BERRY - The Human Consequences of Urbanization

 

The Making o f the 20th Century This seriej o f specially commissioned titles focuses attention o n significant and often controversial events and themes of world history in the present century. The authors. many o f them already out standing in their field. have tried to close the gap between the intelligent layman. whose interest is aroused by recent history. and the specialist student at university. Each book will therefore provide suffi cient narrative and explanation for the newcomer while offering the specialist student detailed source references and bibliographies. together with inter pretation and reassessment in the light o f recenl scholarship. I n the choice o f subjects there will be a balance between breadth in some spheres and detail in others; between the th e essentia essentially lly political political and matters matte rs scientific. economic or sodal. The series cannot be a comprehensive account 0/ everything that has hap pened in the twentieth twentie th century. c entury. but il will prov provide ide a guide 10 recent research and explain something o f the times of extraordinary change and complexity in which wh ich we live. live.

 

The Making o f the 20th Century

Series Ser ies Editor: Edit or:

CHRISTOPHER THORNE

Tides in the Series include

Already published V. R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach 01 War in 1914 Brian J. L . Berry, The Human Consequences 01 Urbanisation Intern al Confl Conflict ict and Internat International ional Peac Peacee Peter Calvert, Latin America: Internal Anthony Harrison, The Framework 01 Economie Aetivity: The International Economy and the Rise 01 the State Century? Deamond Deam ond King-Hele King-Hele,, The End 01 the Twentieth Century? Peter Pet er Mansfiel Mansfield, d, The Ott Ottoma oman n Empire Empir e and an d its Su Suee eees essor sorss A. J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise 01 Hitler B. N. Pandey, The Break-up 01 British India David Davi d Rees, The Age 01 Containment: The Cold War Christopher Thome, The Approach 01 War 1938-1939 Francee in the M Midd iddle le East and North Alriea Ann Williams Williams,, Britain and Franc Elizabeth Wiskemann, Fascism in Italy: Its Development and an d Influenee Tides in preparation include

Anthony Adamthwaite, Britain and Franee 1914-1945 Sally Marks, The Illusion 01 Peaee: International Relations 1918-1933 B. N. Pandey, Problems 01 Independenee in South and South-East Asia Asia E. M. Robertson, Striving lor Empire: Ital, between the Powers Zara Steiner, Britain and the th e Origins 01 the First W orld War an d the Deel Deeline ine 01 the West in Asia Richard Storry, Storry, Japan and International Wang Gungwu, Chi1UlJ Foreignl'oli cyand International DeoelopmentJ '949-1973 Geoffrey Warn er, Indo,hina Jinee [945

 

The Human Consequences of Urbanisation DIVERGENT PATHS IN THE URBAN EXPERIENCE O F T H E T WE N T I E T H CENTURY

Brian J. L. Berry

[rving B. Harns Professor o f Urban Geography The University o f Chicago

Macmillan Education

 



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T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

a special fonn of bureaucracy, increases because modernisation creates crea tes a highly h ighly specialised specialised and differentiated, interdependent and more vulnerable society. And finally, because in transition to a full inass society there are many frictions, social and personal disorganisation are most manifest in those parts of society under going the most rapid transition, particularly among migrants and immigrants, especially the second generation moving from pare pa rent ntal al to mass mass-s -soci ociet ety y culture. cult ure. Urbanism as a Way 01 Lile

I t remained for a n American sociologist, Louis Wirth, to draw

these ideas together into the single most widely accepted theory of the effects of cities on social relationships, in his famous article 'Urbanism as a Way of Life' (1938). Wirth accepted the definition of the city as a point of population concentration of large size, high density, and heterogeneity of inhabitants. What trom these attributes the patterns of social he did was and to derive interaction their consequences for organised social life that had been outlined by the earlier philosophers: impersonality, isolation, the decline of primary group membership, and the dominance of o f fonna fonnall organisat organisations ions.. For example, he feit that it was largely the greater size of the city that produced greater volumes of human interaction. With interpersonal dependence spread over more people, there would thus be less dependence upon particular individuals. Contacts would, as a result, beome impersonal, superficial and tran si t o r y  too often viewed simply as means to individual ends.

The second feature of the new city, high population density,

was seen to produce frequent physical contacts, high-pace living, the functional segregation of urban sub-areas, and the segregation segregation of people in a residential mosaic in which people with similar backgrounds and needs consciously select, unwittingly drift, or are forced force d by circumstances circumstances into the same sectio section n of the city. For those unable to find a secure life in some specialised role and sub-area, the likelihood of dysfunctional, deviant o r patholo pathological gical behaviour was seen to increase, particularly where densities were the highest. Finally, the greater heterogeneity of the new cities was argued to produce pro duce a distinctive distinctive seri series es of effec effects ts.. With Wi thou outt a common co mmon back bac k ground, Wirth feIt that diverse peoples tended to place emphasis on visual visual recognition and symbolism. Such things as the place of

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISATION

15

residence, therefore, became status symbols. With n o common value sets o r ethical systems, money tended to become the sole measure of worth. However, economic economic dass distinctions tended to break down, because city-dwellers belonged to a variety of groups, a further consequence of which was the growth of mass political movements and of pluralistic interest groups within the city. When Wirth's model is analysed, it will be seen that his theory actually actual ly had ha d two components, a sociol sociolog ogic ical al one based based upon upo n D Durk urk heim, and a social-psychological one drawn from Simmel. O n the structural level, size, density and heterogeneity were thought to lead sequentially to differentiation, formalisation o f institutions and anomie. O n the behavioural level, urbanism was thought to produce highly selective responses to the nervous stimulation and possibilities of psychological overload in the city, opportunities for great gre at mobilit mobility, y, but also adaptations to urban life i n the form o f social isolation and deviance. The two were put together by Wirth's informal acknowledgement of the ideahthat in any social sy syst stem em,, structure str ucture operates on behaviour through throug the mediation mediati on o f cognition, and is itself a n aggrega aggregation tion of individual behaviour. I f one accepts accepts this this basic basic idea, Wirth' Wir th'ss mod model el can be diagr di agramme ammed d in the manner man ner of Fig. Fig. I to show show how he reIated his his basic basic structu stru ctural ral variables-size, density, and heterogeneity-to individual be haviour via high degrees of nervous stimulation that demand selectiv sele ctivee respons responses es by the indivi i ndividual dual to preve pr event nt psychological psychological over load. Selective response to stimuli is seen as producing, in the city structure, differentiated interest groups which, in turn, pro duce the opportunity for individual mobility. Mobile individuals seeking seif-identity seeking seif-ident ity in the t he mass society society create creat e many ma ny complex insti tutional devices to maintain formal integration of diverse interest groups, but the resulting secondary relationships also breed im personality and isolation; too much isolation, in turn, creates anomie a t the societallevel, societallevel, alienation a t the perceptuallevel, and resulting individual deviance. Urbanisation, in Wirth's view, led unremitti unrem ittingly ngly to socia sociall malaise. T H E ROOTS OF URBAN PLANNINO

This interpretation o f social change from traditionallittle society to modern mass society was accepted as a n artide of faith by social scientists and social activists alike for the first half of the

 

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Louis Wirth's theory of 'Urbanism as a Way of Life' diagrammed i n caus causal al pa path th for form m

The figure is ada adapte pted d from tthe he wo work rk of Claud Claudee Fisch Fischer. er.

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISATION

17

twentieth century. I t moulde moulded d scientist scientists' s' analyse analysess of o f dties, dties , sparked spa rked the activists' drive t o change them, and produced many of the proposed solut solutions ions to urban urb an ilIs adva advance nced d by a new profe profess ssion ion,, the t he urban urb an planners planners.. The history of the American planning experience is interesting in this this regard. regar d. Not N ot only does does this this history provide a bridge to Chap Ch ap ter 2 , which focuses upon the changing nature of American ur banisation in the twentieth century. I t also reveals how the beliefs of the Progressive ideologists, who led the fight for soda} reform in America a t the turn of the century, were derived from the dassical ideas just discussed; how, in turn, in Progressivism are to be found many o f the roots of modem American urban plan ning; and how American cultural values have cast this planning into particul pa rticular ar forms. forms. ProgTessive Thought The Progressive intellectuals-among them William Allen White, Frederic Howe, Jane Addams, Mary Parker Follett, John Dewey, Josiah Royce, Frank Giddings, Charles Horto Hor ton n Cooley and Robert Park-advanced their main ideas from 1890 through the First World W a r. I t is probably incorrect t o think of Progressivism as constituting a singl singlee movement. There were a t lea least st three separate sepa rate threadss of concern : soci thread social al justice, justice, the manag ma naged ed economy, economy, and poli tical democracy (DeWitt, 1915). A t best the Progressives consti

tuted a coalition of interests, often contradictory, involving the ambition of the new middle dass to fulfil its destiny through its own bureau bur eaucra craticm ticmean eanss (Wie (Wiebe be,, 1967). Yet several common features may be noted. The Progressive intellectuals idealised the small town as a place with a sense o f community, communi ty, with w ith a n intimacy of face-to-fa face-to-face ce personal contact con tact and easy neighbourliness. The price paid by the individual may have been conformity, but this was feit to be bearable, even desirable. They also emphasised doing good works and the moral duty of the individual individ ual to act. A strong ethical perspective perspective pervade per vaded d thei t heirr w work, ork, orientation towards imposition of a moral order (Quandt, 1970). What the Progressives elaimed to see was the breakdown, under the impact impac t of urbanisation urbanisation and industr industrialisation ialisation,, of the t he small elo elose se knit group which they had experienced in their youth. Social or ganisation based on family, neighbourhood and small-town solid arity was being replaced by the more impersonal and tenuous ties H . C. U. --2

 

18

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN1SATI0N

of the market ma rket place. place. The division of labour, together with modern methods of communication and transportation, had created a physical unity based on the interdependence of p ar t s- an urban, industrial order whose size and complexity precluded the tradi tional sens sensee of belonging belonging.. A moral unity uni ty corresponding t o this eco nomic web had not yet emerged. Older form formss of socia sociall control con trol had been weakened; individual individualss in the cities had lost direct, spontan eous and intimate contacts with social reality. The restraints of public opinion and a common cause with neighbours that occur red in small towns was lacking. The city was too complex and im personal to create a sense of identification on the part of the indi vidual. Indeed, its bureaucratic complexities discouraged the feel ing of belonging, while class conflict, complexity and physical isolation o f social classes impeded mutual understanding. What was needed, the Progressives argued, was a greater psychic and moral integration to match the increasing physical integration of society. I n this vis visio ion n the small small community commun ity became be came the scale model for the larger one. Its values of intimacy, mutual identification, and face-to-face communication appeared in the Progressives' blueprin blue printt for the city, city, the province and the nation. Emphasising the importance of face-to-face communication, Mary Parker Follett sought to establish community centres in the public schools, agencies that would integrate local organisations and overcome civic apathy. The idea of genuine democracy led t o the idea that all persons should contribute to neighbourhood purposes through direct and regular interchange. I n this frame work Jane Addams, America's most distinguished social worker, began her Hull House settlement in Chicago, and from that experi ence grew the Settlement House Movement, as weIl as pressures for local self-government self-governme nt as the antith antithesis esis of City Hall controls and corruption, such as was exemplified by Boss Tweed in New York. A t the national scale, John Dewey and Robert Park feIt that through communications social progress could be produced b y mutual awareness of and response to society's probIernIl. A new community of purpose would arise and produce a new moral order through creation of justice and a cooperative social order. Park thought of unity unit y oriented orie nted to national nat ional effi effici cien ency cy and the scien scien tific solutions to crime, poverty and other social ills. All that was needed for social harmony was a common purpose and the instru mentss of enligh ment enl ighten tenmen mentt : the th e scho school ols, s, the press, press, the motion picture,

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISAT10N

19

and the social survey. Thus, the great comrnunity would material

ise. se. An implied im plied commu c ommunio nion n was a religious religious idea as weIl weIl as as the cent ce nt ral idea i dea of democracy. Above all, the Progressives feit the need for good govemment, aregenerated civic life, that would draw pe perso rsons ns of culture cul ture back and not abando a bandon n the public sphere to commercial commercialism ism and corrupt Bossism. The cru crux x of change would have to be in polit politics ics,, and most Progressives advanced the ideal of democratic capitalism. This ideal rested on the premise that education and communication would create cr eate the cooperation necess necessary ary to limit conflict conflict and make the system work. From the 1890S through the 1920S the Progressives' views on industrial legislation, business regulation, and political organisa tion reflected their support of reforms in the United States which regulated capitalism but stopped short of govemment control of the economy. Their beli belief ef in liberal reform refor m was combined with a n antibureaucratic bias which limited their enthusiasm for big govemment and the expertise which a rationalised economy re quired. Sharing a suspicion of large-scale organisation, they wanted to bring centralisation and rationalisation into harmony with the values of the small community. The political position of the Progressives centred on the desire t o regulate capitalism capitalism with wi th out capitulating to state socialism. They favoured govemment protection of workers; non partisan parti san politics; politics; regulation o f trusts; child labour lab our laws; coIl coIlect ective ive bargain bar gaining; ing; workmen's compensati comp ensation; on; reform of govemments through the use of commissions of experts for social engineering and scientific management; direct democ racy, including direct di rect primaries, primaries, the referendum and initiative, to break br eak the power of o f bo boss and party machine; and appointment and election of speciaIly trained experts i n govemment, who would appoint experts in administration to manage the cities. Thus, urban-indust urbanindustrial rial society society,, rationalised by functional organisation o f city govemment with professional administrators, was welcomed. Yet remote impersonal govemment was deplored. Attachment to face-to-face communication and grassroots democracy made the Progressives Progre ssives cling t o the smaIl smaIl community communit y as the sine qua non of a humane social order. They tried to preserve the integrity of the small locality because i t encouraged a sense of belonging; they tried to perpetuate the importance of local politics because it fos tered tere d civic and poli politica ticall participation.

 

20

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

I n these eoneems eone ems of the th e Progre Progressi ssives ves are to be found the roots of Ameriean urban planning, whieh was thus a produet of the first forthright attempts to eonfront what was pereeived to be the new urban reality. Only a t the end of the nineteenth century did men

seriously question whether laissez-faire market-plaee economics would suffiee in dealing with housing and the use of urban land; only then t hen did eeonomi eeonomists sts beeome beeome so eoncemed that neither mono polies nor the provision of publie goods would respond to the laws of demand and supply that they were willing to eountenance direct publie regulatio regulation. n. Thus, Thu s, only thereafter therea fter was there a seareh for the norms of publie intervention designed to control land use and improve the quality o f housing. A variety of threads are intertwined: landscape arehiteeture, the City Beautiful Move ment, and pressures for housing reform. Landscape Architecture Frederiek Law Olmsted, America's first great landscape architeet, and othe others, rs, heirs to the th e romanti rom anticc Gothic Gothi c revival revival,, tried to establish establish new criteria for urban form. Much influeneed by Edward Bel lamy's novel Looking Backward (1888), which was a nostalgie attempt to eapture the imagined simplicity of a n earlier, less com plex, more socially responsive, American way of life, they reaeted against the high densities and crowding of the city. Instead, they espoused ideas of the 'city in a garden' and they developed the prototypic Ameriean suburb, thus producing the two most dis tinctive urba ur ban n innovations of the New W orId. orId. Adna Weber recognised the signifieance of what was happen ing, for h e concluded The Growth 0/ Cities in the Nineteenth Century b y remarking that

the most encouraging feature of the whole situation is the ten dency . . . towards the development develo pment of suburban subu rban towns. towns. The signifi canee of this tendency is that it denotes . . . a diminuition on the distribution ion o f population intensity of coneentration. Such a new distribut eombines a t onee the open air and spaciousness o f the eountry with the t he sanitary sanit ary improvements, comforts and associated life of the city . . . The ri rise se of the suburbs it is, whie whieh h fumishes the solid basi basiss of hope that the evils of eity life, so far as they result from over crowding, may be in large part removed. I f eoneentration of population seems desired to continue, it will be a modified eoneen tration whieh offers the advantages of both eity and country life. One of the faeets of this change was the attempt to bring the country into the city b y developing eomprehensive park-boulevard

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISATION

21

systems. But such development necessitated long-range systematic planning for parks and open space beyond the city's limits. Thus, park planning became the source of regional planning, beginning with the Bost Boston on Metropol Metr opolitan itan Park Pa rk Commis Commissio sion n in 1890, and, fol lowing the influential Chicago Exhibition of 1893, leading to Master Plans for the City Beautiful, such as the Bumham Plan for Chicago and Chicago Chicagoan an Walt W alter er Burley Griffi Griffin's n's 1912 plan for Australia's new capital city, Canberra. Bumham inspired genera ti tion onss of planners with his admonition admonit ion : 'Make 'Ma ke no little plans; plan s; they have no magie to stir men's blaod', and Chicago, i t might be re membered, adapted 'th 'thee city in in a garde ga rden' n' as its its civi civicc motto mot to when it it rebuilt after the 1871 fire. Although that rebuilding involved in vention of o f the steel-frame steel-frame skyscraper skyscraper and the elevator that epito mised mise d the high h igh densities densities and core-o core-orientat rientation ion of the later industrial metropolis, i t was in Chicago that some of the early experimenta tion with the modern suburb, with its winding streets, took place, following the building of Llewellyn Park, America's first planned romantic suburb, in New Jersey b y Alexander Jackson Davis. Olmsted's and Calvert Vaux's Riverside, Illinois and Brookline, Massachusetts, were planned to have picturesque informality, blending human and nat natura urall environments in ways ways that contrasted with the right angles, flat surfaces and straight lines of the grid iran town. The ramifications extended further than this, however. Eben ezer Howard, the originator of the Garden City's first experiment, Letchworth, designed it as a city in a garden. But, in many res pectss Howard's pect Howar d's concept of the Garden Gar den City as as a n alternative to the Victorian industrial metropolis and a counter to speculative capi talism was alien to the American scene. Howard argued that a new order could be achieved only by reversing the trend of con centration b y means of planned decentralisation into small, balanced bala nced cities cities that combined the best of rurallife with the t he fruits of industrial occupations, in which land was regulated co-opera tively rather than competitively, supported b y effective public controls. O n the other hand, Americans came to favour limited controls on the laissez-faire development of garden suburbs. The City Beautiful Movement

I n the closing years of the nineteenth century, the civic endea

vours marking mar king the beginnings beginnings of American city planning plann ing were de-

 

22

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

rived from landscape architecture rived archit ecture and were mainly main ly aesthetic. The basic idea was that of the need for a planned unity of the entire city as as a work of art, supported suppor ted by a Mast M aster er Plan for land la nd use use and b y a comprehensive zoning ordinance to maintain the plan. New environmental ideals were advanced, as was the notion that plan ning was essential if the industrial city was to be saved from what was perceived to be progressive physical and moral deterioration. deterioration. A s one reporter remarked after attending a meeting of young architect archit ect planners in 189 1899: 9: 'Beauty 'Bea uty in high places places is what we want; beauty in our municip municipal al buildings, buildings, our parks, squares and courts.' From such notions came the idea that the role of planning was to produce the City Beautiful. Inspiration was drawn from such sources as Major Pierre CharIes L'Enfant's baroque plan for Washington, D.C., and Baron Haussmann's transformation of Paris in i n 1853 1853.. More than any other base, the City Beautiful Movement pro vided the stimulus for American city planning. It began with the Chicago Exhibition of 1893 and had its first forthright expression in the Washington plan of 1902. Following the Washington ex ample, b y 191343 cities had prepared similar plans-the apogee was Burnham's Plan for Chicago (1909) which followed his 1905 plans for Manila and San Francisco-and 233 cities were engaged in some civic improvement programme. Out of this activity there emerged two aspects of local planning that remain in common use today: the professional consultant, and the quasi-independent planning commission composed of leading citizens. The first com missions were created in 1907-9, and the idea spread rapidly. Over 70 700 0 commiss commissions ions were created crea ted in the 1920-30 decade. decade . Privat Pri vatee consultants prepared one-shot Master Plans, and planning com com

missio miss ions ns administered them through thro ugh the mechanism me chanism of zoning zoning and subdivision control. Housing Reform

As the architects and planners developed their ideas, minimal

structural and sanitary standards for urban housing were, simul taneously, being sought by housing reformers. Linked with the drive for better public health was the feIt need for public decision making to control the deleterious consequences of private interests thought to be selfishly exploiting the tenement-bound working poor. Housing and building codes were thus linked to environ-

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISATION

23

mental controls for public health purposes. As a resuIt, environ mental standards were gradually improved. Housing standards were formulated and enforced, sanitary sewers were constructed, streets were paved, and ref refuse use dispos disposal al was was broug br ought ht u und nder er control. But whereas whereas in Britain, Germany, and Belgium, effective means of creating a low-cost housing supply were being developed--charit able trusts, for example, pioneered by investing in limited-profit, reasonable ren tal flats-and slum clearance and housing pro grammes under municipal direction direction had alr already eady been designed, designed, in the United States city and state housing codes mimicked the New York State Tenement House Law of 1901. This law was based upon model codes formulated by economist Lawrence Veiller, founder of the National Housing Association, supporter of restric tive housing codes, but ardent opponent of the European 'con structive' type legislation as socialistic. Public bodies, he feit, should not replace private enterprise. The proper public role was and set limits to the market-place simply to establish standards to regulate, rather than to substitute for market-place economics. Restrictive legislation spread, and while it provided a means of controlling new construction, it solved neither the problem of a low-income housing supply nor that of the urban slums in the United Uni ted States. States.

Planning Professionalises Many of the foregoing efforts involved what Leonard Reissman (1964) has called 'visionary planning for urban utopias'. Out of them emerged a new idea that grew in in importance import ance in the twentieth

century, the belief that men could consciously and effectively plan and control the physical physical environment environmen t o f their communities to produce sought-after social consequences. T o each of the vision

aries, the industrial metropolis presented a problem environment. The vision in each case involved a physical plan for building into reality those forms, social values and human qualities believed necessary for the ideal city to emerge. There was disenchantment with industrial urbanism, and a 'spatial wish'-the projection of the utopia into space-with the attendant idea that physical plan ning for land use and housing would produce the desired social resuIts. Such was the basis on which urban planning professional ised. By the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, the con-

 

24

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

cepts of urban planning were widely accepted in North America. Professional city planning, devoted to conscious control of urban environments environm ents through thro ugh regulatory measu measures res,, emerged after a fter 1909, i n which year was founded the National Conference of City Plan ning, followed b y the American City Planning Institute in 1917. Thereafter, universities initiated their first training programmes for planners, public administ administrators, rators, and city managers. managers. New N ew York introdu intr oduced ced the firs firstt comprehensive zonin zoning g resolution resolution in 1916, pro viding the planners with some control over urban land use. Cities around the country followed suit; through their mimicry, New York's innovations diffused-albeit, by lagged emulation-to 981 cities and towns by 1930. The po popu pula larit rity y of zoning bears closer closer inspection, however. Since in theory i t was to be the main instrument for regulating urban development, i t migh mightt be concluded that it reflected some change in Americans' laissez-faire attitudes to the urban land market. No thing could could be furthe fur therr from from the truth. trut h. Zoning became popular popu lar pre cisely because i t was touted as means of protecting property values. Single-family hornes were secured from intrusions of un desirable uses, but multi-family, commercial and industrial areas were commonly overzoned. And seldom did the planning com mission o r the zoning board of appeals resist proposals for re zoning or variances to permit 'higher and better uses'. The plan ning commission in a social sense and the zoning ordinance in a real estate sense even today represent middle- and upper-class values and are conservative holding operations against the forces of social social change. change . T o the extent that planning was concerned with parks, boule vards and civic centres, the same conservatism prevailed, for such orientations ensured that the claims of the polity did not become an issue. The achievement of those limited goals required public investment, rather than controls; the orientation was consistent

with the uppe up perr middlemiddle-clas classs constituency of plans for f or civic civic design design.. By nature suspicious of governmental controls, especially a t the local level, this powerful interest group responded enthusiastic ally to' objecti objectives ves like like beautification throug thr ough h public investment. A t the same time, the radical alternatives of the Garden City movement were eschewed, as was active involvement in provision of low-income housing. American realtors turned Garden Cities into middle-class suburbs. American planning became essentially

 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDUSTRIAL URBANISATION

25

ConseIVative, emphasising municipal effidency. Businessmen

turn ed the City Beautiful Movement into a publicly turned publicly finan financed ced pro p ro gramme for maintaining maintaining the commerd c ommerdal al importance of the central business district. Broad reform objectives were replaced in the planni pla nning ng profession professional, al, as as it became institutionalised, by an a n increas ingly narr na rrow ow focus focus on techn t echnical ical skill skills. s. Only in private groups-for example, the Regional Planning Association of America, spearheaded by Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, Frederick Ackerman, Ackerman, Benton Benton MacKay Mac Kayee and Lewis Mum ford--did there remain concern for direct housing programmes, for new towns, and for regional reconstruction of urban forms. Mumford had been much influenced by the Scottish biologist and plann pl anner er Patrick Patr ick Geddes. Geddes. Geddes Geddes set u p a settlement settle ment house house in in Edin Ed in burgh in 1887 three years after Samuel A. Barnett established Toynbee Hall, the first first such experiment, experiment, in London, Londo n, and two years before Jane Addams founded Hull House in Chicago in 1889. H e was well aware of Charles Booth's analyses of social problems in London Lond on and a nd of o f the Fabian Fab ian socialis socialists' ts' call callss for for reform, and a nd,, as a con temporary of Ebenezer Howard, gave his support to the Garden City Ci ty movement. movement. Geddes influenced influenced several generations of o f students, including Sir Patrick Abercrombie, who subsequently developed the Greater Grea ter London Plan. He helped stimulate the first town plan ning legislation in Britain in 1909. H e proposed urban renewal, neighbourhood rehabilitation, community action and partidpa tory democracy. And he invented the term conurbation to de scribe constellations of eities sprawling together. Like Geddes, Mumford argued that public controls over urban form and land

use were not enough, that amelioration of the environmental and

social pathologies of existing eities was impossible without funda mental changes in residential design, housing finance, and urban regional regi onal planning. plannin g. I t was in Britain rather than in the United States that these ideas took root, however, as w e shall see in Chapter 4. Before the First World War, the London County Couneil had embarked upon programmes of slum clearance and provision of low-income housing, and by the mid 1930S lo loca call authority auth ority housing housing and other othe r state-aided construction construction was was already alrea dy aceounting for half ha lf of an a n new housing in Britain. By the late 1930S a major poliey aim had emerged: to provide satisfactory housing for all a t rents within their capacity to pay. Along with this came a concern lest the H.C.U.-2*

 

26

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

private housing sector promote 'unhealthy' urban sprawl not conducive to fuH community development. There was the first Town Pla Planni nning ng Act of 1909 1909,, the Town Planning Institute in 1914, the International Internat ional Garden Ga rden Cities Cities Federation in 1913,a 1913,and nd then,with then,wit h F. J. Osborn and C . B. Purdom leading the movement, came the construction construc tion of Welw Welwyn yn Garden Gard en City. Even more inßuential i nßuential action followed in the 1930s. Finally, as the Town and Country Planning Association (1941), the Garden City activists had their major im pact on Britain's post-war reconstruction policies, and indeed, on post-Second World War urban development policies throughout Western Europe, Eur ope, for thei t heirr plans were extensiv extensively ely copied elsewhere, elsewhere, for example in Sweden. The plans were were clear : large urban urb an centres should shou ld be decentra decentralised lised through t hrough the plann p lanned ed development of small small satellite cities; growth should be controlled through restrictive land la nd use use and building licens licensing ing polici policies; es; the 'unhealt 'unh ealthy' hy' growt g rowth h of the largest cities, in particular, should be stopped; urban 'sprawl' should be hai ted by girdling green belts; the public should pro vide a n effective counterpoint to speculative private development. I n the Americ American an city, city, on the other ot her hand, a tradition of 'pr 'privat ivat ism' prevailed. This Thi s traditi trad ition on has h as been called by Sam Ba Bass Warner J r (1 (19 968) the most most importan imp ortantt element element of American American culture for underst understand and ing the development o f cities. [It] has meant that the cities of the United States depended for their wages, employment, and general prosperity upon the aggregate successes and failures of thousands thousan ds of individual enterprise enterprises, s, not upon communityact commun ityaction. ion. I t has also meant that the physical forms of American cities, their and

of

eal lots, houses, streets have beenland the outcome estate marketfactories of profit-seeking builders, speculators,arand large investors. fAnd itl has meant that the local politics o f Ameri can cities have depended for their actors, and for a good deal o f their subject matter, on the changing focus of men's private eco nomic activities. activities.

Privatism has persisted throughout America's urban history. The realisation that this is so is essential to a n understanding of Ameri can urba ur ban n dynamics dynamics in the twentieth century, to which we we turn in Chapter 2 .

 

2

Twentieth-Century Urbanisation: The North Ameri Ame rica can n Expe Experie rienc nce e

B y the end of the First World War, interpretations of the indus trial metropolis had been provided, its ills had been diagnosed, new social movements had emerged, and city planning had pro

fessionalised. During the two inter-war decades most American social scientists simply accepted the conventional wisdom of the social theorists as they analysed cities. Hope Tisdale, for example, summarised what had by then the n become a generally accepted a ccepted defini defini tion in her paper 'The Process of Urbanisation' (1942). Louis Wirth, Iikewise, responsible as fora the definitive the social theorywas in 'Urbanism Way of Life'.codification But even of as Tisdale and Wir Wirth th wrote, American cities cities were were being transformed. It is to the nature of this transformation that we now should turn, because i t created a new and different proces processs of o f urbanisation urbani sation and a contrasting array of human consequences.

CONSEQUENCES OF METROPOLITAN CONCENTRATION

'Urbanisation', 'Urbanisa tion', Tisdale wrote wrote in the manner of Adna Weber,

is a pr proc oces esss of population populat ion concentration. conce ntration. It proceeds in two ways :

the muItiplication o f the points of concentration and the increas ing in size of individual concentrations. . . . Just as long as cities grow in size o r multiply in number, urbanisation is taking place. · • . Urbanisation is a process of becoming. I t impl implies ies a movement moveme nt · • • from astate o f less concentration to astate of more concentra tion. The statistics of the twentieth century apparently bear out Tisdale's contention. Care is, of course, required in defining the areas for which the data on concentration are reported. A s the U.S. Bureau of the Census Census no ted early earl y in the century: · . . the population o f the corporate city frequently gives a very inadequate inade quate idea i dea of the population populatio n mass massed ed in and around that city, constituting the greater city . • • [ f he boundaries of] large cities in few cases • • . limit the urban population which that city repre-

 

28

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN1SATI0N

sents or of which it sents i t is the centre . . . I f we are to have a correct pic ture of the massing o r concentration of population in extensive urban areas . . . i t is necessary to establish metropolitan districts which will show the magnitude of each of the principal popula tion centres. Spelling out the idea further, in 1960 the Bureau of the Budget's Committee on Metropolitan Area Definition wrote: The general concept of a metropolitan metrop olitan area ar ea is one of of an integrated economic and social unit with a recognised large population nuc1eus . . . . The Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area will in c1ude a central city, and adjacent counties that are found t o be metropolitan in character and economically and socially inte grated grat ed with the county c ounty of the central city. city. The percentage of the American population living in such metro politan areas increased progressively d u ring the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, 60 per cent of the population lived on farms and in villages villages.. By 1970,69 per cent of the popula tion resided in metropolitan areas. Clearly, metropolitan concen tration was was the dominant domin ant feature of population redistribution redistribution dur dur  ing the first half of the century. But as the century c entury progre progress ssed, ed, the patterns of population redistribution within these metropolitan areas became of increasing increasing importance. importan ce. cOur Cities', 1937: National Cancern with Urban Problems Emerges Many of the consequenc consequences es of this this rapid rap id burst bur st of metropolitan metropolit an co con n centration came to the forefront of public attention in the 1930s, as the crash of 1929 was followed b y America's first venture into b y massive urban unemploy social among policy, the Deal.ofFaced ment, the New creations this period was the National Re sources Committee, charged with recommending ameliorative action. One of its subcommittees prepared areport entitled Our Cities: Their Role in the National Economy (1937), and con cluded in a vein that has been repeated in public inquiries ever since (for few few of the problems prob lems have ha ve been bee n solv solved ed)) : I.

The most drastic inequalities of income and wealth are found

within the urban within u rban community. . . • 2. . . . locali localities, ties, by means mean s of subsi subsidie dies, s, tax ta x exemptions, and free sites, have indiscriminately attracted enterprises which did not mesh withhelped the resttoof throw the community's comm which out sooner o r later the unity's entire industries industrialand pattern of gear . . •

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

29

3. Rapid obsolescence of physical plan and plant is another problem . . . 4. Competing for forms ms of transportation transpor tation have left their th eir disrupting imprint on the the national national urban pattern pa ttern . . . . 5. The unparalleled growth of cities has been accompanied by uncontro unco ntrolled lled subdivision subdivision and specula speculative tive practices . • . We We are now faced with the problem of arriving a t a rational urban land policy. . . . 6. Urban housing is one of the most burde burdensome nsome problems . . . . 7. Urban public health is endangered particularly in blighted areas and an d among am ong low income income groups . . . . 8. The city with its diversity of ethnic, religious, and cultural strains is the haven par excellence of many widely varying types of personalities . . . but in this heterogeneity the city also finds some of its weightiest problems . . . the urban way of life is often socially disconnected though economically interdependent. Alle giances gian ces may become become group, dass, or sectio sectional. nal. 9. . . . city youths . . . are still barred from higher educational opportunities opportu nities they might mi ght weil weil utilize utilize . . . . 1 0 . Juvenile delinquency, organised crime, and commercial rackets rack ets are among the vexations vexations of the city . . . 1 I . Urban public finance is another emerging problem of vast proportions . . . . 1 2 . Another of the city's tasks is the adjustment of the tradi tional scope scope of urba ur ban n powers . . . 13. Our overlapping medley medley of independent govemmen govemmental tal units was . . . never intended for the sprawling metropolitan regions of America . . . 14. . . . we are still faced in some cities with systematic evasions of civil service laws, irresponsible political leadership, and officiaI tolerance of discriminatory o r questionable administrative prac tices . . . .

The Committee conc1uded that :

All in all there has been more widespread national neglect of our cities than of any other ma.ior segment of our national existence . . . But) But) the delayed proddings prod dings of conscience conscience and the urge for mass consumption of commodities and services unite to thrust us forward towards sounder national nationa l poli polici cies es . . . (that) would accom plish the following : I . Improvem Improvement ent of the standards of urban life life and raisi raising ng of the level of living conditions. . . . 2 . Elimination of urban blight and erosion; and, above aU, abolition of the t he slum. . . . Better planned knowled knowledge edge abo about ut the conditions cities ••• 43.. Better plann industriallocation industrialloc ation ..•• of the cities 5. National-urban preparedness to meet insecurity and unem-

 

30

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

ployment . . . our Committee does not anticipate the decline of urban population o r the wholesale dispersion of great centres of population . . . the realistic answer to the question of a desirable urban environment lies not in wholesale dispersion, but in the judicious reshaping of the urban community and region by b y system system atic development development and redevelopme redevelopment nt in accordance with forward looking and intelligent plans. Systematic concern for the cities cities was thus focused focused on housing, slum slu m clearance, and urban renewal. The Federal Housing Administra tion had been established to stimulate construction and horne ownership through insuring mortgages under certain circum stances. The Housing Act of 193 1937 created cre ated the United States Hous ing Authority and introduced slum clearance to the American scene, to produce employment and help in 'priming the pump' of the economy, economy, to eliminate eliminat e the th e worst worst housing and to provide public housing for the poor. A t the same time the t he Works Progres Progresss Admini stration provided the money to employ planners to conduct a greater volume of urban studies than had ever been undertaken before. The efficacy and orientation of these efforts is a point to which we shall return later on in this chapter, because b y their very nature they conformed to the dominance of privatism in American society. Wirth Evaluated

as a memer of the Urbanism Urba nism Committee, I t was Louis Wirth who, as provided the theoretical basis for the committee's finding that urbanisation had produced the long list of ills. His theory was accepted b y a n entire generation of social scientists and urban policymakers as as thenewfloo then ewflood d of urban researchran its course.Like Wirth, most researchers firmly believed that the essential nature of the city-population size, density and heterogeneity-produced heterogeneity-produced aseries of psychological psychological and social consequences in two mutually reinforcing ways. O n the individual level, urban life was feIt to expose the resident to a constant bombardment of stimuli: sights, sounds, people, social demands for attention, concern and action. Under this overstimulation, coping mechanisms to defend the organism isolated men from their environment and from other people. The urbanite, therefore, became aloof from others, super ficial in his contacts with them, blase, sophisticated and indiffer ent to the events occurring about hirn. His relationships to others

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

31

became restricted to specific roles and tasks in a business-like way, and he thus was though tho ughtt to be estranged from his fel fello low w man. ma n. O n the aggregate level, concentration, it was believed, in con junction with the economic principles of competition and com parative advantage, led to differentiation and diversification. The larger the community, the more divided and specialised the labour, the greater the number and variety of social groups and the greater the differences among neighbourhoods. T o hold such a splintered society together different social mechanisms were seen to be needed: means o f formal integration such as written laws, impersonal rules o f etiquette, and special agencies of social con trol, education, ccimmunication and welfare. Formal institutions were, however, believed to b e inadequate to avoid as t at e of anomie-that condition o f society in which social bonds between individuals and their groups are weak, as are the rules of proper and permissible behaviour. Such astate of anomie was argued to result in social and personality disorganisation, deviance and, once again, individual ind ividual isolation isolation.. How accurate has Wirth's model been as a guide to under standing the consequences of twentieth-century American urbanisation? Proceeding in sequence through Fig. I let us review more recent evidence that bears on the validity of Wirth's postu lates, drawing on the work of Fischer (1972b). Wirth began by defining the city as a 'relatively large, dense and perma permanent nent settl settle e ment of socially heterogeneous individuals', growing rapidly through immigration, and he hypothesised that urbanism causes certain social phenomena.

