Aurangzeb Rajput Relation

Priyanka Kumar B.A. History (Hons.), IIIrd Year Tutorial Group – Thursday, 11:25 (Group IV A) Q. Examine the development of relations with the Rajput chieftains under Aurangzeb. Ans. Aurangzeb, regarded as the last of the Great Mughals, ruled from 1658-1707. During his reign, the Mughal Empire reached its territorial climax. However, it also began to show signs of decline and disruption. Aurangzeb’s policy towards the Rajputs has been clouded by immense controversy. The Mughal alliance with the Rajput chieftains, a key factor in the expansion and consolidation of the Mughal Empire under Akbar, is said to have been breached under Aurangzeb, leading to the weakening and subsequent disintegration of the empire. However, as has been shown in recent works, this is a simplistic approach and needs to be further examined. It has traditionally been understood that the Mughal attitude towards the Rajput chieftains was governed by the personal religious outlook of the individual rulers. Thus, it has been argued that the religious orthodoxy of Aurangzeb and his desire to establish a truly Muslim state was the reason of his breach with the Rajputs, just as Akbar’s religious liberalism was the motive force of his Rajput policy. But Mughal-Rajput relations should instead be seen in the deeper political, economic and geo-strategic context. The Rajputana region, flanking the Gangetic Valley, is characterized by a rocky terrain, inhospitable climate and infertile land. Yet it was always considered important by the Mughals for strategic and political reasons. The region formed a crucial link between the Gangetic Valley and the rich and flourishing sea ports on the west coast of India on one hand, and with the prosperous tract of Malwa in Central India on the other, which was important for trade and also access to both Gujarat and the Deccan region. Akbar, who ruled from 1556-1605, was the first Mughal to recognize the importance of alliance with the Rajputs. He initiated policies to conciliate the Rajput chieftains and integrate them into the Mughal state through the mansabdari system. Accordingly, the Rajputs were given a personal rank (zat) and asked to maintain a specified number of troops (sawar) that could be placed in the service of the Emperor. In lieu of salary, the Mughals frequently granted the mansabdar a territorial grant (jagir), which in the case of the Rajputs was generally their watan (home territory). Akbar also sought to guarantee the allegiance of the Rajput rulers through matrimonial alliances with them. At the same time, by acknowledging the authority of the rajas in the internal affairs of their kingdoms and their positions as heads of the clans, he was able to turn their hostility into support. For all practical purposes, thus, the states were independent. However, the Mughals had one important right – over matters of succession. On the death of a raja, the territory was, in theory, supposed to devolve to not his heir, but the Mughal Emperor, who then had the right to choose the successor. In practice, however, the state was generally returned to the nominated heir. A sanad was presented to the new ruler, and tika marked on his forehead by the Emperor’s delegate, legitimizing his ascent to the throne (gaddi). Frequently a Rajput raja would avoid a succession dispute among his sons by having his heir designate formally recognized by the Mughal Emperor.

