Aurelius Equity Opportunities SE & Co KGaA: Do Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries exist?

GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC

Aurelius Equity Opportunities SE & Co KGaA:

Do Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries exist?

How many shares does Aurelius’ management currently own? Why does Aurelius refuse to answer this simple question?

When asked about his current shareholdings last week, CEO Dirk Markus said: “I cannot say anything… we respect the law with regards to quiet periods” Is Dirk Markus telling the truth, implying that he is legally restricted?

Is Aurelius telling the truth when it claims, “Steffen Schiefer has been CFO of AURELIUS since 2012?

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Table of Contents I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. VIII. IX. X.

Disclaimer Do Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries exist? “Manipulating the facts”: Gotham City Research? Or Aurelius? Unaudited NAV: Less disclosure after management share sales Unaudited NAV: The curious case of SECOP Do sick companies merit a healthy company’s cost of capital? Is working capital a sustainable source of cash flow? Aurelius & Arques: different, yet employing the same people? Do the consolidated & subsidiaries’ earnings reconcile? Appendix – Gegendarstellung (Counterstatement to Handelsblatt)

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Do Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries exist? Gotham City Research was researching Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries and was unable to verify the existence of the following entities:   

Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB (listed as a subsidiary in Aurelius’ 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports). Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB (listed as a subsidiary in Aurelius’ 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports). Aurelius Nordics (referred to as Aurelius’ “Stockholm Office” in the 2015 & 2016 Annual Reports).

We searched for ‘Aurelius’ in the Bolagsverket (Swedish Companies Registration Office). We were unable to find any of the above-mentioned entities within the Bolagsverket (and therefore, unable to verify their existence):

Gotham City Research has searched for and examined Swedish company filings in the past; this is the first time ever we were unable to verify the existence of a Swedish subsidiary listed in a company’s list of subsidiaries. We find it puzzling we could not verify the existence of the above mentioned entities because:  

We had no trouble verifying the existence of Aurelius’ other Swedish subsidiaries. We had no trouble verifying the existence of Aurelius’ London Office, Aurelius Investments LTD.

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We were able to verify the existence of Aurelius’ other listed Swedish subsidiaries, Conaxess Holding Sweden AB, Conaxess Trade Sweden AB, Scandinavian Cosmetics AB, and Beauty Cosmetics AB:

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The Aurelius Swedish subsidiaries discussed in the prior page, are clearly disclosed:

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We could not verify the existence of Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB and Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB and Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB are listed as Aurelius subsidiaries in Aurelius’ 2015 and 2016 Annual Reports, yet were not listed in the Bolagsverket (Swedish Companies Registration Office), unlike Aurelius’ other subsidiaries that were listed (Conaxess Holding Sweden AB, Conaxess Trade Sweden AB, Scandinavian Cosmetics AB, and Beauty Cosmetics AB):

Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB and Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB were not listed in the Bolagsverket (Swedish Companies Registration Office):

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Aurelius Nordics Aurelius Nordics is referred to as Aurelius’ Stockholm office:

Yet there is no Aurelius Nordics listed in the Bolagsverket:

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We were unable to Aurelius Nordic in the Swedish Bolagsverket, which is puzzling given that we were able to verify the London Office’s existence:

Aurelius’ London Office, Aurelius Investments Ltd. (shown above) is listed per the UK Companies House:

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Do Aurelius’ Swedish subsidiaries exist? We have shown that the previously discussed subsidiaries do exist, per the corporate registries in the respective jurisdictions. But do Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB, Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB, & Aurelius Nordics exist? Possible explanations 1. Aurelius Geissblatt DS AB, Aurelius Geissblatt Holding AB, and Aurelius Nordics do not exist; 2. They exist, but Aurelius has something to hide about their existence; 3. They exist, and Aurelius made an “editorial mistake”. If the answer is 1 or 2, we do not believe Aurelius shares are investable. In Gotham City Research’s experience, companies who either: (1) fake the existence of subsidiaries or; (2) Hide and/or conceal the existence of subsidiaries tend to experience material and permanent subsequent declines in the value of their share price. What if this is an “Editorial mistake”? What is an “Editorial mistake”? It is possible that there is an alternative explanation; perhaps Aurelius wrote the wrong names, i.e. an “editorial mistake” … but for two consecutive years? Also, where is the auditor? After all, the list of subsidiaries is part of the audit. Note that this is not Aurelius’ first “editorial mistake” in their audited financial statements. Aurelius admitted in their detailed response to our first report, the following:

In our first report on Aurelius, we stated: “2015 contingent liabilities, as calculated by the sum of its parts, seem understated by 46% or more” – Aurelius quietly validated our observation, and attributed the irregularity to an “editorial mistake”. How many times can Aurelius attribute these serious errors as mere “editorial mistakes” before people start wondering: is Aurelius telling the truth? Is Aurelius intentionally deceptive? Isn’t CEO Dirk Markus a former McKinsey consultant and Harvard MBA? McKinsey (where coincidentally Enron and Valeant Pharmaceutical’s management originated from) and Harvard are some of the most prestigious and elite institutions in the world. Shouldn’t Dirk Markus and other members of the board be intelligent enough to avoid “editorial mistakes”, especially when it comes to audited financial statements?

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“Manipulating the facts”: Gotham City Research? Or Aurelius? In our experience, management integrity matters. Financial markets tend to assign premium valuations to the share price of companies whose executives demonstrate integrity, and discount valuations to the share price of companies whose executives demonstrate dishonesty. In the case of financial companies (e.g. Aurelius), we believe management integrity matters far more than it does for the non-financial company, as people’s prudent (or otherwise) decisions weigh heavier on longterm performance. Has Aurelius’ executives demonstrated integrity or not? In our opinion: (1) Aurelius’ management has not demonstrated integrity. (2) Aurelius’ public statements cannot be trusted on the word of management alone; their claims must be verified. (3) Based on our evaluation of management integrity, Aurelius shares will trade at a discount to its 2016 tangible book value per share, or around EUR 8 per share. Here’s why (there are many additional reasons, found in the prior report, this report, and more): “CFO”       

Aurelius claims “Steffen Schiefer is CFO of AURELIUS and has been so successfully since 2012.” Aurelius’ 2012 Annual Report does not even mention Schiefer, instead: “His [former CFO’s] areas of responsibility were divided among the remaining three Executive Board members.” Steffen Schiefer, so-called “CFO” is not even mentioned in Aurelius’ recent 2016 Annual Report. We could not find the name “Steffen Schiefer” in any of Aurelius’ annual reports. We (and evidently, many others) have never heard the name “Steffen Schiefer” until last week. Aurelius’ former CFO, Ulrich Raldmayr, was referred to as CFO in Aurelius’ 2011 annual report. Steffen Schiefer, so-called “CFO”, is not even listed as CFO on Aurelius’ website.

