Belgica V Ochoa JR

 

PASCUA, MA. BETINA GRACE V.

CONSTITUTION CONSTITUTI ON I

JD 1A

CASE DIGEST

BELGICA v. OCHOA JR.

710 SCRA 1 (2013)

FACTS:

Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant me ant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's district. Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations approp riations In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly commo nly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage usa ge would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive. On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Temporar y Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 20 13 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the annual "Pork " Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions prov isions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, lump -sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date requiring public respondents to comment on issuing a TRO (September 10, 10 , 2013 TRO) enjoining the DB DBM, M, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013.

I S SU SUE :

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on separation of powers and non-delegability of legislative power.

RULING:

The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been violated. The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which belongs to the executive department. Legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in the various operational aspects of  budgeting, including including ―the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities and the ― regulation and release of funds in violation of the separation of powers principle. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any an y of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority to identify projects is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition proh ibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Respondents also failed to prove that the role of the legislators is only recommendatory in nature. They even admitted that the identification of the legislator constitutes a mandatory requirement before the PDAF can be tapped as a funding source. The principle of nondelegability of legislative powers has been violated The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers postenactment identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability non -delegability since

 

said legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which –  which –  as  as settled in Philconsa –  Philconsa –   is is lodged in Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: ― No money shall  be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. The legislators are individually exercising the power of appropriation because each of them determines how much of their PDAF fund would go to and a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.

 In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members,  should not cross over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is  properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the  picture when it deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval and passage of the GAA, Congress law making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not no t to blur the constitutional boundaries between them them,, Congress must "not concern itself with details for implementation by the Executive."

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