Over time, a symbiotic relationship developed. The rajas gained an opportunity to increase personal power by imperial appointment. In return, they acknowledged the suzerainty of the Emperor and provided large military forces and leadership to the Mughals in their campaigns. Thus the Rajputs acquired an important position in the Mughal Empire. This policy of religious toleration and cooperation continued under Jahangir and Shah Jahan. Aurangzeb, however, is said to have reversed the policy followed by his predecessors and alienated the Rajputs, in turn, leading to rebellion by the two major Rajput states – the Rathors of Marwar (Jodhpur) and the Sisodias of Mewar (Chitor). There has been a lot of debate about the factors which led to this breach between Aurangzeb and the Rajputs. Jadunath Sarkar, one of the first scholars to work on this, attributed it to Aurangzeb's narrow religious policy and his attempts to establish Islamic orthodoxy. He based himself on Persian sources like the Padishahnamah, the Muntakhab-ulLubab b Khafi Khan, manuscript newsletters of the Imperial Court (akhbarat-i-darbar-i-muala), letters of Aurangzeb; official records, biographical dictionaries etc., and accounts of European travelers like Bernier and Manucci In the recent writings, however, efforts have been made to assess Aurangzeb's policies in the context of social, economic and administrative problems that he faced during his rule. Although he was certainly more orthodox in his personal thinking than his predecessors, his actions were always guided by political expediency. A close examination of the development of Mughal-Rajput relations under Aurangzeb is thus required. If we begin with the War of Succession, it has been assumed that it was a war between the liberalminded Dara and an orthodox Aurangzeb, and so the Rajputs sided with Dara. However, evidence shows that the Rajputs, like other ethnic groups in the nobility, were internally divided on the issue. Athar Ali has shown the number of Hindus on the side of Aurangzeb were 28, opposed to 32 on the side of Dara. Jaswant Singh of Marwar, sent by Shah Jahan, was defeated by Aurangzeb at the Battle of Dharmat (1658). Some Rajput clans, like the Hadas, fought for Dara. Aurangzeb also went out of his way to conciliate and win over leading Rajput rajas. Qanungo has shown how Raja Jai Singh of Amber became a secret supporter of Aurangzeb and played a key role in the overthrow of Dara. Aurangzeb also established cordial relations with Rana Raj Singh of Mewar. He issued several nishans (princely order) to the Rana, agreeing to assign to him four parganas (Pur, Mandal, Badnor etc.), which had been sequestered by Shah Jahan in 1654 as a punishment for the breach of the treaty of 1615, in return for the services of a Rajput contingent. He also assured him of religious toleration. After the battle of Dharmat, Kanwar Sardar Singh joined Aurangzeb and was present in the battle against Shuja. Thus, Dara failed to win over the important Rajput rajas to his side. After accession to the throne in 1658, Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajputs passed through a number of phases which need to be analyzed separately. In the early phase, from 1658 to 1667, Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajput rajas were cordial. In fact, during the period the Rajputs were treated as partners in the kingdom, and in some respects, their position actually improved from what it had been under Shah Jahan. The percentage of nonIndian Muslims employed in the mansabdari system remained almost constant from Akbar to Aurangzeb. Rana Jai Singh was a close advisor to Aurangzeb, so much so that a contemporary historian, Ishwardas, calls him “the key to the brain” of Aurangzeb. In 1665, he was appointed viceroy of the Deccan, a charge normally given to princes of blood or nobles of the highest rank and confidence. At his instance, Aurangzeb also pardoned Jaswant Singh, in spite of his support for Dara

and his role at the battles of Dharmat and Khajwah; and he was posted as Governor of Gujarat even without appearing at the court for formal leave as was the custom. There had been no Rajput officer throughout the reign of Shah Jahan holding the rank of 7000. Now both Jai Singh and Jaswant Singh were promoted to a rank of 7000. Rana Raj Singh’s mansab was also raised to 6000/6000 (1000 duaspa sih-aspa), the sequestered parganas restored and his overlordship over Dungarpur, Banswara, Devaliya etc. recognized, as had been promised before the war. Likewise, good relations were maintained with the other important states of Bikaner, Bundi and Kota. Although Rao Karan of Bikaner had abandoned Aurangzeb in the Deccan after hearing of the illness of Shah Jahan and had gone home, he was pardoned. Rao Chhatrasal of Bundi, and Mukund Singh of Kota had laid down their lives fighting against Aurangzeb, but there was no attempt to interfere in the succession there, or to show displeasure in any way. However, it is true that such tokens of honour as the putting of tika on the forehead of the Rajput rajas by the Emperor himself or the chief wazir were withdrawn. Matrimonial alliances also came to