bp 22 cases

bp 22 cases Eduardo Vaca vs. Ca VACA VS. CA Facts: Eduardo Vaca is the president and owner of Ervine International while Fernando Nieto, Vaca’s son-in-law, is the firm’s purchasing manager. They issued a check for P10,000 to the General Agency for Reconnaissance, Detection and Security (GARDS) and drawn against China Bank. When deposited with PCIBank, the check was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. GARDS sent a demand letter but the drawers failed to pay within the time given (7 days from notice). A few days later, however, Vaca issued a check to GARDS for P19,866.16, drawn against Associated Bank, replacing the dishonored check. GARDS did not return the dishonored check. Later on, GARDS Acting Operations Manager filed a criminal suit against Vaca and Nieto for violation of BP 22. The trial court sentenced each to 1 year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and costs. Issue [1]: Whether the drawers had knowledge of insufficient funds in issuing the check. Held [1]: Section 2 of BP 22 provides a presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds if the drawer fails to maintain sufficient funds within 90 days after the date of the check, or to make arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within 5 days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. Herein, the second check supposedly replacing the dishonored check is actually the payment of two separate bills, and was issued 15 days after notice. Such “replacement” cannot negate the presumption that the drawers knew of the insufficiency of funds. Issue [2]: Whether the absence of damages incurred by the payee absolves the drawers from liability. Held [2]: The claim — that the case was simply a result of a misunderstanding between GARDS and the drawers and that the security agency did not suffer any damage from the dishonor of the check — is flimsy. Even if the payee suffered no damage as a result of the issuance of the bouncing check, the damage to the integrity of the banking system cannot be denied. Damage to the payee is not an element of the crime punished in BP 22. Note: In this case, the Court recognized the contribution of Filipino entrepreneurs to the national economy; and that to serve the ends of criminal justice, instead of the 1 year imprisonment, a fine of double the amount of the check involved was imposed as penalty. This was made to redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order

king vs people gr no. 131540

BETTY KING vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 131540 Facts: Betty King discounted with complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the total amount of P1, 070,000.00 in exchange for cash in the amount of P1, 000,000.00. When the checks were deposited for

payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they were drawn against an account without sufficient funds. Betty King failed to make good the checks despite demand. During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the prosecution offered in evidence its documentary evidence. Betty King admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documents presented. As noted earlier, Betty King filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In doing so, she waived her right to present evidence and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the documentary exhibits adduced by the prosecution. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime. The CA also pointed out that the failure of Betty King to sign the pretrial order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her conviction was based on the evidence presented during the trial. Ellen Fernandez sent Betty King a registered mail, informing the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri’s letter addressed to complainant’s counsel certified that the subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992. Issue: (1) Admissibility of documentary evidence (2) Sufficiency of the prosecution evidence Held: We emphasized that "the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22. Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster’s certification, the prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in different addresses. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. Petitioner Betty King is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crimes charged.

First Issue: Admissibility of Documentary Evidence Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same matter, they will be discussed together. She contends that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the prosecution during pretrial are inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial agreement as required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court. Hence, she argues that there is no basis for her conviction. True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction of petitioner was based not on that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial, all of which were admitted without any objection from her counsel. During the hearing on September 17, 1993, the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the return check tickets addressed to private complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to petitioner that the checks had been dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice had been returned to sender. Petitioner's counsel did not object to their admissibility. This is shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on September 17, 1993: COURT: You have no objection to the admissibility, not that the Court will believe it.

Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post Office dated 21 September 1992;

ATTY. MANGERA No, Your Honor.

Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central Post Office letter dated 24 September 1992, addressed to this representation showing that there were 3 notices sent to the herein accused who received the said letter.

