AUTHORIZED CAUSES FOR TERMINATION DIGEST

Serrano v NLRC [G.R. No. 117040, January 27, 2000] FACTS: Petitioner was hired by the Respondent Isetann Department Store as a security checker to apprehend shoplifters. As a cost-cutting measure, private respondent decided to phase out its security section engage the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner was then terminated prompting him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. NLRC ordered petitioner to be given separation pay holding that the phase-out of the security section was a legitimate business decision. However, respondent was denied the right to be given written notice before termination of his employment. ISSUE: What is the effect of violation of the notice requirement when termination is based on an authorized cause? HELD: The Wenphil doctrine stated that it was unjust to require an employer to reinstate an employee if, although termination is made with cause, if due process was not satisfied. The remedy was to orderthe payment to the employees of full backwages from the time of his dismissal until the court finds that the dismissal was for a just cause. But his dismissal must be upheld and he should not be reinstated. This is because the dismissal is ineffectual. In termination of employment under Art. 283, the violation of notice requirements is not a denial of due process as the purpose is not to afford the employee an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him for there is none. The purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment. With respect to Art. 283, the employer’s failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely ineffectual. If the employee’s separation is without cause, instead of being given separation pay, he should be reinstated. In either case, whether he is reinstated or given separation pay, he should be paid full backwages if he has been laid off without written notice at least 30 days in advance. With respect to dismissals under 282, if he was dismissed for any of the just causes in 282, he should not be reinstated. However, he must be paid backwages from the time his employment was terminated until it is determined that the termination is for a just cause because the failure to hear him renders the termination of his employment without legal effect. ASUFRIN JR V SAN MIGUEL CORP 425 SCRA 270YNARES-SANTIAGO; March 10, 2004 FACTS - Coca Cola Plant, then a department of respondent San MiguelBeer Corporation (SMC), hired petitioner as autility/miscellan eous worker.- He became a regular employee paid on daily basis as a ForkliftOperator. Then became a monthly paid employee promoted asStock Clerk.- The sales office and operations at the Sum-ag, Bacolod CitySales Office were reorganized. Several positions wereabolished including petitioner’s position as Stock Clerk. Afterreviewing petitioner’s qualifications, he was designatedw arehouse checker at the Sum-ag Sales Office.- SMC implemented a new marketing system known as the “preselling scheme” at the Sum-ag Beer Sales Office. As aconsequence, a ll positions of route sales and warehousepersonnel were declared redundant. Respondent notified theDOLE Director of Region VI that 22 personnel of the SalesDepartment of the Negros Operations Center would be retired.-

SMC thereafter wrote a letter to petitioner informing him that,owing to the implementation of the “pre-selling operations”sche me, all positions of route and warehouse personnel will bedeclared redundant and the Sum-ag Sales Office will be closedeffective April 30, 1996. Thus, from April 1, 1996 to May 15,1996, petitioner reported to respondent’s PersonnelDepartment at the Sta. Fe Brewery, pursuant to a previousdirective.- Thereafter, the employees of Sum-ag sales for ce wereinformed that they can avail of respondent’s early retirementpackage pursuant to the retrenchment program, while thosewho will not avail of early retirement would be redeployed orabsorbed at the Brewery or other sales offices.Petitioner opted to remain and manifested to Acting PersonnelManager Salvador Abadesco his willingness to be assigned toany job, considering that he had three children in college.Petitioner was surprised when he was informed by the ActingPersonnel Manager that his name was included in the list of employees who availed of the early retirement package.Petitioner’ s request that he be given an assignment in thecompany was ignored by the Acting Personnel Manager.- Petitioner thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with theNLRC.- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.- Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which set aside the LaborArbiter’s decision and ordered respondent SMC to reinstatepeti tioner to his former or equivalent position with fullbackwages.Respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals whichreversed the decision of the NLRC and reinstated the judgmentof the Labor Arbiter dismissing the complaint for illegaldis missal.- Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration]was denied. ISSUE WON the dismissal of petitioner is based on a just andauthorized cause HELD NO-Dole Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, citing the leading case of Wiltshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC:… redundancy in an employer’s personnel force necessarily or even ordinarily refers to duplicationof work. That noother person was holding the same position that privaterespondent held prior to the termination of his services, does not show that his position had not become redundant.Indeed, in any well-organized business enterprise, it wouldbe surprising to find duplication of work and two (2) ormore people doing the work of one person. We believe thatredundancy, for purposes of the Labor Code, exists wherethe services of an employee are in excess of what isreasonably demanded by the actual requirements of theenterprise. Succinctly put, a position is redundant where itis superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positionsmay be the outcome of a number of factors, such asoverhiring of workers, decreased volume of busines s, ordropping of a particular product line or service activitypreviously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.- The determination that employee’s services are no longernecessary or sustainable and, therefore, properly terminable isan exercise of business judgment of the employer.- The wisdom or soundness of this judgment is not subject todiscretionary review of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,provided there is no violation of law and no showing that it wasprompted by an arbitrary or malicious act.- It is not enough for a company to merely declare that it hasbecome overmanned. It must produce adequate proof that suchis the actual situation to justify the dismissal of the affectedemployees for redundancy.- Persuasive as the explanation proffered by respondent may beto justify the dismissal of petitioner, a number of disturbingcircumstances, however, leave the Court unconvinced.1. Of the 23 SMC employees assigned at the Sum-ag SalesOffice/Warehouse, 9 accepted the offer of SMC to avail of theearly retirement whose separation benefits was computed at250%

of their regular pay. The rest, including petitioner, didnot accept the offer. Out of the remaining fourteen14,only petitioner clearly manifested, through several letters, hisdesire to be redeployed to the Sta. Fe Brewery or any salesoffice – and forany position not necessarily limited to that of a warehouse checker. In short, he was even willing to accepta demotion just to continue his employment. Meanwhile,other employees whodid not even write a letter to SMC wereredeployed to the Sta. Fe Brewery or absorbed by otheroffices/outlets outside Bacolod City.2. Petitioner was in the payroll of the Sta. Fe Brewery andassigned to the Materials Section, Logistics Department,although he was actually posted at the Sum-ag Warehouse. Thus, even assuming that his position in the SumagWarehouse became redundant, he should have been returnedto the Sta. Fe Brewery where he was actually assigned andwhere there were vacant positions to accommodate him.3. It appears that despite respondent’s allegation that itceased and closed down its warehousing operations at theSum-ag Sales Office, actually it is still used for warehousingactivities and as a transit point where buyers and dealers gettheir stocks.4. In selecting employees to be dismissed, a fair andreasonable criteria must be used, such as but not limited to(a) less preferred status, e.g.temporary employee; (b)efficiency; and (c) seniority. In the case at bar,no criterionwhatsoever was adopted by respondent in dismissingpetitioner. - Furthermore, as correctly observed by the NLRC,respondent “has not shown how the cessation of operationsof the Sum-ag Sales Office contributed to the ways andmeans of improving effectiveness of the organization with theend in view of efficiency and cutting distribution overheadand other related costs.- Respondent, thus, clearly resorted to sweepinggeneralization[s] in dismissing complainant.” Indeed,petitioner’s predicament may have something to do with anincident where he incurred the ire of an immediate superior inthe Sales Logistics Unit for exposing certain irregularitiescommitte d by the latter.- Whether it be by redundancy or retrenchment or any of theother authorized causes, no employee may be dismissedwithout observance of the fundamentals of good faith.- It is not difficult for employers to abolish positions in the guiseof a cost-cutting measure and we should not be easily swayedby such schemes which all too often reduce to near nothingwhat is left of the rubble of rights of our exploited workers.- Given the nature of petitioner’s job as a Warehouse Checker, itis inconceivable that respondent could not accommodate hisservices considering that the warehousing operations at Sum-agSales Office has not shut down.- To sustain the position taken by the appellate court wouldbeto dilute the workingman’s most important right: hisconstitut ional right to security of tenure.- While respondent may have offered a generous compensationpackage to those whose services were terminated upon theimplementation of the “preselling scheme,” we find such anoffer, in the face of the prevailing facts, anathema to theunderlying principles whi ch give life to our labor statutesbecause it would be tantamount to lik ening an employer-employee relationship to a salesman and a purchaser of acommodity.- To quote what has been aptly stated by former GovernorGeneral Leonard Wood in his inaugural message before the 6th Philippine Legislature on October 27, 1922 “labor is neither achattel nor a commodity, but human and must be dealt withfrom the standpoint of human interest.”- As has been said: “We do not treat our workers asmerchan dise and their right to security of tenure cannot bevalued in precise peso-and-centavo terms. It is a right whichcannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of employers who are only too

willing to bankroll the separationpay of their illegally dismissed employees to get rid of them.”- This right will never be respected by the employer if wemerely honor it with a price tag. The policy of “dismiss now andpay later” favors moneyed employers and is a mockery of theright of employees to social justice. Disposition. The petition was granted.

Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of Free Workers LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION V. FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, PHILIPPINELABOR UNION ASSOCIATION (PLUA-NACUSIP) AND NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION189 SCRA 179J. FELICIANO. FACTS Private respondent Federation of Free Workers ("FFW"), as the certified bargainingagent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner, filed with the Ministry of Labor andEmployment a complaint for unfair labor practices and recovery of union dues.In said complainant, FFW claimed that the terminations undertaken by petitioner wereviolative of the security of tenure of its members and were intended to "bust" theunion and hence constituted an unfair labor practice.FFW claimed that after the termination of the services of its members, petitioner advised110 casuals to report to its personnel office. FFW further argued that to justifyretrenchment, serious business reverses must be "actual, real and amply supportedby sufficient and convincing evidence." FFW prayed for reinstatement of its memberswho had been retired or retrenched.The Labor Arbiter denied petitioner's application for clearance to retrench its employeeson the ground that for retrenchment to be valid, the employer's losses must beserious, actual and real and must be amply supported by sufficient and convincingevidence.Petitioner was ordered to reinstate twenty-seven retired or retrenched employeesrepresented by private respondent Philippine Labor Union Association and FFW andto pay them full backwages from the time of termination until actual reinstatement.Both dissatisfied with the Labor Arbiter's decision, petitioner and respondent FFWappealed the case to public respondent NLRC. On appeal, the NLRC, finding no justifiable reason for disturbing the decision of the Labor Arbiter, affirmed thatdecision. Hence, this Petition for certiorari.ISSUE Is petitioner justified in the retrenchment of the private respondents? HELDNO.The retrenchment is unjustified. Petitioner argues that under the law, it has the right toreduce its workforce if made necessary by economic factors which would endanger itsexistence, and that for retrenchment to be valid, it is not necessary that losses be actuallysustained. Article 283 of the Labor Code provides for the authorized causes of termination ofemployment. In its ordinary connotation, he phrase "to prevent losses" means thatretrenchment or termination of the services of some employees is authorized to beundertaken by the employer sometime before the losses anticipated are actually sustainedor realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the lawmaker to compel the employer tostay his hand and keep all his employees until sometime after losses shall have in factmaterialized ; if such an intent were expressly written into the law, that law may well bevulnerable to constitutional attack as taking property from one man to give to another. Thisis simple enough.At the other end of the spectrum, it seems equally clear that not every asserted possibility ofloss is sufficient legal warrant for reduction of personnel. In the nature of things, thepossibility of incurring losses is

