Bail Cases Digest

People vs. San Diego Case Digest People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968) FACTS: The accused were charged for murder. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses to present. Bail was granted on the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when trial court granted bail without allowing the prosecution to present their other witnesses? HELD: YES. Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void. The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution. They only contain the court’s conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this ground, be allowed to stand.

SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396SCRA 443 (2003)FACTS:Before the Court are two petitions forcertiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,assailing the resolutions of the ThirdDivision of the Sandiganbayan denying hispetition for bail, motion for a reinvestigationand motion to quash, and a petition forhabeas corpus, all in relation to CriminalCase No. 26558 for plunder whereinpetitioner is one of the accused togetherwith former President Joseph E. Estrada,Jose “Jinggoy” P. Estrada and severalothers. Petitioner was a member of theBoard of Trustees and the Legal Counsel ofthe Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established inFebruary 2000 ostensibly for the purpose ofproviding educational opportunities for thepoor and underprivileged but deservingMuslim youth and students, and support toresearch and advance studies of youngMuslim educators and scientists. Petitioner, as trustee of theFoundation, received on its behalf adonation in the amount of Two HundredMillion Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos SurGovernor Luis “Chavit” Singson. Later that year, Singson publiclyaccused then president Estrada and hiscohorts of engaging in several illegalactivities, including its operation on theillegal numbers game known as juetengwhich triggered the Ombudsman to filecases of plunder against the formerpresident and others who were allegedlyinvolved.The Sandiganbayan set thearraignment of the accused, includingpetitioner. In the meantime, on April 27,2001, petitioner filed with theSandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bailwhich was set for hearing on May 4, 2001.For his part, petitioner’s coaccused Jose“Jinggoy” Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 aVery Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging thathe was entitled to bail as a matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001on petitioner’s Urgent Petition for Bail, theprosecution moved for the resetting of thearraignment of the accused earlier than theJune 27, 2001 schedule. However, theSandiganbayan denied the motion of theprosecution and issued an order declaringthat the petition for bail can and should beheard before petitioner’s arraignment onJune 27, 2001 and even before the otheraccused filed their respective petitions forbail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan setthe hearing for the reception of evidence onpetitioner’s petition for bail on May 21 to 25,2001. The Sandiganbayan issued aresolution requiring the attendance ofpetitioner as well as all the other accusedduring the hearings on the petitions for bailunder pain of waiver of cross-examination.The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherentpowers to proceed with the trial of the casein the manner it determines best conduciveto orderly proceedings and speedytermination of the case, directed the otheraccused to participate in the said bailhearing considering that under Section 8,Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,whatever evidence is adduced during thebail hearing shall be consideredautomatically reproduced at the trial. The bail hearing did not proceedbecause petitioner filed with theSandiganbayan a motion to quash theamended Information on the grounds thatas against him, the amended Informationdoes not allege a combination or series ofovert or criminal acts constitutive of plunder;as against him, the amended Informationdoes not allege a pattern of criminal actsindicative of an overall unlawful scheme orconspiracy. By way of riposte, theprosecution objected to the holding of bailhearing until petitioner agreed to

