. Santos (Ms. Santos) and Administrative Officer Vicente N. Macarubbo (Mr. Macarubbo) wrote a letter to Dr. Quiñones relaying their observations on the controversy and recommending that their findings “be submitted to the DepEd - Central Office for its final word on the matter.”[8] Ms. Santos and Mr. Macarubbo were of the view that Dr. Blas did not violate any rule in executing the August-MOA. They even found the lease to Pineda beneficial to the school. Thus, Dr. Quiñones wrote the DepEd seeking its decision on the matter. On February 11, 2005, respondent DepEd, through Undersecretary Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon (Usec. Gascon), declared the August-MOA “null and void ab initio” and ordered it “cancelled.” Pineda was also ordered to “cease and desist” from further managing and operating the canteen. DepEd made clear that the management and operation of the canteen should revert to the Home Economics Department of the School. [9] This prompted Pineda to file a petition for Certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC. On March 14, 2005, the RTC ordered the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining the enforcement of Usec. Gascon’s decision.[10] DepEd, represented by Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Olympiada Camilo (Ms. Camilo), who succeeded Dr. Blas as School Principal, sought the dismissal of Pineda’s petition before the RTC on the ground that the latter failed to state a cause of action. On June 7, 2005, the trial court denied its motion.[11] For said reason, DepEd, this time represented by Assistant Secretary Camilo Miguel M. Montesa (Asec. Montesa), filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA seeking to set aside the March 14, 2005 and June 7, 2005 orders of the RTC.

G.R. No. 181643 : November 17, 2010 MICHELLE I. PINEDA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Ninth Division) and the DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, represented by Assistant Secretary CAMILO MIGUEL M. MONTESA, Respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Michelle I. Pineda (Pineda) seeking to annul and set aside the June 15, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals[1] (CA), which reversed the March 14, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City (RTC) directing the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction enjoining respondent Department of Education (DepEd) from enforcing its decision to cancel a 5-year lease of the school canteen.

The CA affirmed the June 7, 2005 order of the RTC denying DepEd’s motion to dismiss but reversed its March 14, 2005 order granting the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. According to the CA, DepEd’s order cancelling the August-MOA had already been partially implemented as Pineda herself recognized such fact in her amended petition before the RTC. In effect, this was the status quo. In addition, the CA held that Pineda appeared to have no clear or unmistakable right to be protected since the MOA that granted her the right to operate the school canteen was, in fact, invalidated by the DepEd for not being sanctioned by its existing rules and regulations. Finally, the CA also held that there was no pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which would warrant the issuance of the injunctive writ as the purported damage to Pineda, if she would not able to operate the canteen, was readily quantifiable. [12]cralaw Hence, Pineda filed this petition for Certiorari relying on the following: GROUNDS:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION THROUGH ASSISTANT SECRETARY CAMILO MIGUEL M. MONTESA, IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO IT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE GLARING FACT THAT IT WAS NOT A PARTY AT ALL IN SCA NO. 2797, HENCE, WITH NO LOCUS STANDI.

II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS OUTRIGHT THE PETITION SINCE NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED FROM THE ORDERS DATED MARCH 14, 2005, GRANTING THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND THE ORDER DATED JUNE 7, 2005, DENYING RESPONDENTS’ (USEC JOSE LUIS MARTIN C. GASCON, SUPT. MA. LUISA QUINONES AND OLYMPIADA CAMILO) MOTION TO DISMISS, IN MANIFEST VIOLATION OF SECTION 4, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. III THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISSOLVED THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 153, PASIG CITY, IN SCA NO. 2797, THEREBY UNJUSTIFIABLY INTERFERING WITH THE LOWER COURT’S DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE WRIT OF INJUNCTION IN FAVOR OF HEREIN PETITIONER WHO HAS A CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE LEGAL RIGHT TO BE AFFORDED THIS REMEDY AND CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS DID NOT FILE A MOTION TO DISSOLVE BOND WITH THE TRIAL COURT OR AT LEAST FILED AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OPPOSITION.[13]cr alaw On November 18, 2009, after the parties had filed their respective pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition and ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[14]cralaw On the first ground, Pineda argues that the CA gravely abused its discretion in entertaining the petition for Certiorari of DepEd considering that Asec. Montesa was not the proper party to file the petition. She adds that, even assuming that DepEd had the locus standi to file said petition before the CA, Asec. Montesa was not duly authorized to do so.

Certiorari may lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity for the court a quo to correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.[16] There are, however, recognized exceptions permitting a resort to the special civil action for Certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration. In the case of Domdom v. Sandiganbayan,[17] it was written:chanroblesvir tuallawlibrary The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as where the order is a patent nullity because the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the Certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the Petitioner, or the subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; where the petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the grant of such relief by the trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.[18] (underscoring supplied) As previously discussed, the present case concerns the implementation or application of a DepEd policy which had been enjoined by the RTC. Certainly, there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interest of the government. Moreover, the subject matter of the case involves the operation of the canteen of a public secondary school. This is of public interest for it affects the welfare of the students, thus, justifying the relaxation of the settled rule. Still on the second ground, Pineda points out that the March 14, 2005 Order of the RTC was received by the DepEd on March 16, 2005 and the latter filed its petition before the CA on June 28, 2005, which was beyond the sixty (60)-day reglementary period. Going over DepEd’s petition before the CA, it appears that DepEd reckoned the 60-day period from June 28, 2005, the date of its receipt of the June 7, 2005 Order of the RTC. Pineda’s Comment and Memorandum, however, did not raise this procedural lapse as an issue. Instead, Pineda put forth her own arguments in support of the two RTC orders.

The Court cannot accommodate the view of Pineda. In her petition for Certiorari before the RTC, Pineda impleaded Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo in their official capacities as Undersecretary of DepEd, Division Superintendent and Principal of Lakandula High School, respectively. Although the petition mentioned that Usec. Gascon was merely a nominal party, it stated therein that Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo were being sued for “having been tasked to immediately carry out” his order of February 11, 2005. The Court is of the view that DepEd was the proper party and Usec. Gascon, Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo were just its representatives. Thus, they were sued in their official capacities. A review of Usec. Gascon’s order discloses that the cancellation of Pineda’s August-MOA was pursuant to DepEd’s existing guidelines on the turn over of school canteens to teachers’ cooperatives, laid out in Department Order No. 95, series of 1998. He was simply applying a DepEd policy when he ordered the August-MOA cancelled. So, what was actually being assailed by Pineda in her petition before the RTC was the implementation of DepEd’s existing guidelines with the nullification of the August-MOA entered into by Dr. Blas, then principal of LHS.[15] As Asec. Montesa merely took over the functions of Usec. Gascon, he is certainly authorized to institute the petition before the CA in order to advance and pursue the policies of his office – DepEd. Applying Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, DepEd is the real party in interest for it will surely be affected, favorably or unfavorably, by the final resolution of the case before the RTC. Thus, it would be absurd not to recognize the legal standing of Asec. Montesa, as representative of DepEd, but consider Dr. Quiñones and Ms. Camilo as the proper parties when they were merely tasked to implement a directive emanating from a superior official (Asec. Montesa) of the DepEd. On the second ground, Pineda questions DepEd’s failure to move for reconsideration before going to the CA on Certiorari. The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non before a petition for

The rule in pleadings and practice is that that no new issue in a case can be raised in a pleading which by due diligence could have been raised in previous pleadings.[19] Thus, it is too late in the day for Pineda to question the procedural lapse. At any rate, the Court finds no cogent reason for the reversal and setting aside by the CA of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the RTC. The very writ of preliminary injunction set aside by the CA could no longer lie for the acts sought to be enjoined had already been accomplished or consummated. [20] The DepEd already prohibited Pineda from operating the school canteen. As correctly ruled by the CA in its questioned decision, since Pineda had ceased the operation of the school canteen since 2005, the RTC’s preliminary writ should be set aside as there was nothing more to enjoin. The Court agrees with the CA when it explained:c hanroblesvirtuallawlibrary A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that a party may resort to in order to preserve and protect certain rights and interests during the pendency of an action. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Status quo is defined as the last actual, peaceful, and uncontested status that precedes the actual controversy, that which is existing at the time of the filing of the case. Indubitably, the trial court must not make use of its injunctive relief to alter such status. In the case at bench, the Decision of Undersecretary Gascon dated February 11, 2005, ordering Pineda to cease and desist from operating and managing the school canteen and to revert the management thereof to the Home Economics Department and to the Principal, has already been partially implemented. This is evident from the allegations of Pineda in her amended petition, to wit:chanrobl esvirtuallawlibrary “Earlier, in the dawn of same date, 22 February 2004 (should be 2005), the guards of Lakandula High School, taking strict orders from respondents Mrs. Camilo and Dr. Quiñones who immediately executed the assailed illegal decision from the respondent undersecretary,

prevented the canteen workers from entering the school and the delivery of softdrinks such as Pop Cola to the petitioner. On the same date, more canteens sprouted, in addition to those found in the H.E. and dressmaking rooms, operated by the teachers, under the guise that they were doing service to the students in the meantime that the canteen was closed. x x x.”[21]cralaw

year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines in July 1991 to work on her dissertation entitled, “Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.”

Finally, while the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is discretionary on the part of the trial court, grave abuse of discretion is committed when it does not maintain the status quo which is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested status which preceded the actual controversy. If there is such a commission, it is correctible through a writ of Certiorari.[22] In this case, the status quo ante litem or the state of affairs existing at the time of the filing of the case was that Pineda was already prohibited from operating the school canteen. For said reason, the trial court cannot make use of its injunctive power to change said status.[23]cralaw

On December 22, 1992, Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. Dr. Rolda suggested that the oral defense be held on January 6, 1993 but, in a letter, dated February 2, 1993, Dr. Serena Diokno rescheduled it on February 5, 1993. Named as members of the dissertation panel were Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the dean’s representative.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED

After going over private respondent’s dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondent’s dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfour’s Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967), volume I, pp. 392-401 (3 v., Edward Balfour 1885 reprint) and from John Edye’s article entitled “Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting Navigation” in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal, volume I, pp. 1-14 Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation on February 5, 1993. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. These were Drs. Manuel, Quiason, Skandarajah, and Teodoro. Dr. Quiason added the following qualification to his signature: Ms. Arokiaswamy must incorporate the suggestions I made during the successful defense of her Ph.D. thesis. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form but added the following comment: Pipirmahan ko ang pagsang-ayon/di pagsang-ayon kapag nakita ko na ang mga revisions ng dissertation. Dr. Teodoro added the following note to his signature: Kailangang isagawa ang mga mahahalagang pagbabago at ipakita sa panel ang bound copies.

[G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999] UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS, CHANCELLOR ROGER POSADAS, DR. EMERLINDA ROMAN, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, DR. ISAGANI MEDINA, DR. MARIA SERENA DIOKNO, DR. OLIVIA CAOILI, DR. FRANCISCO NEMENZO II, DEAN PACIFICO AGABIN, CARMELITA GUNO, and MARICHU LAMBINO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE, respondents. DECISION MENDOZA, J.: For review before the Court is the decision of the Court of Appealshttp://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/aug99/134625.htm - _edn1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 42788, dated December 16, 1997, which granted private respondent’s application for a writ of mandatory injunction, and its resolution, dated July 13, 1998, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. The antecedent facts are as follows: Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitor’s visa. Sometime in April 1988, she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-

In a letter, dated March 5, 1993 and addressed to her thesis adviser, Dr. Manuel, private respondent requested a meeting with the panel members, especially Dr. Medina, to discuss the amendments suggested by the panel members during the oral defense. The meeting was held at the dean’s office with Dean Paz, private respondent, and a majority of the defense panel present. During the meeting, Dean Paz remarked that a majority vote of the panel members was sufficient for a student to pass, notwithstanding the failure to obtain the consent of the Dean’s representative. On March 24, 1993, the CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondent’s graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. In April 1993, private respondent submitted copies of her supposedly revised dissertation to Drs. Manuel, Skandarajah, and Quiason, who expressed their assent to the dissertation. Petitioners maintain, however, that private respondent did not incorporate the revisions suggested by the panel members in the final copies of her dissertation. Private respondent left a copy of her dissertation in Dr. Teodoro’s office on April 15, 1993 and proceeded to submit her dissertation to the CSSP without the approvals of Dr. Medina and Dr. Teodoro, relying on Dean Paz’s March 5, 1993 statement. Dr. Teodoro later indicated his disapproval, while Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form Dean Paz then accepted private respondent’s dissertation in partial fulfillment of the course requirements for the doctorate degree in Anthropology.

In a letter to Dean Paz, dated April 17, 1993, private respondent expressed concern over matters related to her dissertation. She sought to explain why the signature of Dr. Medina was not affixed to the revision approval form. Private respondent said that since she already had the approval of a majority of the panel members, she no longer showed her dissertation to Dr. Medina nor tried to obtain the latter’s signature on the revision approval form. She likewise expressed her disappointment over the CSSP administration and charged Drs. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation, and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious acts against her.

On June 15, 1993, the Ventura Committee submitted a report to Dean Paz, finding at least ninety (90) instances or portions in private respondent’s thesis which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment. On July 28, 1993, the CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993.

On April 17, 1993, the University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondent’s name.

On September 6, 1993, the Board of Regents deferred action on the recommendation to study the legal implications of its approval.

On April 21, 1993, Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondent’s name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Her letter reads:

Meanwhile, in a letter, dated September 23, 1993, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her.

Abril 21, 1993 Dr. Milagros Ibe Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs Unibersidad ng Pilipinas Quezon Hall, Diliman, Q.C.

During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter dated September 25, 1993.

Mahal na Dr. Ibe, Mahigpit ko pong hinihiling na hwag munang isama ang pangalan ni Ms. Arokiaswam[y] William Margaret Celine sa listahan ng mga bibigyan ng degri na Ph.D. (Anthropology) ngayon[g] semester, dahil sa mga malubhang bintang nya sa ilang myembro ng panel para sa oral defense ng disertasyon nya at sa mga akusasyon ng ilan sa mga ito sa kanya. Naniniwala po kami na dapat mailinaw muna ang ilang bagay bago makonfer ang degri kay Ms. Arokiaswam[y]. Kelangan po ito para mapangalagaan ang istandard ng pinakamataas na degree ng Unibersidad. (Sgd.) CONSUELO JOAQUIN-PAZ, Ph.D. Dekano Apparently, however, Dean Paz’s letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, April 22, 1993, the Board approved the University Council’s recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, on April 24, 1993, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. On the other hand, Dean Paz also wrote a letter to private respondent, dated April 21, 1993, that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations contained in her letter dated April 17, 1993. In her letter, dated April 27, 1993, private respondent claimed that Dr. Medina’s unfavorable attitude towards her dissertation was a reaction to her failure to include him and Dr. Francisco in the list of panel members; that she made the revisions proposed by Drs. Medina and Teodoro in the revised draft of her dissertation; and that Dr. Diokno was guilty of harassment. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, dated May 1, 1993, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. On May 13, 1993, Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee, composed of faculty members from various disciplines and chaired by Dr. Eva Duka-Ventura, to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn. In a letter, dated June 7, 1993, Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her.

Another meeting was held on October 8, 1993 between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A third meeting was scheduled on October 27, 1993 but private respondent did not attend it, alleging that the Board of Regents had already decided her case before she could be fully heard. On October 11, 1993, private respondent wrote to Dr. Emil Q. Javier, U.P. President, alleging that some members of the U.P. administration were playing politics in her case. She sent another letter, dated December 14, 1993, to Dr. Armand Fabella, Chairman of the Board of Regents, complaining that she had not been afforded due process and claiming that U.P. could no longer withdraw her degree since her dissertation had already been accepted by the CSSP. Meanwhile, the U.P. Office of Legal Services justified the position of the University Council in its report to the Board of Regents. The Board of Regents, in its February 1, 1994 and March 24, 1994 meetings, further deferred action thereon. On July 11, 1994, private respondent sent a letter to the Board of Regents requesting a re-investigation of her case. She stressed that under the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, it was the student disciplinary tribunal which had jurisdiction to decide cases of dishonesty and that the withdrawal of a degree already conferred was not one of the authorized penalties which the student disciplinary tribunal could impose. On July 28, 1994, the Board of Regents decided to release private respondent’s transcript of grades without annotation although it showed that private respondent passed her dissertation with 12 units of credit. On August 17, 1994, Chancellor Roger Posadas issued Administrative Order No. 94-94 constituting a special committee composed of senior faculty members from the U.P. units outside Diliman to review the University Council’s recommendation to withdraw private respondent’s degree. With the approval of the Board of Regents and the U.P. Diliman Executive Committee, Posadas created a five-man committee, chaired by Dr. Paulino B. Zafaralla, with members selected from a list of nominees screened by Dr. Emerenciana Arcellana, then a member of the Board of Regents. On August 31, 1994, the members of the Zafaralla committee and private respondent met at U.P. Los Baños. Meanwhile, on August 23, 1994, the U.P. Diliman Registrar released to private respondent a copy of her transcript of grades and certificate of graduation. In a letter to Chancellor Posadas, dated September 1, 1994, private respondent requested that the Zafaralla committee be provided with copies of the U.P. Charter (Act No. 1870), the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, her letter-response to Chancellor Roman, dated September 25, 1993, as

well as all her other communications. On September 19, 1994, Chancellor Posadas obtained the Zafaralla Committee’s report, signed by its chairman, recommending the withdrawal of private respondent’s doctorate degree. The report stated: After going through all the pertinent documents of the case and interviewing Ms. Arokiaswamy William, the following facts were established: 1. There is overwhelming evidence of massive lifting from a published source word for word and, at times, paragraph by paragraph without any acknowledgment of the source, even by a mere quotation mark. At least 22 counts of such documented liftings were identified by the Committee. These form part of the approximately ninety (90) instances found by the Committee created by the Dean of the College and subsequently verified as correct by the Special Committee. These instances involved the following forms of intellectual dishonesty: direct lifting/copying without acknowledgment, full/partial lifting with improper documentation and substitution of terms or words (e.g., Tamil in place of Sanskrit, Tamilization in place of Indianization) from an acknowledged source in support of her thesis (attached herewith is a copy of the documents for reference); and 2. Ms. Arokiaswamy William herself admits of being guilty of the allegation of plagiarism. Fact is, she informed the Special Committee that she had been admitting having lifted several portions in her dissertation from various sources since the beginning.

Secretary Ricardo Gloria, Chairman of the Board of Regents, she asked for a reinvestigation of her case. She also sought an audience with the Board of Regents and/or the U.P. President, which request was denied by President Javier, in a letter dated June 2, 1995. On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24690 and assigned to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1,500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. On August 6, 1996, the trial court, Branch 227, rendered a decision dismissing the petition for mandamus for lack of merit. Private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on December 16, 1997, reversed the lower court. The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads: WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and set aside. Respondents are ordered to restore to petitioner her degree of Ph.D. in Anthropology. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend:

In view of the overwhelming proof of massive lifting and also on the admission of Ms. Arokiaswamy William that she indeed plagiarized, the Committee strongly supports the recommendation of the U.P. Diliman Council to withdraw the doctoral degree of Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William. On the basis of the report, the University Council, on September 24, 1994, recommended to the Board of Regents that private respondent be barred in the future from admission to the University either as a student or as an employee. On January 4, 1995, the secretary of the Board of Regents sent private respondent the following letter: 4 January 1995 Ms. Margaret Celine Arokiaswamy William Department of Anthropology College of Social Sciences and Philosophy U.P. Diliman, Quezon City Dear Ms. Arokiaswamy William: This is to officially inform you about the action taken by the Board of Regents at its 1081st and 1082nd meetings held last 17 November and 16 December 1994 regarding your case, the excerpts from the minutes of which are attached herewith. Please be informed that the members present at the 1081st BOR meeting on 17 November 1994 resolved, by a majority decision, to withdraw your Ph.D. degree as recommended by the U.P. Diliman University Council and as concurred with by the External Review Panel composed of senior faculty from U.P. Los Baños and U.P. Manila. These faculty members were chosen by lot from names submitted by the University Councils of U.P. Los Baños and U.P. Manila. In reply to your 14 December 1994 letter requesting that you be given a good lawyer by the Board, the Board, at its 1082nd meeting on 16 December 1994, suggested that you direct your request to the Office of Legal Aid, College of Law, U.P. Diliman. Sincerely yours, (Sgd.) VIVENCIO R. JOSE Secretary of the University and of the Board of Regents On January 18, 1995, private respondent wrote a letter to Commissioner Sedfrey Ordoñez, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, asking the commission’s intervention. In a letter, dated February 14, 1995, to

I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS AND ORDERING PETITIONERS TO RESTORE RESPONDENT’S DOCTORAL DEGREE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTORAL DEGREE GIVEN RESPONDENT BY U.P. CANNOT BE RECALLED WITHOUT VIOLATING HER RIGHT TO ENJOYMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TO JUSTICE AND EQUITY. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN DEPRIVING PETITIONERS OF THEIR RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS. Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property. On the other hand, private respondent, unassisted by counsel, argue that petitioners acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion in withdrawing her degree even prior to verifying the truth of the plagiarism charge against her; and that as her answer to the charges had not been forwarded to the members of the investigating committees, she was deprived of the opportunity to comment or refute their findings. In addition, private respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her doctorate degree; that petitioners acted contrary to §9 of the U.P. Charter and the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of the University, which according to her, does not authorize the withdrawal of a degree as a penalty for erring students; and that only the college committee or the student disciplinary tribunal may decide disciplinary cases, whose report must be signed by a majority of its members. We find petitioners’ contention to be meritorious. Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan, this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out

the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student’s petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court’s finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal “would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job.” Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondent’s petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitioner’s Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitioner’s subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded on September 25, 1993. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents. Nor indeed was private respondent entitled to be furnished a copy of the report of the Zafaralla committee as part of her right to due process. In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, we held: Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners’ February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to investigate students’ participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. . . In this case, in granting the writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals held:

First. Petitioner graduated from the U.P. with a doctorate degree in Anthropology. After graduation, the contact between U.P. and petitioner ceased. Petitioner is no longer within the ambit of the disciplinary powers of the U.P. As a graduate, she is entitled to the right and enjoyment of the degree she has earned. To recall the degree, after conferment, is not only arbitrary, unreasonable, and an act of abuse, but a flagrant violation of petitioner’s right of enjoyment to intellectual property. Second. Respondents aver that petitioner’s graduation was a mistake. Unfortunately this “mistake” was arrived at after almost a year after graduation. Considering that the members of the thesis panel, the College Faculty Assembly, and the U.P. Council are all men and women of the highest intellectual acumen and integrity, as respondents themselves aver, suspicion is aroused that the alleged “mistake” might not be the cause of withdrawal but some other hidden agenda which respondents do not wish to reveal. At any rate, We cannot countenance the plight the petitioner finds herself enmeshed in as a consequence of the acts complained of. Justice and equity demand that this be rectified by restoring the degree conferred to her after her compliance with the academic and other related requirements. Art. XIV, §5 (2) of the Constitution provides that “[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.” This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution and the 1973 Constitutionh likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out by this Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, it is a freedom granted to “institutions of higher learning” which is thus given “a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students.” If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the “graduation” of a student, as the Court of Appeals held. For it is precisely the “graduation” of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthy that the investigation of private respondent’s case began before her graduation. If she was able to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not have been allowed to graduate. Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.” Under the U.P. Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University Council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student’s rights. An institution of higher learning cannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfully deserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a university’s highest academic degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. While it is true that the students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the USC as an educational institution is also entitled to pursue its academic freedom and in the process has the concomitant right to see to it that this freedom is not jeopardized. In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents’ decision to withdraw private respondent’s doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense. On the other hand, private respondent was afforded the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but

failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. Her only claim is that her responses to the charges against her were not considered by the Board of Regents before it rendered its decision. However, this claim was not proven. Accordingly, we must presume regularity in the performance of official duties in the absence of proof to the contrary. Very much the opposite of the position of the Court of Appeals that, since private respondent was no longer a student of the U.P., the latter was no longer within the “ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.,” is private respondent’s contention that it is the Student Disciplinary Tribunal which had jurisdiction over her case because the charge is dishonesty. Private respondent invokes §5 of the U.P. Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline which provides: Jurisdiction. – All cases involving discipline of students under these rules shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal, except the following cases which shall fall under the jurisdiction of the appropriate college or unit; (a) Violation of college or unit rules and regulations by students of the college, or (b) Misconduct committed by students of the college or unit within its classrooms or premises or in the course of an official activity; Provided, that regional units of the University shall have original jurisdiction over all cases involving students of such units. Private respondent argues that under §25 (a) of the said Rules and Regulations, dishonesty in relation to one’s studies (i.e., plagiarism) may be punished only with suspension for at least one (1) year. As the above-quoted provision of §5 of the Rules and Regulations indicates, the jurisdiction of the student disciplinary tribunal extends only to disciplinary actions. In this case, U.P. does not seek to discipline private respondent. Indeed, as the appellate court observed, private respondent is no longer within “the ambit of disciplinary powers of the U.P.” Private respondent cannot even be punished since, as she claims, the penalty for acts of dishonesty in administrative disciplinary proceedings is suspension from the University for at least one year. What U.P., through the Board of Regents, seeks to do is to protect its academic integrity by withdrawing from private respondent an academic degree she obtained through fraud. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the petition for mandamus is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED EN BANC G.R. No. 70484 January 29, 1988 ROMAN C. TUASON and REMEDIOS V. TUASON, by attorney-in-fact Trinidad S. Viado, Petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS, CALOOCAN City, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, and the NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents. TOMASA BARTOLOME, in her own behalf and in behalf of the other members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association," petitioners-intervenors. NARVASA, J.: A more despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power than that manifested in this case can scarcely be found in the sordid annals of the martial law regime. Relief to the victims must be as it is hereby extended by the grant to them of the extraordinary writ of certiorari and prohibition condemning as unconstitutional, and annulling and perpetually enjoining the acts complained of. law library Petitioner spouses, the Tuasons, were retired public school teachers. On April 6, 1965, with funds pooled from their retirement benefits and savings, they bought from Carmel Farms, Inc. (hereafter simply, Carmel) a piece of land measuring about 8,756 square meters, in the latter's subdivision in Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan City. In virtue of this sale, Carmel's Torrens title (No. 64007) over the lot was cancelled and a new one (No. 8314) issued in the name of the Tuasons. The Tuasons took possession of their property. law library Some eight (8) years thereafter, the Tuasons' travails began. They woke up one morning to discover that by presidential flat, they were no longer the owners of the land they had purchased with their hard-earned money, and that their land and the other lots in the subdivision had been "declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof." Chanro

virtual law library On September 14, 1973-a year almost to the day after the declaration of martial law Mr. Ferdinand Marcos, then president of the country, invoking his emergency powers, issued Presidential Decree No. 293 with immediate effect. The decree invalidated inter alia the title of the Tuasons' vendor, Carmel, which had earlier purchased from the Government the land it had subsequently subdivided into several lots for sale to the public (the Tuasons being among the buyers). The land bought by Carmel was part of the Tala Estate (one of the so-called "Friar Lands"). Carmel had bought the land under Act No. 1120 and C.A. No. 32, as amended. Under these statutes: 1) a bona fide settler or occupant was allowed to purchase (if he did not wish to lease) the portion occupied by him at the price fixed by the Government, in cash or on installment; the interested buyer was given a certificate of sale, which was regarded as an agreement by him to pay the purchase price in the and at the interest specified, the acceptance of such certificate making the occupant a debtor of the government; chanrobles virtual law library 2) until the price was fully paid however, title was reserved in the Government, and any sale or encumbrance made by the purchaser prior to such full payment was explicitly declared to 'be invalid as against the Government ... and ... in all respects subordinate to its prior claim;" chanrobles virtual law library 3) in the event of default by a purchaser to pay any installment of purchase money and interest thereon, the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands (now Director of Lands) had the duty at once to protect the Government from loss by bringing suit to obtain judicial authority to enforce the Government's lien on the "and by selling it in the same manner as for foreclosure of mortgages, the purchaser at such sale being deemed to acquire a good and indefeasible title, and the proceeds of the sale being applied to the payment of the costs of the court and all installments due or to become due; and chanrobles virtual law library 4) in the event of completion of payment, the Government transferred title to the land to the purchaser "by proper instrument of conveyance," the certificate of title over the land to issue and become effective in the manner provided by the Land Registration Act. 1 Said Presidential Decree No. 293 made the finding 2that Carmel had failed to complete payment of the price. It adjudged that – ... according to the records of the Bureau of Lands, neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by the Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of said Association 3 stand. Hence, title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines, any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic of the Philippines being therefore null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy. Upon this adjudgment, Mr. Marcos invalidated the titles of Carmel Farms, Inc. and all those derived therefrom, and declared as aforestated "the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. the present bona fide occupants" of the lots which, in consequence, thereby became open to them for "disposition and sale ... pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended." 4 chanrobles virtual law library It seems to have completely escaped Mr. Marcos' attention that his decree contained contradictory declarations. While acknowledging on the one hand that the lots in the Carmel Subdivision were occupied by the buyers thereof, and in fact the latter's dwellings stood thereon, he states on the other that the "members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. (are) the present bona fide occupants" of all said lots. The latter averment is not only essentially inconsistent with the former but is both a physical and legal fallacy. Well known is the rule of physics that two objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time. And the absurdity of the subsumed proposition is self-evident for persons not in possession of land, who probably have not even set foot thereon, cannot be deemed "occupants" thereof, much less "bona fide" occupants. virtual law library But this notwithstanding, and upon the factual premise already indicated, Mr. Marcos disposed of the land of the petitioner spouses and others similarly situated as they, in the following imperious manner: NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1, dated September 22, 1972, do hereby order and decree that any and all sales contracts between the government and the original purchasers, are hereby cancelled, and those between the latter and the subsequent transferees, and any

and all transfers thereafter, covering lots 979, 981, 982, 985, 988, 989, 990, 991 new, 1226, 1228, 1230, and 980-C-2 (LRC PSD-1730), all of Tala Estate, Caloocan City, are hereby declared invalid and null and void ab initio as against the Government; that Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 62603, 62604, 62605, covering lots 1, 2 and 3, PCS-4383, all in the name of Carmel Farms, Inc., which are a consolidation and subdivision survey of the lots hereinbefore enumerated, are declared invalid and considered cancelled as against the Government; and that said lots are declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc., the present bona fide occupants thereof, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 32, as amended. On the strength of this presidential decree, the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City caused the inscription on the Tuasons' title, TCT No. 8314, of the following: MEMORANDUM. - Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this certificate of title is declared invalid and null and void ab initio and considered cancelled as against the Government and the property described herein is declared open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. The Tuason Spouses thereupon filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the Marcos decree as an arbitrary measure which deprived them of their property in favor of a selected group, in violation not only of the constitutional provisions on due process and eminent domain 5 but also of the provisions of the Land Registration Act on the indefeasibility of Torrens titles; 6 and they prayed that the Register of Deeds be directed to cancel the derogatory inscription on their title and restore its efficacy, or in the alternative, that they be compensated for the loss from the Assurance Fund.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Mr. Marcos' Solicitor General sought to sustain the decree. In his comment on the petition, 7 he questioned the propriety of the remedy of certiorari resorted to by the petitioners, it not appearing that the public respondents were being sued as judicial or quasi-judicial officers who had acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. He opined that the petitioner spouses had no cause to complain of unjust deprivation of property because in legal contemplation 8 they had never become owners thereof because of non-payment of the purchase price by their predecessor-in-interest; and the decree was justifiable under the social justice clause of the Constitution and the police power, being in response to the pressing housing need of the employees of the Office of the President who were left homeless and landless after they were asked to vacate Malacanang Park where they had theretofore been residing. He expressed the view, too, that petitioner spouses were not entitled to recover anything from the Assurance Fund. Petitions for intervention have of late been filed by sixty-four (64) persons, members of the "Consuelo Heights Homeowners Association" headed by Tomasa Bartolome, on the claim that they, too, had been divested of their lands by the same Presidential Decree No. 293, adopting as their own the allegations and prayer embodied in the Tuasons' petition. law library The procedural issue is quite easily disposed of. It is true that the extraodinary writ of certiorari 9 may properly issue to nullify only judicial or quasi-judicial acts, unlike the writ of prohibition which may be directed against acts either judicial or ministerial. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court deals with the writ of certiorari in relation to "any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions, while Section 2 of the same Rule treats of the writ of prohibition in relation to "proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person ... exercising functions judicial or ministerial." But the petition will be shown upon analysis to be in reality directed against an unlawful exercise of judicial power.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The decree reveals that Mr. Marcos exercised an obviously judicial function. He made a determination of facts, and applied the law to those facts, declaring what the legal rights of the parties were in the premises. These acts essentially constitute a judicial function, 10or an exercise of jurisdiction - which is the power and authority to hear or try and decide or determine a cause. 11He adjudged it to be an established fact that neither the original purchasers nor their subsequent transferees have made full payment of all installments of the purchase money and interest on the lots claimed by Carmel Farms, Inc., including those on which the dwellings of the members of ... (the) Association (of homeowners) stand." And applying the law to that situation, he made the adjudication that "title to said land has remained with the Government, and the land now occupied by the members of said association has never ceased to form part of the property of the Republic of the Philippines," and that 'any and all acts affecting said land and purporting to segregate it from the said property of the Republic ... (were) null and void ab initio as against the law and public policy.