constantly present, in greater or lesser degree, in thecarrying on of business operations, since some, indeed many, of the factors which impactupon the profitability or viability of such operations may be substantially outside the controlof the employer. Thus, the difficult question is determination of when, or under whatcircumstances, the employer becomes legally privileged to retrench and reduce the numberof his employees.The following are the general standards in terms of which the acts of petitioner employermust be appraised. 1. The losses expected should be substantial and not merely de minimis in extent. 2. The substantial loss apprehended must be reasonably imminent, as suchimminence can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. There should, inother words, be a certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drasticrecourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees retired or otherwiselaid-off. Because of the consequential nature of retrenchment, it must, 3. be reasonablynecessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should havetaken other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut other coststhan labor costs. Whether or not an employer would imminently suffer serious or substantiallosses for economic reasons is essentially a question of fact for the Labor Arbiter and theNLRC to determine. In the instant case, the Labor Arbiter found no sufficient and convincingevidence to sustain petitioner's essential contention that it was acting in order to preventsubstantial and serious losses. Asionics Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC ASIONICS PHILIPPINES VS. NLRC 290 SCRA 164 VITUG, J. FACTS 1. API is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of assembling semiconductor chips and other electronic products mainly for export. 2. Yolanda Boaquina and Juana Gayola started working for API in 1979 and 1988, respectively, as material control clerk and as production operator. 3. During the third quarter of 1992, API commenced negotiations with the duly recognized bargaining agent of its employees, the Federation of Free Workers ("FFW"), for a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"). 4. A deadlock, however, ensued and the union decided to file a notice of strike. This event prompted the two customers of API, Indala and CP Clare Theta J, to thereupon refrain from sending to API additional kits or materials for assembly. 5. API, given the circumstance that its assembly line had to thereby grind to a halt, was forced to suspend operations pursuant to Article 286 of the Labor Code. Private respondents Boaquina and Gayola were among the employees asked to take a leave from work. 6. Upon the resolution of the bargaining deadlock in October of 1992, a CBA was concluded between API and FFW. 7. Subsequently, and inasmuch as its business activity remained critical, API was constrained to implement a company-wide retrenchment affecting one hundred five (105) employees from a work force that otherwise totalled three hundred four (304). 8. Boaquina and Gayola were ordered by API to take an indefinite leave of absence. They were not recalled since then.

9. Private respondents joined the Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Pilipinas Labor Union (Lakas Union) and, through the latter union, filed a notice of strike against API on the ground of unfair labor practice. The Labor Arbiter declared the strike as illegal. 10. Meanwhile, at the instance of several employees which included private respondents Boaquina and Gayola, a complaint for illegal dismissal, violation of labor standards and separation pay, as well as for recovery of moral and exemplary damages, was filed against API and/or Frank Yih (API's President) before the NLRC National Capital Region Arbitration Branch. 11. The Labor Arbiter declared the private respondent's dismissal as illegal. On appeal, NLRC modified the Labor Arbiter's decision declaring that private respondents were not illegally dismissed but were validly terminated due to the retrenchment policy implemented by API. ISSUE 1. Whether or not private respondents who are officers of Lakas Union are still entitled to separation pay and indemnity despite having participated in a strike that has been declared illegal. 2. Whether or not a stockholder/director/officer of a corporation can be held liable for the obligation of the corporation absent any proof and finding of bad faith. HELD Anent the first issue, we must rule in the negative. It is quite evident that the termination of employment of privaterespondents was due to the retrenchment policy adopted by API and not because of the former's union activities. The decision of Labor Arbiter, declaring private respondents to have lost their employment status due to their participation in an illegal strike is of no really significance to petitioners. It should suffice to say, as so aptly observed by the NLRC, that the retrenchment of private respondents has, in fact, preceded the declaration of strike. It is, instead, on the issue of joint and solidary liability of petitioner Frank Yih with API that the Court has decided to give due course to the instant petition. The court cannot agree with the Solicitor-General in suggesting that even if Frank Yih had no direct hand in the dismissal of the respondents he should be personally liable therefor on account alone of his being the President and majority stockholder of the company. In Sunio vs. NLRC, petitioner

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ME-SHURN CORPORATION V. ME-SHURN WORKERS UNION Facts: On June 7, 1998, the regular rank and file employees of Me-Shurn Corporation organized Me-Shurn Workers Union-FSM, an affiliate of the February Six Movement (FSM).6 Respondent union had a pending application for registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) through a letter dated June 11, 1998. Ten days later, or on June 17, 1998, petitioner corporation started placing on forced leave all the rank and file employees who were members of the union’s bargaining unit. On June 23, 1998, respondent union filed a Petition for Certification Election with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. 3. Instead of filing an answer to the Petition, the corporation filed on July 27, 1998, a comment stating that it would temporarily lay off employees and cease operations, on account of its alleged inability to meet the export quota required by the Board of Investment. While the Petition was pending, 184 union members allegedly submitted a retraction/withdrawal thereof on July 14, 1998. As a consequence, the med-arbiter dismissed the Petition. On May 7, 1999, DOLE Undersecretary Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz granted the union’s appeal and ordered the holding of a certification election among the rank and file employees of the corporation. Meanwhile, on August 4, 1998, respondent union filed a Notice of Strike against petitioner corporation on the ground of unfair labor practice (illegal lockout and union busting). This matter was docketed as Case No. NCMB-RO3-BEZ-NZ-08-42-98. On August 31, 1998, Chou Fang Kuen (alias Sammy Chou, the other petitioner herein) and Raquel Lamayra (the Filipino administrative manager of the corporation) imposed a precondition for the resumption of operation and the rehiring of laid off workers. He allegedly required the remaining union officers to sign an Agreement containing a guarantee that upon their return to work, no union or labor organization would be organized. Instead, the union officers were to serve as mediators between labor and management. After the signing of the Agreement, the operations of the corporation resumed in September 1998. On November 5, 1998, the union reorganized and elected a new set of officers. Respondent Rosalina Cruz was elected president. Thereafter, it filed two Complaints docketed as NLRC Case Nos. RAB-III-119586-98 and RAB-III-09-0322-99. These cases were consolidated and assigned to Labor Arbiter Henry Isorena for compulsory arbitration. Respondents charged petitioner corporation with unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and deficiency in separation pay, for which they prayed for damages and attorney’s fees.

The corporation countered that because of economic reversals, it was compelled to close and cease its operations to prevent serious business losses. Petitioner corporation questioned the legality of the representation of respondent union. Allegedly, it was not the latter, but the Me-Shurn Independent Employees’ Union — with Christopher Malit as president — that was recognized as the existing exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees and as the one that had concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) with the corporation on May 19, 1999.16 Hence, the corporation asserted that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz’s Decision ordering the holding of a certification election had become moot and academic. On the other hand, respondents contested the legality of the formation of the Me-Shurn Independent Employees’ Union and petitioners’ recognition of it as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees. Respondents argued that the pendency of the representation issue before the DOLE had barred the alleged recognition of the aforementioned union. Labor Arbiter Isorena dismissed the Complaints for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter Isorena. Finding petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice, the Commission ruled that the closure of the corporation shortly after respondent union had been organized, as well as the dismissal of the employees, had been effected under false pretenses. The true reason therefor was allegedly to bar the formation of the union. Accordingly, the NLRC held that the illegally dismissed employees were entitled to back wages.18 After the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners elevated the cases to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Petitioners added that respondent union’s personality to represent the affected employees had already been repudiated by the workers themselves in the certification election conducted by the DOLE. Pursuant to the Decision of Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz in Case No. RO3 00 9806 RU 001, a certification election was held on September 7, 2000, at the premises of petitioner corporation under the supervision of the DOLE. Ruling of the Court of Appeals The CA dismissed the Petition because of the failure of petitioners to submit sufficient proof of business losses. It found that they had wanted merely to abort or frustrate the formation of respondent union. The burden of proving that the dismissal of the employees was for a valid or authorized cause rested on the employer. The appellate court further affirmed the union’s legal personality to represent the employees. It held that (1) registration was not a prerequisite to the right of a labor organization to litigate; and (2) the cases may be treated as representative suits, with respondent union acting for the benefit of all its members. Hence, this Petition. Issues: (1) Whether the dismissal of the employees of petitioner Meshurn Corporation is for an authorized cause, and (2) Whether respondents can maintain a suit against petitioners.” HELD:

The Petition lacks merit. Validity of the Dismissal The reason invoked by petitioners to justify the cessation of corporate operations was alleged business losses. Yet, other than generally referring to the financial crisis in 1998 and to their supposed difficulty in obtaining an export quota, interestingly, they never presented any report on the financial operations of the corporation during the period before its shutdown. Neither did they submit any credible evidence to substantiate their allegation of business losses. We also take note of the allegation that after several years of attempting to organize a union, the employees finally succeeded on June 7, 1998. Ten days later, without any valid notice, all of them were placed on forced leave, allegedly because of lack of quota. All these considerations give credence to their claim that the closure of the corporation was a mere subterfuge, “a systematic approach intended to dampen the enthusiasm of the union members.” Third, as a condition for the rehiring of the employees, the union officers were made to sign an agreement that they would not form any union upon their return to work. This move was contrary to law. Fourth, notwithstanding the Petition for Certification Election filed by respondents and despite knowledge of the pendency thereof, petitioners recognized a newly formed union and hastily signed with it an alleged Collective Bargaining Agreement. Their preference for the new union was at the expense of respondent union. Moncada Bijon Factory v. CIR held that an employer could be held guilty of discrimination, even if the preferred union was not companydominated. Fifth, petitioners were not able to prove their allegation that some of the employees’ contracts had expired even before the cessation of operations. We find this claim inconsistent with their position that all 342 employees of the corporation were paid their separation pay plus accrued benefits in August 1998. Sixth, proper written notices of the closure were not sent to the DOLE and the employees at least one month before the effectivity date of the termination, as required under the Labor Code. Notice to the DOLE is mandatory to enable the proper authorities to ascertain whether the closure and/or dismissals were being done in good faith and not just as a pretext for evading compliance with the employer’s just obligations to the affected employees. This requirement is intended to protect the workers’ right to security of tenure. The absence of such requirement taints the dismissal. All these factors strongly give credence to the contention of respondents that the real reason behind the shutdown of the corporation was the formation of their union. Note that, to constitute an unfair labor practice, the dismissal need not entirely and exclusively be motivated by the union’s activities or affiliations. It is enough that the discrimination was a contributing factor. If the basic inspiration for the act of the employer is derived from the affiliation or activities of the union, the former’s assignment of another reason, no matter how seemingly valid, is unavailing. Legal Personality of Respondent Union Neither are we prepared to believe petitioners’ argument that respondent union was not legitimate. It should be pointed out that on June 29, 1998, it filed a Petition for Certification Election. While this Petition was initially dismissed by the med-arbiter on the basis of a supposed retraction, note that the appeal was granted and that Undersecretary Dimapilis-Baldoz ordered the holding of a certification election.