Management share ownership – “cannot say anything”   

Aurelius’ management refuses to disclose their current ownership of Aurelius shares. When asked about his current share holdings, CEO Dirk Markus said “I cannot say anything… we respect the law with regards to quiet periods” According to a German attorney: “I am not aware of any such rule (quiet period relates to trading). In addition, they did not appear inhibited to state their trading strategy when they said "we do not intend to sell any more shares"

Additional reasons 

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Aurelius referred to their inaccurate contingent liabilities total in their Annual Report 2015 as a mere “editorial mistake”. Aurelius now provides less transparency regarding their NAV as of their 2016 Annual Report released last week. Dirk Markus says, “we run a hospital for sick businesses” yet he refuses to explain how Aurelius use discount rates (for their NAV calculation) more appropriate for very healthy businesses, like Visa, rather than “sick businesses” which tend to demand discount rates over 20%-30%+ Aurelius refuses to disclose the rate of insolvency of the subsidiaries AFTER they are sold. Page 11 of 54

Aurelius’ “CFO” Aurelius claims:  

“Steffen Schiefer has been CFO of AURELIUS since 2012.” “As CFO, while not being part of the Executive Board, Steffen is a member of AURELIUS extended management board”

Actually, in March 2013 (when Aurelius released its 2012 Annual Report) Aurelius did NOT state that Steffen Schiefer was CFO, nor that Schiefer had replaced former CFO Ulrich Radlmayr. In fact, here is what Aurelius said (AR 2012 released on March 19, 2013): For personal reasons Ulrich Radlmayr did not renew his Executive Board contract that expired on 30 June 2012. His areas of responsibility were divided among the remaining three Executive Board members. In March 2013, Aurelius did not say “Steffen Schiefer has replaced Ulrich Radlmayr as CFO” Rather, Aurelius said “his areas of responsibility were divided among the three Executive Board members.” Aurelius made it very clear previously, that Ulrich Radlmayr was CFO (from Aurelius Annual Report):

Aurelius claimed: “As CFO, while not being part of the Executive Board, Steffen is a member of AURELIUS extended management board” It is our understanding that there is no such thing as an “extended management board” under German law. Individuals serve as an officer on the management board or serves as an employee of the company underneath the management board. Legally, this is mutually exclusive.

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Additional CFO Inconsistencies and/or apparent contradictions On the conference call held last week, March 29, one of the participants asked who is actually CFO of the company and stated that he previously thought that Gert Purkert was the CFO: Analyst: Regarding the position of CFO… There was an accusation of Gotham that you are CEO and CFO at the same time. And in your answer yesterday you claimed that there is Steffen Shiefer as CFO. We looked at the company for quite a while and I’ve never heard that name. It is strange to me. I’ve always thought Mr [Gert] Purkert is CFO. As if matters could not get more convoluted, on March 28th (the day we released our first report) Berenberg immediately acknowledged that CEO Dirk Markus is Aurelius’ CFO: CEO Dirk Markus, a former Finance executive of Arques is also the CFO of Aurelius, according to Hauck & Aufhauser. Our comment [Berenberg]: True but to our understanding it has not led to any corporate governance issues. How is it possible that some analysts claimed and/or believed:  

CEO Dirk Markus is CFO Board member Gert Purkert is CFO

Even while Aurelius claimed:  

The CFO role was “divided among the remaining three Executive Board members.” & just last week, Aurelius now claims Steffen Schiefer has been CFO all along (since 2012).

In our view, what Aurelius actually said at the time – that the CFO role was divided among three Executive Board members – carries more credibility than what the company is saying 4-5 years later. HOW MANY VERSIONS OF THE TRUTH EXIST? IS THIS SOME KIND OF COMEDY? It is our understanding that in Germany, the CFO designation may not be used in the same manner as is in the US. We considered the possibility that cultural differences might explain these inconsistencies. However, given his extensive background in American business culture – Dirk Markus is a former McKinsey consultant and Harvard MBA, after all – we have dismissed cultural differences as an explanation. Furthermore, Aurelius itself clearly referred to Ulrich Radlmayr as CFO in past annual reports… Therefore, we ask the following questions:   

Who is the one manipulating facts? Who is intentionally presenting information in a misleading fashion? Who is making “false claims, presumptions and assertions to deliberately distort the situation” in order to abuse the capital markets and capitalism, in its own economic interest?

Gotham City Research? or Aurelius/Dirk Markus? Page 13 of 54

We are not aware of any legal restrictions that prevent Aurelius’ management team from disclosing their current share ownership in Aurelius’ shares During the conference call held last week, CEO Dirk Markus implied that they could not comment on their shareholdings due to legal restrictions, referencing a “quiet period” related restriction: Analyst: Can you give at least an indication on where your shareholding currently stands? Dirk Markus: I cannot say anything beyond what I have said in the presentation on shareholding. And on quiet period, I cannot say anything. Dirk Markus: We have to respect limitations of German law when it comes to so called “quiet period” which are phases when insiders are not allowed to trade shares due to impending important information Dirk Markus: Since then (December) We have not sold any shares. And have no intentions of doing so in the future.