These acts may thus be properly struck down by the writ of certiorari, because done by an officer in the performance of what in essence is a judicial function, if it be shown that the acts were done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Since Mr. Marcos was never vested with judicial power, such power, as everyone knows, being vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law 12 - the judicial acts done by him were in the circumstances indisputably perpetrated without jurisdiction. The acts were completely alien to his office as chief executive, and utterly beyond the permissible scope of the legislative power that he had assumed as head of the martial law regime. Moreover, he had assumed to exercise power - i.e. determined the relevant facts and applied the law thereto without a trial at which all interested parties were accorded the opportunity to adduce evidence to furnish the basis for a determination of the facts material to the controversy. He made the finding ostensibly on the basis of "the records of the Bureau of Lands." Prescinding from the fact that there is no indication whatever the nature and reliability of these records and that they are in no sense conclusive, it is undeniable that the petitioner Tuasons (and the petitioners in intervention) were never confronted with those records and afforded a chance to dispute their trustworthiness and present countervailing evidence. This is yet another fatal defect. The adjudication was patently and grossly violative of the right to due process to which the petitioners are entitled in virtue of the Constitution. Mr. Marcos, in other words, not only arrogated unto himself a power never granted to him by the Constitution or the laws but had in addition exercised it unconstitutionally. In any event, this Court has it in its power to treat the petition for certiorari as one for prohibition if the averments of the former sufficiently made out a case for the latter. 13 Considered in this wise, it will also appear that an executive officer had acted without jurisdiction - exercised judicial power not granted to him by the Constitution or the laws - and had furthermore performed the act in violation of the constitutional rights of the parties thereby affected. The Court will grant such relief as may be proper and efficacious in the premises even if not specifically sought or set out in the prayer of the appropriate pleading, the permissible relief being determined after all not by the prayer but by the basic averments of the parties' pleadings. 14 There is no dispute about the fact that title to the land purchased by Carmel was actually issued to it by the Government. This of course gives rise to the strong presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, 15that official duty being in this case the ascertainment by the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands of the fulfillment of the condition prescribed by law for such issuance, i.e., the payment in full of the price, together with all accrued interest. Against this presumption there is no evidence. It must hence be accorded full sway in these proceedings. Furthermore, the title having been duly issued to Carmel, it became "effective in the manner provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration Act." 16 It may well be the fact that Carmel really did fail to make full payment of the price of the land purchased by it from the Government pursuant to the provisions of Act 1120. This is a possibility that cannot be totally discounted. If this be the fact, the Government may bring suit to recover the unpaid installments and interest, invalidate any sale or encumbrance involving the land subject of the sale, and enforce the lien of the Government against the land by selling the same in the manner provided by Act Numbered One Hundred and Ninety for the foreclosure of mortgages. 17This it can do despite the lapse of a considerable period of time. Prescription does not lie against the Government. But until and unless such a suit is brought and results in a judgment favorable to the Government, the acquisition of title by Carmel and the purchases by the petitioners and the petitioners-intervenors from it of portions of the land covered by its original title must be respected. At any rate, the eventuation of that contingency will not and cannot in any manner affect this Court's conclusion, herein affirmed, of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of Presidential Decree No. 293, and the absolute lack of any right to the land or any portion thereof on the part of the members of the socalled "Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc." The decree was not as claimed a licit instance of the application of social justice principles or the exercise of police power. It was in truth a disguised, vile stratagem deliberately resorted to favor a few individuals, in callous and disdainful disregard of the rights of others. It was in reality a taking of private property without due process and without compensation whatever, from persons relying on the indefeasibility of their titles in accordance with and as explicitly guaranteed by law. virtual law library One last word, respecting the petitioners in intervention, Their petition to intervene substantially fulfilled the requirements laid down for a class suit 18and was consequently given due course by the Court. They are therefore covered by this judgment.

WHEREFORE, Presidential Decree No. 293 is declared to be unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts. The public respondents are commanded to cancel the inscription on the titles of the petitioners and the petitioners in intervention of the memorandum declaring their titles null and void and declaring the property therein respectively described open for disposition and sale to the members of the Malacanang Homeowners Association, Inc. to do whatever else is needful to restore the titles to full effect and efficacy; and henceforth to refrain, cease and desist from implementing any provision or part of said Presidential Decree No. 293. No pronouncement as to costs. Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes JJ., concur. Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library I concur fully in the main opinion forcefully written by Mr. Justice Narvasa and the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Feliciano depicting the unparalleled "despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power" by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as struck down by the Court's unanimous judgment in the case at bar. To be sure, this is but one of the many unconstitutional and void Presidential Decrees of the past unlamented regime which perforce have been so annulled and relief granted to the victims, as they are brought to the Court's attention. These arbitrary, capricious and oppressive decrees, tailored to suit the deposed President's every wish and whim, were the product of unrestrained power, as the deposed President took over the entire government with the imposition of martial law in September, 1972. Such unrestrained exercise of power was heightened by the Court's majority pronouncement in April, 1983 (even as martial law had been lifted at least on paper two years earlier by Proclamation No. 2045 in January, 1981) that in times of grave emergencies, "The President takes absolute command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them." 1 It certainly cannot be gainsaid that such judicial abdication turned back the clock to lese majeste and dismantled the intricate system of reenforcing rules, principles and procedures that have evolved through centuries of struggle for the more efficacious protection through independent courts of the individual's right to life, liberty and property and due process of law, so that they would no longer have to depend upon prayers for the purpose. This concurrence is to express the fervent prayer that we have learned well our lesson that absolute power corrupts absolutely and that as Thomas Jefferson warned (which sadly proved to be true in our case), "a single consolidated government would become the most corrupt government on earth." We have won back our freedoms and restored democracy with three great departments of government, and separation of powers and checks and balances. As Rizal taught us, freedom must be nurtured and cherished, not abused, else we lose or forfeit it. We must reconsecrate ourselves to the supremacy of the Rule of Law and renew once more our faith in and adherence to the force of law, rather than the law of forcefor only in the Rule of Law may a democracy survive and flourish. This means selfless adherence by all to the basics, for as Brandeis aptly expressed it, "Democracy is a serious undertaking. It is more difficult to maintain than to achieve. It demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more exigent obedience to the moral law than any other form of government." FELICIANO, J., concurring: I quite agree with the constitutional law analysis of my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Narvasa, in his eloquent opinion. I should like simply to add that Presidential Decree No. 293 is constitutionally offensive for still another reason: it constitutes a bill of attainder, prohibited not only under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions but also under the 1973 Constitution. Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at

times enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modem terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty - the deprivation of life or liberty or property - not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an Identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) Without a prior charge or demand, without notice and healing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. P.D. No. 293 has clearly been cast from the mould. Former President Marcos, by establishing martial law, undertook to assume legislative powers in addition to his regular powers as Chief Executive. He consolidated in his own person the powers of the Presidency and the powers of Congress. Such was the theory underlying the streams of decrees, executive orders, executive proclamations, letters of instruction and the like that he released upon the nation. The emergence of Presidential Decree No. 293 into public light underscores the fact that Mr. Marcos also purported at times to exercise judicial prerogatives. If one viewed PD No. 293 as issued by Mr. Marcos in his presidential capacity, as it were, the decree is constitutionally vitiated as an exercise of a power judicial power- deliberately denied to the Chief Executive by the Constitution. This is made clear in Mr. Justice Narvasa's opinion. If one viewed PD No. 293 as rendered by Mr. Marcos in his other, assumed i.e. legislative capacity, the decree is similarly fundamentally flawed as a bill of attainder and ultimately, again, as an assumption unto himself of a power and authority clearly withheld by the Constitution from both the Chief Executive and the legislative body and lodged elsewhere in our Constitutional system. I vote for the nullification of PD No. 293 by the grant of certiorari.c Separate Opinions TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: I concur fully in the main opinion forcefully written by Mr. Justice Narvasa and the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Feliciano depicting the unparalleled "despotic, capricious, oppressive and unjustifiable exercise of government power" by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as struck down by the Court's unanimous judgment in the case at bar. To be sure, this is but one of the many unconstitutional and void Presidential Decrees of the past unlamented regime which perforce have been so annulled and relief granted to the victims, as they are brought to the Court's attention.chanrobles virtual law library These arbitrary, capricious and oppressive decrees, tailored to suit the deposed President's every wish and whim, were the product of unrestrained power, as the deposed President took over the entire government with the imposition of martial law in September, 1972. Such unrestrained exercise of power was heightened by the Court's majority pronouncement in April, 1983 (even as martial law had been lifted at least on paper two years earlier by Proclamation No. 2045 in January, 1981) that in times of grave emergencies, "The President takes absolute command, for the very life of the nation and its government, which, incidentally, includes the courts, is in grave peril. In so doing, the President is answerable only to his conscience, the people and to God. For their part, in giving him the supreme mandate as their President, the people can only trust and pray that, giving him their own loyalty with utmost patriotism, the President will not fail them." 1 It certainly cannot be gainsaid that such judicial abdication turned back the clock to lese majeste and dismantled the intricate system of reenforcing rules, principles and procedures that have evolved through centuries of struggle for the more efficacious protection through independent courts of the individual's right to life, liberty and property and due process of law, so that they would no longer have to depend upon prayers for the purpose. This concurrence is to express the fervent prayer that we have learned well our lesson that absolute power corrupts absolutely and that as Thomas Jefferson warned (which sadly proved to be true in our case), "a single consolidated government would become the most corrupt government on earth." We have won back our freedoms and restored democracy with three great departments of government, and separation of powers and checks and balances. As Rizal taught us, freedom must be nurtured and

cherished, not abused, else we lose or forfeit it. We must reconsecrate ourselves to the supremacy of the Rule of Law and renew once more our faith in and adherence to the force of law, rather than the law of forcefor only in the Rule of Law may a democracy survive and flourish. This means selfless adherence by all to the basics, for as Brandeis aptly expressed it, "Democracy is a serious undertaking. It is more difficult to maintain than to achieve. It demands continuous sacrifice by the individual and more exigent obedience to the moral law than any other form of government." FELICIANO, J., concurring: I quite agree with the constitutional law analysis of my learned brother in the Court, Mr. Justice Narvasa, in his eloquent opinion. I should like simply to add that Presidential Decree No. 293 is constitutionally offensive for still another reason: it constitutes a bill of attainder, prohibited not only under the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions but also under the 1973 Constitution. Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more modem terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty - the deprivation of life or liberty or property - not by the ordinary processes of judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an Identified person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) Without a prior charge or demand, without notice and healing, without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L.Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90 L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression. P.D. No. 293 has clearly been cast from the mould. Former President Marcos, by establishing martial law, undertook to assume legislative powers in addition to his regular powers as Chief Executive. He consolidated in his own person the powers of the Presidency and the powers of Congress. Such was the theory underlying the streams of decrees, executive orders, executive proclamations, letters of instruction and the like that he released upon the nation. The emergence of Presidential Decree No. 293 into public light underscores the fact that Mr. Marcos also purported at times to exercise judicial prerogatives. If one viewed PD No. 293 as issued by Mr. Marcos in his presidential capacity, as it were, the decree is constitutionally vitiated as an exercise of a power judicial power- deliberately denied to the Chief Executive by the Constitution. This is made clear in Mr. Justice Narvasa's opinion. If one viewed PD No. 293 as rendered by Mr. Marcos in his other, assumed i.e. legislative capacity, the decree is similarly fundamentally flawed as a bill of attainder and ultimately, again, as an assumption unto himself of a power and authority clearly withheld by the Constitution from both the Chief Executive and the legislative body and lodged elsewhere in our Constitutional system. I vote for the nullification of PD No. 293 by the grant of certiorari.

Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. On 26 March 1998, the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256 (trial court') granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in favor of Innovatech. The 26 March 1998 Order became the subject of a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49326 filed by Security Bank before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision[7] promulgated on 24 August 1999,[8] the Court of Appeals dismissed Security Bank's petition for lack of merit. However, in an Amended Decision promulgated on 8 June 2000,[9] the Court of Appeals set aside its 24 August 1999 Decision and nullified the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court. Innovatech filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its Resolution of 19 February 2002.[10] Innovatech filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 152157, before this Court. This Court denied the petition in its 10 April 2002 Minute Resolution and denied with finality Innovatech's motion for reconsideration on 6 September 2002. Meanwhile, on 22 June 1998, Indiana filed a Complaint-in-Intervention with prayer for the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction. On 1 February 1999, the trial court issued an Order[11] the dispositive portion of which reads:

G.R. No. 146197. June 27, 2005 SECURITY BANK CORPORATION (formerly Security Bank and Trust Company), Petitioner, vs. INDIANA AEROSPACE UNIVERSITY, THE BRANCH SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MAKATI CITY, Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before this Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 22 February 2000 and 29 November 2000 Resolutions[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 56534. The Court of Appeals denied the petition of Security Bank and Trust Company (Security Bank') for failure to comply with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Supreme Court Circular No. 39-98.[3] The Antecedent Facts

WHEREFORE, the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is GRANTED. Subject to the filing of a bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00 by Plaintiff-Intervenor to pay the damages which Defendant may sustain by reason of the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, if this Court should finally decide that Plaintiff-Intervenor is not entitled thereto, the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati City and any person acting in its behalf, are hereby directed to cancel the registration and annotation of the Certificate of Sale dated January 29, 1998 at the back of Condominium Certificates of Title [N]os. 41863, 41864, 41865, 41866, 41867, 41868, 41869, 41870, 41871, 41872, 41873, 41875, 41876 and 41877 which was inscribed thereon on February 3, 1998 and known as Entry [N]o. 1454/CCT 41863. And since the regularity of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings conducted by the Notary Public in connection with the condominium units covered by the aforementioned condominium certificates of title is one of the issues in this case, the Office of the Registry of Deeds and any person acting in its behalf are likewise enjoined and prohibited from subsequently undertaking the registration and annotation of the Certificate of Sale dated January 29, 1998 at the back of Condominium Certificates of Title [N]os. 41863, 41864, 41865, 41866, 41867, 41868, 41869, 41870, 41871, 41872, 41873, 41875, 41876 and 41877 until further order from this Court and trial on the merits of the instant case. Set this case for hearing on the merits on February 12 and 24, 1999 both at 9:30 a.m. SO ORDERED.[12]

On 20 September 1996, Security Bank as mortgagee and Innovatech Development and Management Corporation (Innovatech') as mortgagor entered into a real estate mortgage. Innovatech secured its P25,000,000 loan from Security Bank with a mortgage on fourteen condominium units located at Tito Jovy Tower, Buencamino St., Alabang, Muntinlupa City with Condominium Certificates of Title No. 41863, 41864, 41865, 41866, 41867, 41868, 41869, 41870, 41871, 41872, 41873, 41875, 41876 and 41877 of the Register of Deeds of Makati City.

Security Bank moved for reconsideration of the Order. In its Order[13] of 3 November 1999, the trial court denied Security Bank's motion for lack of merit.

In a letter[4] dated 1 July 1997, Inigo A. Nebrida and Librada C. Nebrida, Innovatech's Vice-President and Treasurer, respectively, informed Security Bank that Innovatech sold the fourteen condominium units to Indiana Aerospace University (Indiana') of Mactan, Cebu. Innovatech provided Security Bank with copies of the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage[5] it made with Indiana as well as Indiana's loan application with Bank of Southeast Asia for P69,000,000. According to Innovatech, part of the proceeds of Indiana's loan with the Bank of Southeast Asia would be used to pay the loan with Security Bank. The loan with Security Bank matured on 19 September 1997 without payment from either Innovatech or Indiana. Consequently, Security Bank filed a petition for notarial foreclosure of the fourteen condominium units under Act No. 3135,[6] as amended by Act No. 4118. The public auction was held on 29 January 1998, at 10:00 a.m., at the City Hall of Muntinlupa City. During the public auction, the condominium units were sold for P32,839,290 to Security Bank as the only and highest bidder.

In its assailed Resolution of 22 February 2000,[14] the Court of Appeals denied due course to Security Bank's petition. The Court of Appeals ruled:

On 25 February 1998, Innovatech filed an action against Security Bank for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale and Certificate of Sale, Reconveyance of Properties and Damages with Prayer for

Security Bank went to the Court of Appeals for relief. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals

x x x However, the petition does not indicate the dates when petitioner received a copy of the Order dated 01 February 1999 and when the Motion for Reconsideration was filed in violation of Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular 39-98 (Emphasis supplied) which provides: Sec. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. ' x x x In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received. x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and consequently DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.[15] Security Bank filed a motion for reconsideration. However, in its Resolution of 29 November 2000,[16] the Court of Appeals denied Security Bank's motion. Hence, the recourse to this Court. The Issue

The Rules clearly provide that non-compliance with any of the requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. If we apply the Rules strictly, we cannot fault the Court of Appeals for dismissing Security Bank's petition. The Court of Appeals merely followed the Rules. However, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction this Court may disregard procedural lapses so that a case may be resolved on its merits based on the evidence presented by the parties.[17] Rules of procedure should promote, not defeat, substantial justice.[18] Hence, the Court may opt to apply the Rules liberally to resolve the substantial issues raised by the parties.[19] The material dates required to be stated in the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 are:

The sole issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Security Bank's petition on mere technicality despite the bank's substantial compliance with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98.

(1) the date of receipt of the notice of the judgment or final order or resolution; (2) the date of filing of the motion for new trial or for reconsideration; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of denial of the motion.[20]

Security Bank asserts that the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration appears in the body of the petition. Security Bank likewise contends that the certified true copy of the 1 February 1999 Order attached to the petition clearly shows the stamped date of receipt of the Order. Hence, Security Bank insists that the petition substantially complies with Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by Circular No. 39-98.

Contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, Security Bank correctly asserted that page 13 of its petition states the date of filing of the motion for reconsideration on 23 February 1999, or thirteen days after the receipt of the Order.[21] The petition also states the date of receipt of notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court. Hence, the petition only lacked the date of receipt of the trial court's Order of 1 February 1999 that was the subject of the motion for reconsideration.

Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by Circular No. 39-98, provides:

The stamped date on the Order of 1 February 1999 annexed to the petition is not clear enough for the Court of Appeals to determine when Security Bank's counsel received a copy of the Order.[22] However, upon filing its motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, Security Bank attached another copy of the Order of 1 February 1999.[23] This time, the stamped date of receipt of the Order shows that the Security Bank's counsel received the Order on 10 February 1999.

RULE 46 SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - The petition shall contain the full names and actual addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied upon for the relief prayed for.

When Security Bank furnished the Court of Appeals with the copy of the trial court's Order bearing the stamped date of its receipt, it showed its willingness to rectify its omission. Security Bank, in effect, substantially complied with the Rules. In addition, the trial court would have dismissed the motion for reconsideration outright if Security Bank had filed it late. The trial court's Order of 3 November 1999 does not show that Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration out of time.

In actions filed under Rule 65, the petition shall further indicate the material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received.

The rationale for requiring the statement of material dates is to determine the timeliness of filing of the petition. Clearly, Security Bank filed the motion for reconsideration with the trial court on time. Security Bank also filed the petition before the Court of Appeals within the reglementary period. The Court reiterates that there is ample jurisprudence holding that the subsequent and substantial compliance of a party may call for the relaxation of the rules of procedure.[24]

The Ruling of This Court The petition has merit.

It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or pertinent thereto. The certification shall be accomplished by the proper clerk of court or by his duly authorized representative, or by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or by his duly authorized representative. The other requisite number of copies of the petition shall be accompanied by clearly legible plain copies of all documents attached to the original. The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom. The petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

In the recent case of Great Southern Maritime Services Corporation v. Acua , [25] we held that 'the failure to comply with the rule on a statement of material dates in the petition may be excused since the dates are evident from the records. The more material date for purposes of appeal to the Court of Appeals is the date of receipt of the trial court's order denying the motion for reconsideration, which date is admittedly stated in the petition in the present case. The other material dates may be gleaned from the records of the case if reasonably evident. Thus, in this case the Court deems it proper to relax the Rules to give all the parties the chance to argue their causes and defenses.[26] WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 22 February 2000 and 29 November 2000. This case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals which is DIRECTED to reinstate and give due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 56534, and decide the same on the merits. SO ORDERED

the Secretary of Justice dated November 12, 2002 and April 30, 2003 in IS No. 01B05485 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 30, 2001 Resolution of the City Prosecutor of Manila finding probable cause against private respondent Artemio Torres, Jr. is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. [17] Torres' motion for reconsideration was denied, [18] hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari [19] on the following grounds: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003 RENDERED MOOT AND ACADEMIC THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FILED BY RESPONDENTS BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE PURPOSE OF REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001.

ARTEMIO T. TORRES, JR., G.R. No. 164268 Petitioner, vs SPS. DRS. EDGARDO AGUINALDO & NELIA T. TORRES-AGUINALDO, June 28, 2005 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION This petition for review on certiorari [1] assails the decision [2] of the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 77818, and its resolution [3] dated June 28, 2004 denying reconsideration thereof. The facts are as follows: Respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Manila, [4] a complaint against petitioner Artemio T. Torres, Jr. (Torres) for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-93596, T-87764, and T-87765, were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale [5] dated July 21, 1979. Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him [6] as evidenced by the March 10, 1991 Deed of Absolute Sale. [7] Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of public document against Torres, [8] which was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MTC), Branch 8, on October 3, 2001. Torres moved for reconsideration [9] but was denied. [10] On appeal, [11] the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information. [12] The motion for reconsideration filed by Aguinaldo was denied. [13] A Motion to Withdraw Information [14] was filed which the MTC granted on June 11, 2003. [15] It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned. Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari [16] which was granted in the assailed decision dated March 22, 2004. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE ASSAILED DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS REINSTATING THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001 VIOLATED THE DOCTRINE THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A CRIMINAL CASE IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT ONCE THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED THEREIN. III. WHETHER OR NOT THE EVIDENCE OF A RESPONDENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT HIM FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE OCP-MANILA HAS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION IN DETERMINING IF PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO INDICT THE PETITIONER FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. V. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND THE OFFICE OF A WRIT OF CERTIORARI WHEN IT SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DELIBERATE DISREGARD OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE WHEN IT IGNORED THE FINAL ORDER OF THE MTC-MANILA DATED 11 JUNE 2003 AND ORDERED THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OCP-MANILA DATED 30 APRIL 2001. VII. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ENGAGED IN FORUM SHOPPING WARRANTING THE OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONER (sic) FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 WHICH THEY FILED BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. VIII. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED THE DISREGARD OF SECTION 3, RULE 46 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHEN IT ENTERTAINED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 FILED BY RESPONDENTS. [20]

investigating prosecutor's findings on the existence of probable cause. The foregoing assignment of errors may be summarized into three issues: I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding probable cause against petitioner. Anent the first issue, Torres contends that the order granting the withdrawal of the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed before the Court of Appeals. Citing Baares II v. Balising, [21] Torres insists that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is final if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. The contention is untenable. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation. On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality. In Baares II v. Balising, a motion to dismiss was filed thus putting into place the time-bar rule on provisional dismissal. In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Baares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that the law on provisional dismissal becomes operative once the judge dismisses, with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party: (a) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived; or (b) a case involving a penalty of imprisonment of more than six (6) years, where such provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case having been revived. There is provisional dismissal [22] when a motion filed expressly for that purpose complies with the following requisites, viz.: (1) It must be with the express consent of the accused; and (2) There must be notice to the offended party. Section 8, Rule 117 contemplates the filing of a motion to dismiss, and not a motion to withdraw information. Thus, the law on provisional dismissal does not apply in the present case. Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117. Respondent-spouses are not guilty of forum shopping. The cases they filed against petitioner are based on distinct causes of action. Besides, a certificate of non-forum shopping is required only in civil complaints under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In People v. Ferrer, [23] we held that such certificate is not even necessary in criminal cases and distinct causes of action. Be that as it may, what is principally assailed is the Court of Appeals' decision reversing the resolution of the Justice Secretary and reinstating the April 30, 2001 resolution of the OCP of Manila. The issue, therefore, is whether the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reversing the

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure defines preliminary investigation as an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The officers authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation are the: (a) Provincial or city fiscals and their assistants; (b) Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts Judges; (c) National and Regional state prosecutors; and (d) Such other officers as may be authorized by law. [24] Preliminary investigation is executive in character. It does not contemplate a judicial function. It is essentially an inquisitorial proceeding, and often, the only means of ascertaining who may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial on the merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. 'It does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. Generally, preliminary investigation falls under the authority of the prosecutor. However, since there are not enough prosecutors, this function was also assigned to judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Their findings are reviewed by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. After conducting preliminary investigation, the investigating judge must transmit within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with the entire records to the provincial or city prosecutor. [25] In Crespo v. Mogul, [26] we underscored the cardinal principle that the public prosecutor controls and directs the prosecution of criminal offenses whose resolutions may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice. [27] We held that where there is a clash of views between a judge who did not investigate and a fiscal who conducted a reinvestigation, those of the prosecutor should normally prevail. [28] We ruled in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals [29] that when a motion to withdraw an information is filed on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the bounden duty of the trial court is to independently assess the merits of the motion. The judge is not bound by the resolution of the Justice Secretary but must evaluate it before proceeding with the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case. Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari. The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale. [30] It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres should not have been considered during the preliminary investigation but should be threshed out only during trial. [31] Only the evidence presented by the complainant should be considered in determining probable cause or the lack thereof. We are not persuaded. The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report [32] and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner. It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.

Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a party's defense or accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based on the totality of evidence presented by both parties. Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in determining the existence or the lack of probable cause. There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus between the acts and omissions and the accused. The allegation that petitioner effectuated the illicit transfer of the disputed properties in his name is without factual basis. He was not in possession of the alleged forged deed which does not even bore his signature. We find merit in his contention that the subject properties were sold to him on March 10, 1991 considering that the new TCTs were issued in his name only on March 26, 1991. His address mentioned in the 1979 Deed of Sale was non-existent yet in 1979, thus giving the impression that it was executed on a later date. It would be absurd for petitioner to use the 1979 Deed of Sale to facilitate the transfer on March 26, 1991 considering his possession of the March 10, 1991 Deed of Sale. Respondents never denied the allegation that they assumed the obligation of transferring the Tanza properties in petitioner's name. Considering that they wanted to cancel the sale and that they were in possession of the forged deed, it is not far-fetched to assume that they facilitated the transfer of the properties using the allegedly 1979 forged deed. It appears that the conveyance of the questioned properties in favor of petitioner was made at the instance of the respondents. Torres has no reason to falsify the 1979 Deed of Sale when he had in his possession the 1991 Deed of Sale which he claims to be authentic. By presenting the alleged forged deed of sale, respondents cast a cloud of doubt on petitioner's title. While motive is not reasonable basis in determining probable cause, the absence thereof further obviates the probability of petitioner's guilt. Besides, Nelia Aguinaldo admitted in her letter dated November 12, 1998 the sale of the properties although she wanted the sale cancelled. This admission is consistent with petitioner's declaration that the sale took place.

Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals [37] declared that the determination of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official. In Noblejas v. Salas, [38] we reaffirmed the power of supervision and control of the department secretary over his subordinate. We stated that 'the power of control therein contemplated means to alter, modify, or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court. We also find that the trial court independently assessed the merits of the motion to withdraw information. Before it was granted, respondents were allowed to submit their opposition [39] and the petitioner to comment [40] thereon, which were both considered. The trial judge also considered the basis of the Justice Secretary's resolution before finding that no probable cause exists, thus: The two DOJ Resolutions absolving the accused from incipient criminal liability were premised on the ground that the herein accused had no participation in the preparation of the alleged falsified Deed of Sale dated July 29, 1979, which deed, in effect, transferred ownership of private complainant's three parcels of land located in Tanza, Cavite to the accused. This finding was based on the argument that it would be highly irregular for the accused to effect the transfer of the property through a falsified deed when accused had in his possession a valid and genuine Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1991 executed by the spouses-complainants transferring ownership of the aforesaid property to him. The court is inclined to grant the motion of the public prosecutor. The issues which the court has to resolve in the instant case had been amply discussed in the aforesaid resolutions of the DOJ and it is convinced that, indeed, no probable cause exists against the accused. [41] WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 22, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Secretary of Justice dated November 12, 2002 is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED

In their complaint, respondents claimed that they discovered the alleged illegal conveyance in November 2000. [33] This was, however, belied by their Adverse Claim dated December 18, 1999 which appeared as Entry No. 5856-115 and annotated on the new titles issued in the name of Torres in February 2000. [34] In November 1998, Nelia was claiming her share in the property that was sold by Torres to Porfirio and Yolanda Dones in 1993. [35] In D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Esguerra, [36] grave abuse of discretion is defined: By grave abuse of discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law. The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa in his separate opinion in

On February 23, 2010, the LP filed its Opposition[5] to the NP-NPC's petition on the following grounds: 1) The NP-NPC's petition should be denied since it was not a duly registered coalition of political parties at the time of filing of their petition for accreditation as dominant minority party; 2) The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for registration as a coalition because the petition should have been first brought before the proper Division; 3) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed with the Clerk of the Commission instead of the Law Department in violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; 4) The petition for registration as a coalition was filed beyond the August 17, 2009 deadline set by the COMELEC; and 5) The respective chapters, incumbents and candidates of the NP and the NPC separately cannot be taken into account for purposes of accreditation as dominant minority party because the NP-NPC as a coalition is an entirely different entity.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 191771 : May 06, 2010] LIBERAL PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL A. ROXAS II AND SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NACIONALISTA PARTY, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR AND NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN FAUSTINO S. DY, JR., RESPONDENTS. DECISION BRION, J.: This case poses to the Court, at this very late stage of our election period, issues involving the registration of political coalitions, the grant of accreditation to the dominant parties under the first time ever automated election system in the country, and validity of the COMELEC en banc's (en banc) authority to act on the registration of political coalitions. The challenged ruling is a Per Curiam Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)[1] dated April 12, 2010 in SPP-10-(DM) granting the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition (NP-NPC or coalition) and deferring the question of the coalition's dominant minority status to a future resolution. The challenge comes from the Liberal Party (LP)[2] through a petition for certiorari and prohibition[3] with a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction or a status quo order. We issued a status quo order through our Resolution of April 20, 2010. I. THE BACKGROUND FACTS a. General Background On July 14, 2009, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8646 setting August 17, 2009 as the last day for the filing of petitions for registration of political parties. On January 21, 2010, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 8752, providing, among others, for the rules for the filing of petitions for accreditation for the determination of the dominant majority party, the dominant minority party, ten major national parties, and two major local parties for the May 10, 2010 elections. Resolution No. 8752 also set the deadline for filing of petitions for accreditation on February 12, 2010 and required that accreditation applicants be registered political parties, organizations or coalitions. On February 12, 2010, the LP filed with the COMELEC its petition for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the same date, the Nacionalista Party (NP) and the Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC) filed a petition for registration as a coalition (NP-NPC) and asked that "it be recognized and accredited as the dominant minority party for purposes of the May 10, 2010 elections."[4] It was docketed as an SPP (DM) case, indicating - pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 - that it was an accreditation case.