an end during Aurangzeb's reign. However, this had started during the time of Shah Jahan itself. The ban on tika can be attributed to the financial crisis faced by the state in this period, a big gap between the jama and the haasil. Matrimonial alliances had been used by Akbar to strengthen the relationship with the Rajputs. This had already been achieved by the time of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, and can thus explain the absence of marriages between the Rajputs and the Mughals. Between 1666 and 1679, relations between Aurangzeb and the Rajputs seem gradually to have become cool. In 1660, Rana Raj Singh was asked to explain why he had invaded Kishangarh and married the young Raja's sister, Charumati, “without Imperial permission”. Raj Singh replied that permission was not asked for since Rajputs had always married Rajputs and this had not been forbidden. Moreover, his ancestors had married among the Pawars of Ajmer. He also pointed out that he had not engaged in any hostilities with the Imperial forces. The explanation of the Rana was accepted, but Aurangzeb showed his displeasure by restoring Ghayaspur (Devaliya) and Banswara to Hari Singh, who had been ousted by the Rana and had been at the Imperial court since 1659. Subsequently, the younger sister of Charumati was married to Prince Muazzam. Aurangzeb also faced a series of domestic challenges in this period. There were the Jat and the Satnami uprisings, continued conflict with the Afghans, the Assamese and the Marathas, and a growing financial crisis reflected in a gap between income and expenditure. One response of Aurangzeb was to re-emphasize Islam as a major bond of unity by instituting a series of orthodox measures, and coming closer to the ulama. Yet the Rajputs continued to receive important positions. They sided with the Mughals in trying to crush the Jat uprising as well as the peasant-based Satnami uprising. Rajput forces were also despatched to deal with the two frontiers, the north-east and the north-west. Jaswant Singh was given charge of north-west. Raja Ram Singh, who had been restored to the mansab of 5000 following the death of Jai Singh in 1667, was sent to the north-east. However, unlike Mir Jumla earlier, he was not given the charge of the subah of Bengal so that its resources could be used for the campaign. The surprising part was that they were virtually made to languish there for long periods. It does not, of course, follow that the presence of these premier Rajput rajas at the court would have influenced Aurangzeb's policies. But their virtual banishment to distant places does support the suggestion of

the contemporary observer, Mamuri, that before his departure for the Deccan, i.e. during this period, Aurangzeb had been exercising restraint in promoting the Rajputs. It also seems that the percentage of Rajput nobles to the total number of nobles dropped, as did their aggregate ranks. Information about the mansab promotions and reductions is given in the official chronicle, Alamgirnamah of Mirza Muhammad Kasim. It shows that, on the whole, the old proportion of appointment of the Rajputs was not being maintained. It also seems that while during the first 6 years of the decade, the Rajputs were granted relatively higher ranks, during the last 4 years, their position declined appreciably. The sawar ranks held by them were reduced in absolute terms. All this suggests a growing reservation on the part of Aurangzeb towards the Rajputs. However, this could be as Aurangzeb faced a problem of lack of suitable lands (paibaqi) available for assignment of jagirs. After the failure of his campaigns to extend Mughal territory, he may have decided to limit the number of jagirs that the Rajputs could hold outside their homelands. Subsequently he allotted to other groups of the Mughal nobility the revenue grants and promotions that might have gone to the Rajputs. The real break in relations comes in the latter half of Aurangzeb’s reign. This period witnessed the major rebellion by the states of Marwar and Mewar in 1679. The causes for this breach between Aurangzeb and Mewar and Marwar have generally been sought in the religious and political policies pursued by Aurangzeb. However, the complexity in the actions of the Emperor should be noted. For instance, although there are instances of temple destruction, grants were also given to temples in Mathura and for the maintenance of several Brahmins and maths. The re-imposition of jaziya by Aurangzeb in 1679 is generally regarded as marking the culmination of the spirit of religious bigotry, which led to the alienation of the Rajputs. The timing of the reimposition has led some historians to consider the measure as the impetus for a final call of arms by the Rajput race against the bigotry of the Hindu Emperor. However, there is no evidence to show that it had any effect on the relations of the Rajputs with the Emperor. Relations between Raj Singh of Mewar remained cordial even after the enactment of jaziya. In fact, his son Jai Singh was a guest at the imperial court till April 1679. At the time the prince returned to Mewar carrying with him several presents from