We asked an attorney based in Germany about Dirk Markus’ claims. This is what he said: “I am not aware of any such rule (quiet period relates to trading, not disclosures). In addition, they [management] did not appear inhibited to state their trading strategy when they said "we do not intend to sell any more shares"

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Unaudited NAV: Less disclosure after management share sales Aurelius’ management sold €169 million of shares in December 2016 (40% or more of their stake at that time). The 2016 annual report, which was prepared shortly after the management share sales, provides less transparency regarding Aurelius’ unaudited Net Asset Value than in past annual reports. Gotham City Research does not trust Aurelius’ unaudited Net Asset Value, as a measure of value, for the following reasons/questions (in addition to those stated in the prior report and current report):   

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Aurelius is providing less transparency regarding NAV soon after management significantly reduced their ownership of Aurelius shares. Why has the ‘IT Services & Systems’ component of NAV increased from EUR 209 million in Q3 2016 to EUR 255 million in Q4 2016, despite the sale of Getronics IDS in Q4 2016? If Aurelius is extracting value out of its subsidiaries by converting its subsidiaries’ working capital/non-current assets into cash (and then extracting the cash), how are the values of Aurelius’ companies, i.e. their NAVs, not impaired? Aurelius’ 2016 gross cash flow is very negative (in fact, cash flow from operating activities is negative, before working capital adjustments) – how is NAV positive? How does Aurelius make money again? By collecting its subsidiaries’ profits (generated from their underlying operations) or by asset stripping?

2016 NAV (as of December 31, 2016) is less transparent than in the past Soon after selling €169 million of shares, Aurelius’ management decided to eliminate the disclosure of individual portfolio companies’ NAVs. In the words of Oddo Seydler: It [Aurelius] makes the NAV calculation less transparent which is the wrong way to go in the current situation, in our view. Aurelius now discloses only 8 NAV components (excluding ‘other’) whereas Aurelius disclosed 19 components just a few months ago:

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Aurelius disclosed 19 components as recently as November 2016 (when Q3 2016 NAV was released):

And in the prior period (Q2 2016):

In fact, Aurelius has been providing unaudited NAV disclosures, consistent with those shown above, since H1 2014. Is it a mere coincidence that Aurelius has become less transparent about its NAV as soon as management sold shares in December 2016?

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Does the recent increase in the IT Services component of Aurelius’ NAV make sense? Aurelius’ ‘IT Services & Systems’ component of NAV increased from  

EUR 209 million in Q3 2016 to EUR 255 million in Q4 2016

Notwithstanding the slight change in the name of the categories, how did the IT Services component of NAV increase despite Aurelius’ sale of Getronics IDS in Q4 2016, which generated revenue of EUR 90 million per year? (read the section in our prior report regarding the so called “strategic investor”):

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Aurelius also sold BrightONE IT Services BV, which accounted for around EUR 7 million.

So how did Aurelius increase its IT Services component of NAV from Q3 to Q4 2016, despite the fact that Aurelius conducted two sales in Q4 2016? Addition by subtraction? Hocus Pocus?

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Unaudited NAV: The curious case of SECOP In our original report, we provided an estimate for SECOP NAV component of EUR 17.5 million. Actually, that figure might be overly aggressive; here’s why SECOP NAV might actually be worth zero, and why Aurelius’ historical SECOP NAV might be suspect:   

SECOP GmbH earnings declined from 2011-2015, despite rising revenue and many years of ownership under Aurelius. Its cash flow generation seems insignificant as well. SECOP GmbH held over EUR 30 million in net debt as of 2015. Other SECOP subsidiaries as listed in Aurelius’ AR show de minimis cumulative profits, as of 2015.

Secop was acquired by Aurelius in 2010. It has been the largest or one of the largest components of Aurelius’ unaudited NAV. While SECOP has grown revenue since 2011, EBITDA has actually declined:

EUR m Revenues EBITDA EBIT Net income

KEY INCOME STATEMENT FIGURES FOR SECOP GMBH 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 19.7 74.5 113.0 162.1 187.9 -5.3 5.3 3.1 5.4 3.6 -6.5 4.0 2.1 4.5 1.5 -3.7 3.3 4.4 4.8 -0.4

2015 222.5 3.9 1.6 1.4

SECOP GmbH Income statement (per the local filings summarized above and shown below):

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SECOP NAV worth zero? If we apply a 12x EBIT multiple (we arrived at 12x based on a review of the business), to the average SECOP EBIT for the last four years (EUR 2.5 million), we arrive at an enterprise value of about EUR 30 million. Net Debt exceeds EUR 30 million, implying that SECOP GmbH equity is worthless:

What of the other subsidiaries? In aggregate, the other SECOP subsidiaries don’t seem profitable in 2015:

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Yet Aurelius valued SECOP at EUR 255.6 million as of 9/30/2016 (the last time Aurelius disclosed portfolio company specific NAVs), not zero:

Given that SECOP was Aurelius’ largest NAV component, and that we arrive at a value for SECOP of zero, not EUR 255 million, how accurate and reliable is Aurelius’ entire NAV? Where’s the evidence of “curing” companies? Dirk Markus claimed: We run a hospital for sick businesses where we help to cure them. And like in a real-world hospital once in a while a patient might die. That is normally not the doctor's or our fault but that it’s the prior condition of the patient that causes that.

The SECOP valuation questions aside, why has Aurelius failed to improve SECOP’s profitability through 2015? Is Aurelius a proven and repeat turnaround expert? Or is Aurelius something else entirely?

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Do sick companies merit a healthy company’s cost of capital? Aurelius is a “hospital for sick businesses” yet does not detail how its discount rates account for this According to CEO Dirk Markus, Aurelius is: We run a hospital for sick businesses where we help to cure them. And like in a real-world hospital once in a while a patient might die. That is normally not the doctor's or our fault but that it’s the prior condition of the patient that causes that. Gotham City Research believes that Aurelius’ portfolio companies deserve discount rates that are at least 3x-4x higher than the 5.3%-10.5% WACC they use currently for the following reasons:    

Aurelius, in its CEO’s own words, works with “sick businesses” Aurelius refuses to disclose the failure rate of companies after they are sold. We believe a negative inference, due to their refusal to disclose, is warranted. A healthy, stable, & modest growth company such as VISA appears to trade on an implied yield of 5.6%; by way of inference, sick companies seem to deserve far higher cost of capital. Other loss-making, high risk venture companies regularly demand discount rates between 30%70%. This has been true even with historically low nominal interest rates.