The COMELEC issued an Order dated February 16, 2010 and a Notice of Hearing on February 17, 2010 setting for hearing the petitions for accreditation for the purpose of determining the dominant majority party, dominant minority party, ten (10) major national parties and two (2) major local parties in connection with the May 10, 2010 elections. Among the petitions set for hearing were the LP's and the NP-NPC's petitions for accreditation as the dominant minority party.[6] On March 9, 2010, the LP presented Rep. Lualhati Antonino (a member of the NPC's National Convention) as its witness.[7] Rep. Antonino testified, among others, that the NPC National Convention did not authorize its National Central Committee to enter into a coalition with the NP,[8] and that neither the National Convention nor the general membership was ever consulted about the merger with the NP.[9] On March 10, 2010, the NP-NPC presented former Gov. Faustino Dy, Jr. as its witness to refute Rep. Antonino's testimony.[10] On March 15, 2010, the LP and the NP-NPC filed their respective Memoranda.[11] b. The Assailed COMELEC Resolution On April 12, 2010, the en banc granted the NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition through the Resolution assailed in the present case. In the same Resolution, the en banc deferred the resolution of the NP-NPC's application for accreditation as dominant minority party. On the issue of jurisdiction, the en banc citing Baytan v. Comelec[12] held that the registration of coalitions involves the exercise of its administrative powers and not its quasi-judicial powers; hence, the en banc can directly act on it. It further held that there is no constitutional requirement that a petition for registration of a coalition should be decided first by a division. In Baytan, the Court held that the Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Thus, the en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. The en banc ruled further that although the NP-NPC's failure to file the petition with the Law Department constituted a violation of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure (COMELEC Rules), the en banc has the discretion to suspend the application of the rules in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of cases;[13] in any case, the authority to approve or deny the Law Department's recommendation on the registration of the coalition rests with the en banc. On the timeliness of the filing of the petition, the en banc held that no rule exists setting a deadline for the registration of coalitions. It opined that the registration of a coalition is simply a recognition by the COMELEC of a political reality. It held that if the NP-NPC is genuine, then the approval of its registration by the COMELEC is a mere recognition of an "operative fact." On the merits, the en banc found that both the NP and the NPC have validly agreed to join forces for political or election purposes. It held that the NP-NPC satisfactorily submitted all the documentary

requirements to prove the merger's validity. It opined, too, that if the Constitution and By-Laws of either the NP or the NPC was violated by the merger, the representatives or members of either party possess the legal standing to question the coalition; the LP, a stranger to the internal dynamics of both parties, does not have this required standing. The en banc noted that no representative from either the NP or the NPC ever filed any formal opposition to the NP-NPC petition for registration and accreditation. It thus concluded that hardly any controversy existed for it to resolve. At the same time, it disregarded Rep. Antonino's testimony, since she lost her NPC membership when she admitted support for the candidacy of Sen. Manuel A. Roxas II - the Liberal Party candidate for vice-president - a ground provided under the Constitution and By-Laws of the NPC.[14] c. The Sarmiento Dissent Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento dissented on various grounds.[15] First, he ruled that the COMELEC sitting en banc had no jurisdiction over NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition and accreditation as dominant minority party. Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules governs the registration of coalitions. Rule 32 is found under Letter F of the Rules entitled "Special Proceedings." According to Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules, the Commission sitting in two (2) Divisions, shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases falling under special proceedings, with the exception of the accreditation of citizens' arms of the COMELEC. The dissent concluded that the present petition is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC sitting in Division and not of the COMELEC sitting en banc, citing Villarosa v. COMELEC.[16] Commissioner Sarmiento secondly took the position that the relaxation of the Rules is inappropriate in the present case. In general, election laws may be divided into three parts for purposes of applying the rules of statutory construction. The first part refers to the provisions for the conduct of elections that election officials are required to follow; these provisions are merely directory. The second part covers those provisions that candidates for office are required to comply with and are necessarily mandatory. The last part embraces those procedural rules designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections; this requires liberal construction. The NP-NPC's petition falls under the second part, so the applicable requirements of law are mandatory. The dissent argued that the relaxation of the rules is not applicable to the present case, because it does not involve the determination of the will of the electorate; thus, the rules governing the registration of coalitions should be construed strictly and not liberally. Commissioner Sarmiento's third point is that no valid coalition was formed between the NP and the NPC. He pointed out that the Constitutions and By-Laws of both parties require that the parties' respective National Conventions give their approval before their parties can enter into any coalition agreement with another political party. The dissent found that the records are bereft of any proof that the National Conventions of both the NP and the NPC authorized their officers to form the NP-NPC. The dissent held that the action of the Executive Committees of the NP and the NPC in issuing the Joint Resolution (declaring the NP-NPC merger) was a clear violation of the parties' Constitutions and By-Laws and was thus ultra vires and void.

and the NPC admitted that the COMELEC had not extended any recognition to their coalition; without the requisite recognition and registration, the NP-NPC could not seek accreditation as the dominant minority party for the May 10, 2010 elections. The dissent also noted that the NP-NPC could no longer seek accreditation since the deadline for filing a petition for accreditation had lapsed. Finally, while the NP and NPC are both duly accredited political parties, their recognition cannot benefit the NP-NPC, since the latter seeks accreditation as an entity separate and distinct from both the NP and the NPC. II. The Petition The LP now assails the April 12, 2010 COMELEC Resolution for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, as follows: 1) The COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain petitions for registration of political coalitions; 2) The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite the lapse of the deadline for registration; 3) The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it allowed the registration of the purported NP-NPC coalition despite patent and manifest violations of the NPC Constitution and By-Laws; and 4) The purported NP-NPC coalition is a bogus, sham and paper coalition that makes a mockery of the electoral process.[17] In support of its petition, the petitioner attached the Sworn Affidavits of two prominent members of the NPC, namely: Atty. Sixto S. Brillantes (the current NPC Legal Counsel) and Daniel Laogan (a member of the NPC's National Central Committee) to show that the NP-NPC was entered into without consultations; much less, the approval of the NPC's National Convention which was not even convened.[18] a. Comments from the OSG and the COMELEC On April 27, 2010, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a "Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of Comment." The OSG manifested that the duty to appear and defend on their behalf and on behalf of the COMELEC falls on the respondents, since they are the real parties interested in upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution. The COMELEC, as a mere nominal party, does not need to file a separate comment. We responded to the OSG's manifestation by requiring the COMELEC to file its own comment, which it did on May 4, 2010. On the merits, the OSG argues that the present petition is premature. It notes that the petition's real thrust is to foreclose the possibility that respondent NP-NPC would be declared the dominant minority party in the coming May 10, 2010 elections. The OSG emphasizes that the assailed COMELEC Resolution only affirmatively resolved the registration of the NP-NPC, not its accreditation. Thus, the petition's core issue is not yet ripe for adjudication. As expressly indicated in the assailed Resolution, the accreditation has yet to be the subject of a coming separate resolution.

The dissent also branded the NP-NPC as a sham whose sole purpose was to secure dominant minority party status. The Commissioner noted that members of the NP and NPC are pitted against each other and are vying for the same election positions - an absurd situation in a coalition, since no alliance for a common cause can exist if members of the component parties are competing against each other for the same positions.

The OSG also argues that no violation of due process attended the registration process, since the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard. The OSG notes that the petitioner filed its Opposition to the NP-NPC's application for registration and accreditation before the COMELEC. In addition, hearings were scheduled and held where the COMELEC allowed the petitioner to submit its evidence, both testimonial and documentary.

Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out as his last point that the NP-NPC cannot seek accreditation as the dominant minority party without the requisite recognition by the COMELEC.

The COMELEC's comment is practically a reiteration of the rulings in the assailed Resolution, heretofore summarized. For this reason, we shall no longer reflect on and repeat the COMELEC's positions in detail.

COMELEC Resolution No. 8752 requires that only political parties duly registered with the COMELEC may seek accreditation as a dominant party. At the time the NP-NPC filed its petition for accreditation on February 12, 2010, it was still seeking registration as a coalition of political parties. By filing the petition, both the NP

b. The NP-NPC Coalition's Comment In their Comment, the respondents argue that the present petition should be dismissed outright since it is

plagued with procedural infirmities. First, the respondents contend that the petitioner violated Section 5(2) of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which requires that the petition be accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record the petition referred to. The respondents point out that the petitioner failed to attach the required certified true copies of the documents to its petition. Second, the respondents argue that the petitioner unjustifiably failed to implead the NP-NPC as a party to the present case. The respondents contend that NP-NPC is a real party-in-interest, as well as an indispensable party without the participation of which no final determination of the case can be secured. Third, the respondents argue that the present petition raises mere errors of judgment that are not within the Court's authority to act upon under its certiorari jurisdiction, since the present petition merely assails the en banc's appreciation of facts and evidence. On the merits, the respondents aver that the en banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in granting the registration of the NP-NPC. First, the respondents argue that that the en banc had jurisdiction to entertain their petition for registration of the NP-NPC. The respondents emphasize that the NP-NPC's registration falls within the ambit of the COMELEC's administrative powers; hence, the en banc properly assumed jurisdiction over their petition.

Fourth, the respondents contend that Commissioner Sarmiento's thesis that the coalition is a sham since they are fielding contending candidates is baseless. As explained in the hearings, the NP and NPC agreed on an arbitration procedure to settle these conflicts, although no arbitration has taken place to date, since the registration of the NP-NPC has not attained finality. Fifth, the respondents contend that the newspaper reports presented by the petitioner to show that there was no valid NP-NPC is inadmissible and carries no probative value for being hearsay. The respondents further argue that the affidavits of Atty. Sixto Brillantes and Daniel Laogan, attached to the present petition, are inadmissible as the Court cannot receive evidence or conduct a trial de novo under its certiorari jurisdiction. In addition, the respondents argue that the affidavits are hearsay evidence, since Atty. Brillantes and Daniel Laogan were never presented during the hearings before the en banc and were not subjected to crossexamination. Finally, the respondents point out that the subject matter of Atty. Brillantes' affidavit is covered by the attorney-client privilege; he was the NPC's general counsel who represented the NPC in all legal proceedings. III. THE ISSUES The parties' positions raise the following issues for resolution: 1. Preliminary Issues: a. b.

The respondents cite Baytan v. COMELEC[19] as authority for its position. The Court held in this cited case that the COMELEC's administrative powers include the registration of political parties and coalitions under Section 2 (5) of Article IX of the Constitution. The Court also ruled that since the Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections" while providing that the COMELEC may sit en banc or in two Divisions, the en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Second, the respondents also contend that their petition for registration as a coalition is not time-barred. They argue that the August 17, 2009 deadline applied only to "political parties"; and to "parties, organizations and coalitions under the party-list system." The respondents emphasize that there is no deadline for petitions for the registration of coalition of parties, since COMELEC Resolution No. 8646 has not specifically set a deadline. Thus, they conclude that the August 17, 2009 deadline applies only to the registration of new and unregistered political parties, and not to the registration of coalitions between previously registered political parties such as the NP and the NPC. Third, the respondents point out that the NP-NPC was validly formed, and that the requisite approvals were duly obtained. The respondents contend that the en banc's factual findings on the formation of the coalition and the submission and approval of the requisite documents are supported by substantial evidence, and thus are final and binding on this Court. The respondents emphasize that the 1993 Revised Rules of the NP does not require the approval of the National Convention for purposes of coalescing with another political party; neither do the Rules confer on the National Convention the power to approve a coalition with another political party. Similarly, the respondents point out that the NPC's Constitution and By-Laws is silent on and does not confer any power to approve a coalition with another political party. The respondents emphasize that they cannot violate a non-existent requirement; Rep. Antonino in fact affirmed that there is no specific provision in the NPC's Constitution and By-Laws relating to a coalition with another party. The respondents argue that NPC Chairman Dy's testimony adequately showed that the NP-NPC was entered into after meetings and consultations with party members and the NPC national organization; in fact, 70%-75% of those consulted supported the coalition. The respondents also aver that it is a common party practice that the NPC National Convention decides through a series of small meetings of leaders and members, whether to arrive at a consensus. The respondents point out that, to date, no member of the NP or NPC has ever expressed his or her objection to the NP-NPC. The respondents emphasize that the wisdom of entering into a coalition is strictly an internal matter; and no third party such as the LP, not even the courts, can interfere. The respondents cite Sinaca v. Mula[20] as authority that political parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision.

c.

Should the petition be dismissed outright for procedural and technical infirmities? Is the present petition premature since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC issue? Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred? i.

2. 3.

Is the NP-NPC an "operative fact" that the COMELEC simply has to note and recognize without need of registration?

Does the en banc have jurisdiction at the first instance to entertain the petition? On the merits and assuming that the en banc has jurisdiction, did it gravely abuse its discretion when it allowed the registration of the NP-NPC? a. b.

Was due process observed in granting the registration? Did the coalition take place as required by law: i. ii.

in terms of compliance with internal rules of the NP and the NPC? in terms of the consent to or support for, and the lack of objection to, the coalition?

IV. THE COURT'S RULING We find the petition meritorious. a. Preliminary Considerations 1. The technical and procedural questions We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical and procedural objections is the nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues are solely confined to the parties' private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affecting the public,[21] but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised when grave public interests are involved.[22] Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical and procedural where Court intervention has become imperative.[23] Thus, we have recognized exceptions to the threshold issues of ripeness[24] and mootness[25] of the petitions before us, as well as questions on locus standi.[26] We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues raised, because of the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents deserve the Court's attention and active intervention.[27]

We see every reason to be liberal in the present case in view of interests involved which are indisputably important to the coming electoral exercise now fast approaching. The registration of political parties, their accreditation as dominant parties, and the benefits these recognitions provide - particularly, the on-line real time electronic transmission of election results from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) through the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines; the immediate access to official election results; the per diems from the government that watchers of accredited parties enjoy; and the representation at the printing, storage and distribution of ballots that the dominant-party status brings - constitute distinct advantages to any party and its candidates, if only in terms of the ready information enabling them to react faster to developing situations.[28] The value of these advantages exponentially rises in an election under an automated system whose effectiveness and reliability, even at this late stage, are question marks to some. To the public, the proper registration and the accreditation of dominant parties are evidence of equitable party representation at the scene of electoral action, and translate in no small measure to transparency and to the election's credibility. Thus, our focus is on the core issues that confront us and the parties, by-passing the technical and procedural questions raised that do not anyway affect the integrity of the petition before us or prejudice the parties involved, and concentrating as well on the issues that would resolve the case soonest so that the parties involved and the COMELEC can move on to their assigned time-sensitive roles and tasks in the coming elections. We note that while the respondents placed in issue defects in the attachments to the petition, their objection is a formal one as they do not deny the existence and basic correctness of these attachments. We see no resulting harm or prejudice therefore if we overrule the objection raised, given the weight of the counterbalancing factors we considered above.[29] We do not likewise find the failure to formally implead the NP-NPC a sufficient reason to dismiss the petition outright. Without any finally confirmed registration in the coalition's favor, NP-NPC does not legally exist as a coalition with a personality separate and distinct from the component NP and NPC parties. We find it sufficient that the NP and the NPC have separately been impleaded; as of the moment, they are the real parties-in-interest as they are the parties truly interested in legally establishing the existence of their coalition. Again, we find no resulting harm or prejudice in the omission to implead NP-NPC, as the component parties have voiced out the concerns the coalition would have raised had it been impleaded as a separate and properly existing personality. The respondents next argue that the petition's cited grounds are mere errors of law and do not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This objection can be read as a facial objection to the petition or as a substantive one that goes into the merits of the petition. We will discuss under the present topic the facial objection, as it is a threshold issue that determines whether we shall proceed to consider the case or simply dismiss the petition outright. A facial objection is meritorious if, expressly and on the face of the petition, what is evident as cited grounds are erroneous applications of the law rather than grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. After due consideration, we conclude that the petition passes the facial objection test.

of jurisdiction; in other words, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be explained below. As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light: "When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari." The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy. [Emphasis supplied.] The most obvious ground cited in the petition that, if properly established, would constitute grave abuse of discretion is the alleged unwarranted action of the en banc in acting on the registration of the NP-NPC when the COMELEC's own Rules of Procedure provides that registration is under the jurisdiction of the Division at the first instance. This alleged error is more than an error of law. If this cited ground is correct, then the en banc acted without legal authority and thereby committed a jurisdictional transgression;[31] its action, being ultra vires, would be a nullity. Another allegation of an ultra vires act is that the COMELEC, by appropriate resolution, ordered that August 17, 2009 be the cut-off date for the registration of parties, and yet approved the registration of NP-NPC long after this cut-off date had passed without any valid justification or reason for suspending the rule. For the en banc to so act was not a mere error of law. The grant of registration was an act outside mandatory legal parameters and was therefore done when the COMELEC no longer had the authority to act on it. In this sense, it is a proper allegation of grave abuse of discretion under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. In our view, these jurisdictional challenges to the en banc Resolution, if established, constitute ultra vires acts that would render the Resolution void. b. Prematurity Is the present petition premature, since its object is to foreclose a ruling on the unsettled NP-NPC accreditation issue? This is another threshold issue, raised this time by the OSG, and we rule that the OSG's objection has no merit.

[30]

In Madrigal Transport, Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, gave a very succinct exposition of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in relation to errors of law. The Court then said: A writ of certiorari may be issued only for the correction of errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ cannot be used for any other purpose, as its function is limited to keeping the inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction. xxxx "Without jurisdiction" means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority. There is "excess of jurisdiction" when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess

The root of the present petition is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC for registration as a coalition and accreditation as the dominant minority party. While the en banc claimed that it had jurisdiction over the registration of coalitions and in fact decreed the NP-NPC's registration, it strangely did not rule on the accreditation aspect of the petition. The registration of a coalition and the accreditation of a dominant minority party are two separate matters that are substantively distinct from each other. Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our election laws;[32] accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.[33] Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32 of the COMELEC Rules regulate the registration of political parties, organizations or coalitions of political parties. Accreditation as a dominant party is governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 8752, Section 1 of which states that the petition for accreditation shall be filed

with the Clerk of the Commission who shall docket it as an SPP (DM) case, in the manner that the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC was docketed. While the registration of political parties is a special proceeding clearly assigned to a Division for handling under the COMELEC Rules,[34] no similar clear-cut rule is available for a petition for accreditation as a dominant party. We thus make no statement on this point, as it is not a matter in issue.

registration of political organizations and coalitions, if allowed, may even wreak havoc on the procedural orderliness of elections by allowing these registrations to introduce late and confusing signals to the electorate, not to mention their possible adverse effects on election systems and procedures. This, the en banc very well knows, and their lack of unanimity on the disputed point of timeliness shows how unusual the majority's reading has been.

Under the circumstances of the present case where the registration was handled at the en banc, action at the COMELEC ended upon the en banc's issuance of the assailed Resolution; under Rule 13, Section 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules, a motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling is a prohibited pleading, except in election offense cases. Any request for accreditation that may be filed is conceptually a separate matter for the COMELEC to handle. Thus, after the en banc issued the assailed Resolution resolving the NP-NPC's application for registration as a coalition, the COMELEC's part in the registration process was brought to a close, rendering the Resolution ripe for review by this Court.

The en banc's failure to follow its own rules on deadlines may, at first blush, be a negligible error that does not affect its jurisdiction (assuming for the sake of argument that the en banc has the authority to act at the first instance). An examination of Resolution No. 8646, however, shows that the deadline for registration cannot but be a firm and mandatory deadline that the COMELEC has set.

The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NPNPC; the petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. Where the registration is flawed for having been attended by grave abuse of discretion, as alleged in the petition, the filing of a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a preliminary injunction can only be expected as a logical remedial move; otherwise, accreditation, unless restrained, will follow. Thus, from the point of view of prohibition, there is absolutely no prematurity as its avowed intent is in fact to forestall an event the accreditation - that according to the assailed Resolution shall soon take place. From the point of view of the petition for certiorari questioning the registration made, no prematurity issue is involved as the nullification of a past and accomplished act is prayed for. From these perspectives, the OSG objection based on prematurity is shown to be completely groundless. c. Timeliness

We note in this regard that the registration of parties is the first in a list of election-related activities that peaks in the voting on May 10, 2010. This list takes into account the close step-by-step procedure the COMELEC has to undertake in implementing the automated election system (AES). We note, too, that a closely related activity is the holding of political conventions to select and nominate official party candidates for all election positions, scheduled on October 21, 2009,[35] and November 20, 2009 was the deadline for the filing of the certificates of candidacy for all elective positions - an undertaking that required the candidates' manifestation of their official party affiliation. There is also a host of election activities in which officially registered parties have to participate, principally: the examination and testing of equipment or devices for the AES and the opening of source codes for review;[36] the nomination of official watchers;[37] and the printing, storage and distribution of official ballots wherein accredited political parties may assign watchers.[38] Of course, registered political parties have very significant participation on election day, during the voting and thereafter; the COMELEC needs to receive advance information and make arrangements on which ones are the registered political parties, organizations and coalitions. All these are related to show that the COMELEC deadline cannot but be mandatory; the whole electoral exercise may fail or at least suffer disruptions, if the deadlines are not observed. For this reason, the COMELEC has in the past in fact rejected applications for registration for having been filed out of time. A case in point is the application of the political party Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.,[39] where the COMELEC denied the plea for registration for having been filed out of time,[40] among other grounds. Philippine Guardians Brotherhood might not have been the only political party whose application for registration was denied at the COMELEC level for late filing. We are sure that all these other organizations would now cry foul - and rightly so - because of the denial of their applications on the ground of late filing, when the NP-NPC has been made an exception without rhyme or reason.

Is the NP-NPC petition before the COMELEC, viewed as a petition for registration, time-barred?

Our short answer to the question posed is: yes, the NP-NPC's petition for registration as a coalition is time-barred. Thus, the en banc was wrong in ordering the out-of-time registration of the NP-NPC coalition.

Given the mandatory nature of the deadline, subject only to a systemic change (as contrasted to an ad hoc change or a suspension of the deadline in favor of a party in the course of application), the en banc acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted the registration of NP-NPC as a coalition beyond the deadline the COMELEC itself had set; the authority to register political parties under mandatory terms is only up to the deadline. Effectively, the mandatory deadline is a jurisdictional matter that should have been satisfied and was not. Where conditions that authorize the exercise of a general power are wanting, fatal excess of jurisdiction results.[41]

Admittedly, Resolution No. 8646 simply states that August 17, 2009 is the "[L]ast day for filing petitions for registration of political parties," without mentioning "organizations and coalitions" in the way that the three entities are separately mentioned under Section 2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution and Rule 32, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules. Resolution No. 8646, however, is simply a listing of electoral activities and deadlines for the May 10, 2010 elections; it is not in any way a resolution aimed at establishing distinctions among "political parties, organizations, and coalitions." In the absence of any note, explanation or reason why the deadline only mentions political parties, the term "political parties" should be understood in its generic sense that covers political organizations and political coalitions as well.

Separately from the above consideration, we view the en banc's position that the deadline for registration is only for "political parties" and not for "organizations and coalitions" to be preposterous, given the importance of the participation of political parties in the election process and the rigid schedules that have to be observed in order to implement automated elections as efficiently and as harmoniously as possible. We note that the COMELEC has not even bothered to explain why it imposed a deadline applicable only to political parties, but not to political organizations and coalitions. In our view, this kind of ruling was patently unreasonable, made as it was without basis in law, in fact or in reason; and was a grave abuse of discretion that fatally afflicted the assailed COMELEC Resolution.[42]

To rule otherwise is to introduce, through a COMELEC deadline-setting resolution, a meaning or intent into Section 2(5), Article IX-C, which was not clearly intended by the Constitution or by the COMELEC Rules; Resolution No. 8646 would effectively differentiate between political parties, on the one hand, and political organizations and coalitions, on the other.

1. The "Operative Fact" Issue

This issue, raised by the petitioner, strikes at the heart of the petition that the assailed COMELEC Resolution passed upon, and that the divided en banc decided in the NP-NPC's favor.

In fact, no substantial distinction exists among these entities germane to the act of registration that would justify creating distinctions among them in terms of deadlines. Such distinctions in the deadlines for the

Other than the matter of timeliness which is an open-and-shut consideration under the clear deadline imposed, the more important issue is raised by the statement in the assailed Resolution that the coalition was an "operative fact" that the en banc could note and thereafter recognize, thereby implying that coalitions of political parties may not need any separate registration if the component parties are already registered.

Whether one party would coalesce or work together in partnership, or in close collaboration with another party for purposes of an electoral exercise, is a matter that the law as a rule does not and cannot regulate. This is a part of the freedom of choice derived from the freedom of individuals constituting the political parties to choose their elected leaders,[43] as well as from the concepts of democracy and sovereignty enshrined in our Constitution.[44] This is a freedom, too, that cannot but be related to individuals' associational rights under the Bill of Rights.[45] We mention this freedom, as it was apparently the basis for the "operative fact" that the assailed COMELEC Resolution spoke of. In effect, the assailed Resolution implied that registered political parties are well within their right to coalesce; and that this coalition, once proven, should already bind the COMELEC, rendering registration a mere recognition of an operative fact, i.e., a mere ministerial formality.

away, we find it compelling to declare this Decision immediately executory. WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition and, accordingly, NULLIFY and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated April 12, 2010 in the application for registration of the Nacionalista Party-Nationalist People's Coalition as a political coalition, docketed as SPP-10-(DM). The Commission on Elections is DECLARED BARRED from granting accreditation to the proposed NP-NPC Coalition in the May 10, 2010 elections for lack of the requisite registration as a political coalition. This Decision is declared immediately executory. No costs. SO ORDERED

We categorically reject this COMELEC position and its implication; the freedom to coalesce or to work together in an election to secure the vote for chosen candidates is different from the formal recognition the Constitution requires for a political party, organization or coalition to be entitled to full and meaningful participation in the elections and to the benefits that proceed from formal recognition. Registration and the formal recognition that accompanies it are required, as the words of the Constitution themselves show, because of the Constitution's concern about the character of the organizations officially participating in the elections. Thus, the Constitution specifies religious and ideological limitations, and in clear terms bars alien participation and influence in our elections. This constitutional concern, among others, serves as a reason why registration is not simply a checklist exercise, but one that requires the exercise of profound discretion and quasi-judicial adjudication by the COMELEC.[46] Registration must be undertaken, too, under the strict formalities of the law, including the time limits and deadlines set by the proper authorities. Explained in these terms, it is easy to discern why the "operative fact" that the assailed Resolution speaks of cannot simply be equated with the formal requirement of registration, and why this process should be handled in all seriousness by the COMELEC. To carry this statement further, the Constitution itself has spoken on the matter of registration and the applicable processes and standards; there can be no dispute about the wisdom, propriety, reasonableness or advisability of the constitutional provision and the standards and processes it imposed. Only the people as a sovereign can dwell on these matters in their consideration of the Constitution in a properly called political exercise. In this sense, the question of whether a coalition of registered parties still needs to be registered is a non-issue for being beyond the power of this Court to resolve; this Court can only rule that the Constitution has set the norms and procedures for registration, and these have to be followed. To sum up, political coalitions need to register in accordance with the established norms and procedures, if they are to be recognized as such and be given the benefits accorded by law to registered coalitions. Registered political parties carry a different legal personality from that of the coalition they may wish to establish with other similarly registered parties. If they want to coalesce with one another without the formal registration of their coalition, they can do so on their own in the exercise of their and their members' democratic freedom of choice, but they cannot receive official recognition for their coalition. Or they can choose to secure the registration of their coalition in order to be accorded the privileges accruing to registered coalitions, including the right to be accredited as a dominant majority or minority party. There are no ifs and buts about these constitutional terms. 2. The Jurisdictional and Other Questions Raised Aside from the threshold and timeliness questions we have extensively discussed, this case raises other important questions as well that, without the time constraints the coming elections impose on us, would have been fertile areas for discussion in exploring the limits and parameters of COMELEC authority on the registration of coalitions. These questions, however, are not for us to answer now, given our time constraints and the decisive impact on the present case of our ruling on timeliness. Thus, we reserve for another case and another time the answers to these no less important questions. We solely rule for now that the en banc gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its own deadline in ruling on the registration of the NP-NPC as a coalition. In so ruling, we emphasize that the matter of party registration raises critical election concerns that should be handled with discretion commensurate with the importance of elections to our democratic system. The COMELEC should be at its most strict in implementing and complying with the standards and procedures the Constitution and our laws impose. In light of the time constraints facing the COMELEC and the parties as the election is no more than a week

Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective interest in the property, is approved. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners for the following lots, namely: xxxx G.R. No. 142549 : March 9, 2010 FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner, vs. The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents. DECISION LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.6 Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of Deeds to comply with the Order.

The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican."1cЃacЃaląw What we have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest and most extensive land-grabbing incidents in recent history."

The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a letter-reply7cЃacЃaląw dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st Indorsement8cЃacЃaląw dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-11 issued to all Registers of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:

The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable; but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just, equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost forty-five (45) years.

We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22 September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of Deeds, copy attached, stating the following: xxxx In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated 8 January 1998.

Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the Order3cЃacЃaląw dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v. Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of Finality on March 12, 1998. On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 120. Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,4cЃacЃaląw reiterated in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals,5cЃacЃaląw the Court held that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of the prior registration rule. In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property. The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners Report dated October 21, 1997 and Supplemental Commissioners Report dated December 30, 1997 that the following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the Register of Deeds of

The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x. (Emphasis ours.) The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No. 1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings: i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.] ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City. iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.] iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing "certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued or registered on May 3, 1917. v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had previously issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No. 994. (Underscoring in the original.) The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being kept in the LRA "to prevent its

alteration and tampering." We quote the last portion of said letter-reply: 4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.1 As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994 was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8 January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of land registration. With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering land previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs. CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B. Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer certificates of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution. As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA 874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion, honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large." Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st Indorsement,made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the highest Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court on "what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer amend, modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered the Order of no effect. Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3, 1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of the highest degree." Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely ministerial duty, that she and her coplaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other than this action.cra|aw" In his Comment,respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for denial of the petition: 1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary 2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court. 3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st Indorsement was issued.

Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not a real party-in-interest in this case. Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February 1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry: "(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other units and attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate." Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo Estate. He alleges that based on this committees report dated August 27, 1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies, procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ, must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or supplanted any judgment of this Court. Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18, 1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her rights and interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioners counsel to present petitioners case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19 With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where petitioners claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court, however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score alone, such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.20 In her Reply,petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of public respondents failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the court; and it shall be the

duty of such private respondent to appear and defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not charged with any improper act, but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall require private respondents active participation. 22 Anent private respondents argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondents claim, she is entitled to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification, because of the wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument: RULE 65 xxxx SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39. RULE 39 SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution. Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23 Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their Comment24cЃacЃaląw on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names. Public respondents claim the following as facts:

The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25, 1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her coplaintiffs are not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3, p. 33, Senate Report). x x x. As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason, Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz, Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia OFarrell y Patiño, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D", and its faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof. As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-enumerated true owners. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the questioned Order of the lower court. The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.26 We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus against said public respondents. Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful for public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does not lie and the petition must be dismissed. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.It is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.28c Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public

respondents refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient legal basis to refuse to grant petitioners request? In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration Authority instructive, to wit: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration. xxxx x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious, objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this case, mandamus cannot issue.30 (Emphasis ours.) As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for his refusal to grant petitioners request.31cЃacЃaląw There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly anchored their rights, did not exist. It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation32cЃacЃaląw (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the succeeding resolution33cЃacЃaląw in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions. As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this Court which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioners claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in the 2007 Manotok case: The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine, and can no longer be relied upon as precedents. Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case: First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on [19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x. Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at bar.(Emphases supplied.) To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows: Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them. There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x. xxxx The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this Resolution. Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said Special Division, and adopted the latters conclusions as to the status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void.cra|aw" In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money, should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist. The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack of merit. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

DISSENTING OPINION: CARPIO MORALES, J.: CONCURRING OPINION: ABAD, J.:

EN BANC G.R. No. 191002 : March 17, 2010 ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC) and PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL - ARROYO, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191032 JAIME N. SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191057 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC IN RE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE VII OF THE CONSTITUTION TO APPOINTMENTS TO THE JUDICIARY, ESTELITO P. MENDOZA, Petitioner, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191149 JOHN G. PERALTA, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC). Respondent. PETER IRVING CORVERA; CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM; ALFONSO V. TAN, JR.; NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS; MARLOU B. UBANO; INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES-DAVAO DEL SUR CHAPTER, represented by its Immediate Past President, ATTY. ISRAELITO P. TORREON, and the latter in his own personal capacity as a MEMBER of the PHILIPPINE BAR; MITCHELL JOHN L. BOISER; BAGONG ALYANSANG BAYAN (BAYAN) CHAIRMAN DR. CAROLINA P. ARAULLO; BAYAN SECRETARY GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR.; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCE-MENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE) CHAIRMAN FERDINAND GAITE; KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY) SECRETARY GENERAL GLORIA ARELLANO; ALYANSA NG NAGKAKAISANG KABATAAN NG SAMBAYANAN PARA SA KAUNLARAN (ANAKBAYAN) CHAIRMAN KEN LEONARD RAMOS; TAYO ANG PAG-ASA CONVENOR ALVIN PETERS; LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS) CHAIRMAN JAMES MARK TERRY LACUANAN RIDON; NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (NUSP) CHAIRMAN EINSTEIN RECEDES; COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES (CEGP) CHAIRMAN VIJAE ALQUISOLA; and STUDENT CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES (SCMP) CHAIRMAN MA. CRISTINA ANGELA GUEVARRA; WALDEN F. BELLO and LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES; WOMEN TRIAL LAWYERS ORGANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by YOLANDA QUISUMBINGJAVELLANA; BELLEZA ALOJADO DEMAISIP; TERESITA GANDIONCO-OLEDAN; MA. VERENA KASILAG-VILLANUEVA; MARILYN STA. ROMANA; LEONILA DE JESUS; and GUINEVERE DE LEON. Intervenors. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191342 ATTY. AMADOR Z. TOLENTINO, JR., (IBP Governor-Southern Luzon), and ATTY. ROLAND B. INTING (IBP Governor-Eastern Visayas), Petitioners, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC), Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 191420 PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL and HER EXCELLENCY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: SEPARATE OPINION: NACHURA, J.: BRION, J.:

The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence thereof, to the matter of the appointment of his successor? May the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) resume the process of screening the candidates nominated or being considered to succeed Chief Justice Puno, and submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President even during the period of the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII? Does mandamus lie to compel the submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC? Precís of the Consolidated Cases Petitioners Arturo M. De Castro and John G. Peralta respectively commenced G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149 as special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus, praying that the JBC be compelled to submit to the incumbent President the list of at least three nominees for the position of the next Chief Justice. In G.R. No. 191032, Jaime N. Soriano, via his petition for prohibition, proposes to prevent the JBC from conducting its search, selection and nomination proceedings for the position of Chief Justice. In G.R. No. 191057, a special civil action for mandamus, the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) wants the JBC to submit its list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, because the incumbent President is not covered by the prohibition that applies only to appointments in the Executive Department. In Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, petitioner Estelito M. Mendoza, a former Solicitor General, seeks a ruling from the Court for the guidance of the JBC on whether Section 15, Article VII applies to appointments to the Judiciary. In G.R. No. 191342,which the Court consolidated on March 9, 2010 with the petitions earlier filed, petitioners Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr. and Roland B. Inting, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governors for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas, respectively, want to enjoin and restrain the JBC from submitting a list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice to the President for appointment during the period provided for in Section 15, Article VII. All the petitions now before the Court pose as the principal legal question whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement. That question is undoubtedly impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation, because the appointment of the Chief Justice is any Presidents most important appointment. A precedent frequently cited is In Re Appointments Dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Bago City and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively (Valenzuela),by which the Court held that Section 15, Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed. In G.R. No. 191002, De Castro submits that the conflicting opinions on the issue expressed by legal luminaries one side holds that the incumbent President is prohibited from making appointments within two months immediately before the coming presidential elections and until the end of her term of office as President on June 30, 2010, while the other insists that the prohibition applies only to appointments to executive positions that may influence the election and, anyway, paramount national interest justifies the appointment of a Chief Justice during the election ban has impelled the JBC to defer the decision to whom to

send its list of at least three nominees, whether to the incumbent President or to her successor.8 He opines that the JBC is thereby arrogating unto itself "the judicial function that is not conferred upon it by the Constitution," which has limited it to the task of recommending appointees to the Judiciary, but has not empowered it to "finally resolve constitutional questions, which is the power vested only in the Supreme Court under the Constitution." As such, he contends that the JBC acted with grave abuse of discretion in deferring the submission of the list of nominees to the President; and that a "final and definitive resolution of the constitutional questions raised above would diffuse (sic) the tension in the legal community that would go a long way to keep and maintain stability in the judiciary and the political system."9 In G.R. No. 191032, Soriano offers the view that the JBC committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction when it resolved unanimously on January 18, 2010 to open the search, nomination, and selection process for the position of Chief Justice to succeed Chief Justice Puno, because the appointing authority for the position of Chief Justice is the Supreme Court itself, the Presidents authority being limited to the appointment of the Members of the Supreme Court. Hence, the JBC should not intervene in the process, unless a nominee is not yet a Member of the Supreme Court.10 For its part, PHILCONSA observes in its petition in G.R. No. 191057 that "unorthodox and exceptional circumstances spawned by the discordant interpretations, due perhaps to a perfunctory understanding, of Sec. 15, Art. VII in relation to Secs. 4(1), 8(5) and 9, Art. VIII of the Constitution" have bred "a frenzied inflammatory legal debate on the constitutional provisions mentioned that has divided the bench and the bar and the general public as well, because of its dimensional impact to the nation and the people," thereby fashioning "transcendental questions or issues affecting the JBCs proper exercise of its "principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary" by submitting only to the President (not to the next President) "a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy" from which the members of the Supreme Court and judges of the lower courts may be appointed."11cЃacЃaląw PHILCONSA further believes and submits that now is the time to revisit and review Valenzuela, the "strange and exotic Decision of the Court en banc."12

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice Honorable Reynato S. Puno. It will publish the opening of the position for applications or recommendations; deliberate on the list of candidates; publish the names of candidates; accept comments on or opposition to the applications; conduct public interviews of candidates; and prepare the shortlist of candidates. As to the time to submit this shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in the light of the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, the JBC welcomes and will consider all views on the matter. 18 January 2010. (sgd.) MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA Clerk of Court & Ex-Officio Secretary Judicial and Bar Council As a result, the JBC opened the position of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published for that purpose its announcement dated January 20, 2010, viz: The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announces the opening for application or recommendation, of the position of CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, which will be vacated on 17 May 2010 upon the retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, HON. REYNATO S. PUNO. Applications or recommendations for this position must be submitted not later than 4 February 2010 (Thursday) to the JBC Secretariat xxx: The announcement was published on January 20, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star.17c

Peralta states in his petition in G.R. No. 191149 that mandamus can compel the JBC "to immediately transmit to the President, within a reasonable time, its nomination list for the position of chief justice upon the mandatory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in compliance with its mandated duty under the Constitution" in the event that the Court resolves that the President can appoint a Chief Justice even during the election ban under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.13

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC "automatically considered" for the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.1

The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 insist that there is an actual controversy, considering that the "JBC has initiated the process of receiving applications for the position of Chief Justice and has in fact begun the evaluation process for the applications to the position," and "is perilously near completing the nomination process and coming up with a list of nominees for submission to the President, entering into the period of the ban on midnight appointments on March 10, 2010," which "only highlights the pressing and compelling need for a writ of prohibition to enjoin such alleged ministerial function of submitting the list, especially if it will be cone within the period of the ban on midnight appointments."14

Others either applied or were nominated. Victor Fernandez, the retired Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, applied, but later formally withdrew his name from consideration through his letter dated February 8, 2010. Candidates who accepted their nominations without conditions were Associate Justice Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion; and Associate Justice Edilberto G. Sandoval (Sandiganbayan). Candidates who accepted their nominations with conditions were Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales.19cЃacЃaląw Declining their nominations were Atty. Henry Villarica (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 5, 2010) and Atty. Gregorio M. Batiller, Jr. (via telephone conversation with the Executive Officer of the JBC on February 8, 2010).2

Antecedents These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII, that "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof" from a "list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.cra|aw" On December 22, 2009, Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, therefore, the JBC passed a resolution,which reads:

The JBC excluded from consideration former RTC Judge Florentino Floro (for failure to meet the standards set by the JBC rules); and Special Prosecutor Dennis Villa-Ignacio of the Office of the Ombudsman (due to cases pending in the Office of the Ombudsman).21 In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the names of the following candidates to invite the public to file their sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than February 22, 2010, to wit: Associate Justice Carpio, Associate Justice Corona, Associate Justice Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Brion, and Associate Justice Sandoval. The announcement came out in the Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Philippine Star issues of February 13, 2010.22

Issues Although it has already begun the process for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the President its list of nominees for the position due to the controversy now before us being yet unresolved. In the meanwhile, time is marching in quick step towards May 17, 2010 when the vacancy occurs upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The actions of the JBC have sparked a vigorous debate not only among legal luminaries, but also among non-legal quarters, and brought out highly disparate opinions on whether the incumbent President can appoint the next Chief Justice or not. Petitioner Mendoza notes that in Valenzuela, which involved the appointments of two judges of the Regional Trial Court, the Court addressed this issue now before us as an administrative matter "to avoid any possible polemics concerning the matter," but he opines that the polemics leading to Valenzuela "would be miniscule [sic] compared to the "polemics" that have now erupted in regard to the current controversy," and that unless "put to a halt, and this may only be achieved by a ruling from the Court, the integrity of the process and the credibility of whoever is appointed to the position of Chief Justice, may irreparably be impaired." Accordingly, we reframe the issues as submitted by each petitioner in the order of the chronological filing of their petitions. G.R. No. 191002 a. Does the JBC have the power and authority to resolve the constitutional question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the election ban period? b. Does the incumbent President have the power and authority to appoint during the election ban the successor of Chief Justice Puno when he vacates the position of Chief Justice on his retirement on May 17, 2010? G.R. No. 191032 a. Is the power to appoint the Chief Justice vested in the Supreme Court en banc? G.R. No. 191057 a. Is the constitutional prohibition against appointment under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution applicable only to positions in the Executive Department? b. Assuming that the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution also applies to members of the Judiciary, may such appointments be excepted because they are impressed with public interest or are demanded by the exigencies of public service, thereby justifying these appointments during the period of prohibition? c. Does the JBC have the authority to decide whether or not to include and submit the names of nominees who manifested interest to be nominated for the position of Chief Justice on the understanding that his/her nomination will be submitted to the next President in view of the prohibition against presidential appointments from March 11, 2010 until June 30, 2010? A. M. No. 10-2-5-SC a. Does Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution apply to appointments to positions in the Judiciary under Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution? b. May President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo make appointments to the Judiciary after March 10, 2010, including that for the position of Chief Justice after Chief Justice Puno retires on May 17, 2010? G.R. No. 191149

a. Does the JBC have the discretion to withhold the submission of the short list to President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo? G.R. No. 191342 a. Does the JBC have the authority to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent President without committing a grave violation of the Constitution and jurisprudence prohibiting the incumbent President from making midnight appointments two months immediately preceding the next presidential elections until the end of her term? b. Is any act performed by the JBC, including the vetting of the candidates for the position of Chief Justice, constitutionally invalid in view of the JBC's illegal composition allowing each member from the Senate and the House of Representatives to have one vote each? On February 16, 2010, the Court directed the JBC and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on the consolidated petitions, except that filed in G.R. No. 191342. On February 26, 2010, the JBC submitted its comment, reporting therein that the next stage of the process for the selection of the nominees for the position of Chief Justice would be the public interview of the candidates and the preparation of the short list of candidates, "including the interview of the constitutional experts, as may be needed." It stated:25 Likewise, the JBC has yet to take a position on when to submit the shortlist to the proper appointing authority, in light of Section 4 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution, which provides that vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within ninety (90) days from the occurrence thereof, Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution concerning the ban on Presidential appointments "two (2) months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term" and Section 261 (g), Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. 12. Since the Honorable Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the Constitution, the JBC will be guided by its decision in these consolidated Petitions and Administrative Matter. On February 26, 2010, the OSG also submitted its comment, essentially stating that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement by May 17, 2010. The OSG insists that: (a) a writ of prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution to recommend appointees in the Judiciary; (b) the JBC's function to recommend is a "continuing process," which does not begin with each vacancy or end with each nomination, because the goal is "to submit the list of nominees to Malacañang on the very day the vacancy arises"; the JBC was thus acting within its jurisdiction when it commenced and set in motion the process of selecting the nominees to be submitted to the President for the position of Chief Justice to be vacated by Chief Justice Puno; (c) petitioner Soriano's theory that it is the Supreme Court, not the President, who has the power to appoint the Chief Justice, is incorrect, and proceeds from his misinterpretation of the phrase "members of the Supreme Court" found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution as referring only to the Associate Justices, to the exclusion of the Chief Justice; (d) a writ of mandamus can issue to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the President, considering that its duty to prepare the list of at least three nominees is unqualified, and the submission of the list is a ministerial act that the JBC is mandated to perform under the Constitution; as such, the JBC, the nature of whose principal function is executive, is not vested with the power to resolve who has the authority to appoint the next Chief Justice and, therefore, has no discretion to withhold the list from the President; 29 and (e) a writ of mandamus cannot issue to compel the JBC to include or exclude particular candidates as nominees, considering that there is no imperative duty on its part to include in or exclude from the list particular individuals, but, on the contrary, the JBC's determination of who it nominates to the President is an exercise of a discretionary duty.30 The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition

under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; 31 that in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices, the framers neither mentioned nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments, or its effects on such period, or vice versa; that had the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution, which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations on the President's power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its independence from "political vicissitudes" and its "insulation from political pressures," such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court Justice. The OSG posits that although Valenzuela involved the appointment of RTC Judges, the situation now refers to the appointment of the next Chief Justice to which the prohibition does not apply; that, at any rate, Valenzuela even recognized that there might be "the imperative need for an appointment during the period of the ban," like when the membership of the Supreme Court should be "so reduced that it will have no quorum, or should the voting on a particular important question requiring expeditious resolution be divided";34c and that Valenzuela also recognized that the filling of vacancies in the Judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, most especially if there is any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the prohibition. Lastly, the OSG urges that there are now undeniably compelling reasons for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice, to wit: (a) a deluge of cases involving sensitive political issues is "quite expected";3 (b) the Court acts as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), which, sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President and Vice President and, as such, has "the power to correct manifest errors on the statement of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC)"; (c) if history has shown that during ordinary times the Chief Justice was appointed immediately upon the occurrence of the vacancy, from the time of the effectivity of the Constitution, there is now even more reason to appoint the next Chief Justice immediately upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno; and (d) should the next Chief Justice come from among the incumbent Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, thereby causing a vacancy, it also becomes incumbent upon the JBC to start the selection process for the filling up of the vacancy in accordance with the constitutional mandate.3 On March 9, 2010, the Court admitted the following comments/oppositions-in-intervention, to wit: (a) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Peter Irving Corvera (Corvera);40 (b) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 22, 2010 of Atty. Christian Robert S. Lim (Lim); (c) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 23, 2010 of Atty. Alfonso V. Tan, Jr. (Tan); (d) The comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 1, 2010 of the National Union of People's Lawyers (NUPL); (e) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Atty. Marlou B. Ubano (Ubano); (f) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 25, 2010 of Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesDavao del Sur Chapter and its Immediate Past President, Atty. Israelito P. Torreon (IBP- Davao del Sur); (g) The opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of Atty. Mitchell John L. Boiser (Boiser); (h)The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated February 26, 2010 of BAYAN Chairman Dr. Carolina P. Araullo; BAYAN Secretary General Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE) Chairman Ferdinand Gaite; Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY) Secretary General Gloria Arellano; Alyansa ng Nagkakaisang Kabataan ng Samayanan Para sa Kaunlaran (ANAKBAYAN) Chairman Ken Leonard Ramos; Tayo ang Pag-asa Convenor Alvin Peters; League of Filipino Students (LFS) Chairman James Mark Terry Lacuanan Ridon; National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) Chairman Einstein Recedes, College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEGP) Chairman Vijae Alquisola; and Student Christian Movement of the Philippines (SCMP) Chairman Ma. Cristina Angela Guevarra (BAYAN et al.); (i) The opposition-in-intervention dated March 3, 2010 of Walden F. Bello and Loretta Ann P.

Rosales (Bello et al.); and (j) The consolidated comment/opposition-in-intervention dated March 4, 2010 of the Women Trial Lawyers Organization of the Philippines (WTLOP), represented by Atty. Yolanda QuisumbingJavellana; Atty. Belleza Alojado Demaisip; Atty. Teresita Gandionco-Oledan; Atty. Ma. Verena Kasilag-Villanueva; Atty. Marilyn Sta. Romana; Atty. Leonila de Jesus; and Atty. Guinevere de Leon (WTLOP). Intervenors Tan, WTLOP, BAYAN et al., Corvera, IBP Davao del Sur, and NUPL take the position that De Castro's petition was bereft of any basis, because under Section 15, Article VII, the outgoing President is constitutionally banned from making any appointments from March 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010, including the appointment of the successor of Chief Justice Puno. Hence, mandamus does not lie to compel the JBC to submit the list of nominees to the outgoing President if the constitutional prohibition is already in effect. Tan adds that the prohibition against midnight appointments was applied by the Court to the appointments to the Judiciary made by then President Ramos, with the Court holding that the duty of the President to fill the vacancies within 90 days from occurrence of the vacancies (for the Supreme Court) or from the submission of the list (for all other courts) was not an excuse to violate the constitutional prohibition. Intervenors Tan, Ubano, Boiser, Corvera, NULP, BAYAN et al., and Bello et al. oppose the insistence that Valenzuela recognizes the possibility that the President may appoint the next Chief Justice if exigent circumstances warrant the appointment, because that recognition is obiter dictum; and aver that the absence of a Chief Justice or even an Associate Justice does not cause epic damage or absolute disruption or paralysis in the operations of the Judiciary. They insist that even without the successor of Chief Justice Puno being appointed by the incumbent President, the Court is allowed to sit and adjudge en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members at its discretion; that a full membership of the Court is not necessary; that petitioner De Castro's fears are unfounded and baseless, being based on a mere possibility, the occurrence of which is entirely unsure; that it is not in the national interest to have a Chief Justice whose appointment is unconstitutional and, therefore, void; and that such a situation will create a crisis in the judicial system and will worsen an already vulnerable political situation. ice is imperative for the stability of the judicial system and the political situation in the country when the election-related questions reach the Court as false, because there is an existing law on filling the void brought about by a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; that the law is Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, which has not been repealed by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or any other law; that a temporary or an acting Chief Justice is not anathema to judicial independence; that the designation of an acting Chief Justice is not only provided for by law, but is also dictated by practical necessity; that the practice was intended to be enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, but the Commissioners decided not to write it in the Constitution on account of the settled practice; that the practice was followed under the 1987 Constitution, when, in 1992, at the end of the term of Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan, Associate Justice Andres Narvasa assumed the position as Acting Chief Justice prior to his official appointment as Chief Justice; that said filling up of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice was acknowledged and even used by analogy in the case of the vacancy of the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, per Brillantes v. Yorac, 192 SCRA 358; and that the history of the Supreme Court has shown that this rule of succession has been repeatedly observed and has become a part of its tradition. Intervenors Ubano, Boiser, NUPL, Corvera, and Lim maintain that the Omnibus Election Code penalizes as an election offense the act of any government official who appoints, promotes, or gives any increase in salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or employee during the period of 45 days before a regular election; that the provision covers all appointing heads, officials, and officers of a government office, agency or instrumentality, including the President; that for the incumbent President to appoint the next Chief Justice upon the retirement of Chief Justice Puno, or during the period of the ban under the Omnibus Election Code, constitutes an election offense; that even an appointment of the next Chief Justice prior to the election ban is fundamentally invalid and without effect because there can be no appointment until a vacancy occurs; and that the vacancy for the position can occur only by May 17, 2010. Intervenor Boiser adds that De Castro's prayer to compel the submission of nominees by the JBC to the incumbent President is off-tangent because the position of Chief Justice is still not vacant; that to speak of a list, much more a submission of such list, before a vacancy occurs is glaringly premature; that the proposed advance appointment by the incumbent President of the next Chief Justice will be unconstitutional; and that no list of nominees can be submitted by the JBC if there is no vacancy.

All the intervenors-oppositors submit that Section 15, Article VII makes no distinction between the kinds of appointments made by the President; and that the Court, in Valenzuela, ruled that the appointments by the President of the two judges during the prohibition period were void. Intervenor WTLOP posits that Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply only to the appointments in the Executive Department, but also to judicial appointments, contrary to the submission of PHILCONSA; that Section 15 does not distinguish; and that Valenzuela already interpreted the prohibition as applicable to judicial appointments. Intervenor WTLOP further posits that petitioner Soriano's contention that the power to appoint the Chief Justice is vested, not in the President, but in the Supreme Court, is utterly baseless, because the Chief Justice is also a Member of the Supreme Court as contemplated under Section 9, Article VIII; and that, at any rate, the term "members" was interpreted in Vargas v. Rillaroza (G.R. No. L-1612, February 26, 1948) to refer to the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court; that PHILCONSA's prayer that the Court pass a resolution declaring that persons who manifest their interest as nominees, but with conditions, shall not be considered nominees by the JBC is diametrically opposed to the arguments in the body of its petition; that such glaring inconsistency between the allegations in the body and the relief prayed for highlights the lack of merit of PHILCONSA's petition; that the role of the JBC cannot be separated from the constitutional prohibition on the President; and that the Court must direct the JBC to follow the rule of law, that is, to submit the list of nominees only to the next duly elected President after the period of the constitutional ban against midnight appointments has expired. Oppositor IBP Davao del Sur opines that the JBC - because it is neither a judicial nor a quasi-judicial body has no duty under the Constitution to resolve the question of whether the incumbent President can appoint a Chief Justice during the period of prohibition; that even if the JBC has already come up with a short list, it still has to bow to the strict limitations under Section 15, Article VII; that should the JBC defer submission of the list, it is not arrogating unto itself a judicial function, but simply respecting the clear mandate of the Constitution; and that the application of the general rule in Section 15, Article VII to the Judiciary does not violate the principle of separation of powers, because said provision is an exception. Oppositors NUPL, Corvera, Lim and BAYAN et al. state that the JBC's act of nominating appointees to the Supreme Court is purely ministerial and does not involve the exercise of judgment; that there can be no default on the part of the JBC in submitting the list of nominees to the President, considering that the call for applications only begins from the occurrence of the vacancy in the Supreme Court; and that the commencement of the process of screening of applicants to fill the vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice only begins from the retirement on May 17, 2010, for, prior to this date, there is no definite legal basis for any party to claim that the submission or non-submission of the list of nominees to the President by the JBC is a matter of right under law. The main question presented in all the filings herein - because it involves two seemingly conflicting provisions of the Constitution - imperatively demands the attention and resolution of this Court, the only authority that can resolve the question definitively and finally. The imperative demand rests on the everpresent need, first, to safeguard the independence, reputation, and integrity of the entire Judiciary, particularly this Court, an institution that has been unnecessarily dragged into the harsh polemics brought on by the controversy; second, to settle once and for all the doubt about an outgoing President's power to appoint to the Judiciary within the long period starting two months before the presidential elections until the end of the presidential term; and third, to set a definite guideline for the JBC to follow in the discharge of its primary office of screening and nominating qualified persons for appointment to the Judiciary. Thus, we resolve.

petitioners due to the ever-present need to regulate the invocation of the intervention of the Court to correct any official action or policy in order to avoid obstructing the efficient functioning of public officials and offices involved in public service. It is required, therefore, that the petitioner must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, for, as indicated in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.:42cЃacЃaląw The question on legal standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."43cЃacЃaląw Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. It is true that as early as in 1937, in People v. Vera,45c the Court adopted the direct injury test for determining whether a petitioner in a public action had locus standi. There, the Court held that the person who would assail the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." Vera was followed in Custodio v. President of the Senate,46cЃacЃaląw Manila Race Horse Trainers' Association v. De la Fuente, Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix,48cЃacЃaląw and Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works.49cЃacЃaląw Yet, the Court has also held that the requirement of locus standi, being a mere procedural technicality, can be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. For instance, in 1949, in Araneta v. Dinglasan,50cЃacЃaląw the Court liberalized the approach when the cases had "transcendental importance." Some notable controversies whose petitioners did not pass the direct injury test were allowed to be treated in the same way as in Araneta v. Dinglasan.51cЃacЃaląw In the 1975 decision in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,52cЃacЃaląw this Court decided to resolve the issues raised by the petition due to their "far-reaching implications," even if the petitioner had no personality to file the suit. The liberal approach of Aquino v. Commission on Elections has been adopted in several notable cases, permitting ordinary citizens, legislators, and civic organizations to bring their suits involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations, and rulings.53cЃacЃaląw However, the assertion of a public right as a predicate for challenging a supposedly illegal or unconstitutional executive or legislative action rests on the theory that the petitioner represents the public in general. Although such petitioner may not be as adversely affected by the action complained against as are others, it is enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in his petition that he is entitled to protection or relief from the Court in the vindication of a public right. Quite often, as here, the petitioner in a public action sues as a citizen or taxpayer to gain locus standi. That is not surprising, for even if the issue may appear to concern only the public in general, such capacities nonetheless equip the petitioner with adequate interest to sue. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,54cЃacЃaląw the Court aptly explains why:

The preliminary issue to be settled is whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk,55cЃacЃaląw where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer's suit is in a different category from the plaintiff in a citizen's suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:56cЃacЃaląw "In matter of mere public right, howeverthe people are the real partiesIt is at least the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to taxpayer's suits, Terr v. Jordan57cЃacЃaląw held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."58cЃacЃaląw

Black defines locus standi as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question."41cЃacЃaląw In public or constitutional litigations, the Court is often burdened with the determination of the locus standi of the

Petitioners De Castro (G.R. No. 191002), Soriano (G.R. No. 191032) and Peralta (G.R. No. 191149) all assert their right as citizens filing their petitions on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue

Ruling of the Court Locus Standi of Petitioners

of the appointment of the next Chief Justice. De Castro and Soriano further claim standing as taxpayers, with Soriano averring that he is affected by the continuing proceedings in the JBC, which involve "unnecessary, if not, illegal disbursement of public funds."59cЃacЃaląw PHILCONSA alleges itself to be a non-stock, non-profit organization existing under the law for the purpose of defending, protecting, and preserving the Constitution and promoting its growth and flowering. It also alleges that the Court has recognized its legal standing to file cases on constitutional issues in several cases.60cЃacЃaląw In A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC, Mendoza states that he is a citizen of the Philippines, a member of the Philippine Bar engaged in the active practice of law, and a former Solicitor General, former Minister of Justice, former Member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular Batasang Pambansa, and former member of the Faculty of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines. The petitioners in G.R. No. 191342 are the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for Southern Luzon and Eastern Visayas. They allege that they have the legal standing to enjoin the submission of the list of nominees by the JBC to the President, for "[a]n adjudication of the proper interpretation and application of the constitutional ban on midnight appointments with regard to respondent JBC's function in submitting the list of nominees is well within the concern of petitioners, who are duty bound to ensure that obedience and respect for the Constitution is upheld, most especially by government offices, such as respondent JBC, who are specifically tasked to perform crucial functions in the whole scheme of our democratic institution." They further allege that, reposed in them as members of the Bar, is a clear legal interest in the process of selecting the members of the Supreme Court, and in the selection of the Chief Justice, considering that the person appointed becomes a member of the body that has constitutional supervision and authority over them and other members of the legal profession.61cЃacЃaląw The Court rules that the petitioners have each demonstrated adequate interest in the outcome of the controversy as to vest them with the requisite locus standi. The issues before us are of transcendental importance to the people as a whole, and to the petitioners in particular. Indeed, the issues affect everyone (including the petitioners), regardless of one's personal interest in life, because they concern that great doubt about the authority of the incumbent President to appoint not only the successor of the retiring incumbent Chief Justice, but also others who may serve in the Judiciary, which already suffers from a far too great number of vacancies in the ranks of trial judges throughout the country. chanroblesvirtua|awlibary In any event, the Court retains the broad discretion to waive the requirement of legal standing in favor of any petitioner when the matter involved has transcendental importance, or otherwise requires a liberalization of the requirement.62cЃacЃaląw Yet, if any doubt still lingers about the locus standi of any petitioner, we dispel the doubt now in order to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented herein. We are not to shirk from discharging our solemn duty by reason alone of an obstacle more technical than otherwise. In Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.,63cЃacЃaląw we pointed out: "Standing is a peculiar concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest." But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners "are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised."64cЃacЃaląw Justiciability Intervenor NUPL maintains that there is no actual case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for adjudication, considering that although the selection process commenced by the JBC is going on, there is yet no final list of nominees; hence, there is no imminent controversy as to whether such list must be submitted to the incumbent President, or reserved for submission to the incoming President. Intervenor Tan raises the lack of any actual justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial determination, pointing out that petitioner De Castro has not even shown that the JBC has already completed its selection process and is now ready to submit the list to the incumbent President; and that petitioner De Castro is merely presenting a hypothetical scenario that is clearly not sufficient for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review.

Intervenors Corvera and Lim separately opine that De Castro's petition rests on an overbroad and vague allegation of political tension, which is insufficient basis for the Court to exercise its power of judicial review. Intervenor BAYAN et al. contend that the petitioners are seeking a mere advisory opinion on what the JBC and the President should do, and are not invoking any issues that are justiciable in nature. Intervenors Bello et al. submit that there exist no conflict of legal rights and no assertion of opposite legal claims in any of the petitions; that PHILCONSA does not allege any action taken by the JBC, but simply avers that the conditional manifestations of two Members of the Court, accented by the divided opinions and interpretations of legal experts, or associations of lawyers and law students on the issues published in the daily newspapers are "matters of paramount and transcendental importance to the bench, bar and general public"; that PHILCONSA fails not only to cite any legal duty or allege any failure to perform the duty, but also to indicate what specific action should be done by the JBC; that Mendoza does not even attempt to portray the matter as a controversy or conflict of rights, but, instead, prays that the Court should "rule for the guidance of" the JBC; that the fact that the Court supervises the JBC does not automatically imply that the Court can rule on the issues presented in the Mendoza petition, because supervision involves oversight, which means that the subordinate officer or body must first act, and if such action is not in accordance with prescribed rules, then, and only then, may the person exercising oversight order the action to be redone to conform to the prescribed rules; that the Mendoza petition does not allege that the JBC has performed a specific act susceptible to correction for being illegal or unconstitutional; and that the Mendoza petition asks the Court to issue an advisory ruling, not to exercise its power of supervision to correct a wrong act by the JBC, but to declare the state of the law in the absence of an actual case or controversy. We hold that the petitions set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination, because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates, the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the "interview of constitutional experts, as may be needed.cra|aw" A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The ripeness of the controversy for judicial determination may not be doubted. The challenges to the authority of the JBC to open the process of nomination and to continue the process until the submission of the list of nominees; the insistence of some of the petitioners to compel the JBC through mandamus to submit the short list to the incumbent President; the counter-insistence of the intervenors to prohibit the JBC from submitting the short list to the incumbent President on the ground that said list should be submitted instead to the next President; the strong position that the incumbent President is already prohibited under Section 15, Article VII from making any appointments, including those to the Judiciary, starting on May 10, 2010 until June 30, 2010; and the contrary position that the incumbent President is not so prohibited are only some of the real issues for determination. All such issues establish the ripeness of the controversy, considering that for some the short list must be submitted before the vacancy actually occurs by May 17, 2010. The outcome will not be an abstraction, or a merely hypothetical exercise. The resolution of the controversy will surely settle - with finality - the nagging questions that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist from the rest of the process. We need not await the occurrence of the vacancy by May 17, 2010 in order for the principal issue to ripe for judicial determination by the Court. It is enough that one alleges conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but seemingly proscribed by the Constitution. A reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the perceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a basis for bringing a challenge,

provided the Court has sufficient facts before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.65cЃacЃaląw Herein, the facts are not in doubt, for only legal issues remain.