Aurangzeb to the Rana, there is no suggestion of animosity between Mewar and the Mughals. Later that month Aurangzeb issued a farman to the Rana assuring him of his continued support and friendship Furthermore, there is no record of Raj Singh protesting against the reinstitution of jaziya. As G. N. Sharma notes, “Had there been any such protest, the local annalists who have given minute details of other events would not have left this unnoticed”. Tradition says that the Rana sent a letter of protest to the Emperor. But its authorship is under question – while James Tod and K. S. Das ascribe it to Raj Singh, J. N. Sarkar asserts that the style and content of the letter suggest that Shivaji had written it. Thus, to ascribe the war between Raj Singh and Aurangzeb to the re-imposition of jaziya by the latter is entirely incorrect. Also, to say that the measure was intended to force a conversion of the Hindus is a misrepresentation of the facts. People who served in the Mughal army were exempt from it, as were priests and religious heads. Instead, the policy seems to have been reintroduced due to serious political and economic considerations. Having ascended the throne as a ‘champion of Islam’, Muslim theologians made it seem binding on him to impose the tax. Also, one of his initial acts after succession had been to abolish nearly 80 oppressive taxes. This meant an enormous decrease in the imperial income. This

coupled with heavy expenditure entailed in quelling disturbances and waging wars, added o the financial crisis and may have driven the Emperor to re-impose the tax. Satish Chandra points out that while Aurangzeb’s policies are extremely important, the developments inside Rajputana, including the inter-state relations in the area and the policies and ambitions of the individual rulers, in shaping Mughal-Rajput relations should also be taken cognizance of. Keeping this in mind, one can understand the rebellion of Marwar, and later Mewar, against the Mughals in 1679. The crisis began when Jaswant Singh died in November 1678, with no surviving heir. This raised the problem of who was to succeed to the gaddi. There were no definite principles regulating succession in Marwar. Earlier, in 1638, Maharaja Gaj Singh had set aside the elder son, Amar Singh, and nominated Jaswant Singh. The nomination was accepted by Shah Jahan, although Jaswant Singh was only a minor, whereas Amar Singh had performed useful service in the Deccan. So, when news reached Aurangzeb at Agra, he converted the state of Marwar into khalisa. According to Jadunath Sarkar, there were many reasons why Aurangzeb “annexed” Jodhpur. Firstly, he felt that as one of the leading Hindu states, Marwar could emerge as the centre of Hindu opposition to his policy of temple destruction and the imposition of jaziya. V. S. Bhargava agrees, suggesting that Aurangzeb wanted to deprive the Hindus of a possible strong-head in their resistance to his policy of religious persecution. Also, he wanted to take vengeance for the role played by Jaswant Singh in the War of Succession, when he had sided first with Dara. The Ajitodayas and Ajit Vilas of the second quarter of the 18 th century assert that Aurangzeb had never forgiven Jaswant Singh for his disloyalty during the war against Shuja. Moreover, being strategically located on route to the Deccan, he wanted it to be in the hands of someone more loyal than Jaswant Singh had been. Further, Aurangzeb’s policy of forcible conversion of Hindus “required that Jodhpur should sink into a quiescent dependency or a regular province of the Empire.” Jadunath's conclusions have been contested by a number of historians, especially in the light of the two contemporary sources which have recently been discovered - the Persian Waqai Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambhor and the Rajasthani Jodhpur Hukumat-ri-Bahi. The former is the secret report of a news-writer posted at Ranthambhor and Ajmer during the Rathor rebellion and who then accompanied the Imperial army in the Rajput war. The latter deals with the Jodhpur state under Jaswant Singh, and gives a detailed account of the developments in the Maharaja’s camp from the time of his death till the arrival of Durga Das and the Ranis at the court at Delhi, and their subsequent flight to Jodhpur. Firstly, it has been argued that if Aurangzeb did actually want to punish Jaswant Singh, why would he have waited for so long? Moreover, Aurangzeb had actually pardoned him and appointed him as subahdar of Gujarat. Later he was sent to Jamrud as thanadar. There is also no reason to suppose that the taking of Jodhpur into khalisa signified its "annexation" to the Empire. Apart from the fact that the state already formed a part of the Mughal Empire, there were many precedents of a state being occupied pending the settlement of a disputed succession. For instance, in 1669 when Rai Singh had usurped the gaddi of Nawanagar from his nephew, Satarsal (Chhatrasal), the state was occupied, the name of the capital being changed to Islamnagar, and officials appointed to administer the state. After some time however, the state was restored to Tamachi, the son of Rai Singh.