The DOLE would not have entertained the Petition if the union were not a legitimate labor organization within the meaning of the Labor Code. Under this Code, in an unorganized establishment, only a legitimate union may file a petition for certification election.34 Hence, while it is not clear from the record whether respondent union is a legitimate organization, we are not readily inclined to believe otherwise, especially in the light of the pro-labor policies enshrined in the Constitution and the Labor Code. Verily, the union has the requisite personality to sue in its own name in order to challenge the unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against it and its members. “It would be an unwarranted impairment of the right to self-organization through formation of labor associations if thereafter such collective entities would be barred from instituting action in their representative capacity.” Finally, in view of the discriminatory acts committed by petitioners against respondent union prior to the holding of the the pending Petition for certification election — the results of that election cannot be said to constitute a repudiation by the affected employees of the union’s right to represent them in the present case. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against the certification election on September 27, 2000 — acts that included their immediate grant of exclusive recognition to another union as a bargaining agent despite petitioners. SO ORDERED.

AT GEN SERVICES V NLRC (MASCARINAS) 421 SCRA 78QUISUMBING; January 26, 2004 NATURE Certiorari on decision of CA affirming NLRC affirming LA findingpetitioner liable for illegal dismissal and ordering petitioners topay private respondent Mascarinas separation pay, backwages,legal holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13 th monthpay in the aggregate sum of P85,871.00. FACTS - JAT is engaged in the business of selling second-hand heavyequipment. It hired private respondent as helper tasked tocoordi nate with the cleaning and delivery of the heavyequipment sold to customers. Initially, private respondent washired as a probationary employee and was paid P165 per daythat was increased to P180 in July 1997 and P185 in January1998.- In October 1997, the sales of heavy equipment decline dbecause of the Asian currency crisis. Consequently, JATtemporarily suspended operations. It advised its employees,including private respondent, not to report for work starting onthe first week of March 1998. JAT indefinitely closed shopeffectiv e May 1998.- A few days after, Mascarinas filed a case for illegal dismissaland underpayment of wages.- On December 14, 1998, JAT filed an Establishment Terminat ion Report with the DOLE, notifying its decision toclose its business operations due to business losses andfinancial reverses. ISSUE WON private respondent was illegally dismissed HELD NORatio Article 283 of the Labor Code is clear that an employermay close or cease his business operations or undertaking evenif he is not suffering

from serious business losses or financialreverses, as long as he pays his employees their terminationpay in the amount corresponding to their length of service, Itwould, indeed, be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if we were to unjustly interfere in management’s prerogative toclose or cease it s business operations just because saidundertaking is not suffering from any loss. (Industrial TimberCorp. v NLRC) ReasoningWhile the CA defined the issue to be the validity of dismissaldue to alleged closure of business it cited jurisprudencerelating to retrenchment to support its resolution andconclusion. While they are often used interchangeably and areinterrelated they are actually two separate andindependent causes for termination of employment. Termination of an employment may be predicated on onewithout the need of resorting to the other.- Closure of business, on one hand, is the reversal of fortune of the employer whereby there is a complete cessation of businessoperations and/or an actual lockingup of the doors of establishment, usually due to financial losses. Clos ure of business as an authorized cause for termination of employmentaims to prevent further financial drain upon an employer whocannot pay anymore his employees since business has alreadystopped.- On the other hand, retrenchment is reduction of personnelusually due to poor financial returns so as to cut down on costsof operations in terms of salaries and wages to preventbankruptc y of the company. It issometimes also referred to asdownsizing. Retrenchment is an authorized cause fortermination of employment which the law accords an employer who is not making good in its operations in order to cut back onexpenses for salaries and wages by laying off some employees. The purpose of retrenchment is to save a financially ailingbusiness establishment from eventually collapsing.- However, the burden of proving that such closure is bona fidefalls upon the employer. JAT’s submitted financial statementswere bereft of details on the extent of alleged losses incurred.- So we proceed to determining if there was valid dismissal onthe ground of closure or cessation of operations for reasonsother than substantial business losses. JAT’s income statementshowed declining sales –enough to justify the closure of bus iness. The dismissal being valid, backwages need not be awarded. Dispositive petition is given due course. The assailedResolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60337 areAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of P66,924.00as backwages is deleted. The award of separation paya mounting to P10,296.00 and the other monetary awards,namely salary differentials in the amount of P1,066.00, legalholiday pay in the amount of P1,850.00, service incentive leavepay in the amount of P925.00 and the 13th month pay in theamount of P4,910, or a total of P29,047.00 are maintained. Nopronouncements as to costs.

ACESITE CORP VS NLRC CARPIO-MORALES; January 26, 2005 NATURE Two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari challengingCA decision FACTS - Leo Gonzales was hired as Chief of Security of Holiday InnManila. On March 25, 1998, Gonzales took a 4-day sick leaveand took emergency leave on March 30, 1998. On April 1629,1998, he again took a 12-day vacation leave. Before theexpiration of his 12-day vacation leave, Gonzales filed anapplication for emergency leave for 10 days. The applicationwas not approved. He received a telegram from Acesitead vising him that he was on unauthorized leave and asking himto provide a written explanation within the next 24 hours whyhe was not

reporting for work and was required to report forwork the following day. On May 2, 1998, Gonzales’ fatherAnaclet o sent a telegram to Acesite stating that he was stillrecovering from severe stomach disorder and would report backfor work on May 4, 1998, attaching a medical certificate.- On May 4, 1998, Gonzales reported for work and presentedhimself to Johann Angerbauer, then Resident Manager of thehotel. He requested for leave without pay from May 5-9, 1998which was provisionally approved on condition that he(Gonzale s) would be sending his explanation re his absencesthat same day through e-mail, which he did. In the eveningGonzales left for Abra.- Also on May 4, 1998 Angerbauer sent an inter-office memo toGonzales, stating that his presence was needed at a meetingscheduled on the following day. Gonzales claims that he gothold of a copy of the above-quoted memo only on May 8, 1998.- Not having reported for work, Angerbauer sent Gozales atelegram on May 5, 1998 stating that Gozales should report forwork upon receipt of notice due to very urgent matters.Gonzales, who claims to have received the telegram only in theafternoon of May 7, 1998, immediately went back to Manila onMay 8, 1998 only to be “humiliatingly and ignominiously barredby the guard from entering the premises.” It appears that onMay 7, 1998, Angerbauer issued a Notice of Terminationthrough an inter-office memo.- Gonzales thus filed a complaint against Acesite, Angerbauerand Kennedy for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatementand payment of full backwages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.Gonzales, however, failed to appear in 2 consecutive hearingsdespite notice, meriting the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of hiscomplaint.- Gonzales refiled his complaint for illegal dismissal. The LaborArbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRCreversed the decision. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision. ISSUES 1. WON Gonzales was illegally dismissed2. WON Gonzales should be reinstated HELD 1. YES- There appears to have been no just cause to dismiss Gonzalesfrom employment. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,Gonzales cannot be considered to have willfully disobeyed hisemployer. Willful disobedience entails the concurrence of at east 2 requisites: the employee’s assailed conduct has beenwillful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a“wrongful and perverse attitude;” and the order violated musthave been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employeeand must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged todischarge.- In Gonzales’ case, his assailed conduct has not been shown tohave been characterized by a perverse attitude, hence, the firstrequisite is wanting. His receipt of the telegram disapprovinghis application for emergency leave starting April 30, 1998 hasnot been shown. And it cannot be said that he disobeyed theMay 5, 1998 telegram since he received it only on May 7, 1998.On the contrary, that he immediately went back to Manila uponreceipt thereof negates a perverse attitude.2. NO- In illegal dismissal cases, reinstatement to an illegallydismissed employee’s former position may be excused on theground of “strained relations.” This may be invoked againstemployees whose positions demand trust and confidence, orwhose differences with their employer are of such nature ordegree as to preclude reinstatement. In the case at bar,Gonzales was Chief of Security, whose duty was to “managethe operation of the security areas of the hotel to provide andensure the safety and security of the hotel guests, visitors,management, staff and their properties according to companypolicies and local laws.” It cannot be gainsaid that Gonzales’position is one of trust and confidence, he being in charge of the over-all security of said hotel. Thus,

reinstatement is nolonger possible. In lieu thereof, Acesite is liable to payseparation pay of 1 month for every year of service. LOADSTAR SHIPPING CO. INC. v. ROMEO MESANO G.R. No. 138956, 07 August 2003, Third Division (SandovalGutierrez, J.) To constitute a valid dismissal two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Loadstar Shipping hired Romeo Mesano as bosun/boatswin in charge of the care and custody of M/V Beaver, one of its vessels. The company investigated Mesano after he brought out from the vessel a TV set and telescope in January 1995. Mesano immediately submitted a voluntary explanation asking for forgiveness. He claimed that he intended to have the TV set repaired but when it could not be done he returned it to the vessel. On February 24, 1995, Loadstar handed Mesano a disembarkation order terminating his services effective February 28, 1995. Aggrieved, Mesano filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. The NLRC affirmed but the Court of Appeals reversed and ruled in Mesano’s favor.

Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc VS Catinoy FACTS: 2 union officers, Catinoy and Saturnino, had a fight insidethe union office, an act that violates company rules andunion by-laws. The union executive board decided to placethem on indefinite suspension and requested thecompany,Hyatt Taxi Services Inc., to implement it. The companyplace the 2 on preventive suspension for 30 days Catinoy,aggrieved by the preventive suspension since he was not the aggressor, filed a complaint for illegal suspension. Afterthe lapse of 30 days, he reported to work but was not allowed to resume his duties. He amended his complaint toinclude constructive dismissalLA: found the Hyatt taxi to be guilty of illegal preventivesuspension and illegal constructive dismissal Hyatt and theunion appealed to the NLRC. NLRC: affirmed LA..HOWEVER, upon MFR, the NLRC deleted the award of backwages because there was no concrete showing that thecomplainant was constructively dismissed CA: reinstated the LA’s decision . Issue: Whether the private respondent was constructivelydismissed

Loadstar appealed to the SC, alleging Mesano was not deprived of his right to due process since it gave Mesano the opportunity to present his side through his written explanation where he pleaded for forgiveness. Loadstar Shipping further claimed that Mesano failed to live up to the standard of responsibility and honesty called for by his position. Hence, measured by moral standards, his termination was lawful.

