Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire

Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire Author(s): Hamida Khatoon Naqvi Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Nov., 1977), pp. 191-192 Published by: Association for Asian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053411 . Accessed: 05/10/2012 20:00 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal Empire In the FebruaryI976 issue, ProfessorM. N. Pearson attemptedan analysisof the determinants in the decline of the MughalEmpire.' He attributesthe empire's performance of almost crisisto twoprincipalfactors:(i) thepoor and unsatisfactory all the powerfulMughal nobles; (2) Aurangzeb'smove south in I68I-82. Though one may join issue withProfessorPearson in several matters,I shall limitmyself here to the two most crucialpointsnoted above. Whereas the decadent characterof Aurangzeb'sumerahis generallyaccepted, Pearsondoes not seem to have takenintoaccountthefactthat,of his approximately I4,500 mansabdarsin I695, at least 8,ooo existingin I647 were,togetherwiththe crown,received by Aurangzebas a legacy of the House in i658. By about the middle of Emperor Akbar'sreign(I556-I605), the Mughal mansabdarshad sucon vitalissuesof the to themselvestherightof decision-making ceeded in arrogating empire. In the nineteenthregnalyear,Akbar replaced land assignmentwithcash butsuchwas thepressurefromhis nobles that,withina salariesto imperialofficers,2 fewyears,he restoredstatusquo ante.3The imperialmansabdars,alreadyenjoying in addialmostall the militaryand executivepowers in the realm,were henceforth tion enabled to acquire more or less completerightsover the land revenueof the non-khalisaareas-a circumstancethatover the decades renderedthe mansabdar community virtuallysupremein theempire.It is well knownthatEmperorsJahangir (i 605-2 7) and Shah Jahan(i 62 7-58), leaningheavilyon the mansabdars,had eleand further expandingthe vatedand expanded theirranks.Aurangzeb'smaintaining to them.Pearsonwould was merelyto honorthe dynasty's commitment community perhapshave done betterifhe had criticizedAurangzebforso stubbornlyand unimaginatively hangingon to the tradition,since the approximately7,000 new mansabdarshe enlistedover the lastfivedecades were no improvementupon the older set of umerah. Pearson puts Aurangzebin the dock once again when he contendsthatwhat soundedthe deathknellof theGreat Mughalswas the emergenceof Shivajiand his Marhattasas a parallelpowerfulbody. Worse still,while Aurangzebgenerallyblundered in his dealingswiththe Marhattas,on fourspecificoccasions-according to Pearson'sassessment-his unwiseand tactlesshandlingof the rebelswas decisive:in of oftheDeccan, he failedto availhimselfof theopportunity I 65 7, when,as subedair crushingShivaji,who had notyetgrowntoo powerful;in I659, whenShaistaKhan's debacle occurred;in I664, when Shivaji sacked Suratwithimpunity;and finallyin i666, when the arch-rebelwas presentedto the Emperorat Agra. Shivaji and his bandoffollowerswere undoubtedlya formidableforcein thelaterhalfof theseventeenthcentury,and the factremainsthatAurangzeband his nobles failedto suppressthem.It mayalso be conceded thatMarhattas-bytheirperseverance,audacity,and vigor-had largelycontributedto the generalweakeningof the empireand to the erosion of imperialprestige,time,and energy.But Marhattasas a body did I"Shivaji

and the Decline of the Mughal Em-

pire,"JAS, XXXV, pp. 22I-35.

2 Abul Fazl, Akbarnama(Persian ed.), III (Calcutta,i 886), p. I I7.

3Fazl, pp. 292, 327; Badayuni,Muntakhebat-utTawarikh,II, trans.by Rankingand Lowe (Patna, I973), pp. i88, I93, 2I8.

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notexistwhenAkbardied; theyarose and grewover the subsequentdecades. Their principalasset was theirlarge and ever-growing strengthof followers.Aurangzeb, however,did not ascertainthe causes of the swellingof the Marhattaranks,nor did he checktheoutflowofmenfromtheimperialdomainsintoMarhattaarms.Instead, Aurangzeb embarked upon a twenty-five-year-long campaignto reduce the insurgents.In otherwords,Aurangzebomittedto tracethe cause of the trouble,and confinedhimselfto dealingwiththe resultantphenomenonof Shivajiand Marhatta power. SubstantiallyfollowingAurangzeb,Pearson too concentratesalmostexclusivelyon Aurangzeb vis-a-visthe Marhattas,disregardingthe factsof the origin, character,composition,and circumstancesattendingthe rise of Marhattapower. Large migrationsof able-bodiedmen fromtheirsettledtrade and base are usually promptedby politicalinsecurity, social barriers,or economic crises;and it would seem thatMarhattas(as well as theSikhs,Jats,or Bundelas) were in facttheresultof some unfortunatedevelopmentsin the precedingdecades withinthe imperialdominionoccasioninglarge movementsinto rebel camps. Even the factthat,as the imperialarmsmade theirhaltingprogressin victories,it onlyadded to the size and strengthof the Marhattas,did not make eitherAurangzebor Pearson thinktwice beforecommitting themselvesanyfurther.Each yardof land gained by Aurangzeb drove at least one individualto findrefugeand perhaps livelihoodwiththe Marhattas. As a matterof fact,in medievaltimes,social and economic changeswere very slow indeed: the rebel forcesthatcrystallizedduringAurangzeb'sreigncould not (and actuallydid not) emergeat one strokein i658. The originand beginningsof the Marhattas,Sikhs,Jats,and Bundelas can, withthe help of availablesources,be traced back to Jahangiror early years of Shah Jahan'sreign; Aurangzebmerely had sown. He certainlystumbledand blunreaped whathis fatherand grandfather dered when facedwiththe predicament,but it is less thanfairto hold himresponsible forthe sins of his royalprogenitors. Finally,societies,includingthatof the GreatMughals,are complexin character. To ascribethe I 707 catastrophe,and all thatfollowedin itstrain,to a singlecauseespeciallyin the absence of a whirlwindinvasionof a Taimuror a Nadir Shah-is an A Marhatta,Sikh,orJatrebellionmayweakenan empireor even oversimplification. but in orderto see the qualitativechangesthatcame over the reduce its territory, shape and interestsof theempire,the threadsof a denouementas complexas thatof I707 have to be soughtverymuch earlier. Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi

HAMIDA KHATOON NAQVI