In Aurelius’ preliminary response last Tuesday, it wrote the following regarding the discount rate:

Aurelius only referred to interest rate risk as a driver of cost of capital… yet our question is about the credit/solvency risk of Aurelius’ portfolio of “sick businesses”. Despite historically low nominal interest rates, bankruptcies and financial distress have been present post 2008. In the conference call the next day (last Wednesday), Dirk Markus does not seem to have answered the question regarding discount rates for sick/distressed companies: Analyst: My question targets your discount rate. Can you explain how you calculate it, because Gotham mentioned that your discount rate is quite low for sick or distressed companies. Dirk Markus: Discount rates are published by IQ capital which is international well-reputed service… Current discount rate is 5.3% to 10.5%. The logic is that discount rates tend to be higher in industries that are considered more risky and lower in industries that are considered less risky. The average discount rate is 7.26%. Historically there has been a strong correlation between interest rates and discount rates: when interest rates are lower, discount rates also go down and vice versa. Page 22 of 54

In Aurelius’ more detailed response released a few days ago, despite providing more facts/claims than before, it is not clear how Aurelius actually calculates the “sick company” risk in its discount rates:

When we published our first report on Quindell, Quindell (like Aurelius) issued a detailed response. We found Quindell’s response to be full of false, true (but irrelevant), and true (but misleading) responses to our report. We believe that Aurelius’ responses to our report (and others’ questions) eerily resemble Quindell’s response to our report (and others’ questions). As such, we believe that Aurelius’ share price will continue to decline dramatically, as was the case with Quindell. Here is what research regarding venture companies (that generate losses and fail at a high rate), says about high discount rates used by venture capitalists: Venture capitalists typically use discount rates in the range of 30 to 70 percent. During the startup stage of venture-capital financing, discount rates between 50 to 70 percent are common. The discount rate decreases from the first through fourth stage: from 60 percent to 30 percent. These rates of return are high compared to historical returns on common stocks or small stocks (12.1 percent and 17.8 percent respectively). Such high discount rates also cannot be explained in the context of any existing asset pricing theory; that is, any reasonable risk-adjusted discount rates are not consistent with discount rates in the order of 30 to 60 percent. The high rates of return charged by venture capitalists reflect the fact that not all their projects succeed in that they have no net cash-inflows. Adjusting for the probability of success of the project provides estimates of discount rates comparable to rates of return on common stocks and other financial assets. Source: http://leeds-faculty.colorado.edu/bhagat/venture-discount-ppr.doc Doesn’t the highlighted text remind you of the “sick companies” that Aurelius has historically owned? Therefore, shouldn’t Aurelius’ portfolio companies use discount rates (maybe not quite as high as 60%) but much closer to the above range of discount rates?

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Is working capital a sustainable source of cash flow? According to Financial Shenanigans by Howard M. Schilit, Jeremy Perler: The cash inflow from pushing out payments (i.e., an increase in payables) should be considered a one-time activity, not a sign that the company has found a lasting way to generate more cash. While this may seem like common sense, you would be surprised at how many companies tout their CFFO strength and forget to mention their little secret: that they increased CFFO by stringing out vendors and not paying them in a timely fashion. Base on the just released 2016 Annual Report, we have found:  

Aurelius’ cash flow from operating activities (before working capital adjustments) is EUR -55m. Increase/decrease in trade payables and other liabilities accounts for nearly all positive cash flow from operating activities. This doesn’t seem like a recurring source of cash flow.

Why did trade payables and other liabilities contribute so much to cash flow from operations? Is the underlying source of this cash inflow sustainable? Page 24 of 54

What is “Operating EBITDA” ? We were unable to derive a positive “Operating EBITDA” 2016 Operating EBITDA reached EUR 114.0 million (EBITDA reached EUR 148.4 million), according to Aurelius’ provisional figures provided on March 6, 2017:

Our calculations of 2016 EBITDA do not reconcile with Aurelius’ calculations of EBITDA nor operating EBITDA:

EUR m Gross cash flow add back: Interest paid Income tax paid EBITDA* Operating EBITDA Variance * - according to Gotham calculations

2016 -54.9 23.0 12.3 -19.6 114.0 -133.6

We used Aurelius’ gross cash flow from operations as a starting point, and added back interest paid and income taxes paid (the ‘DA’ in the EBITDA is already added back), and were unable to arrive at a positive figure. Page 25 of 54

Does Aurelius’ 2016 cash flow statement imply that the company derives little value from its subsidiaries’ profits / cash flow from their respective operations? How does Aurelius largely make money? By fixing companies? Or by asset stripping companies?    

If Aurelius was a successful turnaround investor, shouldn’t its cash flow from operating activities before working capital be meaningfully positive, rather than negative? Given that Aurelius’ sources of cash are from changes in working capital, does that not suggest Aurelius generates cash flow largely from asset stripping? If Aurelius largely derives its cash flow from asset stripping, how does its NAV make any sense? That is, how can one squeeze the juice out of a lemon, and value the lemon as if its juice were never squeezed out?

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Aurelius & Arques: different, yet employing the same people? In our original report we asked: Aurelius AG and Arques AG: Same Questionable Model, Same Destiny? We subsequently stated our opinion that Gotham City Research believes Aurelius currently exhibits the same patterns as Arques did immediately before Arques’ earnings and share price crashed. Aurelius claims that Arques failed due to bad deals done in 2006-2007, not due to its business model

We doubt Aurelius’ explanation for the following reasons:   

If Arques failed due to bad deals (as alleged by Dirk), why did Aurelius try to buy Arques? If Arques made bad deals, why hire former Arques employees? Did Arques fail due to “bad deals” done in 2006 and 2007, i.e. after Dirk left Arques?

Former employees of Arques who have worked at Aurelius according to publicly available sources:      

Dirk Markus CEO Anke Banaschewski, investor relations Philip Borbely Phillip Wagner Michael Jarkel Michaela Mellinger

Aurelius invested in Arques (from the now deleted former Aurelius website)

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Source: https://web.archive.org/web/20130521173833/http://www.aureliusinvest.de/pressenews/Pressemitteilungen-2008/AURELIUS-beteiligt-sich-an-Arques-Industries.html Does “the fish rot from the head down” ?