HELD: YES.CA affirmed. Preventive suspension beyond 30 daysamounts to constructive dismissal. It shows that respondent was not taken back by petitioner Hyatt after the30- day suspension period. Clearly, constructive dismissalhad already set in when the suspension went beyond the maximum period allowed by law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Loadstar Shipping unlawfully dismissed Mesano?

Toyota Motors Phils. Corp. workers Association v. NLRC, J. Velasco Jr.

HELD: To constitute a valid dismissal two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Art 282 of the Labor Code; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Simply put, the twin requirements of due process, substantive and procedural must be complied with before a dismissal can be considered valid.” In Cruz vs. NLRC, the Court said: “The law requires that an employee sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before termination of employment:(a) First notice - to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions by reason of which his dismissal has been decided upon; (b) Second notice – to inform the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the requirement of two notices makes the dismissal illegal. The procedure is mandatory. Nonobservance thereof renders the dismissal of an employee illegal and void.” The mandatory first notice is absent in the case at bar. Before respondent’s termination from service, he was neither apprised of the particular acts for which his dismissal is sought, nor was he directed to explain why he should not be dismissed for taking out from the vessel company property. While Mesano indeed voluntarily submitted his written explanation, nonetheless, he did not expressly acknowledge that he committed any offense. In fact, being in charge of the company’s vessel and its accessories and cargo, his intention in taking the TV set was to have it repaired. Even granting that by submitting his written explanation, he was deemed to have been notified of the charge, still there was no investigation or hearing conducted wherein he could have submitted evidence to adequately defend himself.

FACTS: The Union is a legitimate labor organization duly registered withthe Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and is the sole andexclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation engaged inthe assembly and sale of vehicles and parts. On February 14, 1999, the Union filed a petition for certificationelection among the Toyota rank and file employees with t he NationalConciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), which was docketed as Case No.NCR-OD-M-9902-001. MedArbiter Ma. Zosima C. Lameyra denied thepetition, but, on appeal, the DOLE Secretary granted the Union’s prayer,and, through the June 25, 1999 Order, directed the immediate holding of the certification election. After Toyota’s plea for reconsideration was denied, the certificationelection was conducted. Med-Arbiter Lameyra’s May 12, 2000 Ordercertified the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of allthe Toyota rank and file employees. Toyota challenged said Order via anappeal to the DOLE Secretary. In the meantime, the Union submitted its Collective BargainingAgreement (CBA) proposals to Toyota, but the latter refused to negotiate inview of its pending appeal. In connection with Toyota’s appeal, Toyota and the Union wererequired to attend a hearing on February 21, 2001 before the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) in relation to the exclusion of the votesof allegedsupervisory employees from the votes cast during the certificationelection. The February 21, 2001 hearing was cancelled an d resetto February 22, 2001. On February 21, 2001, 135 Union officers andmembers failed to render the required overtime work, and

insteadmarched to and staged a picket in front of the BLR office inInt ramuros,Manila.The Union, in a letter of the same date, alsorequested that its members be allowed to be absent on February 22,2001 to attend the hearing and instead work on their next scheduled restday. This request however was denied by Toyota. Despite denial of the Union’s request, more than 200 employeesstaged mass actions on February 22 and 23, 2001 in front of the BLR andthe DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and antiunion stance of Toyota.Due to the deliberate absence of a considerable number of employees on February 22 to 23, 2001, Toyotaexperienced acute lack of manpower inits manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to meet itsproduction goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991. February 27, 2001, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should notbe dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directive torender overtime work on February 21, 2001, for their failure to report forwork on February 22 and 23, 2001, and for their participation in theconcerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed the plant’soperations. On the next day, the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-02-061-01 for union busting amountingto unfair labor practice. March 1, 2001, the Union nonetheless submitted an explanation incompliance with the February 27, 2001 notices sent by Toyota to the erringemployees. The Union members explained that their refusal to work ontheir scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exerciseof their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition thegovernment for redress of grievances. It further argued that thedemonstrations staged by the employees on February 22 and 23, 2001could not be classified as an illegal strike or picket, and that Toyota hadalready condoned the alleged acts when it accepted back the subjectemployees.March 2 and 5, 2001, Toyota issued two (2) memoranda to theconcerned employees to clarify whether or not they are adopting theMarch 1, 2001 Union’s explanation as their own. The employees were alsorequired to attend an investigative interview, but they refused to doso.On March 16, 2001, Toyota terminated the employment of 227e mployees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Codeof Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers,the Union went on strike on March 17, 2001. Subsequently, from March28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the Union intensified its strike by barricadingthe gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants. The strikers preventedworkers who reported for work from entering the plants. Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRCarbitration branch, which was docketed as NLRC NCR (South) Case No. 30-04-01775-01, and prayed that the erring Union officers, directors, andmembers be dismissed.On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over thelabor dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to theNLRC. In said Order, the DOLE Secretary directed all striking workers toreturn to work at their regular shifts by April 16, 2001. On the other hand,it ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same termsand conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option, put them underpayroll reinstatement. The parties were also enjoined from committingacts that may worsen the situation.The Union ended the strike on April 12, 2001. The union membersand officers tried to return to work on April 16, 2001 but we re toldthat Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement authorized by the Order of theDOLE Secretary.The Union filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOLE Secretary’s April10, 2001 certification Order, which, however, was denied by the DOLESecretary in her May 25, 2001 Resolution. Consequently, a petition forcertiorari was filed before the CA.Despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretary’s certification Order,several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a protest rally infront of Toyota’s Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in defianceof the April 10, 2001

Order.May 28, 2001, around forty-four (44) Union members stagedan other protest action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time,some twenty-nine (29) payroll-reinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plant’s main entrance, and were later joined by other Unionmembers. June 5, 2001, notwithstanding the certification Order ,the Union filed another notice of strike.Notwithstanding repeated orders to file its position paper, the Union stillfailed to submit its position paper on July 19, 2001. Consequently, theNLRC issued an Order directing the Union to submit its position paper onthe scheduled August 3, 2001 hearing; otherwise, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution based on the evidence on record.During the August 3, 2001 hearing, the Union, despite several accommodations, still failed to submit its position paper. Later that day,the Union claimed it filed its position paper by registered mail.Subsequently, the NLRC, in its August 9, 2001 Decision, declaredthe strikes staged by the Union on February 21 to 23, 2001 and May 23and 28, 2001 as illegal. The NLRC considered the mass actions staged on February 21 to 23,2001 illegal as the Union failed to comply with the procedural requirementsof a valid strike under Art. 263 of the Labor Code.After the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction overthe Toyota dispute on April 10, 2001, the Union again staged strikes onMay 23 and 28, 2001. The NLRC found the strikes illegal as they violatedArt. 264 of the Labor Code which proscribes any strike or lockout after jurisdiction is assumed over the dispute by the President or the DOLESecretary.The NLRC held that both parties must have maintained the statusquo after the DOLE Secretary issued the assumption/certification Order,and ruled that theUnion did not respect the DOLE Secretary’s directive.Accordingly, both Toyota and the Union filed Motions forR econsideration, which the NLRC denied in its September 14,2001 Resolution. Consequently, both parties questioned the August 9,2001 Decision and September 14, 2001 Resolution of the NLRC inseparate petitions for certiorari filed with the CA.CA considered the participation in illegal strikes as seriousmisconduct. It defined serious misconduct as a transgression of someestablished and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment.However, in its June 20, 2003 Resolution, the CA modifiedits February 27, 2003 Decision by reinstating severance compensation tothe dismissed employees based on social justice. ISSUE: (1) Whether the mass actions committed by the Union ondiffer ent occasions are illegal strikes; (2) Whether separationpay should be awarded to the Union members who participated inthe illegal strikes. (2) HELD: The Union contends that the NLRC violated its right to due processwhen it disregarded its position paper in deciding Toyota’s petition todeclar e the strike illegal. We rule otherwise. It is entirely the Union’s fault that its position paper was n otconsidered by the NLRC. Records readily reveal that the NLRC was eventoo generous in affording due process to the Union. It issued no less thanthree (3) orders for the parties to submit its position papers, whichthe Union ignored until the last minute. No sufficient justification wasoffered why the Union belatedly filed its position paper. The proper ruling in this situation is to consider the petition as compliantwith the formal requirements with respect to the parties who signed it and,therefore, can be given due course only with regard to them. The otherpetitioners who did not sign the verification and certificate against forumshopping cannot

be recognized as petitioners have no legal standingbefore the Court. The petition should be dismissed outright with respect tothe non-conforming petitioners. Tirazona vs. Philippine Techno ServiceGR. No. 169712, January 20, 2009 Facts: -Petitioner Tirazona being the Administrative Manager of thePhilippine EDS Techno Service, Inc.was a managerialemployee who held a position of trust and confidence; thatafter PET officer/directors called her attention to her improper handling of a situation involving a rank – and –fileemployee, she claimed that she was denied due process for which she demanded Php2,000,000.00. Thus, she admittedreading a confidential letter addressed to PET regarding her caseand that she was validly terminated from her employment on the ground that she willfully breachedthetrust and confidence reposed in her by her employer. Thecourt concludes that Tirazona hasgiven PET more enough reasons to distrust her. The court denied her petition andaffirmed thedecision of the CA. Petitioner not contented; file a motion for reconsiderationarguing that the court failed to consider her length service toPET in affirming her termination from employment. Shepleaded that she beawarded separation pay and retirementbenefits out of humanitarian consideration. The court denied her motion for reconsideration withFINALITY for lack of merit. Hence, thepetitioner filedanother Motion for Reconsideration for the second timeIssues:Whether or not asecond motion for reconsideration can beentertained by the Supreme CourtWhether or notpetitioner is entitled to separation pay andretirement benefits for just termination.Held:On the firstissue, the court ruled that Sec. 2 of Rule 52Rules of court explicitly states that “no second motionfor reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the sameparty be entertained. Accordingly, asecond motion for reconsideration is prohibited pleading which shall not be allowed,except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons only after anexpress leave shall have first been obtained.However, in thiscase, the court failed to find such any extraordinarily persuasivereason to allowTirazona’s second motion for reconsideration.With regards to the second issue the general rule isthatseparation pay shall be allowed as a measure of social justiceonly in those instances where theemployee is validly dismissedfor cause other than those serious misconduct or those reflectingonhis moral character. However the court contends that thiswould tolerate the employee who stealsfrom the company isgranted separation pay even as he is validly dismissed, it is notunlikely that hewill commit a similar offense in his nextemployment because he thinks he can expect leniency.Thus,her attitude towards her employer was a clear inconsistent withher position of trust andconfidence. Her poor character becameeven more evident when she read what was supposed tobe aconfidential letter of the legal counsel of PET to PET officer anddirectors. In accordance toseparation pay, it is valid thatTirazona is not entitled to separation pay. With regards to her retirement benefits, it is also denied.Wherefore, the Motion for Leave to File a SecondMotion for Reconsideration is denied and NOTED WITHOUTACTION [G.R. No. 159354 April 7, 2006] EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., and/or ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, Petitioners, vs. DIOSCORO D. SEDAN, Respondent. FACTS