This beginning had some validity. As size, density and hetero geneity increase, residents of cities are indeed recipients of expo nentially increasing amounts and diversity of sensory stimuli (inputs) demanding conscious responses (outputs), both physical and socia . The recipients, consequentially, face problems of coping with such high stimulation, and there is real danger of information overload, producing stress, strain, tension and ulti mately, such behavioural manifestations as psychiatrie disorders. Staney Milgram (1970) has suggested that there is ampl amplee evidenee of the high information informat ion inputs, and eoping teehniques that include sueh protective adapt ad aptati ations ons as bloeking bloeking off off inputs, giving less time to eaeh input, and selectively filtering them to reduee intensity in Wirth's terms 'isolation', 'transitoriness', 'superfieiality' and

 

32

T H E HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

'secondary relationships'. But as Leo Srole (1972) has shown, shown, recent recen t evidenee no longer supports the proposition that mental disorder frequenei frequ eneies es are a re great gr eater er in cities. cities. As total stimulation inereases, the range to which eaeh person responds has been shown to narrow. O n the societal level such narrowing produces specialisation struetural differentiation. well-documented result is a n and increasing number of social One

role ro less and an d institutions institutions ; anot a nother her is the divis divisio ion n of labo labour; ur; and an d others indude the separation of work and horne, geographie differentia tion of the eity into distinet land-use zones, and the emergence of segregated, homogeneous residential neighbourhoods. This struc tural differentiation is reproduced, according to Wirth's theory, in the differentiation of individual personality, divided among com partmental partm entalised ised role roles, s, associat associations ions and an d interests, produci prod ucing ng different differe nt identities insulated from one another by the segregation of time and situation. I n turn, the theory continues, urban individuals should tendothers, to move through moreweekly roles more and more often than both in daily, and rapidly other cydes, and secularly via the life cyde and social mobility. The evidence on such mobility is mixed, however; mobility among urbanites is not consistently higher than in rural areas, and neither is the degree of structural structura l differentiation. T o continue with Wirth, as structural differentiation and role transiency increase in a system, new struetures and functions were hypothesised to arise to integrate both individuals and institutions. Such formal integration involves both rational and legal procedures for governing institutional processes and inter personal interaction. The procedures are bureaucratic, involving the functional, contractual relations that maintain order. Con sistent with this analysis, Wirth hypothesised the dedine of kin ship, neighbourhood and informal in formal groupings groupings and in their place the growth of formal ageneies ageneies of affiliation affiliation and control : associations, corporate enterprises, codified and mediated methods of social control and ma mass ss media. As we shall see later, however, many studies have rejected the kinship hypothesis; strong kin group relations are maintained in cities. What seemed to be forgotten in Wirth's analysis is what has been amply demonstrated b y later studies: that people actually lead their lives in much smaller milieus-their immed immediate iate famili families, es, friends and co-workers, immediate neighbourhoods and carefully

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

33

selected communities. These are the groups which influence and, to a great extent, circumscribe the individual's experience. Rela tively few persons, mostly those a t the upper rungs of the sodal ladder, have in any sense large parts of dties as their meaningful social environments. Thus, the metropolitan experience is Iargely a n experience mediated by the individual's immediate inter action networks within one portion of a city. The most immediate personal context is the family. I t is true that the traditional family structure appears less frequently in larger cities, but the soda force of kinship is affected in very particular ways: the geographic dispersal of relatives and the reduction of the degree to which the family is called upon to provide aid and other ser vices are the most apparent. However, contact with kin is no Jess frequent. Nor is there evidence that the social psychological importance of kin is any less in urban places. The family is a more specialised institution in cities. Whether this strengthens or weake weakens ns the family famil yformal is debatable. Accompanying integration, Wirth saw a cognitive com pI ement, impersonality-the well-documented understanding of the world in terms of the formal roles and rules of interaction. Here the evidence is mixed. Herbert Gans has suggested other patterns among his ethnic 'urban villagers', and similar findings have been produced for other urban sub-groups. There is little evidence that friendships are fewer o r more shallow in cities. Neither is i t apparent that the cohesiveness of ethnic subcultures is reduced, o r that urbanites are necessarily anonymous to their neighbours. I f the formal society environment is marked by impersonality, Wirth argued, urban individuals would be isolated from each other. The members of the 'Ionely crowd' should stay aloof from each other, anonymous by minimising interactions. But many studies have rejected this notion of interpersonal estrangement, showing show ing high hig h leve levels ls of kin kin and a nd friendship interac in teraction tion and Iow levels of expressed sense of isolation. I f rootless and isolated, Wirth con tinued, individuals would be less subject to group pressures, lead ing to a societal condition of low normative cohesion, or anomie. But again, this description of anomie has been rejected for indus trial cities cities,, and a nd this link in Wirth's model is also a doubtful one. I n an anomic society, incongruencies exist between the under standings and motivations that individuals display and those they

 

34

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

should have in the normative terms of the modal o r 'mainstream' patterns and functi functional onal needs needs of the syste system. m. Thi Thiss lack of fit fit due to anomie is alienation, and it involves powerlessness (a low sense of control over one's life), normlessness (ineffectiveness of socially approved means of achieving ends), and meaninglessness (a low sense of comprehension of the events surrounding the individual). Cohesive systems adequately socialise, the theory continues, there by producing a sense of efficacy in role-performance and adher ence to the norms o f the roles and complementary expectations about the results of role behaviour. The anomic city, on the other hand, results in personality-structure incongruencies. The data in this case are inconsistent and generally unsupportive. A s we shall see later, alienation appears better explained by higher aspira tions, lower satisfactions and a general sense of relative depriva tion among urbanites. The final link in Wirth's theory was that betwe between en weak norma norm a and and tive cohesion personality-structure integration deviancy in the city. poor Deviance in the broadest sense is behaviour that is different than that which is normatively expected-illegal, 'odd', o r innovative. Each of these deviant forms reaches its maximum in large cities-innovativeness, moral deviance (alco holism, divorce, illegitimacy), and criminality, as well as lower degrees of religious participation and greater tendencies to radicalism in politics. But again, whether Wirth's model is the appropri appr opriate ate one to use use is seriously open to question. Particularly questionable is the condusion of Wirth's model that high population densities in large cities should produce a

range o f pathologies. An entire research stream dealing with the implications of high levels of density for human populations has gone back to Wirth's model for conceptual foundations. I t may thus be worth while to explore in some detail whether this final condusion has any validity either. Apparent support for Wirth came from studies o f laboratory rats. High densities produced increased mortality, lower fertility, neglect, aggressive conflict-oriented behaviour, withdrawal syn dromes and sexual aberrations. Other animal studies have tended to support suppor t these these condusions. condusio ns. However, in studies of human populations the evidence is less dear, especially when gros grosss density dens ity is broken into int o such components as the number of persons per room, the number of housing units

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

35

per structure, and the number of residential structures per acre, and when such factors as social class and ethnicity are taken into account. I n the most careful and comprehensive investigations completed to date, Omer R. Galle (1972) thus concluded that

density variables tend to simply interpret a more basic relation between social structural variables and pathologies, rather than playing a direct causative role in pathology. Further, he found the most significant elements of density affecting pathologies in volving mortality, fertility, dependency, delinquency and mental iIIness to be persons per room and rooms per housing unit (i.e. overcrowding) rather than persons per unit area (density). H e interpreted the results as meaning that as the number of persons in a dwelling increases, increases, so will the number of social obliga tions, as weIl as the need to inhibit inhibi t individual indivi dual desire desires. s. This escala tion of both social demands and the need to inhibit desires be come co mess particular par ticularly ly problematic when people people are crowded together Further, h e per in a, dwelling a high of ked persons said, said crowdingwith brings with ratio it a marked mar increase room. in stimuli that are difficult t o ignore. Third, if human beings, like many animals, have a need for territory o r privacy, then overcrowding may, in fact, conßict con ßict with a basic basic (biolo (biologic gical? al?)) characteristic chara cteristic of o f man. I t then the n seems seems reasonable reasonabl e tto o expect expe ct that people would react t o the incessant demands, stimulation, and lack of privacy resulting from overcrowding with irritability, weariness, and withdrawal. Furthermore, people are likely to be so completely involved in reacting to their environment that it becomes extremely difficult for them to step back, look a t themselves, and plan ahead. I t

would certainly seem that in a n overcrowded situation i t would be difficuIt for them to follow through on their plans. Thus it might be expected that the behaviour of human beings in a n overcrowded environment is primarily a response to their imme diate situation and reflects relatively little regard for the long range consequences of their acts. Such immediate environments clearly need not be urban. Indeed, the best overall conclusion one may reach is that Wirth's model is inadequate in a variety of impor imp ortan tantt respec respects. ts. T H E N E W T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y URBAN REGION

Wirth's theory may have been appropriate to the nineteenth century industrial urbanisation from whose social theorists h e de de--

 

36

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

rived his intellectual stimulus. The problem is that i t was, even when i t was fonnulated, a woefully inadequate guide to the twentieth-century city. The nature of urbanisation had changed and was changing as Wirt Wirth h wrote. wrote. The nineteenth-century world of escalating technologies and integrating national economies I t was this new created industrial city nation-state. city, thethe industrial city as within it had the matured in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Western world, that became the object of Wirth's essay. Wirth believed that he offered a theory upon which to build future research. I n actuality, his theory was a peroration perora tion on a city that had passed. The concentrated industrial metropolis developed because proximity meant lower transportation and communication costs for those interdependent specialists who had to interact with each other frequently o r intensively. But shortened distances meant higher densities and costs of congestion, high rent, loss of privacy,

and the like. Virtually all the technological developments of more

recent times have had the effect of reducing the constraints of geographie space and the costs of concentration. Modern trans portation and communications have made it possible for each generation to live farther apart and for infonnation users to rely upon infonnation sources that are spatially distant. Decentralisa tion and declining overall densities have moved to the fore as dominant spatial processes. Fig. 2 , for example, shows that the more recent the growth of the city, the lower its population den sities in both the United States and Canada, for the later the growth of the city, the greater its dependence upon the newer technologies of the automobile, motor truck, and modern com munications. munica tions.Moreove Moreover, r, whatever what ever the t he age of the city, its its density has declined significantly in recent decades as even the oldest cities have responded to changing technology and increasing afHuence. Even in 1900, Adna Weber's contemporaries believed that things would change in this direction. They looked to the suburbs as a panacea for the urban ills that they attributed to congestion and high densities. H. G. Wells Wells,, for example, examp le, wrote (1902) that many of Ithe] railway-begotten 'giant cities' will reach their maxi mum in the coming century [and] in all probability they • • . are destined such a process dissection and diffusion as tospace amount almost almo st totoobliteration . . of •within a measurable further of years. [T]hese coming cities will not be, in the old sense, cities at

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

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The relationship between the age of large cities i n North America and their changing population densities i n the years FIG. 2

1950-70 • all; they will present a new and entirely different phase 01 human distribution. [italics added] [TJhe social history of the middle and later third of the nineteenth century . . . all over the civilised world is the history of a gigantic rush of population into the magie radius o f - f o r most people-four miles, to suffer there physical and moral disaster disaster less acute but, finall finally, y, far more appall appal l ing than any famine o r pestilenee that ever swept the world . • • • But • • • these great cities are n o permanent maelstroms. [NJew forces, a t present so potently eentripetal in their influence, bring with them, nevertheless, the distinet promise of a eentrifugal applieation that may finally be equal to the eomplete reduetion o f all our present congestions. The limit of the pre-railway city was the limit o f man and horse. But already that limit has been ex· ceeded, and each day da y brings brings us us nearer near er to the time when i t will b e thrust thru st outward outw ard in every every direction direction with a n effeet of enormous relief. So far the only additions to the foot and horse . . . are the subur ban rthrusting ailways .out . • .The star-shaped city, . . knotted kn otted arms arms contour of of which whichofever evthe ery y modern knot marks magreat rks a station, testify . . . to the relief of pressure thus afforded. Great

 

38

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

towns before this centUlY presented rounded contours and grew as puff-ball swells; the modem Great City looks Iike something that has burst a n in tolerable envelope and splashed . . . the mere first rough expedient of far more convenient and rapid develop ments. We are . • . in in the early phase phase of a great g reat developme development nt of centri centri fuga fugal poss possib ibil ilit ies s . • .four limited [A] city is inexorably by al radius ofitie about milesof.pedestrians . . a horse-usi horse-using ng city may m ay grow out to seven o r eight • . . [I]s i t too much . . . to expect that the available area for even the common daily toilers of the great city of year 2 0 0 0 • • • will have a radius of over one hundred miles? What will be the forces acting upon the prosperous house hold . . . ? [T]he pas passi sion on for for nature nat ure . . . the allied allied char c harm m of cultiva tion . • . rand] that craving . . . for a little private imperium [are] the chief centrifugal centrifu gal inducements. [T]he city will diffuse itself until i t has taken u p considerable areas and many of the characterist characteristics ics of what is now country. . . . [T]he country coun try will will take itse itself lf many man y of the qualities of the t he city. The old anti an ti thesis thesis will will . . .cease, the boundary lines will altogether disappear. '[T]own' and 'city' will be, in truth, terms as obsolete as 'mail coach' • . . We may call . . . these coming town provinces 'urban regions'. Growth 01 Daily U rha rhan n Systems Achieved a t a pace more rapid than he anticipated, Wells' fore

casts capture casts cap tured d the th e esse essent ntia iall features of the u urba rban n geogr geography aphy of the United States in 1 9 7 0 . 'City', the continuously built-up 'urban ised area', and the larger census-defined metropolis had all been superseded in the realities of daily Iife by urban regions of a new and larger scale which we can call for want of another name, 'Daily Urban Systems'. This urban explosion can be seen in Figs. 3-6, which show the region around Detroit, Michigan, the horne of the automobile which was was largely respon responsib sible le for the beginning beg inning of the th e transforma transf orma tion. The shades on the maps map s have been selected selected to sho show w how pre pr e viously agricultural areas were transformed to non-agricultural uses by twentieth-century urbanisation. The final map in the series also shows the outer radius of daily commuting to the city of Detroit in 1960, to give a sense of the scale of the daily ebb and flow responsible for the cohesion of the system. Fig. 7 shows the Urban Systems in the United States in 1960. extent of the9 0Daily More than per cent of the national population lived within these systems in that year.

 

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Urbanisation in the Detroit De troit reg region ion in

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1900

uses per cent of land

in farms as an index of the extent to which non-agricultural ~ s have spread, spread, and is ad adap apted ted from one originally originally prep prepared ared by C. A. Doxiadis in his work for the Detroit Edison Company.

 

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FIG. 9 The relationship between population change in U.S. central cities and growth of their black populations, 1960-70

is the picture of the American urban future painted by President Johnson's Commission on Crämes 01 Violen ce : The result

 

54

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

We can expect fur further ther soci social al fragmentation of the urban ur ban environ ment, formation of excessively parochial communities, greater segregation of different racial groups and economic classes . . . and polarisation of attitudes on a variety of issues. I t is logical to expect the establishment of the 'defensive city' consisting of a n economically declining central business district in the inner city r workin protected by and people shopping working in buildings buildin gs during durin ghours. day d ay light hours 'sealed off' oby policeg during nighttime Highrise apartment buildings and residential 'compounds' will be fortified 'cells' for upper-, middle-, and high-income populations living a t prime locations in the inner city. Suburban neighbour hoods, geographically removed from the central city, will be 'safe areas', protected mainly by racial and economic homogeneity . . . Again, the idea of social isolation within metropolitan regions, suggested by Handlin, is raised, alongside the emergence of the national society, and it is the links between the two that must be forged in the new social theory needed to comprehend new ways of life life in new urb u rban an syst system ems. s.

The concentrated industrial metropolis only developed be cause proximity meant lower transportation and communication costs for those interdependent specialists who had to interact with each other frequently o r intensively. One of the most important forces contributing to thenew urbanisation is the erosion of cen

trality by time-space convergence. Virtually all the technological developments of industrial times have had the effect of reducing the constraints constraints o f geographic space. Developments in transporta tion and commu communicat nications ions have made i t possible for each genera tion to live farther from activity centres and for information users to rely rely upon information informa tion sources sources that are spatially distant. Contemporary developments in communications are supplying better channels for transmitting information and improving the capacities of partners in social intercourse to transact their busi ness a t gre great at distances distances.. I t wa wass the th e demand dem and for eas easee of communica tion that first brought men into cities. The time-eliminating pro perties of long-distance communication and the space-spanning capacities of the new communications communica tions technolo technologies gies are combining to concoct a solvent that has dissolved the core-oriented city in both time and space, creating what some refer to as 'an urban civilisation with wi thou outt cities' (Kristol, (Krist ol, 1972 1972). ). What is being focused on is what J.-J. Servan-Schreiber has called the essence of 'The American Challenge' the(1967) com pression of time and space and the acceleration of change, with

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

55

intensification of human experience alongside lessening demands for face-to-face contact because of the centralised information sources and instantaneous communication, which is producing a quality of presence in the transactions of distant partners i n a variety varie ty of space-eroding ways. ways. The revolutional aspect of the th e new not move electronic they can only reduce the frictions is that they in moving technologies goods and people; the experience in stead to the human nervo nervous us syst system em.. Tradit Tr adition ionally ally,, we have moved the body to the experience; increasingly increasingly we wil willl have the option opt ion to move the experience to the body. The body can, therefore, be located where i t finds the non-electronic experiences most satisfy ing, and thus the second part of the change-increasing localism. Already population is trending accordingl accordingly. y. Settlement Settle ment patterns pattern s are spreading broadly over the continental surface, localised a t those places where the climate and landscape are most pleasant. Densities are settling down a t the scale of the exurban fringes o f the Eastern metropolitan areas. The edges of many of the nation' s daily urba nation's ur ban n syst system emss have now pushed one hund red miles and more from the traditional city centres. More important, the core-orientation implied in use of the terms 'central city' is fast on the wane. Today's daily urban systems appear to be multi-nodal multi-connected social systems in action. The essence of any such system is its linkages and interactions, as changed by changing modes of communication. Both place of residence and place of work are seen to b e responding to social dynamics. A t the same time, new communications media, notably television, have contri buted bute d to the unive universal rsal perception in the th e Un Unit ited ed States of decaying decaying

central cities, the new home o f the former residents o f the now emptied periphe pe riphery; ry; the immediate on-the-spot experience experience of their riots; the careful documentation of their frustrations; and acute awareness of emerging separatist feelings. I t is n o accident that the suburbanisation sub urbanisation of white city-dw city-dwelle ellers rs has increased, supported support ed by rising real incomes and increased leisure time, as persons of greater wealth and leisure seek homes and work among the more remote environments of hills, water and forest, while most aspire to such a n ideal. I t is the spontaneous spontaneous creati creation on o f new communi ties, the flows that respond to new transportation arteries, the waves emanating from growth centres, the mutually repulsive interactions of antagonistic social groups, the reverse commuting resulting resultin g from increasing segregation segregation along city ci ty bound bo undary ary li line ness as

 

56

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

employment decentralises, and many other facets of social dyna mics that have combined to create America's new urban systems. The situation is very different from the period a t the end of the nineteenth century from which was derived the traditional eon eeptt of urbanisation. eep TOWARDS A NEW SOCIAL THEORY

As yet no new soei soeial al theory has been developed developed to account accou nt for the

dynamics of this new urbanisation in America and to explain its human consequences. At its minimum, such a theory must eom prehend the tension between increasing seale and mobility in a truly national society on the one hand and increasing insistence upon a mosaic of small and eoherent eommunities with predict able life styles within a context of intensifying cultural pluralism o n the other. Janet Abu-Lughod (1968) points out that despite the fact that earlier tenninologies are proving inadequate, i t mig might ht be poss possib ible le

to develop the needed theory by substituting scale, interactional density and internal differentiation for Wirth's causal trilogy of size, density and heterogeneity. Let us look a t these alternative variables. Scale and M obility

Seale differs from size, aecording to Abu-Lughod, in that it measures the extent of a given network of relationships, not the number of its participants, although as extent widens the number o f persons directly o r indir indireetly eetly affected affec ted by b y system system decisio decisions ns natur ally increases. What is missing from the eoneept of scale is a dear geographie referent. Whereas in in the urbanism describe described d by Wi Wirt rth h scale sca le was was geographically cotennino cote nninous us with siz size, in the new urba ur ban n ism i t is not, because what is involved in a n increase in nation wide mobility. mobility. Another American soeiologist, Scott Greer (1962), has identi fied three aspects of increasing societal scale that are of major importance. The widening of the radii of interdependence means that, whether men know i t or not, they become mutual means to individual ends; the intensity interdependence increases. a (:oncomitant, increasing scale of produces a n inereasing range As and (:ontent of the communications ftow. This results in a widening

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

57

span of compliance and control within given social organisations, the salience of large-scale organisations, their nationwide span of control,, and control a nd the similarity similarity of their t heir divisi division on of labour labou r and rewards, tending to develop a stratification system cutting across widely varying geograpbical and cultural sub-regions of the country, national nati onal cit citize izens. ns. creating This nationwide quality, together with its accompaniment, in creasing mobility, has been highlighted by Vance Packard (1972). Packard finds that the average American moves 14 times in bis lifeti lif etime, me, compared to 8 for aBrit aBr iton on,, 6 for a Frenchman, 5 for the ]apanese. However, the rates are quite different for different social groups. The hig high h mobiles mobiles are ar e those with some some college college educa educ a tion,, highe tion h igherr incom incomes, es, working working for large corpo c orporate rate o r govemmental organisations, in the mid-twenty to mid-forty age span. The low mobiles are the blue collar employees and other working-class people, whose lives are built around kinship and ethnic ties within

local neighbourhoods. When the high mobiles move, it involves a shift from one urban region to another, but in moving they scarcely change their life style; there is a tendency to move be tween near-identical social environments, and indeed, their assess ment of the quality of o f lif lifee in a community centres centres on the charac ch arac teristics of its social environment. Professional real estate consul same tants aid them i n their search for communities that offer the same environment i n terms of schools and neighbours, income levels, education, family background and clubs. Packard notes: 'They will not be changing their environment, they will just be changing their address.' The attachment to a type of environment that sus tains a particular life style is the key to the way in which con temporary Americans have adjusted the need to retain a locally based sense of security and stability to the emergence of nation wide high-mobile hig h-mobile society. society. Packard equates mobility with rootlessness and rootlessness with a proneness to malaise. Among the things he associates with the new migratory life style are low degrees of community in volvement, small numbers of close friends, high rates of alcohol ism and infidelity. He also suggests a much greater tendency to flee the unpleasant, and consequently, low tolerance for frustra tion, marked impulsiveness, and a growing tendency for mis representation. Like the Progressives, Packard says there is a need to recover a sense of community in America. Such perceptions are H.C.u ·- 3 ·

 

58

T H E HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

disputed by psychiatrists, however-for example Leo Srole (1972). Srole shows that even i f in the past mental disorder frequencies were higher in cities, new evidence shows that this no longer obtains. No longer, he argues, should such place-bound variables as size or density be used to compare mental disorder rates, be at cause mobility implies many higher mobiles four successive life-styles in for significantly different physicalleast settings: growin gro wing g up u p in a smalle smallerr community; career building building in the apar a part t ment neighbourhoods of a city; child-raising in a suburb; and re tirement by 'empty nest' couples to better climates, to exurb country places, or to exclusive big-city apartment complexes. I n this sense, then, the type of community occupied is not a n ante cedent causal variable, but a self-selected and intera interactive ctive or o r circu lar variable related to life-style preferences. Further, during the rhythms of daily activity,the adult experiences many types of communities. The basic question from the viewpoint of mental

health thus becomes: What kinds of people differentially stay in or are drawn to various kinds of milieus? And Srole concludes from his Midtown Manhattan Study (1962) that for children under special conditions of parental psychopathology, economic poverty and family disorganisation, both metropolitan and rural sl slum umss are more psychopathogenic psychopathogenic tha t han n adjoining non-slum non-slum neigh bourhoods; and for adults seeking a change in environment, the metropolis under most conditions is a more therapeutic milieu than the smaller community, especially for nonconformists and escapee-deviants. Interactional Density

Abu-Lughod argued that density also requires aredefinition to make i t applicable to twentieth-century urbanism. She noted that Durkheim, while while making a conceptual c onceptual distinct distinction ion between mater mate r ial density (population concentration) and dynamic density (rate of interaction), could still conclude that i f the technology for in creasing social contacts were taken into consideration, material density could be used as a n index to dynamic density. This con gruence, which Wirth's investigation of urbanism assumed, has been breaking apart. Interactional density facilitated by com munication is far greater grea ter than th an physical physical density density permits permits or requires, requires, as Richard Richa rd Meier Me ier reveal revealss clearly enough (1962). Yet Abu-Lughod goes further, and i t will be useful t o repeat

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

59

her argument. This new density, she says, is different in kind than the interactions that were measured indirectly through con centration. Increasingly, interaction on primary and secondary

levels of involvement is being supplemented by a form of inter action even more abstracted abstracte d from the deeper deepe r layers layers of personality :

tertiary interactions leading tertiar ter tiary y relationships relations hips. . I f a primary is one in relationship whicht othe individuals are known to each

oth er in man other m any y role facet facetss whereas a secondary relationship implies implies a knowledg knowledgee of the th e other oth er individual only in a sing single le role role facet, then the n a tertiary relationship is one in which only the roles interact. The individuals playing the roles are interchangeable and, in fact, with the computerisation of many interactions, are even dispens able, a t least a t the point of immediate contact. What are inter acting actin g are not no t individuals in one role capacity o r another but the functional roles themselves. Such tertiary relationships can only be maintained unde un derr condit conditions ions of physical isolation; once supple mented by physical contact, they tend to revert to the secondary. Thus, the isolation of different communities within urban regions prornotes role and life-style stereotyping via perceptions created by mass media imagery, p parti articula cularly rly tele televi visi sion on,, and many people behave to Others as if these perceptions are correct. Inte rnal Differentiation Internal I n Wirth's view, heterogeneity arose primarily from external

sourees, and was continually reinforced and sustained by migra tion. The city, which brought into contact persons of diverse backgrounds backg rounds,, was was conceive conceived d of as a fertile soil for cross-pollination; physical mobility was presumed to lead to mental mobility, i.e., cosmopolitanism and a questioning of inherited beliefs. The local community was conceived as being bound together primarily b y bonds of sentiment rather than the instrumental usefulness of residents to one another, and these bonds were feIt t o be weaker in the th e city than tha n in small small town towns. s. Within citi cities es,, Rober Rob ertt Park's Park' s image of a 'sorting-out process', into 'little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate', prevailed. The city was was thought thoug ht of as a mosaic of village-like unit unitli li which stayed stay ed to themselves and close closely ly controlle con trolled d their members. Park, like other Progressive thinkers, looked back to the days of the family family,, the tribe and th thee clan cla n with some some sen sense se of nostalgia, and he looked t o communications, education and new forms of politics to reconstitute communities of sentiment and

 

60

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

create a soci social al order orde r equivalent to that which grew u p naturally in the simpler types of society, a positive outcome of heterogeneity and the melting-pot. But Wirth and his contemporaries feIt that the growth gr owth of large-scale large-scale organis organisations, ations, centralisation centralisat ion of organisa tional control, increasing functional division of labour and wide spread the automobile were reducingdedine the significance use ofcommunity. of the local Neither theallpredicted in hetero geneity not increasi increasing ng homegeneit homegeneity y through thr ough blending in the 'melt 'me lt ing pot' po t' have hav e occurred, however; rather rat her,, the t he coalesce coalescence nce of of socie society ty has facilitated an elaborate elabora te internal subdi subdivi visio sion. n. First, the extent to which many of the immigrant groups have been assimilated into the larger society now appears to be quite limited. Milton M. Gordon (1964) sees the process of assimila tion as involving several steps or sub-processes. Each step repre sents a 'type' or 'stage' in the assimilation process. H e identifies seven variables by which one may gauge the degree to which members of members of a partic par ticula ularr group are ar e assimila assimilated ted into the th e host socie society ty which surrounds them. The stages and sub-processes are : Ty p, or Stag' 01 Assimilation 1.

2.

Cultural o r behavioural assimilation Structural Struc tural assimilat assimilation ion

3. Mar Marita itall assimilation assimilation assimilati ilation on 4. Identificational assim 5. Attitude receptional assimilation 6. Behavioural receptional assimilation 7. Civil assimilation

Sub-proClss o r Condition

Change in cultural patterns to those of hast has t societ society y Large-scal Large -scalee entranc e ntrancee iioto oto cli cliques ques,, clubs, clu bs, and institutio institutions ns of has hastt society on primary-group level Large-scal Large -scalee intermarriag inter marriagee Developme Deve lopment nt of a sense sense of people hood hoo d based exclus exclusive ively ly on host society Absenc Abs encee of prejudice preju dice Absence of discrimination Absence Abse nce of value o r power conßict

Using this sequence, White Protestant Americans are the most assimilated; indeed, it is they who most frequently constitute the mainstream or host society (Anderson, 1970). Yet in primary group life, even they tend to clique. Much of the New England upper dassYankee has consisted, for example, a group of social seIf conscious families dustered in theirofown exdusive institutions.

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

61

At the other extreme, Black Americans display mimimal assimi lation (Pinkney, 1969). They are by and large acculturated, but there is minimal structural, marital and identificational assimila tion. They continue to experience widespread prejudice and dis crimination, and conflicts are increasing rather than decreasing as Black Power a broader constituency. there have beenadvocates deliberateachieve attempts to integrate, as with Where busing school children, racial frictions have escalated and the result has been greater polarisation rather than increased tolerance (Armor,

197 2 ) .