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Sources: 1 https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAAAEFCcB4gVQKUUdQJns6acdTSQqvSvgTc8&authType=OUT_OF_N ETWORK&authToken=MvkN&locale=en_US&srchid=5284495041473264439371&srchindex=1&srchtotal=5&trk=vsrp_ people_res_name_headless&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A5284495041473264439371%2CVSRPtargetId%3A267303%2CV SRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Afalse%2CauthType%3AOUT_OF_NETWORK 2 https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAAM9F50BltzDOyUTQQL2_z0gpfEMMRFMST4&authType=OUT_OF_ NETWORK&authToken=dAsp&locale=de_DE&srchid=5284495041473264439371&srchindex=3&srchtotal=5&trk=vsrp _people_res_name_headless&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A5284495041473264439371%2CVSRPtargetId%3A54335389% 2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Afalse%2CauthType%3AOUT_OF_NETWORK 3 https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAANQmkgBYHtZFYUmr6GI0aKoIGXX5gpJtY&authType=OUT_OF_NETWORK&authToken=bCvL&locale=de_DE&srchid=5284495041473264439371&srchindex=2 &srchtotal=5&trk=vsrp_people_res_name_headless&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A5284495041473264439371%2CVSRPt argetId%3A55614024%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Afalse%2CauthType%3AOUT_OF_NETWORK 4 https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAA0caoB4qOCEE_3_ew6pEq8prUbtumMRRM&authType=OUT_OF_NETWORK&authToken=xFPj&locale=de_DE&srchid=52 84495041473264439371&srchindex=4&srchtotal=5&trk=vsrp_people_res_name_headless&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3 A5284495041473264439371%2CVSRPtargetId%3A220002730%2CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Afalse%2Caut hType%3AOUT_OF_NETWORK 5 https://www.linkedin.com/profile/view?id=ADEAAAJG4LMBH8jf22OOoqNmGvF61CXtAWGcLSA&authType=OUT_OF_ NETWORK&authToken=ljTR&locale=en_US&srchid=5284495041473264439371&srchindex=5&srchtotal=5&trk=vsrp_ people_res_name_headless&trkInfo=VSRPsearchId%3A5284495041473264439371%2CVSRPtargetId%3A38199475%2 CVSRPcmpt%3Aprimary%2CVSRPnm%3Afalse%2CauthType%3AOUT_OF_NETWORK

6 https://www.linkedin.com/in/anke-banaschewski-17004b11a/ , http://radaris.de/p/Anke/Banaschewski/

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Do the consolidated & subsidiaries’ earnings reconcile? In its detailed response, Aurelius claimed:

Gotham City Research finds the above explanations insufficient for the following reasons:        

Aurelius claims our analysis was “misleading”; the company did not say it was incorrect; nor did the company say our analysis was irrelevant. Aurelius did not provide any additional details regarding the subsidiaries’ earnings. Aurelius does not explain how the sum of its subsidiaries earnings in 2015 is so massively negative, while Aurelius’ EBITDA and net income are so massively positive. Aurelius does not explain the exact reconciliation process – with exact figures – between IFRS and local GAAP. Aurelius should provide the exact amounts of subsidiaries’ profits (if there are any) that are included in its consolidated earnings. Aurelius should clarify what exactly “no impact from first-time consolidation under IFRS 3” means, with detailed figures and calculations. Aurelius does not provide the exact reconciliations in the differences between de-consolidation between local account level and consolidated account level. Aurelius does not detail how exactly intercompany relationships can be quantified/reconciled. Page 36 of 54

Aurelius claims that the profit/loss figures provided in the subsidiaries list are the same as those presented in the local financial statements: are they? The notes to the subsidiaries list (from Aurelius’ 2015 annual report) clearly states that those subsidiaries’ profit/loss figures are the same as those presented in the local financial statements:

Yet based on our prior report, is the above claim even true? Recall our review of UK subsidiaries (where we calculated differences between the local UK filings’ figures versus the corresponding UK subsidiaries’ figures in Aurelius’ annual reports) in our prior report. The footnote shown above does not mention any differences arising between IFRS and UK GAAP. Can the variances between Aurelius’ consolidated earnings and the sum of its subsidiaries’ earnings fully explained by differences between IFRS and GAAP? Why doesn’t Aurelius detail the exact differences and sources of the differences, with actual numbers, that are shown below: CONSOLIDATED NET INCOME VS SUM OF SUBSIDIARIES' NET INCOME EUR '000 2012 2013 2014 2015 TOTAL Consolidated € 88,056 -€ 1,699 € 107,591 € 154,924 € 348,872 Sum of subsidiaries' € 44,233 -€ 68,127 € 74,991 -€ 56,345 -€ 5,249 Difference € 43,823 € 66,428 € 32,600 € 211,269 € 354,121

Consolidated earnings:

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Subsidiaries’ earnings, from Aurelius’ annual report (see for yourself):

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Gegendarstellung (Counterstatement to Handelsblatt) The following counterstatement was sent to Handelsblatt for publication on Monday, April 3, 2017 in response to two articles published by the paper on May 31, 2017:

GOTHAM CITY RESEARCH LLC [email protected]

Handelsblatt GmbH Herr Dieter von Holtzbrinck, Verleger Herr Gabor Steingart, Herausgeber Herr Sven Afhüppe, Chefredakteur Kasernenstrasse 67 D-40213 Düsseldorf Federal Republic of Germany April 3rd, 2017

Geltendmachung von Rechten auf Gegendarstellung

Sehr geehrte Herren, Das Handelsblatt hat in der Ausgabe vom 31. März/1./2. April 2017 zwei Artikel unter Bezugnahme auf unsere Gesellschaft und unter Behauptung von Tatsachen, die die Gesellschaft betreffen, veröffentlicht, und zwar “Angriff der Spekulanten” auf S. 3 (nachfolgend „Spekulanten-Artikel“) und “Geschäftsmodell üble Nachrede” auf S. 6/7 (nachfolgend „Nachrede-Artikel“); beide Artikel stammen von Ihren Journalisten Peter Köhler und Robert Landgraf. Die Artikel erfüllen weder die journalistische Wahrheits- noch die journalistische Rechercheplicht noch den Handelsblatt-Standard zu neutraler und ausgewogener Berichterstattung (siehe auch die Art und Weise der Fragestellung an den Anwalt von Hengeler Müller, um den Begriff der „Marktmanipulation“ herauszukitzeln) und enthalten zahlreiche unwahre und zum Teil ehrenrührige Tatsachenbehauptungen unsere Gesellschaft betreffend. Sie verletzen die Gotham City Research LLC in ihren deutschen und US-amerikanischen Rechten. Wir fordern Sie auf, nach Erhalt des Originals dieses Schreibens in der nächsterreichbaren Druckausgabe des Handelsblatts sowie im Internet: Page 48 of 54