Substantive Merits I Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict. The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4. (1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. In the consolidated petitions, the petitioners, with the exception of Soriano, Tolentino and Inting, submit that the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement on May 17, 2010, on the ground that the prohibition against presidential appointments under Section 15, Article VII does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. The Court agrees with the submission. First. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. The Constitution consists of 18 Articles, three of which embody the allocation of the awesome powers of government among the three great departments, the Legislative (Article VI), the Executive (Article VII), and the Judicial Departments (Article VIII). The arrangement was a true recognition of the principle of separation of powers that underlies the political structure, as Constitutional Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna (later a worthy member of the Court) explained in his sponsorship speech: We have in the political part of this Constitution opted for the separation of powers in government because we believe that the only way to protect freedom and liberty is to separate and divide the awesome powers of government. Hence, we return to the separation of powers doctrine and the legislative, executive and judicial departments.66cЃacЃaląw As can be seen, Article VII is devoted to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Article. Article VIII is dedicated to the Judicial Department and defines the duties and qualifications of Members of the Supreme Court, among others. Section 4(1) and Section 9 of this Article are the provisions specifically providing for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices. In particular, Section 9 states that the appointment of Supreme Court Justices can only be made by the President upon the submission of a list of at least three nominees by the JBC; Section 4(1) of the Article mandates the President to fill the vacancy within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of

Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the President's or Acting President's term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. Although Valenzuela67cЃacЃaląw came to hold that the prohibition covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado of this Court, a former member of the Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should prevail. Relevantly, Valenzuela adverted to the intent of the framers in the genesis of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, viz: V. Intent of the Constitutional Commission The journal of the Commission which drew up the present Constitution discloses that the original proposal was to have an eleven-member Supreme Court. Commissioner Eulogio Lerum wanted to increase the number of Justices to fifteen. He also wished to ensure that that number would not be reduced for any appreciable length of time (even only temporarily), and to this end proposed that any vacancy "must be filled within two months from the date that the vacancy occurs." His proposal to have a 15-member Court was not initially adopted. Persisting however in his desire to make certain that the size of the Court would not be decreased for any substantial period as a result of vacancies, Lerum proposed the insertion in the provision (anent the Court's membership) of the same mandate that "IN CASE OF ANY VACANCY, THE SAME SHALL BE FILLED WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM OCCURRENCE THEREOF." He later agreed to suggestions to make the period three, instead of two, months. As thus amended, the proposal was approved. As it turned out, however, the Commission ultimately agreed on a fifteen-member Court. Thus it was that the section fixing the composition of the Supreme Court came to include a command to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence. In this connection, it may be pointed out that that instruction that any "vacancy shall be filled within ninety days" (in the last sentence of Section 4 (1) of Article VIII) contrasts with the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, which is couched in stronger negative language - that "a President or Acting President shall not make appointmentscra|aw" The commission later approved a proposal of Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (now a Member of this Court) to add to what is now Section 9 of Article VIII, the following paragraph: "WITH RESPECT TO LOWER COURTS, THE PRESIDENT SHALL ISSUE THE APPOINTMENT WITHIN NINETY DAYS FROM THE SUBMISSION OF THE LIST" (of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council to the President). Davide stated that his purpose was to provide a "uniform rule" for lower courts. According to him, the 90-day period should be counted from submission of the list of nominees to the President in view of the possibility that the President might reject the list submitted to him and the JBC thus need more time to submit a new one. On the other hand, Section 15, Article VII - which in effect deprives the President of his appointing power "two months immediately before the next presidential elections up to the end of his term" - was approved without discussion.68cЃacЃaląw However, the reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, upon the initiative of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum, "a command [to the President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence," which even Valenzuela conceded.69cЃacЃaląw The exchanges during deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on October 8, 1986 further show that the filling of a vacancy in the Supreme Court within the 90-day period was a true mandate for the President, viz: MR. DE CASTRO. I understand that our justices now in the Supreme Court, together with the Chief Justice, are only 11. MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.

MR. DE CASTRO. And the second sentence of this subsection reads: "Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.cra|aw" MR. CONCEPCION. That is right.

We reverse Valenzuela.

MR. DE CASTRO. Is this now a mandate to the executive to fill the vacancy? MR. CONCEPCION. That is right. That is borne out of the fact that in the past 30 years, seldom has the Court had a complete complement.70cЃacЃaląw

There is no question that one of the reasons underlying the adoption of Section 15 as part of Article VII was to eliminate midnight appointments from being made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the mold of the appointments dealt with in the leading case of Aytona v. Castillo.75cЃacЃaląw In fact, in Valenzuela, the Court so observed, stating that:

Second. Section 15, Article VII does not apply as well to all other appointments in the Judiciary.

Moreover, the usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the word shall - an imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced71cЃacЃaląw - should not be disregarded. Thereby, Sections 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the President to do so will be a clear disobedience to the Constitution.

xxx it appears that Section 15, Article VII is directed against two types of appointments: (1) those made for buying votes and (2) those made for partisan considerations. The first refers to those appointments made within the two months preceding a Presidential election and are similar to those which are declared election offenses in the Omnibus Election Code, viz.:

The 90-day limitation fixed in Section 4(1), Article VIII for the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court was undoubtedly a special provision to establish a definite mandate for the President as the appointing power, and cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was "couched in stronger negative language." Such interpretation even turned out to be conjectural, in light of the records of the Constitutional Commission's deliberations on Section 4 (1), Article VIII.

xxx The second type of appointments prohibited by Section 15, Article VII consists of the so-called "midnight" appointments. In Aytona v. Castillo, it was held that after the proclamation of Diosdado Macapagal as duly elected President, President Carlos P. Garcia, who was defeated in his bid for reelection, became no more than a "caretaker" administrator whose duty was to "prepare for the orderly transfer of authority to the incoming President." Said the Court:

How Valenzuela justified its pronouncement and result is hardly warranted. According to an authority on statutory construction:72cЃacЃaląw

"The filling up of vacancies in important positions, if few, and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of 350 appointments in one night and the planned induction of almost all of them in a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded by the latter as an abuse of Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby to deprive the new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.cra|aw"

xxx the court should seek to avoid any conflict in the provisions of the statute by endeavoring to harmonize and reconcile every part so that each shall be effective. It is not easy to draft a statute, or any other writing for that matter, which may not in some manner contain conflicting provisions. But what appears to the reader to be a conflict may not have seemed so to the drafter. Undoubtedly, each provision was inserted for a definite reason. Often by considering the enactment in its entirety, what appears to be on its face a conflict may be cleared up and the provisions reconciled. Consequently, that construction which will leave every word operative will be favored over one which leaves some word or provision meaningless because of inconsistency. But a word should not be given effect, if to do so gives the statute a meaning contrary to the intent of the legislature. On the other hand, if full effect cannot be given to the words of a statute, they must be made effective as far as possible. Nor should the provisions of a statute which are inconsistent be harmonized at a sacrifice of the legislative intention. It may be that two provisions are irreconcilable; if so, the one which expresses the intent of the law-makers should control. And the arbitrary rule has been frequently announced that where there is an irreconcilable conflict between the different provisions of a statute, the provision last in order of position will prevail, since it is the latest expression of the legislative will. Obviously, the rule is subject to deserved criticism. It is seldom applied, and probably then only where an irreconcilable conflict exists between different sections of the same act, and after all other means of ascertaining the meaning of the legislature have been exhausted. Where the conflict is between two statutes, more may be said in favor of the rule's application, largely because of the principle of implied repeal. In this connection, PHILCONSA's urging of a revisit and a review of Valenzuela is timely and appropriate. Valenzuela arbitrarily ignored the express intent of the Constitutional Commission to have Section 4 (1), Article VIII stand independently of any other provision, least of all one found in Article VII. It further ignored that the two provisions had no irreconcilable conflict, regardless of Section 15, Article VII being couched in the negative. As judges, we are not to unduly interpret, and should not accept an interpretation that defeats the intent of the framers.73cЃacЃaląw Consequently, prohibiting the incumbent President from appointing a Chief Justice on the premise that Section 15, Article VII extends to appointments in the Judiciary cannot be sustained. A misinterpretation like Valenzuela should not be allowed to last after its false premises have been exposed.74cЃacЃaląw It will not do to merely distinguish Valenzuela from these cases, for the result to be reached herein is entirely incompatible with what Valenzuela decreed. Consequently, Valenzuela now deserves to be quickly sent to the dustbin of the unworthy and forgettable.

As indicated, the Court recognized that there may well be appointments to important positions which have to be made even after the proclamation of the new President. Such appointments, so long as they are "few and so spaced as to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications," can be made by the outgoing President. Accordingly, several appointments made by President Garcia, which were shown to have been well considered, were upheld. Section 15, Article VII has a broader scope than the Aytona ruling. It may not unreasonably be deemed to contemplate not only "midnight" appointments - those made obviously for partisan reasons as shown by their number and the time of their making - but also appointments presumed made for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Presidential election. On the other hand, the exception in the same Section 15 of Article VII - allowing appointments to be made during the period of the ban therein provided - is much narrower than that recognized in Aytona. The exception allows only the making of temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. Obviously, the article greatly restricts the appointing power of the President during the period of the ban. Considering the respective reasons for the time frames for filling vacancies in the courts and the restriction on the President's power of appointment, it is this Court's view that, as a general proposition, in case of conflict, the former should yield to the latter. Surely, the prevention of vote-buying and similar evils outweighs the need for avoiding delays in filling up of court vacancies or the disposition of some cases. Temporary vacancies can abide the period of the ban which, incidentally and as earlier pointed out, comes to exist only once in every six years. Moreover, those occurring in the lower courts can be filled temporarily by designation. But prohibited appointments are long-lasting and permanent in their effects. They may, as earlier pointed out, in fact influence the results of elections and, for that reason, their making is considered an election offense.76cЃacЃaląw Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII, we have no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. The

framers did not need to extend the prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary, because their establishment of the JBC and their subjecting the nomination and screening of candidates for judicial positions to the unhurried and deliberate prior process of the JBC ensured that there would no longer be midnight appointments to the Judiciary. If midnight appointments in the mold of Aytona were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship,77cЃacЃaląw the appointments to the Judiciary made after the establishment of the JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the JBC's prior processing of candidates. Indeed, it is axiomatic in statutory construction that the ascertainment of the purpose of the enactment is a step in the process of ascertaining the intent or meaning of the enactment, because the reason for the enactment must necessarily shed considerable light on "the law of the statute," i.e., the intent; hence, the enactment should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose, and the court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it.78cЃacЃaląw Also, the intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential election, or of satisfying partisan considerations. The experience from the time of the establishment of the JBC shows that even candidates for judicial positions at any level backed by people influential with the President could not always be assured of being recommended for the consideration of the President, because they first had to undergo the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing away with the intervention of the Commission on Appointments. This insulating process was absent from the Aytona midnight appointment. Third. As earlier stated, the non-applicability of Section 15, Article VII to appointments in the Judiciary was confirmed by then Senior Associate Justice Regalado to the JBC itself when it met on March 9, 1998 to discuss the question raised by some sectors about the "constitutionality of xxx appointments" to the Court of Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential elections. He assured that "on the basis of the (Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of Appeals."79cЃacЃaląw This confirmation was accepted by the JBC, which then submitted to the President for consideration the nominations for the eight vacancies in the Court of Appeals.80cЃacЃaląw The fault of Valenzuela was that it accorded no weight and due consideration to the confirmation of Justice Regalado. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Much of the unfounded doubt about the President's power to appoint during the period of prohibition in Section 15, Article VII could have been dispelled since its promulgation on November 9, 1998, had Valenzuela properly acknowledged and relied on the confirmation of a distinguished member of the Constitutional Commission like Justice Regalado. Fourth. Of the 23 sections in Article VII, three (i.e., Section 14, Section15, and Section 16) concern the appointing powers of the President. Section 14 speaks of the power of the succeeding President to revoke appointments made by an Acting President,81cЃacЃaląw and evidently refers only to appointments in the Executive Department. It has no application to appointments in the Judiciary, because temporary or acting appointments can only undermine the independence of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will.82cЃacЃaląw The letter and spirit of the Constitution safeguard that independence. Also, there is no law in the books that authorizes the revocation of appointments in the Judiciary. Prior to their mandatory retirement or resignation, judges of the first and second level courts and the Justices of the third level courts may only be removed for cause, but the Members of the Supreme Court may be removed only by impeachment. Section 16 covers only the presidential appointments that require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Thereby, the Constitutional Commission restored the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments after the requirement was removed from the 1973 Constitution. Yet, because of Section 9 of Article VIII, the restored requirement did not include appointments to the Judiciary.83cЃacЃaląw Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14 and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the

general intent of the whole enactment.84cЃacЃaląw It is absurd to assume that the framers deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof. Fifth. To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative Departments. Such a holding will tie the Judiciary and the Supreme Court to the fortunes or misfortunes of political leaders vying for the Presidency in a presidential election. Consequently, the wisdom of having the new President, instead of the current incumbent President, appoint the next Chief Justice is itself suspect, and cannot ensure judicial independence, because the appointee can also become beholden to the appointing authority. In contrast, the appointment by the incumbent President does not run the same risk of compromising judicial independence, precisely because her term will end by June 30, 2010. Sixth. The argument has been raised to the effect that there will be no need for the incumbent President to appoint during the prohibition period the successor of Chief Justice Puno within the context of Section 4 (1), Article VIII, because anyway there will still be about 45 days of the 90 days mandated in Section 4(1), Article VIII remaining. The argument is flawed, because it is focused only on the coming vacancy occurring from Chief Justice Puno's retirement by May 17, 2010. It ignores the need to apply Section 4(1) to every situation of a vacancy in the Supreme Court. The argument also rests on the fallacious assumption that there will still be time remaining in the 90-day period under Section 4(1), Article VIII. The fallacy is easily demonstrable, as the OSG has shown in its comment. Section 4 (3), Article VII requires the regular elections to be held on the second Monday of May, letting the elections fall on May 8, at the earliest, or May 14, at the latest. If the regular presidential elections are held on May 8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such elections are held on May 14, the period of the prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-day period to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court. The result is that there are at least 19 occasions (i.e., the difference between the shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days and the 90-day mandatory period for appointments) in which the outgoing President would be in no position to comply with the constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the framers of the Constitution could not have intended such an absurdity. In fact, in their deliberations on the mandatory period for the appointment of Supreme Court Justices under Section 4 (1), Article VIII, the framers neither discussed, nor mentioned, nor referred to the ban against midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII, or its effects on the 90day period, or vice versa. They did not need to, because they never intended Section 15, Article VII to apply to a vacancy in the Supreme Court, or in any of the lower courts. Seventh. As a matter of fact, in an extreme case, we can even raise a doubt on whether a JBC list is necessary at all for the President - any President - to appoint a Chief Justice if the appointee is to come from the ranks of the sitting justices of the Supreme Court. Sec. 9, Article VIII says: xxx. The Members of the Supreme Court xxx shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for any vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. xxx The provision clearly refers to an appointee coming into the Supreme Court from the outside, that is, a nonmember of the Court aspiring to become one. It speaks of candidates for the Supreme Court, not of those who are already members or sitting justices of the Court, all of whom have previously been vetted by the JBC. Can the President, therefore, appoint any of the incumbent Justices of the Court as Chief Justice? The question is not squarely before us at the moment, but it should lend itself to a deeper analysis if and when circumstances permit. It should be a good issue for the proposed Constitutional Convention to consider

in the light of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile's statement that the President can appoint the Chief Justice from among the sitting justices of the Court even without a JBC list. II The Judiciary Act of 1948 The posture has been taken that no urgency exists for the President to appoint the successor of Chief Justice Puno, considering that the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the situation of having the next President appoint the successor. Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 states: Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. - In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of Chief Justice. The provision calls for an Acting Chief Justice in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Chief Justice, or in the event that the Chief Justice is unable to perform his duties and powers. In either of such circumstances, the duties and powers of the office of the Chief Justice shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in precedence until a new Chief Justice is appointed or until the disability is removed. Notwithstanding that there is no pressing need to dwell on this peripheral matter after the Court has hereby resolved the question of consequence, we do not find it amiss to confront the matter now. We cannot agree with the posture. A review of Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII shows that the Supreme Court is composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices, who all shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC for every vacancy, which appointments require no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. With reference to the Chief Justice, he or she is appointed by the President as Chief Justice, and the appointment is never in an acting capacity. The express reference to a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court. Otherwise, they would have simply written so in the Constitution. Consequently, to rely on Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 in order to forestall the imperative need to appoint the next Chief Justice soonest is to defy the plain intent of the Constitution. For sure, the framers intended the position of Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary capacity. In relation to the scheme of things under the present Constitution, Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 only responds to a rare situation in which the new Chief Justice is not yet appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief Justice is unable to perform the duties and powers of the office. It ought to be remembered, however, that it was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the confirmation process might take longer than expected. The appointment of the next Chief Justice by the incumbent President is preferable to having the Associate Justice who is first in precedence take over. Under the Constitution, the heads of the Legislative and Executive Departments are popularly elected, and whoever are elected and proclaimed at once become the leaders of their respective Departments. However, the lack of any appointed occupant of the office of Chief Justice harms the independence of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is the head of the entire Judiciary. The Chief Justice performs functions absolutely significant to the life of the nation. With the entire Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of the Tribunal. There being no obstacle to the appointment of the next Chief Justice, aside from its being mandatory for the incumbent President to make within the 90-day period from May 17, 2010, there is no justification to insist that the successor of Chief Justice Puno be appointed by the next President. Historically, under the present Constitution, there has been no wide gap between the retirement and the resignation of an incumbent Chief Justice, on one hand, and the appointment to and assumption of office of his successor, on the other hand. As summarized in the comment of the OSG, the chronology of succession

is as follows: 1. When Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee retired on April 18, 1988, Chief Justice Pedro Yap was appointed on the same day; 2. When Chief Justice Yap retired on July 1, 1988, Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan was appointed on the same day; 3. When Chief Justice Fernan resigned on December 7, 1991, Chief Justice Andres Narvasa was appointed the following day, December 8, 1991; 4. When Chief Justice Narvasa retired on November 29, 1998, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. was sworn into office the following early morning of November 30, 1998; 5. When Chief Justice Davide retired on December 19, 2005, Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban was appointed the next day, December 20, 2005; and 6. When Chief Justice Panganiban retired on December 6, 2006, Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno took his oath as Chief Justice at midnight of December 6, 2006.85cЃacЃaląw III Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC May the JBC be compelled to submit the list of nominees to the President? Mandamus shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station.86cЃacЃaląw It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a particular way.87cЃacЃaląw For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary: Section 8. xxx (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. xxx Section 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list. However, Section 4(1) and Section 9, Article VIII, mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the submission of the list, in the case of the lower courts. The 90-day period is directed at the President, not at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the process of selecting the candidates to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court before the occurrence of the vacancy. Under the Constitution, it is mandatory for the JBC to submit to the President the list of nominees to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court in order to enable the President to appoint one of them within the 90-day period from the occurrence of the vacancy. The JBC has no discretion to submit the list to the President after the vacancy occurs, because that shortens the 90-day period allowed by the Constitution for the President to make the appointment. For the JBC to do so will be unconscionable on its part, considering that it will thereby effectively and illegally deprive the President of the ample time granted under the Constitution to reflect on the qualifications of the nominees named in the list of the JBC before making the appointment. The duty of the JBC to submit a list of nominees before the start of the President's mandatory 90-day period to appoint is ministerial, but its selection of the candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to

the President lies within the discretion of the JBC. The object of the petitions for mandamus herein should only refer to the duty to submit to the President the list of nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, because in order to constitute unlawful neglect of duty, there must be an unjustified delay in performing that duty.88cЃacЃaląw For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore, there should be an unexplained delay on its part in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that is, in submitting the list to the President. The distinction between a ministerial act and a discretionary one has been delineated in the following manner: The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.89cЃacЃaląw Accordingly, we find no sufficient grounds to grant the petitions for mandamus and to issue a writ of mandamus against the JBC. The actions for that purpose are premature, because it is clear that the JBC still has until May 17, 2010, at the latest, within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno. IV Writ of prohibition does not lie against the JBC In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the conclusion is ineluctable that only the President can appoint the Chief Justice. Hence, Soriano's petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032, which proposes to prevent the JBC from intervening in the process of nominating the successor of Chief Justice Puno, lacks merit. On the other hand, the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 191342 is similarly devoid of merit. The challenge mounted against the composition of the JBC based on the allegedly unconstitutional allocation of a vote each to the ex officio members from the Senate and the House of Representatives, thereby prejudicing the chances of some candidates for nomination by raising the minimum number of votes required in accordance with the rules of the JBC, is not based on the petitioners' actual interest, because they have not alleged in their petition that they were nominated to the JBC to fill some vacancies in the Judiciary. Thus, the petitioners lack locus standi on that issue. WHEREFORE, the Court: 1. Dismisses the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. No. 191002 and G.R. No. 191149, and the petition for mandamus in G.R. No. 191057 for being premature; 2. Dismisses the petitions for prohibition in G.R. No. 191032 and G.R. No. 191342 for lack of merit; and 3. Grants the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC and, accordingly, directs the Judicial and Bar Council: (a) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010; (b) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice; (c) To submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on or before May 17, 2010; and (d) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED

QUO WARRANTO [G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]

PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents. DECISION PUNO, J.: Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court granting his petition for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits. Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port Security Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988. On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as "Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office. On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X, Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive the salary and benefits of the position of Director III. In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario, informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads: "Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government benefits due [him]." Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau of Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza." Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made. On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and other benefits appurtenant thereto. Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion, petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996. On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24, 1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo warranto petition. Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning the order of the trial court.

On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence, this recourse. Petitioner claims that: "The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued, considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject position The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority from the state. In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. The action may be commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal against individuals who usurp a public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated. The action may also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office. If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows: "Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires." If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully holding the same, the court may order: (1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office; (2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator; (3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires. The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of the court and on the relief sought. In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief: "WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto. Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for." In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that: "WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition for quo warranto by: 1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and 2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated." The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs

Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until reinstated." The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his successor-in-interest. Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim. In the case at bar, the petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying execution of the trial court's decision. Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's decision. Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo warranto. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41801 is affirmed. SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 168696 February 28, 2006 MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR., JADELSON PETER P. CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES and PERFECTO NIXON C. TABORA, Petitioners, vs. JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY, AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and MA. THELNA P. MALLARI, Respondents. DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,

Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005. The antecedent facts are as follows. On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents. On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However, the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to another administrative jurisdiction. The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of (1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then required to submit their respective memoranda. On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: It is undisputed that the plaintiffs’ cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred ["]to the Court of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the "Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases." Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated authority, promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December 2000 designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was designated as "special court" (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC). Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that "all SEC cases originally assigned or transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001. From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction "to try and decide these cases to the "special courts" created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . . Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-corporate dispute. In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to the

Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order 8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799. The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled. For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court of competent jurisdiction to rule upon. SO ORDERED. 2 Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition raises the following issues: I WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION II WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, 2005. 3 In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that "all decisions and final orders in cases falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court;" and (3) the petition was intended merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court, said court granted petitioners’ motion to hold the proceedings in view of the present petition pending before this Court. Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that on January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated at P400,000.00. The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13, 2005. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals from judgments or final orders.4 The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein petitioners’ prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of respondents’ case against them. As a consequence of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court that had been designated as a special court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the order was merely interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a petition under Rule 45. As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, 5 to wit: In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the well-settled rule that: . . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary course of

law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.6 It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,7 the Court proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein, stating thus: While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the parties.8 In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the parties to resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners’ technical lapse of filing a petition for review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court. Thus, the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits. It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-corporate controversy.9 Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting Justice Jose Y. Feria’s view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals 10 that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated," while "[a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended)."11 However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows: 5.2. The Commission’s jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court: Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. Xxx Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus: Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against (a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise; xxxx As explained in the Unilongo12 case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the phrase "or an office in a corporation created by authority of law" which was found in the old Rules. Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated. The Interim Rules provide thus:

Section 1. (a) Cases covered. – These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases involving the following: xxxx (2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between and among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; (3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations; xxxx SEC. 5. Venue. – All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association concerned. xxx (Emphasis ours) Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC (effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit: Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides that: 1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July 2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission; xxxx 4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours) The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-1103-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto filed by herein Respondents. Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents’ petition for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners’ Association,13 the Court held that the trial court, having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.

Note, further, that respondents’ petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions shall be filed in the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court. Since the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost two years by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why respondents were not aware of the appropriate court where their petition should be filed. The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to order the transfer of respondents’ petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious because as of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, which had no jurisdiction over those kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous. WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled "Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al." is ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED

EN BANC G.R. Nos. 179431-32 June 22, 2010 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., as the second nominee of CITIZENS BATTLE AGAINST CORRUPTION (CIBAC), Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 180443 LUIS K. LOKIN, JR., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, CINCHONA C. GONZALES and ARMI JANE R. BORJE, Respondents. DECISION BERSAMIN, J.: The principal question posed in these consolidated special civil actions for certiorari and mandamus is whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) can issue implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) that

provide a ground for the substitution of a party-list nominee not written in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941,1 otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, the law that the COMELEC thereby implements. Common Antecedents The Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections. Together with its manifestation of intent to participate,2 CIBAC, through its president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007,3 were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. CruzGonzales; (4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees’ certificates of acceptance were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star News4 (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.5 Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated May 7, 2007,6 whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje. Following the close of the polls, or on June 20, 2007, Villanueva sent a letter to COMELEC Chairperson Benjamin Abalos,7 transmitting therewith the signed petitions of more than 81% of the CIBAC members, in order to confirm the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje. In their petitions, the members of CIBAC averred that Lokin and Tugna were not among the nominees presented and proclaimed by CIBAC in its proclamation rally held in May 2007; and that Galang had signified his desire to focus on his family life. On June 26, 2007, CIBAC, supposedly through its counsel, filed with the COMELEC en banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers a motion seeking the proclamation of Lokin as its second nominee.8 The right of CIBAC to a second seat as well as the right of Lokin to be thus proclaimed were purportedly based on Party-List Canvass Report No. 26, which showed CIBAC to have garnered a grand total of 744,674 votes. Using all relevant formulas, the motion asserted that CIBAC was clearly entitled to a second seat and Lokin to a proclamation.

With the formal declaration that CIBAC was entitled to an additional seat, Ricardo de los Santos, purportedly as secretary general of CIBAC, informed Roberto P. Nazareno, Secretary General of the House of Representatives, of the promulgation of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 and requested that Lokin be formally sworn in by Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr. to enable him to assume office. Nazareno replied, however, that the request of Delos Santos could not be granted because COMELEC Law Director Alioden D. Dalaig had notified him of the pendency of E.M. 07-054. On September 14, 2007, the COMELEC en banc resolved E.M. No. 07-05413 thuswise: WHEREFORE, considering the above discussion, the Commission hereby approves the withdrawal of the nomination of Atty. Luis K. Lokin, Sherwin N. Tugna and Emil Galang as second, third and fourth nominees respectively and the substitution thereby with Atty. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Atty. Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee for the party list CIBAC. The new order of CIBAC's nominees therefore shall be: 1. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva 2. Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales 3. Armi Jane R. Borje SO ORDERED. The COMELEC en banc explained that the actions of Villanueva in his capacity as the president of CIBAC were presumed to be within the scope of his authority as such; that the president was charged by Section 1 of Article IV of the CIBAC By-Laws to oversee and direct the corporate activities, which included the act of submitting the party's manifestation of intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections as well as its certificate of nominees; that from all indications, Villanueva as the president of CIBAC had always been provided the leeway to act as the party's representative and that his actions had always been considered as valid; that the act of withdrawal, although done without any written Board approval, was accomplished with the Board’s acquiescence or at least understanding; and that the intent of the party should be given paramount consideration in the selection of the nominees. As a result, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC.14 Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC on September 17, 2007.15

The motion was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales. Notwithstanding Villanueva’s filing of the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees and the petitions of more than 81% of CIBAC members, the COMELEC failed to act on the matter, prompting Villanueva to file a petition to confirm the certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC on June 28, 2007.9 On July 6, 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8219,10 whereby it resolved to set the matter pertaining to the validity of the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution of Borje for proper disposition and hearing. The case was docketed as E.M. No. 07-054. In the meantime, the COMELEC en banc, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, issued National Board of Canvassers (NBC) Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 200711 to partially proclaim the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System as having won in the May 14, 2007 elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong, Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives, Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms, Inc., Akbayan! Citizen's Action Party, Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party, Cooperative-Natco Network Party, Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns and Abono; and to defer the proclamation of the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until final resolution of their respective cases. The COMELEC en banc issued another resolution, NBC Resolution No. 07-72 dated July 18, 2007,12 proclaiming Buhay Hayaan Yumabong as entitled to 2 additional seats and Bayan Muna, CIBAC, Gabriela Women's Party, and Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives to an additional seat each; and holding in abeyance the proclamation of the nominees of said parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes until the final resolution of their respective cases.

Precís of the Consolidated Cases In G.R. No. 179431 and G.R. No. 179432, Lokin seeks through mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. In G.R. No. 180443, Lokin assails Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 promulgated on January 12, 2007;16 and the resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E.M. No. 07-054 (approving CIBAC’s withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang as CIBAC’s second, third and fourth nominees, respectively, and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales and Borje in their stead, based on the right of CIBAC to change its nominees under Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804).17 He alleges that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.18 the law that the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement. In its comment, the COMELEC asserts that a petition for certiorari is an inappropriate recourse in law due to the proclamation of Cruz-Gonzales as Representative and her assumption of that office; that Lokin’s proper recourse was an electoral protest filed in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); and that, therefore, the Court has no jurisdiction over the matter being raised by Lokin. For its part, CIBAC posits that Lokin is guilty of forum shopping for filing a petition for mandamus and a petition for certiorari, considering that both petitions ultimately seek to have him proclaimed as the second nominee of CIBAC. Issues The issues are the following:

(a) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy; (b) Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping; (c) Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the PartyList System Act; and (d) Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature. Ruling The petitions are granted. A The Court has jurisdiction over the case The COMELEC posits that once the proclamation of the winning party-list organization has been done and its nominee has assumed office, any question relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the candidates to the House of Representatives falls under the jurisdiction of the HRET pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Lokin should raise the question he poses herein either in an election protest or in a special civil action for quo warranto in the HRET, not in a special civil action for certiorari in this Court.

action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Thus, forum shopping may arise: (a) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorable decision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another; or (b) if, after having filed a petition in the Supreme Court, a party files another petition in the Court of Appeals, because he thereby deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even as one case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering a similar remedy) would still be open"; or (c) where a party attempts to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction from a court after failing to obtain the writ from another court.19 What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused to the courts and the litigants by a party who accesses different courts and administrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes or to grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issue.20 The filing of identical petitions in different courts is prohibited, because such act constitutes forum shopping, a malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling with the courts and as abusing their processes. Forum shopping is an improper conduct that degrades the administration of justice.21 Nonetheless, the mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances.22 The actions must also raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues.23 Elsewise stated, forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.24

An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the preceding elections.

Lokin has filed the petition for mandamus to compel the COMELEC to proclaim him as the second nominee of CIBAC upon the issuance of NBC Resolution No. 07-72 (announcing CIBAC’s entitlement to an additional seat in the House of Representatives), and to strike down the provision in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 and NBC Resolution No. 07-72 holding in abeyance "all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases." He has insisted that the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to proclaim him due to his being CIBAC’s second nominee; and that the COMELEC had no authority to exercise discretion and to suspend or defer the proclamation of winning party-list organizations with pending disputes.

A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.

On the other hand, Lokin has resorted to the petition for certiorari to assail the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC (approving the withdrawal of the nomination of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and the substitution by Cruz-Gonzales as the second nominee and Borje as the third nominee); and to challenge the validity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804, the COMELEC’s basis for allowing CIBAC’s withdrawal of Lokin’s nomination.

The controversy involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC. Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokin’s case is not one in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie, considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of CruzGonzales to the Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her.

Applying the test for forum shopping, the consecutive filing of the action for certiorari and the action for mandamus did not violate the rule against forum shopping even if the actions involved the same parties, because they were based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different.

We do not agree.

Lokin has correctly brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days. Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokin’s petitions for certiorari and for mandamus against the COMELEC. B Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of

C Invalidity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 The legislative power of the Government is vested exclusively in the Legislature in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. As a general rule, the Legislature cannot surrender or abdicate its legislative power, for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the Legislature to any other authority, a power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.25 Under certain circumstances, the Legislature can delegate to executive officers and administrative boards the authority to adopt and promulgate IRRs. To render such delegation lawful, the Legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles that are to control in given cases. The Legislature should set a definite or primary standard to guide those empowered to execute the law. For as long as the policy is laid down and a proper standard is established by statute, there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power when the Legislature leaves to selected instrumentalities the duty of making subordinate rules within the prescribed limits, although there is conferred upon the executive officer or administrative board a large measure of discretion. There is a distinction between the delegation of power to make a law and the conferment of an authority or a discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law, for the power to make laws necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be.26

The authority to make IRRs in order to carry out an express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law. The power of administrative agencies is confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Corollary to this is that administrative regulation cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Indeed, administrative or executive acts shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.27

ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the law, from which the courts must not depart.34 When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.35 Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.36 The legislative intent to deprive the party-list organization of the right to change the nominees or to alter the order of the nominees was also expressed during the deliberations of the Congress, viz:

28

To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the following requisites to be valid: 1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature; 2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature; 3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and 4. It must be reasonable.