Jewish Americans have become a thoroughly Americanised group, acculturated to the American middle-class way of life (Goldstein, 1968). Yet, a t the same time, there is an increasing emphasis on 'being Jewish', including association with Jewish culture, religion and organisational life. Third and later genera tion Jews, in particular, are seeking to temper assimilation with separate group grou p identity. As for other groups, Japanese Americans have experienced the pluralistic pluralis tic development development of a congruent Japanese culture cu lture within the larger American societ society y (Kitano, (Kit ano, 1969), wh whil ilee for for both India In dian n and an d Mexican Americans there remains a bifurcation of Indian and White (Wax, 1971; Moore, 1970), increasing because of the mili tancy of the 'Re 'Red d Power' and a nd Chicano moveme movements nts.. I n the case of other ethnic groups, especially the blue-collar eastern and southern European Catholics, expressions of cultural pluralism are increasing, too. Let us focus on Chicago as a n ex ample. Race and ethnicity now dominate the public life of Chi cago. Chicago's residential patterns, neighbourhood schools, shops, community newspapers, hospitals, old-age hornes, cemeteries, sav ing and loan associations, charitable, fraternal and cultural organisations attest to the role of ethnicity in Chicago's culture and politics. Public decisions affecting horne ownership, schools, public housing, police, shopkeepers, allocation of state and federal funds and welfare are increasingly perceived in terms of nationality-group o r racial-group attachments. Ethnicity defines interest groups in the city,is recognised in the public decision-mak ing of the city, and is rewarded and a nd encouraged by the politici politicians ans and established institutions. Ethnic and racial quotas have been informally adopted by public officials on a large scale. The forma tion in Chicago of associations of policemen ~ d public school-

 

62

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATlON

teachers along ethnic and racial lines, and the revitalisation of ethnic and racial vocational and professional associations, con firm the tr trend end to define define interests interests in these terms. terms. When Whe n the th e heterogeneity of American cities cities was was caused primar pri marily ily by the t he inßux in ßux of o f suc succe cess ssiv ivee immi i mmigra grant nt waves waves,, the th e policy policy of encour agin g assimilatio aging assimilation n was was taken t aken for gra g rant nted ed ideologic ideologically ally.. Consumers might demonstrate a wide range of behaviours and preferences, but this variety was viewed as being both temporary and expend able. A white, middle-class 'Americanised' standard could be i m posed from the outside and just justifie ified d in terms of the shared sha red higher high er goal of assimila assimilation. tion. People behaved beha ved the way wa y they did d id only because because they had not yet learned the better way. The segregated local residential community was regarded as a passing entity which might be maintained only so long as temporary patterns of racial and socio socio-eco -economic nomic segregation persisted, but ultimately the local community would decline as people found other, preferable, non territorial bases for association. Territorial groups were, i t was feIt, coercive in character and far less attractive than voluntary forms of association. The latter would shortly replace local com munit mun ity y ties ties and the these se 'interest communities' would result in a more m ore faithful response from government and big business. The local community commu nity would decline decline then as racial and socio-economic segre gation declined and interest communities replaced residential communities. What is indicated in American urban regions today is, however, that a new type of heterogeneity exists and is intensifying. This hetereogeneity results from internal differentiation and may b e understood from the different ideolo ideologic gical al positio position n of cultural cult ural plu ralism. I n such a framework, the forms of community that emerge are in no way vestigial remnants of a more fragmented localised society. A major advance in understanding these new forms of com munity munit y has been been made by Gerald Geral d Suttles (1972). Suttles argues that a useful point a t which to begin is by retrieving the cognitive cognitive maps of childhoo childhood. d. For F or the child, awa awaren reness ess of the city radiates outward, outwa rd, with the density of information diminishing rapidly with the dis tance from horne. The area of comfortable familiarity familiari ty constitutes constitutes the experience of neighbourhood. neighbourh ood. Yet cities cities d o not consist o f a n inf infini initel tely y large num n umber ber of neigh bourhoo bou rhoods ds each e ach centring o n one of millio millions ns of inhabit in habitants ants only a

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANlSATION

63

slight spatial spati al remove from his fellows. Rat Rather her there is a small num berr of soci be social al labels labels applie ap plied d to definable geographie areas. Becau Because se population populati on eharaeteristies eharaeteristies of a eity are eontinuous eontinuously ly variable, with no clear demareation between one side of the street and the other, society imposes eategorieal labels on specifie geographie realms. Neighbourhood Neighbourho od categ categori ories es areons. not n ot simply simply found found in nature, natu re, but bu t are eonsensually imposed definitions. definiti A neighbourhood label, onee affixed, has real eonsequenees, Suttles points out. For outsiders it reduees deeision-making to more manageable terms. Instead of dealing with the variegated reality realit y of numerous eity street streets, s, the resident can form a set of atti atti  tudes about a limited number of social eategories and aet aeeord aeeord ingly. ing ly. For Fo r those those who liv livee within it, the neighbourhood denies denies areas relatively relati vely free free of intruders, intrude rs, identif identifies ies w where here potenti pot ential al friends are ar e to to be found or where they are to be eultivated, minimises the pros pects of status insult, and simplifies innumerable daily decisions dealing with spatial aetiv aetiviti ities. es. Thus the mental menta l map of neighbour hoods is not superfluous eognitive baggage, but performs impor ta tant nt psye psyeholo hologica gicall and a nd social social funetions. funetions. scheme, the boundaries boundar ies of neighbourhoods are ar e set by I n Suttles' scheme, physical barriers, ethnie homogeneity, social class and other fac tors that together eontribute to the definition of homogeneous areas that are supportive of partieular life styles. But i f a neigh bourho bou rhood od exists exists firs firstt as a erea ereative tive social social eonstruetion, eonstru etion, it i t nonetheless possesses a number of important properties. First, it becomes a eomponentt of a n individual's identity, a stable judgmental refer eomponen enee against again st whieh people are ar e asse assess ssed ed.. A neighbourhood neighb ourhood may de rive its its reput rep utat atio ion n from several sources sources : first, first, from f rom the th e master mast er identity of of the area a rea of whieh whieh it is apart; sec second ond,, throug t hrough h eompari son so n and a nd eontrast with adjaee a djaeent nt eommuniti eommunities; es; and third, from his torie claims. I n this framework, the idea of a eommunity as first and foremost a group of people bound together by eommon senti ments, a primordial solidarity, representsan over-romantieised view of sociallife. Communities do lead to social eontrol, they d o segregate people to avoid danger, insult, and status claims; but whatever sentiments are engendered by neighbourhoods are strietly tied to funetional fune tional realities. realities. There are multiple levels of eommunity organisation in whieh the resident participates. The smallest of these units is the face ehildren it i t is the prescribed social world carved out by block. For ehildren

 

64

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

parents. I t is here that face-to-face relations are most likely, and the resulting institutional form is the block association. Next, in Suttles' typology, is the de/ended neighbourhood o r minimal named community, which is the smallest segment of the city re cognised by both residents and outsiders as possessing a particular character, and which possesses many of the facilities needed to carry out the daily routine of life. Third, the urban resident also participates in the community 0/ limited liability, a larger realm possessing a n institutionally secure secure name na me and boundaries. The con cept, originally developed by Morris Janowitz (1952), emphasises the intentional, intentional, voluntary, and especially the differential involve ment of residents in their local communities. Frequently a n exter nal agent, such as a community newspaper, is the most most important importan t guard gu ardian ian of o f such such a community's com munity's sens sensee of boundaries, purpose, and integrity. Finally, even larger segments of the city mayaIso take shape in response to environmental pressures, creating a n expanded community 01 limi expanded limited ted liabilit liability. y. Thus a n individual may find fi nd hirnse hirnself lf picketing to keep keep a highway not n ot just jus t out ou t of his his neigh bourhood, but out of the entire South Side. I n this way, varied levels of community organisation are created as responses to the larger social environment. The urban community mirrors the soci so cial al differentiation differen tiation of the total tota l society. society. Lilee Styles in Lil in the th e Mosaic Mosaic Culture Cultu re The communiti communities es in which Americans thus live live vary in their the ir racial, ethnic, and socio-economic composition and thus in their th eir available life styles styles;; in their the ir physical features, wh ich can ca n be used to create

images and boundaries; and in their historie claims to a distinct reputation or identity. Members of a mobile society select among communiities in terms of the life style they are perceived to offer. What Wh at,, then, are a re some some of the principa pr incipallife-s llife-style tyle di differ fference encess that are to be found within American society today, setting aside the dif ferentiation associated with cultural intensification based on race and ethnicity? They appear to arise from the experience by all Americans of two common developmental processes: (I) passage through stages of the life cycle, with especially sharp breaks associated with the transition from one state to another, as in marriage, family expan sion, entry into the labour force, retirement, etc.; and (2) occupa tional career trajectories that may necessitate, preclude, o r other-

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

65

wise pattern geographic mobiIity alongside social mobility. These

developmental processes are cross-cut by several different value systems: familism, in which a high value is placed upon family living and a corresponding devotion of time and resources to family life; careerism, in which there is a n orientation toward

upward social mobility and a corresponding disposition to engage in career-related activities, a t least to a partial neglect of family ties; localism, a parochial orientation implying interests confined to a neighbourhood and reference to groups whose scope is local; and cosmopolitanism, an ecumenical orientation implying free dom from the binding ties to a locality and reference to groups whose scope is national rath r ather er than th an loca local, l, so th that at the cosmopoli cosmopolitan tan resides in a place but inhabits the nation. From these bases, one can distinguish between working-class communities, ghettos and ethnic centres where the broad pattern of interaction is one where informal meeting places, street corner gangs, church groups and precinct politics tend to dominate the collective forms of communallife; mid middle dle income, incom e, familistic areas areas,, in which informal relations seem to be heavily shaped by the management manage ment of children, and an d formal organisation organisationss are much more extensively developed than in lower income areas; the affluent gener ally apartment complex and the exclusive suburb, wh ich generally have a privatised mode of interaction and organisation: social clubs, private schools, country clubs and businessmen's associa tions; and cosmopolitan centres, which have long existed in some cities and which seem to be sprouting up in other cities as they grow and are able to provide a critical mass of local grown talent and misfits, to create their own symbiotic milieus of tolerance (Suttles, 1972). th e latter lat ter case casess tha t hatt there th ere emerge the most extreme form formss I t is in the of subcultural intensification-the strengthening of the beliefs, values and an d cohesion cohesion both bo th of groups th t h a t previously existed existed as as social social entities outside the city, and of new groups emerging within ex panding urban systems as new cultural values and norms are established. Two ingredients are involved: growth of 'critical masses' such that subcultural institutions can develop (e.g. politi cal power and national churches for ethnic groups; hangouts for 'bohemians' 'bohe mians';; booksto bookstores res for for intellectuals; i ntellectuals; museums for for artists; arti sts; new communities for the elderly; and 'turfs' for each group) which strengthen the subculture and attract more of its members to the

 

66

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

city; and contrasts with other subcultures that intensify people's identification with and adherence to their own. Whereas Wirth thought that the clash o f different values values in in the city might migh t negate all values, i t appears that internal cohesion is strengthened bythe conflict that ari arises ses on contact. cont act. Such, for example, is David Armor's conclusion in 'The Evidence on Busing' (1972). One imp import ortant ant form of intensifica intensification tion is that appearing in crimi nal subcult subcultures ures.. Whereas the t he Wirth Wi rthian ian model explains explains deviance deviance by the breakdown o f norms, the alternative is to see deviance as con stituting subcultural deviance from centre-society values. The group nature of much crime, especially urban crime, seems clear. The State of Illinois classifies its prison population into four sub groups, for example: the socio-pathetic, the immature, the neu roticand roti cand the gang-related gang-related,, with the latter the largest largest group. group. Greater Gre ater criminality in cities might, therefore, be explained by a n intensi fication process for criminals (e.g. growth of a n underground), as weIl as a n intensificati intensification on proces processs for criminals' crimin als' targets (i (i.e .e.. tthe he con centration of wealth and the wealthy). The same intensification process would operate i n regard to other deviant subcultures: homosexuals, prostitutes, 'hippies', political dissidents, etc. What appears to have emerged and to be emerging in America Am erica as a result of these changes is a mosaic culture-a society with a number o f parallel and distinctively different life sty style les. s. While Whil e one o ne result is divisive tendencies for the society as a whole, a t anothec level, mutual harmony is produced by mutual withdrawal into homogeneous communities, exclusion and isolation from groups with different life styles and values. A mosaic o f homogeneous communities maintains different life styles that are internally cohesive and exclusive, but extern externally ally non-aggres non-aggressive sive unle unless ss thre th reat at ened. Mobility within the t he mosaic mosaic leads leads to t o a high degree o f expres sed satisfaction by residents with their communities, and the option for those who are dissatisfied to move to a n alternative that is more in keeping with their life-style requirements (Gans, 1968). T H E AMERICAN PLANNING STYLE

thiss twentieth-century twentieth-cent ury transformation of urbanisation has been been As thi

unfolding, the American planning style has tended to b e suppor tive of privatism and the mosaic mosaic culture cultur e rather than productive of alternative urban futures.

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

67

New Towns in the United Stat States es

Consider the U S. o f new town towns. s. S. . experience with the construction of The first of these, dating from before the twentieth century, were company towns t o serve industrial enterprises. Later came plan ned suburban developments established to capture the residential spin-off from spin-off from large citi cities es.. Around Ar ound the First Fir st World War the Federal Govemment established a number of emergency housing com munities in industrial areas. During the 1920S some efforts were made to create American garden cities pattemed after Letchworth in England . The most notable notabl e examples examples are aseries of communities communities designed by Clarence Stein, although most of these were only planned areas within a larger city, as in the case of Sunnyside Gardens Gard ens in New N ew York City (19 (192424-8) 8) and Chatham Village in Pitts burgh (1932) The first community actually started as a n indepen dent garden city was Radbum, New Jersey (some 16 miles from New York City), which was begun in 1928 1928.. seriou iouss attentio atte ntion n was given to During the New Deal in the 1930S ser creating a number of new towns, the Greenbelt Towns, under Federal Govemment auspices. Rexford G. Tugwell, the pro gramme administrator, wanted t o build 3000. Twenty-five were selected by the Resettlement Administration. President Roosevelt approved 8 o f these, and Congress reduced the number to 5. Finally, only 3-GreenbeIt, Maryland; Greenhills, Ohio; and Greendale, Wisconsin-were ever built (Conkin, 1959; Amold, 1971). I n addition, the Federal Govemment became involved in new town development in the 1930S in connection with a number of large-scale power and reclamation projects and in the 1940S through throug h its atomic energy energy programme. pro gramme. One recent study has found that a total of 376 urban develop ments o f 950 acres o r more, using nearly 1.5 million acres o f land, were started in the United States between 1960 and 1967. O f these, 43 could be classified b y the survey as new towns, mainly located in in areas of rapid growth and warm weather. The builders o f all these new town projects have been called called 'the 'th e new entrepre neurs'. They include (I) builder-developers with areal estate and home-buildi homebuilding ng background; backg round; (2) large national corporations inter ested in product promotion and financial diversification; (3) large landowners looking for a way to increase the value o f property originaUy acquired for other purposes, such as for farming o r

 

68

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

mining; and (4) the big mortgage lenders, such as banks, insur ance companies, and savings and loan associations, as wen as a rare independent developer, who enters the field more o r less by accident. The important thing to note about a n of these groups is that they are private. American new town development is expli citly entrepreneurial, exploiting the profit-making potentialities latent in urban growth and change. T o the extent that there is public involvement, i t involves reducing the risk to the entrepre neur in exchange for some mild regulation of the development style. O n occ occasi asions ons,, the t he result is of high quality. Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland, are certainly the two most highly publi cised examples of privately buiIt new towns in the Uni ed States. Reston has attracted a good deal of attention for its efforts a t pre servin ser ving g the grea g reatt natural be beaut auty y of its its site and for its high quality in architectural design. Columbia has made adefinite effort to attrack black residents, has explored federal programmes for pro viding low-cost housing for the poor, has shown considerable interest in the sociology of urban development, yet has also been challenged by local resident interest groups as i t has grown, o n issues of corporate paternalism. Nonetheless, recent research indi cates that resid residents ents of Reston Rest on and Columbia rate both their com com munities and their micro-neighbourhoods more highly than resi dents of less-planned suburbs rate theirs (a finding that has been repeated elsewhere, for example in Britain's new towns), and indeed, in many cases the concept and planning were the attrac tions tio ns leading to the initial move move in. Among the impo i mporta rtant nt features appear to be the adequacy and location o f open spaces for family activities that wind as sinews through the residential areas of both towns, the lower noise levels, and the superior maintenance levels. Along with quality of the schools, the greatest sources of satis faction with planned communities relate to the environment (Zehner, 1972). H ousing Policy Much the same story can be told about U.S. housing policy. Recall that the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has been under creat created ed circumstances, as part of the New Deal' s efforts Deal's efforts to insure mortgages certain to eliminate the worst housing, to provide public housing for the poor, and ab above ove an, to help in priming the

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

69

pump of the economy. By 1950 170,000 dwelIings had been pro

vided for low-income families. Programm Prog rammee development foll follow owin ing g the Second World Wor ld War was additive. T o the FHA were added the mortgage assistance pro grammes of the Veterans Administration that ultimately were taken advantage of by more than 6.8 million retuming veterans seeking new hornes. The Housing Act of 1949 strengthened and extended the slum clearance and public housing programmes, to be followed by later acts that created the workable programme for community improvement as the prerequisite to housing assis tance and urban renewal (1954), the community renewal (1959) and model cities cities programmes, pro grammes, progressi progressively vely moving towards com co m prehensive socio-economic as weIl as physical goals for the cities. Even more comprehensive enactments came in 1968 and 1970, leavin lea ving g the Uni U ni ted States States not simp simply ly with a Departm Dep artment ent of Hous ing and Urban Development, but with a 'New Communities Communities'' pro gramme, too. And many other public investment programmes have materially affected the urban scene, most notably the mas sive Interstate Highway Programme, but including a host of others, incJuding airports, sewage systems, recreation and open space facili facilitie ties, s, an and d hospitals. hospitals. Federal housing programmes contributed to the suburbanisa tion of Americ Americaa in importa imp ortant nt ways ways,, creating crea ting hundreds hundred s of standard standa rd ised 'Levittowns'. I n these developments, federal policy combined with local planning to maintain and support neighbourhood homogeneity, and specifically to excJude the Black and the poor. We referred in Chapter I to the th e conservatism of American zoning. zoning. I n city planning practice in the inter- and immediate post-war periods one of the most inßuential ideas was Clarence Perry's 'Neighbourhood Unit' concept. Perry feit i t important that cities be built u p of sharply bounded neighbourhood units, physically distinctive, and possessing local unity by virtue of organisation arou ar ound nd a shared focus focus of community activity. Perry's model had a profound inßuence on local planning commissions and zoning boards. The idea that well-designed neighbourhoods would bring about social cohesiveness, neighbourliness, and the virtues of the small community within the large city was consistent with the dominant social philosophy; associated was the belief in the necessity of maintaining neighbourhood homogeneity : a n 'incom patible mix' referred to different racial, ethnic groups as much as

 

70

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

to industrial activity in residential areas. Mixture of racial and cultural groups, in particular, was considered detrimental t o the neighbourhood. Restrictive covenants explicitly excIuded mem bers of minority groups. The National Association of Real Estate Board's 'code of ethics' made mad e i t unethical for arealtor to introduce 'incompatible' groups to a neighbourhood. Early editions of the

FHA Appraisers' Handbook forbade social integration, and de de manded that mortgage institutions follow suit. The suburbanisa tion of the white middle dass and the ghettoisation of the poor and minorities in the central city implied thereby were not crea tions of federal policy-residential segregation and sub-commun ity formation date a t least to the early nineteenth century--but

they certainly were promoted by federal activity in the post-war years. Emergence 01 Broader Concepts 01 Urban Development

With the 1960s 1960s came a search for a new comprehensiveness in the federal approach to urban problems (Scott, 1969). Part of the switch was one of emphasis, from plan-making to planning as a process; part invo involved lved recognition recognition of the need to orchestrate orchestra te physi physi cal and social programmes in the central cities if a significant im pact was to be made on the pockets of poverty in the ghettos. Such efforts as the Community Renewal Programme and the Model Cities Programme were launched. The most significant development came in the t he Housing Act of 1968 1968.. This act confirmed growing disaffection with the pace of housing starts for the poor, and provided new programmes that produced 3°0,000 new low income housing units in the years 1968-70, raising the low-income proportion proport ion of total housing starts from 3 per pe r cent in 1961 to 16 per eentt in 1971 (Kristof, 1972) . A parallel debate on nation een national al growth poliey culminated in 1970 with the passage of tide VII of the Housing and Urban Development Act, requiring the President in order ord er to ass assis istt in the develop development ment of a national nation al urb u rban an poliey poliey . • . to transmit to the Congr Congres esss during the month mo nth of Febru F ebruary ary in every even-numbered year beginning with 1972, a R e p o rt o n Urban Growth. The first such report was President Nixon's Domestic Council Report on National Growth 1972, whieh conduded that, in the

Unit Un ited ed States, privatism should prevail :

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

71

Patt erns of growth are Patterns ar e influenc influenced ed by countle countless ss deci decisi sion onss made ma de by individuals indiv iduals,, families families a n d busi busine ness sses es • . . aimed a t achie achieving ving the per per  sonal goal goalss of those those who make mak e them th em • . . [Su [Such] ch] decisi decisions ons canno can nott be be dictated . . . . I n many nations, the central government has under taken forceful, comprehensive policies to control the process of growth. Similar policies have not been adopted in the Uni ed States for several reasons. Among the most important is the dis tinctive form of government which we value so highly • . . i t is not feasible for the highest level of government to design policies for development that ca can n operate oper ate succe success ssfu full lly y in all parts par ts of the nation. nati on. Earlier, in 1968 President Nixon had created a National Goals Research Staff, and assigned three functions to it: forecasting future developments, and assessing longer-range consequences of present social trends; measuring the probable future impact of alternative courses of action; and estimating the actual range of social choice, indicating what alternative sets of goals might be attain att ainabl ablee in terms terms of available resourc resources es and an d poss possib ible le rates of pro gress. H e was also interested in having it develop devices 'that en able us to assess where we we stand and an d are a re going going with respect respect to our ou r values and an d goals goals,, and to evaluate specific programmes and deter mine their the ir impact'. impac t'. Surely, Surely, it was was thought, bette bet terr statistics statistics of direct normative interest would help us make balanced, comprehensive and concise judgments about the conditions of society. Surely we would benefit if, as many have said, we 'apply real science to social soc ial affairs' , thus eliminating the corruptions corrupti ons of the principle princip le of rationality that arise when decisions about social affairs are made on the basis of beliefs about facts, rather than 'true knowledge'. Yet the Staff's Staff's report on National Growth: Quantity with Quality has been widely acknowledged acknowledged to be a dismal failure. The Problem

0/ Pluralism

been en ignored by the Staff were were the t he multiple and a nd compet What had be

ing interest i nterest groups in American society. society. American society society,, Iik ikee any a ny other democratic pluralistic society (for America we could substi tutee Australia tut Australia o r Canada without loss of generality generality), ), is inherendy incapable of being goal-oriented for deep-seated reasons; the future, instead, instead, is Iik Iikely ely to be b e a n outg outgrowt rowth h of o f present proce processe sses, s, as regulated by legal devices to preserve 'mainstream' values, while subject to t o the t he poss possib ibili ility ty of major ma jor transformations transformations produced produc ed not by design, but by majo ma jorr entrepreneurial entrepreneuria l de deci cisi sion onss made ma de in the private

 

72

T H E HUMAN CONSEQUENCES O F URBANISATION

sector o r carried out by the govenment a t the behest of powerful privat pri vatee lobbying lobbying interests. One consequence is to be seen in American political science, in which there the re has developed a n explicit belief system concerning the process by which policies change, which in turn influences the way in which a problem is perceived. The dominant mode of thought on this subject in American political science is that of incremen says (1963) : 'Democracies chan change ge talism. As Charles E. Lindbloom says their policies almost entirely through incremental adjustments. Policy Poli cy doe doess not no t move move in leaps leaps and a nd bounds.' The political processes of bargaining, bargai ning, log-rol log-rolling ling,, and coalition-building are, of course, course, the majo ma jorr factor factorss producing a situation in which past pas t deci decisi sion onss are ar e tthe he best predictors of future fut ure ones ones.. Under such pressures, the applied rationality of goal-oriented national planning presents fundamental chaHenges to the tradi tional decision-making style. T o cite one example, the politician who remains remains in power by manipul manipulating ating interest-group politi politics cs and an d dispensing patronage feels severely challenged by goal-oriented activity because the very utility of future-oriented planning is to provide a basis for decision-making more rational than that of interest-group interest-g roup politics politics.. Similarly, in Canada N. H . Lithwick (1970) notes that no expli cit policy guides urban growth. Impetus for urban growth derives rather from Canadians' preoccupation with economic achieve ment. H e notes that Canada has specific economic goals such as growth, fuH employment, and rising levels of income which are recognised and accepted by government, labour unions, agricul ture and business. Urban policy serves those economic goals, pro viding education, roads, utilities and supplying public housing, we]fare, protective services. But this limits urban planning to a n ameliorative problem-solving role, which is reinforced by a n atti tude that accepts the inevitability of a continuation of the pro inherent rent in the present. present. 'Because' 'Because' Lithwick notes notes,, 'these pro pro  cesses inhe cesses are abstract and powerful, and have served the needs of those groups who have benefited most, there is great press pressure ure not to tamper tam per with them.' Thus, he come comess to the 'inescapable conclu. sion that 01 all [Canadian] urban problems, the one most likely to deter det erpriority any major improvement improvem enturban is [the]policy urban [The] is thus (mt not what wh at pol icy topolicy lollow, lollow,problem. but b ut an agre agree e ment that any urban policy is needed' [italics added].

 

TWENTIETH-CENTURY URBANISATION

73

No govemmental bodies ean be eredited with the development and exeeution of a n urban poliey in Canada or the United States a t the present time. What substitutes for i t is a eomplex set of un eoordinated,often eoordinated ,often eontradietory,essentiallyrandom eontradietory,essential lyrandom publie polic policie iess and programmes provided in the wake of strong economic forees which has set the set agenda for urba ny growth. Thus, if in objeetives the past pa st urbani sation been govemed govem edurban by any an eonsci eonsciou ous s publie objee tives a t all, thes th esee have been on on tthe he one hand, hand , to eneourage eneourage growth, growth, apparen app arently tly for its own sake; and on the other, to provide publie works and publie welfare programmes to support pieeemeal, spontaneous development impelled primarily by private initiative. I n eontrast, development of a national urban poliey suggests a shift in the locus of initiative, imposing on publie authorities a n obligation to orient, rationalise, and plan the physieal, eeonomie, and textual eharae eha raeter ter of urban li life fe.. Thus, Th us, through a eomplementary set of poli poli ei eies es an and d programmes, a n urban poliey represents a n explieit state ment of the purpose of urbanisation, its pace, its eharaeter, and values that are to prevail. prevail. Sueh urban policies are part of the aspirations of all Third World leaders, as we shall see in Chapte Cha pterr 3, 3, but have been realised only in Europe, as we we shall shall discover discover in Cha C hapt pter er 4.

 

3

A

Transf Transformati ormation on Dur During ing Diffus Dif fusion ion:: Third Wo Worr l d Urbanisation

of the urbanisation process as profound as that in North America has been experienced in the th e countries of the Third World in recent decades, producing different urban forms and social consequences. Adna Weber' Weber'ss statistics statistics showed showed urbanisa urbanis a tion beyond Western Europe and North America to be limited in 1899 in both scale andextent t o the tentacles ofcolonialexpansion. During Duri ng the twentieth century this situation situation has changed dramatic dramatic  ally. As part of the quadrupling of the world's urban population during the last 50 years, the developed regions increased their urban population by a factor of 2'75 (that is, horn 198 to 546 mil lion), while the Third World countries increased increased ttheir heir urban popu lation b y a factor of 6'75 (from 69 to 464 m,illion). I n both Latin America and Africa the urban population increased eight-fold. The big big-cit -city y population popul ation of the Third Worl World d increased increased even faster -nine-fold--during the period period 1920-60, as compared compare d to 0·6 times for Europe and 2'4 times in other more developed regions (Table 4). Clearly i t is the Third World that is experiencing the major thrust of urban growth today. With 25 per cent of the world's urban urb an population in 1920, the Third W orld will encompass encompa ss 51 per cent by 1980 (Davis, 1969). TRANSFORMATION

THE DIFFERING CONTEXT OF URBAN GROWTH

This rapid urbanisation is taking place in the countries with the lowest levels of economic development (Fig. 10) rather than the highest, as was the case when accelerated urbanisation began in Western West ern Europe and Nor North th America. Moreover, as Table 5 shows, i t involves countries in which the people have the lowest levels of life expectancy a t birth, the poorest nutritional levels, the lowest energy consumption levels and the lowest levels of education. I n the west, west, urbanisation invo involved lved gradual gradua l innovation and inter dependent economic and social change spanning more than a

 

75

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

century. Contemporary Third World urbanisation century. urba nisation invo involv lves es great gr eater er numbers of peop people le than th an i t did in the West. Migration is greater in volume, and more rapid. Industrialisation Industrialisation lags lags far behind b ehind the rate r ate of urbanisation, so that the bulk of the migrants find a t best mar ginal employme emp loyment nt in the th e citie cities. s. 100

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78

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

starting a t a similar level, required 70 to 80 years to achieve. The cities have been the main recipients of this new death control be cause they are a re the places places to wh ich the medical and scientific tech niques, niqu es, expert exp ert personnel, and fund fundss from from the advanced advance d nations nations are first imported and where the most people people are reached a t least cost. Nor do conditions in cities of non-industrial countries seem as hostile to reproduction as those of the nineteenth and early twen tieth centuries were. were. Urban fertility remains lower than rur rural al fer fer tility, but not much muc h lower; and in both bot h case casess net repr reproduction oduction rates are higher than they ever were were in most of the industrial countries. countries. T o some extent this city fertility is a function of good healthand low mortality, but it is also a function of some of the very changes that make better health possible. Economic improvement, public welfare, international aid, subsidised housing, and free education make the penalties for having children less than they once were. Giving priority in housing to larger fami famili lies es,, mainta ma intainin ining g mat mater erna nall and child health clinics, and disc discouragi ouraging ng labour-force labour-force particip pa rticipa a tion by married women, are additional props to urban reproduc tion. tio n. Equally import imp ortant ant ar aree old institutional institutional structures with built in incentives for prolific breeding-structures that persist in the cities cit ies because because the patern p aternalism alism of the th e times treats them th em as sacred. For the new urban residents of the burgeoning Third World cities, cit ies, such such improvemen impr ovements ts as are taking place create a gulf between between where they are and where prior Western experience suggests they might aspire to b e - a revolution of o f rising rising expectations. As a result, pressures for rapid social change are greater than they were in the West. Lacking an effective capacity to respond, national govern ments are ar e increasingly increasingly confronted confron ted by people seeki seeking ng more revolu revolu tionary tiona ry solutions. solutions. The political circumstances conducive to revolutionary take overs are there as a result of the recent colonial o r neo-colonial status of most most of the Third World nations. The impr imprint int of colonial colonial ism was, first, that many of the major ma jor citie citiess originated as admini strative centres for the colonising nations. The rece recency ncy of indepen indepen dence from colonialism colonialism means that mos mostt of the developed countries coun tries have inherited a n intentionally centralised administration, with the result that government involvement is more likely in urban than in the west. development in the Third Weorld countri countries es today I n nineteenth-century Europe Europ itwas the craftsman craf tsman and smallentre preneu pre neurr who promoted industrial development, development, not the universityuniversity-

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING D I F F U S I O N

79

educated national bureaucrat. Lacking private development capi tal and an entrepreneurial dass, more Third World development is governmental, involving foreign economic and technical assist ance, requiring a n assertive governmental role in international diplomacy. As a consequence of govemmental leadership in the developmen devel opmentt proce process ss,, public pu blic goals goals have prior p riority ity over priva pr ivate te goals. goals. The colonial powers did not per permit mit effective effective indigenous indigenous leader lea der ship to develop. Although the collectio collection, n, bulking and exporting of industrial raw r aw material ma terial required a high degree degree of organisation organisational and business skills, the logic of the colonial relation was such that the opportunities for doing this were jealously guarded and re stricted to citizens of the metropolitan country. Instead, much post-independence leadership developed within the framework of nationalist. o r revolutionary movements oriented to independent self-determination, albeit on the foundations of western educa tional experiences,and often with the western western model of nineteent nine teenth h century cent ury urbanisation urbanisation in mind. The change in the colonial colonial world world came a t the end of the Second World War. Initially, the metropolitan powers relinquished con trols to parliamentary govemments they had created, and to the westernised bureaucratic elites who had served them. I n but few cases has parliamentary democracy worked. Most ex-colonial states have moved very quickly quickly to single-party govemm gov emment ent and to substantially authoritarian control by either the revolutionary elites, who set modemisation as their task, generally with a n underlying underlyin g socia socialis listt ideol ideology ogy that th at leads leads them to try tr y to t o create basic basic structural changes in society and to change the entire social con text within which urbanisation is proceeding, o r by military military juntas junta s whose perspective leads them to seek national efficiency without social soci al change. cha nge. The continuing problem resulting from these circumstances is that th at the citie citiess are becoming the th e main centres of the soci social al and poli tical changes the new political elites are attempting to produce. This new centrality centrality is a force that att attrac racts ts people to tthe he citie cities. s. The cities have become symbols, drawing in massive immigrant streams, especially of young men, from overcrowded rural areas, only to find find rural ru ral poverty replaced replaced by ur urban ban poverty. poverty. T o be sure, econ economi omicc development developm the highest high est national priority pr iority the new govemments, but i tent hashas failed to keep pace with the in growth of urban urb an populations. populations.

 

80

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

I n all of these complex changes three themes stand out as re

vealing veali ng most most about a bout Thir Th ird d World urbanisation urbanisation and it itss human hum an consequences: the nature of migration and the role of peripheral settlements in aiding in the transformation of rural into urban societies-indeed, some say that the city of the future is now emerging in these peripheral settlements; problems associated with absorption of labour into the urban economies, with atten dant effects upon the spatial diffusion of growth, upon dass struc tures and dass conflict, and upon the integration of developing subcultural mosaics; and the efforts of Third World governments to control the pace, scale and direction of urbanisation, initially with 'western' concepts and ideology as a base, and now by more radical means. These themes will be the focus of what follows in this chapter. The condusion w e reach is that Thi Third rd World World urban isation is a fundamentally fundamenta lly different pro proce cess ss than tha n that th at described described by Adna Weber, with human consequences that do not conform to the conventional wisdom codified by Louis Wirth. MIGRATION AND T H E G R O W T H O F P E R I P H E R A L URBAN SE T T L E M E NT S

Two demograph demographic ic factors factors are of fundamental importance in Third World urbanisation. First is an elevated natural growth rate due to the fact that bir birth th rates have remained almost stable for severa severall decades while death rates have been in dedine. Second is the heavy migration from rural areas and more traditional country towns and cities to the principal urban centres of each country, especially to peripheral settlements located in and around the national capitals and regional industrial centres. The impact of internal migration on urbanisation varies according to country and region, but in most cases exceeds fifty per cent of the total population popul ation increase, increase, as as Tabl Ta blee 6 reveals. reveals. The Consequences

0/ Migration

Enough research has now been done on migration in the Third World countries to challenge the t he socio-polit socio-political ical propositions propositions abou ab outt its consequences inherited from the theorists who codified the nineteenth-century nineteenth-ce ntury experien experience ce in the West. West. Much Mu ch of o f the migration research in the Third World began with borrowed propositions, but increasingly researchers have been led to question this frame-

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

81

work and to suggest drastic revisions of the conventional inter pretations of the role of the peripheral periphe ral settlement settlementss in the urbanisa tion process. process. Table 6 Estimates 01 mig migran rants ts as as a percentage 01 recent population increases

Ci y

Abidjan Bombay Caracas Djakarta Istanbul Lagos Nairobi Säo Paulo Seoul

Period

1955-63 195 1-61 1950-60 1960-6 19 61 - 8 1950-60 1960-5 195 19 5 2-62

19 61 - 9

1950-60 1960-7 1955-65

Total Population Increase (thousands)

Migrants as a Percentage o f Total Population Increase

12 9

76 52 54 50

12°7 58 7 5°1 1528 67 2 428 393

162 2 16 3 2543 16 97

59 68 65

75

5°

72

68

63

SOURCE: World Bank, Urhanization Sector Working Paper (Washington, D.C., Tbe World Bank, June 1972), p. 80.

propositions centre on three th ree themes, themes, according to The borrowed propositions W. A. Comelius J r (1972) : material deprivation and frustration of mobility expectations; personal and social disorganisation; and

political radicalisation and disruptive behaviour. Migrants are expected to experience the first two conditions and graduate into the third. Continuing driving forces are held to be the high rates and volumes of immigration and the limited absorption capacity of the citi cities es caused caused by the discrepancy discrepancy between between urba ur ban n and an d indus indus trial growth rates. Such theory is distinctively Wirthian, with roots in Durkheim and Simmel, as weIl as in the works of Karl Marx. But migration research completed in thei t has 1960s startlingly contradictory evid evidenc ence. e. Migration, beenprovides found, does do es not no t necessa necessaril rily y result in severe severe frustration of expectations for

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82

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

socio-economic improvement or widespread personal and social disorganisation, and even when these latter conditions are present, they do not no t necess necessaril arily y lead to political alienation. Nor No r doe doess aliena aliena  tion apparently lead to political radicalisation or disruptive be haviour. The urban migrants fail in most respects to conform to the usual conception of a highly politicised, disposable mass. Resi dents of peripheral settlements rather frequently acquiesce to regimes that sustain the status quo. The dominant perception of the migrants is one of improved living conditions and life chances experienced as a result of the migration to the cities, as weH as a fundamenta funda mentall belief belief in the potential p otential for future better b etterment ment and an d a low tolerance for political risks. Rather than the masses participating in political violence, this has tended to be restricted to student and militar mili tary y elites. elites. Why is conventional migration theory so deficient? I t is now apparent that Wirth's concept of urbanism as a way of life was both tim timee- and culture-bo culture-bound und to the the immigrant immigrant city city of North Nor th America Ameri ca in the late nineteenth nin eteenth century. century . Moreover, it was was stron strongly gly coloured by a retrospectively idealised conception of the people of 'folk societies' as socially cohesive, personally contented, non conßictual and well-adjusted, leading to the assertion that urbanisation urbani sation destroyed destroyed this idylli idyllicc fol folk k culture. cu lture. convent ional wisdom wisdom is its conceptualisa The limitation of this conventional tion of urban migrants as an undifferentiated mass responding i n uniform fashion to a given set of conditions to which aH migrants to large cities are presumably exposed. I n reality, migrants com promise a large la rge and dispara disparate te arra ar ray y of socia sociall types types both before before and after aft er migration. Distinct migrant migra nt subcultures subcultures have developed developed with widely varying life styles, value orientations and levels of subjec tive political competence. Moreover, a rural-urban dichotomy does do es not exist; instead there ther e is a broad bro ad range of continuity of rural traditions within these urban subcultures (Redfield, 1941 e t seq.). Institutions, values and behaviour patterns have persisted or have been adapted to the specific requirements of the urban setting. Social Soci al organisation organisati on and mutual aid networks continue to function i n the urb u rban an scen scene. e. Africanists, for example, have described the rise of tribaI con sciousness new Mrican metropolises (Little, 1965; Miner, 1967). Thisi nis the probably d ue to conftict due conft ict with other oth er groups which, as social soc ial psyc psychol hologi ogists sts have long known, known, strengthens st rengthens the inter in ternal nal ti ties es

 

TRANSFORMATION

DURING DIFFUSION

83

of the collectivity. Most of these studies report that rapid migra tion has not produced the alienation, anomie, psychological mal adjustments and other symptoms of disorganisation held in the Wirthian Wirth ian model model to be be hallmarks hallmarks of rapid urbanisation. urbanisation. This Thi s is not to say say there is no poverty, unemployment, crime and prostitution; these exist in abundance. But for the vast majority of African migrants the ties of the extended family and those between city and village have been maintained. Far from a 'detribalising' pro cess, much of the rich associational life of African cities is based upon common interests, mutual aid, and the need for fellowship of people in the towns who are members of the same tribe o r ethnic group, speak the same language, o r have come from the same region. Much the same conclusions have been reached in Islamic and Asian urban studies and in investigations of Indian migration to the cities in Latin America. I n all cases, ethnic com petition remains high and racial confrontation frequent. Squatter Settlements: The (Cu (Cultur lturee of Poverty' Rejecte Reje cted d

Most Third WorId orId urban ur ban growth is concentrated in the so-called 'squatter' o r 'uncontrolled' peripheral settlements, which account for a substantial share of city populations throughout the Third WorId (Table 7). The names vary: in Latin America they are

barrios, barriadas, favelas, ranchos, colonias proletarias, o r cal lampas; in North Africa bidonvilles o r gourbivilles; in India, bustees; in Turkey, gecekondu districts; in Malaya, kampongs; and in the Philippines, barung-barongs. The inherited conven

tional wisdom leads to a n interpretation of such settlements as physically decrepit slums, lacking in basic amenities, chaotic, and disorganised-an attitu attitude de that th at per persi sist stss in much of the urban urb an plan plan  ning community, which tends to interpret such settlements as obstacles to good civic design design.. T o cite one example, Morris Juppenlatz (1970), a former U N official, describes them as a 'spreading 'spreading malady', 'fungus' or 'plague' 'plagu e' of 'excessive squalor, filth and poverty . . . human depravity, de privation, priva tion, illiteracy, epidemics epidemics and an d sickn sicknes ess' s' with growing crime rates and ju juve veni nile le d del elin inqu quen ency cy . . . land land grabbing grabbing and disrespect for property rights by a growing number of squat ters . . . in the mounting social disorder and tension in the cities, in the weakening and breaking down of the administrative disci pline of the authorities, in the unsightly human depravity in the midst of the afHuent established urban society, and in the in-

 

84 84--

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES O F URBANISATION

Table 7 Extent 0/ uncontrolled peripheral settlements settleme nts UNCONTROLLED SETTLEMENT

As

percenllJge

C i ~

Country

Africa Senegal

PopulDtion Total o f C i ~ rear (thousands ) (tlwusands ) Population

C i ~

Dakar Dar es Salaam

1969 IgG7 1967

500

Taipei Calcutta Djakarta Baghdad

Pakistan Karachi Republic o f Korea Seoul

IgG6 IgGl 1961 1965 IgGl 1964 197 0

1300 67 00 2906 1745 406 2280 44 0

Singapore

Singapore

1966

1870

Turkey

Total Urban Population Ankara

IgG5 1965 197 0 197 0

10,800

1947 1957 IgGl 19 62 IgG4 IgG4 IgG4 195 2 1966 1957 1961 IgG9 IgGl 1964 1966

Tanzania

Zambia Asia China (Taiwan) India

Indonesia Iraq

Malaysia

Europe

Lusaka

Kuala Lumpur

Izmir

North and South America Brazil Rio deJaneiro

Mexico

Brasilia Santiago Cali Buenaventura MexicoCity

Peru

Lima

Chile Colombia

Venezuela

Caracas Maracaibo

273 194

(d.u.)*

150

98 53

325

2220

725

500 100 752 137

(d.u.)* g80

30 36

27

25 33 25 29 25 33 30

15

23 65 460

22 47 60 65

205 0 294 0 33 26

400

20 22 27

1484 218

54606 243

979

1250 64 0

81 3 111 237 2 328 7 1261 17 16

2800 1330 1590 559

75° 4 16

650

900

88

33°

1500 114 360 1000 280 55 6 280

4 251 3°

80 14 46 9

21 36 21

35 50

• Dwelling units.