On December 30, 1973, petitioners hired on a per-voyage basis private respondent Dioscoro Sedan as 3rd marine engineer and oiler in one of the vessels owned by petitioners. His last voyage was on July 27, 1997 on board the vessel M/V Eastern Universe. His monthly pay was P22,000. Additionally, after each voyage his earned leave credits are monetized and paid in cash. He said he was disembarking because he was going to take the board examinations for marine engineers. Two months later, on September 27, 1997, Sedan sent a letter to petitioners applying for optional retirement, citing as reason the death of his only daughter, hence the retirement benefits he would receive would ease his financial burden. However, petitioners deferred action on his application for optional retirement since his services on board ship were still needed. Nonetheless, according to petitioners, the company expressed intention to extend him a loan in order to defray the costs incurred for the burial and funeral expenses of his daughter. On October 28, 1997, Sedan sent petitioners another letter insisting on the release of half of his optional retirement benefits. Later, he said that he no longer wanted to continue working on board a vessel for reasons of health. On December 1, 1997, Sedan sent another letter to petitioners threatening to file a complaint if his application was not granted. In reply, according to petitioners, the company management sent a telegram on December 9, 1997 informing Sedan that his services were needed on board a vessel and that he should report immediately for work as there was no available replacement. Sedan claims he did not receive the telegram, nor was this fact proved by the company before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC. Sedan proceeded to file a complaint with the Labor Arbiter against petitioners, demanding payment of his retirement benefits, leave pay, 13th month pay and attorney’s fees. Petitioners contend that by refusing to report for work and insisting on applying for optional retirement, private respondent wrongly assumed that he was justified in abandoning his job. Petitioners maintain that private respondent’s refusal to report back to work, despite being duly notified of the need for his service, is tantamount to voluntary resignation. Therefore, petitioners contend, the respondent should not be entitled to any financial assistance. ISSUE Whether or not respondent is entitled to optional retirement benefits. HELD The SC held that respondent is not entitled to retirement benefits. The pertinent law governing retirement is found in the Labor Code, which provides: ART. 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay

equivalent to at least one half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. xxx The age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement between the employer and the employees. However, in the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by law. Under the aforecited article of the Labor Code, the legally mandated age for compulsory retirement is 65 years, while the set minimum age for optional retirement is 60 years. In the instant case, there is an agreement between petitioner shipping company and its employees. The agreement states: xxx B. Retirement under the Labor Code: Any employee whether land-based office personnel or shipboard employee who shall reach the age of sixty (60) while in active employment with this company may retire from the service upon his written request in accordance with the provisions of Art. 277 of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, Book 6, Rule 1, Sec. 13 and he shall be paid termination pay equivalent to fifteen (15) days pay for every year of service as stated in said Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. However, the company may at its own volition grant him a higher benefit which shall not exceed the benefits provided for in the Retirement Gratuity table mentioned elsewhere in this policy. C. Optional Retirement: It will be the exclusive prerogative and sole option of this company to retire any covered employee who shall have rendered at least fifteen (15) years of credited service for land based employees and 3,650 days actually on board vessel for shipboard personnel. Clearly, the eligibility age for optional retirement is set at 60 years. However, employees of herein petitioners who are under the age of 60 years, but have rendered at least 3650 days (10 years) on board ship or fifteen (15) years of service for land-based employees may also avail of optional retirement, subject to the exclusive prerogative and sole option of petitioner company. Records show that private respondent was only 48 years old when he applied for optional retirement. Thus he cannot claim optional retirement benefits as a matter of right. His application for optional retirement was subject to the exclusive prerogative and sole option of the shipping company pursuant to the abovecited agreement between the workers and the company.

tender his resignation from the company. But after several followups, petitioner failed to pay respondent hismonetary claims; hence, the latter was constrained to file a complaint.Petitioner, on the other hand, postulated that respondent, as credit collector/investigator, was given acollection quota per month. However, in 1991 and 1992, he failed to meet the same. It added thatrespondent was also subjected to an investigation for illegal custody of a colored television unit inviolation of the company rules or policies. In February 1993, respondent verbally informed petitioner of his decision to resign. On February 15, 1993, he sent a letter of voluntary resignation, stating thathe was resigning due to ill health effective March 1, 1993. Petitioner contended that respondent'sdismissal was justified, because he failed to meet his collection quota, in which poor performancecompelled him to voluntarily resign due to inefficiency.On March 20, 1995, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of respondent and orderedpetitioner to pay him P39,600.00 as separation pay, P8,126.13 representing 30% of rest day pay fromFebruary 1984 to February 1993, plus 10% attorney's fees; or a total award of P52,498.74.On petitioner's appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision affirming with modification the Labor Arbiter'sDecision by reducing the amount of rest day pay to P2,970.00 for the period February 1990 toFebruary 1993 only. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied the same in itsResolution dated March 15, 2002.Undaunted, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari contending that theNLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the payment of separation pay, rest day payand attorney's fees to respondent in spite of the latter's voluntary resignation from his job. In itsDecision dated September 4, 2003, the CA denied the petition for lack of merit "in fact and in law."Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in the Resolution dated March8, 2004.Hence, the present petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent has a cause of action to claim rest day pay differential. RULING: Anent respondent's claim for rest day pay differential, We likewise uphold the disposition of the NLRC, thus:

Petition is denied.

“J” Marketing Corp. vs TaranG.R. No. 163924 June 18, 2009 FACTS: From February 1981 to February 28, 1993, Cesar L. Taran (respondent) worked as creditinvestigator/collector for "J" Marketing Corporation (petitioner), an appliance and motorcycle dealer with a branch in Tacloban City.Sometime in February 1993, respondent informed petitioner's then Officer-in-Charge (OIC) BranchManager Hector L. Caludac (Caludac) of his intention to resign effective March 1, 1993. On February13, 1993, Caludac sent respondent a Memorandum requiring him to submit a formal resignationletter. On February 15, 1993, respondent filed his resignation letter.On July 26, 1993, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), RegionalArbitration Branch No. VIII, Tacloban City a complaint for illegal dismissal and holiday differential. Heclaimed that there was a verbal arrangement between him and petitioner whereby the latter wouldpay him 100% separation pay and other benefits, provided that he would formally

The Court is not convinced by respondent's position that being a monthly paid employee, complainantis not entitled to rest day pay. An examination of the vouchers submitted by respondent showed thatwhile complainant was paid bi-monthly, he was actually paid on the number of days worked. Thus,every time he is absent, he will not be paid for the day. He is for all intents and purposes, a daily paidemployee. As such, he has to be paid rest day pay when he works on his rest days. Withcomplainant's categorical assertion that he worked during his rest days especially in the month of December, the Labor arbiter did not err in awarding him rest day pay. There is however a need tomodify this award to cover only the period from July 1990 up to July 1993 as the claim before 1990had already prescribed. 1avvphi1 Under Article 291 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations shallbe filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise, they shall forever be barred. It is settled jurisprudence that a cause of action has three elements, to wit, (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) anobligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant

violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff.In the computation of the three-year prescriptive period, a determination must be made as to the timewhen the act constituting a violation of the workers’ right to the benefits being claimed wascommitted. For if the cause of action accrued more than three (3) years before the filing of the moneyclaim, said cause of action has already prescribed in accordance with Article 291 of the Labor Code.Respondent filed his claim for rest day differential in July 1993. It follows then that he is only entitledto his rest day pay within the three-year period counted from the time of the filing of his complaint, or from July 1990. Thus, the NLRC correctly ruled that respondent's claim before July 1990 had alreadyprescribed in accordance with Article 291 of the Labor Code.The instant Petition isDENIED . The Court of Appeals Decision is affirmed.

ST. MICHAEL'S INSTITUTE, FR. NICANOR VICTORINO and EUGENIA BLANCO, petitioners, vs. CARMELITA A. SANTOS, FLORENCIO M. MAGCAMIT and ALBERT M. ROSARDA, respondents. G.R. No. 145280 December 4, 2001 DE LEON, JR., J.: FACTS: Petitioner is a learning institute in Bacoor, Cavite with Fr. Victorino as Director and Blanco as the Principal and respondents Santos, Magcamit and Rosarda were regular classroom teachers. On Aug. 10, 1993, there held a public rally organized and participated by, among others, the respondents aimed at calling the attention of the school administration to certain grievances relative to substandard school facilities and the economic demands of teachers and other employees. in response to the memoranda issued by Blanco, Magcamit and Rosarda denied all the accusations attributed to them while Santos justified her actions as having been done on behalf of her co-teachers with the parents' blessings. After finding that respondents had led and actively participated in the rally through an investigation, petitioners dismissed their employment that caused the former to file a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal. The LA dismissed the cause for lack of merit declaring that there was just cause for the dismissal of the respondents' complaints. The NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and held that the respondents had been illegally dismissed. This was sustained by the CA. ISSUE: WON the conduct of the respondents warranted their dismissal from their employment. RULING: We agree with the appellate court's conclusion that, under the attendant factual antecedents, the dismissal meted out on the respondents for dereliction of duty for one school day and denouncing school authority, appears to be too harsh a penalty. It must be noted that the respondents are being held liable for a first time offense and, in the case of respondent Santos, despite long years of unblemished service. Even when an employee is found to have transgressed the employer's rules, in the actual imposition of penalties upon the erring employee, due consideration must still be given to his length of service and the number of violations committed during his employment. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps may have been committed by the employee ought

not to be visited with a consequence so severe such as dismissal from employment. Moreover, the facts, as further established on appeal in the NLRC, paint out a picture that the respondents were singled out by the petitioners apparently for being officers of the teachers' union which they formed, despite the fact that several other teachers also joined the August 10, 1993 rally.