The COMELEC is constitutionally mandated to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, a plebiscite, an initiative, a referendum, and a recall.29 In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the COMELEC is also charged to promulgate IRRs implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws that the COMELEC enforces and administers.30 The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, and the Party-List System Act.31 Hence, the COMELEC met the first requisite. The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself. Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds. As earlier said, the delegated authority must be properly exercised. This simply means that the resulting IRRs must not be ultra vires as to be issued beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It is basic that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress,32 for administrative IRRs are solely intended to carry out, not to supplant or to modify, the law. The administrative agency issuing the IRRs may not enlarge, alter, or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces, and cannot engraft additional noncontradictory requirements not contemplated by the Legislature.33 Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 reads: Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-Each registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later that forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. The provision is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally because its language is plain and free from

MR. LAGMAN: And again on Section 5, on the nomination of party list representatives, I do not see any provision here which prohibits or for that matter allows the nominating party to change the nominees or to alter the order of prioritization of names of nominees. Is the implication correct that at any time after submission the names could still be changed or the listing altered? MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, that is a good issue brought out by the distinguished Gentleman from Albay and perhaps a perfecting amendment may be introduced therein. The sponsoring committee will gladly consider the same. MR. LAGMAN: In other words, what I would like to see is that after the list is submitted to the COMELEC officially, no more changes should be made in the names or in the order of listing. MR. ABUEG: Mr. Speaker, there may be a situation wherein the name of a particular nominee has been submitted to the Commission on Elections but before election day the nominee changed his political party affiliation. The nominee is therefore no longer qualified to be included in the party list and the political party has a perfect right to change the name of that nominee who changed his political party affiliation. MR. LAGMAN: Yes of course. In that particular case, the change can be effected but will be the exception rather than the rule. Another exception most probably is the nominee dies, then there has to be a change but any change for that matter should always be at the last part of the list so that the prioritization made by the party will not be adversely affected.37 The usage of "No" in Section 8 – "No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list" – renders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but one way to obey the command "thou shall not," and that is to completely refrain from doing the forbidden act,38 subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case. Section 8 does not unduly deprive the party-list organization of its right to choose its nominees, but merely divests it of the right to change its nominees or to alter the order in the list of its nominees’ names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. The prohibition is not arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast, allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees circumvents the voters’ demand for transparency. The lawmakers’ exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.

D Exceptions in Section 8 of R.A. 7941 are exclusive Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the nominee becomes incapacitated. The enumeration is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions. When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with reason and justice.391avvphi1 The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted construction. E Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 states: Section 13. Substitution of nominees. – A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list of nominees. No substitution shall be allowed by reason of withdrawal after the polls. Unlike Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, the foregoing regulation provides four instances, the fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party." Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee. We agree with Lokin. The COMELEC, despite its role as the implementing arm of the Government in the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,40 has neither the authority nor the license to expand, extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law. It is basic that the IRRs should remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out.41 Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law’s general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.42 The COMELEC explains that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 has added nothing to Section 8 of R.A. No.

7941,43 because it has merely reworded and rephrased the statutory provision’s phraseology. The explanation does not persuade. To reword means to alter the wording of or to restate in other words; to rephrase is to phrase anew or in a new form.44 Both terms signify that the meaning of the original word or phrase is not altered. However, the COMELEC did not merely reword or rephrase the text of Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941, because it established an entirely new ground not found in the text of the provision. The new ground granted to the party-list organization the unilateral right to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC, which Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 did not allow to be done. Neither was the grant of the unilateral right contemplated by the drafters of the law, who precisely denied the right to withdraw the nomination (as the quoted record of the deliberations of the House of Representatives has indicated). The grant thus conflicted with the statutory intent to save the nominee from falling under the whim of the party-list organization once his name has been submitted to the COMELEC, and to spare the electorate from the capriciousness of the party-list organizations. We further note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives. The insertion of the new ground was invalid. An axiom in administrative law postulates that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be struck down.45 F Effect of partial nullity of Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law.46 In case of conflict between the law and the IRR, the law prevails. There can be no question that an IRR or any of its parts not adopted pursuant to the law is no law at all and has neither the force nor the effect of law.47 The invalid rule, regulation, or part thereof cannot be a valid source of any right, obligation, or power. Considering that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 – to the extent that it allows the party-list organization to withdraw its nomination already submitted to the COMELEC – was invalid, CIBAC’s withdrawal of its nomination of Lokin and the others and its substitution of them with new nominees were also invalid and ineffectual. It is clear enough that any substitution of Lokin and the others could only be for any of the grounds expressly stated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941. Resultantly, the COMELEC’s approval of CIBAC’s petition of withdrawal of the nominations and its recognition of CIBAC’s substitution, both through its assailed September 14, 2007 resolution, should be struck down for lack of legal basis. Thereby, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction, having relied on the invalidly issued Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 to support its action. WHEREFORE, we grant the petitions for certiorari and mandamus. We declare Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a partylist organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the Commission on Elections. Accordingly, we annul and set aside: (a) The resolution dated September 14, 2007 issued in E. M. No. 07-054 approving Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption’s withdrawal of the nominations of Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Sherwin N. Tugna, and Emil Galang as its second, third, and fourth nominees, respectively, and ordering their substitution by Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as second nominee and Armi Jane R. Borje as third nominee; and (b) The proclamation by the Commission on Elections of Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales as a Party-

List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives. We order the Commission on Elections to forthwith proclaim petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr. as a Party-List Representative representing Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption in the House of Representatives. We make no pronouncements on costs of suit. SO ORDERED

EXPROPRIATION G.R. No. 142304 June 20, 2001 CITY OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. OSCAR, FELICITAS, JOSE, BENJAMIN, ESTELITA, LEONORA AND ADELAIDA, ALL SURNAMED SERRANO, respondents. Mendoza, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated November 16, 1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000, of the Court of Appeals reversing the order, dated December 15, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila and perpetually enjoining it from proceeding with the petitioner's complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282. The facts are as follows: On December 21, 1993, the City Council of Manila enacted the Ordinance No. 7833, authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila 's First District in Tondo, covered by TCT Nos. 70869, 105201, 105202, and 138273 of the Register of Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold and distributed to qualified occupants pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of Manila. One of the properties sought to be expropriated, denominated as Lot 1-C, consists of 343.10 square meters. It is covered by TCT No. 138272 which was derived from TCT No. 70869 issued in the name of Feliza De Guia.1 After her death, the estate of Feliza De Guia was settled among her heirs by virtue of a compromise agreement, which was duly approved by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Manila in its decision, dated May 8, 1986.2 In 1989, Alberto De Guia, one of the heirs of Feliza De Guia, died, as a result of which his estate, consisting of his share in the properties left by his mother, was partitioned among his heirs. Lot 1-C

was assigned to Edgardo De Guia, one of the heirs of Alberto De Guia.3 On April 15, 1994, Edgardo De Guia was issued TCT No. 215593, covering Lot 1-C.4 On July 29, 1994, the said property was transferred to Lee Kuan Hui, in whose name TCT No. 217018 was issued.5 The property was subsequently sold on January 24,1996 to Demetria De Guia to whom TCT No. 226048 was issued.6 On September 26, 1997, petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 70869 (including Lot 1-C), 105201, 105202 and 138273, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed are Serrano.7 On November 12, 1997, respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot l-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot l-C would result in their disclosure, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot l-C exempt from expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048,8 regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282. for eminent domain filed by petitioner.9 Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to deposit the amount of Pl,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties.10 After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner.ll Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of Lot l-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof, landless; that Lot l-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriations; that respondents would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot l-C which consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters.12 On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot l-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§910 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and accordingly GRANTED. The Order, dated December 15, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration issued by the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 94-72282 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let a writ of injunction issue perpetually enjoining the same respondent court from proceeding with the complaint for eminent domain in Civil Case No. 94-72282,14 In its resolution, dated February 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals likewise denied two motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner.l5 Hence this petition. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in – 1) Giving due course to the petition of the Serranos under Rule 65 notwithstanding its own declaration of the impropriety of the resort to the writ and filing thereof with the wrong appellate court; 2) Concluding that the Order of October 9, 1998 which authorizes the immediate entry of the City as the expropriating agency into the property sough to be expropriated upon the deposit of the provisionally fixed fair market value thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the property without prior showing of compliance with the acquisition of other lands enumerated in Sec. 9 of

R.A. 7279 ergo a violation of due process of the Serranos by the doctrinaire application of FILSTREAM ruling and corrollarily, 3) In prohibiting permanently, by writ of injunction, the trial court from proceeding with a complaint for expropriation of the City in Civil Case No. 94-72282.16 We will deal with these contentions in the order they are presented. First. Petitioner contends that the respondents' remedy against the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession was not to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 but a petition for review under Rule 45 which should have been filed in the Supreme Court.17 This contention has no merit. A petition for review under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal. Accordingly, it could not have been resorted to by the respondents inasmuch as the order of the trial court granting a writ of possession was merely interlocutory from which no appeal could be taken. Rule 45, §1 of the 1997 Rules for Civil Procedure applies only to final judgments or orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Regional Trial Court. On the other hand, a petition for certiorari is the suitable remedy in view of Rule 65, §1 which provides: When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainly and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as laws and justice may require. Respondents' petition before the Court of Appeals alleged that the trial court had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order, dated December 15, 1998, resolving that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation and ordering the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of petitioner.18 Second. Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for deciding issues not raised in the trial court, specifically the question of whether or not there was compliance with §§9 and 10 of RA. No. 7279. It argues that the sole defense set up by respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals was that their property was exempted from expropriation because it comes within the purview of a "small property" as defined by R.A. No. 7279 . Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should not have applied the doctrine laid down by this Court in the Filstream19 case as such issue was not raised by respondents in their petition before the Court of Appeals. This contention likewise has no merit. In their petition before the Court of Appeals, respondents raised the following issues: 1. Whether or not the subject Lot 1-C with an area of 343.10 square meters covered by T.C.T. No. 226048 in the name of petitioners' mother, the late Demetria [De Guia] Serrano, may be lawfully expropriated "for the public purpose of providing landless occupants thereof homelots of their own under the "land-for-the landless program of respondent City of Manila." 2. Whether or not the expropriation of the said Lot l-C by respondent City of Manila violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, since petitioners, with the exemption of petitioner Oscar G. Serranno, who are likewise landless are actual occupants hereof. 3. Whether or not Lot 1-C is or may be exempted from expropriation pursuant to R.A. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992.20 It is clear that respondents raised in issue the propriety of the expropriation of their property in connection with RA. No. 7279. Although what was discussed at length in their petition before the Court of Appeals was whether or not the said property could be considered a small property within the purview of the exemption under the said law, the other provisions of the said law concerning expropriation proceedings need also be looked into to address the first issue raised by the respondents and to determine whether or not expropriation of Lot 1-C was proper under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals properly considered relevant provisions of R A. No.7279 to determine the issues raised by respondents. Whether or not it correctly applied the doctrine laid down in Filstream in resolving the issues raised by respondents, however, is a different matter altogether, and this brings us to the next point.

Third. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erroneously presumed that Lot 1-C has been ordered condemned in its favor when the fact is that the order of the trial court, dated December 15, 1998, merely authorized the issuance of a writ of possession and petitioner's entry into the property pursuant to Rule 67, §2. At that stage, it was premature to determine whether the requirements of RA. No. 7279, §§9 - 10 have been complied with since no evidentiary hearing had yet been conducted by the trial court.21 This contention is well taken. Rule 67, §2 provides: Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depository an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary. If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be fixed by the court. After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties. Thus, a writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial.22 In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that petitioner failed to comply with the requirements laid down in §§9 10 of RA. No. 7279 and reiterated in Filstream ruling. This is error. The ruling in the Filstream was necessitated because an order of condemnation had already been issued by the trial court in that case. Thus, the judgment in that case had already become final. In this case, the trial court has not gone beyond the issuance of a writ of possession. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA. No. 7279. It is, therefore, premature at this stage of the proceedings to find that petitioner resorted expropriation without first trying the other modes of acquisition enumerated in § 10 of the law. RA. No 7279 in pertinent parts provide: SEC. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land… Lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order: (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; (b) Alienable lands of the public domain; (c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands; (d) Those within the declares Areas or Priority Development, Zone Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Programs sites which have not yet been acquired; (e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement and Sites and Services or BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired, and; (f) Privately-owned lands. Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageously to the beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local government units shall give budgetary priority on-site development of government lands. SEC. 10. Modes of Lands Acquisition. -- The modes of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall include, amount others, community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and expropriation: Provided, however; That expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, further; That were

expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Act: Provided finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court. For the purpose of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase: Provided, That qualified beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the lands shall be given the right of first refusal. Whether petitioner has complied with these provisions requires the presentation of evidence, although in its amended complaint petitioner did allege that it had complied with the requirements.23 The determination of this question must await that hearing on the complaint for expropriation, particularly the hearing for the condemnation of the properties sought to be expropriated. Expropriation proceedings consist of two stages: first, condemnation of the property after it is determined that its acquisition will be for a public purpose or public use and, second, the determination of just compensation to be paid for the taking of the private property to be made by the court with the assistance of not more than three commissioners.24 WHEREFORE, the decision, dated November 16,1999, and resolution, dated February 23, 2000, of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and the order of the trial court, dated December 15,1998, is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to further proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 106804 August 12, 2004 NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONINO POBRE, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case Before us is a petition for review1 of the 30 March 1992 Decision2 and 14 August 1992 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Tabaco, Albay in Civil Case No. T-552. The Antecedents Petitioner National Power Corporation ("NPC") is a public corporation created to generate geothermal, hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and to transmit electric power nationwide.4 NPC is authorized by law to acquire property and exercise the right of eminent domain. Private respondent Antonino Pobre ("Pobre") is the owner of a 68,969 square-meter land ("Property") located in Barangay Bano, Municipality of Tiwi, Albay. The Property is covered by TCT No. 4067 and Subdivision Plan 11-9709. In 1963, Pobre began developing the Property as a resort-subdivision, which he named as "Tiwi Hot Springs Resort Subdivision." On 12 January 1966, the then Court of First Instance of Albay approved the subdivision plan of the Property. The Register of Deeds thus cancelled TCT No. 4067 and issued independent titles for the approved lots. In 1969, Pobre started advertising and selling the lots. On 4 August 1965, the Commission on Volcanology certified that thermal mineral water and steam were present beneath the Property. The Commission on Volcanology found the thermal mineral water and steam suitable for domestic use and potentially for commercial or industrial use. NPC then became involved with Pobre's Property in three instances.

First was on 18 February 1972 when Pobre leased to NPC for one year eleven lots from the approved subdivision plan.

On 13 July 1987, NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the decision. On 30 October 1987, the trial court issued its Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration.

Second was sometime in 1977, the first time that NPC filed its expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property.5 On 23 October 1979, the trial court ordered the expropriation of the lots upon NPC's payment of P25 per square meter or a total amount of P207,790. NPC began drilling operations and construction of steam wells. While this first expropriation case was pending, NPC dumped waste materials beyond the site agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. The dumping of waste materials altered the topography of some portions of the Property. NPC did not act on Pobre's complaints and NPC continued with its dumping.

NPC appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 30 March 1992, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court but deleted the award of attorney's fees. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Third was on 1 September 1979, when NPC filed its second expropriation case against Pobre to acquire an additional 5,554 square meters of the Property. This is the subject of this petition. NPC needed the lot for the construction and maintenance of Naglagbong Well Site F-20, pursuant to Proclamation No. 7396 and Republic Act No. 5092.7 NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with the Philippine National Bank. The deposit represented 10% of the total market value of the lots covered by the second expropriation. On 6 September 1979, NPC entered the 5,554 square-meter lot upon the trial court's issuance of a writ of possession to NPC. On 10 December 1984, Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint for expropriation. Pobre claimed that NPC damaged his Property. Pobre prayed for just compensation of all the lots affected by NPC's actions and for the payment of damages. On 2 January 1985, NPC filed a motion to dismiss the second expropriation case on the ground that NPC had found an alternative site and that NPC had already abandoned in 1981 the project within the Property due to Pobre's opposition. On 8 January 1985, the trial court granted NPC's motion to dismiss but the trial court allowed Pobre to adduce evidence on his claim for damages. The trial court admitted Pobre's exhibits on the damages because NPC failed to object. On 30 August 1985, the trial court ordered the case submitted for decision since NPC failed to appear to present its evidence. The trial court denied NPC's motion to reconsider the submission of the case for decision. 8

NPC filed a petition for certiorari with the then Intermediate Appellate Court, questioning the 30 August 1985 Order of the trial court. On 12 February 1987, the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed NPC's petition but directed the lower court to rule on NPC's objections to Pobre's documentary exhibits. On 27 March 1987, the trial court admitted all of Pobre's exhibits and upheld its Order dated 30 August 1985. The trial court considered the case submitted for decision. On 29 April 1987, the trial court issued its Decision in favor of Pobre. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, ordering the plaintiff to pay unto the defendant: (1) The sum of THREE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY (P3,448,450.00) PESOS which is the fair market value of the subdivision of defendant with an area of sixty eight thousand nine hundred sixty nine (68,969) square meters, plus legal rate of interest per annum from September 6, 1979 until the whole amount is paid, and upon payment thereof by the plaintiff the defendant is hereby ordered to execute the necessary Deed of Conveyance or Absolute Sale of the property in favor of the plaintiff; (2) The sum of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS for and as attorney's fees. Costs against the plaintiff. SO ORDERED.9

WHEREFORE, by reason of the foregoing, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of attorney's fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.10 The Court of Appeals denied NPC's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated 14 August 1992. The Ruling of the Trial Court In its 69-page decision, the trial court recounted in great detail the scale and scope of the damage NPC inflicted on the Property that Pobre had developed into a resort-subdivision. Pobre's Property suffered "permanent injury" because of the noise, water, air and land pollution generated by NPC's geothermal plants. The construction and operation of the geothermal plants drastically changed the topography of the Property making it no longer viable as a resort-subdivision. The chemicals emitted by the geothermal plants damaged the natural resources in the Property and endangered the lives of the residents. NPC did not only take the 8,311.60 square-meter portion of the Property, but also the remaining area of the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had rendered Pobre's entire Property useless as a resort-subdivision. The Property has become useful only to NPC. NPC must therefore take Pobre's entire Property and pay for it. The trial court found the following badges of NPC's bad faith: (1) NPC allowed five years to pass before it moved for the dismissal of the second expropriation case; (2) NPC did not act on Pobre's plea for NPC to eliminate or at least reduce the damage to the Property; and (3) NPC singled out Pobre's Property for piecemeal expropriation when NPC could have expropriated other properties which were not affected in their entirety by NPC's operation. The trial court found the just compensation to be P50 per square meter or a total of P3,448,450 for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC failed to contest this valuation. Since NPC was in bad faith and it employed dilatory tactics to prolong this case, the trial court imposed legal interest on the P3,448,450 from 6 September 1979 until full payment. The trial court awarded Pobre attorney's fees of P150,000. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. However, the appellate court deleted the award of attorney's fees because Pobre did not properly plead for it. The Issues NPC claims that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors that warrant reversal of the appellate court's decision: 1. In not annulling the appealed Decision for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion and without jurisdiction; 2. In holding that NPC had "taken" the entire Property of Pobre; 3. Assuming arguendo that there was "taking" of the entire Property, in not excluding from the Property the 8,311.60 square-meter portion NPC had previously expropriated and paid for; 4. In holding that the amount of just compensation fixed by the trial court at P3,448,450.00 with interest from September 6, 1979 until fully paid, is just and fair; 5. In not holding that the just compensation should be fixed at P25.00 per square meter only as what NPC and Pobre had previously mutually agreed upon; and 6. In not totally setting aside the appealed Decision of the trial court.11

Procedural Issues NPC, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, insists that at the time that it moved for the dismissal of its complaint, Pobre had yet to serve an answer or a motion for summary judgment on NPC. Thus, NPC as plaintiff had the right to move for the automatic dismissal of its complaint. NPC relies on Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules then in effect. NPC argues that the dismissal of the complaint should have carried with it the dismissal of the entire case including Pobre's counterclaim. NPC's belated attack on Pobre's claim for damages must fail. The trial court's reservation of Pobre's right to recover damages in the same case is already beyond review. The 8 January 1985 Order of the trial court attained finality when NPC failed to move for its reconsideration within the 15-day reglementary period. NPC opposed the order only on 27 May 1985 or more than four months from the issuance of the order.

expropriation cases under Section 3 of Rule 67, the motion to dismiss took the place of the answer. The records show that Pobre had already filed and served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer"25 even before NPC filed its own motion to dismiss. NPC filed its notice of dismissal of the complaint on 2 January 1985. However, as early as 10 December 1984, Pobre had already filed with the trial court and served on NPC his "motion to dismiss/answer." A certain Divina Cerela received Pobre's pleading on behalf of NPC.26 Unfortunately for NPC, even Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court could not save its cause. NPC is in no position to invoke Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court. A plaintiff loses his right under this rule to move for the immediate dismissal of the complaint once the defendant had served on the plaintiff the answer or a motion for summary judgment before the plaintiff could file his notice of dismissal of the complaint.27 Pobre's "motion to dismiss/answer," filed and served way ahead of NPC's motion to dismiss, takes the case out of Section 1, Rule 17 assuming the same applies.

We cannot fault the Court of Appeals for not considering NPC's objections against the subsistence of Pobre's claim for damages. NPC neither included this issue in its assignment of errors nor discussed it in its appellant's brief. NPC also failed to question the trial court's 8 January 1985 Order in the petition for certiorari12 it had earlier filed with the Court of Appeals. It is only before this Court that NPC now vigorously assails the preservation of Pobre's claim for damages. Clearly, NPC's opposition to the existence of Pobre's claim for damages is a mere afterthought. Rules of fair play, justice and due process dictate that parties cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal.13

In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiff's matter of right to dismiss the complaint precisely because the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiff's right in expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and to certain conditions.28 The exceptional right that Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court conferred on the plaintiff must be understood to have applied only to other civil actions. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure abrogated this exceptional right.29

We must correct NPC's claim that it filed the notice of dismissal just "shortly" after it had filed the complaint for expropriation. While NPC had intimated several times to the trial court its desire to dismiss the expropriation case it filed on 5 September 1979,14 it was only on 2 January 1985 that NPC filed its notice of dismissal.15 It took NPC more than five years to actually file the notice of dismissal. Five years is definitely not a short period of time. NPC obviously dilly-dallied in filing its notice of dismissal while NPC meanwhile burdened Pobre's property rights. Even a timely opposition against Pobre's claim for damages would not yield a favorable ruling for NPC. It is not Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court that is applicable to this case but Rule 67 of the same Rules, as well as jurisprudence on expropriation cases. Rule 17 referred to dismissal of civil actions in general while Rule 67 specifically governed eminent domain cases.

The power of eminent domain is subject to limitations. A landowner cannot be deprived of his right over his land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court.30 The court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, there is payment of just compensation and there is due process of law.31 If the propriety of the taking of private property through eminent domain is subject to judicial scrutiny, the dismissal of the complaint must also pass judicial inquiry because private rights may have suffered in the meantime. The dismissal, withdrawal or abandonment of the expropriation case cannot be made arbitrarily. If it appears to the court that the expropriation is not for some public use,32 then it becomes the duty of the court to dismiss the action.33 However, when the defendant claims that his land suffered damage because of the expropriation, the dismissal of the action should not foreclose the defendant's right to have his damages ascertained either in the same case or in a separate action.34

Eminent domain is the authority and right of the state, as sovereign, to take private property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.16 The power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to the local governments, other public entities and public utilities17 such as NPC. Expropriation is the procedure for enforcing the right of eminent domain.18 "Eminent Domain" was the former title of Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court. In the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect on 1 July 1997, the prescribed method of expropriation is still found in Rule 67, but its title is now "Expropriation."

Thus, NPC's theory that the dismissal of its complaint carried with it the dismissal of Pobre's claim for damages is baseless. There is nothing in Rule 67 of the 1964 Rules of Court that provided for the dismissal of the defendant's claim for damages, upon the dismissal of the expropriation case. Case law holds that in the event of dismissal of the expropriation case, the claim for damages may be made either in a separate or in the same action, for all damages occasioned by the institution of the expropriation case.35 The dismissal of the complaint can be made under certain conditions, such as the reservation of the defendant's right to recover damages either in the same or in another action.36 The trial court in this case reserved Pobre's right to prove his claim in the same case, a reservation that has become final due to NPC's own fault.

Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided the exception to the general rule that the dismissal of the complaint is addressed to the sound discretion of the court.19 For as long as all of the elements of Section 1, Rule 17 were present the dismissal of the complaint rested exclusively on the plaintiff's will.20 The defending party and even the courts were powerless to prevent the dismissal.21 The courts could only accept and record the dismissal.22 A plain reading of Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court makes it obvious that this rule was not intended to supplement Rule 67 of the same Rules. Section 1, Rule 17 of the 1964 Rules of Court, provided that: SECTION 1. Dismissal by the plaintiff. — An action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or including the same claim. A class suit shall not be dismissed or compromised without approval of the court. While Section 1, Rule 17 spoke of the "service of answer or summary judgment," the Rules then did not require the filing of an answer or summary judgment in eminent domain cases.23 In lieu of an answer, Section 3 of Rule 67 required the defendant to file a single motion to dismiss where he should present all of his objections and defenses to the taking of his property for the purpose specified in the complaint.24 In short, in

Factual Findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts Bind the Court The trial and appellate courts held that even before the first expropriation case, Pobre had already established his Property as a resort-subdivision. NPC had wrought so much damage to the Property that NPC had made the Property uninhabitable as a resort-subdivision. NPC's facilities such as steam wells, nag wells, power plants, power lines, and canals had hemmed in Pobre's Property. NPC's operations of its geothermal project also posed a risk to lives and properties. We uphold the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts. Questions of facts are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court as a petition for review may only raise questions of law.37 Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are generally binding on this Court.38 We thus find no reason to set aside the two courts' factual findings. NPC points out that it did not take Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC argues that assuming that it is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 square-meter portion that it had successfully expropriated and fully paid for should have been excluded from the 68,969 square-meter Property that Pobre claims NPC had damaged. We are not persuaded.

In its 30 October 1987 Order denying NPC's motion for reconsideration, the trial court pointed out that the Property originally had a total area of 141,300 square meters.39 Pobre converted the Property into a resortsubdivision and sold lots to the public. What remained of the lots are the 68,969 square meters of land.40 Pobre no longer claimed damages for the other lots that he had before the expropriation. Pobre identified in court the lots forming the 68,969 square-meter Property. NPC had the opportunity to object to the identification of the lots.41 NPC, however, failed to do so. Thus, we do not disturb the trial and appellate courts' finding on the total land area NPC had damaged. NPC must Pay Just Compensation for the Entire Property Ordinarily, the dismissal of the expropriation case restores possession of the expropriated land to the landowner.42 However, when possession of the land cannot be turned over to the landowner because it is neither convenient nor feasible anymore to do so, the only remedy available to the aggrieved landowner is to demand payment of just compensation.43

five years after it had already deprived the Property virtually of all its value. NPC has demonstrated its utter disregard for Pobre's property rights. Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to institute expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for Pobre's 68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must be spared any further delay in his pursuit to receive just compensation from NPC. Just compensation is the fair and full equivalent of the loss.50 The trial and appellate courts endeavored to meet this standard. The P50 per square meter valuation of the 68,969 square-meter Property is reasonable considering that the Property was already an established resort-subdivision. NPC has itself to blame for not contesting the valuation before the trial court. Based on the P50 per square meter valuation, the total amount of just compensation that NPC must pay Pobre is P3,448,450.

In this case, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that it is no longer possible and practical to restore possession of the Property to Pobre. The Property is no longer habitable as a resort-subdivision. The Property is worthless to Pobre and is now useful only to NPC. Pobre has completely lost the Property as if NPC had physically taken over the entire 68,969 square-meter Property.

The landowner is entitled to legal interest on the price of the land from the time of the taking up to the time of full payment by the government.51 In accord with jurisprudence, we fix the legal interest at six per cent (6%) per annum.52 The legal interest should accrue from 6 September 1979, the date when the trial court issued the writ of possession to NPC, up to the time that NPC fully pays Pobre.53 NPC's abuse of its eminent domain authority is appalling. However, we cannot award moral damages because Pobre did not assert his right to it.54 We also cannot award attorney's fees in Pobre's favor since he did not appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals denying recovery of attorney's fees.55

In United States v. Causby,44 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that when private property is rendered uninhabitable by an entity with the power to exercise eminent domain, the taking is deemed complete. Such taking is thus compensable. In this jurisdiction, the Court has ruled that if the government takes property without expropriation and devotes the property to public use, after many years the property owner may demand payment of just compensation.45 This principle is in accord with the constitutional mandate that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.46

Nonetheless, we find it proper to award P50,000 in temperate damages to Pobre. The court may award temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, if the court finds that a party has suffered some pecuniary loss but its amount cannot be proved with certainty from the nature of the case.56 As the trial and appellate courts noted, Pobre's resort-subdivision was no longer just a dream because Pobre had already established the resort-subdivision and the prospect for it was initially encouraging. That is, until NPC permanently damaged Pobre's Property. NPC did not just destroy the property. NPC dashed Pobre's hope of seeing his Property achieve its full potential as a resort-subdivision.

In the recent case of National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo,47 the Court compelled the National Housing Authority ("NHA") to pay just compensation to the landowners even after the NHA had already abandoned the expropriation case. The Court pointed out that a government agency could not initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property, and then just decide not to proceed with the expropriation. Such a complete turn-around is arbitrary and capricious and was condemned by the Court in the strongest possible terms. NHA was held liable to the landowners for the prejudice that they had suffered.

The lesson in this case must not be lost on entities with eminent domain authority. Such entities cannot trifle with a citizen's property rights. The power of eminent domain is an extraordinary power they must wield with circumspection and utmost regard for procedural requirements. Thus, we hold NPC liable for exemplary damages of P100,000. Exemplary damages or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.57

In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre's Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages that NPC had to pay Pobre. This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable. We have held that the usual procedure in the determination of just compensation is waived when the government itself initially violates procedural requirements.48 NPC's taking of Pobre's property without filing the appropriate expropriation proceedings and paying him just compensation is a transgression of procedural due process. From the beginning, NPC should have initiated expropriation proceedings for Pobre's entire 68,969 squaremeter Property. NPC did not. Instead, NPC embarked on a piecemeal expropriation of the Property. Even as the second expropriation case was still pending, NPC was well aware of the damage that it had unleashed on the entire Property. NPC, however, remained impervious to Pobre's repeated demands for NPC to abate the damage that it had wrought on his Property. NPC moved for the dismissal of the complaint for the second expropriation on the ground that it had found an alternative site and there was stiff opposition from Pobre.49 NPC abandoned the second expropriation case

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. The appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 16930 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. National Power Corporation is ordered to pay Antonino Pobre P3,448,450 as just compensation for the 68,969 square-meter Property at P50 per square meter. National Power Corporation is directed to pay legal interest at 6% per annum on the amount adjudged from 6 September 1979 until fully paid. Upon National Power Corporation's payment of the full amount, Antonino Pobre is ordered to execute a Deed of Conveyance of the Property in National Power Corporation's favor. National Power Corporation is further ordered to pay temperate and exemplary damages of P50,000 and P100,000, respectively. No costs. SO ORDERED

EN BANC G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008 ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, SECRETARY LEANDRO R. MENDOZA and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, respondents. x ----------------------------------------- x G.R. No. 174166 April 18, 2008 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS and MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and SALACNIB BATERINA, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This Court is still continuously besieged by Petitions arising from the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), despite the promulgation by this Court of Decisions and Resolutions in two cases, Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.1 and Republic v. Gingoyon,2 which already resolved the more basic and immediate issues arising from the said award. The sheer magnitude of the project, the substantial cost of its building, the expected high profits from its operations, and its remarkable impact on the Philippine economy, consequently raised significant interest in the project from various quarters. Once more, two new Petitions concerning the NAIA IPT III Project are before this Court. It is only appropriate, however, that the Court first recounts its factual and legal findings in Agan and Gingoyon to ascertain that its ruling in the Petitions at bar shall be consistent and in accordance therewith. Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547, and 155661) Already established and incontrovertible are the following facts in Agan: In August 1989, the [Department of Trade and Communications (DOTC)] engaged the services of Aeroport de Paris (ADP) to conduct a comprehensive study of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and determine whether the present airport can cope with the traffic development up to the year 2010. The study consisted of two parts: first, traffic forecasts, capacity of existing facilities, NAIA future requirements, proposed master plans and development plans; and second, presentation of the preliminary design of the passenger terminal building. The ADP submitted a Draft Final Report to the DOTC in December 1989. Some time in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco met with then President Fidel V. Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. To signify their commitment to pursue the project, they formed the Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) which was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) on September 15, 1993. On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC/[Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA)] for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) under a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 (BOT Law). On December 2, 1994, the DOTC issued Dept. Order No. 94-832 constituting the Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the implementation of the NAIA IPT III project. On March 27, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jose Garcia endorsed the proposal of AEDC to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). A revised proposal, however, was forwarded by the DOTC to NEDA on December 13, 1995. On January 5, 1996, the NEDA Investment Coordinating Council (NEDA ICC) - Technical Board favorably endorsed the project to the ICC - Cabinet Committee which approved the same, subject to certain conditions, on January 19, 1996. On February 13, 1996, the NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III project. On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA caused the publication in two daily newspapers of an invitation for competitive or comparative proposals on AEDC's unsolicited proposal, in accordance with Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended. The alternative bidders were required to submit three (3) sealed envelopes on or before 5:00 p.m. of September 20, 1996. The first envelope should contain the Prequalification Documents, the second envelope the Technical Proposal, and the third envelope the Financial Proposal of the proponent. On June 20, 1996, PBAC Bulletin No. 1 was issued, postponing the availment of the Bid Documents and the submission of the comparative bid proposals. Interested firms were permitted to obtain the Request for Proposal Documents beginning June 28, 1996, upon submission of a written application and payment of a non-refundable fee of P50,000.00 (US$2,000). The Bid Documents issued by the PBAC provided among others that the proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent would be evaluated based on its ability to provide a minimum amount of equity to the project, and its capacity to secure external financing for the project. On July 23, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 2 inviting all bidders to a pre-bid conference on July 29, 1996. On August 16, 1996, the PBAC issued PBAC Bulletin No. 3 amending the Bid Documents. The following amendments were made on the Bid Documents: a. Aside from the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment, the proponent shall include in its financial proposal an additional percentage of gross revenue share of the Government, as follows: i.

