Boston Equity v CA

Boston equity v CA (jurisdiction over the person) Facts: On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead. As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.

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On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********; (2) that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court; (3) ****** The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the petition. Issue W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person? Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo. Citing the case of Sarsaba: “The court’s failure to acquire jurisdiction over one’s person is a defense which is personal to the person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of having the case dismissed against all of the defendants. “

Boston equity v CA

Facts: ----- supra----Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party? Held: Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states: SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife, respondent herein, is solidary.

The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondent’s husband, on the other, states: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this matter.

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos V Nisperos

When the spouses Santiago died, all the 9 siblings tilted the land of their parents. Maria and Cipriana paid the taxes of the land since 1988 on behalf of their siblings. All 9 siblings agreed that the taxes and papers of the land will be under their sister Maria. Maria has an adopted daughter, Marissa, which was a minor when the land was awarded to Marian in 1992. But because of turn of event, Maria named Marissa as the beneficiary of the land even she still a minor. When the land was finally transferred to Maria’s name, Marissa claimed that the 58t square meter property belongs to her adoptive mother. The other siblings filed a case before the Regional adjudicator board since the land contested is an agriculture land. The board dismissed the contention of Marissa that she’s the owner of the land since the land was awarded to Maria while she’s a minor. Marissa filed a petition to DARAB and granted the petition under the contention that since the land is already transferred to Maria without any problem, the heirs of Santiago is already barred to question the title. Hence this petition reached the Supreme Court Issue: W/N DARAB has a jurisdiction over the contested land Held: The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB. Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is 23 Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, December 3, 2012, 686 SCRA 745, 753. 24 367 Phil. 438 (1999). Decision 8 G.R. No. 189570 an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is

conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.