WENPHIL CORPORATION V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION170 SCRA 69GANCAYCO, J. FACTS 1. Private respondent Roberto Mallare was hired by petitioner Wenphil as a crewmember at its Cubao Branch. He thereafter became the assistant head of theBackroom Department. 2. 2.On May 20, 1985, private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, JobBarrameda regarding the tending of the salad bar. Mallare slapped Barrameda’s cap,stepped on the latter’s foot, and picked up the ice scooper and brandished it againstthe latter. 3. 3.The incident was reported to the assistant manager, Delilah Hermosura, whoimmediately asked Mallare to see her. Mallare refused to see Hermosura and it tookthe security guard to bring him to her. Mallare then shouted profane words instead ofmaking an explanation before her. He stated that the matter should be settled onlyby him and Barrameda. 4. 4.The store manager, on the basis of Hermosura’s report, suspended Mallare andBarrameda until further notice. Later that day, the store manager issued amemorandum suspending Barrameda for one week and dismissing Mallare fromservice, in accordance with their Personnel Manual. The notice of dismissal wasserved on Mallare on May 25, 1985. 5. 5.Respondent Mallare filed a complaint against petitioner Wenphil for unfair laborpractice, illegal suspension, and illegal dismissal. 6. 6.Petitioner contended that under its Personnel Manual, which had been read andunderstood by respondent Mallare, an investigation shall only be conducted if theoffense committed by the erring employee is punishable with a penalty higher thansuspension of fifteen says and the erring employee requests for an investigation ofthe incident. Petitioner alleged that since respondent Mallare did not ask for aninvestigation, he is deemed to have waived such right. 7. 7.The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, since hearing cannot beconducted due to the repeated absence of private respondent’s counsel. 8. 8.The NLRC set aside the appealed decision and ordered the reinstatement of theprivate respondent to his former position, without loss of seniority and other benefitsand one (1) year backwages without qualification and deduction. Hence, the instantpetition for review. ISSUES 1. Whether or not petitioner Wenphil has a just and valid cause to dismiss privaterespondent Roberto Mallare. 2. 2.Whether or not the due process requirement in the manner of dismissal has beencomplied with. 3. 3.Whether or not private respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss ofseniority rights and with payment of full backwages for 3 years, without qualification,in case he was dismissed for a cause but without due process.

HELD 1. YES. The Supreme Court ruled with the Labor Arbiter that the dismissal of privaterespondent Mallare was for a just cause. He was found guilty of grave misconductand insubordination. This is borne by the sworn statements of witnesses. 2. 2.NO. The aforementioned provision of the Personnel Manual of Wenphil which mayeffectively deprive its employees of the right to due process is clearly against the lawand hence, null and void. The security of tenure of a laborer or employee isenshrined in the Constitution, the Labor Code and other related laws. Under Section 1, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the LaborCode, “no worker shall be dismissed except for a just and authorized cause providedby the law and after due process.” Sections 2, 5, 6, and 7 of the same Rules requirethat before an employee may dismiss an employee, the latter must be given a writtennotice stating the particular act or omission constituting the grounds thereof; that theemployee may answer the allegations with a reasonable period; that the employershall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend oneself with theassistance of his representative, if he so desires; and that it is only then that theemployer may dismiss the employee by notifying him of the decision in writing,stating clearly the reasons therefor. The failure of petitioner Wenphil to give privaterespondent Roberto Mallare the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissedconstitutes an infringement of his constitutional right to due process of law and equalprotection of the laws. 3. 3.NO. The Supreme Court held that said policy must be reexamined. .It will be highlyprejudicial to the interests of the employer to impose on him the services of anemployee who has been shown guilty of the charges that warranted his dismissalfrom employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the undeserving, if notthe undesirable, remains in the service.Thus, in the present case, where the private respondent, who appears to be ofviolent temper, caused trouble during office hours and even defied his superiors asthey tried to pacify him, should not be rewarded with reemployment and backwages.It may encourage him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules ofdiscipline that employees are required to observe. Under the circumstances, thedismissal of the private respondent should be maintained, He has no right to returnto his former employer.However, the petitioner must nevertheless be held to account for failure to extend toprivate respondent his right to an investigation before causing his dismissal.Petitioner must be imposed a sanction for said failure. Considering thecircumstances of the case, petitioner must indemnify the private respondent theamount of P1,000.00The measure of this ward depends on the facts of each caseand the gravity of the omission committed by the employer. The petition is granted.

Jenny Agabon & Virgilio Agabon vs. NLRC G.R. No.158693 November 17, 2004 Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims. Issue: Whether or not respondent’s dismissal is illegal and if not, entitles them benefits. Ruling: The Court ruled that the dismissal is legal and entitles them of payment of benefits. Dismissals based on just causes contemplate acts or omissions attributable to the employee while dismissals based on authorized causes involve grounds under the Labor Code which allow the employer to terminate employees. A termination for an authorized cause requires payment of separation pay. When the termination of employment is declared illegal, reinstatement and full back wages are mandated under Article 279. If reinstatement is no longer possible where the dismissal was unjust, separation pay may be granted. Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for noncompliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employee’s last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The Court ruled that respondent is liable for petitioners’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay without deductions. The evident intention of Presidential Decree No. 851 is to grant an additional income in the form of the 13th month pay to employees not already receiving the same so as “to further protect the level of real wages from the ravages of world-wide inflation.” Clearly, as additional income, the 13th month pay is included in the definition of wage under Article 97(f) of the Labor Code.

An employer is prohibited under Article 113 of the same Code from making any deductions without the employee’s knowledge and consent. JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION vs PACOT Case Digest [G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005] JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. DARWIN PACOT, ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB, respondents. FACTS: Private respondents were hired by JAKA but their services were eventually terminated on August 29, 1997 due to “dire financial straits”. It is not disputed by the parties that the termination was effected without compliance of Article 283 of the LC because no written notice was served on the employees and the DOLE at least one month before the respondents’ termination.

GANGCA, RUPERTO GORGONIO, ROMEO HERRERO, SERGIO HORO-HORO, FRANCISCO IBARRA, ABRAHAM JALE, DANDY LABITAD, ANTONINA LAMBANG, ERNESTO LAUSA, VICTORIA LOOD, NEMESIO LOPE, JR., ESCARLITO MADLOS, MARCOS MAKINANO, REMEGIO MAKINANO, VICENTE MAKINANO, REYNALDO MASUHAY, HELEN MARATAS, ELIZABETH MENDOZA, GUILBERTA MONTEROSO, GILDA NAVALTA, PILAR NAVARRO, SIMPORIANO NUÑEZ, JR., ELISEO ORONGAN, ARMANDO OROPA, ASUNCION OROPA, JOSE EDWIN OROPA, BALDEMAR PAGALAN, BARTOLOME PAGALAN, DAMASO PALOMA, MANALO PLAZA, JEREMIAS PELAEZ, FRANCISCO PICARDAL, HERMINIA PUBLICO, ROMULO QUINTOS, FIDEL QUITA, FELICIANO RANADA, RODOLFO RARU, LEAN CILDRIC RODRIGUEZ, SAMUEL SAROMINES, NATIVIDAD SIGNAR, CHERRIE SON, SAMUEL TAGUPA, VICTOR TAGUPA, BRIGIDA TABANAO, PEDRO TABANAO, ROBERTO TABANAO, MARIA TAN, RONNIE TAN, TOLENTINO TEE, ROGELIO TAMADA, MINDA TUMAOB and ROBERTO TUTOR, Respondents.

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against JAKA. JAKA was defeated on appeal in the lower court hence this petition. ISSUE: The issues boil down to one question: What are the implications where an employee is dismissed for cause BUT without compliance of the notice requirement under the LC? HELD: It is clear that an employer is liable for nominal damages even if the termination were upheld due to just causes. However, it is also important to note the different implications between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and one for authorized causes under Article 283. SC ruled that the termination was based on authorized cause (retrenchment), but since JAKA did not comply with the notice requirement they have to pay 50k as nominal damages for noncompliance with statutory due process. JAKA, however should not pay separation pay because where it is true that the rule is to grant separation pay to employees terminated due to authorized causes, the EXCEPTION is where the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses, duly proved, as in this case. INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION vs ABABON Case Digest [G.R. No. 164518 January 25, 2006] INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION, INDUSTRIAL PLYWOOD GROUP CORPORATION, TOMAS TANGSOC, JR., LORENZO TANGSOC and TOMAS TAN, Petitioners vs. VIRGILIO ABABON, IGNACIO ABACAJEN, ANGELINA ABAY-ABAY, EDITH ABREA, SAMUEL ABREA, BIENVENIDO ACILO, RODRIGO ACILO, VICTOR ACILO, ARTURO ADVINCULA, GERTRUDES AMPARO, VIRGILIO ANTONIO, MILA ARQUITA, PRUDENCIO ARQUITA, ALBERT ATON, WARLITA AUTIDA, ALICIA AWITAN, LEOPOLDO AYATON, ARTURO BALBOTEN, DANILO BANATE, LOLITA BATAN, RAMIL BUTALON, CARMILITA CAINGLES, VICENTE CAHARIAN, BENEDICTA CAJIPE, FELIPE CALLANO, ALFREDO CARILLO, NILA CARILLO, ALGER CORBETA, GREGORIO DABALOS, TERESITA DABALOS, VENERANDO DALAUTA, RICARDO DANGCULOS, MONTANO DAPROSA, LUISITO DIAZ, FELIZARDO DUMULAO, EDITHA DUMANON, ALFREDO FAELNAR, RAUL FORTUN, MAXIMO GALLA, ANGELES GALUPO, PERFECTO GAMBE, VERGINITA