COURT: Exhibits "A" to "A" to "K" are admitted. ATTY. MAKALINTAL: We offer Exhibit "L", the return-check ticket dated July 27, 1992, relative to checks No. 021745 and 021746 indicating that these checks were returned DAIF, drawn against insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July 28, 1992, relative to Check No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise indicating the said checks to have been drawn against insufficient funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992, relative to Check Nos. 021749 and 021748, having the same indications; Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992 relative to Check Nos. 021750 and 021753, with the same indications; Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, 1992 relative to Check No. 021752, having the same indication as being drawn against insufficient funds; Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by Atty. Horacio Makalintal dated August 3, 1992; Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification addressed to the Postmaster General sent by the same law office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the said letter was dispatched properly by the Central Post Office of Makati;

COURT: Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the third slip? ATTY. MANGERA: We have no objection as to the due execution and authenticity. COURT: Admitted. ATTY. MAKALINTAL: We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the purpose of showing that there was demand duly made on the accused and that the same had been appropriately served by the Central Post Office Services of Manila. ATTY. MANGERA: We admit as to the due execution and authenticity only as to that portion, Your Honor. COURT: We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In other words, at this point, he makes an offer and the Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in

evidence or deny it. It can deny admission if it is not properly identified etcetera.

So, admitted. ATTY. MAKALINTAL:

ATTY. MANGERA:

With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the prosecution rests.

I think it is already provided. COURT:

From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered and admitted during the trial. In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of Appeals would not apply to the present controversy. In that case, a hearing was conducted during which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was "based solely on the stipulation of facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 4 of Rule 118, the Court held that there was no proof of his guilt. In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented during trial, and not on the stipulations made during the pretrial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during the trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by Section 4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129 which reads: Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said documentary evidence. Second Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense. After a careful consideration of the records of this case, we believe and so rule that the totality of the evidence presented does not support petitioner's conviction for violation of BP 22. Sec. 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows: Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value. 2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment. We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned elements which the trial and the appellate courts relied upon. Issuance of the Questioned Checks Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that she merely signed the questioned checks without indicating therein the date and the amount involved. She adds that they were improperly filled up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she concludes, she did not "issue" the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Law, which defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder." 19 Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A" to "K," contained the date of issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted that she signed those checks. On the other hand, no proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely signed them in blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of the former's instructions or their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven checks, all of which were duly filled up and signed by her. Checks Dishonored Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no evidence on record that the subject checks were unpaid and dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the checks themselves, which were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was further supported by the returned check tickets issued by PCI Bank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been dishonored. Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the checks. Again, no evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution's claim. Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element involves a state of

mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as follows: Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano v. Martinez, the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its application." This opportunity, however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court in Lina Lim Lao v. Court of Appeals: It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a "compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated." This was also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability." In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense." The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand and the basic postulates of fairness require that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under BP 22. Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment. To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on these documents, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make good said checks . . .. Appellant failed to pay the face value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full payment thereof within 90 days after receiving the notice." 24 Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the checks had been dishonored. True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the latter that the checks had been dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter addressed to complainant's counsel certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 . . .. "

Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in different address. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise. Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil liability, for the issue was not raised in the pleadings submitted before us. We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime. Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even absence of that of the defense.” yulo vs people gr no. 142762

Yulo v People Facts: 1. Josefina Dimalanta and Lilany Yulo went to Myrna Roque. 2. Dimalanta told Roque that Yulo is her BFF and that she is a good payer; and asked Roque if she can have Yulo's checks encashed. 3. Relying on this, she agreed. She received 3 checks from Yulo in return. However, such checks were dishonored later on since the account was already closed. 4. After failed demands, she finally filed a crim case against Yulo for violation of BP22 5. Yulo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in RTC. Yulo appealed to the CA, but the decision was affirmed in toto. 6. She filed an MR, but the MR was only resolved after 3 years after filing.(affirmed againt the decision in toto) Issues: WON the CA violated her right to speedy trial. NO Ratio 1. Sec 16 Art 3 of Bill of Rights: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi judicial, or admin bodies → under this provision, any party to a a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. In applying the Consti guarantee, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances of each case. 2. The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only a) when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or

b) when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or c) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. 3. The following factors must be considered: a) length of delay b) reasons for such delay c) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused d) prejudice caused by the delay 4. In this case, the delay was sufficiently explained. The ponente retired during the pendency of the MR which was filed in March 1997. The case was assigned to Assoc Justice Dadole on Feb 2000. And then she resolved the motion within 2 weeks. Thus, there was no violation! (Not important) Issue: WON the CA erred in holding Yulo guilty beyond reasonable doubt. No 1. The elements were all proven (making or issuance of a check, knowledge that he has no/ insufficient funds, subsequent dishonor). 2. Findings of lower court and affirmed in toto by CA are entitled to great weight