withdrawhis motion to quash. The prosecutioncontended that petitioner’s motion to quashthe amended Information was antithetical tohis petition for bail. He also filed a petitionfor Habeas Corpus. Meanwhile, Jose “Jinggoy” Estradafiled with the Sandiganbayan a motionpraying that said court resolve his motion tofix his bail. the Sandiganbayan issued aResolution denying petitioner’s motion toquash the amended Information. Themotion to fix bail filed by Jose “Jinggoy”Estrada was also denied by theSandiganbayan. Jose “Jinggoy” Estradafiled a petition for certiorari for thenullification of a resolution of theSandiganbayan denying his motion to fixbail. ISSUES: 1.)Whether or not petitioner should first bearraigned before hearings of his petition forbail may be conducted; 2.)Whether petitioner may file a motion toquash the amended Information during thependency of his petition for bail; 3.)Whether a joint hearing of the petition forbail of petitioner and those of the otheraccused is mandatory; 4.)Whether the People waived their right toadduce evidence in opposition to thepetition for bail of petitioner and failed toadduce strong evidence of guilt of petitionerfor the crime charged HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The arraignment of an accused isnot a prerequisite to the conduct ofhearings on his petition for bail. Aperson is allowed to petition for bail assoon as he is deprived of his liberty byvirtue of his arrest or voluntarysurrender. An accused need not wait forhis arraignment before filing a petitionfor bail. In cases where it is authorized, bailshould be granted before arraignment,otherwise the accused may beprecluded from filing a motion to quash. However, the foregoingpronouncement should not be taken tomean that the hearing on a petition forbail should at all times precedearraignment, because the rule is that aperson deprived of his liberty by virtue ofhis arrest or voluntary surrender mayapply for bail as soon as he is deprivedof his liberty, even before a complaint orinformation is filed against him. TheCourt’s pronouncement in Lavidesshould be understood in light of the factthat the accused in said case filed apetition for bail as well as a motion toquash the informations filed against him.Hence, we explained therein that tocondition the grant of bail to an accusedon his arraignment would be to placehim in a position where he has tochoose between (1) filing a motion toquash and thus delay his release on bailbecause until his motion to quash canbe resolved, his arraignment cannot beheld, and (2) foregoing the filing of amotion to quash so that he can bearraigned at once and thereafter bereleased on bail. This would underminehis constitutional right not to be put ontrial except upon a valid complaint orInformation sufficient to charge him witha crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that anaccused be first arraigned before theconduct of hearings on his applicationfor bail. For when bail is a matter ofright, an accused may apply for and begranted bail even prior to arraignment.The ruling in Lavides also implies thatan application for bail in a case involvingan offense punishable by reclusionperpetua to death may also be heardeven before an accused is arraigned.Further, if the court finds in such casethat the accused is entitled to bailbecause the evidence against him is notstrong, he may be granted provisionalliberty even

prior to arraignment; for insuch a situation, bail would be“authorized” under the circumstances. Infine, the Sandiganbayan committed agrave abuse of its discretion amountingto excess of jurisdiction in ordering thearraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of hispetition for bail.2. YES. The Court finds that no suchinconsistency exists between anapplication of an accused for bail andhis filing of a motion to quash. Bail is thesecurity given for the release of aperson in the custody of the law,furnished by him or a bondsman, toguarantee his appearance before anycourt as required under the conditionsset forth under the Rules of Court. Itspurpose is to obtain the provisionalliberty of a person charged with anoffense until his conviction while at thesame time securing his appearance atthe trial. As stated earlier, a person mayapply for bail from the moment that he isdeprived of his liberty by virtue of hisarrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion toquash an Information is the mode bywhich an accused assails the validity ofa criminal complaint or Information filedagainst him for insufficiency on its facein point of law, or for defects which areapparent in the face of the Information.An accused may file a motion to quashthe Information, as a general rule,before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectiveswhich are not necessarily antithetical toeach other. Certainly, the right of anaccused right to seek provisional libertywhen charged with an offense notpunishable by death, reclusion perpetuaor life imprisonment, or when chargedwith an offense punishable by suchpenalties but after due hearing,evidence of his guilt is found not to bestrong, does not preclude his right toassail the validity of the Informationcharging him with such offense. It mustbe conceded, however, that if a motionto quash a criminal complaint orInformation on the ground that the samedoes not charge any offense is grantedand the case is dismissed and theaccused is ordered released, thepetition for bail of an accused maybecome moot and academic.3. NO. There is no provision in the RevisedRules of Criminal Procedure or theRules of Procedure of theSandiganbayan governing the hearingsof two or more petitions for bail filed bydifferent accused or that a petition forbail of an accused be heardsimultaneously with the trial of the caseagainst the other accused. The matter ofwhether or not to conduct a joint hearingof two or more petitions for bail filed bytwo different accused or to conduct ahearing of said petition jointly with thetrial against another accused isaddressed to the sound discretion of thetrial court. Unless grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess or lackof jurisdiction is shown, the Court willnot interfere with the exercise by theSandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be underscored that in theexercise of its discretion, theSandiganbayan must take into accountnot only the convenience of the State,including the prosecution, but also thatof the accused and the witnesses ofboth the prosecution and the accusedand the right of accused to a speedytrial. The Sandiganbayan must alsoconsider the complexities of the casesand of the factual and legal issuesinvolving petitioner and the otheraccused. After all, if this Court may echothe observation of the United StatesSupreme Court, the State has a