[G.R. No. 164965] VIRGILIO ABABON, IGNACIO ABACAJEN, ANGELINA ABAY-ABAY, EDITH ABREA, SAMUEL ABREA, BIENVENIDO ACILO, RODRIGO ACILO, VICTOR ACILO, ARTURO ADVINCULA, GERTRUDES AMPARO, MILA ARQUITA, VIRGILIO ANTONIO, PRUDENCIO ARQUITA, ALBERT ATON, WARLITA AUDITA, ALICIA AWITAN, LEOPOLDO AYATON, ARTURO BALBOTEN, DANILO BANATE, LOLITA BATAN, RAMIL BUTALON, CARMELITA CAINGLES, VICENTE CAHARIAN, BENEDICTA CAJIPE, FELIPE CALLANO, ALFREDO CARILLO, NILA CARILLO, ALGIER CORBETA, GREGORIO DABALOS, TERESITA DABALOS, VENERANDO DALAUTA, RICARDO DANGCULOS, MONTANO DAPROSA, LUISITO DIAZ, FELIZARDO DUMULAO, EDITHA DUMANON, ALFREDO FAELNAR, RAUL FORTUN, MAXIMO GALLA, ANGELES GALUPO, PERFECTO GAMBE, VIRGINITA GANGCA, RUPERTO GORGONIO, ROMEO HERRERO, SERGIO HOR-HORO, FRANCISCO IBARRA, ABRAHAM JALE, DANDY LABITAD, ANTONINA LAMBANG, ERNESTO LAUSA, VICTORIA LOOD, NEMESIO LOPE, JR., ESCARLITO MADLOS, MARCOS MAKINANO, REMEGIO MAKINANO, VICENTE MAKINANO, REYNALDO MAHUSAY, HELEN MARATAS, ELIZABETH MENDOZA, GUILBERTA MONTEROSO, GILDA NAVALTA, PILAR NAVARRO, SIMPORIANO NUÑEZ, JR., ELISEO ORONGAN, ARMANDO OROPA, ASUNCION OROPA, JOSE EDWIN OROPA, BALDEMAR PAGALAN, BARTOLOME PAGALAN, DAMASO PALOMA, MANALO PLAZA, JEREMIAS PELAEZ, FRANCISCO PICARDAL, HERMINIA PUBLICO, ROMULO QUINTOS, FIDEL QUITA, FELICIANO RANADA, RODOLFO RARU, LEAN CILDRIC RODRIGUEZ, SAMUEL SAROMINES, NATIVIDAD SIGNAR, CHERRIE SON, SAMUEL TAGUPA, VICTOR TAGUPA, BRIGIDA TABANAO, PEDRO TABANAO, ROBERTO TABANAO, MARIA TAN, RONNIE TAN, TOLENTINO TEE, ROGELIO TAMADA, MINDA TUMAOB, and ROBERTO TUTOR, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INDUSTRIAL TIMBER CORPORATION, INDUSTRIAL PLYWOOD GROUP CORPORATION, TOMAS TANGSOC, JR., LORENZO TANGSOC and TOMAS TAN, Respondents. FACTS

Industrial Plywood Group Corporation (IPGC) is the owner of a plywood plant located at Agusan, Pequeño, Butuan City, leased to Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) on August 30, 1985 for a period of five years. Thereafter, ITC commenced operation of the plywood plant and hired 387 workers. On March 16, 1990, ITC notified the DOLE and its workers that effective March 19, 1990 it will undergo a “no plant operation” due to lack of raw materials and will resume only after it can secure logs for milling. Meanwhile, IPGC notified ITC of the expiration of the lease contract in August 1990 and its intention not to renew the same. On June 26, 1990, ITC notified the DOLE and its workers of the plant’s shutdown due to the non-renewal of anti-pollution permit that expired in April 1990. This fact and the alleged lack of logs for milling constrained ITC to lay off all its workers until further notice. This was followed by a final notice of closure or cessation of business operations on August 17, 1990 with an advice for all the workers to collect the benefits due them under the law and CBA. On October 15, 1990, IPGC took over the plywood plant after it was issued a Wood Processing Plant Permit, which included the antipollution permit, by the DENR coincidentally on the same day the ITC ceased operation of the plant. This prompted Virgilio Ababon, et al. to file a complaint against ITC and IPGC for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and damages. They alleged, among others, that the cessation of ITC’s operation was intended to bust the union and that both corporations are one and the same entity being controlled by one owner. ISSUE Whether or not complainants were illegally dismissed due to the closure of ITC’s business. HELD The SC held that ITC’s closure or cessation of business was done in good faith and for valid reasons. The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking is one of the authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the only limitation being that the closure must not be for the purpose of circumventing the provisions on termination of employment embodied in the Labor Code. A reading of article 283 of the Labor Code shows that a partial or total closure or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due to serious business losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the first kind, the employer must sufficiently and convincingly prove its allegation of substantial losses, while under the second kind, the employer can lawfully close shop anytime as long as cessation of or withdrawal from business operations was bona fide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent the tenurial rights of employees, and as long as he pays his employees their termination pay in the amount corresponding to their length of service. Just as no law forces anyone to go into business, no law can compel anybody to continue the same. It would be stretching the intent and spirit of the law if a court interferes with management's prerogative to close or cease its business operations just because the business is not suffering from any loss or because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment. In sum, under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

The records reveal that the decision to permanently close business operations was arrived at after a suspension of operation for several months precipitated by lack of raw materials used for milling operations, the expiration of the anti-pollution permit in April 1990, and the termination of the lease contract with IPGC in August 1990 over the plywood plant at Agusan, Pequeño, Butuan City. As borne out from the records, respondent ITC actually underwent ‘no plant operation’ since 19 March 1990 due to lack of log supply. This fact is admitted by complainants (Minutes of hearing, 28 October 1991). Since then several subsequent incidents prevented respondent ITC to resume its business operations e.g. expiration and non-renewal of the wood processing plant permit, anti-pollution permit, and the lease contract on the plywood plant. Without the raw materials respondent ITC has nothing to produce. Without the permits it cannot lawfully operate the plant. And without the contract of lease respondent ITC has no option but to cease operation and turn over the plant to the lessor. Moreover, the lack of raw materials used for milling operations was affirmed in Industrial Timber Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission as one of the reasons for the valid closure of ITC’s Butuan Logs Plant in 1989. In said case, we upheld the management prerogative to close the plant as the only remedy available in order to prevent imminent heavy losses on account of high production costs, erratic supply of raw materials, depressed prices and poor market conditions for its wood products. Having established that ITC’s closure of the plywood plant was done in good faith and that it was due to causes beyond its control, the conclusion is inevitable that said closure is valid. Consequently, Ababon, et al. could not have been illegally dismissed to be entitled to full backwages. Thus, we find it no longer necessary to discuss the issue regarding the computation of their backwages. However, they are entitled to separation pay equivalent to one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. Although the closure was done in good faith and for valid reasons, we find that ITC did not comply with the notice requirement. While an employer is under no obligation to conduct hearings before effecting termination of employment due to authorized cause, however, the law requires that it must notify the DOLE and its employees at least one month before the intended date of closure. In the case at bar, ITC notified its employees and the DOLE of the ‘no plant operation’ on March 16, 1990 due to lack of raw materials. This was followed by a ‘shut down’ notice dated June 26, 1990 due to the expiration of the anti-pollution permit. However, this shutdown was only temporary as ITC assured its employees that they could return to work once the renewal is acted upon by the DENR. On August 17, 1990, the ITC sent its employees a final notice of closure or cessation of business operations to take effect on the same day it was released. We find that this falls short of the notice requirement for termination of employment due to authorized cause considering that the DOLE was not furnished and the notice should have been furnished both the employees and the DOLE at least one month before the intended date of closure. Where the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction should be stiff as the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, as opposed to a dismissal based on a just cause under Article 282 with the same procedural infirmity where the sanction to be imposed upon the employer should be tempered as the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated by an act imputable to the employee. Decision of the CA is reversed.

G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATIONvs.NLRC and IMELDA SALAZAR EN BANCROMERO,J.: FACTS: Imelda L. Salazar was employed as general system analyst at GMCR. Delfin Saldivar, with whom shewas allegedly very close, was also employed as manager for technical operations'.When reports that company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, GMCR made an investigation of the latter's activities. The report of the company's internal auditor,Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial andIndustrial Company with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), asupplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. It also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner'smissing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also connived withYambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The air conditioner was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filedan action for replevin against Saldivar. It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that ImeldaSalazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's interestsby signing as a witness to the articles of said partnership and that she had full knowledge of the loss andwhereabouts of the airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.The company placed Salazar under preventive suspension for one month giving her 30 days within which to,explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, she filed a complaint against petitioner for illegalsuspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13thmonth pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that she was considered dismissed "in view of inability to refute and disprove the findings. The Labor Arbiter ordered GMCR to reinstate Salazar to her former or equivalent position and to pay her fullbackwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal including payment of moral damages. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement but limitedthe backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral damages. ISSUE: WON the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension andsubsequent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2)years' backwages. HELD: PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION WAS LAWFUL . Preventive suspension does not signify that the companyhas adjudged the employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Suchdisciplinary measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigationany alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.GMCR had not violated Salazar'sright to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent when sheignored petitioner's "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she wentdirectly to the Labor Department and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer achance to evaluate her side of the controversy.SEPARATION FROM

EMPLOYMENT WAS NOT FOR CAUSE. While loss of confidence or breach of trust is avalid ground for terminations it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly established. An employeeshould not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. GMCR "presumed reasonably thatcomplainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that Saldivar's investigation althoughunverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's test. While we should not condone the acts ofdisloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived fromspeculative inferences. The report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar,she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating privaterespondent is wanting from the records. Also, the report is one sided since it came out after Saldivar had already resigned and he does not have theopportunity to refute management's findings. Since the main evidence dealt principally on the alleged culpabilityof Saldivar and without having had a chance to voice his, stringent examination should have been carried out toascertain if there existed independent legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. REMEDY IN LAW TO RECTIFY AN UNLAWFUL DISMISSAL Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of anemployee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissedfrom work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his fullbackwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed fromthe time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate theservices of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized byexisting laws.Sec. 3. Reinstatement. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled t oreinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages." There being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of privaterespondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages ‖. Theintendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in theformer, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary meaning of theword "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition, positions etc. from which one had been removed" and in thelatter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past,would perforce make her "whole."Reasons advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicablethereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time or because of therealities of the situation; or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " or that reinstatement may nolonger be feasible; or, that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved; or that the company wouldbe prejudiced by the workers' continued employment; or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as whensupervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable or, to an increasingextent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or "irretrievableestrangement" between the employer and the employee.

The principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement cannever be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature.No strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right; otherwise an employeewho shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on thepretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.It should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he enjoys the trust andconfidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonismmay be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.It has not been proved that the position of private respondent is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving theprocurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of systems and analysis of designson a continuing basis. In other words, Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval andpurchase of supplies and company assets. WHEREFORE, the assailed is hereby AFFIRMED. GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period of two (2) years only DANDY V. QUIJANO, COMPLAINANT, VS. GEOBEL A. BARTOLABAC (LABOR ARBITER, NLRC-NCR SOUTH), AND ALBERTO R. QUIMPO (COMMISSIONER, NLRCFIRST DIVISION), RESPONDENTS. FACTS: On 19 March 2002, complainant Dandy Quijano filed before this Court a verified complaint written in Pilipino against herein respondents Atty. Geobel A. Bartolabac (Bartolabac), Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and Commissioner Alberto R. Quimpo (Quimpo) of the same Commission for violating Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. According to complainant, respondents violated his constitutional right to due process in failing to execute the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561 entitled Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corporation. The antecedent facts are as follows: Complainant was dismissed from service by the Mercury Drug Corporation (corporation). He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. Eventually, the case was elevated to this Court. On 8 July 1998, the Court promulgated its Decision in favor of herein complainant ordering, among others, his reinstatement. The corporation’s motion for reconsideration was denied by this Court in its Resolution dated 5 July 1999. Complainant relates that he filed with respondent Labor Arbiter Bartolabac a motion for execution on 9 December 1998 but despite the final resolution of his case, Bartolabac issued an order that in effect changed the tenor of the final judgment. While the decision of this Court had mandated complainant’s reinstatement, Bartolabac instead awarded back wages and separation pay. Pursuant to the Resolution of this Court, Bartolabac issued an alias writ of execution on 18 February 2000. However, respondent Bartolabac allegedly again unilaterally issued another order dated 5 April 2000, amending his previous order and assigning the complainant to the position of selfservice attendant of the corporation instead of his original position of warehouseman. Subsequently, respondent Commissioner Quimpo Page 1 overturned the above order of Bartolabac and directed the payment of separation pay rather than reinstatement to a substantially similar position as ordered by this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are liable for their acts in deviating from the final and executory judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 126561.

