BANDURA, Albert. 1991. Social Cognitive Theory of Moral Thougt and Action

 

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Florida lnternational Univers University ity

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Social Cognitive Theory o f oral Thought and Action

Albert Bandura

ABSTRACT A comprehensive theory of morality must explain how moral reasoning in conjunction with other psychosoc psychosocial ial factors govems moral conduct. Soc ial cog nitive theory adopts a cognitive interactionist perspective to moral phenomena. Within this conceptual framework personal factors in the forro forro of moral thought and affective self-react ions moral conduc t and environmental facto factors rs al alii operat e as interacting deterroinants that iníluence each other bidirectionally. Moral think ing is a process in which multidimensional rules or standar standards ds are used to judge conduct. Situations with moral implications contain many decisional ingredients that may e given lesser or greater weight depending upon the standards by which they are cognitively processed and the particular constellations o f events in given moral predicaments. There are sorne culturally universal features to the developmental changes of standards of conduct and the locus o f moral agency. These commonalities arise from basic uniforroities in the types of biopsycho social changes that occur with increasing age in all cultures. A theory o f morality requires a broader conception than is provided by rationalistic approaches casi in terros of skill in abstract reasoning. Moral conduct is motivated and regulated mainly by the ongoing exercise of self-reactive iníluence. Self-regulatory mecha nisms therefor e forro forro aan n integral integral part part in the conception of moral agency in social cognitive theory. Development of self-regulatory capabilities does not create an invariant control mechanism within a person. Self-reactive iníluences o not operate unless they they are activated and the there re are many psychosocial pro cesses by which self-sanctions can be selectively activated and disengaged from transgressive conduct. Mechanisms of moral disengagement also play a central role in the social cognitive theory of morality.

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FIG 1.1. Mechanisms through which interna contr ol is selectively activated or disengaged from reprehe reprehensible nsible conduct at different points in the regulatory process (Bandura, 1986).

dards. Figure 1.1 shows the four major points in the self-regulatory process at which interna moral control can can be disengaged from from detrimental conduct. Self sanctions can be disengaged by reconstruing conduct, obscuring causal agency, disregarding or misrepresenting injurious consequences, and blaming and de valuating the victims. These mechanisms of moral disengagement have been examined most exten sively in the expression of violent conduct. But selective disengagement of moral self-sanctions is by no meaos confined to extraordinary inducements to violence. People often experience contlicts in which behavior they themselves devalue can serve as the means for attaining valued benefits. As long as self-sanctions over ride the force of externa inducements, behavior is kept in line with personal standards. However, in the face of strong externa externa inducements such contlicts are often resolved by selective disengagement of self-sanctions. This enahles other wise considerate people to perform self-serving activities that have detrimental social effects. The processes by which self-regulatory capabilities are acquired have been examined in sorne detail. However, the selective activation and disen gagemenl of inter interna na control, which have considerable theoretical theoretical and social import, have only recently received systematic study.

Moral Justification

One set of disengagement practices operates on the construal of the behavior itself. People do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions. What is culpable can be

made righteous through cognitive reconstrual. In this process, detrimental con-

 

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Percent of people fully obedient to injurious commands as a function of the legitimation and closeness of the authority issuing the commands {plotted from data by Milgram 19741. FIG 1 2

for lhe effecls of one s aclions. The self system operales most efficiently in lhe service o f aulhority when followers assume personal responsibility for being duliful executors while relinquishing personal responsibility for the hann caused by their behavior. Followers who disowned responsibilily without being bound by a sense of duty would be quite unreliable.

Diffusion of Responsibility 1ñe deterrent power o f self-sanctions is weakened when the link belween con duct and ils consequences is obscured by diffusing responsibility for culpable behavior. This is achieved in several ways. Responsibility can be diffused by division of labor. Most enterprises require the services of many people each perfonning fragmentary jobs thal seem hannless in themselves. The fractional contribulion is easily isolated from llhe he eventual function especia lly when par

ticipants exercise liltle personal judgment in carrying oul a subfunction thal is relaled by remole complex links lo lhe end resull. Afler aclivilies become

 

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SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY

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routinized into programmed subfunctions, attention shifts from the import of what one is doing to the details of one 's fractional fractional job (Kelman, 1973) 1973).. Group decision making is another common bureaucratic bureaucratic practice that enables otherwise considerate people to behave inhumanely, because no single individual feels responsible for policies arrived at collectively. Where everyone is responsi ble no one is really responsible. Social organizations go to great lengths to devise sophisticated mechanisms for obscuring responsibility for decisions that will affect others adversely. Collective action action is still another diffusion expedient for weakening self-restraints. Any harm done by a group can always be ascribed, in large part, to the behavior of other members. members. People, therefore, act more harshly when responsibility is obfuscated by a collective instrumentality than when they hold themselves personally accountable for what what they do (Bandura, Underwood , Fromson, 1975; Diener, 1977; Zimbardo, 1969). Figure 1.3 shows the level of punitiveness of individual individualss given punitive power over others under condition s in which the severity of their sanctions was determined personally or jointly by a group (Bandura, lJnderwood, Fromson, 197 1975) 5)..