Similarly, in Jaisalmer, in 1650, on the death of Rawal Manohardas, who had died heirless, the queens and the Bhatis nominated Ram Chandra, a descendant of Rawal Maldeo's second son, Bhawani Singh. However, Shah Jahan conferred the kingdom on Sabal Singh, a descendant of Rawal Maldeo's eighth son, Khetsi. Apart from the disputed succession, the growing lawlessness in Marwar could have been a contributory factor for Aurangzeb’s decision. Evidence of this is provided in the Waqai Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambor also. The Mertias had risen up rendered the roads to Ahmedabad unsafe, while the zamindars in Ranthambhor and in the neighborhood of Ajmer had withheld the land revenue from the jagirs. Some of the parganas, such as Phalodi and Pokharan, which had been allotted in jagir to the Maharaja, were claimed by the neighbouring states, and they prepared to use force to enforce their claims. The jagir of a chieftain was sometimes also converted to khalisa if he owed the state a large sum of money. This is true in the case of Jaswant Singh also. 40 lakhs of rupees taken on loan by the Maharaja when he was the Governor of Gujarat had not been repaid. There is no evidence that Jaswant Singh settled his account with the imperial treasury by the time of his death in 1678. Thus we see that Aurangzeb did not break any Mughal precedent in his order to convert Marwar into khalisa land. However this move was resisted by the queens of Jaswant Singh, especially the chief queen Rani Hadi, who pleaded that it was against custom that his descendants should be dispossessed. She wrote a letter to Aurangzeb, asking her to allow her to retain Jodhpur and convert the rest to khalisa land. Two of the Ranis of Jaswant Singh were pregnant and so Rani Hadi apparently wanted to delay a decision by Aurangzeb. Her claim was backed by a strong body of Rathors, and by Rana Raj Singh of Mewar, who deputed an army of 5000 horses under one of his leading men, Sanwal Das, to help Rani Hadi. In order to overawe Rani Hadi and her supporters, and to enforce his orders, Aurangzeb left Delhi for Ajmer. The supporters of Rani Hadi were in no position to withstand the Imperial forces, and they entered Jodhpur. The situation became complicated as two claims to the gaddi were put forward - by Indra Singh, who was the grandson of Jaswant Singh's elder brother, Amar Singh; and by Anup Singh, who was the son of a daughter of Amar Singh. Indra Singh argued that a great injustice had been done when the claims of Amar Singh were passed over. He pleaded that this ancient wrong should now be put right. He also offered to pay 20 lakhs of rupees as peshkash. Anup Singh offered to pay a peshkash of 25 lakhs and also offered to realize 20 lakhs for the Imperial treasury from Jaswant Singh's estate. Meanwhile, two posthumous sons of the Raja were born. Their claims were now supported, among others, by Rao Anup Singh, the ruler of Bikaner, and by Khan-i-Jahan, the Imperial Bakshi. Finally Aurangzeb invested Indra Singh as ruler of Marwar for a peshkash of 36 lakhs. This was in keeping with the Mughal traditions, which gave the Emperor rights over succession matters. But it started a dispute within the Rathors. Earlier, desperately seeking to delay a decision in favour of Indra Singh, Rani Hadi had secretly made an astounding offer - that the Rathors would themselves destroy all the temples in Marwar if the tika was given to a son of Jaswant Singh. This was rejected by Aurangzeb As a last resort, Rani Hadi urged that rather than Jodhpur being conferred upon Indra Singh, it should remain in khalisa. If Aurangzeb was being guided by religious orthodoxy and had desired to

annex Marwar in order to further his objective of the forcible conversion of Hindus, as has been suggested by J. N. Sarkar, he should have accepted Rani Hadi's offer and kept Marwar in khalisa. On 15 April, the two minor sons of Jaswant Singh reached Delhi along with their mothers and Durga Das, Jaswant Singh’ senior officer. They again pressed the claims of Ajit Singh, the elder son, with great vehemence. Aurangzeb proposed that the infant be brought up in the Imperial Palace and promised to restore the kingdom to him when he would attain the age of discretion. Erroneously supposing that the intention of the Emperor was to bring up the boy as a Muslim, the Ranis left Delhi with him in disguise. But Aurangzeb had only doubted the legitimacy of the child and wanted him brought to Delhi so that it may be inquired into. The fact that the