SOURCE: U.N. General Assembly, Housing, Building and Planning: Problems and PriMitüs in Human Settlements, Report o f the Secretary-General, August

1970,

Annex 111, P.55' Definitions vary. Additional details are given in the source quoted.

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

85

adequacy of the essential public services • . . As the political political con trol of the cities . . . passes from the presently established urban society . . . into the hands of the emergent urban squatter society who have little o r no heritage of city-dwelling • . . i t can be ex pected that essential services will diminish until they finally break down and collapse. Such views have been given apparent intellectual support b y sdaolarss like sdaolar like the American Ame rican anthropolo anthr opologist gist Oscar Osc ar Lewis, Lewis, who, in his research in the 1950S and 1960s described a subculture with a life style that he feit transcended national boundaries and regional and rural-urban differences within nations. This subculture h e called the culture 01 poverty, of the slum slum,, the ghetto, the squatter squa tter settlement. Wherever i t occurs, Lewis argued, its practitioners exhibit remarkable similarity in the structure of their families, in interpersonal relations, in spending habits, in their value systems and in their orientation orienta tion in time. His studies identified a large number of traits that characterise the culture cu lture of poverty. The principal ones ones may ma y be described described along alo ng four dimensions of the system: the relationship between the sub culture and the larger society; the nature of the 'ghetto' commu nity; the nature of the family; and the attitudes, values and characte char acterr structure of the individual. individual. The disengagement, the non-integration, of the poor with re spect to the t he maj m ajor or institutions of societ society y Lew Lewis is feIt feIt to be a crucial element in the th e culture cultu re of poverty. poverty. I t reßects the combined effect of a variety of factors including poverty, to begin with, but also segregation and discrimination, fear, suspicion and apathy and the development of alternative a lternative institutions institutions and procedures in the slum community. The people do not belong to labour unions o r politicall parties politica p arties and make little little us usee of banks, banks, hospit hospitals als,, depa de partm rtmen entt stores o r mus museums eums.. Such involvement as there ther e is in the institutions of the larger society-in the jails, the army and the public welfare welfare system-does little to suppress the traits of the culture of poverty. People in a culture of poverty, Lewis argued, produce Httle wealth and receive little in return. Chronic unemployment and underemployment, low wages, lack of property, lack of savings, absence of food reserve reservess in the th e home and chronic shortage of cash and imprison family individual makes in a vicious circle. Thus, for lack ofthe cash, the slum the house-holder frequent purchases of small quantities of food a t higher prices. The slum economy

 

86

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

turns inward; it shows a high incidence of pawning of personal goods, borrowing a t usurious rates of interest, infonnal credit arrangements among neighbours, use of secondhand clothing and furniture. There is awareness of middle-class values. People talk about them and even claim some of them as their own. O n the whole, however, they d o not live b y them. They will declare that mar riage b y the law, b y the church or b y both is the ideal fonn of marriage, but few will marry. For men who have no steady jobs, no property and no prospect of wealth wealt h to pass pass on to thei t heirr children, who live in the present without expectations of the future, who want to avoid the expense and legal difficulties involved in mar riage and divorce, a free union o r consensual marriage makes good sense. The women, for their part, will turn down offers of marriage from men who are likely to be immature and generally unreliable. They feel that a consensual union gives them some of the freedom and flexibility men have. By not giving the fathers of their children legal status as husbands, the women have a stronger claim on the children. They also maintain exclusive rights righ ts to their t heir own property. Along with the disengagement from the larger society, Lewis feIt there to be a hostility to the basic institutions of what are re garded as the dominant classes: hatred of police, mistrust of government and of those in high positions and a cynicism that ex tends to the church. The culture of poverty thus, h e felt, holds a certain potential potenti al for protest and for entrain entr ainmen mentt in political political move move ments aimed against the existing existing order. With its its po poor or housing and over overcrow crowding ding,, the community co mmunity of the t he culturee of poverty cultur poverty is high hi gh in gregariousne gregariousness, ss, but Lew Lewis is argued argue d that i t has a minimum of organisation beyond the nuclear and ex tended family. Occasionally slum-dwellers come together in tem porary infonnal groupings; neighbourhood gangs that cut across slum settlements represent a considerable advance beyond the zero ze ro point of th thee continuum. I t is the th e low level level of organisat orga nisation ion that give gi vess the th e culture cultu re of poverty its its marginal margi nal and anomalous quality. The family in the culture of poverty, according to Lewis, does stage not cherish childhood as a specially prolonged and protected stage cyde. Initiation into sex comes early. With the in in the life in stability of consensual marriage the family tends to b e mother centred and tied more dosely to the mother's extended family.

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DI FFUSI ON

87

The female head of the house is given to authoritarian rule. In

spite of much verbal emphasis on family solidarity, sibling rivalry for the limited supply of goods and matemal affection is intense. There is little privacy. this cul cultur turee has a strong feelin feeling g The individual who grows u p in this of fatalism, helple helpless ssnes ness, s, depen d ependen dence ce and inferiority. These traits, characteristicc of the so often remarked in the current literature as characteristi American Negro, Lewis feIt to be equally strong in slum-dwellers elsewhere in the world who are not segregated o r discriminated against as a distinct ethnic or racial group. Other traits include a high incidence of weak ego structure, orality and confusion of sexual identification, all reftecting matemal deprivation; a strong present-time orientation with relatively little disposition to defer gratification and plan for the future; and a high tolerance for psychological pathology of all kinds. There is a widespread belief in male superiority and among the men a strong preoccupation with machismo, machismo, their the ir masculinity. masculinity. Lewis feIt that these people, provincial and local in outlook, with little sen sense se of history, history, knowonly their thei r own neighbourhood neighbourho od and an d their own way of life. Usually they d o not have the knowledge, the vision o r the ideology to see the similarities between their troubles and those of their counterparts elsewhere in the world. And he h e concluded concluded that they are not class-conscious, although they ar aree sensitive sensitive indeed indee d to symbo symbols ls of status. Lewis Lew is has been criticised by by his peers peers (Valentin (Va lentine, e, 1968; 1968; Leacock, 1971), and what is emerging throughout the world is a n alterna tive interpretation: that under conditions 0/ rapid urbanisation the uncontrolled new settlements play an important /unctional role. William Mangin (1967) has written that squatter settlements represent a solution to the complex problem of urbanisation and migration, combined with a housing shortage. While there are indeed some 'slums of despair' displaying the traits listed by Lewis in both advanced and Third World countries, many studies have shown that so-called squatter settlements vary widely in their properties. Clinard (1966) writes that although some squatter settlements show disorganisation, it is important that each be examined in the light of its own distinctive subculture, which is Of the dominant inftuence on the pattern of its formed, inhabitants. critical significance is how thelife settlement was e.g. by organised squatter invasion, gradual accretion, o r government

 

88

T H E HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

initiation, and whether o r not there is a sense of ownership or controll of contro o f property. John Turner has distinguished three different economic levels of the transitional urba ur ban n settlements settlements : I

bridgeheads.. Popula Populated ted by recent arrivals arrivals to The low-income bridgeheads

the city, with few marketable skiIls, the need to obtain and hold work dominates. dominates. Modem standards have h ave low priority, priority, and access is all important. Thus, such bridgeheads tend to be in decaying old hornes in the central city, o r in the centrally located 'slums of despair' . They Th ey are ar e poor, and lack essential services. 2 . The low-income consolidators. A s stab stabilit ility y of a perma pe rmanen nentt in come is achieved, access is no longer so critical (often because because pub pub  lic transport is cheap), although conventional housing is still out of reach. reach. Money is available for other oth er than th an nece necess ssit itie ies, s, and family orientation begins begins to to domin dominate ate in more peripheral squa s quatter tter 'slums 'slums of hope'. Many such settlements settlements are highly organized and planned, and upgrade in quality through self-help efforts over the years, providing shelter and security without imposing on the residents the middle-c middle-c1ass 1ass's 's priorities prioriti es for fo r housing. 3. T h e middle-income status seekers. Those with economic security then seek social status through choice of location-in Rio de Janeiro, this was adjacent to the high-status 'conventional' resi dential areas. Upgrading of housing quality assumes priority, along with education and qu quali ality ty of se servi rvices ces.. Thus, no universal form of decaying sI sIum um settlement is to be found, but instead a range of markedly different settlement types with fundamentally different subcultures. As Robert J . Crooks, Director of the United Uni ted Nations Centre for Housing, Housing, Building Building and Planning comments, they are better called transition transitional al urban settlements, which h e feels demonstrate remarkable vigour and ingenuity in improving ttheir heir living living conditions. conditions. One of the most import imp ortant ant variable variabless confounding conventional western wisdom about the experience of the new migrant in the transitional settlements that has been pointed out is the role o f tradition trad itional al networks networks of soc socia iall relations, which have h ave ffacilitated acilitated suc suc cessful assimilation of many migrants into urban life. I n Africa, as we noted earlier, earlier , these these networks involve involve a continu c ontinuity ity of rura ru rall ways in the city and E. M . Bruner has shown in a study of northern Sumatra that

the cultu c ultural ral premis premises es and roo roots ts of urba ur ban n Batak life life are to t o be found in village society . • . Most urban Batak have more meaningful associations with their rural residents in the highlands than with their non-Batak neighbours.

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

89

Similarly, Janet Abu-Lughod coneluded in studies of Cairo that the Wirthian Wir thian model model of anonymity, anonymity, secondary secondary contacts and an d anomie does not obtain. L. Alan Eyre has described the 'shantytown' resi dent of Montego Bay as 'the poor suburbanite of the developing worl wo rld d • . • upwardly upwardly mob mobil ilee • . . in indu dust stri riou ouss • • • a save saverr • • • more more often a conserv conservati ative ve than th an a radicai'. radicai' . Even Calcutta's teeming bustees have been described by Colin Rosser as performing six func function tionss which which are of major maj or importance importan ce to the urbanisation process as a whole. They provide housing a t rents that are within the means of the lowest income groups. They act as reception centres for migrants, providing a mechanism to assist in adaptation to urban life. They provide within the bustee a wide variety of employment in marginal and small-scale enter prises. They provide a means of finding accommodation in elose proximity to work. Their social and communal organisation pro vides essential social support in unemployment and other occa sions of difficulty. Finally, they encourage and reward small-scale privatee entreprene privat entre preneurshi urship p in the t he fiel field d of o f housing. housing. But the conventional wisdom still dominates attitudes of many poIicy-makers, stereotyping all transitional settlements as social aberrations, 'cancers' overwhelming an otherwise healthy munici pal body. In many cases, governments have responded by the expulsion of squatters and the costly and disruptive elearance of slum areas, resulting in a net reduction of housing available to low income groups, as when, in 1963, inner-city Manila squatters were relocated to a n unprepared site deep in the countryside a t Sapaney Palay, or more recently, recently, as the Brazilian government has eliminated the favelas from Rio de Janeiro. Where elearance together with rehousing has been attempted, i t has generally resulted in the unproductive use of scarce public resources, resources, meagre improvements if any, and unequal treatment of the families in habiting transitional areas. This is bec becaus ausee public housing programmes programmes frequently att a ttemp emptt to follow the pattern set in the more developed countries. Com plete dwellings are constructed prior to occupancy, a t minimum space and material standards. But even these standards tend to be too costly in relation to total needs and total resources available. and costs, Rarely areasthey realistic heavy solution for most slum dwellers, theya involve interest maintenance and squatters apart from the high capital costs per family. I f rents are high

H.C.U·- 4 ·

 

90

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

enou gh to amortise investme enough investments, nts, they are ar e likel likely y to be far fa r above the th e ability abili ty of the people people to pay, creating a high hi gh rate rat e of default. default. How ever, the most serious criticism of pre-built housing projects is that financially they remain beyond the grasp of precisely the group most in need of housing assistance, those with the lowest incomes occupying transitional settlement areas. One of the few successful examples of resettlement via low-cost building pro grammes may be in Singapore, where the Housing and Develop ment Board created in 1960 has tackled the problem with all the energy of the welfare socialism of that city-state's government. Because of the self-improving nature of the transitional settle ments, the United Nations Centre for Housing, Building and Planning now stresses the importance of achieving a major shift in attitude and emphasis from the current norms of national and internat inte rnationa ionall polic policie iess and programmes which attem att empt pt to deal with wit h transitional urban settlements. The most basic policy and pro gramme directions are the acceptance and support of the long term ter m existe existence nce of transitional areas ar eas and adeq adequate uate pre-planning for future transitional settlement growth. The Centre notes that i n many cases, transitional urban settlements constitute valuable actual or potential additions to the urba u rban n housing sto stock ck and fixed capital investment a t city and national scales. I n conditions of rapid urbanisation and even more rapid growth of transitional areas, through migration and natural population growth, vast cIearance schemes, with o r witho without ut high-cost high-cost public housin housing, g, can only aggravate aggra vate the th e problems of people livi living ng in these these areas. I t therefore recommends that, consistent with a positive supportive attitude, governments should take action to make normal urban utilities and community services available to these areas, accord ing to priorities established through the involvement of the resi dents themselves in the development process. Because of the im portance of the degree to which the residents feel asecure right to the land they occupy, the Centre recommends that supportive programmes should treat this issue as a matter of high priority. And becaus becausee the forc forces es leading to the rapid rap id growth of o f transition transition al urban ur ban settle settlement mentss wil willl continue, they recommend pre-planni pre- planning ng for transitional settlement settlement growth, in a manner that wil willl emphasise emphasise the th e positive aspects of these areas. They note that clearance of slum and squatter areas is a waste of popu p opular lar resour resource ce investment investment and often results in a net destruction of the living environment. Gov-

 

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emments and international organisations, they say, must develop and use legal and administrative mechanisms which will make poss po ssib ible le planne pla nned d land lan d acquisitio acquisition n and developm development ent in urban urba n areas in advance of need, taking into account not only the possibility of extending utilities and community facilities to the areas, but also oth er key other key aspects aspects such such as transporta tran sportation tion and location in relation to jobs.

A B S O R P T I O N O F L A B O U R I N T H E URBAN E C O N O M Y

The most pressing pressing problems associated with wi th Third World urbanisa

tion arise because, despite accelerated industrialisation, the rapidly increasing labour force of the cities is no nott being absorbed into in to full full and productive employment (Friedmann and Sullivan, 1972). With urban growth rates typically running a t least twice the rate of natu na tura rall increase, increase, frequently in exce excesss of 5'0 per cent per annum (Davis, 1969), but with industrial employment increasing a t 4'4 per cent per annum (Turnharn and Jaeger, 1971), the bulk of new manpower is absorbed by small-scale enterprise, personal services and open unemployment. Moreover, spurts in urban investment tend only to bring more migrants to the city. Several consequences flow from these facts: maintenance of a minimal 'survival eco nomy'; the reinforcement of traditional subcultures in the city; the prevention of diffusion of development beyond the big cities and the creation, creation, thereby, thereby, of growing growing primacy of the major urban ur ban agglomerations.

Structure 01 th thee Urban Economies

These consequences may be understood in terms of the structure of the urban economies, which are made u p of three separate sectors. The individual enterprise sector comprises the unem ployed workers of the 'street economy' of the city, including the offspring of urban residents, recent migrants to the city, those laid off from other jobs, street hawkers, casual construction workers, prostitutes and panderers, professional beggars and petty thieves. I t accounts for between 25 and 40 per cent of the urban labour force. Few earn more than the subsistence minimum, and those

who do most frequentlyforshare surplus with their kin. aThere is intense competition worktheand this keeps earnings t the subsistence minimum. Any growth in the urban economy simply

 

92

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES O F URBANISATION

brings in more migrants and keeps rewards to individual enter prise a t the lowest possible level. Most people engaged in this sector live marginal lives in the bridgehead settlements, or simply live on the streets, and under the worst conditions experience large scale misery in its full harshness. At night the sidewalks of Calcutta, for example, become public dormitories, heaped with emaciated emaci ated men, women, women, old old people and children. ch ildren. The poor of Cal cutta lack the most elementary belongings, owning neither pillow, mattress nor blanket; blank et; their thei r bodie bodiess stink stink and are covered by soiled rags. At dawn, before the city awakens, earts collect the corpses of thos thosee who have died in the night. nig ht. The second sector of the Third World's urban economies is that devoted to family enterprise in the tradition traditi on al bazaar-type bazaar -type econo econo mies. The land use patterns of the parts of the city in which this sectorr dominates secto dominates are chaotic. Such family family enterprise accounts for 35-45 per cent of the labour force in small trade and service establishments establi shments and an d indus industrial trial works workshop hops. s. By and la large rge,, traditional commodities are produced for the low-income mass market using local raw materials and lacking quality control and standardisa tion. Production is dependent on the utilisation of the entrepre neur's family (the extended kin group), for whom the end-product is a condition of shared poverty. Because pricing is competitive and the activities are labour-intensive, returns seldom provide for more tha t han n the t he subsist subsistenc encee requirements requir ements of the family. family. The third sector is the corporate, including capital-intensive businesses, the government, and the professions. Depending upon the particular city and country, this sec tor provides between 15 and 50 per cent of the urban employment. Economic units are larger, people work regular hours, capital investment is on a large scale, levels of technology and productivity are high. There is continuing pressure to provide all the perquisites of similar occu pations in the developed countries. Education is required for entry to the sector, and employment in it automatically conveys middle-class status as aminimum, and produces the professional managerial urban elite a t its upper echelons, together with the juxtaposit juxta position ion of luxury luxury and an d poverty poverty that th at is one of the striking striking phy phy  sical sic al characteristics of the Thi Th i rd World cities. cities. This structure structu re of the urban urb an economy economy is argued by G. McGee (1967) to be a direct product of the colonial or neo-colonial ex T.

perience of most Third World countr countries ies.. Early European Euro pean contact co ntact

 

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saw the establishment of embryonic colonial urban networks de signed largely to aid European control of indigenous trade. West ern controls expanded in the nineteenth century, involving cre ation of far more extensive urban and communications networks than had exi existe sted d in the t he area ar ea before. But the th e coloni colonial al city remained remain ed essentially a conservative force, economically subordinate to the metropolis and world trade. The culture, way of life and popula tion of the city were alien to the indigenous inhabitants, for the cities were populated by heterogeneous populations, many of whom were migrants o r foreigners. Occupational and residential segregation existed according to ethnic groups, as did social strati fication; Europeans a t the top, commercial groups (frequently Asiatic) in the middle with the local Western-educated elites, and final fi nally ly the th e indigenous indigenous immigrant immigra nt population popula tion a t the bottom bottom.. Much M uch of the indigenous population was transitory, young and male. Even today, McGee argues, with inherited colonial economic structures displaying excessive specialisation in the production of raw materials for the industries industries of the metropolitan metropo litan powers powers,, ma majo jorr cities of the Third W orld stil stilll tend to function as 'head-links' between the industrialised powers and their sources of raw materials. I n asense, then, they remain transplants more closely related to the industrial world world than th an to the countryside countryside of the Third World. There are, of course, differences from one type of city to an other. McGee reports that the 'metropoles' of Southeast Asia, as elsewhere in the Third World, have clearly become part of a new worldwide urban 'super-culture'. They are connecting links with other oth er nations and integrating centres of economic, political and intellectual life. Beyond these metropolises, in the provincial towns, life remains traditional, however, revolving around two main mai n institution al comple complexes xes,, governme government nt and trade. The trans mission of ideas to and by those provincial towns is quite limited limited because socio-political structures tend to be authoritarian, hier archical, and centralised.

Maintenance 01 the SUTvival Economy A pard pa rdcu cula larr set of labour market dynamics betwe between en the three sec sec tors maintains workers in the urban economy a t base survival levels. Any growth in the corporate o r family enterprise sectors,

 

94

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBAN1SATION

for example, filters immediately to the individual enterprise sec tor. The prospect of gaining employment brings more new migrants into the city and intense competition for jobs keeps wage rates a t their minimum. T o add to the downward pressure o n wages, expansion of mass production b y the corporate sector fre quently forces family sector enterprises producing inferior goods out of business. The higher productivity of the corporate sector means that job gains are less than production gains, while job los losses ses in the th e family fa mily sec sec to torr are a re substantiaI. substa ntiaI. The consequences may be seen in bot b oth h social cIas cIasss terms and in terms of urban primacy. Reinforcement Reinforceme nt of Tradi Tradition tion al Subcultures Subcultures

Shared poverty is therefore the rule for the majority in the Third World cities. One major result is to reaffirm the critical impor tance of maintaining maintaining the th e mutual aid networks that honour tradi tional family and tribaI obligations and produce increasing rival ries among tribaI and ethnic groups and social cIasses. The social structure of the Third World's cities has a t its apex today the westernised elite, the reference group for the aspiring masses. Beneath is a n ethnically heterogeneous population in which, out of competition for jobs, ethnic rivalries have become more pronounced and 'tribalism' has increased. increased. Many of the alien alien middlemen groups have been o r are rapidly being eliminated. Out of this new social stratification have arisen new forms o f cIass conßict. O n the one hand, there are pressures for social ascent in the new elite based upon superior education and individual achievement in the occupational and professional world: O n the other hand, continued links to less-advantaged kinsmen produce sharing based upon reciprocity and the mutual benefit ßowing from such relationships, leading to maintenance of rural ways in the city (Marris, 1967). The new cIass conßict comes between the two--between occupational achievement and kin-group relations when reciprocity can no longer be maintained b y the less advan taged. Such conßicts must be seen in a situation in which aspira tions have risen far more rapidly than absolute gains in welfare. Politicians, drawn from the new elite, have tended to portray the benefits of independence in far more glowing terms than have b y urban been realised, leadingsocial to conßicts over wage demands workers, and growing socialist ist pr pressur essures es for reduc re ducing ing the t he privileges of the elite and creating cIassless societies. The counter-thrust has

 

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been aseries of military coups and the present authoritarian sys te tems ms of governm government. ent. Diffusion and Privacy

Maintenance of wages a t survival levels by the flows of migrant

labour into the individual enterprise sector in response to per ceived employment opportunities has consequences beyond those already discussed. T o understand these i t is first necessary to understand unders tand certain features of the urban urb an growth proce process ss in in the de veloped countries, where different labour market conditions obtain. Lett us Le us take the Unite Un ited d States as as a n example (an identical argu ment applies to western Europe versus the overseas colonies and dominions). As the proces processs of industrial urbanisation urbanisa tion ran ra n its course course,, the north-eastern manufacturing belt became the central driving force of the economy in the later nineteenth century, a great heartland nucleation of industry and the national market, the focus of large-scale national-serving industry, the seedbed of new industry responding to the dynamic structure of national final demand, and the centre cent re of high le leve vels ls of per pe r capita cap ita income income.. This T his core region became the lever for development of more peripheral hinterland regions, both in North America and beyond, reaching out to them for their resources as its input requirements increased, stimulating their growth in accordance with wi th its resour resource ce demands and the resource endowment of the regions. Thus, standing in a dependent relationship to the heartland, radiating out across the nationallandscape, there developed resource-dominant regional hinterlands specialising in the production of resource and inter mediate outputs for which the heartland reached out to satisfy the input requirements of its great manufacturing plants. In the hinterlands, resource-endo resource-endowmen wmentt became a critical determ de terminan inantt of the particular cumulative advantage of the region and hence its growth potential. The result of such core-centred patterns of growth was thus a high degree of regional specialisation. Specialisation, in turn, de termined the content and direction of regional growth. Regional economic growth in every case became externally determined The nature of these by national alternative demands for regional specialties, sources of specialties. them, and changes in the struc ture of demand therefore determined in large measure the nature

 

96

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

and extent of regional growth. This extended to the secondary

support needed by export industries--housing, public facilities, retail establishments, seIVice facilities and the like. Emerging systems of cities played a critical role in the whole process, for cities became the instruments whereby the specialised sub-regions were reticulated in national economies. They became the centres of activity and of innovation, focal points of transport networks, locations of superior accessibiIity a t which firms could most easily reap scale economies of localisation and urbanisation. Agricultural enterprise became more efficient in the vicinity of cities. The more prosperous commercialised commercialised agricultures encircled enc ircled the major cities, whereas the inaccessible peripheries of the great urba ur ban n regio regions ns were were character c haracterised ised by backward, bac kward, subsis subsisten tence ce econo mic systems. This Th is spatial organisation involved involved two major elements: systems 01 cities, arranged in hierarchies according to the functions per formed by each; and corresponding areas of urban influence o r urban fields surrounding each of the cities in these systems. Gener ally, the size and functions of a city and the extent of its urban field developed proportionally. Each major region developed around a centre of metropolitan rank, and the network of inter metropolitan connections emerged as the mesh reticulating a whole set of such regions. The spatial incidence of economic growth became a function of distance from the metropolises. Troughs of economic backwardness hung on in the most inacces sible areas along the intermetropolitan peripheries. Further sub regional articulation was provided by successively smaller centres a t progressively lower levels of the hierarchy-smaller cities, towns, villages, etc.-and as transportation was improved, the lowe lo west st lev level el centres, centres, aft a fter er initially import impo rtan antt roles roles,, be began gan to wither with er and vanish. I n such circumstances, impulses of economic social change moved along three planes: outwards from heartland metro polises to those of the regional hinterlands in anational-level 'spread effect'; from centres of higher to centres of lower level in the hierarchy hierar chy in a patter pat tern n of 'hierarchical ' hierarchical diffusio diffusion' n' ; and outward from urban ur ban centres centres into their surrounding urban urb an fields in a hinter hi nter land spread pattern. Part of this diffusion mechanism has been found in the operation of urban labour markets. When growth was sustained over long periods, economic expansion in high-

 

TRANSFORMATION DURINO DIFFUSION

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income areas and the heartland metropolises produced labour shortages and a rising wage-rate. Labour-intensive industries, therefore, therefo re, were were priced out ou t of the high-incom high-incomee labour la bour markets and shifted to smaller urban centres and more peripheral areas. The signif sig nifica icance nce of this 'filtering' o r 'trickle-down' proc proces esss lay not no t only in its direct but also in its indirect effects. The induced effects on real income and employment were frequently considerable in the low-income regions because prices there tended to rise less and because capital substitution led to output per worker becoming greater. Where the boom was maintained, industries of higher labour productivity shifted into lower-income areas, and the lower-wage industries were forced to move into even smaller towns tow ns and an d more isolated areas. I f such processes operate over a long period of time, they pro duce and an d maintai mai ntain n an a n urba u rban n syste system m compris comprising ing a few few large metro poli po lise ses, s, a larger lar ger numbe nu mberr of intermedia inter mediate te size cities, and a stil11ar stil11arger ger number of smaller towns, all sharing in the national growth pro cess and distributing its benefits throughout both heartland and hinterland regions. Such a 'balan 'ba lanced ced'' syste system m of citi cities es has been describ described ed as produc pro duc ing a 'rank-size distribution' of cities (Berry, 1971). As defined by G. K. Zipf, who first identified it, a rank-size distribution arises if, when cities are ranked in decreasing order of size and plotted in a graph prepared on doubly-Iogarithmic paper with population on one axis and rank on the other, the plot form formss a straight str aight line. line. Zipf Zi pf thought that such straight-line relationships re8ected the achieve ment of o f national unity in both bo th political political and an d economi economicc terms terms.. Where the population of the largest city exceeds the figure that might be expected on the basis of the rank-size distribution, a condition of 'primacy' is said to exist. Colin Clark (1967) uses the additional term 'oligarchy' to describe situations in which the towns over 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 population have a bigger share of the total urban population than would be expected from the straight-line relationship, but where, a t the same time, the primacy of the leading city is kept in check. check. A particul part icularly arly striking example is pro vided by the Portuguese colonial colonial syste system, m, in which the majo ma jorr urban urb an 'head-links' form one oligarchie rank-size regime and centres a t the local levels of the hierarchy form another (Fig. functioning II). The idea of primacy was was initially formulated by Mark Ma rk Jefferson

 

98

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

(1938), and was very simple. H e argued that th at everywh everywhere ere 'national ism erystallises in primate eities . . . supereminent . • • not merely in size, but in national influenee'. H e assessed the degree of emin ence of eities eities within eountries by eomputing eompu ting the ratios of size of the seeond- and third-ranking eities to that of the largest plaee. But immediately after afte r Jefferson Jefferson's 's papers pap ers had appeared, Zipf direeted attention to the entire system of eities. The rank rank-si -size ze distribution, distributio n, he argued, was the situation to be expeeted in any 'homogeneous socio-economie system' that had reaehed astate of 'harmonious equilibrium' . 100

50

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'. •• •

* Macau *

5

o u r e n ~ o

*

Marque.

Luanda

•

Porto

Lisboa

I ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ ·100,000 1,000,000

10,000

FIG.

