Bill of Rights - Outline

BILL OF RIGHTS I. THE DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND CONTRACT CLAUSES AS LIMITATIONS ON POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION ART. III, S EC. 1. NO PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE , LIBERTY, OR PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW , NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS . ART . III, S EC . 10. NO LAW IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS SHALL BE PASSED . LIMITATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

A. Due process - Procedural and Substantive Civil Procedural Due Process In civil cases, the SC laid down its elements in the case of Banco Espanol Filipino v. Palanca: Criminal Due Process In criminal cases, the elements were laid down in Vera v. People: Administrative Due Process Substantive Due Process Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) B. Due Process and Police Power

Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984) Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid. Velasco v. Villegas, 120 SCRA (1983) Ordinance Prohibiting Barbershops from Rendering Massage Services Valid. Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569 (1983) HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. VV. 1

C. Due Process and Eminent Domain The taking by the State of private property in an expropriation proceeding must be: (1) for public use, (2) with just compensation, and (3) upon observance of due process.

Article III, Sec. 9. Private property shall not be take for public use without just compensation. Article XII, Sec. 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the government. 1. Taking either for public use or public purpose. Public Use Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220 Sumulong v. Guerrero 154 SCRA 461 (1987) 2. Just compensation must be judicially determined Just Compensation EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987) Manotok v. NHA 150 SCRA 89 (1987)

3. Due process must be observed De Knecht v. Bautista 100 SCRA 660 (1980) Republic v. De Knecht, 182 SCRA 142 (1990) NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991)

D. Equal Protection

Art. III, Sec. 1.

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. 2

1. ECONOMIC EQUALITY Art. XIII, Sec. 2. The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance. Art. XIII, Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitle to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making process affecting the rights and benefits as may be provided by law. The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace. The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth. Art. XII, Sec. 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. Id., Sec. 2. xxx The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

Art. III, Sec. 11.

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. There are areas of economic activity which can be limited to Filipinos. The Constitution itself acknowledges this in various places - exploitation of marine wealth (Art. XII, Sec. 2 par. 2), certain areas of investment (Art. XII, Sec. 10), to name a few. 3

In Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937), the SC upheld the validity of the law which nationalized the retail trade. For the protection of the law can be observed by the national interest. Ichong v. Hernandez, 201 Phil. 1155 (1937) Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho 86 SCRA 270 (1978) Vera v. Cuevas 90 SCRA 379 (1979) 2. POLITICAL EQUALITY

Art. III, Sec. 18. (1)

No person shall be detained solely by reason of his

political beliefs and aspirations. Dumlao v. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392 (1980) Igot c. Comelec 95 SCRA 392 (1980)

3. SOCIAL EQUALITY Art. XIII, Sec. 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measure that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. II. REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR PROCEDURE A. Arrests, Searches and Seizures

Art. III, Sec. 2.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. Sec. 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section, shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

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1. Requirements for Search Warrants Yee Sue Kuy v. Almeda, 70 Phil. 141 (1940)

Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689, (1938)

Burgos v. Chief of Staff 133 SCRA 800 (1984) Illegal search of newspaper offices and press freedom Corro v. Lising 137 SCRA 341 (1985) Bache & Co. (Phil.) v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 (1971) Prudente v. Dayrit, 180 SCRA 69 (1990)

Olaes v. People, 155 SCRA 486 (1987) Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989)

a. Existence of probable cause. Probable cause is such facts and circumstances as would reasonably make a prudent man believe that a crime have been committed and that the documents or things sought to be searched and seized are in the possession of the person against whom the warrant is sought. Without probable cause, there can be no valid search warrant. In Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 385 (1967), 42 search warrants were issued for alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, the Tariff and Customs Code, the NIRC, and the Revised Penal Code. The SC voided the warrants on the ground that it was impossible for the judge to have found probable cause in view of the number of laws alleged to have been violated by the petitioner. How could he even know what particular provision of each law had been violated? If he did not know this, how could it be determined if the person against whom the warrant was issued was probably guilty thereof? In truth, this was a fishing expedition, which violated the sanctity of domicile and privacy of communications. To establish the requirement of probable cause, the rule is: One crime, one warrant. b. As determined by a judge Under the 1987 Constitution, only a judge can issue a warrant; the offensive and much abused phrase "and other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" in the 1973 Constitution has been removed c. After personally examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witness. d. On the basis of their personal knowledge of the facts that they are testifying to.