1. Auf der ersten mit Fließtext versehenen Seite des Handelsblatt (bzw. auf der ersten Seite des Spekulanten-Artikels im Internet) die beigefügte Gegendarstellung der Gotham City Research LLC zum Spekulanten-Artikel abzudrucken bzw. aufzunehmen und 2. Auf der ersten Seite des Abschnittes „Titelthema“ (bzw. auf der ersten Seite des NachredeArtikels im Internet) die beigefügte Gegendarstellung der Gotham City Research LLC zum Nachrede-Artikel abzudrucken bzw. aufzunehmen. Sollten Sie dieser Aufforderung nicht nachkommen, behalten wir uns rechtliche Schritte und Schadensersatz- bzw. Schmerzensgeldklagen gegen die rechtliche Herausgeberin und die verfassenden Journalisten in unserem Sitzstaat USA vor. Mit vorzüglicher Hochachtung

Gotham City Research LLC

Daniel Yu - Managing Partner -

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Gegendarstellung zum Artikel “Angriff der Spekulanten” auf S. 3 des Handelsblatt vom 31. März/1./2. April 2017 der Journalisten Peter Köhler und Robert Landgraf: In dem Artikel wird behauptet, der „Hedge Fonds Gotham City“ habe am Dienstag den Vorstand der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius mit einer vernichtenden Analyse des Unternehmens attackiert und die Bilanzierung in Frage gestellt. Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Die Analyse wurde von der Gotham City Research LLC veröffentlicht. Diese Gesellschaft ist unter keiner in Betracht kommenden Definition ein Hedge Fonds. Im Research Bericht wurde im ersten Absatz des Disclaimers ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß zwischen Gotham City Research LLC und dem Hedge Fonds Gotham Asset Management, LLC sowie dessen verbundenen Unternehmen keinerlei Verbindung besteht. Gotham City Resarch LLC ist selbst kein Fonds, sondern steht im Alleineigentum, investiert ausschließlich Eigenmittel, verwaltet keinerlei Fremdgelder von Investoren oder einen Fonds, erhält keine Verwaltungsgebühren von irgendeiner Person und hat auch keinerlei Zulassung für eine derartige Verwaltung von Investorengeldern. In dem Artikel wird behauptet, der Hedge Fonds Gotham City habe am Dienstag „den Vorstand der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius“ mit einer vernichtenden Analyse des Unternehmens „attackiert“ und die Bilanzierung in Frage gestellt. Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Kein Mitglied des Vorstandes der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius wurde im Research Report von Gotham City Research LLC persönlich angegriffen. Soweit die Infragestellung der Bilanzierung betroffen ist und hieraus ein impliziter Vorwurf gegen den CFO von Aurelius hergeleitet werden könnte, ist kein Vorstand der Aurelius betroffen. Sowohl in ihrer schriftlichen Stellungnahme als auch im Conference Call stellte der Vorstand der Aurelius klar, daß kein Mitglied des Vorstands der Aurelius die Funktion des CFO einnimmt. In dem Artikel wird behauptet, die „Strategie des Hedge Fonds [Gotham City] sei aufgegangen“. Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Ausweislich des Research Reports war und ist die Strategie der Gotham City Research LLC, von einer Kurskorrektur der Aurelius-Aktie auf einen höheren einstelligen EURO-Betrag zu profitieren. Diese Strategie ist noch nicht aufgegangen, weswegen nach wie vor eine Nettoleerverkaufsposition der Gotham City Research LLC bei Aurelius besteht, ein weiterer Analysebericht veröffentlicht wird und ein neuerlicher Ausbau der Nettoverkaufsposition ausdrücklich vorbehalten bleibt. In dem Artikel wird behauptet: „Inzwischen hält der Spekulant [Gotham City Research LLC] nur noch einen kleinen Restposten der Anteile“. Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Gotham City Research LLC hält keine Anteile an Aurelius. Gotham City Research hält im Zeitpunkt dieser Gegendarstellung eine Nettoleerverkaufsposition in Aktien der Aurelius, die unterhalb der im Bundesanzeiger zu veröffentlichenden Schwelle von 0,5% liegt.