I

I

SIZE

Rank-size Rank-size relationship for eities eities of the Portuguese eolonial system aree used. The Iatest eensus data ar

I t remained for discussants a t aseries of post-war UNESCO conferences confere nces on urbanisatio urban isation n in Asia Asia and the Far East East,, and in Latin America, to put the two together and to point out the links to

Louis Wirth's soeial doetrines. Cases deviating from the rank-size distribution were said to arise from 'over-urbanisation' of the eeo nomies of Iesser-developed eountries because of 'excessive' in-

 

TRA N SFO RMA TI O N DURING D I F F U S I O N

99

migration and superimposition of limited economic development of a colonial type, creating 'dual economies' characterised by 'pri matee eities mat eities'' that tend to have 'paralytic' effects upon the develop ment of smalier urban places, to be 'parasitic' in relation to the re mainder main der of the national nat ional econom economy, y, and to be productive of aliena tion, anomie and soeial disorganisation. Obviously, each of the words in quotation marks involves a value judgment, but they d o reveal that the idea of the primate city is firmly established in many people's minds as a malignant deviation from expectations about hierarchical organisation de rived from the rank-size rule, with obvious pejorative connota tions. I n fac fact, t, the reasons reasons for primacy ar aree straightforward. Instead Instea d of development filtering down the urban hierarchy and spreadi spreading ng its effects outwards within urban fields, growth is concentrated in the majo ma jorr eeit itie ies. s. This Thi s is beca because use each increment to the urba u rban n econom economy y draws in more migrants, to maint ma intain ain wages wages a t th thee subsis subsistenc tencee mini min i mums, in the manner described earlier. There is no incentive for growth grow th to decentralis decentralise. e. Modern Mod ern enterprise remains concentr conc entrated ated in thee majo th ma jorr ci citi ties es.. Modernising inßuences reach reachhe he migrants, but i n the hinterlands traditional ways of life remain in the small towns and villages. Increasing primacy is, in turn, a sign that economic growth is taking place and affecting more people. T H E URGE TO PLAN

Yet to many planners and policy-makers in the developing coun tries, 'gigantism' of the largest cities is still a characteristic to be feared, even when the principal city is small relative to eities in other areas. areas. This Th is fear is manifested in the expressed desire on the part of public officials to gain control over the urbanisation pro cess and to restriet population growth in the primate cities. The reasons given usually are uncontrolled urban sprawl, traffic con gesti ges tion, on, unemployment, unemployme nt, crime, crime, proliferation proliferatio n of squatters communi c ommuni ties ti es,, in ability to provide pro vide servi services ces and and,, in general, gener al, a fear fe ar that living standards standa rds could be depressed depressed by further furt her uncontrolled growth. Als Also perceived by the western-educated planners are 'diseconomies of and the primate scale' prisimate as a 'parasite'. that city continued change within the framework of The feeling present pre sent economic syst system emss will will produce prod uce only more and worse prob-

 

100

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

lems, and that changes in the nature of urban systems must be produced to overcome the continuing constraints of low rates of economi econ omicc growth, export ex port orientation or ientation and colonial inheritance that conspire to confine modernising influences to primate cities with little foreseeable hope for filtering to take place. The increasing feeling is that experiences of developed nations are irrelevant in the Third World today, and so radical new approaches to plan ning are ar e being tried. The developed countries, i t is argued, were economi economical cally ly ahead ah ead of the rest of the world when they commenced modern economic growth, and the underdeveloped countries are the worst off eco nomically a t the present time. The world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had freer trade policies, freer opportunities for international movements of population and less political and economic barriers than the world of today. I n the Third World institution al settings settings which are ar e the products produ cts of modern mode rn economic economic growth have preceded the process of growth. The political insti tution of democracy, for instance, often precludes the exploitation of the proletariat for the purpose of growth, a feature which was not uncommon in the t he initial st stages ages of growth in the t he West West.. Welfare Welfar e measures like minimum wages, regulation of hours of work, pro hibition of child labour, are all institutions which in certain ways do not n ot make for economic economic developm development ent of the sort that took place under early western capitalism. This is compounded by the co existence of highly developed countries with rapid means of com munication and transportation that enables peoples of the under developed countries to copy consumption patterns of the de veloped countries. countries. This Th is 'demon ' demonstration stration effect' is assymetrical, i.e. i t applies to consumption but not to investment and savi saving ng patterns, patter ns, thus diverting resources from investment to conspicuous and other types of consumption. Parallel 'derived development' projects divert investments to conspicuous and monumental structures rath ra ther er than th an to productive one ones. s. For all these reasons, Third World planning is tryin trying g to produce by other means means the th e 'balanced' urban urb an distributions that 'no 'norma rmal' l' growth proc proces esse sess wi will ll not produce p roduce.. Many dr dram amat atic ic new polici policies es are ar e trying, for example, to promote pro mote urba ur ban n decentralisation decentralisation through thr ough investment investment incentive incentive programmes programmes,, growt gr owth h pole strategies, strategies, regional region al develop dev elopment ment schem schemes, es, and the th e like. like. I n Indonesia rapid urban growth of a major city has been chal lenged frontally. The city of Djakarta issues a required residency

 

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pennit to new in-migrants only upon certification of lodging and employment. The new arrival must deposit with the city govern

ment for six months the equivalent of return fare to the point of origin. I t is claimed that th this is poliey poliey,, initiated ini tiated iin n late lat e 1 9 7 0 , has cut migration by as much as 50 per cent. Such asserted successes are

now leading other leaders and planners to t r y to devise equally radieal solutions solutions to the perceived urba ur ban n problems. problems. Planning is thus the order of the day-national, regional and urban. But in a 1 9 7 2 survey of urban development efforts i n the Third World, the U.S. Agency for International Development reported that most national development development plans traditionally trad itionally have given only token attention to urban development. T o the extent that urban considerations have been incorporated, the focus has been primarily on housing and expressed in tenns of a housing sector. I n some places, for example Singapore and Brazil, sub stantial gains have been made towards solving housing difficulties through national sectoral planning. Those few instances i n which national planning for urban development has gone beyond this narrow approach are conspicuous and groundbreaking. These range from national natio nal infrastructural infra structural development development prioriti priorities es in Tur key to a plan for all-out restructuring of society through urbanisa tion and urb urban an development in Malaysia. Malaysia. I n the mid-range there are Brazil's long-standing preoccupation with national political, social, and economic integration and Colombia's urban sectoral programme aimed a t reducing population ßow to major cities and a t stimul stimulating ating developmen dev elopmentt on a regional basis basis.. Brazil's programmes have never congealed into anational whole; nevertheless, in the past decade they have produced mas sive separate endeavours, each entrepreneurial in the sense of try ing to create growth opportunities,suchas transferring thenat thenationa ionall capital from coastal Rio de Janeiro to the interior a t Brasilia, development of weIl over 1 0 0 new towns in the south, promotion of a large-scale growth pole development programme through infrastructure and investment incentiv incentives es to stimulate development of the north-east and help stem its rapid out-migration, and construction of a trans-Amazonian highway t o open u p that region and stimulate strategie urban growth centres along the route. Colombia is attempt attempting ing a more orchestrated orchestrated and comprehensive programme nationaUy, speeifically to foster the development of

 

102

THE H U M A N CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

intermediate-sized cities as countermagnets to the major popula tion centres. Malaysia's programme is outlined comprehensively in its new Five-Year National Development Plan. The Plan places priority on urban development and rural-urban migration as a tool for achieving its its g goal oal of restru restructurin cturing g soeiet soeiety y to me meet et the t he larg l arger er needs and to bring more Malays into the economi economicc mainstream. I t is a dramatic attempt to promote fundamental societal changes quickly. T o help co-ordinate and implement the urbanisation fea fea turess of the new plan, an Urban Development Authority was cre ture ated in the Office of the Prime Minister. Other unit unitss in the Prime Prim e Minister's Offic Officee also also will will be actively actively engaged engage d in plan pl an implementa impleme nta tion. Both the overall strategy and the concentration of co-ordinat ing and implementing authority for urban development a t such a high level level are unprecedented. Regional planning and developmen developmentt goa goals ls appea app earr aass new ingre dients in many national development plans (e.g. those of Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Kenya, Nigeria, Turkey, India, Thailand and Korea), and they are ar e unde un derr serio serious us disc discus ussi sion on in other countries (such as Panama, Vietnam, Indonesia and Pakistan). However, in spite of aII of this attention and application, region al planning meansmanythings to manypeople manyp eople.Much .Much of the action in regional planning and development is tentative and experimen tal in nature. I n a number numb er of countri countries es regional regional planning pl anning has been applied in piecemeal fashion in attempts to encourage develop ment me nt of backward regio regions ns,, such as nor northth-eas eastem tem Brazil Brazil and north e m Tha Thaila iland nd.. Similarly, Similarly, the strong strong notion of regional development in Turkey is related to adesire to achieve more 'balanced' growth b y stimulating development in the south and esp especia ecially lly in the east. I t includes the idea of trying to develop counter-magnets to the largest cities--that is, to encourage the growth of eities in the 2 0 , 0 0 0 to 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 size class. Incentives such as tax breaks, special amortisation, and exceptions to corporate income laws have been given to industry. Professional salaries have been supplemented and embryonic regional universities begun. I n fact, regional plan ning of thi thiss kind kind preceded the th e development of the curre cur rent nt Nation National al Plan in Turkey. The concept of growth centres and growth poles in regional development is perhap perhapss the most common application of regional regional

 

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103

planning. The most speeifie example of this within anational planning framework is Colombia. For planning purposes the eountry has been split ioto four major eeonomic regions, eaeh one having one of the four major cities as a growth pole: BarranquilIa for Atlantie Coast, Cali in south-west, Medellin in north-west, and Bogota in eentraI. Kenya too has regional physieal development plans ineorporating a growth pole eon cept, and Indonesian In donesian planners are grappling with more fundamen tal aspectsofregional aspectsofregional planning plan ningas as it affeet affeetss thedevelopment thed evelopment ofcities regions, ns, identifying iden tifying -namely, defining the funetions of eeonomie regio growth poles within the regions, and assessing the real and poten tial role of these eities within eaeh region o r sub-region (area). Planning for new towns is part of the growth eentre planning proeess; proe ess; there are a re numerous nume rous examples examples in the th e developing countries. These range from the massive endeavour required to establish the 'new town' new eaptit eap tital al of Brazi Brazill a t interior Brasili Brasiliaa to the ereation ere ation of the new rural eommunities in eonneetion with the Bandama River Valley projeet in Ivory Coast. Somewhere in the mid-range sateIlitee town app approa roach ch in whieh new towns towns are ar e ereated ereat ed is the new sateIlit on the periphery of major urban eentres, either as bedroom eom munities, industrial eomplexes, or as combined industrial, com mercial and residential eomplexes. Tax ineentives are rapidly gaining in popularity as a related locational tool. Examples can be found in Brazil, Colombia, Tur key, Ivory Coast, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The tax and infrastructure ineentive for eommereial loeation a t spe speeif eifie ie growt gr owth h points in north-east Brazil is a ease in point. I t was thought that, by allowing tax exemption on 50 per eent of all profits invested in the north-east, business investments would flow into designated designated growth centres. The govemment would eneourage development further by ereation of physieal infrastrueture. Beeause the goal wass development of lagging areas presumed to have growth wa g rowth poten tial, the already burgeoning eities of Salvador and Reeife were excluded excl uded from from the plan pl an;; the incent incentive ivess did not n ot apply appl y in thes thesee two eities. I t was found, however, that investments did not flow to the designated growth points throughout the region as planned. I n  stead they tended to cluster cluster a t the municipal boundaries of Recife Recife and Salvador. This is testimony to the effeetiveness of tax ineen tives to locational deeisions and also to the strong pull effeets exerted on industry and an d eommeree eommeree by major majo r metropolitan eentres. eentres.

 

104

THE H U M A N CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

An alternative approach

is under consideration whereby con

centric zones of increasing tax incentives would be established around Recife and Salvador. I t is hoped that this change will help achieve the objectives of the original policy; namely, the de velopment of the lagging regions contributing so heavily to the chronic out-migration of the north-east. north-east. At a lesser level than regional growth centre planning, but often a component of regional regional planning, is the area developme development nt planning plannin g found in I vory Coas Coast, t, Kenya, Morocc Morocco, o, Malaysia, Indo In don n esia, and elsewhere. More rural in its orientation, i t focuses on specific projects or resettlement areas. The approach is essentially physical, concentrating on infrastructure. Frequently special de velopment autborities autbor ities or o r semi-publi semi-publicc companies companies are a re established to help overs oversee ee the plann p lanning ing and development of the area. An example of such a complex is the Bandama Banda ma Valley Valley Authority (AVB) in Ivory Coast. Similar to the TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) in the United States, i t was set u p to oversee develop ment of adam, a man-made lake, and related projects which will involve 7 2 0 square miles, 1 0 0 villages and settlements, and 7 0 , 0 0 0 people. The physic physical al plan for the Island Isla nd (Provi (Province nce)) of o f Bal Balii is a n example of area are a planni pla nning ng on a more comprehensive sca scale le.. Because Because the prim pr im ary functions of Bali are already clear (namely, tourism and rice culture), the Indonesian government established a centrally assisted area planning unit in Denpassar which might serve as a physical cal plan pla n for the t he island, island, model for the rest of the country. The physi includin incl uding g urban ur ban and rural areas, was completed in 1 9 7 1 . Planning a t the munieipal level has long been applied in one form o r another in most developing countries. It has taken place within highly centralised national government structures, largely without with out benefit of nationa nati onall policy guidel guidelines ines o r budgetary priority and frequently under constraint of obsolete laws and codes. The plans usually are regarded with great expectations, usually not reali rea lise sed. d. Some of the problems problems with urban urb an planning plann ing arise arise from the physical approach, which has dominated. The professionals tend to be primaril pri marily y engineers engineers and archi architect tects. s. This Th is appro ap proach ach deals very very superfiei supe rfieially ally with the th e economi economic, c, soeial, soeial, legal, legal, environme env ironmental, ntal, poli tical, and institutional aspects of urban development. It usually fails to encompass fails encompass the developmental developmen tal interacti inte raction on between city and hinterland and th thee linkages between eiti eities. es. The app approa roach ch too often

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING D I F F U S I O N

105

has been narrowly sectoral or project oriented (e.g. a master plan for sewera sewerage, ge, transportati transp ortation, on, o r a specific housing project) without regard to impact on or relationshi relationship p to other oth er elem element entss of the urb urban an system. This is true also of most forms of capital investment pro jects. Urban planning has a particularly unimpressive record. There seem se emss to be a consens consensus us today tod ay in the Third World that traditional master planning, being costly, time consuming, static, and fre

quently done by expatriates, expatriates, is not the appropriate approach in a developmental context. Alien solutions abound. Examples are model cities programmes, urban renewal, Western-type urban freeways and circumferent circumferential ial highw highways ays,, 'City Beautiful' planning planni ng approaches, and new towns towns decentralisation programmes. And the plans proposing these alien solutions are often obsolete before they aree ever publishe ar published. d. For exam example, ple, the master plan p lan for Kuala Lum pur was begun in 1965 on the basi basiss of 1964 data. I t was completed in 1969 and published in 1970. A master plan for Bangkok was completed 20 years ago and updated 10 years later, but has never been accepted o r irnplemented. I n spite of some of the radical solutions now being proposed that have been listed above, what characterises most of the plan ning nin g effort effortss in the Third World is the absence of will will to p pla lan n effec tively, and more often than not, political smokescreening. Most urbanisation policy is unconscious, partial, unco-ordinated and negative (Dotson, 1972). I t is unconscious in the sense that those who effect i t ar aree largely unaware unawa re of o f its its proportions and features. I t is partial in that few of the points a t which governments might act to manage urbanisation and affect its course and direct direction ion are in fact fa ct utilised. I t is unco-ordinated in that national planning p lanning tends tends to be economic and urban planning tends to be physical, and the disjunction often produces produ ces competin comp eting g poli policie cies. s. I t is negative in that the ideological perspective of the planners leads them to try to divert, retard o r stop urban growth, and in particular to inhibit the expansion of o f me metrop tropoli olises ses an and d primat pri matee cities cities.. Elsewhere, in Maoist China for example, this anti-urban bias is also c1ear (Lewis, 1971). I n China i t has obvious historical roots in the history of the Chinese Communist Party and its struggle for power before 1949 an and d in the mode mo dem m his his tory of a China domin ated by treaty-port colonialists who controlled and shaped nearly all of its large cities. These cities were also the hornes of the

 

106

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

Chinese bourgeoisie. They were feIt to have been reactionary in the past, potentially revisionist now and in the future, and alienat ing a t all times. Thus, their growth in China continues to be con trolled by a n upr uprece eceden dented ted policy which limits their thei r size ize and which channels new industrial investment into new or smaller cities in previously remote or backward areas, o r into rural communes, which whic h are a re to be mad m adee industr ind ustrially ially as self-suf self-suffici ficient ent as as possi possibl blee with with  out acquiring the morally corrupting and alienating qualities of big cities, nor their damaging effects on the environment. City dwellers, especially white collar workers, must spend a month or more every year, whatever their status, in productive physical labour in the countryside, where they may regain 'correct' values. The distinctions between mental and manual labour, city and countryside, 'experts' or bureauerats and peasants or workers are to be eliminated. The benefits and the experience of industrialisa tion and modemisation are ar e to be dif diffus fused ed uniformly over the la land nd scape and to all of the people, while the destructive, de-humanis ing, corrupting aspects of over-concentration in cities are to be avoided. T W O CASES OF NATIONAL URBAN PLANNING AT T HE T H IRD W O R L D ' S MARGINS

The keys to the Maoist reconstruction of China have been a will to plan, clear objectives, and totalitarian powers. There are two

oth er case other casess in the world where these these three th ree prerequisites have com bined to produce remarkably effective national plans for urban development: Israel and South Africa. Africa. I n both of these cases, in which Western societies exist side by side with Third World cul tures, explicit goals have been formulated, pursued and achieved. For this reason they are of interest not only because of the effec tiveness of the planning efforts but also because of the social theo ries entering into goal formulation, and the resulting changes pro duced in the nat n atur uree of urbanisation urbani sation in the two case cases. s. Israel: A National Plan for a 'Balanced' Urban System The Israeli national urbanisation policy was formulated after

1948, in which year the State of Israel was created (Shachar, 1971). Before that time, a Zionist ideology prevailed that regarded the city as a necessary evil a t best (Cohen, 1970). I t was assumed

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

107

that communal or cooperative argriculture would provide the

needed national presence, and that cities were functionally unim portant. But the choices of new immigrants belied this ideology. By 1948 three-quarte threequarters rs of Palestine's Jewish Jewish populatio p opulation n live lived d in cities-the majority in only three cities. Fully 43.2 per cent of the national population popula tion lived lived in in the prima pr imate te city, city, Tel Te l Aviv Aviv.. Tel T el Aviv's Aviv's share of industrial produc p roduction, tion, commercial enterprises, enterprises, and cultural activi activi ties was even higher. After independence large numbers of immigrants poured into the new state, including in cluding both bot h highly skill skilled ed Eu Europe ropean an city-dwel city-dwellers lers and backwa backward rd folk folk from both b oth the cities cities and the countryside of the Middle East. Absorption of these migrants and modemisation of the traditional tradit ional men were essent essential ial if growth of squatter squat ter settlements settlements and emergence of deep socio-economic disparities between the primatee city and the rest of primat of the country cou ntry were were to be avoided. avoided. Thus, Thu s, soon after independence, alongside absorption, five ot othe herr goal goalss of a national urbanisation policy were formulated by the new Nation al Planning Department: settling sparsely populated regions to avoid growth growt h of regional 'imbalances'; 'imbalan ces'; occupying fron tier regions, regions, for strategie purposes and a nd to esta establis blish h anational presence; opening u p 'resou 'resource rce fron tiers', tiers', particu par ticularly larly in the th e southem sout hem deserts; deserts; chang ch ang ing the primacy structure of the urban system by limiting the growth of urban concentration in and around Tel Aviv, and creat ing the 'missing' level of middle-sized towns; and building inte grated regional systems of settlement by promoting complete urba ur ban n hierarchies in in each region. region. The goal to stern the growth of Tel Aviv arose from the anti urban Zionist ideology, and, consistent with other purposes in State building, the planners gave much mu ch stronger emphasis emphasis to social social values than economic efficiency. Basic economic motives, like maximising the rat r atee of economic growth, growth , were not no t prime pri me goals goals,, but national natio nal sovereign sovereignty ty and an d security security were. were. I n achieving the fourth and fifth goals, planning was based upon central-place theory, WaIter Christaller's classic concept of a n urban hierarchy. hierarchy. A s one of the planners, A . Glickson, was re ported to have said of the Israel for which the goals were stated by his colleague E. Brutzkus : There were a t least two Israels . • . ; the one represented by over centralisation in three big towns and their environs, and the other

 

108

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATI0N

represented by extreme trends o f social, institutional and even economic decentralisation in small villages striving for self-suffi ciency. The plann planners ers thus decided to establis establish h the th e missi missing ng middle links links in

the hierarchy. Settlements were divided by size into five main

groups (Brutzkus, 1964) : the basic agricultural cell o r village unit of about 500 persons; rural centres serving 4-6 surrounding vil lages with agricultural services; urban-rural centres with popula tions 6,000-12,000, serving tens of villages; medium-sized towns of 15,000-60,000 people, the centres o f whole districts (the populated areas of the country were divided into 24 districts); national centres of over 100,000 people. The 'missing links' were in the middle three categories. categories. I n the period 1948-68, 450 new rural settlements and 34 de de velopment towns were created. The new development towns ac counted for 21·3 per cent of Israel's Israel's urban population b y 1970. An important importa nt underlying underlying condition condition permitting su such ch major achievement was was the ext extent ent of public ownersh ownership ip of the land. Fully 92 per cent is controlled by the Israel Land Board (the balance being in the major existing cities and the coastal plain, controlled in its development by the powerful 1966 Planning and Building Law). Law ). No landowner landown er has the right righ t to develop develop his his land other oth er than tha n as such right is created by a n official plan. This made physical plan ning for the development towns inuch simpler in that the settler was relieved of any difficulties relating to land acquisition, pro perty rights, and rent payments. Within this context, the basic of

instruments the induced induc urbanisat urba nisation proces processs wereopportunities. two, two, creation creatio n o f public housing oion f employment and ed provision

New housing was created by building fixed anmial quotas in the development towns. New immigrants, after their initial period o f citizenship training, designed to promote assimilation into the Jewish state, were directed direct ed to this housing. housing. Ren Rents ts were heavily sub sidised for the first three years. The physical planners also built u p the infrastructure of the new towns, and either direct public investment o r financial incentives that induced private investment (including tax exemptions for for several several yea years rs)) creat cr eated ed job jo b opport oppo rtun un  ties. Vocational training built u p the human resources. A s a result, industry in the development towns has claimed between 35 and 45 per cent of the total investment in Israel during duri ng the th e last decade. decade. B y 1970 Tel Aviv's share o f the national population had de-

 

TRANSFORMATION DURINO DIFFUSION

109

clined to one-third, one-thir d, and the prima pr imate te city city-s -siz izee distribution had been changed to a rank-size distribution. O n the other hand, the de velopment towns have developed less intense local city-region relations than was expected, probably due to efficient transporta tion and the small size of the country. There hav havee been complaints that they have higher non-European populations and greater un employment rates than else1\'here in Israel, and that Jews of Euro

pean background remain disproportionately concentrated in the major cities, and in the higher social echelons and better occupa occupa tions. Because the government did not subsidise development of services in the development towns, their amenities have lagged, and heavy emigration from them into the bigger cities con tinues. These caveats regarding the regional integration goal notwith standing, it is now generally acknowledged acknowledged that, tha t, in the firs firstt q qua uar r ter-century of its existence, the State of Israel has been unusually successful in achieving most of the goals of the national urbanisa tion policy formulated in 1948 (Shachar, 1971). Reflecting on the experience, another of Israel's regional planners, E. Brutzkus, re marked a t the 1971 Rehovot Conference on Urbanisation in the Developing Countries that there are real advantages {rom pursu ing analogous policies of 'decentralised urbanisation' elsewhere in the Third World : I n social and cultural terms decentralised urbanisation makes the unavoidable transfor transformation mation of traditional tradi tional soci societ etie iess less abrupt and painful . . . than under und er condi conditi tions ons of a uniform 'mode ' modem' m' and cos ....

The social mopolitan civilisation of asufferings metropolitan complex and personal strains and linked to metropolitan con centration in the most developing countries cannot be considered as minor inconveniences versus the allegedly overriding necessi ties of more rapid increases in national income. I t seems therefore that in most cases a policy supporting a decentralised pattern of urbanisation should be adopted.

South Africa: Control Control via via Apartheid

While Israel sought to combat primacy and the undesirable con sequences of mass immigration by creating a n integrated socio economy and a balanced urban network, South Africa pursued a policy of separation and containment, that o f apartheid. The context is, of course, somewhat different. Southem Africa is a n outpost outp ost of European cultur culturee and settlement as weIl as the home-

 

1 IO

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

land of indigenous tribaI, mainly Bantu-speaking peoples, lying athwart the boundary in contemporary world relations between the developed countries on the one hand and the Third World on

the otRer otRer (Fair, 1969). The ori origin ginss date dat e baek to the period of European Euro pean eoloni eolonial al expan

sion, during whieh permanent Afrikaner and English settlements were developed, developed, and out of whieh emergep 'islands' of advaneed economic econom ic aetivity set within large but poorly endowed areas of tra tr a ditional Mrican settlement, in a classic dual eeonomy. I n 1970 the population of 2 1 ' 4 million included 3.8 million White, 2 ' 0 million Coloured, 0·6 million Asian, and 15'0 million Bantu. T o the White, sharing o f political power was anathema. Many English had been sehooled sehooled in the t he eolonial tr tradit adition ion exemplified exemplified by Lugard's treatise Dual Mandate (1920). The Afrikaner had long prQPound prQP ounded ed a poliey poliey of segregation, segregation, for example ex ample in the 1856 Con stitution o f the Transvaal (South African Republic). Thus, when the National Party came to power in 1948, many English, too, were not unhappy to see the deve10pment of a n affirmative racial poliey : the separa se parate te soc socia ial, l, residential, industrial, and political de velopment of different peoples, ensuring security for the Whites (who would not have to relinquish power to a majority of non Whites), and leading to the separate political development of Bantu Ba ntu in separate separa te vassa vassall states. W h a t wa wass rejeeted was the growth, growt h, through migration and modernisation of the Bantu, of a multi raeial eommunity in South Afriea. Rather, the country has been divided territorially territorially into a White Whit e state containing the t he maj major or urban areas and European farming areas, and nine Bantu states, a t various stag stages es along the road r oad to independenee. As R . J. Davies has pointed out, this poliey of apartheid sterns from a distinct social theory. Whereas the North American theory of the 'melting pot' in the fi firs rstt half ha lf of this this century centu ry was was that shared experiences and cooperation provide the basis for development and assimilation of migrant groups (a theory, i t might be added, to which the Israelis subseribed), many South Mricans have sub seribed to a friction theory. This theory holds holds that physieal, social, eultural, and economic differenees between peoples are funda mentally ineompatible, leading to friction o n eontaet, and thus that harmonious relations relations between groups groups can c an be secured only by redueing the points o f eontaet to a minimum, particularly i n the cities, creating a mosaic o f social worlds which coexist without

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

III

penetration-a situation which we noted has been the actual

American experience in recent recen t years. years. Eighty-seven per cent of the Whites live in towns, including large numbers of previ previous ously ly poor Mrikaners, Mrikan ers, next nex t after af ter the English English to urbanise before Asians, Coloureds and Blacks, and the greatest supporters of the National Party. But these same urban areas which in 1936 contained 1'36 million Whites, 0'4 million Coloureds, 0'52 million Asians and 1'24 million Bantu by 1970 contained 3'3 million Whites, 1'5 million Coloureds, 0'54 million Asians, and 4'99 million Bantu. Non-Whites now comprise two thirds of the urban population. A s this change took place, i t sig nalled the threat to which the White Mrikaner responded b y accelerating accelera ting government action to halt the growth of a n integrated multi-raciall socie multi-racia society, ty, Non-Whites were denied political representa representa tion in White Wh ite areas. areas. By colour bar legis legislatio lation, n, betterbett er-pay paying ing skil skilIe Ied d jobs were reserved for Whites (see Fig. 12). The Ban Bantu tu was was denied R3S9S

R1929

..

o :z

<

"" RS76

R400

1966

FIG. 12

1968

1970

Incomes of black and white South Africans relative to the poverty po verty line

permanent status in White areas. Influx control restricted Bantu migrations t o the employment needs of industry and services. The residential areas area s of citie citiess were segregated. Influx control was undertaken in earnest after the Second World War. The post-war period brought Bantu workers flood ing into peripheral perip heral squatter squat ter settlem settlement ents, s, o r crowdin crowding g into factory

 

112

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

barracks. Succ Succes essi sive ve measures measures tightened tighte ned controls upon upo n immigrants immigran ts until by 1957 the principle p rinciple was was laid down that onl only y Bantus born in urban areas who had lived there continuously, o r who had been in unbroken employment for ten years years,, o r had been lawfully resi dent there for fifteen years without leaving the area, were entitled to remain. These measures were designed to prevent the estab lishment of a large permanent urban Bantu society, and also to perpetuate the supply to the towns of temporary workers in de mand by growing indust industries, ries, eager for po pool olss of cheap che ap labour. lab our. By 1964 the measures were strengthened further. All Bantu in the White areas were now to be regarded as temporary residents whose permanent homes lay in the Bantu 'Homelands', to which they could be compelled to return if unemployed o r if their pre sence sen ce was was deemed undesirahle. As a result, Bantu migration to the cities has been controlled in a way not para paralleled lleled elsewh elsewhere. ere. Within the urban areas, the different racial groups have been segregated, producin prod ucing g radical radica l transformations in the th e racial ecolog ecology y of the cities. I n 1958, i t was estimated that the full achievement of apartheid would require movement of 50 per cent of the Coloured, 50 per cent of the Indian, 67 per cent of the Bantu and 20 per cent of the White population. By 1970 the sought-after segregation involving such shifts had largely been achieved. The aparthe apa rtheid id city contains contains conso consolida lidated ted group areas ar eas that avoid ethnic 'islands', and provide 'protection' 'protection ' in the t he form of either eithe r physi physical cal o r man-made barriers separating the groups. Direct access to work zones is provided along routes that wherever possible do not in in  volve passage through any other group's territory. Non-White areass are, area ar e, gene rally, rally, located lo cated elos elosee to maj m ajor or indust i ndustrial rial foci foci,, with wit h sectoral orientation towards the native homelands where these impinge impin ge upon upo n metropolitan areas areas,, as a t Pretoria and Durban. I n the citie citiess the Bantu Ban tu is denied land ownership. Through slum elearance and rehousin rehousing g schem schemes es,, Bant Ba ntu u squa squatte tterr settlements settlements have hav e been removed and new Bantu residential areas have been created on the peripheries of the White cities. The only exception is that one Bantu servant is allowed t o reside on the property of each White household, and the servants in apartment buildings i n the city centres liv livee hidden hidde n on the th e roof ops i n 'reservations in the sky'. I n the Witwatersrand Witwatersrand Metropolitan Area surrounding Johannes Johannes

burg, Soweto (the South-westem Native Townships) housed over 500,000 Bantu i n 1970, i n row upon up on row of identical identica l hornes hornes physi-

 

TRANSFORMATION DURING DIFFUSION

113

cally superior to the former Bantu squatter slums, arranged in groupings that preserve tribaI organisation (Holmer, 1971). I n Durban, Indians were removed from more desirable residential settings to be replaced by Europeans. O f a n Asian population of 250,000, over 60 per cent will have heen relocated by 1975.And in Cape Town more than 100,000 of the Coloured population were removed from the central city and resettIed in the less desirable Cape Flats. Current plans call for the development of aseparate Coloured city a t Mamre, 50 kilometres north of Cape Town, de signed sig ned to have hav e a population popul ation of 800, 800,000 000 by the th e turn of the eentury. A keystone in the policy of apartheid is the ereation of the nine 'Bantustans' as vassal Blaek states. These are supposedly indepen dentIy govemed permanent homelands from which the urban workers are presumed to have migrated as work-seekers, not set tIers, but are, in fact, strictIy controlled native reservations. T o the Mrikane Mrik anerr regiona regionall planner, a n urban decentralisation o r 'growth eentres' poliey means one in which considerable incentives are offered to industry to locate in boundary areas hetween the home lands and the White areas. I n this way, Bantu labour can live in the homeland and work in the White faetories, thus solving one of the continuing dilemmas of the metropolises-maintaining a n apar ap arthe theid id poliey poliey while while satis satisfyin fying g growing growing needs for industrial in dustrial em ployment. Thus, a major industrial eomplex has heen created a t Ross Ro ssyl yln n hetween Preto Pr etoria ria and an adjacent adja cent reserva reservatio tion, n, and similar arrangements have been created in Durban. Where boundary locatio loca tions ns are ar e not no t poss possib ible le,, as in the gold mines mines of tthe he Oran Or ange ge Free Fr ee State or the diamond mines of South West Africa (Namibia), blaek male workers are housed in dormitory eompounds segre gated by trihe and clan, to enable older males to maintain tradi tional social social controls over the th e young men. me n. T o date, these policies designed to cast the joint processes of urbanisation and modemisation that are occurring elsewhere in the world into purposively purposively segregate segregated d forms have hav e been quite q uite effec effec tive. tiv e. Normal Norma l migration mechanisms mechanisms have been interdicted interd icted and the fuller full er participation of the majority major ity Bl Blac ack k group in South Mrican society has been checked, a system of temporary labour migration has been prolonged, and vast numbers have hav e been moved moved to segre segre gate the allocation cities. While systemscentres', of incentives have induced shiftsean in industriallocatio industri n to 'growth centre s', and while whil e within wi thin European Europ areas development has proceeded in directior,s commensurate

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Britain's new towns

 

136

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

intervention in the shaping of a n urban environment. . • • A coherent strategy for the planned distribution of population and employment which was linked to a policy of containing the fur ther th er growth of large citie citiess was was pursued pur sued . . . . But the th e total influen influence ce of planning intervention has to be seen in even wider terms than the security security of order and a nd a sens sensee of rationality. Its I ts greatest impac im pactt has been been to bolster bolster the traditional traditi onal view view of the West European Euro pean city • . . that cities, as ancient repositories of culture, should be pro tected from decay. I n this sense, planning has been essentially a conservative movement, aiming to retain traditional ideas about urban urb an soci societ ety y and a nd urban urb an functi functions ons.. I n other words, a nostalgie sense of attachment to urban forms, perceived to be functional in the past, has pervaded Britain's de velopment controls. controls. The New To Town wnss Assesse Assessed d

I f the development controls were conservative in their applica I n many

tion, whatLondon's of the radical alternative, thegreat new successes, towns? housing respects, new towns have been over 470,000 people. Peter Hall (1966) argues that they have be come magnets for over 400 industrial plants, places of employment for over 250,000 worken, attractive shopping centres, and major market mar ket areas. But, in a deeper deepe r sens sense, e, they reflect reflect a failure of Aber crombie's plan. The initial idea was to create self-contained com munities that would receive a population of 400,000 and a corre sponding amount of employment, developed by public corpora tionss and tion an d acting as instruments for the removal of Londoners from a London prevented from growing and attracting jobs from out side. The Abercrombie proposals were modified in several ways. ways. Only

eight new towns were designated instead of ten, and three of these were already well-established population centres. Many of the modifications were needed because Abercrombie's population forecasts proved to be in error. I n the 1940S it was thought that the country faced aperiod of population stagnation. I t was not expected that the population of the London region would in crease, and plans for the early post-war period were concerned almost entirely with decentralisation, envisaging a movement of about one million people from the Greater London Conurbation to the Outer Metropolitan Area. The new towns were to play a major role in casting decentralisation into new forms.

Between 1951 and 1971 the Greater London Conurbation has,

 

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indeed, decreased in population b y some 3.0 per cent per decade. But the Outer Metropo Metropolitan litan Area has increased increased in population far more rapidly than this--between 1951 and 1961 alone by nearly the million envisaged as the 'ultimate' target in Abercrombie's plans. Thus, London's new towns had much less of a total impact on decentralisation than envisaged. By 1971 their population approached 470,000 people, with their ultimate targeted popu lation 650,000, but this has represented only 18 per cent of population growth in the outer ring of South-eastem Eng land. mostt important importa nt idea in the creation of the new towns was The mos self-contained and balanced communities communities for that they should be self-contained working and living (Thomas, 1969), thus differing from the local authority housing estates, o r private enterprise's version of the garden city, the commuting suburb attached to a n existing settle ment. Each new town was to be made u p of neighbourhood units centring on schools, shops and other local facilities, following the concepts of Clarence Claren ce Perr Pe rry y discu discuss ssed ed earlier. The neighbourhoods, together with a major shopping centre, industrial estate, and a range of community-wide educational, cultural and recreational facilities, were to constitute a self-contained entity, with girdling open space. I n thi thiss way wa y the ideals ideals of Ebenezer Howard would be met, combining the advantages of town and country with wit h none of the disadvantages. Balance was to be achieved in several ways : between residence and employment, between facilities and needs, and also between social c1asses. For example, one of the charges to Lord

committee in 1946 was folIows: the commu commu nity isReith's to be truly balanced, so long as as social all must c1asses' I fexist, be represented in i t . . . the community will be poorer if all are not there.' Thus, subsidised rental housing was to b e provided alongside homes for higher income groups, and different family sizes and age groups would be b e catered cat ered for. I t had been feIt that, a t Letchworth and Welwyn Garden City, a mixture of social dasses had brought about a se sens nsee of community commu nity that was absent in most towns. I t was hoped that a similar sense of community in which dass distinctions were minimised could be created in the new towns b y physica physicall plan p lannin ning g means. means. I n most of the new towns towns,, tther heree was a mixture of housing for different groups in each neighbour hood.

The new towns towns have hav e served as magnets for modem industry and

 

138

T HE HUMAN CONSEQUBNCES OF URBANISATION

have provided vastlyimproved vastly improved physical physical conditions conditions and housing for their residents, predominantly young Britons in the child-rearing stages of the family cyde. Slightly more than half of their resi dents came from London, but the Londoners tended to stay, for 96 per cent of the net immigration came from London (Thomas, 1969). For the othen, the new towns acted as staging points in migration migra tion to parts of the country other than th an London. I n large measure the seIf-containment goal has been achieved. A far higher proportion of the resident residentss of the new towns towns work in them than tha n elsew elsewhe here. re. Whereas in ot other her parts p arts of the th e Outer Metro politan Zone of London, where population growth has been ac cornmodated b y the more conventional suburbs and housing estates, growth of car ownership and long-distance cornmuting to London have gone gone hand in hand. I n the new towns, on the other hand, increasing entry of women into the labour force has in than

and

creased com muting muti ng torather London hasdecreased decreased. decreased.their seIf-containment, The question of social balance in the new towns ia much more debatable. A significant proportion of the residents in Harlow new town also had other family members in the town, frequently of the same same generation, but also induding retired parents because of the housing created crea ted for retire retirees. es. Critics have hav e spoken spoken of 'new town blues' of working-class families cut off from traditional social net works, of the increasing social homogeneity of towns from which profes pro fessio sional nalss and an d manager ma nagerss move move to private pr ivate housing developed developed in surrou sur roundi nding ng viIIa viIIage ges. s. Yet studies comparin compa ring g residents of new towns with those of old city boroughs have failed to find differences in o r psychiatrie symptoms attributable to the new psychosomatic environment (Pahl, 1970). T o be sure, feelings of social isolation tended to be greater among those just separated by long distance from kin and friends, but they were soon offset by involvement in local circles. The greatest strains in the new towns appear to have been among the blue-coIIar workers displaced from inner-London neighbourhoods in which family and kinship ties were strongest (Young and WiIImott, 1957). Where kin have moved to the same new town-in Harlow this was the case for 47 per cent of the families-these strains have been absent. And whereas there is a general feeling of satisfaction with the new community, there is little eviden evidence ce tha t hatt the th e life-s life-sty tyle le of the new town resident residentss chang ch anged ed

significantly as a result of the move. Nor is there any evidence in

 

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139

Britain's dass-conscious society that communications across dass lines lin es have improved . I t was possi possible ble to build socially socially mixed neighbourhoods neighbourh oods in i n Letch Let ch worth and Welwyn Garden City exactly because the dass system that pervaded inter-war Britain preserved social distances and specified the etiquette of social relationships across dass boun daries.Butt in a n increasinglymobile post-war daries.Bu post- war socie society ty,, the planners' planne rs' ideal of the t he social social mixing o f housing has foundered. I t had limited success in the early new towns because of the greater propensity o f the middle dass to move move out to private privat e housin housing g estates estates adjacent adjac ent to villa villages ges in surroundi sur rounding ng areas. This Thi s led to t o stic sticki kine ness ss in the th e mark ma rket et for the higher-priced dwellings. Thus, more recently, there has been a much greater degree of spatial segregation of housing types in the new towns. Social idealism has given way to the influ ences en ces of the mark ma rket et (Herau (He raud, d, 1968). 68). A t the level of the towns as a whole, although they do have higher proportions of managers, professionals, and higher-skilled manual workers than the country as a whole--a consequence of their industrial structure-the new towns are far from the one dass communities that characterise North American suburbia. Instead, they have many neighbourhoods catering to the variety o f housing needs o f th thee persons persons employed in their t heir industri i ndustrial al estates estates and commercial enterprises. enterprises. But now in Britain there are many calls for a shift in strategy. Thom Th omas as (196 (1969) 9) notes that the new ne w towns have ridden the crest of the wave. They have accommodated manufacturing industry industry . . . much origi originat nated ed fro from m London. But manufacturing industry has been decentralising from London anyway. (They) have accommodated thousands o f young mobile migrants from London. But so has the rest of the Outer Metro politan Area. The fact that the new towns towns have moved with wit h rather than against the tide has probably been the most vital ingredient in thei t heirr succe successf ssful ul growth. growth . Thomas, among others, calls for a new move with the newer tides of change in Britain. New Trends and New Policies

London hascontinued to grow grow,andw ,andwith ith rising rising real incomesand incomesand in creased mobility,long-distance commuting is on the t he increase, increase, crea crea 

ting commuting fields much like those in North America (Fig. 16).