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e. The search warrant must describe particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. 2. When Search May Be Made without a Warrant (a) When search is made of moving vehicles (b) When search is an an incident to a valid arrest. Rule 126, Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.-- A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (Rules of Court.) Nolasco v. Cruz Paño 139 SCRA 152 (1985) (c) When things seized are within plain view of a searching party Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986) Pita v. CA, 178 SCRA 362 (1989) (d) Stop and Frisk Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990) (e) When there is a valid express waiver made voluntarily and intelligently.

People v. de Gracia, 233 SCRA 716 (July 6, 1994) 3. Constitutionality of checkpoints and "a real target zonings." Valmonte v. De Villa, 170 SCRA 256 (1989) Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 (1990)

4. Wire Tapping Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) 5. What may be seized Rule 126, sec. 2. Personal property to be seized.-- A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property: (a) Subject matter of the offense; (b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and (c) Used or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense. (Rules of Court.) 6. Exclusionary Rule 6

Art. III, Sec. 3.

xxx

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this (privacy of communication and correspondence) or the preceding section (unreasonable searches and seizures) shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967) 7. Civil Action for Damages

8. Search and Seizure by Private Persons People v. Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

9. In the issuance of warrants of ARREST, as distinguished from SEARCH warrants, the judge may rely simply on fiscal's certification as to probable cause Rule 112, Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue.-- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-Upon the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused. (b) By the Municipal Trial Court.-- If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest. (Rules of Court.)

Rule 126, Sec. 4. Examination of complainant; record.-- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the records their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted. Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988)

10. When arrest may be made without a warrant Rule 113, Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense, has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment of place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. 7

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section. 7. (Rules of Court.) a. Strict enforcement of rule People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) People v. Rodriguez, 232 SCRA 498 (April 25, 1989)

b. Exceptions to strict enforcement

ADMISSIBLITY OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION. These admissions strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds upon w/c the arresting officers based their arrests w/o warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e., that the persons arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in compliance w/ Sec. 5, R 113, ROC. To note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon w/c their warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested w/o warrant is not proper in a petition for HC. It pertains to the trial of the case on the merits. (2) Illegal Possession of guns or drugs People v. Linsangan, 195 SCRA 784 11. Immunity from arrest of members of Congress Art. VI, Sec. 11. A Senator or Member of the House shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six (6) years imprisonment (prision correcional), be privileged from arrest while Congress is in session. xxx

B. Rights of Persons under custodial interrogation

Art. III, Sec. 12.

(1) Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or sec. 17 hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section, as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. 8

Source: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

A police investigation consists of 2 stages: Mendoza, The Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigations, 2 Law Rev. No. 10, 2 (1988); 61 Phil. LJ 409 I. RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS DEVELOPED AS PART OF PROTECTION AGAINST INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS. THE EFFECT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES THE MIRANDA RULE

THE CUSTODIAL PHASE OF INTERROGATION

III. WAIVER OF RIGHTS. IX. THE EXLUSIONARY RULE. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him, the Consti. says. No distinction is made bet. confession or admission. Although the previous Consti. spoke of confessions only, I have argued that it was not so limited but that it also embraced uncounselled statements. For "if a statement made wore in fact exculpatory, it could ... never be used by the prosecution, in fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication." EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

People v. Bolanos, 211 SCRA 262

People v. Bandula, 232 SCRA 566

1. Miranda rule not applicable to confessions executed before January 17, 1973

2. Not applicable to res gestae statements 3. Not applicable to statements given in administrative investigations People v. Ayson, 175 SCRA 216 (1989) 9

Right Against Self-Incrimination Rights in Custodial Interrogation Miranda rights Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case As Regards Giving of Testimony

4. Custodial Phase of Investigation Police Lineups Gamboa v. Cruz June 27, 1988 Police line-up not part of custodial inquest

US v. Wade, 388 US 218 (1967) People v. Hatton, 210 SCRA 1 5. Tests of Validity of Waiver of Miranda Rights No valid waiver. People v. Caguioa 95 SCRA 2 (1980) Right to counsel may be waived provided the waiver is voluntary, knowing and intelligent People v. Tampus 96 SCRA 624 (1980) Public trial; waiver of right to counsel People v. Poyos 143 SCRA 543 (1986) No valid waiver of right to counsel and to silence

b. The Galit Rule (March 20, 1985 to Feb. 2, 1987) People v. Galit 135 SCRA 465 (1985) People v. Sison 142 SCRA 219 (1986) People v. Lim, 196 SCRA 809 (1991)

People v. Lasac 148 SCRA 624 (1987) 10

Art. III, Sec. 12 (1): Waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel

Art. III, Sec. 12. (1)

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

Under the new Constitution, any waiver must now be made (1) in writing, and (2) in the presence of counsel. 6. The burden of proving voluntariness of waivers is on the prosecution

People v. Jara, 144 SCRA 516 (1986) 7. What may be waived: The right to remain silent and to counsel, but not the right to be given "Miranda warnings" The right to remain silent and to counsel, which are the effectuations of the Miranda rights, can be waived. What cannot be waived are: 8. Exclusionary rule

Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) Public Safety New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984). C. Right to bail

Art. III, Sec. 13.