First 5 years

5.0%

ii.

Next 10 years

7.5%

iii.

Next 10 years

10.0%

b. The amount of the fixed Annual Guaranteed Payment shall be subject of the price challenge. Proponent may offer an Annual Guaranteed Payment which need not be of equal amount, but payment of which shall start upon site possession. c. The project proponent must have adequate capability to sustain the financing requirement for the detailed engineering, design, construction, and/or operation and maintenance phases of the project as the case may be. For purposes of prequalification, this capability shall be measured in terms of: i. Proof of the availability of the project proponent and/or the consortium to provide the minimum amount of equity for the project; and ii. a letter testimonial from reputable banks attesting that the project

proponent and/or the members of the consortium are banking with them, that the project proponent and/or the members are of good financial standing, and have adequate resources. d. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponent's compliance with the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the Bid Documents and the [Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)] of the BOT Law. The minimum amount of equity shall be 30% of the Project Cost. e. Amendments to the draft Concession Agreement shall be issued from time to time. Said amendments shall only cover items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponent's proposal. On August 29, 1996, the Second Pre-Bid Conference was held where certain clarifications were made. Upon the request of prospective bidder People's Air Cargo & Warehousing Co., Inc (Paircargo), the PBAC warranted that based on Sec. 11.6, Rule 11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the BOT Law, only the proposed Annual Guaranteed Payment submitted by the challengers would be revealed to AEDC, and that the challengers' technical and financial proposals would remain confidential. The PBAC also clarified that the list of revenue sources contained in Annex 4.2a of the Bid Documents was merely indicative and that other revenue sources may be included by the proponent, subject to approval by DOTC/MIAA. Furthermore, the PBAC clarified that only those fees and charges denominated as Public Utility Fees would be subject to regulation, and those charges which would be actually deemed Public Utility Fees could still be revised, depending on the outcome of PBAC's query on the matter with the Department of Justice. In September 1996, the PBAC issued Bid Bulletin No. 5, entitled "Answers to the Queries of PAIRCARGO as Per Letter Dated September 3 and 10, 1996." Paircargo's queries and the PBAC's responses were as follows: 1. It is difficult for Paircargo and Associates to meet the required minimum equity requirement as prescribed in Section 8.3.4 of the Bid Documents considering that the capitalization of each member company is so structured to meet the requirements and needs of their current respective business undertaking/activities. In order to comply with this equity requirement, Paircargo is requesting PBAC to just allow each member of (sic) corporation of the Joint Venture to just execute an agreement that embodies a commitment to infuse the required capital in case the project is awarded to the Joint Venture instead of increasing each corporation's current authorized capital stock just for prequalification purposes. In prequalification, the agency is interested in one's financial capability at the time of prequalification, not future or potential capability. A commitment to put up equity once awarded the project is not enough to establish that "present" financial capability. However, total financial capability of all member companies of the Consortium, to be established by submitting the respective companies' audited financial statements, shall be acceptable. 2. At present, Paircargo is negotiating with banks and other institutions for the extension of a Performance Security to the joint venture in the event that the Concessions Agreement (sic) is awarded to them. However, Paircargo is being required to submit a copy of the draft concession as one of the documentary requirements. Therefore, Paircargo is requesting that they'd (sic) be furnished copy of the approved negotiated agreement between the PBAC and the AEDC at the soonest possible time. A copy of the draft Concession Agreement is included in the Bid Documents. Any material changes would be made known to prospective challengers through bid bulletins. However, a final version will be issued before the award of contract. The PBAC also stated that it would require AEDC to sign Supplement C of the Bid Documents (Acceptance of Criteria and Waiver of Rights to Enjoin Project) and to submit the same with the required Bid Security. On September 20, 1996, the consortium composed of People's Air Cargo and Warehousing Co.,

Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank) (collectively, Paircargo Consortium) submitted their competitive proposal to the PBAC. On September 23, 1996, the PBAC opened the first envelope containing the prequalification documents of the Paircargo Consortium. On the following day, September 24, 1996, the PBAC prequalified the Paircargo Consortium.

On April 16, 1997, AEDC filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction against the Secretary of the DOTC, the Chairman of the PBAC, the voting members of the PBAC and Pantaleon D. Alvarez, in his capacity as Chairman of the PBAC Technical Committee. xxxx

On September 26, 1996, AEDC informed the PBAC in writing of its reservations as regards the Paircargo Consortium, which include:

On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to PIATCO. On July 12, 1997, the Government, through then DOTC Secretary Arturo T. Enrile, and PIATCO, through its President, Henry T. Go, signed the "Concession Agreement for the Build-Operateand-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III" (1997 Concession Agreement). x x x. On November 26, 1998, the Government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA). x x x.

a. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO; b. The lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAGS; c. The prohibition imposed by RA 337, as amended (the General Banking Act) on the amount that Security Bank could legally invest in the project; d. The inclusion of Siemens as a contractor of the PAIRCARGO Joint Venture, for prequalification purposes; and e. The appointment of Lufthansa as the facility operator, in view of the Philippine requirement in the operation of a public utility. The PBAC gave its reply on October 2, 1996, informing AEDC that it had considered the issues raised by the latter, and that based on the documents submitted by Paircargo and the established prequalification criteria, the PBAC had found that the challenger, Paircargo, had prequalified to undertake the project. The Secretary of the DOTC approved the finding of the PBAC. The PBAC then proceeded with the opening of the second envelope of the Paircargo Consortium which contained its Technical Proposal. On October 3, 1996, AEDC reiterated its objections, particularly with respect to Paircargo's financial capability, in view of the restrictions imposed by Section 21-B of the General Banking Act and Sections 1380 and 1381 of the Manual Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries. On October 7, 1996, AEDC again manifested its objections and requested that it be furnished with excerpts of the PBAC meeting and the accompanying technical evaluation report where each of the issues they raised were addressed. On October 16, 1996, the PBAC opened the third envelope submitted by AEDC and the Paircargo Consortium containing their respective financial proposals. Both proponents offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to the government and to pay the government: 5% share in gross revenues for the first five years of operation, 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next ten years of operation, and 10% share in gross revenues for the last ten years of operation, in accordance with the Bid Documents. However, in addition to the foregoing, AEDC offered to pay the government a total of P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years while Paircargo Consortium offered to pay the government a total of P17.75 billion for the same period. Thus, the PBAC formally informed AEDC that it had accepted the price proposal submitted by the Paircargo Consortium, and gave AEDC 30 working days or until November 28, 1996 within which to match the said bid, otherwise, the project would be awarded to Paircargo. As AEDC failed to match the proposal within the 30-day period, then DOTC Secretary Amado Lagdameo, on December 11, 1996, issued a notice to Paircargo Consortium regarding AEDC's failure to match the proposal. On February 27, 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine International Airport Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO). AEDC subsequently protested the alleged undue preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections as regards the prequalification of PIATCO. On April 11, 1997, the DOTC submitted the concession agreement for the second-pass approval of the NEDA-ICC.

Subsequently, the Government and PIATCO signed three Supplements to the ARCA. The First Supplement was signed on August 27, 1999; the Second Supplement on September 4, 2000; and the Third Supplement on June 22, 2001 (collectively, Supplements). xxxx Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with the maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. x x x. On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming that they stand to lose their employment upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed before this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of said agreements. On October 15, 2002, the service providers, joining the cause of the petitioning workers, filed a motion for intervention and a petition-in-intervention. On October 24, 2002, Congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula filed a similar petition with this Court. On November 6, 2002, several employees of the MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various agreements. On December 11, 2002, another group of Congressmen, Hon. Jacinto V. Paras, Rafael P. Nantes, Eduardo C. Zialcita, Willie B. Villarama, Prospero C. Nograles, Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing O. Macaranbon, moved to intervene in the case as Respondents-Intervenors. They filed their Comment-In-Intervention defending the validity of the assailed agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions. During the pendency of the case before this Court, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, on November 29, 2002, in her speech at the 2002 Golden Shell Export Awards at Malacañang Palace, stated that she will not "honor (PIATCO) contracts which the Executive Branch's legal offices have concluded (as) null and void."3 The Court first dispensed with the procedural issues raised in Agan, ruling that (a) the MIAA service providers and its employees, petitioners in G.R. Nos. 155001 and 155661, had the requisite standing since they had a direct and substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts which would affect their source of livelihood;4 and (b) the members of the House of Representatives, petitioners in G.R. No. 155547, were granted standing in view of the serious legal questions involved and their impact on public interest.5 As to the merits of the Petitions in Agan, the Court concluded that: In sum, this Court rules that in view of the absence of the requisite financial capacity of the Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of respondent PIATCO, the award by the PBAC of the contract for the construction, operation and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III is null and void.

Further, considering that the 1997 Concession Agreement contains material and substantial amendments, which amendments had the effect of converting the 1997 Concession Agreement into an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded upon, the 1997 Concession Agreement is similarly null and void for being contrary to public policy. The provisions under Sections 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the 1997 Concession Agreement and Section 4.04(c) in relation to Section 1.06 of the ARCA, which constitute a direct government guarantee expressly prohibited by, among others, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations are also null and void. The Supplements, being accessory contracts to the ARCA, are likewise null and void.6 Hence, the fallo of the Court's Decision in Agan reads: WHEREFORE, the 1997 Concession Agreement, the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement and the Supplements thereto are set aside for being null and void.7 In a Resolution8 dated 21 January 2004, the Court denied with finality the Motions for Reconsideration of its 5 May 2003 Decision in Agan filed by therein respondents PIATCO and Congressmen Paras, et al., and respondents-intervenors.9 Significantly, the Court declared in the same Resolution that: This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.10 (Emphasis ours.) It is these afore-quoted pronouncements that gave rise to the Petition in Gingoyon. Republic v. Gingoyon (G.R. No. 166429) According to the statement of facts in Gingoyon: After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes. The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to "take or enter upon the possession" of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that "[t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint." Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued.

However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as "An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes" and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects. There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method. Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government "specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation;" and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed "to maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA 3 facilities or "perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation" of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited "from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties." The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Order affirmed the earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance "the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties." Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005.11 The Court resolved the Petition of the Republic of the Philippines and Manila International Airport Authority in Gingoyon in this wise: In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:

(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. (2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation. (3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law. (4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses "the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport." 5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with the standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules. Considering that the NAIA 3 consists of structures and improvements, the valuation thereof shall be determined using the replacements cost method, as prescribed under Section 10 of the Implementing Rules. (6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan. (7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision. (8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon. All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.12 The decretal portion of the Court's Decision in Gingoyon thus reads: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005 and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2004 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities; 2) Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized [to] start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project; 3) RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government. The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein. The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED. No pronouncement as to costs.13 Motions for Partial Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision were filed by therein petitioners Republic and MIAA, as well as the three other parties who sought to intervene, namely, Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina.

In a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of therein petitioners and remained faithful to its assailed Decision based on the following ratiocination: Admittedly, the 2004 Resolution in Agan could be construed as mandating the full payment of the final amount of just compensation before the Government may be permitted to take over the NAIA 3. However, the Decision ultimately rejected such a construction, acknowledging the public good that would result from the immediate operation of the NAIA 3. Instead, the Decision adopted an interpretation which is in consonance with Rep. Act No. 8974 and with equitable standards as well, that allowed the Government to take possession of the NAIA 3 after payment of the proffered value of the facilities to PIATCO. Such a reading is substantially compliant with the pronouncement in the 2004 Agan Resolution, and is in accord with law and equity. In contrast, the Government's position, hewing to the strict application of Rule 67, would permit the Government to acquire possession over the NAIA 3 and implement its operation without having to pay PIATCO a single centavo, a situation that is obviously unfair. Whatever animosity the Government may have towards PIATCO does not acquit it from settling its obligations to the latter, particularly those which had already been previously affirmed by this Court.14 The Court, in the same Resolution, denied all the three motions for intervention of Asakihosan Corporation, Takenaka Corporation, and Congressman Baterina, and ruled as follows: We now turn to the three (3) motions for intervention all of which were filed after the promulgation of the Court's Decision. All three (3) motions must be denied. Under Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure the motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the court. Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was before and not after resolution of this case. To allow intervention at this juncture would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such lack of knowledge. Takenaka and Asahikosan rely on Mago v. Court of Appeals wherein the Court took the extraordinary step of allowing the motion for intervention even after the challenged order of the trial court had already become final. Yet it was apparent in Mago that the movants therein were not impleaded despite being indispensable parties, and had not even known of the existence of the case before the trial court, and the effect of the final order was to deprive the movants of their land. In this case, neither Takenaka nor Asahikosan stand to be dispossessed by reason of the Court's Decision. There is no palpable due process violation that would militate the suspension of the procedural rule. Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari. In the case of Representative Baterina, he invokes his prerogative as legislator to curtail the disbursement without appropriation of public funds to compensate PIATCO, as well as that as a taxpayer, as the basis of his legal standing to intervene. However, it should be noted that the amount which the Court directed to be paid by the Government to PIATCO was derived from the money deposited by the Manila International Airport Authority, an agency which enjoys corporate autonomy and possesses a legal personality separate and distinct from those of the National Government and agencies thereof whose budgets have to be approved by Congress. It is also observed that the interests of the movants-in-intervention may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before lower courts. There is no compelling reason to disregard the established rules and permit the interventions belatedly filed after the promulgation of the Court's Decision.15 Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and Communications and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914) Banking on this Court's declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO is null and

void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC) filed before this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order), praying of this Court that: (1) After due hearing, judgment be rendered commanding the Respondents, their officers, agents, successors, representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf, to formally award the NAIA-APT [sic] III PROJECT to Petitioner AEDC and to execute and formalize with Petitioner AEDC the approved Draft Concession Agreement embodying the agreed terms and conditions for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project and directing Respondents to cease and desist from awarding the NAIA-IPT Project to third parties or negotiating into any concession contract with third parties. (2) Pending resolution on the merits, a Temporary Restraining Order be issued enjoining Respondents, their officers, agents, successors or representatives or persons or entities acting on their behalf from negotiating, re-bidding, awarding or otherwise entering into any concession contract with PIATCO and other third parties for the operation of the NAIA-IPT III Project. Other relief and remedies, just and equitable under the premises, are likewise prayed for.16 AEDC bases its Petition on the following grounds: I. PETITIONER AEDC, BEING THE RECOGNIZED AND UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL PROPONENT, HAS THE EXCLUSIVE, CLEAR AND VESTED STATUTORY RIGHT TO THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT; II. RESPONDENTS HAVE A STATUTORY DUTY TO PROTECT PETITIONER AEDC AS THE UNCHALLENGED ORIGINAL PROPONENT AS A RESULT OF THE SUPREME COURT'S NULLIFICATION OF THE AWARD OF THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT TO PIATCO[; and] III. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LEGAL BASIS OR AUTHORITY TO TAKE OVER THE NAIA-IPT III PROJECT, TO THE EXCLUSION OF PETITIONER AEDC, OR TO AWARD THE PROJECT TO THIRD PARTIES.17 At the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof. However, the Petition of AEDC should be dismissed for lack of merit, being as it is, substantially and procedurally flawed. SUBSTANTIVE INFIRMITY A petition for mandamus is governed by Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads – SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus. – When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent. It is well-established in our jurisprudence that only specific legal rights are enforceable by mandamus, that the right sought to be enforced must be certain and clear, and that the writ will not issue in cases where the right is doubtful. Just as fundamental is the principle governing the issuance of mandamus that the duties to be performed must be such as are clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station.18 A rule long familiar is that mandamus never issues in doubtful cases. It requires a showing of a complete and clear legal right in the petitioner to the performance of ministerial acts. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Otherwise, the mandamus petition must be dismissed.19 The right that AEDC is seeking to enforce is supposedly enjoined by Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957,20

as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, on unsolicited proposals, which provides – SEC. 4-A. Unsolicited proposals. – Unsolicited proposals for projects may be accepted by any government agency or local government unit on a negotiated basis: Provided, That, all the following conditions are met: (1) such projects involve a new concept or technology and/or are not part of the list of priority projects, (2) no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required, and (3) the government agency or local government unit has invited by publication, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, comparative or competitive proposals and no other proposal is received for a period of sixty (60) working days: Provided, further, That in the event another proponent submits a lower price proposal, the original proponent shall have the right to match the price within thirty (30) working days. In furtherance of the afore-quoted provision, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, devoted the entire Rule 10 to Unsolicited Proposals, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below – Sec. 10.1. Requisites for Unsolicited Proposals. – Any Agency/LGU may accept unsolicited proposals on a negotiated basis provided that all the following conditions are met: a. the project involves a new concept or technology and/or is not part of the list of priority projects; b. no direct government guarantee, subsidy or equity is required; and c. the Agency/LGU concerned has invited by publication, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation, comparative or competitive proposals and no other proposal is received for a period of sixty (60) working days. In the event that another project proponent submits a price proposal lower than that submitted by the original proponent, the latter shall have the right to match said price proposal within thirty (30) working days. Should the original proponent fail to match the lower price proposal submitted within the specified period, the contract shall be awarded to the tenderer of the lowest price. On the other hand, if the original project proponent matches the submitted lowest price within the specified period, he shall be immediately be awarded the project. xxxx Sec. 10.6. Evaluation of Unsolicited Proposals. – The Agency/LGU is tasked with the initial evaluation of the proposal. The Agency/LGU shall: 1) appraise the merits of the project; 2) evaluate the qualification of the proponent; and 3) assess the appropriateness of the contractual arrangement and reasonableness of the risk allocation. The Agency/LGU is given sixty (60) days to evaluate the proposal from the date of submission of the complete proposal. Within this 60-day period, the Agency/LGU, shall advise the proponent in writing whether it accepts or rejects the proposal. Acceptance means commitment of the Agency/LGU to pursue the project and recognition of the proponent as the "original proponent." At this point, the Agency/LGU will no longer entertain other similar proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals. The implementation of the project, however, is still contingent primarily on the approval of the appropriate approving authorities consistent with Section 2.7 of these IRR, the agreement between the original proponent and the Agency/LGU of the contract terms, and the approval of the contract by the [Investment Coordination Committee (ICC)] or Local Sanggunian. xxxx Sec. 10.9. Negotiation With the Original Proponent. – Immediately after ICC/Local Sanggunian's clearance of the project, the Agency/LGU shall proceed with the in-depth negotiation of the project scope, implementation arrangements and concession agreement, all of which will be used in the Terms of Reference for the solicitation of comparative proposals. The Agency/LGU and the proponent are given ninety (90) days upon receipt of ICC's approval of the project to conclude negotiations. The Agency/LGU and the original proponent shall negotiate in good faith. However, should there be unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the Agency/LGU shall have the option to reject the proposal and bid out the project. On the other hand, if the negotiation is successfully concluded, the original proponent shall then be required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance with the requirements of the Terms of Reference to facilitate comparison with the comparative proposals. The Agency/LGU shall validate the reformatted proposal if it meets the requirements of the TOR prior to the issuance of the invitation for comparative proposals.

xxxx Sec. 10.11. Invitation for Comparative Proposals. The Agency/LGU shall publish the invitation for comparative or competitive proposals only after ICC/Local Sanggunian issues a no objection clearance of the draft contract. The invitation for comparative or competitive proposals should be published at least once every week for three (3) weeks in at least one (1) newspaper of general circulation. It shall indicate the time, which should not be earlier than the last date of publication, and place where tender/bidding documents could be obtained. It shall likewise explicitly specify a time of sixty (60) working days reckoned from the date of issuance of the tender/bidding documents upon which proposals shall be received. Beyond said deadline, no proposals shall be accepted. A pre-bid conference shall be conducted ten (10) working days after the issuance of the tender/bidding documents. Sec. 10.12. Posting of Bid Bond by Original Proponent. – The original proponent shall be required at the date of the first date of the publication of the invitation for comparative proposals to submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the form required of the challengers. Sec. 10.13. Simultaneous Qualification of the Original Proponent. – The Agency/LGU shall qualify the original proponent based on the provisions of Rule 5 hereof, within thirty (30) days from start of negotiation. For consistency, the evaluation criteria used for qualifying the original proponent should be the same criteria used for qualifying the original proponent should be the criteria used in the Terms of Reference for the challengers. xxxx Sec. 10.16. Disclosure of the Price Proposal. – The disclosure of the price proposal of the original proponent in the Tender Documents will be left to the discretion of the Agency/LGU. However, if it was not disclosed in the Tender Documents, the original proponent's price proposal should be revealed upon the opening of the financial proposals of the challengers. The right of the original proponent to match the best proposal within thirty (30) working days starts upon official notification by the Agency/LGU of the most advantageous financial proposal. (Emphasis ours.) In her sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1586 (the precursor of Republic Act No. 7718), then Senator (now President of the Republic of the Philippines) Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo explained the reason behind the proposed amendment that would later become Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718: The object of the amendment is to protect proponents which have already incurred costs in the conceptual design and in the preparation of the proposal, and which may have adopted an imaginative method of construction or innovative concept for the proposal. The amendment also aims to harness the ingenuity of the private sector to come up with solutions to the country's infrastructure problems.21 It is irrefragable that Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, and Section 10 of its IRR, accord certain rights or privileges to the original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project. They are meant to encourage private sector initiative in conceptualizing infrastructure projects that would benefit the public. Nevertheless, none of these rights or privileges would justify the automatic award of the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC after its previous award to PIATCO was declared null and void by this Court in Agan. The rights or privileges of an original proponent of an unsolicited proposal for an infrastructure project are never meant to be absolute. Otherwise, the original proponent can hold the Government hostage and secure the award of the infrastructure project based solely on the fact that it was the first to submit a proposal. The absurdity of such a situation becomes even more apparent when considering that the proposal is unsolicited by the Government. The rights or privileges of an original proponent depends on compliance with the procedure and conditions explicitly provided by the statutes and their IRR. An unsolicited proposal is subject to evaluation, after which, the government agency or local government unit (LGU) concerned may accept or reject the proposal outright. Under Section 10.6 of the IRR, the "acceptance" of the unsolicited proposal by the agency/LGU is limited to the "commitment of the [a]gency/LGU to pursue the project and recognition of the proponent as the 'original proponent.'" Upon acceptance then of the unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is recognized as such but no award is yet made to it. The commitment of the agency/LGU upon acceptance of the unsolicited proposal is to the pursuit of the project, regardless of to whom it shall subsequently award the same. The

acceptance of the unsolicited proposal only precludes the agency/LGU from entertaining other similar proposals until the solicitation of comparative proposals. Consistent in both the statutes and the IRR is the requirement that invitations be published for comparative or competitive proposals. Therefore, it is mandatory that a public bidding be held before the awarding of the project. The negotiations between the agency/LGU and the original proponent, as provided in Section 10.9 of the IRR, is for the sole purpose of coming up with draft agreements, which shall be used in the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the solicitation of comparative proposals. Even at this point, there is no definite commitment made to the original proponent as to the awarding of the project. In fact, the same IRR provision even gives the concerned agency/LGU, in case of unresolvable differences during the negotiations, the option to reject the original proponent's proposal and just bid out the project. Generally, in the course of processing an unsolicited proposal, the original proponent is treated in much the same way as all other prospective bidders for the proposed infrastructure project. It is required to reformat and resubmit its proposal in accordance with the requirements of the TOR.22 It must submit a bid bond equal to the amount and in the form required of the challengers.23 Its qualification shall be evaluated by the concerned agency/LGU, using evaluation criteria in accordance with Rule 524 of the IRR, and which shall be the same criteria to be used in the TOR for the challengers.25 These requirements ensure that the public bidding under Rule 10 of IRR on Unsolicited Proposals still remain in accord with the three principles in public bidding, which are: the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition, and a basis for exact comparison of bids.26 The special rights or privileges of an original proponent thus come into play only when there are other proposals submitted during the public bidding of the infrastructure project. As can be gleaned from the plain language of the statutes and the IRR, the original proponent has: (1) the right to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within 30 working days from notice thereof, and (2) in the event that the original proponent is able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal submitted, then it has the right to be awarded the project. The second right or privilege is contingent upon the actual exercise by the original proponent of the first right or privilege. Before the project could be awarded to the original proponent, he must have been able to match the lowest or most advantageous proposal within the prescribed period. Hence, when the original proponent is able to timely match the lowest or most advantageous proposal, with all things being equal, it shall enjoy preference in the awarding of the infrastructure project. This is the extent of the protection that Legislature intended to afford the original proponent, as supported by the exchange between Senators Neptali Gonzales and Sergio Osmeña during the Second Reading of Senate Bill No. 1586: Senator Gonzales: xxxx The concept being that in case of an unsolicited proposal and nonetheless public bidding has been held, then [the original proponent] shall, in effect, be granted what is the equivalent of the right of first refusal by offering a bid which shall equal or better the bid of the winning bidder within a period of, let us say, 30 days from the date of bidding. Senator Osmeña: xxxx To capture the tenor of the proposal of the distinguished Gentleman, a subsequent paragraph has to be added which says, "IF THERE IS A COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL, THE ORIGINAL PROPONENT SHALL HAVE THE RIGHT TO EQUAL THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE COMPETITIVE PROPOSAL." In other words, if there is nobody who will submit a competitive proposal, then nothing is lost. Everybody knows it, and it is open and transparent. But if somebody comes in with another proposal – and because it was the idea of the original proponent – that proponent now has the right to equal the terms of the original proposal. SENATOR GONZALES: That is the idea, Mr. President. Because it seems to me that it is utterly unfair for one who has conceived an idea or a concept, spent and invested in feasibility studies, in the drawing of plans and specifications, and the project is submitted to a public bidding, then somebody will win on the basis of plans and specifications and concepts conceived by the original proponent. He should at least be given the right to submit an equalizing bid. x x x.27 (Emphasis ours.)

thus, is but a component of the construction of the structures and not the entirety thereof. As already found by this Court in the narration of facts in Agan, AEDC failed to match the more advantageous proposal submitted by PIATCO by the time the 30-day working period expired on 28 November 1996;28 and, without exercising its right to match the most advantageous proposal, it cannot now lay claim to the award of the project. The bidding process as to the NAIA IPT III Project was already over after the award thereof to PIATCO, even if eventually, the said award was nullified and voided. The nullification of the award to PIATCO did not revive the proposal nor re-open the bidding. AEDC cannot insist that this Court turn back the hands of time and award the NAIA IPT III Project to it, as if the bid of PIATCO never existed and the award of the project to PIATCO did not take place. Such is a simplistic approach to a very complex problem that is the NAIA IPT III Project. In his separate opinion in Agan, former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted that "[T]here was effectively no public bidding to speak of, the entire bidding process having been flawed and tainted from the very outset, therefore, the award of the concession to Paircargo's successor Piatco was void, and the Concession Agreement executed with the latter was likewise void ab initio. x x x.29" (Emphasis ours.) In consideration of such a declaration that the entire bidding process was flawed and tainted from the very beginning, then, it would be senseless to re-open the same to determine to whom the project should have been properly awarded to. The process and all proposals and bids submitted in participation thereof, and not just PIATCO's, were placed in doubt, and it would be foolhardy for the Government to rely on them again. At the very least, it may be declared that there was a failure of public bidding.30 In addition, PIATCO is already close to finishing the building of the structures comprising NAIA IPT III,31 a fact that this Court cannot simply ignore. The NAIA IPT III Project was proposed, subjected to bidding, and awarded as a build-operate-transfer (BOT) project. A BOT project is defined as – A contractual arrangement whereby the project proponent undertakes the construction, including financing, of a given infrastructure facility, and the operation and maintenance thereof. The project proponent operates the facility over a fixed term during which it is allowed to charge facility users appropriate tolls, fees, rentals, and charges not exceeding those proposed in its bid or as negotiated and incorporated in the contract to enable the project proponent to recover its investment, and operating and maintenance expenses in the project. The project proponent transfers the facility to the government agency or local government unit concerned at the end of the fixed term that shall not exceed fifty (50) years. This shall include a supply-andoperate situation which is a contractual arrangement whereby the supplier of equipment and machinery for a given infrastructure facility, if the interest of the Government so requires, operates the facility providing in the process technology transfer and training to Filipino nationals.32 (Emphasis ours.) The original proposal of AEDC is for a BOT project, in which it undertook to build, operate, and transfer to the Government the NAIA IPT III facilities. This is clearly no longer applicable or practicable under the existing circumstances. It is undeniable that the physical structures comprising the NAIA IPT III Project are already substantially built, and there is almost nothing left for AEDC to construct. Hence, the project could no longer be awarded to AEDC based on the theory of legal impossibility of performance. Neither can this Court revert to the original proposal of AEDC and award to it only the unexecuted components of the NAIA IPT III Project. Whoever shall assume the obligation to operate and maintain NAIA IPT III and to subsequently transfer the same to the Government (in case the operation is not assumed by the Government itself) shall have to do so on terms and conditions that would necessarily be different from the original proposal of AEDC. It will no longer include any undertaking to build or construct the structures. An amendment of the proposal of AEDC to address the present circumstances is out of the question since such an amendment would be substantive and tantamount to an entirely new proposal, which must again be subjected to competitive bidding. AEDC's offer to reimburse the Government the amount it shall pay to PIATCO for the NAIA IPT III Project facilities, as shall be determined in the ongoing expropriation proceedings before the RTC of Pasay City, cannot restore AEDC to its status and rights as the project proponent. It must be stressed that the law requires the project proponent to undertake the construction of the project, including financing; financing,