 

,UEAS WITHIH -COMMU COMMUTING TING UNGE I O ~ S

OF

SIZE CATEGORIES

ClTIES Of

P'op ,lclioft of Clnhol .city

50 ,000 - 250,000

250,00 250 ,000 0 - 1, 1,00 000, 0,00 000 0 gftatl( Ihon 1,000,000

G REATER LONDON

NOR H

HA

Milli 0= = = ;;20_...,;.4.0

ENGLISH CHANNEL

= 20 = 40

KM 0

FIG. 16 Comm Commutin uting g ffie ield ldss of loeal loeal autho au thorit rity y areas in Englan Eng land d in 19 61

This map is ada adapted pted from the work work of Peter Hall that in turn was was modelIed model Ied on the U.S. studies studies

that

resulted in Fig. 7.

 

PLANNING FOR N E W URBAN REALITIES

141

Between 1961 and 1971, there was a consistent pattern of growth differentials favouring the outer rings of metropolitan areas in England and Wales. O f 52 meropolitan areas, 49 experi enced relative decentralisation and, in 27 of them, them, central-area central-ar ea loss was coupled with outer o uter-are -areaa growth to give give absolute absolute decentralisa tion (Kivell, (Kivell, 1972). The basis of London's continued employment growth has been the office, not the factory. The 'office boom' of 1955-62, i n parti cular, produced rapid increases in the number o f jobs in central London, increasing congestion. Great concern about this resulted in growing pressure on the government to control office growth and engage in broader development strategies than those con tained in the New Towns Policy (Cowan et al., 1969). The government responded: a 1963 White Paper on Central Scotland suggested major expansion of East Kilbride, Cumbernauld, LivingstonandGlen-Rothes into major growthz growthzones, ones, transforming transformin g the new towns towns into economic w weapons eapons to accelerate growth, reduce unemployment and change migration patterns. The South-East Study of 1964 and thelater Strategic Plan for the South-East of 1970 recommended rethinking London's green belt strategy and the diversion of growth away from London to major new urban eomplexes near Southampton, a t Crawley, around Reading, in South Essex, and a t Northampton. These eomplexes, of a t least 250,000 peop people, le, are regar r egarded ded asweapons for for spurringg spurr inggrowth rowth of the national eeonomy and redueing the infra-strueture eosts of eon tinued expansion of outer oute r London. The for theSouth-East has beenextended for beenextended to other oth er regions.StrategicPlan The publieation in September 1965 of anational eeo nomie plan u p to 1970 led to to the creation of the National Planni Pla nning ng Council and of a regional planning plan ning couneil in eaeh of the th e eeonomie eeonomie regions, each of which has produced its strategy studies. Thus, a policy originally aimed a t controlling London's growth has been turned around to beeome a poliey for national growth and de velopment. The push to greater size and variety represents a new phase of new town planning in whieh traditional deeentralisation and housing goals have been superseded by the attempt to use major new town developments as the leading edges of national

gro wth policie growth policies. s. By By developing those town towns, s, the th e publie pub lie has ente en tere red d into a new role role of developmental leadership, leadership, supplemented b y the

controls of the town and country planning maehinery.

 

142

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN DIRECTJONS

Such themes themes have been carried over to Continental Continenta l Europe. Europ e. Eben ezer Howard's new towns philosophy and the successes of British planning have induced other countries to attempt to control physical development, to direct new settlement away from con gested metropolitan metropoli tan centres, and to stimulate stimulat e economic and urban growth growt h in periphe pe ripheral ral regi regions ons.. The particular form of policy varies from country to country. For example, the French Fren ch have been con cemed for a decade and a half over the steady concentration of people and economic activity in Paris. The Finns have seen the population of the northem half o f their country pour into Hel sinki o r leav leavee Finla Fi nland nd entirely. The Swedes are conce concemed med because most o f their people are concentra concentrated ted in Stockholm Stockholm and two other metropolitan areas o f southem Sweden. They are not concemed because becau se their the ir metropolitan metropolita n centres are too big, as the French are over Paris, but because the depopulation o f the Swedish north threatens to erode the social structure in that seetion of their nation. The Hunga Hungarian rianss share a similar concem conc em over the domina thee Poles are un tion of their national natio nal economy b y Budapest. Only th concemed concem ed with the outftow outftow of rural rur al people into their metropolitan metropolita n areas. L a g ~ i n g behind the rest of Europe in their rate of modemi sation, the Poles see metropolitanisation as a process essential to absorb a 'surplus' 'surplus' rural rura l population. Despite these differences in forms, however, the central concem of urbanEconomic policy in all of Europe distribution of is now growth. growth as the the regional basic means to achieve is viewed social objectives such as improved income, housing, education, health, welfare, recreation, and so on. European growth policies are intended to ameliorate disparities in income and welfare he tween regions of the country and, to a lesser extent, to minimise deleterious effects of economic growth on the natural environ ment. The goals and objectives of urban growth policies vary from country to country, but to some degree all are aimed at : (I) balanced welfare-achieving a more 'balanced' distribution of income and social weIl-heing among the various regions of the country, as weIl as among social classes; (2) centralisation/de

centralisation-establishing a linked set of local and national

 

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143

public institutions which make i t possible to develop, a t the national level, overall growth strategies, integrated with regional o r metropolitan planning and implementation that is partly a pro duct du ct of a reforme reformed d loca1 governmental system and is directly ac countable to local officials and the affected constituency; (3) environmental p r o t e c t i o n ~ a n n e l l i n g future growth away from areas suffering from environmental overload o r which possess qualities worthy of special protection, towards areas where dis ruption of the environment can be minimised; (4) metropolitan development-promiting more satisfactory satisfactory patte patterns rns of metropol metropoli i tan development through new area-wide governmental bodies and the use of special land use controls, new towns, housing construc tion,, new tion n ew trans t ransport portatio ation n syst system ems, s, and tax incentives and disincen tives; (5) non-metropolitan development-diverting growth into hitherto by-passed regions by developing 'growth centres' in pre sently non-metropolitan regions, constructing new transportation links lin ks between such region regionss and a nd centres of economic activity, using various incentives and disi disincen ncentive tivess to encourage en courage o r compel loca tion o f economic activity in such areas, and forcibly relocating certai cer tain n goverriment goverriment activities activities into them. Meanwhile, as attempts have been made to formulate these policies, many of the twentieth-century changes already described in North America and Britain have been unfolding in continental Europe, following emergence from the post-war period in which there had been preoccupation with reconstruction and meeting immediate immedia te housing shortages. shortages. But many ma ny of the changes have taken t aken onBetween distinctively Euro pean n form forms. s. 1970, employment in agriculture in the 1955Europea and European Economic Community dropped from 24 ·3 to 13·4 per cent and, while manufacturing remained essentially stable, em ployment in the tertiary sector increased from 35·7 to 42.7 per cent (EIkins, 1973). Progressive concentration of population took place. A t the same time, rising real incomes produced much greater automobile ownership, and the extension of commuting areas, as illustrated illustr ated in the British case case by Fig. Fig. 16, to cover much of the West European Europe an landscape. landscape. As we have already seen in Britain, the central city populations have tended to decline while metro poli tan growth has been taking place. politan But in spite spite of these these appar app aren entt simil similarit arities, ies, there are funda f undament mental al

differences with the North American scene. Many industrial com-

 

144

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

muters live in rural villages, commute by bus o r train, and fre quently combine factory work with agricultural smallholdings- especially in Hessen, north-east Bavaria, Switzerland, south-west German Ger many y the Czech lands, parts of eastern France and the Low Countries. High proportions of white-collar workers, professionals and managers also commute b y bus and train, for example throughout south-east England to London. Only where jobs are substantially decentralised d o the higher status work worker erss commute co mmute b y automobile in large numbers. The higher density of population in both rural districts and the closely built-up urban areas (Barcelona: u p to 2000 per hectare; Naples: 1500 500 per hectar hec tare; e; Vienna: 750 per hectare) as compared with North American cities (26-65 per hectare) continues to pro vide the opportunity for solving movement problems b y means of rapid transportation rather than b y the automobile. I n the sixties, big eiti eities es throughou thro ughoutt Europe Europ e started start ed subway construct construction ion (Rome, Milan, Vienna, Munich, Frankfurt Fra nkfurt-am-Ma -am-Main, in, Colog Cologne, ne, Hambur Ham burg, g, Stockholm, Madrid, Barcelona) and extensions (Paris). Fares are often kept ke pt lower than cost to enable enabl e the t he present pres ent 70 per cent of the continental European employees who travel to work b y public transportation transportat ion to continue to d o 50. I n contrast to North America, i n most European countries long-range trafiic planning has, since the 1960s, become a n integrated part of the master plans control control ling urban growth patterns. And just as there is the preference preference in the European scene for public rather than private transportation, transportation, there remains the traditiona t raditionall preference for housing housing to be provided prov ided apartment complexes that are necessary to in the higher-density suppor support t mass mass transportation, rather than in single-family single-family suburbs. Thus, whereas in North American metropolitan areas many tra ditional city centres have begun to rot away, throughout Europe public and private development are combining to preserve, re habilitate and/or construct new city centres that continue to dominate urban life. One result is that many older central city neighbourhoods are going through a process of 'gentrification' as the affluent move b a c k - a pattern which is occurring also in Canada and Australia, but wh ich is limited in the American scene b y problems of race to a few neighbourhoods that have been

able, in the major metropolises such as Washington, D.C., and Chicago, to insulate insulat e the themselv mselves es from the t he ghetto. ghett o.

Thus as the Danish planner Steen Eiler Rasmussen has re-

 

PLANNING FOR N E W URBAN R E A L I T I E S

145

marked, the cooperation of many circumstances has led to pro foundly different urban patterns and expressions of need in Europe and between the European countries, and these have stamped themselves on national housing and town planning pro grammes. I t is, therefor therefore, e, appro ap propri priate ate to consider severa severall different cases-Sweden, France and the Netherlands--to begin to appre ciate the differing planning concepts and some of the conse quences quen ces of this this planning. Once Onc e again i t bears repeating repea ting : we devote much h time to discus discussi sing ng planning plan ning i n the European Europ ean scen scenee because so muc i t is one of the major twentieth-century human consequences of nineteenth-century industrial urbanisation. Sweden's Achievements Sweden's Any such inquiry must begin with Sweden. I n this country, high standards of living i n a smalI, culturally homogeneous nation, combined with a strong central government committed to the principles princip les of the welfare state, have hav e provided provide d the th e setting for forth right affirmative action. I n the Stockholm area, i n particular, public ownership of the land under development, and state con trol over the construction industry, have meant that plans, once approved, have been been carried out as approved appr oved.. Ninety Nine ty to ninety-five ninety-five per cent of the housing is built with government finandal assist ance, so the government determines the numbers and kinds of units that will be built each year. The plannen have preferred large apartment buildings rather than single-family homes. The National Housing Board prescribes the standards of apartment and has consistently maintained high architectural construction, quality. Not only is housing controlled. Land use is controlled; the ownership of land carries with i t no inherent inheren t development rights. rights. The Swe Swedis dish h govem go vemmen mentt controls controls when and where urban develop ment will occur. I n this planning, several policy objectives have had priority: slowing the growth of Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö; inducing industry to move into lagging regions; and maintaining economically sound smaller towns a t sizes large enough to support supp ort adequ ad equate ate commun c ommunity ity serv servic ices es.. Achievement of the goals goals has been aided a ided b y the critical housing

shortage and the control of land use. For several decades Sweden has had a chronic housing shortage, resulting in much doubling

u p of families and substantial overcrowding. Simple availability H

C

U

~

 

146

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

of ahorne somewhere has over-ridden, for many Swedes, what might otherw otherwise ise be their individuall indiv iduallocati ocational onal and a nd housing housing prefer ences, which in large measure have been ignored by the planners. Once an apartment was made available to someone whose name had finally moved to the top of the waiting list, i t would be taken regardless of other considerations. Private development is also subject to public control by the Master Mast er Plan, Plan , the function of which is to look ahead 15-20 years and to specify future locations for roads, water and sewerage lines, green belts and urban land use. Once accepted, uses contrary to its intentions are prohibited. I t is in this framework that the growth of Stockholm has been directed since the Second World War. Stockholm's planners were influenced influ enced in developing developing their plans plan s of of th thee desirable desirable future futu re city by Lewis Mumford, Clarence Stein, Patrick Abercrombie, and Clar ence Perry-and in turn, therefore, by those who reacted against nineteenth-century urbanisation. Satellite communities with adequ ad equate ate local local industrial facili faciliti ties es have been crea created, ted, separated sepa rated by green belts, and linked into an interdependent metropolitan whole of 1·5 mill million ion people by a public transport tran sportation ation syst system em.. Although building began a t Arsta in 1947 and Vällingby in 1950 19 50,, the Master Mas ter Plan P lan for Stockholm dates da tes from 1952 1952,, re revise vised d and modernised in 1966. I t is a 'rolling plan' subject to 5-yearly revi sion, always looking ahead for 30 years, and it envisages a metro politan region re-fashioned by building satellite communities located along transportation corridors radiating from the city centre, primarily rail and subway. Half of the labour force would be employed in the th e horne hornein Past decis dec ions ns favoured the placing of development incommunity. differentiated nuelei nuel eiisio along public ttran ran sit corridors elose to bodies of water. More recently, widespread car ownership and ris rising ing real in come comess have ha ve dicta ted the addition addit ion of an extensive expressway network, the shift from neighbourhood to regional shopping centres and the provision of more housing options, as modifications of the traditional planning concept. The key to successful planning was, first of all, extensive muni cipal ownership of land to be developed, largely purchased in the period 19°0-3°, but continuing, for exampIe, to permit building of Sätra in the 1960s. Second, the public transport network was designed as the principal determina dete rminant nt of urban urba n Iocati Iocation on and form, initially radiating from the city centre and expected to carry 75

per cent of all all peak hour ho ur travel to and an d from central Stockh Stockholm olm..

 

PLANNING FOR NEW URBAN REALITIES

147

Third, the satellite centres were built as unified developments.

Vällingby, for example, was built neighbourhood by neighbour hood, outward outwa rd from higher h igher density density structures structures surrounding a com mercial core core located above the principal pr incipal subway stat station ion.. Attractive Attractiv e architecture and careful blending with the physical landscape characterise the town, completed in 1954. Inside it, pedestrian and vehicu vehicular lar traflic traflic are separated. separate d. Reflecting rising real incomes, automobile ownership, and the new expressways, the next community to be completed (Farsta in 1960) has the same physicallayout-tall apartments succeeded by lower slab apartment buildings, row houses, and then b y limited numbers o f single-family hornes. But the shopping centre was built with a massive surrounding parking lot, and the size of resi dential units was increased. This trend to greater automobile use is reßected even more forthrightly forthrigh tly in Skärholmen, now being built, built, and in the plans for Jarva. A greater variety of housing types is provided, and more low-profile hornes. I n these plans Stockholm has provided a n example of what forthright planning can achieve in changing the physical expres sion of urbanisation, and the conditions under which effective public controls can prevail, albeit in a small country with a rela tively affluent and quite homogeneous homogeneous population. Tbe continuing source of conßict is that Sweden's planners prefer high-density housing concentrated near city centres and oriented to public transport, while, increasingly, affluent Swedes demand more low density single-family hornes and better facilities for the private automobile. Swede Sweden n has not nothe t found a way to contend cont endthe ef effec fec As yet, tively with the conßicts between planners' ideals and de veloping preferences of the citizenry in the planning process. Finland: The Building of Tapiola Finland shares all the urbanisation problems found e1sewhere in Europe, but differs from Sweden in that the national government has not taken a forceful leadership role in urban development. Financial aid is provided for housing housing programmes, and, despite the fact that Finland has a long history of municipal land ownership, most construction is undertaken b y private entrepreneurs. Master

planning and zoning were only spelled out in the Building Law o f 1958, and few plans have been completed.

I n this framework, Helsinki has ha s tried to develop a regional plan pl an--

 

148

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

ni ning ng proces process. s. There is agreement that further concentrated growth of Helsinki Helsinki should be stemmed. stemmed. Thus, in cont contrast rast to the Stockholm plan for an integrated but spatially dispersed metropolis, Heikki von Hertzen developed the Seven Towns Plan. New communities are t o b e built, self-contained self-contained and independe independent, nt, and separated separated by extensive green belts. Within the framework of the plan, the development is to be undertaken underta ken b by y private groups. groups. Tapiola is the first of the towns to be built by the Housing Federation, a coalition of welfare and trade organisations headed byvon Hertzen.It is generallyacknowledged to b e a n architectural masterpiece. Densities are low. Building styles are intermingled throughout the developed area. The public planners did not im posee standards pos stand ards constraining the t he priva p rivate te designe designers, rs, but instead gave them free rein. A radial expressway provides access to Helsinki. More than 90 per cent of the residents own their own houses or apartments. Ann Louise Strong (1971) observes from the vantage point of a planner, that Tapiola may be the most successful new community yet built . • • People want to live there; they enjoy it. N o group in Finnish society is foreclosed . . . and all groups pursue the possibiIity. Tapiola offers them humanity and convenience, modemity and comfort comf ort,, urbanity and nature, people and tranquillity, taste and modest cost, variety and cohesion. I t is a setting for the enhance mentt of man's men man 's spirit. spirit. Yet other oth er recent evaluations evaluations sound notes notes of caution. Tapi Ta piol olaa is not self-conta self-co ntaine ined, d, for jobs are unavailable there th ere for half h alf the popula p opula tion; more than half the population commutes to Helsinki. Fur ther, Tapiola was developed to contain a proportional cross section of Finnish society, and hornes were built accordingly. But the design of the town has evoked such a popular response that under rising conditions of demand, prices have increased t o ex cIude the poor, and Tapiola is becoming much more of a homo geneous middle-class suburb. Its very architectural success may thus signify signify its its downfall as a social social experime expe riment. nt. France: Economic and Urban Planning Combine I n Fran France ce a tradition of individualis individualism m has bred hostilit hostility y towards govemmental intervention to influt:nce land use o r capi capital tal invest invest

ment. Against such a backdrop, a major national economic and

 

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urban development planning effort has been launched. Following an immediate post-war focus on housing estates (grands en sembles), the major maj or thrust thr ust of the national planning effort has been to industrialise underdeveloped peripheral regions, particularly in the southern and western portions of the country, to stimulate the growth of o f eight majo ma jorr metropol metropoles, es, and to stern stern the g growth rowth of o f Paris. Paris. French urban structure had, a t the end of the Second World War, a distinctive continental flavour. Around the highly prized 16e Arrondissement in Paris, for example, the low mobility of working-class populations had built u p the small social unit of the quarter, with its distinctive street life and tightly knit networks of kin-group and an d other oth er socia sociall relationshi relationships. ps. Many areas retained the floor-b flo or-by-fl y-floor oor socia sociall distinctions distinctions noted not ed much mu ch earli e arlier er by Kohl. Th These ese graded out to highly individualistic suburban areas with unplan ned single-family housing in pavillons, o r the development by the bidonvilles. poor of teeming Policies of rent control, the Depression and the Second World War had created almost a compl complete ete gap in building in France Fr ance for several decades. Combined with post-war migration and rising birth rates, a housing crisis of major proportions resulted, the effects of which can still be feIt (Merlin, 1969). The immediate post-war respon response se of the public authorities was to build bui ld the largest number of houses as quickly as possible, without regard to loca tion, provisi provision on of amen amenities ities,, or improveme improvement nt of housing quality. The only way in which the construction industry could cope with the problem was by building large numbers of standardised

apa apartm rtment ents s using usingensembles, mass-production methods. methalso ods. favoured Such was wasby the t hethe basis basplan is of France's grands which were ners on ideological grounds, as adeparture from the excessive in dividualism and isolation of the pavillons, produ producing cing more collec collec tive forms of habitation which, by throwing residents of a variety of social origins together, would create a new classless society (Elkins, 1973). By 1964, 1964,200 200 such developments developments of a t least 1000 dwellings each had been built, providing 365,000 apartment dwelling units (197,000 in the Paris region), largely for more youthful child rearing families headed by salaried workers. Despite their plan ners' hopes, the grands ensembles have been much criticised for their monotony, lack of amenities and community spirit, de

nounced because of their overcrowding and the resulting deviant

 

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and delinquent behaviour, and said to be cold, impersonal, un friendly and overpowering in scale. The French have coined the term sarcellite to describe the phenomenon, after the best-known grand ensemble in the Paris region. Yet they did help meet

Fran ce's critical housing shortage. France's While the focus in housing policy was on the grands ensembles, there was was growing concern with the t he problems of Paris. At present, nearly 2 0 per cent of the country's population lives in the Paris area, are a, which also also accounts for 5 0 pe perr cent cen t of the country's country 's busin busines esss turnover, 33 pe perr cent cen t of the country's countr y's co coll llege ege students, students, 65 65 per p er cent cen t of its artists artists and a nd writers, writers, and 54 per cent cen t of its publishing publishing activity. I n the Paris area are a is 5 0 pe perr cent cen t of the electrical electrical construction indus try, 56 per cent of the aircraft industry, 64 per cent of the auto mobile industry, and 76 per cent of the pharmaceutical industry. O n the other hand, hand , there aare re only three other othe r centres centres in the eoun 500,000

try with aToureoin population of over (Marseille, Lyon, and Lille Roub Roubaixaix-Tour eoing g eompl eom plex) ex).. Two streams of poliey developed, one focusing on the transfor mation of the Paris region into a deeentralised metropolis, the other on ereating major new growth eentres elsewhere in Franee. The history of these efforts is of interest. Even after the Seeond World War Franee had very limited planni pl anning ng tool tools. s. Yet Ye t new intel leetual eurrents were were beginning beginning to appea app earr in a eountry e ountry whieh had very eonservative eultural and politieal traditions and a highly centralised administration. I n 1947, a young geographer called Jean-Franc;ois Gravier wrote a book entitled Paris et le desert attrae raeted ted wide attention atten tion with its dia diagno gnosi siss of nation franfais that att a l ills relating to the imbalanee of Paris's dominanee, and its re eommendations that a poliey of deeentralisation be developed. Out of the debate that ensued emerged a progressive elaboration of planning tools, the 1958 Plan d'Amenagement e t d'Organisa tion Generale de la Region Parisienne (PADOG), (PADOG), and the Nation al Urba Ur ban n Growth Strategy Strateg y foe foeus usin ing g on the metropoles d'equilibre. PADOG's initial strategy strategy was was to try to halt ha lt the physieal physieal growth of Paris, redueing eongestion a t the eentre by massive improve ment in transportation infra-strueture, and by diverting growth to major new nodes in the suburbs. The plan speeifieally rejected the British green belt and new towns ideas, however; the new

urban nuclei were to be linked to the eore by a system of express-

 

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ways. I t quickly became apparent that PADOG' PADOG'ss estimate estimate of one million new inhabitants during the sixties was too eonservative, and it was replaced repla ced in 196 1965 by the Sc Sche hema ma direc, direc,teu teur, r, the Strategie Plan for the Distriet of Paris. Paris. This plan view viewss the ereation ere ation of new urban eentres as the only remedy for the underequipment of the suburbs and the overeongestion of the eentre. T o assure a n ade quate amount of land for eonstruetion and green spaee, sites must be on the fringe of the present agglomeration. Growth of popu lation will will be ehannelled along 'prefer ' preferential ential axes' ehose ehosen n to fit fit the physieal, eeonomic, and human geogr geography aphy of the th e region. region. The prin eipal axis will move downstream along the Seine, a direction in whieh growth is already relatively rapid, toward the Norman agglomerations of Rouen and L e Havre Havre,, which together comprise comprise the second port of France. Along this axis, new communities are being created which will contain a full range of urban facilities and can accommodate from 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 to 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 inhabitants each. Specifically, these new communities are to be located located tangential to nort h-west-south-eas south-eastt alignment alignme nt from Noisy Noisy le the Paris core on a north-westGrand to Cergy-Pontoise (which is now being built) and Tigery Lieusaint to Mantes. I n all, eight new communities are ar e envisioned envisioned by the year 2 0 0 0 , five to the south and three to the north of the Seine, with six urban centr centres es in the inner i nner ring around Paris to be renovated, inc1uding Choisy-Ie-Roi-Rungis, where a new national food market has been built to replace Les Halles. Thus the new scheme will break with the radial-concentric pattern which has heretofore contributed to the region's difficulties. Transportation the new towns with one another facilities beParis, provided as weIl aswill with but to onelink of the main aims of the new towns will be to provide self-sufficient communities where people can live and work without witho ut having to make long trips trips.. Complementing the Schema directeur for the Paris region is the National Urban Gro Growth wth Strategy, developed developed especi especiall ally y during dur ing the fifth plan of 196&-9. The basi basicc idea of this strategy came cam e from the work of other French geographers: Pierre George, who argued that whereas in the past regions made cities, today cities make regions; regions; and J. Hautreux and M. Rochefort, whose book L a Fonction Regionale dans l Armature Urbaine FraTlfaise (1964)

identified eight metropolitan areas whose growth could offset the dominance of Paris. Thus, the urban strategy plans give high

priority to public incentives to spur growth in Lyon-St-Etienne,

 

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Marseille-Aix, MarseilleAix, Lille-Rouba Lille- Roubaix-Tou ix-Tourcoin rcoing, g, Toulou Toulouse, se, Nancy-Metz, Nancy-Me tz, Bourdeaux, Nantes-St-Nazaire, and an d Strasbourg. The mechanisms to achieve the goals of the Schema directeur and the metropoles d'equilibre are, first of all, the succession of national economic plans, combined with anational land use plan. These plans have, in turn, been regionalised as part of the search for a 'better' distribution of population that reflects not simply economic purposes, but more balanced development and more equitable well-being. Local communities are expected to have comprehensive plans consistent with regional objectives. Six OREAM (Organisateurs d'Etudes d'Amenagement d'Aires Metropolitaine) have been established by the metropolitan areas of Marseille, Lyon-St Etienne, Metz-Nancy, the North, the lower Seine and the lower Loire, to trace long-term development pros pects and urban planning needs, taking the year 2 0 0 0 as a plan ning horizon. horizon.ofThe principal controls on (ZUPs) landPs) useand involve the designation priorit priority y zo zone nesslocal of urbanisation urban isation (ZU deferred developmen deve lopmentt zone zoness (ZAD (ZADs) s).. These Th ese zones zones are ar e specified specified by the th e muni mu ni cipalities, subject to national approval. Once a ZUP is approved, national funding for land acquisition and the government's 3 0 5 0 per cent contribution for streets, 4 0 pe perr cent ce nt for sewerage, sewerage, and cen t for water supply supply is directed there and withheld from 2 5 per cent ZADs. Government funding is also available to aid housing con struction. Various tax incentives can also be used to induce de velopment in desired directions. The Schema directeur calls for new towns within the Paris Basin, as we have described earlier (Merlin, 1969). I t is a plan that is much criticised by those who fear that limited funds will be diverted from the regional decentralisation plans to the construc tion of massive new towns in the Paris Basin that will, admittedly, reshape and decentralise the metropolitan region, but divert in vestment back from the provinces provinces towards this re-fashioning re-fashioning of the th e metropolis. Thus, the Schema directeur and the metropoles d 'equilibre have assumed a competitive rather than the comple mentary ment ary relationship relationship they were were intended to have. The Schema directeur reflects the spread of British thinking, even though the British new towns form was disavowed. Yet France has also produced a variety of dramatic new alternative

plans for urbanisation, ur banisation, too, as as we noted note d earlier ear lier when whe n we discus discussed sed L e Corbusier's Ville Radieuse. The outstanding recent Frenc French h idea

 

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in urban development that follows Corbusier is the Cite Parallel. The spiny backbone style of this idea id ea is best expressed a t Le Mirail, near Toulouse. This is a new loo,ooo-inhabitant community, de signed by Georges Candilis and intended to serve the aerospace complex the government is creating in the Toulouse area. I t will have green areas larger than Paris's Paris's Bois de Boulogne and Bois de Vincennes combined and will provide separate streets for pedes trians and cars. 72 per cent of the people will be housed in 5-14storey Bats and another 16 per cent in 2-4-storey Bats. I t repre sents a distinctively European alternative design concept to that of the British new towns. towns. The Netherlands: Focus on the Human Consequences o{

Urbanisation

Yet other plans are being being formulated and executed in the Nether lands,, one of the lands th e most urbanised countries in the world, but with out a city of over one million population. Much of its population lives in physically separate medium-size eities situated in a horse shoe pattern around a relatively open agricultural heart in the eastern part of the country. This horseshoe development is refer red to as the 'Randstad'. Travel between any two points i n the area does not require much more than one hour. There is con siderable sidera ble commuting, yet each e ach city is differentiated enough to pro vide a variety of jobs and facilities. So far, planning for the area has sought to maintain this arrangement by stimulating growth in other parts of the country, preserving open space, creating new towns on new land claimed from the sea, improving inter urban transportation system. Thus, it is and hoped that thethe present multiple-nuclei, dispersed urbanisation pattern will continue to prevail, and that the green heart of Randstad can be preserved. Amenity is the national government's basic reason for seeking to limit metropolitan growth. No other national government de monstrates quite the same concern for the soeial consequences of urbanisation. The concern encompasses the preservation of a choice among living environments, and protection of individu ality. Retention of Randstad's green core and eity separators is a major national goal. Yet, in contrast, Rotterdam takes a view contrar y to that of the national contrary nati onal government, gove rnment, seek seekin ing g growth in the belief that it is necessary to remain competitive in a united

Europe. H.C.U.--6*

 

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THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

Control of Randstad is being sought sough t afte af terr in several ways ways,, in the face of continuing pressures to develop the green heart in the interests of growth. Emigration is a national goal. Both physical and eco econom nomic ic planning are undertak und ertaken en a t the nationa nat ionall leve level. l. After Afte r remarkable post-war accomplishments in restoring a devastated housing stock, sparked by government subsidy programmes, the Netherlands thus embarked upon a poliey of polycentric 'con centrated deconcentration', based on the realisation of environ mental goals. People would be encouraged to settle in four multi nuclear urban zones. Demands for lower-density single-family housing were acknowledged, but strict developmental controls ap plied to avoid sprawl. The actual planning has had three ingre dients : direct investment in roads, infra-structure, schools, etc., inducing private investment; plan enforcement, determining de velopment in designated green spaces; and incentives for develop ing problem Growth Randstad to be along transpor tran sport t routes, routareas. es, separated separat ed byinagricultur agri cultural alisbuffer buffe r zone zooutwards nes, s, preserving both bot h the historie cities cities and the agricultural heart. I n contrast to other parts of Randstad, Rotterdam has experi enced rapid growth, and represents a n outstanding example of post-war central city redevelopment (its Lijnbaan is a prototype copied by shopping centre developers throughout the world), new port development-Europort, and the use of municipal land ac quisition to permit satellite city development both to stern the growth of the central centra l city and to control the patter pa ttern n of suburbani sation. The latter perhaps is the most significant difference emerging in the urbanisation process between Western Europe and North America: public creation of satellite communities, with consis tentt overall architectural ten architec tural design design,, green belts and open space, space, speci speci fication of growth directions, and clear preferences for mass trans portation, as opposed to private development of automobile oriented suburbs drifting after major style-setting, profit-seeking private priva te initiati initiatives. ves.

THE CITY OF SOCIALIST MAN

The Communist Revolution of 1917 marked the beginning in

Russia, and later in eastern eastern Europe, of yet another ano ther path in urban development. The revolutionaries had great faith in the power of

 

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the government to transform society for the betterment of man, in seizing the government not to restrict its power but rather t o use it. They aspired to remould society through astate mono poly o f the production of goods, of means of communications, of education, and o f science. The gr grea eatt modernising revolution revolutionss that too took k place much earlier in the west and a t a more leisu leisure rely ly pace of gradual gra dual transition transition came concurrently in the Soviet Union and took a more dramatic and radical form. The religious revolution, which in the west found expression in the Reformation, the Counter-Reformation and the grad gr adua uall secularisati secularisation on of most aspe aspects cts of life life,, took the form in the Soviet Sov iet Union of militant milita nt atheism atheism.. The econo economic mic revolution, which as the Industria Ind ustriall Revolution Revolution in the west west extended over more tha than na century cent ury,, took took the form in the Soviet Union Uni on of state ownership and managem mana gement ent of the entire ent ire economy to promote pro mote socia sociall goals goals and to speed industrialisation. The democratic politic political al revolution, revolution, which found expression in the west in the American and Frenc French h revolu revolu tions and the gradual diffusion of political power in Britain through aseries of reforms, in the Soviet Union took the form of transfer of power from from the autocracy of o f the Tsars to the dictator ship of the proletariat through the leadership of the Communist centralised ised authority auth ority but democratic participation. The party with central intellectual revolution, which in the west flowered in the Age of Reason o r the Die Aufklärung and an d in which faith developed in the perfectibility of man and social institutions, in the ability of man by rational r ational thought thou ght and an d scie scient ntif ific ic investigat investigation ion to t o improve himself himself and society and to rule the universe, in the Communist Revolu tion took the form of an optimistic faith in the ability of the Party

and the Government, through science and industrialisation, to transform society and social relations and to create a rational

communistic communist ic world order. ord er.