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. 1. When right may be invoked 11

Bail and Habeas Corpus 2. When bail is a matter of right, when it is a matter of discretion People v. Donato, 196 SCRA 130 (1991) 3. Bail in courts-martial Commendador v. De Villa, 200 SCRA 80 (1991) 4. Standards for fixing bail

5. Right to bail and right to travel abroad

Art. III, Sec. 6.

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149 (1986) 6. Waiver of the Right to Bail People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) D. Rights during trial

Art. III, Sec. 14. (1)

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. 1. Presumption of innocence

People v. de Guzman, 231 SCRA 739 2. Right to be heard personally or by counsel

Filing of demurrer to evidence is a WAIVER of right to be heard (Rule 119, Sec. 15.) 12

Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil 525, (1949) People v. Donesa, 49 SCRA 281 (1973) Grant of demurrer is equivalent to an acquittal

Rule 119, Sec. 15. Demurrer to evidence.-- After the prosecution has rested its case, the court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence: (1) ont its own intitiative after givint the prosecution an opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of the accused filed with proper leave of court. If the court denies the motion for dismissal, the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the accused files such motion to dismiss without express leave of court, he waives the right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. (Rules of Court.) 3. Right to free legal assistance

Art. III, Sec. 11.

Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. People v. Rio, 201 SCRA 702 (1991) 4. Right to be informed of nature and cause of accusation The arraignment in criminal prosecution is precisely intended to comply with the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. As noted in Vera v. People, procedural due process requires that the accused must be informed why he is being prosecuted and what charge he must meet. Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977) No valid trial in absentia without arraignment 5. Right to speedy, impartial and public trial (1) Speedy Trial

(2) Public Trial

Garcia v. Domingo, 52 SCRA 143 (1970) (3) Impartial trial 6. Right to confront witness

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The purpose of this right is to enable the accused to test the credibility of the witness. The best means of confrontation is the process of cross-examination. 7. Right to secure attendance of witnesses (and the production of evidence in his behalf) There are various means available to the parties to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents and things needed in the prosecution or defense of a case in an adversarial manner: subpoena and subpoena duces tecum: depositions and other modes of discovery; perpetuation of testimonies. 8. Trial in Absentia Boria v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977), supra.

People v. Salas 143 SCRA 163 (1986) Trial in absentia applies even to capital cases

Provision for trial in absentia not a justification for jumping bail Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988) In trial in absentia accused waives the right to present evidence and confront witnesses

9. When presence of the accused is a DUTY

a. Arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of guilt Rule 116, Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.-xxx (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but a failure to enter of record shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.

b. During trial, for identification People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986), supra. c. Promulgation of sentence, unless it is for a light offense, in which case accused may appear by counsel, or a representative (Rule 120, Sec. 6.) E. Priviledge against self incrimination

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Art. III, Sec. 17.

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. [Art. III, Sec. 12 (3)] 1. Scope of privilege: Compulsory Testimonial self-incrimination The privilege covers only testimonial incrimination obtained compulsorily. It refers therefore to the use of the mental process and the communicative faculties, and not to a merely physical activity. If the act is physical or mechanical, the accused can be compelled to allow or perform the act, and the result can be used in evidence against him. Thus the accused can be required to allow a sample of a substance taken from his body (U.S. v. Tan Teng. 23, Phil. 145 (1912)).