Moreover, this "reimbursement arrangement" may even result in the unjust enrichment of AEDC. In its original proposal, AEDC offered to construct the NAIA IPT III facilities for $350 million or P9 billion at that time. In exchange, AEDC would share a certain percentage of the gross revenues with, and pay a guaranteed annual income to the Government upon operation of the NAIA IPT III. In Gingoyon, the proferred value of the NAIA IPT III facilities was already determined to be P3 billion. It seems improbable at this point that the balance of the value of said facilities for which the Government is still obligated to pay PIATCO shall reach or exceed P6 billion. There is thus the possibility that the Government shall be required to pay PIATCO an amount less than P9 billion. If AEDC is to reimburse the Government only for the said amount, then it shall acquire the NAIA IPT III facilities for a price less than its original proposal of P9 billion. Yet, per the other terms of its original proposal, it may still recoup a capital investment of P9 billion plus a reasonable rate of return of investment. A change in the agreed value of the NAIA IPT III facilities already built cannot be done without a corresponding amendment in the other terms of the original proposal as regards profit sharing and length of operation; otherwise, AEDC will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the Government. Again, as aptly stated by former Chief Justice Panganiban, in his separate opinion in Agan: If the PIATCO contracts are junked altogether as I think they should be, should not AEDC automatically be considered the winning bidder and therefore allowed to operate the facility? My answer is a stone-cold 'No.' AEDC never won the bidding, never signed any contract, and never built any facility. Why should it be allowed to automatically step in and benefit from the greed of another?33 The claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project, after the award thereof to PIATCO was set aside for being null and void, grounded solely on its being the original proponent of the project, is specious and an apparent stretch in the interpretation of Section 4-A of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, and Rule 10 of the IRR. In all, just as AEDC has no legal right to the NAIA IPT III Project, corollarily, it has no legal right over the NAIA IPT III facility. AEDC does not own the NAIA IPT III facility, which this Court already recognized in Gingoyon as owned by PIATCO; nor does AEDC own the land on which NAIA IPT III stands, which is undisputedly owned by the Republic through the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA). AEDC did not fund any portion of the construction of NAIA IPT III, which was entirely funded by PIATCO. AEDC also does not have any kind of lien over NAIA IPT III or any kind of legal entitlement to occupy the facility or the land on which it stands. Therefore, nothing that the Government has done or will do in relation to the project could possibly prejudice or injure AEDC. AEDC then does not possess any legal personality to interfere with or restrain the activities of the Government as regards NAIA IPT III. Neither does it have the legal personality to demand that the Government deliver or sell to it the NAIA IPT III facility despite the express willingness of AEDC to reimburse the Government the proferred amount it had paid PIATCO and complete NAIA IPT III facility at its own cost. AEDC invokes the Memorandum of Agreement, purportedly executed between the DOTC and AEDC on 26 February 1996, following the approval of the NAIA IPT III Project by the National Economic Development Authority Board in a Resolution dated 13 February 1996, which provided for the following commitments by the parties: a. commitment of Respondent DOTC to target mid 1996 as the time frame for the formal award of the project and commencement of site preparation and construction activities with the view of a partial opening of the Terminal by the first quarter of 1998; b. commitment of Respondent DOTC to pursue the project envisioned in the unsolicited proposal and commence and conclude as soon as possible negotiations with Petitioner AEDC on the BOT contract; c. commitment of Respondent DOTC to make appropriate arrangements through which the formal award of the project can be affected[;] d. commitment of Petitioner AEDC to a fast track approach to project implementation and to commence negotiations with its financial partners, investors and creditors; e. commitment of Respondent DOTC and Petitioner AEDC to fast track evaluation of competitive proposals, screening and eliminating nuisance comparative bids;34

It is important to note, however, that the document attached as Annex "E" to the Petition of AEDC is a "certified photocopy of records on file." This Court cannot give much weight to said document considering that its existence and due execution have not been established. It is not notarized, so it does not enjoy the presumption of regularity of a public document. It is not even witnessed by anyone. It is not certified true by its supposed signatories, Secretary Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. for DOTC and Chairman Henry Sy, Sr. for AEDC, or by any government agency having its custody. It is certified as a photocopy of records on file by an Atty. Cecilia L. Pesayco, the Corporate Secretary, of an unidentified corporation. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that the said Memorandum of Agreement, is in existence and duly executed, it does little to support the claim of AEDC to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The commitments undertaken by the DOTC and AEDC in the Memorandum of Agreement may be simply summarized as a commitment to comply with the procedure and requirements provided in Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR. It bears no commitment on the part of the DOTC to award the NAIA IPT III Project to AEDC. On the contrary, the document includes express stipulations that negate any such government obligation. Thus, in the first clause,35 the DOTC affirmed its commitment to pursue, implement and complete the NAIA IPT III Project on or before 1998, noticeably without mentioning that such commitment was to pursue the project specifically with AEDC. Likewise, in the second clause,36 it was emphasized that the DOTC shall pursue the project under Rules 10 and 11 of the IRR of Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718. And most significantly, the tenth clause of the same document provided: 10. Nothing in this Memorandum of Understanding shall be understood, interpreted or construed as permitting, allowing or authorizing the circumvention of, or non-compliance with, or as waiving, the provisions of, and requirements and procedures under, existing laws, rules and regulations.37 AEDC further decries that: 24. In carrying out its commitments under the DOTC-AEDC MOU, Petitioner AEDC undertook the following activities, incurring in the process tremendous costs and expenses. a. pre-qualified 46 design and contractor firms to assist in the NAIA-IPT III Project; b. appointed a consortium of six (6) local banks as its financial advisor in June 1996; c. hired the services of GAIA South, Inc. to prepare the Project Description Report and to obtain the Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) for the NAIA-IPT III Project; d. coordinated with the Airline Operators Association, Bases Conversion Development Authority, Philippine Air Force, Bureau of Customs, Bureau of Immigration, relative to their particular requirements regarding the NAIA-IPT III [P]roject; and e. negotiated and entered into firm commitments with Ital Thai, Marubeni Corporation and Mitsui Corporation as equity partners.38 While the Court may concede that AEDC, as the original proponent, already expended resources in its preparation and negotiation of its unsolicited proposal, the mere fact thereof does not entitle it to the instant award of the NAIA IPT III Project. AEDC was aware that the said project would have to undergo public bidding, and there existed the possibility that another proponent may submit a more advantageous bid which it cannot match; in which case, the project shall be awarded to the other proponent and AEDC would then have no means to recover the costs and expenses it already incurred on its unsolicited proposal. It was a given business risk that AEDC knowingly undertook. Additionally, the very defect upon which this Court nullified the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO similarly taints the unsolicited proposal of AEDC. This Court found Paircargo Consortium financially disqualified after striking down as incorrect the PBAC's assessment of the consortium's financial capability. According to the Court's ratio in Agan: As the minimum project cost was estimated to be US$350,000,000.00 or roughly P9,183,650,000.00, the Paircargo Consortium had to show to the satisfaction of the PBAC that it had the ability to provide the minimum equity for the project in the amount of at least P2,755,095,000.00. xxxx Thus, the maximum amount that Security Bank could validly invest in the Paircargo Consortium is only P528,525,656.55, representing 15% of its entire net worth. The total net worth therefore of the Paircargo Consortium, after considering the maximum amounts that may be validly invested by each of its members is P558,384,871.55 or only 6.08% of the project cost, an amount

substantially less than the prescribed minimum equity investment required for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost. The purpose of pre-qualification in any public bidding is to determine, at the earliest opportunity, the ability of the bidder to undertake the project. Thus, with respect to the bidder's financial capacity at the pre-qualification stage, the law requires the government agency to examine and determine the ability of the bidder to fund the entire cost of the project by considering the maximum amounts that each bidder may invest in the project at the time of prequalification. xxxx Thus, if the maximum amount of equity that a bidder may invest in the project at the time the bids are submitted falls short of the minimum amounts required to be put up by the bidder, said bidder should be properly disqualified. Considering that at the pre-qualification stage, the maximum amounts which the Paircargo Consortium may invest in the project fell short of the minimum amounts prescribed by the PBAC, we hold that Paircargo Consortium was not a qualified bidder. Thus the award of the contract by the PBAC to the Paircargo Consortium, a disqualified bidder, is null and void.39 Pursuant to the above-quoted ruling, AEDC, like the Paircargo Consortium, would not be financially qualified to undertake the NAIA IPT III Project. Based on AEDC's own submissions to the Government, it had then a paid-in capital of only P150,000,000.00,40 which was less than the P558,384,871.55 that Paircargo Consortium was capable of investing in the NAIA IPT III Project, and even far less that what this Court prescribed as the minimum equity investment required for the project in the amount of P2,755,095,000.00 or 30% of the project cost. AEDC had not sufficiently demonstrated that it would have been financially qualified to undertake the project at the time of submission of the bids. Instead, AEDC took pains to present to this Court that allowing it to take over and operate NAIA IPT III at present would be beneficial to the Government. This Court must point out, however, that AEDC is precisely making a new proposal befitting the current status of the NAIA IPT III Project, contrary to its own argument that it is merely invoking its original BOT proposal. And it is not for this Court to evaluate AEDC's new proposal and assess whether it would truly be most beneficial for the Government, for the same is an executive function rather than judicial, for which the statutes and regulations have sufficiently provided standards and procedures for evaluation. It can even be said that if the award of the NAIA IPT III Project was merely a matter of choosing between PIATCO and AEDC (which it is not), there could be no doubt that PIATCO is more qualified to operate the structure that PIATCO itself built and PIATCO's offer of P17.75 Billion in annual guaranteed payments to the Government is far better that AEDC's offer of P135 Million. Hence, AEDC is not entitled to a writ of mandamus, there being no specific, certain, and clear legal right to be enforced, nor duty to be performed that is clearly and peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. PROCEDURAL LAPSES In addition to the substantive weaknesses of the Petition of AEDC, the said Petition also suffers from procedural defects. AEDC revived its hope to acquire the NAIA IPT III Project when this Court promulgated its Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. The said Decision became final and executory on 17 February 2004 upon the denial by this Court of the Motion for Leave to File Second Motion for Reconsideration submitted by PIATCO. It is this Decision that declared the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO as null and void; without the same, then the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO would still subsist and other persons would remain precluded from acquiring rights thereto, including AEDC. Irrefutably, the present claim of AEDC is rooted in the Decision of this Court in Agan. However, AEDC filed the Petition at bar only 20 months after the promulgation of the Decision in Agan on 5 May 2003. It must be emphasized that under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the revised Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions for prohibition and mandamus, such as in the instant case, can only be resorted to when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the party in the ordinary course of law.

In Cruz v. Court of Appeals,41 this Court elucidates that – Although Rule 65 does not specify any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus, it must, nevertheless, be filed within a reasonable time. In certiorari cases, the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the commission of the complained act. The same rule should apply to mandamus cases. The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioner's mandamus suit unerringly negates any claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy was the most expeditious and speedy available to the petitioner. (Emphasis ours.) As the revised Rules now stand, a petition for certiorari may be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed.42 Reasonable time for filing a petition for mandamus should likewise be for the same period. The filing by the AEDC of its petition for mandamus 20 months after its supposed right to the project arose is evidently beyond reasonable time and negates any claim that the said petition for the extraordinary writ was the most expeditious and speedy remedy available to AEDC. AEDC contends that the "reasonable time" within which it should have filed its petition should be reckoned only from 21 September 2005, the date when AEDC received the letter from the Office of the Solicitor General refusing to recognize the rights of AEDC to provide the available funds for the completion of the NAIA IPT III Project and to reimburse the costs of the structures already built by PIATCO. It has been unmistakable that even long before said letter – especially when the Government instituted with the RTC of Pasay City expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III on 21 December 2004 – that the Government would not recognize any right that AEDC purportedly had over the NAIA IPT III Project and that the Government is intent on taking over and operating the NAIA IPT III itself. Another strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it is already barred by res judicata. In Agan,43 it was noted that on 16 April 1997, the AEDC instituted before the RTC of Pasig City Civil Case No. 66213, a Petition for the Declaration of Nullity of the Proceedings, Mandamus and Injunction, against the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members.

Government, PIATCO shall be entitled to full reimbursement for all costs and expenses it incurred in order to obtain the NAIA IPT III BOT project in an amount not less than One Hundred Eighty Million Pesos (Php 180,000,000.00). This was apparently the reason why the President was determined to have AEDC's case dismissed immediately. n) On February 9, 1999, after the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (hereinafter referred to as "ARCA") was signed without Petitioner AEDC's knowledge, Petitioner AEDC signed a Joint Motion to Dismiss upon the representation of the DOTC that it would provide AEDC with a copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement. x x x.45 On 30 April 1999, the RTC of Pasig City issued an Order dismissing with prejudice Civil Case No. 66213 upon the execution by the parties of a Joint Motion to Dismiss. According to the Joint Motion to Dismiss – The parties, assisted by their respective counsel, respectfully state: 1. Philippine International Air Terminals Company, Inc. ("PIATCO") and the respondents have submitted to petitioner, through the Office of the Executive Secretary, Malacañang, a copy of the Concession Agreement which they executed for the construction and operation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III Project ("NAIA IPT III Project), which petitioner requested. 2. Consequently, the parties have decided to amicably settle the instant case and jointly move for the dismissal thereof without any of the parties admitting liability or conceding to the position taken by the other in the instant case. 3. Petitioner, on the other hand, and the respondents, on the other hand, hereby release and forever discharge each other from any and all liabilities, direct or indirect, whether criminal or civil, which arose in connection with the instant case. 4. The parties agree to bear the costs, attorney's fees and other expenses they respectively incurred in connection with the instant case. (Emphasis ours.) AEDC, however, invokes the purported pressure exerted upon it by then President Joseph E. Estrada, the alleged fraud committed by the DOTC, and paragraph 2 in the afore-quoted Joint Motion to Dismiss to justify the non-application of the doctrine of res judicata to its present Petition.

In Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC prayed for: i) the nullification of the proceedings before the DOTC-PBAC, including its decision to qualify Paircargo Consortium and to deny Petitioner AEDC's access to Paircargo Consortium's technical and financial bid documents; ii) the protection of Petitioner AEDC's right to match considering the void challenge bid of the Paircargo Consortium and the denial by DOTC-PBAC of access to information vital to the effective exercise of its right to match; iii) the declaration of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid in an unsolicited proposal.44 Despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 66213, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO on 9 July 1997. The DOTC and PIATCO also executed on 12 July 1997 the 1997 Concession Agreement. AEDC then alleges that: k) On September 3, 1998, then Pres. Joseph Ejercito Estrada convened a meeting with the members of the Board of Petitioner AEDC to convey his "desire" for the dismissal of the mandamus case filed by Petition AEDC and in fact urged AEDC to immediately withdraw said case. l) The President's direct intervention in the disposition of this mandamus case was a clear imposition that Petitioner AEDC had not choice but to accept. To do otherwise was to take a confrontational stance against the most powerful man in the country then under the risk of catching his ire, which could have led to untold consequences upon the business interests of the stakeholders in AEDC. Thus, Petitioner AEDC was constrained to agree to the signing of a Joint Motion to Dismiss and to the filing of the same in court. m) Unbeknownst to AEDC at that time was that simultaneous with the signing of the July 12, 1997 Concession Agreement, the DOTC and PIATCO executed a secret side agreement grossly prejudicial and detrimental to the interest of Government. It stipulated that in the event that the Civil Case filed by AEDC on April 16, 1997 is not resolved in a manner favorable to the

The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as follows: (1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.46 All of the elements are present herein so as to bar the present Petition. First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not appealable.47 Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment on the merits. The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case amicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a provision in which the parties – the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and PBAC, on the other – released and forever discharged each other from any and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It is undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.48" Essentially, it is a contract perfected by mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once an agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment.49 Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that a compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata. Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was accordingly a judicial settlement of the

controversy, and the Order, dated 30 April 1999, of the RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only upon the ground of extrinsic fraud.50 Thus, the RTC of Pasig City, in the same Order, correctly granted the dismissal of Civil Case No. 66213 with prejudice. A scrutiny of the Joint Motion to Dismiss submitted to the RTC of Pasig City would reveal that the parties agreed to discharge one another from any and all liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising from the case, after AEDC was furnished with a copy of the 1997 Concession Agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. This complete waiver was the reciprocal concession of the parties that puts to an end the present litigation, without any residual right in the parties to litigate the same in the future. Logically also, there was no more need for the parties to admit to any liability considering that they already agreed to absolutely discharge each other therefrom, without necessarily conceding to the other's position. For AEDC, it was a declaration that even if it was not conceding to the Government's position, it was nonetheless waiving any legal entitlement it might have to sue the Government on account of the NAIA IPT III Project. Conversely, for the Government, it was an avowal that even if it was not accepting AEDC's stance, it was all the same relinquishing its right to file any suit against AEDC in connection with the same project. That none of the parties admitted liability or conceded its position is without bearing on the validity or binding effect of the compromise agreement, considering that these were not essential to the said compromise. Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the subject matter and parties in Civil Case No. 66213. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.51 To recall, the Petition of AEDC before the RTC of Pasig City was for the declaration of nullity of proceedings, mandamus and injunction. The RTC of Pasig City likewise had jurisdiction over the parties, with the voluntary submission by AEDC and proper service of summons on the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members. Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the Petition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the petitioner. The respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the PBAC Chairman and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC, the DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA). While it may be conceded that MIAA was not a respondent and did not participate in Civil Case No. 66213, it may be considered a successor-in-interest of the PBAC. When Civil Case No. 66213 was initiated, PBAC was then in charge of the NAIA IPT III Project, and had the authority to evaluate the bids and award the project to the one offering the lowest or most advantageous bid. Since the bidding is already over, and the structures comprising NAIA IPT III are now built, then MIAA has taken charge thereof. Furthermore, it is clear that it has been the intention of the AEDC to name as respondents in their two Petitions the government agency/ies and official/s who, at the moment each Petition was filed, had authority over the NAIA IPT III Project. There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve none other than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT III Project. There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is asserting the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project as the original proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders. As early as in Civil Case No. 66213, AEDC already sought a declaration by the court of the absence of any other qualified proponent submitting a competitive bid for the NAIA IPT III Project, which, ultimately, would result in the award of the said project to it. AEDC attempts to evade the effects of its compromise agreement by alleging that it was compelled to enter into such an agreement when former President Joseph E. Estrada asserted his influence and intervened in Civil Case No. 66213. This allegation deserves scant consideration. Without any proof that such events did take place, such statements remain mere allegations that cannot be given weight. One who alleges any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the same by full, clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance thereof.52 And, even assuming arguendo, that the consent of AEDC to the compromise agreement was indeed vitiated, then President Estrada was removed from office in January 2001. AEDC filed the present Petition only on 20 October 2005. The four-year prescriptive period, within which an action to annul a voidable contract may be brought, had already expired.53 The AEDC further claims that the DOTC committed fraud when, without AEDC's knowledge, the DOTC

entered into an Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA) with PIATCO. The fraud on the part of the DOTC purportedly also vitiated AEDC's consent to the compromise agreement. It is true that a judicial compromise may be set aside if fraud vitiated the consent of a party thereof; and that the extrinsic fraud, which nullifies a compromise, likewise invalidates the decision approving it.54 However, once again, AEDC's allegations of fraud are unsubstantiated. There is no proof that the DOTC and PIATCO willfully and deliberately suppressed and kept the information on the execution of the ARCA from AEDC. The burden of proving that there indeed was fraud lies with the party making such allegation. Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side. In this jurisdiction, fraud is never presumed.55 Moreover, a judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from judgment. Section 3 thereof prescribes the periods within which the petition for relief must be filed: SEC. 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification.– A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken, and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. According to this Court's ruling in Argana v. Republic,56 as applied to a judgment based on compromise, both the 60-day and six-month reglementary periods within which to file a petition for relief should be reckoned from the date when the decision approving the compromise agreement was rendered because such judgment is considered immediately executory and entered on the date that it was approved by the court. In the present case, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City granting the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties in Civil Case No. 66213 was issued on 30 April 1999, yet AEDC only spoke of the alleged fraud which vitiated its consent thereto in its Petition before this Court filed on 20 October 2005, more than six years later. It is obvious that the assertion by AEDC of its vitiated consent to the Joint Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 66213 is nothing more than an after-thought and a desperate attempt to escape the legal implications thereof, including the barring of its present Petition on the ground of res judicata. It is also irrelevant to the legal position of AEDC that the Government asserted in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT III Project to PIATCO was void. That the Government eventually took such a position, which this Court subsequently upheld, does not affect AEDC's commitments and obligations under its judiciallyapproved compromise agreement in Civil Case No. 66213, which AEDC signed willingly, knowingly, and ably assisted by legal counsel. In addition, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental change in the Government's position since Civil Case No. 66213, contrary to the allegation of AEDC. The Government then espoused that AEDC is not entitled to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project. The Government still maintains the exact same position presently. That the Government eventually reversed its position on the validity of its award of the project to PIATCO is not inconsistent with its position that neither should AEDC be awarded the project. For the foregoing substantive and procedural reasons, the instant Petition of AEDC should be dismissed. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Baterina (G.R. No. 174166) As mentioned in Gingoyon, expropriation proceedings for the NAIA IPT III was instituted by the Government with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Case No. 04-0876CFM. Congressman Baterina, together with other members of the House of Representatives, sought intervention in Case No. 04-0876CFM by filing a Petition for Prohibition in Intervention (with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction). Baterina, et al. believe that the Government need not file expropriation proceedings to gain possession of NAIA IPT III and that PIATCO is not entitled to payment of just compensation, arguing thus – A) Respondent PIATCO does not own Terminal III because BOT Contracts do not vest ownership in PIATCO. As such, neither PIATCO nor FRAPORT are entitled to compensation.

B) Articles 448, ET SEQ., of the New Civil Code, as regards builders in good faith/bad faith, do not apply to PIATCO's Construction of Terminal III. C) Article 1412(2) of the New Civil Code allows the Government to demand the return of what it has given without any obligation to comply with its promise. D) The payment of compensation to PIATCO is unconstitutional, violative of the Build-OperateTransfer Law, and violates the Civil Code and other laws. 57 On 27 October 2005, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order admitting the Petition in Intervention of Baterina, et al., as well as the Complaint in Intervention of Manuel L. Fortes, Jr. and the Answer in Intervention of Gina B. Alnas, et al. The Republic sought reconsideration of the 27 October 2005 Order of the RTC of Pasay City, which, in an Omnibus Order dated 13 December 2005, was denied by the RTC of Pasay City as regards the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes, but granted as to the intervention of Alnas, et al. On 22 March 2006, Baterina, et al. filed with the RTC of Pasay City a Motion to Declare in Default and/or Motion for Summary Judgment considering that the Republic and PIATCO failed to file an answer or any responsive pleading to their Petition for Prohibition in Intervention. In the meantime, on 19 December 2005, the Court's Decision in Gingoyon was promulgated. Baterina also filed a Motion for Intervention in said case and sought reconsideration of the Decision therein. However, his Motion for Intervention was denied by this Court in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006. On 27 March 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order and Writ of Execution, the dispositive portion of which reads – WHEREFORE, let a writ of execution be issued in this case directing the Sheriff of this court to immediately implement the Order dated January 4, 2005 and January 10, 2005, as affirmed by the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 166429 in the above-entitled case dated December 19, 2005, in the following manner: 1. Ordering the General Manager, the Senior Assistant General Manager and the Vice President of Finance of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) to immediately withdraw the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from the above-mentioned Certificates of US Dollar Time Deposits with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch; 2. Ordering the Branch Manager, Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch to immediately release the sum of P3,002,125,000.00 to PIATCO; Return of Service of the Writs shall be made by the Sheriff of this court immediately thereafter;58 The RTC of Pasay City, in an Order, dated 15 June 2006, denied the Motions for Reconsideration of its Order and Writ of Execution filed by the Government and Fortes. Baterina, meanwhile, went before the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (With Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction), docketed as CA-G.R. No. 95539, assailing the issuance, in grave abuse of discretion, by the RTC of Pasay City of its Orders dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006 and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006. During the pendency of CA-G.R. No. 95539 with the Court of Appeals, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order, dated 7 August 2006, denying the Urgent Manifestation and Motion filed by the Republic in which it relayed willingness to comply with the Order and Writ of Execution dated 27 March 2006, provided that the trial court shall issue an Order expressly authorizing the Republic to award concessions and lease portions of the NAIA IPT III to potential users. The following day, on 8 August 2006, the RTC of Pasay City issued an Order denying the intervention of Baterina, et al. and Fortes in Case No. 04-0876CFM. In a third Order, dated 9 August 2006, the RTC of Pasay City directed PIATCO to receive the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 from the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch. By 24 August 2006, the Republic was all set to comply with the 9 August 2006 Order of the RTC of Pasay City. Hence, the representatives of the Republic and PIATCO met before the RTC of Pasay City for the supposed payment by the former to the latter of the proferred amount. However, on the same day, the Court of Appeals, in CA G.R. No. 95539, issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining, among other things, the RTC of Pasay City from implementing the questioned Orders, dated 27 March 2006 and 15 June 2006, or "from otherwise causing payment and from further proceeding with the determination of just compensation in the expropriation case involved herein, until such time that petitioner's motion to declare in default and motion for partial summary judgment shall have been resolved by the trial court; or it is clarified

that PIATCO categorically disputes the proferred value for NAIA Terminal 3." The TRO was to be effective for 30 days. Two days later, on 26 August 2006, the Republic filed with the Court of Appeals an Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order, which the appellate court scheduled for hearing on 5 September 2006. While the Urgent Motion to lift the TRO was still pending with the Court of Appeals, the Republic already filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, attributing to the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion in granting the TRO and seeking a writ of prohibition against the Court of Appeals to enjoin it from giving due course to Baterina's Petition in CA-G.R. No. 95539. The Republic thus raises before this Court the following arguments: I THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO AN EXCESS OR LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT GRANTED THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. A. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S DECISION IN GINGOYON CONSTITUTES THE "LAW OF THE CASE". B. THE TRO IS IN DIRECT CONTRAVENTION OF THIS COURT'S DECISION WICH HAD ATTAINED FINALITY. II THE REPUBLIC IS SUFFERING IRREPARABLE DAMAGE. III THE COURT OF APPEALS MUST BE PROHIBITED FROM GIVING DUE COURSE TO A PETITION THAT IS DEFECTIVE IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE. A. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING. 1. THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS RULED THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO LEGAL STANDING. 2. PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS LOST HIS STANDING AS AN INTERVENOR. B. PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HE IS ENTITLED TO THE INJUNCTIVE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR. C. THE BOND POSTED IS INSUFFICIENT. IV GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S PETITION IS SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE, THE SAME HAS BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC. A. THE MOTION TO DECLARE IN DEFAULT AND/OR MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAS ALREADY BEEN RESOLVED. B. PIATCO HAS CATEGORICALLY DISPUTED THE PROFFERED VALUE FOR NAIA TERMINAL III.59 The Republic prays of this Court that: (a) Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction be ISSUED restraining the Court of Appeals from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 and proceeding in said case such as hearing it on September 5, 2006. After both parties have been heard, the preliminary injunction be MADE PERMANENT; (b) The Resolution date 24 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals be SET ASIDE; and (c) CA-G.R. SP No. 95539 be ORDERED DISMISSED. Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.60 On 4 September 2006, the Republic filed a Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Urgent Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals stating, among other things, that it had decided to withdraw the said Motion as it had opted to avail of other options and remedies. Despite the Motion to

Withdraw filed by the Government, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution, dated 8 September 2006, lifting the TRO it issued, on the basis of the following – In view of the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Gingoyon case upholding the right of PIATCO to be paid the proferred value in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 prior to the implementation of the writ of possession issued by the trial court on December 21, 2004 over the NAIA Passenger Terminal III, and directing the determination of just compensation, there is no practical and logical reason to maintain the effects of the Temporary Restraining Order contained in our Resolution dated August 24, 2006. Thus, We cannot continue restraining what has been mandated in a final and executory decision of the Supreme Court. WHEREFORE, Our Resolution dated 24 August 2006 be SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Lift the Temporary Restraining Order is rendered moot and academic.61 There being no more legal impediment, the Republic tendered on 11 September 2006 Land Bank check in the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 representing the proferred value of NAIA IPT III, which was received by a duly authorized representative of PIATCO. On 27 December 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in CA G.R. No. 95539 dismissing Baterina's Petition.

intervention [meaning Takenaka, Asahikosan, and herein Private Respondent] may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts."62 In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA IPT III is already public property. Hence, PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA IPT III. He is asking the Court to make a definitive ruling on this matter considering that it was not settled in either Agan or Gingoyon. We disagree. Contrary to Baterina's stance, PIATCO's entitlement to just and equitable consideration for its construction of NAIA IPT III and the propriety of the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings were already recognized and upheld by this Court in Agan and Gingoyon. The Court's Decisions in both Agan and Gingoyon had attained finality, the former on 17 February 2004 and the latter on 17 March 2006. This Court already made an unequivocal pronouncement in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 in Agan that for the Government of the Republic to take over the NAIA IPT III facility, it has to compensate PIATCO as a builder of the structures; and that "[t]he compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government cannot unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors."63 As between the Republic and PIATCO, the judgment on the need to compensate PIATCO before the Government may take over NAIA IPT III is already conclusive and beyond question. Hence, in Gingoyon, this Court declared that:

The latest developments before the Court of Appeals and the RTC of Pasay City render the present Petition of the Republic moot. Nonetheless, Baterina, as the private respondent in the instant Petition, presented his own prayer that a judgment be rendered as follows: A. For this Honorable Court, in the exercise of its judicial discretion to relax procedural rules consistent with Metropolitan Traffic Command v. Gonong and deem that justice would be better served if all legal issues involved in the expropriation case and in Baterina are resolved in this case once and for all, to DECLARE that: i. TERMINAL 3, as a matter of law, is public property and thus not a proper object of eminent domain proceedings; and ii. PIATCO, as a matter of law, is merely the builder of TERMINAL 3 and, as such, it may file a claim for recovery on quantum meruit with the Commission on Audi[t] for determination of the amount thereof, if any. B. To DIRECT the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 117 to dismiss the expropriation case; C. To DISMISS the instant Petition and DENY The Republic's application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction for lack of merit; D. To DECLARE that the P3 Billion (representing the proferred value of TERMINAL 3) paid to PIATCO on 11 September 2006 as funds held in trust by PIATCO for the benefit of the Republic and subject to the outcome of the proceedings for the determination of recovery on quantum meruit due to PIATCO, if any. E. To DIRECT the Solicitor General to disclose the evidence it has gathered on corruption, bribery, fraud, bad faith, etc., to this Honorable Court and the Commission on Audit, and to DECLARE such evidence to be admissible in any proceeding for the determination of any compensation due to PIATCO, if any. [F]. In the alternative, to: i. SET ASIDE the trial court's Order dated 08 August 2006 denying Private Respondent's motion for intervention in the expropriation case, and ii. Should this Honorable Court lend credence to the argument of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 20 April 2006 that "there are issues as to material fact that require presentation of evidence", to REMAND the resolution of the legal issues raised by Private Respondent to the trial court consistent with this Honorable Court's holding in the Gingoyon Resolution that "the interests of the movants-in-

This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this decision of the Court. Indeed, Agan, final and executory as it is, stands as governing law in this case, and any disposition of the present petition must conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004 Resolution. xxxx The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain. It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.64 The Court then, in Gingoyon, directly addressed the issue on the appropriateness of the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings: The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment. However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.

xxxx The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex "stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]." Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case. Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely diminished.65 (Emphasis ours.) The Court, also in Gingoyon, categorically recognized PIATCO's ownership over the structures it had built in NAIA IPT III, to wit: There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings. xxxx Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by PIATCO. x x x (Emphasis ours.)66 It was further settled in Gingoyon that the expropriation proceedings shall be held in accordance with Republic Act No. 8974,67 thus: Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution. And finally, as to the determination of the amount due PIATCO, this Court ruled in Gingoyon that:

Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to "immediately pay" the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to "the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7," with Section 7 referring to the "implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land." Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based using "the replacement cost method." However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation. In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well. Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that "in case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property its proferred value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]." The "proffered value" may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which "proffered value" should be based, as well as the certainty of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value. In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount of P3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.68 Gingoyon constitutes as the law of the case for the expropriation proceedings, docketed as Case No. 040876CFM, before the RTC of Pasay City. Law of the case has been defined in the following manner – By "law of the case" is meant that "whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case" so long as the "facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court" (21 C.J.S. 330). And once the decision becomes final, it is binding on all inferior courts and hence beyond their power and authority to alter or modify (Kabigting vs. Acting Director of Prisons, G.R. L-15548, October 30, 1962).69 A ruling rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the case, and, even if erroneous, it may no longer be disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago.70 The extensive excerpts from Gingoyon demonstrate and emphasize that the Court had already adjudged the issues raised by Baterina, which he either conveniently overlooked or stubbornly refused to accept. The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have

been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion and upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is finally solved.71 Since the issues Baterina wishes to raise as an intervenor in Case No. 04-0876CFM were already settled with finality in both Agan and Gingoyon, then there is no point in still allowing his intervention. His Petition-inIntervention would only be a relitigation of matters that had been previously adjudicated by no less than the Highest Court of the land. And, in no manner can the RTC of Pasay City in Case No. 04-0876CFM grant the reliefs he prayed for without departing from or running afoul of the final and executory Decisions of this Court in Agan and Gingoyon. While it is true that when this Court, in a Resolution dated 1 February 2006, dismissed the Motions for Intervention in Gingoyon, including that of Baterina, it also observed that the interests of the movants-inintervention may be duly litigated in proceedings which are extant before the lower courts. This does not mean, however, that the said movants-in-interest were assured of being allowed as intervenors or that the reliefs they sought as such shall be granted by the trial courts. The fate of their intervention still rests on their interest or legal standing in the case and the merits of their arguments. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing: a. The Petition in G.R. No. 169914 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit; and b. The Petition in G.R. No. 174166 is hereby likewise DISMISSED for being moot and academic. No costs. SO ORDERED