The Soviet Experience What was sought in urban development was what Lenin had

called ' a new patter patt ern n of settlement for for mankind' mank ind' , the city of social social is istt man. man . The clas classi sicc writings of Ma Marxi rxismsm-Len Lenini inism sm suggested ways i n which the goal goal migh mightt be achiev achieved ed : plann p lanning ing was was to create crea te cities cities without social o r economic divisions; there was to be a commit

me nt to the ment th e social socially ly integrative value of housing housing and a wide range of social services; city planning was to be responsive to economic

 

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THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

planning, which which would would determine determine industrialloc industr iallocation ation and set limits to the rate of urbanisation in developed regions and major urban complexes; and thus city planning per se was to be restricted to a basic physical-engineering-architectural profession, providing high-density new developments in approved styles. The accomplishments of the Soviets in urban development are unquestionable. During the Soviet period the U.S.S.R. has been transformed from a rural society to a predominantly urban one, through a combined process of industrialisation and urbanisation achieved as the outcome of aseries of five-year plans. The popu lation was was 82 per cen centt rural rur al in 1926, 926, but 56 per cen centt urba ur ban n in 1969 1969,, a t which time the U.S.S.R. had 209 cities of more than 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 people. Chauncy D. Harris (1970) has revealed several things about the urban system that has been created. First, size and eco nomicc power within nomi within the th e urba ur ban n network are clos closel ely y related; relate d; each of majo ma jorr urban urba n region regi onss the hasadministrative a relativel relatively y comple complete te urban urb an hthe ierarchy chy that corresponds with hierarchy of hierar 'com mand' economy. Second, growth has been led by economic poli 24

eies, while the succession of economic plans has brought this growth and its associated urbanisation to regions successively more remote from Moscow. Other conditi conditions ons have also also affected the urb u rban an development deve lopment pro cess, particularly after the Secon Second d World War: wartime devasta tion and the high cost of bringing existing cities u p to minimal standards; the political rigidity of the Stalinist era, its single minded focus on specified planning standards, and its peculiar bar oquee arch baroqu a rchitec itectura turall manifestations ; tthe he necess necessit ity y to develop basic industrialised construction skills, emphasising quantity rather than quality; the basic emphasis on heavy industry in in vestment allocatio allocations, ns, with wit h only small percentages going to housing, urban development and service facilities. The authoritarian role role of the central govemment and the prior ity of the economic goals of the state have been expressed a t all levels of urbanisation, down to the precise physical nature of the new urba u rban n develop development mentss that have been built. The procedure is as folIows. The Sta State te Planni Pl anning ng Commiss Commission ion determines the economic economic norms for the city and, therefore, the basic employment required. Given this basic employment figure as a base, the city planner's

role is simply to implement existing norms, also determined by the central planning authorities and laid out in basic books of

 

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standards: Regulations and Norms for the Planning and Con struction of Cities: USSR (translated by the U.S. Joint Publica tions Research Service [Pravilia i Normy Planirovki i Zastroyki Gorodov), Moscow, 1959, and Handbook for Desi Designer gners: s: City Ci ty Plan ning nin g [Spravocnik proetirorshika-g proetirorshika-gradostro radostroitelstvo), itelstvo), Moscow, 1963 . These The se book bookss layout the physic p hysicallay allayout, out, dens densit itie ies, s, street patterns,

utilities networks, and so on, of the th e settlements settlements to he bu built ilt (Fis (Fisher, her, 1962) . Building proceeds in the Soviet Union Uni on on the basis basis of micro rayons (neighbourhood units), built for 6000-12,000 people to gether with whatever services are specified for inclusion in them. The automatie nature of the process is both a result of the directed directe d natur na turee of the Soviet Soviet state, state, and the need ne ed to provide massive massive quantities of housing and urban services after years of neglect of urban needs, as a result of preoccupation with industrialisation and the long period for which the effects of wartime devastation were feIt.construction A major goal of standardisation was to industrialise housing through factory production of prefabri cated and precast materials and forms, both to reduce costs and speed construction to meet the immense needs for housing. Since quantity was so important, quality was sacrificed, and no where does one find more drab and monotonous modem cities, and buildings with poorer internal design, than in the U.S.S.R., although there are attempts today to provide a greater range of building styles, apartment sizes, and qualities of developments. The industrialised methods produce standard apartment blocks almost exclus exclusive ively. ly. Movem Mo vement ent in i n the th e cities cities is by public public transporta transporta  tion.. often tion Services Service s and facili facilities tiespolitical-cultural are the minim mi nimum umadministrative necessary necessary.. An core elabor ate, monumental, is provided for the city, surrounded by a succession of self-contained neighbourhood neighbourhoo d units units,, undifferenti undiff erentiated ated soci sociaI aIly ly.. The indi individu vidual al city plans, plan s, as in the case of Mosco Moscow, w, nonetheless have a distinctive new town flavour. Official Soviet policy is to restrain Moscow's growth and to channel such outlying growth as occurs occurs into satellite town towns. s. Like Abercrombie's Abercrombie's Great Gre ater er Lond L ondon on Plan, that for Moscow is formulated in aseries of rings. Within the inner belt highway, growth will be restrained. Focus will be on major rehousing schemes, facilitated by industrialisation of a standardised housing industry. This is encircled by a green belt,

a 10-kilometre wide ring heing developed into a recreation area, in which residential dacha construction is being restrained.

 

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THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

Finally, there are the satellite towns (goroda-sputnika), accom modating new growth, and built according to the standardised microrayon physical design specifications outlined earlier. The resulting spatial patterns are held t o be consistent with social soc ialis istt principles principles of urba ur ban n development, the anti ant i thes thesis is of the European industrial urbanisation of the nineteenth century that so angered and repelled Marx and Engels. One Polish planner's version of the principles is as follows (Fisher, 1962) : the principles of social justice are realised by using the official norms and stan dards which determine per capita living spaces, population den sity, and quantity of services adjusted to projected population limits without dass distinctions. The only basis for differentiation of available environment among urban families are the biological characteristics of the families. Functional and spatial structure of new residential areas and towns corresponds, due to the deve1op mentt of functionally men functio similar a nd to the social social conception of a nally socialis social istt urban urb anneighbourhood community. units and The Impact

0/ Russian Socialism on Eastern Europe's Cities

These principles have been applied throughout Eastern Europe since the Second World War, although distinctively different st styl yles es of urban urba n developm development ent are a re distinguishable: (I) the post-war reconstruction period, when (with the exception of the meticu lous reconstruction of Warsaw as it had existed in 1939, as Poland's national symbol) housing was to be built as quickly as possible; (2) aperiod of 'Stalinesque' massive developments; and

(3) the 'post-Stalin modem' period.

During the Stalinist period, there was a strong ideological over tone that the socialist city should be significantly different from that of the West, and unif uniform orm in its characteristics, consi consistent stent with wit h the goal of soci social al equality. Eastern Ea stern Euro E uropea pean n plannin pla nning g a t that time showed heavy Soviet influence, and there was consistent applica tion of Soviet procedures, norms and plans. The buildings that were constructed were massive and the town planning 'absolutist baroque', typified by the Stalin Allee in East Berlin, or North Avenue in Bucharest, Bucharest, along which the th e Open Air Museum Muse um of Folk lore and the Academy Acade my of Sciences Sciences greet gree t visito visitors. rs. I n this period, too, were started some of the socialist new towns, designed to represent

comp letedep complete departu artures res from western western experience. Many Ma ny are showp showplac laces es of the new socialist city: Nowa Huta in Poland, Dunaujvaros in

 

P L A N N I N G F O R N E W URBAN R E A L I T I E S

IS9

Hungary, Titograd in Yugoslavia, to mention a few. The cities accomplish a specific economic purpose-to house steelmill work ers, o r those in a regional administrative centre. Their form is simple: a square of administrative-cultural composition a t the centre, with radiating streets flanked by massive residential de velopmen velo pments ts comprisin comprising g s-g-storey s-g- storey apart apa rtme ment nt buildings buildings containing 2-3-room apartments for families, and dormitories for unmarried workers. Adjacent to the complex is the economic unit that pro vide vi dess the employment. employm ent. I n this period, too, the application of Socialist principles to existing cities began to have a significant impact on their spatial form and so socia ciall structu s tructure. re. For example, the effect of Russian-style socialism on the cities of East Germany, differentiating them from their counterparts of the west, has been to reduce areal specialisation and segregration by substituting for market processes direct planning by the state o f the central (Elkins, 1973). The expansion office-shopping core has ceased and the type of retailing has changed. Land vacated by departing depart ing industry has been occupied occupied by apartment blocks, and people have been brought back to the central city. The high pres tige assigned to manufacturing industry has resulted in the disper sion throughout the city of large industrial complexes with associated housing areas. Because new residential development is all in apartments, significant density differences among parts of the city have been ironed out, and social segregation has been largely abolished. Housing policy is to give priority in new dwell ings to young families with children, employees in key jobs, and families living in bad condit conditions. ions. Thus, Thu s, there t here is a strong correlation between age of structures and age of inhabitants, producing socially mixed neighbourhoods with the virtual disappearance of social status as a differentiating factor. Only intellectuals and party leaders enjoy a distinctive residential area. And because there is little reliance on the automobile, a n residential areas are c10sely related to public transportation facilities. Similar changes are reported throughout Eastern Europe. Since Stalin greater variety in building styles has emerged, however, and the planning process and goals have come to differ from fro m one country to another. The philosophie tenets of Marxist

Leninist dogma and their implicati implications ons for operation al city plan ning are being re-examined, but several features do stand out and

 

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THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

persist : standardisation; eoneern for the proper size of eities; a partieular eoneept of the city centre; and development by neigh bourhood units (Fisher, 1 9 6 2 ) . But the nature of these eoncerns has begun to diverge. Only where the scale of construction has been great enough has pre fabricated eonstruction proved to be eeonomical, in the major cities of Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. EIsewhere, there has been greater reliance on traditional building techniques. And although apartment houses and tenements were nationalised throughout Eastern Europe, this is still not the case everywhere with urban land, much of which remains in private ownership, albeit strictly controlled b y zoning and subject to alienation for public purposes. I n Hungary, for example, each year a consider able amount of public land is divided into lots and sold b y the government gover nment for fo r construction of condominiums, condominiums, single-f single-family amily hous ing and weekend hornes, and in Budapest this is producing a cer tain amount of social differentiation between the elite neighbour hoods to the west in old Buda and the working-class communities of old Pest to the th e east. Most eastern European planners are seeking to create city centress with other centre ot her than the monumental and political-administra tive functions of the Stalinesque baroque. While all agree on the necessity for neighbourhood unit development, they differ o n the nature of these units. Finally, in all countries there is concern for the 'proper' o r 'bal 'balance anced' d' siz size of city based based on the primary econo mic functions functions o f the place, and in all cases there is the underlying conviction that large citi cities es must have hav e their t heir growth contained, and that new towns and satellite cities should be built around large urban agglomerations. The Contin Continuing uing Debate Abou Ab outt Urban Goal Goalss

Throughout Eastern Europe, Europ e, therefore, the tradi tradition tion al western de bate that ultim ultimately ately led t o western Europe Eur ope's 's new towns towns policies policies has ha s been joined, and the role of ideology in the selection of a n urban future onee more comes to the fore. More clearly than anywhere else, in the socialist societies what men believe determines the future they try to create, but one sees in the Soviet literature today major debates about abou t the desired desired urban future.

is between two scholars in fluential in the Soviet planni fluential pla nning ng proc proces ess, s, geograph geo grapher er B. B. S. Khorev One such widely publicised debate

 

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argues (1972) and eeonomist V. V. Perevedentsev (1972). Khorev argues that continued attempts must be made in the Soviet Union to develop new forms o f urbanisation consistent with the tenets o f Marxism-Leninism. H e writes that the division division of labour labo ur leads in the first place to aseparation of industrial and eomm eommercial ercial labour from the labour of agriculture and, thus, to aseparation of town from eountryside. I n a class society this separation produces antagonism between town and eountryside. But as classes dis appear and society is rebuilt on a communist foundation, h e feels that significant differences between town and countryside also gradually disappear. The essence of long-range ehanges in settlement and in growth of eities lies in the gradual erasing of differences between town and countryside, to yield a unified system system of settlement, whose planned regulation may help prevent haphazard and uncontrolled city

growth.

The classic writings of Marxism-Leninism, according to Khorev, suggest ways of achieving that goal: harmonious development of produetive forces according to a single plan; a more uniform dis tribution of large-scale industry and population throughout the

country; achievement of elose internal links between industrial and agricultural production; expansion of the means of trans portation; reduction o f the concentration of population in large cities. T o date, h e argues, we have experienced a concentration of industrial production and urban population. Revolutionary changes are now leading to a single system of settlement, a functionally delimited and structur ally interrelated network of places that can be regulated in a planned manner for the benefit of society, and encompassed by a

unified unifi ed syste system m of regional planning, a type of spati spatial al organisation that ean be conceived only onl y as a n integral combination of artifieial and natural environments. Perevedentsev eontests this argument saying that the literature on city planning is strewn with expressions like exeessive growth, exce ex cess ssiv ivee development, develop ment, exees exeessi sive ve eoneentr eone entrati ation, on, ex exee eess ssiv ivee satur sa turati ation on with industry. ' I once made persistent efforts to find out what the originatorss of originator o f such express expression ionss had in mind. min d. Alas, Alas, I did not sueeeed in determining this. Here, everything is exeessive.' H e notes that

B. S. Khorev writes:

'The excessive, hypertrophie growth o f our targe and superl superlarge arge cities is inexpedient and undesirable.' Pereve Pereve--

 

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THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATlON

dentsev asks, 'Where do the hypertrophy and excessiveness start? A t what size?' 'One searches in vain', he says, 'for the criteria of optimal size o r of excessiveness', noting that the productivity of social labour is generally considered to be the chief criterion for efIectiveness in distributing production forces. CaIculations show that the productivit pr oductivity y of labour in large cities cities is many tim times es higher than that in the small ones, and in the superlarge cities cities i t is many times higher than in the large cities. Thus, for example, the pro ductivity of labour in the industry of cities with populations of more than 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 persons is 38 per cent higher than in cities with populations of from JOO,OOO to 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 and the return on assets is more than twi twice ce as high. high . Perevedentsev also notes the inefIectiveness of attempts to limit growth b y registration requirements placed o n migrants. 'Many large cities have lang had rigidly limited registration; they grow and grow all the same.' By no means is the problem here attribut attrib ut able to natural growth (the preponderance prepondera nce of births over over deaths) deaths),, which in i n the t he largest cities cities is insignificant. I n Moscow, for example ex ample,, i n J967 i t was J'7 persons for every 1 0 0 0 residents-that is, I J,OOO for all of Moscow-but Moscow's annual growth stilI amounted to more than 6 0 , 0 0 0 . The administrative regulation of migration has proved inefIective in the extreme, and where there has been some success i t has led only to a shortage of manpower-that is, industry and othe otherr branches branches of the national nati onal economy were were unable to exploit their potentialities. The man power shortage in many cities cit ies has only been alleviated b y incr increasi easing ng the number num ber of people

who commute to work every day from the suburbs. The price is high. Many commuters spend a n hour and a half o r two hours en route, in addition to the usual city norm, and some spend even more. They co commu mmute te to work in Moscow from as far as J 0 0 km o r moreaway. What Perevedentsev sees i n the Soviet Union is continued population concentration in major cities in the foreseeable future, because major structural shifts are taking place in the national economy. The proportion of people employed in the 'primary' sphere-in agriculture and extractive industry-is growing smal ler. The proportion of people people employed employed in the manufa ma nufacturi cturing ng and

the service industries is growing. But extractive industry is the

industry of small cities, whereas manufacturing industry is the industry of large cities. Economic reforms promoting greater effi-

 

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ciency in industrial production will contribute to the trend. The increased effectiveness of enterprises situated i n the large eities will inevitably promote a tendency toward priority development of them. And, of course, in the majority of cases, the reconstruc tion of enterprises is considerably more advantageous than the constructio constr uction n of new ones ones.. Furt Fu rthe her, r, since since sc scien ience ce holds firs firstt place in the rate of increase of employees, its share i n the economy will increase rapidly. And i n Soviet conditions science is a big eity in dustry. Finally, the entire service sphere, which lags behind the other branches of the national economy, is inevitably bound to those places where people are concentrated. Its importance for the growth of cities will increase more and more. Social factors will play an increasing role, too. The large city will become in creasingly more attractive as people's free time increases. The importance of contacts made outside work will grow, and the conditions for this in a small cannot compared to those in a well-organised large city city.simply Thus, the statebe policy of regu lating the growth of cities must be based on a precise knowledge of the relative shortcomings and advantages of eities of various sizes and types. T o do this it is neeessary to study the economie, soci so cial al,, demographie, demogra phie, publie health heal th and oth other er aspects aspects of the growth growt h of cities. Right now, he says that knowledge of these factors is patently inadequate, and what is known speaks in favour of large eities rather than against them. I n the U.S.S.R., apparently, eon tinuing eentralisation is most likely, a t the time that planned de centralisation is ehanging urban areas in Western Europe.

 

5

Div Diverg ergent ent Paths in Twentieth-Century Urbanisation

the most widely held thesis of recent decades about the social consequences of urbanisation is that of the convergence of social forms. Sjoberg (1965), one of the leading proponents of this view, writes that PERHAPS

ind ustiia indust iiall citie citiess over the world are ar e becoming becoming alike alike in many ma ny aspects of their social structure • . • as technology becomes increasingly complex, a significant number of structural imperatives become ..•• . . encompasses more narrowly defined technology scientific know-how. In turn,Modern the scientific method .seems to sup port and is itself sustained by a n ideology that gives rise to and promotes the democratic process, and such norms as universalism and emphasis on achievement in modern bureaucracies.

Th eree was Ther was a logi logicc to the arran a rrangeme gement nt of the preceding chapters chapte rs in a spectrum of urbanisation expeiiences from those obtaining unde un derr conditions of lai laisse ssez-f z-fair airee privatism to the th e highly centralised centrali sed circumstances of the socialist states that argues strongly for a con trary view. Modernism has not meant the westernism of conven tional wisdom, the Wirthian theory of the human consequences of urbanisation with which we began, for Wirth's theory was found to be be both time and an d culture-bound to the immigrant city of the nineteenth century. In twentieth-century North Ameiica dif ferent social theories were found to be needed to account for the consequences of urbanisation. Equally different concepts will be needed in the Third W orld to provide prov ide a basis for comprehen comp rehending ding contemporary urban dynamics in nations with widely varying cultures, where new governments are beginning to try to control urbanisation and to cast i t into forms held to be more desirable than those thought likely to result from unconstrained urban growth, often for reasons of sodal and economic equity. Effective planning plann ing for such purposes purposes was was found increasing increasingly ly to be b e the hall ha ll

mar k of the redistiibutive welfare states mark states of Western Europe, Eu rope, where it was seen that urban growth has been cast into new physical

 

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forms commensurate with the utopian constructs of Ebenezer Howard and Le Corbusier. Finally, the control o{ urbanisation was shown to reach its maximum in the centralised command economies of the socialist states, where planning for the city of socialist man has been underta und ertaken ken in circumstances circumstances in wh ich status and neighbourhood differences have been reduced, and where continuing housing shortages eliminate the freedom of indi vidual choice. THE SOCIO-POLITICAL BASES

A sequence of socio-politica socio-politicall fonns fon ns is suggested, arranged along a spectrum in which there is increasing public involvement in delib erately managing urbanisation to produce social consequences other than those conventionally perceived to result {rom the in and heterogeneity of urban population con creasing size,Indeed, density perhaps centrations. the most important of the human consequences of urbanisation during the twentieth century may weIl be this attempt to change the narure of its perceived nine teenth-century consequences, to produce b y coercive means more human hum anee urban urb an environments environments.. Looking Looking forward, forward, urbanisation urbanisation pro cesses wi will ll,, in the next decades, decades, be similarly similarly contrived in more par p arts ts of the world than today. Even where central controls do not pre vail, substantial pressures will exist for governments to move into the policy arena to alter urban futures. As Lloyd Rodwin (1970) has remarked, 'Before World War 11 almost no one wanted the

central govemment to determine how cities should grow. Today, only a generation later, national govemments throughout the world are adopting o r being implored to adopt urban growth strategies.' Moreover, he concludes that 'radical changes in tech nology and i n analytical and plan planning ning methods may make sign signif ifi i cant changes in the urban system not only feasible, but to some extent manipulable'. The diverse {orms that public intervention is taking, the variety of goals being sought, and the differences in manipulation and manipulability from one society to another are combining to produce increasingly divergent paths of deliberate urbanisation. This makes it all the more important to understand the relations between socio-political {orms and urbanisation, be

cause the socio-polity determines the public planning style. U r  banisation, in this sense, can only be understood within the broad

 

166

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATJON

spectrum of closely interrelated cultural processes; among these processes, planning increases rather than decreases the range of social choice as modernisation takes place, while simultaneously restricting the range of individual choice to conform to the social path selected. Free Enterprise Dynamics At one extreme of the spectrum spe ctrum is the free enterprise, decentralised, market-directed system. I n such societ societies ies deci decisio sions ns ar aree made ma de by in dividuals, and groups of decisions interact in the market through the free interplay of the forces of demand and supply. Economic and political power, vested in the claims of ownership and pro perty, is widely dispersed and competitively exercised. exercised. The instru ments of collective o r government action are used only to protect and support the central ce ntral institution institutionss of the market ma rket and to maintain

the required dispersion of power. Such is the classical nineteenth century model which remains the underpinning today in the Uni ed States, Canada and Australia. Australia. Success in the competitive system delivers status and power, wh ich in turn enables the successful to determine the course of urbanisation by their choices, because others in society ape them. Power, of course, means control of the political system, and this power is exercised to protect property rights in the private land market and to preserve both the fruits of success and the competi tive system in which it was achieved. The public role is limited tto combating crises that threaten the societal mainstream as privately initiated innovation produces social change. Legal sys tems are mainly main ly regulatory, regulato ry, too, functioning functio ning to preserve established values; indeed, the reliance of American law upon the regulatory approach appro ach to city city building has meant the atrophy of city planning as a constructive element in social change (Warner, 1972) . Plan ning practice has clearly been ineffectual in confronting the tre mendous conflicts inherent in such undertakings as the building of the national Interstate Highway System and other major public works ventures undertaken by public agencies, yet deliver ing their rewards to private interest groups. No success whatever has been achieved in ameliorating ameliora ting poverty. The poor performance of the public sector in both the United States and Canada is, in

this regard, a function both of the free-enterprise ideology and of the fragmented governments which the ideology maintains, to-

 

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gether with fiscal systems that allocate tasks without resources to eity governments. governments. The crux o f i t all is clear clearly ly the desire desire to maintain ma intain open competi tion. I n the United States the benefits of redistributive welfare systems, mass public housing and rationalised urban investment inherent, inheren t, for example, in Europ E uropean ean socia sociali lism sm have been eschewed eschewed in favour of unshakeable commitment to the private land and labour markets. markets. Where there are diffe differences rences between what is hap pening penin g to eitie eitiess in the th e United States on the one hand, and Canada and Australia on the other, they are to b e found in the deep seated white racism that exists as a n additional feature of Ameri Ameri can culture, rather than in any differential pattern of rewards fl flow owin ing g from the comm c ommitm itment ent to competitive priv pr ivat atee live lives. s. Organisation Organi sation al Marke Mar kett Negotiation Chapter 2 , increasing organisational scale and was noted in As concentration of power is a dominant domin ant characteristic characteristic of today's new industrial and post-industrial states. As the scale of economic and

bureaucratic organisation increases, changes arise in the dynamics of social and economic change. Major developmental decisions are made b y negotiation among amon g large-sca large-scale le autonomous autono mous organisations organisations and b y voluntary associations, profit-oriented but not necessarily maximi max imiser sers, s, countervailing and a nd countervailed against, negotiating negotia ting together and existing in a context of negotiated relationships, rather than deliv delivered ered by the th e guiding hand of the market. Power is determined as a matter of policy or agreed upon b y counter balancing powers. Under such conditions there is organisation of production b y large corporations run for the benefit of stock holders, while labour negotiates wages through large-scale unions. partly y determined by indivi indivi The consumption of end products is partl dual choice, and partly by governmental policy. The collective power of organisations, collective power of the government, and the free choice of individuals are all part of the system. Hence, the 'market' is no longer the single master. Rather, elaborate negotiation for 'satisfactory' solutions tends to prevail; instead of miximisation, there is 'satisficing' and, increasingly, each of the large-s lar ge-scale cale organisat organisations ions engages engages in in planning plan ning in i n terms of corporate corpora te goals, often with systems analysis staffs a t their disposal to help

them the m select select desirable desirable courses courses of o f action. Under such conditions, the public can begin to play a n assertive

 

168

T H E HUMAN CONSEQUENCES O F URBANISATION

countervailing o r leader leadership ship role role in urbanisation. Thu T hus, s, while while the t he approach to urban growth which prevailed in many Australian eities until recently seems to have been to allow random, un planned development and to let such development take place simply in accordance with the ftuctuations of the real estate mar ket, increasing dissatisfactionwith dissatisfac tionwith the th e laissez-f laissez-faire aire eityis now being expressed. For example, the State of Victoria now has a Decen tralisation Minister, who is calling for directed decentralisation of half a million people from Melbourne into outlying country centres by the year 2 0 0 0 . Also, the Town and Country Planning :Board of Victoria issued aReport on Organisation for Strategie Planning in which it stated that the four broad components for strategic planning and programming should be those of the pat tern of urban land use for future growth, the pattern of rural urban land conversion, the transport system and the utilities sys What is envisaged is cont tem. rol ofonurban urba growth the luppl lupply y of basic public works and control services the none hand,via and develop ment consents on the other, since both are necessary prerequisites for private action. Private housing and industrial development, the report says, can and should be steered by affirmative pro gramming of basic infra-structural provision such as railway lines, highways, gas, electrieity, telecommunications, water, sewerage, main drainage, schools, hospitals, and so on. This idea of the public counterpoint in the development pro cess has been taken one Itep further in both France and Japan. The French case was discussed in Chapter 4. I n the instance of Japan, accelerated post-war laissez-faire centralisation of popula tion and economic activity has taken place. U p to the end of the Second World War Japan had been a highly centralised state. The nationalism that had been the t he basis basis of Japanese Japa nese development developmen t policies since the beginnings of modernisation in the Meiji era

also conferred other powers, in particular the capaeity to direct industrial decentralisation and to hold in check migration to the major eities. The nationalist doctrine underwent great change after Japan's defeat in the Pacific War, however, as the Occupa tion Forces' polieies sought to eliminate i t as a driving force in Japanese life and to replace i t by the American model of a de centralised democratic power structure containing competing in

te rest groups. This Th is had disastrous effects in the cities, many Japanese now think, for central government controls were elimi-

 

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nated in favour of political decentralisation. This, in turn, per mitted accelerated centralisation of population and economic activity, as part of the drive for economic growth that sacrificed both public and private consumption consumption to further furt her ca capital pital formation. formation. Major developmental problems that had been held in check in earlier times resulted, induding land scarcity and environmental pollution. A t the end of the Second World War Japan's large cities were devastated. In Tokyo 768,000 homes (56 per cent of the housing stock) had been destroyed and 5 per cent of the population were homele hom eless. ss. But Toky Tokyo o recovered faster faste r than any other ot her city in Japan following the war, and this led to massive immigration from other devastated areas. Many of the city's slums had their origin origin a t this time, in spite of the fact that 1'5 million housing units were created between 1945 and 1964, three-quarters built by private enterprise. Seiichi Yasui, then Governor of Tokyo, -took the lead in developing speciallegislation for thesuccessfully city under the National Capita C apitall Regional Regional Developmen Developmentt Law of 1956. Under its provisions, integrated plans for 'regulating' and 'readjusting' the growing population o f Tokyo, and checking its sprawl, could be undertaken, to 'solve' problems created by the 'overconcentra tion' of population and industry. Tbe principles involved were strictly tho those se of th thee earlier Abercrombie Abercrombie pla plan n for London : a built bu ilt u p ring o f the city was identified; a surrounding green belt, 1 2 kilometres wide, was proposed (although the planning powers provided have not proved strong enough to preserve it); and be yond the green belt, new towns were proposed to accommodate additional metropolitan growth. This legislation proved ineffec tive, however. T o provide additional powers, a 1 9 6 2 law concern ing the construction of New Industrial Cities provided a mechanism for guiding industry into smaller towns, to comple ment the 1959 Law Restricting Industrial and Educational Estab ments in Built-Up Built-U p Areas Areas of the National Nati onal Capi C apital tal Region. Region. Later, a U.N. Survey Team recommended similar policies as part o f a 'broader area are a admi administration' nistration' for Hanshin (Osaka-Kobe) (Osaka-Kobe) and adjacent areas, areas, effectuated effectuated under unde r the Kinki Region Region Readjust ment Law (1965). Later in 1966 the Diet Die t passed passed the Chubu Region Development and Readjustment Law for Nagoya. However, a

policy contradiction developed, for the accelerated economic de velopment plans of the state produced accelerated concentration

 

170

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

of economic activity hypersensitive to international markets a t the time that plans were being made for population dispersal. T o attempt to remove the contradiction, under the provision of the New Industrial City Development Promotion Law, sixteen new towns were planned for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Chubu, Chu goka, Shikoku and Kyushu. Little has come of this, however, be cause of the competitive competitive attitu att itude de of local local governments with respe respect ct to economic development. There was a clear need for concerted action a t the natio n ational nal leve level. l. This came in the late 1960s with the New Comprehensive National Development Programme, the purpose of which is to place anational development pol policy icy as an overlay overlay on the plans of local authorities in the style of French planning, designating growth and an d non-growth areas. This Thi s action come comess in an atmosphere atmosphe re of crisis-the feeling that local self-determination has to give way before national purpose if the scale of centralised development is not to cause Japan to founder in the sea of environmental pollu tion that has been produced by the laissez-faire post-war indus trial and urban growth. But as yet, the issues have simply been joined. The stage has been reached in which asearching for nationwide and long-range development policy is taking place. place. I n the past the Japanese process of urbanisation has been a unique blend of the Western and the Oriental, involving the coexistence of industrial urbanisation and an Asian style of life. But Japan is now trying to work out a n urban poliey in which economic efficiency is balanced by achievement of a social organisation in which everyone is guaranteed a minimum standard of living wherever he may live, and in whieh he can ca n choose his pi aces of residence and work from among many alternatives made pos sible by indigenous, innovative technologies, that do not blindly adopt the assumptions and premises having their origins in the differing cultures of the th e West. The Third Worl World d Increasingly affirmative and effective planning and action is something to which all all of the th e countries of the Third World aspire. The Third World countries constitute a diverse mosaic in which traditional self-perpetrating, self-regulating, semi-autonomous,

largely pre-industrial little societies coexist with and are being changed by post-war modernisation. Traditional forms of autho-

 

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rity and the centralised controls controls of coloniali colonialism sm have been replaced by one-party governments o r military dictatormips. There is frequent instability, and limited capacity for public administra tion. The public sectors are smalI. There is fragmentation of eco nomies along geographic, ethnic and modern-versus-traditional line lines, s, imperfection imperfec tion of o f markets mark ets and limite limited d development of modern economic institutions, limited industrial development and con tinued predominance of agriculture, low per capita product and market mar ket dependence dependenc e on foreign economic relations relations.. Yet there is also accelerated urban growth, a compounding of the scale of the primate cities and their associated peripheral settlements, perceived increases in social pathologies, growing attachment to national urban planning as a means of securing control cont rol of o f social social and econom economic ic change, chang e, and a n increasing willing willing ness to experiment with new and radical plans and policies. The Third World are reaching for powers countries of the , controls control s and planning best exemplified b y the welfare states statespow of ers, W Western estern Europe Eur ope on the side of innovative planning, and b y the command econo mies mi es of Eastern Europe Euro pe and th thee U .S.S.R. in th thee sense sense of more com plete and effective controls. A t the same time many are seeking to preserve significant elements of their traditional cultures, so that modernisation andwesternisation andwesterni sation are not synonymo synonymous us in such cases. cases. The Redistributive Welfare States o f Western Europe

western n Europe Euro pe is one that The radicalism of the welfare states of wester involves the modification o f the free enterprise system and its larger-scale twentieth-century heirs by governmental action to reduce social and spatial inequities and to provide every citizen with minimum guarantees for material welfare-medical care, education, employment, housing and pensions. This is usually achieved through differential taxation and welfare payments, but i t also involves associated extensions of more centralised decision making designed to make the market system satisfy social goals in addition to its traditional economic functions. I n this way, what has emerged are modified o r mixed capitalist ca pitalist econom economies ies,, the hall marks of which are pluralistic societies with multiparty govern ments,, relatively high ments hig h level levelss of development developm ent and per capita output, built-in capacity for continued growth, and substantial public

sectorss alongside sector alongside elaborate elab orate private privat e markets and 'modern' economic institutions.

 

172

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATJON

Public involvement in urbanisation is t o b e seen as more than merely a counterpoint counter point to pri private vate interests interests i n these cases. B y direct ing society towards goals of redistribution and equity, the com petitive drive is reoriented. By constructing a large share o f all in

and b y

housing existing towns, constructing new towns, the public exercises developmental leadership. Urbanisation is de liberately led in new n ew directions. Socialist Directions

From leadership, hoping that others will follow, the next step is to command, as i n the socialist states, where monolithic govern mental systems are domina ed by a single party; there is state

operation of non-agricultural industries (in some, agriculture, too) and centralised direction o f the economy. Each of the socialist nations shows shows strong commitme commi tment nt to economic growth, but on the social soc ial side there is al also so eliminatio elimination n of most of the status differences differences based upon economic rewards that are the hallmark hall mark of free-ente free-enter r prise pri se competition. competition. A greate gre aterr uniformity and lack of specialisation is to be seen seen in in the th e urba ur ban n fabric, alongside more highly regimented regiment ed life styles and building patterns. I t is easier to command with a n explicit set of rules and procedures to be followed; i n this way urban urb an development has been both bureaucratised and standardised under socialism. FOUR MODES OF PLANNINO

A sequence of four modes of planning may b e discerned i n the foregoing socio-political sequence : reactive o r ameliora ameliorative tive prob prob  lem-solving, allocative trend-modification, exploitive opportunity seeking and developmentalleadership, and normative goal-orien tation. These involve progressive achievement of greater closure o r control with respect to both means and ends and the passage from the past to a n idealised future as the determinant of the urban future. The four modes are described in Table 8 and de picted in Fig. 18. A s will now b e demonstrated, however, they are all variants of the more general policy model diagrammed i n Fig. 17·

The general model may b e understood if one distinguishes be

tween two categories of inputs (external forces and poliey instru ments) that produce change in the urban system, resulting in two

 

D I V E RG E N CE IN T W E N T I E T H - C EN TU R Y URBANISATION

Box 4

173

Box 2

Goals and Objectives

Policies and P r o g r a m m e ~

I inputs) I

The Urban System

t outputs)

Box 1

External Forces

•

Undesirable Results Box 5

Box 3

FIG. 17

An urba ur ban n policy model

different types of outputs (undesirable results, o r 'problems' and sought-after results, or 'goals'). I n this way, the model may b e thought of as aseries of 'boxes 'boxes'' , as in Fig. 17. I n understanding the parts, we first need to consider Box I , the 'system' to b e acted upon. The urban system is composed of individuals and institu tions co-existing in a n environment composed of interacting natural and cultural processes, and possessing a n established set of traditions o r values. Such systems are open, not closed, changed by the influences of forces from within and the impact of forces from without. Their essence is process not place; they are in continual motion, respon sive to the dynamics of change that produ produce ce syst system emss of heightened complexity and scale, in which interactions intensify and tensions increase. The tensions, in turn, incite the so-called urban crisis and produce 'urban problems' as one category category of outpu out put. t. Unfortunately Unfortu nately,, much of this this change in urban ur ban sys systems tems appears appea rs to b e without purpose, and without a sense of purpose there is often little satisfaction with the results and rather narrow focus on the problems. The purpose of urban policy policy is thus to point the polity

towards goals. This is the responsibility of national and civic leadership. leader ship. Such policy has to be future-oriented. I t cannot remain remain

 

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D I V E R O E N C E IN T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y U RBA N I SA T I O N

177

bound Up with problems arising in the past, nor even with the present. It has to anticipate the future; indeed, i t has to invent thefuture. This brings us to Box 2 of the poliey model, whieh eontains the goals. Construetive urban poliey is seen as being direeted to aehieving long-range goals and meeting speeified objeetives on the way toward the realization of these goals. But this begs a majo ma jorr question. Are u urb rban an system systemss teleologi teleologieal eal (this is purposeful)? Can they be made goals-oriented and managed by affirmative policies and planning? Or, is the urban system simply aseries of existential situations o r events to whieh, a t best, the eivie eommu nity nit y will respond ? Diffe Different rent soeie soeieti ties es have hav e answered these ques tions in different ways, as we have seen, and thus have embodied into their planning proeess quite different versions of the poliey model mod el portrayed portr ayed in Fig. 17. Every urban system exists in a world of eultural and historical eonstraints. Inevitably, ideologieal expedieney rather than poli tieal wisdom will retard development; ignoranee is always aggres sively available to prevent the rationalisation of the urban pro eess. Agrarian legal systems and obsolete politieal struetures make i t diffi diffieult eult,, if not n ot impossi impossible ble,, to att a ttai ain n goals o r even to reaeh temp orary targets. In turn, these restrietive and restraining forees tend to inspire negative poliey, poliey, aimed aime d a t preventing ehange from taking plaee. And, as a eonsequenee, urban planning often takes on a reaetive, eurative role, simply responding to erises and trying to clean u p 'bundles' of erises whieh, for want of a better term, we might eall 'messes' (Box 5). Box 3 of the model draws attention to exogenous forees-all those inputs into the system that influenee its future behaviour and whose eauses lie beyond the influenee of the urban policy maker, for example war, inflatio inflation, n, the birth bi rth rate, r ate, and behaviour of the Gross National Produet. A small rise in the GNP will prob ably do more to inerease the eeonomie growth of a eity than all the effort the planner ean make to bring industry into the eom munity. A poliey maker has to be knowledgeable not only about the internal strueture of his system; he also has to be thoroughly familiar with these forees from beyond the system and the nature of the t heir ir energies. energies.

of the t heir ir energies. energies. Now, we ean turn to the poliey maker who, understanding the nature of the urban system with whieh h e is dealing, and having H.C.U·-7

 

178

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

some insights of the some th e influenee of extern ext ern al forees forees upon up on it, eonsiders the kinds of poliey whieh he has to put into the system to aehieve the desired goals (Box 4). There appear to be three kinds of poliey he can formulate: poliey dealing with the social or physieal en vironment, poliey dealing with institutional struetures, and poliey dealing with the values established within the system. First of an, the poliey maker has to determine the nature of the problem. H e has to know whether he is simply to ameliorate eurrent problems o r to design a n idealised alternative future. H e has a range of policies a t his disposal, but he has to know the types of poliey to be utilised utilised in light li ght of the interna int ernall and an d extern e xtern al energies energies eneoun tered in the workings of the system. Thus, polieies beeome instru mental; that is, 'levers' to be 'pulIed' in order to eause ehange in the system--change to eorreet a eondition or to eontrol develop ment o r to ereate a desired eondition. Whether the polieies are effeetive, or whether they are suppressed by more powerful exter nal forees depends on how wen the poliey maker has eompre hended the problem and the teehniques and eontrols made avail able to him by the t he politieal aetors aetors.. The policies have to be imple mented with programmes, whieh may be effeetive o r may not n ot he. he. The best of polie polieies ies are ineffect ineffective ive if progra pr ogramme mmed d poorly. A Sequence 01 Determinants 01 the Future We are now a t the point where we ean understand the sequenee

of four modes of planning distinguished in Table 6 and dia grammed in Fig. 18. The mcst eommon is simply ameliorative natural tendeney to do nothing until prob lems arise o r undesirable dysfunetions are pereeived to exist in sufficient amounts to demand eorreetive or ameliorative aetion. Sueh 'reaetive' o r 'curative' planning proeeeds by studying 'prob lems', setting standards for aeeeptable levels of toleranee of the dysfunetions, and devising means for sealing the problems baek down to aeeeptable proportions. The foeus is upon present prob lems, which implies eontinually reaeting to proeesses that have already worked themselves out in the past; in a proeessual sense, then, sueh planning is past-oriented. And the implied goal is the preservation of the 'mainstream' values of the past by smoothing outt tthe ou he problems problems that arise along the way. problem-solving-the

A seeond style of planning is allocative trend-modilying. This is the future-oriented version of reaetive problem-solving. Present

 

D I V E RO E N CE IN T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y URBANISATION

179

trends are projected into the future and likely problems are fore cast. The plan planning ning procedure proc edure invo involv lves es devi devisi sing ng regulatory mechanisms to modify the trends in ways that preserve existing values into the future, while avoiding the predicted future prob lems. econo mic planning, highway building de is Keynesian economic signedSuch to accommodate predicted future travel demands, or Mas ter Planning using the public counterpoint of zoning ordinances and building regulations. regulations. The third planning style style is exploitive opportunity-seeking. opportunity-seeking. Ana lysis is performed not to identify future problems, but to seek out new growth opportunities. The actions that follow pursue those opportunities most favourably ranked in terms of returns arrayed against feasibility and risk. Such is the entrepreneurial world of corporate planning, the real-estate developer, the industrialist, the private risk-taker-and also of the public entrepreneur acting a t the behest of private interests, o r the national leader concerned with exercising developmental leadership, as when Ataturk built Ankara, or as the Brazilian Brazilianss are a re developing developing Amazonia today. I t is in this latter context in already-developed situations that the con cept ce pt of str strategy ategy planning, p lanning, disc discus usse sed d earlier, ea rlier, was developed. Finally, the th e fourth fou rth mode of plann pl anning ing invo involv lves es explicitl explicitly y norma tive goal-orientation. Goals are set, based upon images of the desired future, and policies are designed and plans implemented to guide the system towards the goals, or to change the existing system i f i t cannot achieve the goals. This style of planning in volves the cybernetic world of the systems analyst, and is only possible when a society can achieve closure of means and ends; i.e. acquire sufficient control and coercive power to ensure that inputs will will produce produ ce desired desired outputs. o utputs. The four different planning styles have significantly different long-range results, ranging from haphazard modifications of the future futu re produ p roduced ced by reactive problem problem-so -solvi lving, ng, thr through ough gentle modi fication of trends by regulatory procedures to enhance existing values, to significant unbalancing changes introduced by entre preneurial profit-seeking, to creation of a desired future specified ex ante. ante. Cle Clearly arly,, in any country coun try there is bound to be some mixture of all styles present, but equally, predominant value systems so

determine the preferred policy-making and planning style that significantly different processes assume key roles in determining the futu f uture re in i n different diffe rent socie societi ties es..