U.S. v. Ong Sio Hong 36 Phil 735, (1917) Counsel for appellant raises the constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself. The contention is that this was the result of forcing the accused to discharge the morphine from his mouth. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime. (Harris vs. Coats [1885], 75 Ga., 415.) The accused can be made to take off her garments and shoes and be photographed. (People v. Otadura, 96 Phil 244 (1950)). A woman accused of adultery can be compelled to show her body for physical investigation to see if she is pregnant (Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920)). Viewed against present standards, however, it is possible that this method of determining pregnancy would violate due process as being too barbaric. Villaflor v. Summers, 41 Phil. 62 (1920) Bermudez v. Castillo, 64 Phil. 485 (1937) People v. Olvis, 154 SCRA 525 People v. Go, 237 SCRA 73 2. In what proceedings available Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

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In Galman v. Pamaran, infra, the privilege was held to extend to fact-finding investigation by an adhoc body. Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985) A person can be compelled to testify provided he is given immunity co-extensive with the privilege against self- incrimination

3. "Use and Fruit Immunity" v. "Transactional Immunity" Transactional Immunity Use and Fruit Immunity Use and Fruit Immunity

Galman v. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 274 (1985), supra. HELD: Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use immunity" and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity." The distinction between the two is: "Use immunity" prohibits use of a witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. PD 1886, sec. 5 grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. 4. Exclusionary rule

Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violationof this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. The paradigmatic application of the exclusionary rule is a traditionally coerced confession, and not so much on uncounselled statement. A fortiori, testimony forced out of a person cannot be used in evidence against that person. 5. Effect of denial of the privilege by court E. Right to an impartial tribunal and trial of civilians by military courts Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 Military trial of civilians void even under Martial Law if the civil courts are open Cruz v. Ponce-Enrile, 160 SCRA 702 (1988) G. Bills of attainder-- Legislative adjudication of guilt 16

Bill of Attainder H. Right to a speedy disposition of cases

Art. III, Sec. 16.

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. III. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

A. What acts cannot be criminalized 1. Mere beliefs and aspirations Art. III, Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. 2. Debts and civil obligations Art. III. Sec. 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax. Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

Art. III, Sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. Ex Post Facto Law An "ex post facto law" is a law that seeks to punish an act which, when committed, was not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. It is a law that retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. Its unfairness consists in the fact that the person could not have known the act was criminal, and thus could not have avoided the crime. When a law is more favorable to the accused, however, it is allowed to retroact. B. What punishments cannot be imposed 1. Involuntary servitude Art. III, Sec. 18 (2) No involuntary sevitudes in any form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted. 2. Excessive fines Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. 3. Cruel, degrading and inhuman punishments Art. III, Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed. nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the death penalty be imposed, unless for compelling reasons

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involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Id., Sec. 12. xxx (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) People v. Lubreo, 200 SCRA 11 (1991) 4. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado and other forms of detention and the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited. Id., Sec. 19. xxx (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law. 5. Indefinite Imprisonments People v. Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90 (1989), supra. C. The protection against double jeopardy Art. III, Sec. 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. Elements of double jeopardy, (Rule 117, Sec 7; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 (1968): Subsequent prosecution is barred for the following: Exceptions to no. 5: Identity of offenses and identity of act 1. Two situations contemplated People v. Relova 148 SCRA 292 (1987) People v. City Court of Manila, Branch VI, 154 SCRA 175 (1987) 2. Rules of Court provisions 18

Rule 117, Sec. 7. Former conviction of acquittal; double jeopardy.-- When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of compentent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense in the former complaint of information. However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: (a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act or omission consituting the former charge; (b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only after the filing of the former complaint or information; or (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfied or serves in whole or in part the judgement, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for the graver offense.

Melo v. People, 85 P 776 (1950) People v. City Court of Manila, Branch XI, 121 SCRA 637 (1983) People v. Yorac, 42 SCRA 230 (1971) When defense of double jeopardy not available.-- When the case is dismissed other than on the merits upon motion of the accused personally, or through counsel, such dismissal is regarded as w/ express consent of the accused, who is therefore deemed to have waived the right to plea double jeopardy. Yap v. Lutero, April 30, 1959 Galman v. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 249 D. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus Art. III, Sec. 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. 1. Functions of the writ

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Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 P 778 (1919)

2. The writ of habeas corpus as a post-conviction remedy

3. Suspension of the privilege Art. VII, Sec. 18. Lansang v. Garcia, 42 SCRA 488 (1971) E. Affirmative rights 1. Free access to the courts Art. III, Sec. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty. 2. Protection and enforcement of constitutional rights Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctionsfor violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. 3. Compensation to, and rehabilitation of, victims of tortures Art. III, Sec. 12. xxx (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. IV. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Art. III, Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievance. Id., Sec. 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations. xxx A. Philosophical Basis of Guarantees Free Market Place of Ideas 1. For the discovery of political truth 20