stake,with every citizen, in his being affordedour historic individual protections,including those surrounding criminalprosecutions. About them, this Courtdares not become careless orcomplacent when that fashion hasbecome rampant over the earth. 4. NO. Petitioner’s claim that theprosecution had refused to presentevidence to prove his guilt for purposesof his bail application and that theSandiganbayan has refused to grant ahearing thereon is not borne by therecords. The prosecution did not waive,expressly or even impliedly, it’s right toadduce evidence in opposition to thepetition for bail of petitioner. It must benoted that the Sandiganbayan hadalready scheduled the hearing dates forpetitioner’s application for bail but thesame were reset due to pendingincidents raised in several motions filedby the parties, which incidents had to beresolved by the court prior to the bailhearings. The bail hearing waseventually scheduled by theSandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but thehearing did not push through due to thefiling of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of hearingson petitioner’s application for bail istherefore not imputable solely to theSandiganbayan or to the prosecution.Petitioner is also partly to blametherefor, as is evident from the followinglist of motions filed by him and by theprosecution. “When the grant of bail isdiscretionary, the prosecution has theburden of showing that the evidence of guiltagainst the accused is strong. However, thedetermination of whether or not theevidence of guilt is strong, being a matter ofjudicial discretion, remains with the judge.This discretion by the very nature of things,may rightly be exercised only after theevidence is submitted to the court at thehearing. Since the discretion is directed tothe weight of the evidence and sinceevidence cannot properly be weighed if notduly exhibited or produced before the court,it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicialdiscretion requires that the evidence of guiltbe submitted to the court, the petitionerhaving the right of cross-examination and tointroduce his own evidence in rebuttal.”Accordingly, petitioner cannot be releasedfrom detention until the Sandiganbayanconducts a hearing of his application for bailand resolve the same in his favor. Eventhen, there must first be a finding that theevidence against petitioner is not strongbefore he may be granted bail.

People Vs. Judge Donato Case Digest People Vs. Judge Donato 198 SCRA 130 G.R. No.79269 June 5,1991

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that: 1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA) 2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address; 3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity; 4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address; 5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and address were also found to be false; 6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail. Held:

Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Case Digest on People vs. Donato PEOPLE V. DONATO [198 S 130 (1991)] - The doctrine of waiver extends to the rights and privileges of any character, and since the word "waiver" covers any conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privi¬leges do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy. Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) Those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested, and (b) those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived, those of the second may be. (Commonwealth v. Petrillo). This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as the rights against unreason¬able searches and seizures, the right to counsel and to remain silent, and the right to be heard. The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

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G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.: FACTS: Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.” Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? HELD: Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules. Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

We disagree. Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied. (emphasis supplied) In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail. A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, judicial discretion has been defined as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.”

The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows: Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong. Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit: 2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied; Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows: SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail. Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.” Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides: SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Case Digest: Leviste vs CA GR No 189122 Leviste vs CA GR No 189122

March 17, 2010

Facts: Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his

advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.

The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility.

On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of Leviste.

Ruling: No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other circumstances: that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon; that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the appeal. That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court,

the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.