 

180

THE HUMAN CONSEQUENCES OF URBANISATION

The publicly supported supporte d private privat e developmental style style that charac terise ter isess the American America n sc scen ene, e, incorporat incor porating ing bargaini barg aining ng among major

interest groups, serves mainly to protect developmental interests by reactive or regulatory planning, ensuring that the American

urban ur ban wil be aimpact continua tion of present tr trends, on only ly chang ing as afuture as resultwill ofl the imcontinuation pact of change produce pr oduced dends, by the exploitive exploi tive opportunity-seeking planning of Arnerican corporations. O n the other hand, hierarchical sodal and political systems, where the governing class is accustomed to govern, where other classes are accustomed to acquiesce, and where private interests have relatively less power, can more readily evolve urban and regional growth polides a t the national level than systems under the sway of the market, local political jurisdictions, o r egali tarian political processes (Rodwin, 1970). This is one reason urban growth policies burgeoned earlier in Britain than in the United States. Controls are of several kinds. Most basically, use of the land is effectively regulated in conformity to a plan that codi fies some public concept of the desirable future and we1comes private profit-seeking development only to the extent that i t con forms to the public plan. Such is the underpinning of urban de velopment in Britain, in Sweden, in France, in the Netherlands, i n Israel's lirnited privately owned segments o r within the desig nated White areas of South Mrica. Such a situation also obtains, i t might be added, in the planning of Australia's new capital, Canberra. T o understand the developmental outcome i n these circumstances, one must understand the aspirations of private developers or of public agencies involved in the development pro cess on the one hand, and the images of the planners built into the Master Plan on the other. I t is the resolution resolution of the t he two force forcess that ultimately shapes the urban scene. I n Britain, Cherry (1972) has concluded that the planners' images of the desirable future have been essentially conservative, aiming to project into the future a belief that centrality is a n imm immutab utable le necess necessity ity for urban order, leading to the preservation of urban forms that are fast vanishing in North America. I n Chapter 4, we noted the differ ences in concept between British and European New Towns pro grammes. What these differences highlight is the importance of the

utopian image that becomes embedded in the specific plan and the effi effica cacy cy with wit h which the th e public counterpoin count erpointt functions functions to con strain private interests.

 

D I V E R O E N C E I N T W E N T I E T H - C E N T U R Y U R B A N I S A T I O N 181

Nowhere has the imagery of the social reformers of the nine teenth century been more apparent than in Soviet planning for the 'city of socialist man'. Reflecting the reactions against the human consequences o f nineteenth-century industrial urban sa tion, the by public counterpoint o f the 'mixed' economies has been replaced the goal-oriented planning of the socialist states and other directed societies. If, to understand under stand urbanisation and its con sequences in the mixed economies, one has to understand the nature and resolutionof private and public forces, in directed societies one has to understand national goals and the ideologies of the planners, for the most important fact of the past quarter century has been the realisation that such sought-after futures can be made to come true. Adna Weber concluded that the history of attempts to change urbanisatio n was was,, to his day, a history of failure. failure. T o  the nature of urbanisation day we must conclude differently. Images of the desirable future are becoming major determinants of that future in societies that are able t o achieve closure between means and ends. Political power is thus becoming a major element of the urbanisation pro cess. Combined with the will to plan and a n image of what might be, i t can be directed t o pro produce duce new social social forms and outcomes, making i t possible for a society to create what it believes believes should be rather than extending what is o r what has been into the future.

 

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Index

Abercrombie, P., 25, 131, 146 Abu-Lughod, J . E., 56, 58-g, 89 Acculturation o f ethnic groups i n the U.S., 61 Ackerman, F., 25 Addams,J ., 17, 18,25 AfHuent apartment complex, life style in, 65 65 African metropolis, rise rise o f tribai tri bai consciousne consciousness ss in, 82 AIIoca AII ocativ tivee trend-modifying, trend-modifyi ng, mode of planning, 179 Ameliorative problem-solving, problem-solving, mode of plann planning, ing, 178 178 Amenity,, role of, i n Amenity Netheriands, 153 America, see Uni e d States Anderson, C., 6 0 Annexation as factor i n twentieth-century U . S . metropolitan Ano mic Anomic society, society, 34growth, Apartheid

46

city, 112 policy of, I 13 Apartment house, appearance of, 126 Architecture domestic, domest ic, history of, of, in Conti Cont i nental Europe, 126-8 landscape,2Q--I, 12 5 Armor, D. J., 61, 6 6

Australia control of urban growth in, 168 decentralisation policy in, 168 Austria, municipal munic ipal socia socialis lism m in,

12 5

'Balanced growth' in Israel, 106-g in Turkey, 102 Bantu, experience o f migrants, 111-13 Barlow, M., 131 Barlow Report, 131 Barn Ba rnett ett,, S. A., 2 25 5 Baroque court city, 124 Barriadas, 83 Barrios, 83 Bar ung-baro ung -barongs, ngs, 83

Bell, D., 49-50 Bell, Bellamy, E., 20 Berghe, P. L . von der, 119 119 Berry, B. B. J . L., 97 Bidonvilles, 83 Booth, C., 25,129 Brazil, planning in, 101 Britain, see Uni ed Kingdom Bruner, E . H., 88

Assimilation

.S., of immigrant groups i n U .S., 60 subprocessess of, subprocesse o f, 60- i

Brutzkus, E., J08, 109 Burgess, E. W., 121 Burnham, D., 22 Bustees of Calcutta, 8 9

 

194

INDEX

Ga/lampas, 83

Canada urban growth, impetus for, urban problems in, 72-3

72

Candilis, Candil is, G., 153 153 Calcutta, 92 Careerism, 65 Causes o f nineteenth-century urbanisation, 2-4 Centralised Centra lised administration i n Third World countries, countries, 78 Centrali Cent rality, ty, erosion of, i n U.S., 54 Chadwick, E., 121 Cherry, G. E., 129, 134, 180 Chicago,61 China, anti-urban bias in,

Civic desig design, n, concern co ncern wit with, h, in Europe, 124-6 Clark, Clar k, C., 97 Class conftict, new forms of, i n Third World, 94 Clinard, M . B., 8 7 Cohen, E., 107 Colombia, planning in, 101-2 Golonias, 83 Commission o n Population Growth and the American Future (1972),46 Communities, Communit ies, isolation of, i n U.S.,59

Choa y, F., 120 Choay, 120 Christaller, W., 107 Gitee Par Git Paralle allel, l, idea oe 153 Cities as administ admi nistrati rative ve centres, 78 78 as main centres o f social and political change, 79 as symbols, 79 heterogeneity o f nineteenth-century, 15

Conc entratio Concentr atio n proces process, s, in nineteenth ninete enth century, 6 Conkin, P . K., 67 Continental Europe, directions in planning, 142-54 Conurbation, 25 'Conventional 'Conven tional wisdom', I domination oe 89-90 limitations limita tions of, 82 Cooley, C. H., 17 Cornelius, W. A., Jr, 81 Cosmopolitan centres, 65 Cosmopolitanism, Cosmopolita nism, 65 Cowan, P., 141

systems of, 96 City

Crooks, ]., 8 8 in U.S., CulturalR. pluralism U .S., 56,

10 5-6

as spectroscope o f society, 8 dass antagonism i n nineteenth-century,9 complexity o f government government,, 9 core-oriented, core-orie nted, dissolv dissolving ing in U.S·,54

differentiation in, 31 essential nature of, 30 o f Socialist Man, 154-63 size, concern for, 160

59-64

Daily urban systems, growth of, i n U.S., 38-48 Davies, J. R., 110 Davis, A. J., 21 Davis, K., 91 Death-controI gains in twentieth-century non-industr non-in dustriaI iaI countries, c ountries, 78

City Beautiful Beautiful Movement, 22,25 City planning, atrophy oe in

U.S., 166

Democratic Democra tic capitalism, capitalism, idea of,

19

Demographie structure o f new nine1eenth-centurycities,6

 

INDEX

'Demonstratio 'Demons tration' n' effect in Third World development, 100 Design in European city city,, 124-6 124 -6 Deviancy in the th e city, city, 34 Dewey,J., 17, 18 DeWitt, B. P., 17 Diffusion Third World, 9 5 ~ hierarchical, 96 Dotson, Dots on, A., 105 'Dual economies' in Third World,99

Durkheim, E., 10,58 Dynamic density density (rate (rat e o f interaction), 58 Edwards, A. T., 131 E.E.C., employment emplo yment changes in, 143 Elkins, T . H., 143, 149, 159 Engels, F., 120-1, 122-3, [29 Ethnic

centres, 65 subcultures, subcul tures, cohesivene cohesiveness ss of, 33

Europe

o f urban central concern policy in, 142 changes in urban system in,

12 7

concern with civic design design in, in ,

12 4-5

Continent al dire Continental directio ctions ns i n planning, 142-54 historie histor ie city types in, 11 115 5 post-war planning in, 115-63 tradition o f public involvement in, 123-4 123- 4

195

urban patterns and social

struc ture in, 116-23 structure western, radicalism o f welfare welf are states stat es of, of, 17 I European cities contro con troll of skyline in, 117 design in, 124-6 Eastern, impact of Russian socialism, 158-60 street pattern of, I 16 heterogeneity in, in, 118118-19 19 socio-politi sociopolitical cal struct str ucture ure o f classical pre-industrial, 117-19 Exclusive suburb, characteristics character istics of, i n U.S., Explo65 Exploitive itive opportunity-seeking mode of plann planning, ing, 179 179 Externa Ext ernall economies economies i n nineteenth-century urbanisation,, 4 urbanisation Eyre, L. A. A ., 89 Fabian socialists,

25

cultu re', 124 culture', Fair, T . J. D., 110 Familism, 65 F a ~ a d e

Familistic areas of American cities,65 Family structu structure, re, traditional, appearance of, 33 Farm migrants, number of, in twentieth-century American urbanisation, 46 Favelas, 83 'Filtering' 'Filte ring' proce process ss in U S. housing mark market, et, 52-3 Finland

building o f Tapiola, 147-8

urban growth policies, goals and objectives, 142-3,

144-5

urbaninheritancein, 115-41

planning in, 147-8

Fischer, C. S., 31 Fisher, J. C., 157, 158, 160 Foley, D . L., 132

 

196

INDEX

Follett, M . P., 17 'Footloose' industries, 50 Foreshaw, J. H., 131 France

Cit e Para Cite Parallel llel,, idea of, 152-3 economic and urban planni pla nning ng in, 148-53, 168 grands ensembles of, I 4 ~ 5 0 major thrust of nation al planning effort, 148-g metropoles d'equilibre, mechanisms to achieve goals of, 152 national urban growth strategy, idea of, 151 establishmen ishmentt of, of, OREAM, establ

15 2 stra strateg tegy y of, of, 150-1 150-1 PADOG, 'preferential 'prefere ntial axes' concept,

15 1

problems o f Paris, 150-1 Schema Sch ema directeu directeurr 1960), 15 1- 2 Free-enterprise dynamics in twen tieth-cen tieth -cen tury urbanisation, 166-7 Friction theory in South Africa, 110

Friedmann,

J., 44, 9 1

Galle, O. R., 35 Gans, H . J., 33, 66 Garden City, 21 activists, 26 International Federation (19 (1 9 13),26 ~ o v e m e n t , 2 4 - 5 , 2 6

Gecekondu, 83 Geddes, P., 25 Gentrificati Gentri fication on process process in

Giddings, F., I 7 Glickson, A., 107 Goldstein, S., 6 I Gordon, M . M., 60 Gottmann, J., 4 6 Gourbiuilles, 83 Gravier, J. F., Par Paris is et le desert franfais, 150 Greenbelt continental concept, concept, 1 25-6 strategy in D.K., 131 Greer, Gree r, S., 56 Griffen, Griff en, W. B., B., 21 Growth centres i n Colombia, 103 in regional development, 1°3 Africa, I 13 in South Hall, P., 136 Handlin, 0., 4 6, 54 Harris, Harri s, C. D., 156 Harri Ha rriso son, n, A. A.,, 12 128 8 Hauss Ha ussman man n, Baron, 22, 22, 12 125 5 Hautreux, J., 15 1 Hautreux,

J. (

w i t h ~ .

Rochefort), L a Fonction

Regionale dans l'Armature Urbaine Franfaise (1964), 151 HeartIand of D.S D.S., ., 95 Heraud, B. J., 139 Hertzen, H . von, 148 'Hierarc 'Hie rarchica hicall diffusion' diffusion',, 96 Holzner, L., I 13 Hoover, E. . , 44 Housing Acts (D.S.), 69, 70 industry, suburban D.S., 51

neighbourhood change, 144 George, P., 151 Ghettos,, 65 Ghettos

market mar ket,, 'filtering' 'filtering ' process process in, 52 - 3 policy in D.S., 68-70 preferences in Europe, 126-8

 

INDEX

programmes, Federal, 69

reform,innineteenth-eentury planning, 22-3 Howard, E., 21, 123, 129-30,

137, 142, 16 5 Garden Cities o{ Tomorrow,

12 9

Howe, F. C., 9,17 Indian Amerieans, 61 Indonesia, planning in, 100-1 Infant mortality i n

nineteenth-eentury eities, 6 Interaetional density, 58-9 Inter-metropolitan periphery, 45 Internal differentiation i n U.S. eities, 59-63 Israel absorption of migrants, 107 planning in, 106-g

91 Janowitz, M., 6 4 Jaeger, 1.,

Japan

aeeeierated eentralisation in, 168-9 National Capital Regional

Development Law, provisions of, 169 national development polieies, 169-70 urban laws, 169-70 J apanese apan ese Amerieans, Amer ieans, 6 I Jefferson, M., 97-8 J ewish Amerieans, Ameri eans, 6 I Johnson, President L . B., 53-4 Juppenlatz, M., 83 Kampongs, 83

197

Kohl,]. G., 118, 149 Kristol, I., 5 4

Kuznets, S., 2

Labour market dynamies i n Third W orId urban eeonomies, 93-4 Landseape arehiteeture, 20-1,

12 5

Lawton, R., 115 L e Corbusier,]., 120, 165

Ville Radieuse, 1 2 0 Leaeoek, E., 8 7 Lenin, V . 1., 155 Lewis, J . W., 105 Lewis, 0., 85 Liehtenberger, E., 115 Life eyde, stage stagess of, 64 Lindbloom, C . E., 72 Lithwiek, N. H., 72 Little, K., 82 Loealism in U.S., 65 Lugard, F. J. D. (later Lord), Dual Mandate, 110 McClelland, D. C., 50 MeGee, T . G., 92-3

Maekaye,B.,25

Maine, H.,planning 10 Malaysia, in, 102 Mangin, W., 87

Marris, P., 94 Material densi density ty (population concentration), 58 Mayhew, H., 129 Meiser, R . L., 58 Melting-pot in South Africa, 109-14 in U.S., 59-64 Mental disorders, frequeneies

Kh orev Khor ev,, B. B. S., S., 161 Kinship Kins hip hypothesis, 32-3 Kitano, H . H . L., 61 Kivell, P. T., 141

of, in U.S. of, U.S.,, 58 Merlin Mer lin,, P., 152 152 Metropoles d'equilibr d'equilibree (Franee), 152

 

198

INDEX

Metropolitan area eoneept, 27-8 eoneentration in twentieth-eentury U.S., eonsequenees of, 2727-35 35 growth, changing nature of, in U.S.,46 influence, eores of, i n U.S., 45 Mexie Mex iean an Arnericans, Arnericans, 6 I Migrant subeultures in Third World,82

Migrants, farm, in U . S ., 46 Migration eityward,5

eonsequenees eonsequene es of, in Third World,80-3 World nature of, in Third80 urbanisation,

rate of farm population, 46

'National 'Nat ional Society', emergenee of, in U.S., U.S ., 49, 54 Neighbourhood Neighb ourhood nie niehes hes,, homogeneity homogene ity of, in U.S.,

51

'Neighbourhood unit' eoneept in U.S.,69

Neighbourhoods, U.S. boundarie bound ariess of, of, 63 63 defended, 6 4 mental map of, 63 raeial separation se paration of, of, 52-3 Netherlands planning in, 153-4 polyeentrie polyee ntrie 'eoneentrated 'eoneentrat ed deeoneentration' poliey, 154 153-4 Randstad, role o f amenity, 153

smaller eities eities as staging points in, 5 theory, theor y, eonventional, defieieney of, 8 1-2 1- 2 Milgram, Milgra m, S., 3 Military juntas, j untas, 79 Miller, j., 44 Mills, E., 45 Miner, H., 82

New eit eitie ies, s, popul populatio ation n strueture struet ure of,, ninetee of nineteenth-eent nth-eentury, ury, 6 'New town blues' i n the U .K.,

Modemisation, nineteenth-eentury,4

139-41 139-4 1 oceupational strueture of, of, 139 post-war plans, 13 1-5 spatial segregation of housing types in, 139 139 NewTownsMovement, 123 New York State Tenement Housing Law (1901), 23 Nineteenth-eentury growth salient features featu res of, 3 urbanisation, urbanisa tion, scale and eauses

Moore, J. W., 61 Mosaie eulture eriminall subeultures in, erimina in, 66 life styles in, 64-6 Mumford, L., 25, 146 Munieipal-Ievel Munieipal-I evel plann planning ing in Third W orld, 104-5 networks in Third Mutual aid networks World Wor ld cities cities,, 9 4

13 8

128-41 NewTowns, Britain's, 128-41 assessed, 136-9 impact on deeentralisation, 137 new trends and polieies,

Nation Nat ional al Associatio Association n of Real Estate Est ate Boards, 70 Nation al Conferenee of City Plann Pl ann in ing g (190 (1909) 9),, 24

Of,2-4

Nixon, President R . M .,70-1 70-1 Non-industrial countries eonditions eondit ions in cities o of, f, 78

 

INDEX

old ol d institutional institutio nal structures in, importance impor tance of, 78 urba ur ban n fertility fertility in, 78 Normative goal-oriented planning, 179 Olmsted, F. L., 20, 21 OREAM (France), establishment establishme nt of, 152 Osborn, Osbor n, F. F . J., 26, 26, 130 Owen, R ., 129 Packa rd, V ., 47, Packard, 47, 57 PADOG (France), 150-1 Pahl, R . E., 138 'Parasi 'Pa rasitic tic cities', cities', 99 Paris, growing concern with wit h problemss of, problem of, 150-1 Park, R . E., E., 17, 18, 5g-60, 121 Perevedentsev, V . V., V., 161-2 Perry, Per ry, C., 69,137,146 69,13 7,146 Pinkney Pink ney,, A., A., 61 Planning modes of allocative trend-modifying (regulatory), 178-9 ameliorative problem-solving (reactive), 178 exploitive opportunity-seeking (entrepreneurial), 179 normative goal-oriented (future-oriented), 179 municipal-Ievel, in Third World, 104-5 professionalisation professional isation of, of, 23-6 23 -6 'reactive', 'curative 'cur ative',', focu focuss of, 17 8 styles sty les,, long-r lo ng-range ange results of, of,

199

.S., ., Pluralism problem in U .S 7 1- 3 Polarisation Polarisatio n pattern pat ternss in U.S., 53 Policy formulation of, 178 planning plan ning models models,, 172 Population Populati on mobility in U.S., 47 Poverty, Povert y, cultu c ulture re of, traits tra its of, of, 85-7 'Preferential 'Prefer ential axes' axes' concept in France, 151 'Primacy' idea id ea of, in Third Wor World, ld, 97-8 reasons for, for, 99 'Private 'Pri vate cities', cities', 99 'Privatism' 'Privat ism' tradition trad ition in America, 26 Progressive thought ideologists' beliefs, 17 in nineteenth-century urban planning, 17-20 Proletarias, 83 Public involvement involvement tradition traditio n of Europe, 123-4 Purdom, C. B., 26, 130 Quandt,J .,17

Racial discrimination in U.S., 52-3 separation of neighbourhoods in U.S., 53 Ranchos, 83 Randstad, 153-4 'Rank-size 'Ranksize distribution' of cities,97 Rasmussen, S. E., 144-5 Redfield, R ., 82 Regional planning, see

179

urba ur ban, n, roots of, of, in nineteenth-century, 1 5 -26

respective countries

Reissmann, L., 23 Reith, Lord, 131 Reith Rei th Committee, Committee, 137

 

200

INDEX

Revolut ion of rising Revolution rising expectations in Third World,7 8 Robson, B. T., 130 Rochefort, M., 151 Rodwin, L., 180 Roosevel Roos evelt, t, President Presi dent F. D., 67 Rosser,, C., Rosser C. , 89 Rowntree, S., 129 Royce, J., 17 Rural traditions, continuity of, in Third W orld orl d cities, cities, 82 Sanitary Reform Movement Move ment in U . K ., 121 Satellite cities,26 communities, as unified settlements in Sweden, 146-7 'Satisficing' solutions, notion noti on of, in planning, 167 Segmental Segme ntal society, society, in nineteenth-c ninete enth-century entury ci citi ties es,,

10

Servan-Schreiber, J.-J., 55-6 Scale and mobility in social theory, 56-8 Scale Sca leurbanisation, of nineteenth-century nineteenth-cent 2-4 ury

Shachar, A. S., 106, 109 Simmel, G., G ., I I Singapore, 90, 101 Sjoberg, G., 164 Social Soci al organisation organisat ion in nineteenth century, 17-18 Social philosophers in nineteenth ninetee nth century, 12-14 Sodal theoretidans in nineteenth ninetee nth century, 12-14

scale and mobility in, 56-8 toward a new, new, 56-66 56-6 6 Socialist directions directi ons in planning, planning , 172 Man, the city of, of, 154-5 Societal scale, increasing, in V.S., 56 South Sout h Africa Africa apartheid city, 112 control via, via, 110-14 110 -14 policy of, 1 1 3 experience of Bantu Bantu,, I I 1-13 friction theory, 1 O growth centres in, 113 urban migration control contro l in, I I I

Soviet V nion Moscow's growth, gro wth, offici official al Soviet policy, policy, 157-8 official policy for urban growth, 157 planni pla nning ng experience experience,, 155-8 State Sta te Plann P lanning ing Commissio Commission, n,

15 6

urban urb an developmen development, t, accomplishmentss of, accomplishment of, 156 conditions affecting, 156-7 Spread Spre ad effect in regional regiona development, 96 l

Squa tterr settleme Squatte settlements nts conventional wisdom wisdom about, 83 extent exte nt of, of, 84 functional funct ional role of, 87 in Third World, 83-91 Srole, L., 32, 58 Staffelweise mode of internal migration, 5 'Staging points', smaller dties

Sodal theory

interac tional density in, 58-9 interactional internal differentiati differentiation on in, 59-64

as, in migratio as, migr ation, n, 5 Steffens,, L., 9 Steffens Stein, C., 25, 67, 146 Strong, A. L., 148

 

INDEX

Subcultur al deviance in U.S., Subcultural 66 Suburban Subu rban towns towns,, development of, in nine nineteent teenth h century,

20

Suburbanisati on of white Suburbanisation city-dweller city-d wellerss in twentieth-century U.S., 55 Sullivan, F., 91 Sumatra, urban Bat Batak ak li life fe,, 88 Sumner, Sumn er, W. G., I I Survival Surviv al economy economy,, mainten m aintenance ance of, in Third W orId, 94 Suttles, Suttl es, G. D., 62-4, 62 -4, 65 Sweden Master Mast er Plan Pl an for Stockholm, Stockholm, 146-7 planni pla nning ng achievements achievements in, 145-7 satellite communities, creation crea tion of, 146 Systems of cities, 96 Tisdale, H., 27 Third WorId big-city populati popul ation on of, 74 74 centralised administration administratio n in, in,

78

dass conflict in, new ne w forms of,94

development, governmental development, governmenta l natu na ture re of, 78-9 diffusion in, 95-9 hierarchieal, 96 impr im prin intt of colonialism colonialism in, 78 labour market ma rket dynamics dynamics in urban economies of, 93-4

migration consequences of, 80-3

201

planning in, 99-106 municipallevel, 104-5 104-5 political circumstances circumstance s in, 78-9 'primacy' id idea ea of, of, in 97-8 reasons for, 99 'prim 'pr imat atee cities' cities' in, in, 99 rural tradition traditions, s, continuity of, in cities of, 82 squat squ atte terr settlements in in,, 83 conventional conven tional wisdom about,83

ext ent of, extent of, 84 functional role of, 87 survival economy econom y 93-4in, traditmaintenance, traditional ional subcultures reinforcement of, of, 94-5 94 -5 urban economies absorption of labour lab our in, 9 1- 9 structure structu re of, of, 91-3 91- 3 urba ur ban n growth in, in, different context of, of, 74-80 7 4-80 urbanisation, 74-114 contemporary, 75-80 demographie demograph ie factors in, 80

efforts effo rts to 80 urban growth ofcontrol, peripheral settlements,8o-g1 Thomas Tho mas,, R., 137, 137, 13 8, 139 Tönnies, F., I O Transitional urban urb an settle settlemen ments ts economic levels of, 88 seIf-improving nature of, 90 Tugwell, R. G., 67

Turkey

balance bal anced d growth in, idea ide a of, of,

102

nature of,80 research resear ch in, 80-3 theory, deficienc deficiency y of conventional, 81-2

planning in, in, 101 Turner, ]., 88 Turnham, D., 91 Tweed, B., 18

 

202

INDEX

Twentieth-century urbanisati urba nisation, on, North No rth American experience, 27-73 Uni ed Kingdom air poll pollutio ution n in cities of, of, 134,

13 6

Barlow Report Barlow Rep ort,, 131 County of London Plan (1943),13 1 Greenbelt strategy, 131 local-authori localauthority ty housing housing in, social soci al impa im pact ct of, 130-1 local-authority intervention, 134, 136 evaluation tion of, of,138 'newevalua town blues', New Towns, 128-41 assessment of, 136-9 impac im pactt on on decen tralisation, 137 New Towns Movement, 123 New trends and policies, 139-4 1 occupational structure str ucture of, 139 post-war plans, 131-5

seIf-containment social soc ial bala ba lanc ncee in, goal, 138 138 spatial segregation of housing types in, 139 planning development controls in, 134, 13 6 early growth gr owth of, 128-3 effort for London, Londo n, goals goals of, of,

13 2 - 4

new trends and policies, 139-4 1

Sanitary Reform Movement, Movement, 121 South-East South-Ea st Study St udy (1964), 14 1 Strategie Plan for the South-East (1970),141 Town and Country Planning Acts (1941 and 1944), 13 2 Town and Countr Country y Planning Planning Association (1941), 26 Town Planning Act (1909), 26; (1932), 130 Town Planning Institute 14),26 (191 (19 urba ur ban n eco ecolog logy y and social structure in nineteenth century, 120-1 White Paper on Centr Central al 63), 141 Scotland (19 (196 V.N. Cent Centre re for Housing, Building, and Planning, recommendations recommendat ions of, of, 90-1 United Unite d States acculturation of ethnic groups, 61-2 age structure structur e o f nineteenthnineteenth-century century ci citi ties es in, 6-7 American Americ an City Planning Institute (1917), 24 American culture, mainstream mainstr eam of, 50 American planning plann ing style, style, 66-73

atrophy of city planning in, 166 Bureau of the Budget, Committee on

Royal Commissio Commission n on the t he Distribution of the Industrial Population, Population,

13 1

Metropolitan Area Definition, 28 city, core-oriented core-or iented,, dissolving dissolving of,54

 

INDEX

communities in isolation of, 59 new fonns fon ns of, 62-7 cultura cul turall pluralism in, 62 diffusion diffus ion in, 95-7 ethnic grou groups, ps, acculturation acculturat ion (assimilation) of, 61-2 ethnic subcultures in, cohesiveness of, 33 familism in, 65 familistic area a reass in cities of, of, 65 migrants ts in, 46 fann migran 'footloose' industries, 50 ghettos, ghet tos, 65 Housing Act (1937), 30 industry, suburban, 51 market, 'filtering' process in, 52-3 policy, 68-70 programmes, Federal, 69 life cyc1e in, stages o f (a (ass dede velopmenta velop mentall process process), ), 64 localism in, 65 megalopolis, 46 'melting-pot', 60-2 metropolitan metropol itan area(s) area(s) conceptt of, 27-8 concep 46-7 gro growth wth of,cones influence, of, 45 metropolitan concentration, concentration, consequences consequen ces of, of, in twentieth century, 25-35 Mosaic culture cultur e in, 64-6 Nation Nat ional al Resources Resources Committee, O u r Cities. Cities. Their The ir Role in in the National Economy (1937),28-30

203

'neighbourhood unit' concept,69 new towns in, 67-8 New York State Tenement Housing Law (190 I), 23 occupational career

traject ories (as trajectories developmen devel opmental tal proc proces ess) s),, 64-5

pluralism, problem prob lem of of,, in, 71 - 3 Population Growth and the American Future (1972), Commission on, 4 6 privatism, tradition of, in, 26 Regional Planning Planni ng Association o f America,

25

scale and mobility in, 56-8 suburb, exc1usive, characteristics characteri stics of, 65 suburbanisation o f white city-dwellerss in city-dweller twentieth cen tury, 55 transfonnation o f cities in nineteenth century, 27 urban change change,, contemporary, reasons for, 49-56 development in, urban emergence of broader

concepts, 70-1 urban growth process, 95-7 self-generated nature of, 47 urban population centrifugal movem m ovement ent of of,, 48 changes chang es in reasons reasons for, for,

'national 'nati onal society' society' in, emergence emerge nce of, of, 49, 54 neighbourhoods in, 63-4 racial separation sepa ration of, 52-3

48-5 6

urban problems, emergence o f national concern with,28-3 0

 

204

INDEX

Unit ed States (contd} United urba ur ban n region regionss new type of heterogeneity in, 62 in twentieth century, 3535-8 8 urba ur ban n syste systems ms,, daily, growth grow th of,38-48 value systems in, 65 zoning in as conservative holding operations, 24 as means of protectin prot ecting g proper pro perty ty values, values, 24 for regulating urban development, 24 Unwin, R., 130 Urban

decentralisation,, promotion decentralisation of, in Indonesia, 100-1 development, emergence of broade bro aderr concepts concepts of, of, in U.S., 70-1 ecology and so socia ciall structure struc ture in nineteenth-century nineteenth-century Britain, 120-1 economies, Third W orld sectors of, 91-2 structure of, of, 91-3 91- 3

environment, socialof, 54 fragmentation explosion, 38 6 fields,96 fields,9 growth grow th policies policies goals and objectives in Europe, 142-3 in Canada, 72-3 patterns and so soci cial al structure str ucture,, in Europe, 116-23 1 16-23 population centrifugal movement, 48

region, new twen tieth tiet h -cen -cen tury, 36-55 system, in Europe, changes in, 127 U rbanisation nineteenth-century, nineteenth -century, 1-26 1- 26 twentieth-century divergentt paths divergen path s in, in, 164164-81 81 North Nort h American American experience, 27-73 Third W orld experience, experienc e, 7 4 - 11 4 U rbanism as a way wa y of life, life, 1 4 - 15 U.S.S.R., see Soviet Union Valen tine, C., 87 Valentine, 87 Vaughan, R., 115 Vaux,, C., 21 Vaux VeilIer, L., 23 Vernon, R., R ., 44 Warner, S. B., 166 Weber,A. F., 1,2,20,36,74, 80, 181 in the 0/ Cities Nineteenth Century, 2 0

The Growth

Weber, M., 11-12 Welfaree states of Western Welfar Europe,radicalism of,

17 1

WelIs, H . G., 36-8,4 36- 8,46, 6, 119 White, L., 7 White, M., 7 White, W.A., 17 Wiebe, Wie be, R. H., 17 Wilcox, D. F., 11 11

in Third World, 74 problems, emergence of national concern in U.S.,, 28-30 U.S.

Wilmot t, P., 138 Wilmott, 138 Wirth, L., 14,27,30-5,36,59, 60, 80, 82, 164 evaluation of, of, 30-5

 

INDEX

Wright, F. L., Broadacre City, 120

Wright, H.,

25

Yasui, S., 169 Young, M., 138 Zehner, R . B., 68

Zipf, G. K., 97 Zoning, Zoni ng, U .S., .S., 24 as conservative conservative holding operation, 24 as means of protecting protec ting proper pro perty ty values values,, 24 for regulating urban development, 24

205