2. For self government 3. For individual protection B. Prior Restraints Subsequent Punishment

C. Content-Based Restrictions 1. Test of validity of content-based restrictions The U.S. Supreme Court and, by haphazard imitation, the Philippine Supreme Court, have evolved certain tests to regulate the contents of speech. Dangerous Tendency Test: When the legislative body has determined generally, in the exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such danger of a substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in and itself, to bring the substantive evils, is not open to consideration. In such cases, the general provision of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the specific utterance if its natural and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body might prohibit. [Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652 (1925).] Clear and Present Danger Test: The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. [Schenck v. United States, 249 US 47 (1919).] Grave-but-improbable danger: Whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such an invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. [Dennis v. United States, 341 US 494 (1951), quoting Judge Learned Hand.] Direct Incitement Test: The consitutional guarantees of free speech and press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, except where such advocacy or peech is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, and is likely to incite or produce such action. [Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), cited in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985).] Balancing of Interest Test: The court must undertake the delicate and difficult task of weighing the circumstances and appraising the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of rights. [American Communication Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 383 cited in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 27 SCRA 835 (1969A)] Balancing of Factors Test: The truth is theat the clear-and-present danger test is over- simplified judgement unless it takes into account also a number of other factors: (1) the relative seriousness of the danger in comparison with the value of the occasion for speech or political activity, (2) the availability of more moderate controls than those the State has imposed, and perhaps (3) the specific intent with which the speech is launched. (Freund, quoted in Dennis v. United States in the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter). 21

2. Applications of tests in various contexts a. Freedom of expression and national security Babst v. National Intelligence Board 132 SCRA 316 (1984) b. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of "Actual Malice" Read Revised Penal Code, Articles 353-354 and 361-362 Freedom of expression and libel Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) Manuel v. Cruz-Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989) Libel suits based on official criticisms should be dismissed outright unless made in bad faith Newsweek Inc. v. IAC 142 SCRA 171 (1986) Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 34 SCRA 116 (1970) Quisumbing v. Fernando, 96 Phil 510 (1955) Mercado v. CFI of Rizal 116 SCRA 93 (1982) c. Freedom of expression and the right to privacy Lagunzad v. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476 (1979) Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong April 29, 1988 d. Freedom of expression and administration of justice (contempt of court) In re Ramon Tulfo, AM NO. 90-4-1545-0, April 17. 1990 Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 1 (1989) Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil 152 (1957) People v. Alarcon, 60 Phil 265 (1939) e. Symbolic Expression-- The Flag-burning case Flag burning when done to express dissent is protected speech. f. Movies Censorship Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 356 (1985) 22

Tests of obscenity: g. Radio Broadcast Eastern Broadcasting Corp. (DYRE) V. Dans, 137 SCRA 647 (1985) h. Freedom of Information Art. III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to, official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. D. Content-Neutral Restrictions O'brien test: A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [US v. O'brien, 391 US 367 (1968), adopted in Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992)] 1. Regulation of political campaign National Press Club v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1 (1992) Adiong v. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 712 (1992) 2. Freedom of Assembly Public Assembly Act of 1985 (Batas Blg. 580) Primicias vs Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 Navarro v. Villegas, 31 SCRA 730 (1970) Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil. 346 (1956) J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983) German v. Barangan 35 SCRA 514 (1985) Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 (1984) Arreza v. GAUP, 13 SCRA 94 (1985) Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez 154 SCRA 541 (1987) 3. Freedom of Association and the right to strike in the public sector 23

Art. III, Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Since the terms and conditions of govt. employment are fixed by law, govt. workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law. Relations bet. private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In govt employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of govt w/c fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through CBA's E. Academic Freedom Garcia v. Faculty of Admission, 68 SCRA 277 (1975) UP v. Ayson, 176 SCRA 647 (1989) UP v. CA, Feb. 9, 1993 V. FREEDOM OF RELIGION Art. III, Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion; or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. A. Non-Establishment Clause 1. Operation of sectarian schools 2. Religious instruction in public schools 3. Anti-evolution laws 4. Prayer and Bible-reading in public schools 5. Tax exemption

6. Public aid to religion B. Free Exercise Clause 1. Flag Salute 24

Ebranilag v. Division Superindentent of Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256 (1993) Conscientious Objectors cannot be compelled to salute the flag. Compare West V. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 US 624 (1943) 2. Freedom to propagate religious doctrines American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 P 386 (1957) 3. Exemtion from union shop Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974) 4. Disqualification from local government office Pamil v. Teleron 86 SCRA 413 (1978) VI. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND OF TRAVEL Art. III, Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Salonga v. Hermoso 97 SCRA 121 (1980) Right to travel Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 & 178 SCRA 760 (1989)

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