vicky moster vs people gr no. 167461 VICKY MOSTER VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 167461 Facts: Petitioner obtained from Presas a loan of P450,000, for which the petitioner issued as payment three postdated PhilBank checks. The three checks were all payable to cash. Presas testified she did not deposit the checks on their due dates upon petitioner’s request and assurance that they would be replaced with cash. When she could not wait any longer, Presas deposited Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 in her Westmont Bank account, only to be notified later that the checks were dishonored because the account had been closed. Presas said she did not deposit Check No. 026137 after she agreed to petitioner’s request to withhold its deposit as it had not yet been funded. After receiving notice that Check Nos. 026138 and 026124 had been dishonored, Presas immediately informed petitioner thereof and demanded payment for the value of the checks. This demand, however, went unheeded. In a letter, Presas through counsel, demanded from petitioner the settlement of P367,602, representing the total value of the three checks, within five days from receipt. Petitioner, however, did not comply. Thus, three Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed against petitioner. Issue: Is petitioner guilty of a violation of BP 22? Ruling: NO. B.P. Blg. 22 punishes as malum prohibitum the mere issuance of a worthless check, provided the other elements of the offense are proved. Section 1 enumerates the elements of B.P. Blg. 22, as follows: (1) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Upon careful examination of the records, however, the Court found that only the first and third elements have been established by the prosecution. By her own admission, petitioner issued the three subject checks, two of which were presented to PhilBank but were dishonored and stamped for the reason “Account Closed”. Under Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 22, the introduction in evidence of the dishonored check, having the drawee’s refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as aforesaid shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuing of the said checks and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped or attached thereto by the drawee on such dishonored checks. As to the second element, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates the presumption that the issuer of the check was aware of the insufficiency of funds when he issued a check and the bank dishonored it. This presumption, however, arises only after it is proved that the issuer had received a written notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangements for its payment. Ordinarily, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. But in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter allegedly sent to petitioner through registered mail and the registry return card. There was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. All that we have on record is an illegible signature on the registry receipt as evidence that someone received the letter. As to whether this signature is that of petitioner or her authorized agent remains a mystery. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letters, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. Unfortunately, the prosecution presented only the testimony of Presas to prove mailing and receipt of the demand letter eumelia r. mitra vs people gr no. 191404

Mitra vs. People Facts: Petitioner Mitra was the treasurer and Cabrera (now deceased) was the President of Lucky Nine Credit Corporation (LNCC), a corporation engaged in money lending activities. Private respondent Felicisimo Tarcelo (Tarcelo) invested money in LNCC. As the usual practice in money placement transactions, Tarcelo was issued checks equivalent to the amounts he invested plus the interest on his investments. When Tarcelo presented the checks for payment, they were dishonored for the reason "account closed." Tarcelo made several oral demands on LNCC for the payment of said checks but he was frustrated. So he filed seven information for violation of Batas Pambansa blg. 22 (BP 22) in the amount of P925,000.00 before the MTCC. Court decided in favor if Tarcelo. So petitioners appealed to RTC contending that : They signed the seven checks in blank with no name of the payee, no amount stated and no date of maturity; that they did not know when and to whom those checks would be issued; that the seven checks were made to sign at that time; and that they signed the checks so as not to delay the transactions of LNCC because they did not regularly hold office there. Petition was still denied. Meanwhile Cabrera died. Mitra alone file a petition for review claiming among others, that there was no Notice of Dishonor on her. CA denied for lack of merit, hence this petition; ISSUE(S): 1. WON the elements of violation of BP 22 must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as against the corporation who carries the account where the subject checks were drawn before liability attaches to the signatories. 2. WON there is proper service of Notice of Dishonor and demand to pay to the petitioner and the late Cabrera.