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Gegendarstellung zum Artikel “Geschäftsmodell üble Nachrede” auf S. 6/7 des Handelsblatt vom 31. März/1./2. April 2017 der Journalisten Peter Köhler und Robert Landgraf: Der Artikel erweckt durch das Zusammenspiel von Überschrift („Geschäftsmodell üble Nachrede“, Unterüberschrift „Mit wilden Vorwürfen setzen die Spekulanten Firmen wie Aurelius unter Druck“) und prominenter Nennung und Bezugnahme auf die Gotham City Research LLC und ihren Research Report zu Aurelius im Fließtext den Eindruck, die Gotham City Research LLC habe in ihrem Research Report bezüglich der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius den Straftatbestand der üblen Nachrede nach § 186 StGB erfüllt. Dieser Eindruck ist falsch und ehrenrührig. Richtig ist: Der Research Report enthält keine nicht erweislich wahre Tatsachenbehauptung der Gotham City Research LLC in Bezug auf Aurelius, welche dieselbe verächtlich zu machen oder in der öffentlichen Meinung herabzuwürdigen geeignet ist. In dem Artikel wird behauptet daß der „Hedge Fonds Gotham City“ im wahren Leben ein Gefühl von „Angst und Schrecken“ bei Opfern auslöse, die keine Kriminellen seien, sondern „bislang unbescholtene“ „deutsche Mittelständler“, und daß „jüngstes Beispiel“ die „Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius“ sei. Diese Tatsachenbehauptungen sind falsch. Richtig ist: 1. Die Analyse des Aktienkurses der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius wurde von der Gotham City Research LLC veröffentlicht. Diese Gesellschaft ist unter keiner in Betracht kommenden Definition ein Hedge Fonds. Im Research Bericht wurde im ersten Absatz des Disclaimers ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen, daß zwischen Gotham City Research LLC und dem Hedge Fonds Gotham Asset Management, LLC sowie dessen verbundenen Unternehmen keinerlei Verbindung besteht. Gotham City Resarch LLC ist kein Fonds, investiert ausschließlich Eigenmittel, verwaltet keinerlei Fremdgelder von Investoren oder einen Fonds, erhält keine Verwaltungsgebühren von irgendeiner Person und hat auch keinerlei Zulassung für eine derartige Verwaltung von Fremdgeldern. 2. Aurelius ist das erste deutsche Unternehmen überhaupt, für das Gotham City Research LLC je einen Research Report angefertigt hat; Aurelius ist nicht das jüngste Beispiel. 3. Aurelius ist kein deutsches Mittelstandsunternehmen, sondern ein Finanzinvestor. 4. Aurelius ist nicht unbescholten. Die Gesellschaft wurde in den letzten Jahren in zahlreichen Artikeln namhafter Publikationen und Journalisten mit fragwürdigen Geschäftspraktiken in Verbindung gebracht bzw. dafür gerichtlich belangt. 5. Gotham City Research LLC löst bei unbescholtenen deutschen Mittelständlern kein Gefühl von „Angst und Schrecken“ aus, weil Gotham City Research LLC keine Research Reports über solche unbescholtenen Unternehmen veröffentlicht, veröffentlicht hat oder zu veröffentlichen beabsichtigt. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „In Europa sitzt die Schar der Hedge Fonds vor allem in London. Sie seien bestens miteinander vernetzt und tauschten sich aus. Dabei gehe es vor allem um Informationen. Im Fall von Aurelius ist Gotham City nicht der einzige Hedge Fonds, der sich das Beteiligungsunternehmen vorgeknöpft hat. Zu den anderen Adressen, die auf fallende Kurse spekulieren zählen Jericho Asset Management, BG Master Fund und CQS. Die 2013 gegründete Gotham ist in England mit einer Attacke auf die Outsourcing-Firma Quindell aufgefallen.“ Diese Gesamtdarstellung erweckt den unwahren und ehrenrührigen Eindruck, Gotham City Research LLC sei ein Hedge Fonds, sei bestens mit anderen Hedge Page 51 of 54

Fonds (vor allem mit Sitz in London) vernetzt und tausche sich mit diesen aus und habe sich gemeinsam mit anderen Hedge Fonds das Beteiligungsunternehmen Aurelius vorgeknöpft. Richtig ist: Gotham City Research LLC ist kein Hedge Fonds, Gotham City Research LLC ist nicht mit Hedge Fonds vernetzt oder tauscht Informationen mit diesen aus, die Short Position in der englischen Gesellschaft Quindell hatte nichts mit einer in London sitzenden Schar von Hedge Fonds zu tun, sondern beruhte allein auf einer eigenständigen Analyse durch Gotham City Research LLC und Gotham City Research LLC hat sich die Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius nicht gemeinsam mit Jericho Capital Asset Management, BG Master Fund und/oder CQS „vorgeknöpft“, sondern ist die Nettoleerverkaufsposition bei Aurelius allein aufgrund öffentlich zugänglicher Informationen und eigener Analyse eingegangen, die im veröffentlichten Research Report zusammengefaßt sind. Die vorbezeichneten Hedge Fonds sind direkte Konkurrenten der Gotham City Research LLC im Hinblick auf Entleihmöglichkeiten von Aurelius-Aktien sowie Glattstellungsmöglichkeiten, so daß ein gemeinsames sich „vorknöpfen“ der Beteiligungsgesellschaft Aurelius wirtschaftlich überhaupt keinen Sinn macht. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „Sie [die Gotham City Research LLC] sorgte dort [bei der britischen Gesellschaft Quindell] ebenfalls für einen massiven Kurssturz und setze die Zahlung von über 400 Millionen Pfund an die Aktionäre durch. Diese Tatsachenbehauptungen sind falsch. Richtig ist: 1. Die Gotham City Research LLC hat nicht für einen Kurssturz bei Quindell gesorgt, sondern der Kurssturz war darauf zurückzuführen, daß Aktionäre der Quindell der fundierten Analyse von Gotham City Research LLC im Jahre 2014 Glauben schenkten und in hoher Stückzahl ihre Aktien verkauften. 2. Gotham City Research LLC hat auch keine Zahlung von 400 Millionen Pfund an die Aktionäre der Quindell durchgesetzt. Gotham City Research LLC veröffentlichte im April 2014 einen Research Report zu Quindell, in dem die im Jahresabschluß 2013 von Quindell veröffentlichten Umsatzund Gewinnzahlen der Gesellschaft für das Jahr 2013 auf fundierter Grundlage ernsthaft angezweifelt wurden; aufgrund der Analyse kam Gotham City Research LLC zu einem aus ihrer Sicht angemessen Aktienkurs, der mehr als 90% unterhalb des seinerzeitigen Börsenkurses lag. Nachdem das Quindell-Management den Research Report als falsch und irreführend zurückgewiesen und gegen die Gotham City Research LLC ein Versäumnisurteil wegen Verleumdung erlangt hatte, verließ der Vorstandsvorsitzende das Unternehmen Ende 2014. Die eingeleiteten Untersuchungen der britischen Financial Conduct Authority, des Serious Fraud Office und des Financial Reporting Council führten dann im Jahre 2015 dazu, daß Quindell den im Jahresabschluß 2013 ausgewiesenen Umsatz um GBP 109 Mio. und den Nachsteuergewinn um GBP 130 Mio. nach unten korrigieren mußte. Für das Jahr 2014 zeigte der offengehaltene Jahresabschluß von Quindell aufgrund der angeordneten Änderung des Bilanzausweises der Umsatz- und Gewinnrealisierung einen um GBP 290 Mio. verminderten Umsatz und einen um GBP 282 Mio. verminderten Gewinn. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „Für Aufsehen sorgte der Hedge Fonds [Gotham City Research LLC] besonders mit einem Bericht über „angebliche Betrügereien“ beim spanische Wifi-Anbieter Let’s Gowex.“ Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Gotham City Research LLC berichtete in seinem Research Report zu Let’s Gowex nicht über angebliche, sondern über tatsächlichen Bilanzbetrug. Der Vorstandsvorsitzende von Let’s Gowex gestand vier Tage nach Veröffentlichung des Research Page 52 of 54