HELD: The Court is unyielding in its adjudication that complainant must be reinstated to his former position as warehouseman or to a substantially equivalent position. Clearly, the Court is unwilling to accept the corporation and respondent labor arbiter’s reason that reinstatement is no longer feasible because the position of warehouseman had already been abolished and there is no substantially equivalent position in the corporation. Both respondents labor arbiter and commissioner do not have any latitude to depart from the Court’s ruling. The Decision in G.R. No. 126561 is final and executory and may no longer be amended. It is incumbent upon respondents to order the execution of the judgment and implement the same to the letter. Respondents have no discretion on this matter, much less any authority to change the order of the Court. The acts of respondent cannot be regarded as acceptable discretionary performance of their functions as labor arbiter and commissioner of the NLRC, respectively, for they do not have any discretion in executing a final decision. The implementation of the final and executory decision is mandatory. As held in Siy v. National Labor Relations Commission and Embang: Once the case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s verdict and to comply with it. We reiterate our pronouncement in Salicdan v. Court of Appeals: Well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. Again, we are unceasing in emphasizing that the decision in the labor case has become final and executory since 1999. [G.R. No. 160871 February 6, 2006] TRIAD SECURITY & ALLIED SERVICES, INC. and ANTHONY U. QUE, Petitioners, VS. SILVESTRE ORTEGA, JR., ARIEL ALVARO, RICHARD SEVILLANO, MARTIN CALLUENG, and ISAGANI CAPILA, Respondents. FACTS On 25 March 1999, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners and a certain Ret. B/Gen. Javier D. Carbonell for underpayment/nonpayment of salaries, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service incentive leave pay, holiday pay, and attorney’s fees. The complaint was amended on 20 April 1999 to include the charges of illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, underpayment/nonpayment of allowance, separation pay, and claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages as well as night shift differential. According to respondents, during the time that they were in the employ of petitioners, they were receiving compensation which was below the minimum wage fixed by law. They were also made to render services everyday for 12 hours but were not paid the requisite overtime pay, nightshift differential, and holiday pay. Respondents likewise lamented the fact that petitioners failed to provide them with weekly rest period, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay. As a result of these perceived unfairness, respondents filed a complaint before the Labor Standards Enforcement Division of the Department of Labor on 6 January 1999. Upon learning of the complaint, respondents’ services were terminated without the benefit of notice and hearing. For their part, petitioners denied respondents’ claim of illegal dismissal. Petitioners explained that management policies dictate that the security guards be rotated to different assignments to avoid fraternization and that they be required to take refresher courses at their headquarters. Respondents allegedly refused to comply with

these policies and instead went on leave or simply refused to report at their headquarters. As for respondents’ money claims, petitioners insisted that respondents worked for only eight hours a day, six days a week and that they received their premium pays for services rendered during holidays and rest day. The service incentive leave of respondents was allegedly made payable as soon as respondents applied for said benefit.

Roquero and Pabayo received a “notice of administrative charge” for violating the PAL Code of Discipline. They were required to answer the charges and were placed under preventive suspension. Roquero and company alleged that they were set up by PAL to take the drugs through a certain trainee. In a Memorandum dated July 14, 1994, Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they filed a case for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE

The Labor Arbiter ruled against Roquero and upheld the validity of their dismissal, but awarded separation pay.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE REMEDY ADOPTED BY THE PETITIONERS IS ERRONEOUS. HELD Petitioners contend that based on the rules of procedure of the NLRC, the order granting the issuance of the 2nd alias writ of execution could not have been the proper subject of an appeal before the NLRC neither could petitioners have sought the remedy of certiorari from the NLRC. Petitioners argue that the rules of procedure of the NLRC do not provide for any remedy or procedure for challenging the order granting a writ of execution; hence, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court should apply which in this case is Section 1 of Rule 41 It is a basic tenet of procedural rules that for a special civil action for a petition for certiorari to prosper, the following requisites must concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, petitioners insist that the NLRC is bereft of authority to rule on a matter involving grave abuse of discretion that may be committed by a labor arbiter. Such conclusion, however, proceeds from a limited understanding of the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC under Article 223 of the Labor Code Given the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari brought before it. Notwithstanding this procedural defect committed by petitioners, in the interest of substantial justice WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court AFFIRMS the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 July 2003 and the Order dated 23 April 2003 of the Labor Arbiter declaring petitioners liable for additional accrued backwages. The amount of money claims due the respondents is, however, MODIFIED. Let the records of this case be remanded to the Computation and Examination Unit of the NLRC for proper computation of subject money claims as above-discussed. ROQUERO vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC. Case Digest [G.R. No. 152329. April 22, 2003] ALEJANDRO ROQUERO, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondent. FACTS Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of respondent PAL. From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were caught red-handed possessing and using Methampethamine Hydrochloride or shabu in a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM personnel.

While the case was on appeal with the NLRC, the complainants were acquitted by the RTC, in the criminal case which charged them with “conspiracy for possession and use of a regulated drug in violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425,” on the ground of instigation. The NLRC ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to their former positions but without backwages. Complainants did not appeal from the decision but filed a motion for a writ of execution of the order of reinstatement. The Labor Arbiter granted the motion but PAL refused to execute the said order on the ground that they have filed a Petition for Review before this Court. In accordance with the case of St. Martin Funeral Home vs. NLRC and Bienvenido Aricayos, PAL’s petition was referred to the Court of Appeals. The CA reversed the decision of the NLRC and held that petitioner’s dismissal was valid, but it denied the award of separation pay. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review under Rule 45. ISSUE Whether or not PAL can validly refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that the case is still on appeal. HELD The SC held that PAL cannot refuse to execute an order for reinstatement on the ground that the case is still on appeal. Article 223(3) of the Labor Code (as amended by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code) provide that an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending appeal. In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working man. These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation’s progress and stability. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his family.

The order of reinstatement is immediately executory. The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court. We reiterate the rule that technicalities have no room in labor cases where the Rules of Court are applied only in a suppletory manner and only to effectuate the objectives of the Labor Code and not to defeat them. Hence, even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. On the other hand, if the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more so if he actually rendered services during the period. Dismissal of Petitioner is affirmed, but respondent PAL is ordered to pay the wages to which Roquero is entitled from the time the reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision.

GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009 FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were allegedly caught sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were dismissed for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate reinstatement. A writ was issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC. ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s order up to the final decision of the higher court? HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of the decision of the labor arbiter to the time of the final decision of the higher court. [G.R. No. 112965. January 30, 1997.] PHILIPPINES TODAY, INC., BETTY GO-BELMONTE, MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ARTURO A. BORJAL, and ISAAC G. BELMONTE, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FELIX R. ALEGRE, JR., respondents.

On October 20, 1988, Respondent Alegre filed a request for a thirtyday leave of absence effective on the same date, citing the advice of his personal physician for him to undergo further medical consultations abroad. Four days later, he wrote a "Memorandum for File" addressed to Petitioner Betty Go-Belmonte with copies furnished to members of the board of directors of PTI, which expressed respondent’s negative feelings towards the company. On December 6, 1988, Respondent Alegre received from Petitioner Belmonte a letter, informing the former that the Board has accepted his resignation. The following day, Respondent Alegre wrote Petitioner Belmonte expressing surprise over the acceptance of his "resignation", since he did not resign. Unheeded, Respondent Alegre filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and damages against herein petitioners. ISSUE 1. 2.

Whether or not the Memorandum for File constitutes voluntary resignation. Whether or not a resignation be unilaterally withdrawn.

HELD IN # 1 The SC held that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation. Alegre's choice of words and way of expression betray his allegation that the memorandum was simply an "opportunity to open the eyes of Belmonte to the work environment in petitioners' newspaper with the end in view of persuading her to take a hand at improving said environment." Apprising his employer of his frustrations in his job and differences with his immediate superior is certainly not done in an abrasive, offensive and disrespectful manner. A cordial or, at the very least, civil attitude, according due deference to one's superiors, is still observed, especially among high-ranking management officers. The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipino values of pakikisama and paggalang which are not only prevalent among members of a family and community but within organizations as well, including work sites. An employee is expected to extend due respect to management, the employer being the "proverbial hen that lays the golden egg," so to speak. An aggrieved employee who wants to unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a baleful pen. Here, respondent Alegre was anything but respectful and polite. His memorandum is too affrontive, combative and confrontational. It certainly causes resentment, even when read by an objective reader. His incendiary words and sarcastic remarks negate any desire to improve work relations with petitioners. Such strongly worded letter constituted an act of “burning his bridges” with the officers of the company. Further, the actions of respondent, such as clearing his work desk of personal belongings, not reporting back to work after his leave, and his immediate employment with another employer, confirm his intention to terminate his employment with petitioner.

FACTS HELD IN # 2 Private Respondent Felix R. Alegre, Jr. was employed by PTI as a senior investigative reporter of the Philippine Star. He later became chief investigative writer and then assistant to the publisher.

The SC held that resignations, once accepted, may not be withdrawn without the consent of the employer. If the employer accepts the withdrawal, the employee retains his job. If the employer does not,

the employee cannot claim illegal dismissal. To say that an employee who has resigned is illegally dismissed, is to encroach upon the right of employers to hire persons who will be of service to them. Obviously, this is a recognition of the contractual nature of employment which requires mutuality of consent between the parties. An employment contract is consensual and voluntary. Hence, if the employee "finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, then he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment". If accepted by the employer, the consequent effect of resignation is severance of the contract of employment. A resigned employee who desires to take his job back has to re-apply therefor and he shall have the status of a stranger who cannot unilaterally demand an appointment. He cannot arrogate unto himself the same position which he earlier decided to leave. To allow him to do so would be to deprive the employer of his basic right to choose whom to employ. Such is tantamount to undue oppression of the employer. It has been held that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment including hiring. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, impels neither the oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. Consistent with our ruling in Intertrod, the resignation of respondent Alegre after its acceptance by petitioners can no longer be withdrawn without the consent of the latter. In fairness to the employer, an employee cannot backtrack on his resignation at his whim and without the conformity of the former. Petition is granted.