HELD: Petition DENIED. The convenience afforded by checks is damaged by unfunded checks that adversely affect confidence in commercial and banking activities, and ultimately injure public interest. 1. NO. The 3rd paragraph of sec.1 of BP 22 reads: "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this act." This provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence its wording is unequivocal and mandatory that the person who actually signed the corporate check shall be held liable for violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition, qualification or limitation. 2. Yes. There is no dispute that Mitra signed the checks and that the bank dishonored the checks because the account had been closed. Notice of Dishonor was properly given, but Mitra failed to pay the checks or make arrangements for their payment within 5 days from notice. (Cite elements of violation of BP22) With all the above elements duly proven, Mitra cannot escape the civil and criminal liabilities that BP 22 imposes for its breach.

Llamado vs ca j.l. recuerdo vs people 395 scra 117

JOY LEE RECUERDO v . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS 395 SCRA 117 (2003) Yolanda Floro sold a loose diamond stone valued at P420,000.00 to Joy Lee Recuerdo. As payment for the diamond, Recuerdo gave P40,000 as downpaymentand issued 9 postdated checks. When Floro tried to deposit eight checks, only three were cleared and the other five were dishonored due to the closure of Recuerdo‘s account. Recuerdo promised to convert the checks into cash but she welshed on it A demand letter was sent to Recuerdo but she still failed to comply with her obligation. This prompted Floro to file at the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) five informations against Recuerdo for violation of B.P. 22. Recuerdo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of B.P. 22 and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 30 days for each count and to restitute the amount of P200,000 to Floro. The decision was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and later on, by the Court of Appeals (CA). ISSUE: Whether or not Recuerdo is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of B.P. 22 HELD: Recuerdo contends that since banks are not damaged by the presentment of dishonored checks as they impose a penalty for each, only creditors/payees are unduly favored by the law; that the law ―is in essence a resurrected form of 19th century imprisonment for debt‘ since the drawer is coerced to pay his debt on threat of imprisonment even if his failure to pay does not arise from malice or fraud or from any criminal intent to cause damage; and that the law is a bill of attainder as it does not leave much room for judicial determination, the guilt of the accused having already been decided by the legislature.

These matters subject of Recuerdo‘s contention have long been settled in the landmark case of Lozano v. Martinez where the Court upheld the constitutionality of B. P. 22: the gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The contention that B. P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, fails. For under B. P. 22, every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction for violation thereof. Recuerdo argues that as no bank representative testified as to ―whether the questioned checks were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds (sic), such element was not clearly and convincingly proven, hence, the trial court failed to uphold her right to presumption of innocence when she was convicted based on the sole testimony of Yolanda. Yolanda‘s testimony that when she deposited the checks to her depository bank they were dishonored due to ―Account Closed sufficed. In fact, even Recuerdo‘s counsel during trial admitted the dishonor, and on that ground. In fine, the affirmance of Recuerdo‘s conviction is in order. In the case at bar, the Court notes that no proof, nay allegation, was proffered that Recuerdo was not a first time offender. Considering this and the correctness of the case, it would best serve the interests of justice if Recuerdo is just fined to enable her to continue her dental practice so as not to deprive her of her income, thus insuring the early settlement of the civil aspect of the case, not to mention the FINE. josephne domagsang vs ca gr no. 139292 Josephine Domagsang vs. CA and the People Summary of Doctrines: 1. To secure the conviction in BP 22, a WRITTEN NOTICE of dishonour is required. 2. The law does not presume that the offender knows of the FACT OF DISHONOR from merely making an instrument without value. As such, the accused is still entitled to notice of such dishonour. Facts: Petitioner approached Ignacio Garcia, an Assistant Vice President of METROBANK, to ask for financial assistance. Garcia accommodated petitioner and gave the latter a loan in the sum of P573,800.00. In exchange, petitioner issued and delivered to the complainant 18 postdated checks for the repayment of the loan. When the checks were, in time, deposited, the instruments were all dishonored by the drawee bank for this reason: “Account closed.” The complainant demanded payment allegedly by calling up petitioner at her office. Failing to receive any payment for the value of the dishonored checks, the complainant referred the matter to his lawyer who supposedly wrote petitioner a letter of demand but that the latter ignored the demand. (Note: the said demand letter was not presented as evidence) Hence, 18 cases for the violation of BP 22 were filed against Domagsang. RTC Ruling as affirmed by CA:

Petitioner was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati of having violated Anti-Bouncing Check Law, on eighteen (18) counts, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of One (1) Year imprisonment for each count. The judgment, when appealed to the Court of Appeals was affirmed in toto by the appellate court. A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioner to SC. Defense raised by Domagsang: There was no proper written letter of demand served upon her person, thus she must not be charged for the violation of BP 22. According to Domagsang, even if she was informed of the dishonour by Garcia through a telephone call, the same is not sufficient to convict her. SC Ruling: On the question of whether or not lack of written letter of demand will acquit her from the criminal violation, the SC ruled in the positive. Note: SC enumerated some provisions of BP 22. For further reading, please see Sections. 1 – 3. Ratio / Doctrine: To secure conviction for the vilation of BP 22, the prosecution must establish the fact that the check was dishonoured AND that the accused has been notified in writing of the fact of dishonour. While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in writing, taken in conjunction, however, with Section 3 of the law, i.e., "that where there are no sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the notice of dishonor or refusal," a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient for conviction under the law. The Court is convinced that both the spirit and letter of the Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified in writing of the fact of dishonour. Evidently, the appellate court did not give weight and credence to the assertion that a demand letter was sent by a counsel of the complainant because of the failure of the prosecution to formally offer it in evidence. Courts are bound to consider as part of the evidence only those which are formally offered,for judges must base their findings strictly on the evidence submitted by the parties at the trial. Without the written notice of dishonor, there can be no basis, considering what has heretofore been said, for establishing the presence of "actual knowledge of insufficiency of funds. Related Doctrine: There is no prima facie presumption of the knowledge of dishonour in BP 22, thus notice of dishonour (written) is required to secure conviction. The law enumerates the elements of the crime to be : (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. There is deemed to be a prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of the maker, drawer or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the drawee bank of the check issued if the dishonored check is

presented within 90 days from the date of the check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when the maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank. In Lao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explained: Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 clearly provides that this presumption arises not from the mere fact of drawing, making and issuing a bum check; there must also be a showing that, within five banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, such maker or drawer failed to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment in full by the drawee of such check. It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. This was also compared to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability. In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand – and the basic postulates of fairness require – that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.

victor ting and emily chan-azajar vs ca gr no. 140665 manuel nagrampa vs ca gr no.132552 Manuel Nagrampa Vs Ca Gr No.132552

Facts:Manuel Nagrampa purchased porcelain excavator equipment from Fedcor Trading Corporation on an installment basis. He then issued checks to be drawn against Security Bank and Trust Company. The checks were dishonored on the ground that the account was already closed. He was then charge with violation of BP 22. In his defense he claimed that he is not guilty of estafa because no damage was caused to FEDCOR and the back hoe being unserviceable was returned to FEDCOR The trial court found him guilty and was ordered to pay FEDCOR the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto. Issue:Whether or not he is liable for violation of BP 22 despite no notice of dishonor was given.

Held:Yes, because the account was closed for four years prior to the transaction. He knew fully well that the check he issued would be dishonored and the 90-day grace period given to him by law is unavailing. claro e. narte vs ca gr no.132552 felia marigomen vs people gr no.153451

OFELIA MARIGOMEN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 153451. May 26, 2005. FACTS: Caltex sold their gas and oil to INSURECO through postdated checks. Petitioner was the finance officer who was authorized to sign checks against INSURECO. Three checks were dishonored due to insufficient funds. After Caltex made demands to INSURECO, which was unheeded, they filed a complaint against petitioner for violation of BP 22. Petitioner contends that while she had drawn and signed the checks she was not an employee anymore at the purchase of the products. She did not receive any telegrams or notice of the dishonored checks. The lower ruled in favor of Caltex. ISSUE: Whether petitioner was guilty of violating BP 22. RULING: The SC ruled in favor of petitioner and acquitted her. Caltex did not prove that petitioner knew that there were insufficient funds when she drew and signed those checks. Also the notice of dishonor should be in writing and not a verbal notice. The SC also said that if the drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or issued the check for and in its behalf. Prosecution also failed to prove that petition receive those notices of dishonor.