Reports, daß er die Bilanzen seit vier Jahren vorsätzlich gefälscht hatte. Let’s Gowex stellte unmittelbar darauf einen Insolvenzantrag. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „Die Transparenz, die Gotham City von anderen einfordert, bietet Sie selbst nicht: es gibt nur wenige öffentliche Informationen, […], eine telefonische Kontaktaufnahme [ist] nicht möglich. Auf Fragen des Handelsblatts reagierte die Gesellschaft nicht.“ Diese Gesamtdarstellung erweckt den unwahren Eindruck, daß Gotham City Research LLC undurchsichtig sei und eine Transparenz nicht biete. Richtig ist: 1. Es gibt zahllose öffentlich zugängliche Informationen zu Gotham City Research LLC sowie ihrem im Artikel namentlich genannten Gründer und Geschäftsführer, darunter Berichte und Interviews etwa mit dem deutschen Wirtschaftsmagazin Brand Eins sowie Publikationen wie dem Wall Street Journal, der Financial Times, Bloomberg, New York Post etc., die einfach über jede Internetsuchmaschine zu finden sind. 2. Gotham City Research LLC ist telefonisch zu erreichen und wird täglich dutzende Male telefonisch erreicht. 3. Gotham City Research LLC erfüllt gegenüber Presseanfragen höchste Transparenzanforderungen und spricht beinahe täglich mit Journalisten weltweit. Eine Ausnahme macht Gotham City Research LLC nur dann, wenn Journalisten um Auskünfte ersuchen, von denen eine ausgewogene Berichterstattung nicht zu erwarten ist; in diese Kategorie fiel vorliegend Herr Köhler, der an dem Tag seiner Anfrage unter dem Titel „Dubiose Attacken“ (Handelsblatt vom 30. März 2017, S. 27) mit Sicht auf Aurelius einen Kommentar verfasste, in dem für ein generelles Verbot von Leerverkäufen geworben wird. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „Egal, ob sie Muddy Waters, Gotham City oder Jericho Capital Asset Management heißen: Die Firmen kennen nur Eingeweihte.“ Diese Tatsachenbehauptung ist im Hinblick auf Gotham City Research LLC falsch. Richtig ist: Der Branchendienst Activist Short Research setzt Gotham City Research LLC regelmäßig auf einen der ersten drei Plätze der weltweit erfolgreichsten Analysten dieser Art (vgl. etwa Brand Eins, Ausgabe 6/2016). Allein eine Anfrage bei einer Internetsuchmaschine ergibt, daß jedenfalls Gotham City Research LLC nicht nur Eingeweihten, sondern unzähligen Marktteilnehmern, Journalisten und Bloggern weltweit geläufig ist. In dem Artikel wird ausgeführt: „Vorstandschefs wie Dirk Markus von Aurelius jagen sie [u. a. Gotham City Research LLC] aber Angst und Schrecken ein, da sie den Druck auf den Aktienkurs verschärfen und Vorstandsposten gefährden“. Diese Tatsachendarstellung ist falsch. Richtig ist: Die Existenz von Gotham City Research LLC verschärft weder den Druck auf irgendeinen Aktienkurs noch gefährdet sie irgendeinen Vorstandsposten. Zudem hat ihre bloße Existenz weder in der Vergangenheit noch gegenwärtig Herrn Markus Angst und Schrecken eingejagt; Aurelius hat in seiner ersten Stellungnahme ausdrücklich ausgeführt, daß es niemals Kontakt zu Aurelius oder Dr. Markus seitens Gotham City Research LLC gegeben hat. Es sind die Tatsachen und Analysen in den Research Reports von Gotham City Research LLC sowie Gotham City Research LLC’s Reputation am Kapitalmarkt für die Treffgenauigkeit ihrer Analysen, die - wenn sie vom betroffenen Emittenten nicht glaubhaft widerlegt werden können – zu einem Verkaufsdruck auf die Aktien führen und – Page 53 of 54

sollten sich erhebliche Pflichtverletzungen von Vorständen ergeben – Vorstandsposten gefährden. Der Kurssturz der Aurelius-Aktie am Mittwochnachmittag (nachdem die Aktie ohne gravierende Marktentscheidung den gesamten Vormittag um EUR 50.00 pendelte) und die Notwendigkeit für Gotham City Research LLC, ihre Nettoleerverkaufsposition wegen eines drohenden short-squeeze vorläufig einzudecken ergab sich ausweislich diverser Analysten- und veröffentlichter Teilnehmerberichte aus der Unwilligkeit von Dr. Markus, trotz mehrfacher Nachfrage aufgrund einer behaupteten gesetzlichen „Quiet-Period“ seinen aktuellen Aktienbesitz an der Aurelius offenzulegen, der Verunsicherung selbst langfristiger Anleger/Analysten über die Person des CFO bei Aurelius (ein Teilnehmer sagte „Ich dachte, Herr Purkert sei der CFO“), den Ausführungen zu den von Aurelius genutzten Discountfaktoren bei der Errechnung des NAV der Portfoliounternehmen von einer Datenbank für M&A-Transaktionen prosperierender Unternehmen, dem hohen Gehalt des Vorstands bei deutlich zurückgegangenem Gewinn, usw. Kurz: Dr. Markus war aus Sicht der Teilnehmer an dem Conference Call im Vergleich zum Research Report von Gotham City Research LLC nicht überzeugend, so daß offenbar noch während des Calls viele Teilnehmer Verkaufsorders herausgaben und der Kurs der Aurelius-Aktie ungebremst fiel.

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