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FIG. 1.3. Leve l of punitiveness by individuals under conditions in which severity of their punitiveness was determined personally or

jointly by a group. Occasions represent successive times at which punitive sanctions could be applied (Bandura, Underwood,

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FIG. 1.4. Perce ntage of people fully obedient to injurious commands FIG. issued by an authority as the victim's suffering becomes more evident and personalized (plotted from data by Milgram, 1974).

carry them out. The farther removed individuals are form the end results, the weaker is the restraining power of the foreseeable destructive effects. Kilham and Mann 1974) set forth the view that the disen disengagem gagement ent of personal control is easiest for the intennediaries in a hierarchical system they neither bear respon sibility for major decisions nor are they a party to their execution. In performing the transmitter role, they model dutiful behavior and further legitimize their superiors and their social policies and practices. Consistent with these specula tions, intennediaries are much more obedient to destructive commands than are those who have to carry them out and face the results Kilham Mann, 1974) 1974)..

Dehumanization The final set of disengagement practices operates on the recipients of detrimental acts. The strength of self-evaluative reactions to injurious conduct partly depends on how the perpetrators view the people toward whom the behavior is directed. To perceive another as human activates empathetic or vicarious emotional reac tions through perceived similarity Bandura. 1991 . The joys and sufferings oí similar persons are more vicariously arousing than are those of strangers or individuals who have been divested of human qualities. Personalizing the inju

rious effects experienced by others also makes their suffering much more salient.

 

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FIG. 1.5. Level of punitiveness on repeated occasions toward people characterized characte rized in humanized terms, not personalized with any charac terization (neutrall. or portrayed in dehumanized terms (Bandura, Un derwood, Fromson, 19751.

Under certain conditions, the exercise of instit institutional utional power changes the users in ways that are conducive to dehumanization. This happens most oíten when persons in positions o í authority have coercive power over others and adequate safeguards for constraining the behavior o í powerholders are lacking. Power holders come to devalue those over whom they wield control (Kipnis, 1974). In a simulated prison experiment (Haney, Banks, Zimbardo, 1973), even college students, who had been randomly chosen to serve as either inmates or guards given unilateral power, began to treat their charges in degrading, tyrannical ways as guards. Thus, role assignment that that authorizes use o í coercive power overrode personal characteristics in promoting punitive conduct. Systematic tests o í rela tive influences similarly show that social influences conducive to punitiveness exert considerably greater sway over aggressive conduct than do people's per sonal characteristics ( Larsen, Cole Cole man, Forges, Johnson, 1971 )

The overall findings from research on the different mechanisms o í moral disengagemenl corroborate the historical chronicle of human atrocities: ll re quires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce

 

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heinous deeds. Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things. Psychological research tends to focus extensively on how easily it is to bring out the worst in people through dehumanization and Power o Humanization

other self-exonerative means. The sensational negative findings receive the greatest attention. Thus, for example, the aspect of Milgram s research on ohe dient aggression that is widely cited is the evidence that good people can he talked into perfonning perfo nning cruel dee deeds. ds. However, to get people to carry out punitive acts, the overseer had to be physically present, repeatedly ordering them to act cruelly as they voiced their concems and objections. Orders to escalate punitive ness to more intense levels are largely ignored or subverted when remotely issued by verbal command. As Helm and Morelli ( 1979) note, this is hardly an example o f blind obedience triggered by an authoritative mandate. Moreover, what is

rarely noted, is the equally striking evidence that most people steadfastly refuse to behave punitively. even in response to strong authoritarian commands, if the

 

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situalion is personalized by having lhem see lhe victim or requiring lhem lo inílicl pain direclly ralher lhan remolely. The emphasis on obedienl aggression is underslandable considering lhe preva lence and hannfulness of peop le's inhumanities to one another. However, of considerable lheorelical and social significance is the power of humanization to counteract cruel conduct. Studies examining this process rrevea evea that it is difficult for individuals to behave cruelly toward toward others when they are humanized or even personalized a bit bit (Bandura. Underwood. & Fromson, 1975) 1975).. Even under condi tions in which punitive sanctions are the the only means available and they are highly functional in producing desired results, those exercising that power cannot get themselves to behave punitively toward toward humanized individuals (Figure I. 7). The affinnation of common humanity can bring out the best in others. In contrast, when punitive sanctions are dysfunctional because they usually fail to produce results, punitiveness is precipitously escalated toward dehumanized individuals. The failur failuree of degraded individuals to change in response to punitive treatment is taken as further evidence of their culpability that justifies intensified punitiveness toward them.

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OCCASIONS FIG. 1.7. level of punitiveness on repeated occasions as a result o f dehumanization and the effectiveness of punitive actions. Under the functional condition, punishment consistently produced good results;

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