child who had been left behind by the Rajputs, and whom Aurangzeb pretended to regard as genuine, was converted to Islam is not a proof of the evil intention of Aurangzeb for it was a well-known convention that if a raja's son changed his religion, willingly or unwillingly, he lost all claim to his hereditary principality. For instance, after defeating Jujhar Singh Bundela, Shah Jahan had conferred the gaddi on his cousin, Devi Singh, and had either killed the sons of Jujhar Singh or converted them to Islam in order that they may forfeit their right to the gaddi for all time. The arrival of Ajit Singh and Durga Das in Jodhpur marked the beginning of the Rathor uprising. They openly attacked the Mughals officials. So the Mughals now retaliated by using force against them. Aurangzeb also removed Indra Singh from the gaddi on the ground that “he was too incompetent to rule the country and put down the disturbances”. Towards the end of September, Aurangzeb himself reached Ajmer. After that, temporarily, resistance in Marwar was and Jodhpur was occupied. Even Rani Hadi submitted after some time. Durga Das now turned to Mewar for help and along with Ajit Singh, escaped to the Mewar territories, where he was welcomed by the Rana, and given the jagir of Kelwa for his maintenance. If the Rathors had not received active help and encouragement from Rana Raj Singh from the outset, it is likely that their resistance to Aurangzeb would have collapsed. The interest taken by the Rana in the Marwar dispute cannot be explained merely on the basis of support to the principle of legitimacy, for he had extended support to Rani Hadi at a time before the two posthumous sons of Jaswant Singh had been born, and the claim of Indra Singh was the strongest from the point of view of legitimacy. Nor can it be explained on the ground of an implied threat to the Hindu religion for there is no evidence of any protest on the part of the Rana against Aurangzeb's policy regarding temples and his re-imposition of the jaziya. Nor, contrary to general belief, was the mother of Ajit Singh a relation of the Rana. Thus the Rana had no personal interest in the succession of Ajit Singh. Several reasons have been identified as to why Mewar joined the rebellion with the Rathors. It is possible that the Rana was moved by the generous impulse of helping his sister-in-law, Rani Hadi. He may also have hoped to gain some territorial advantage. Further, Aurangzeb had drawn Raj Singh into an alliance with him during the War of Succession. Though he made a number of concessions to the Rana, he could hardly honour the vague promise held out by him of restoring the Rana to the position and honour enjoyed by Rana Sangram Singh. Raj Singh, therefore, gradually drifted away from Aurangzeb. Also, Mewar had, before the coming of the Mughals, been the most prominent state in Rajputana. And although they had submitted to the Mughals in 1615, they wanted to restore their lost prestige and possessions. Moreover, while all other petty Rajput states had earlier been their

feudatories, now, through alliances with the Mughals, states such as Bikaner and Amber had forged ahead On the other hand, Mewar itself had been subjected to humiliating restrictions regarding Chittor, and the Mughals had granted independent status to some of the states on the southern border of Mewar, such as Banswara, Durgapur, Pratapgarh, Devaliya, etc. To add to this, a number of Mewar parganas had been sequestered by Shah Jahan in 1654 for a breach of the agreement regarding Chittor. Thus, the Ranas of Mewar chafed at the restrictions placed on them by the Mughals and may have hoped to use the situation to demonstrate the importance of Mewar in Rajput affairs, and thus re-establish, to some extent, its position as the premier state of Rajasthan. Initially the Rana had viewed the succession struggle in Marwar with indifference, since rivalry and antagonism had always characterized the relations between the two leading states. However, as an increasing number of Mughal forces came to be stationed in the Rathor state, the proximity of Mewar to Jodhpur and the formidable military strength of the Mughals in the vicinity could have created an uneasiness in his mind. The Emperor’s decision to personally direct the operations against Marwar from Ajmer created further apprehension in the Sisodian state. This may also have contributed in Raj Singh’s decision to protect the young Ajit from the Mughals. As a result, the war now extended to Mewar as well. With this, Marwar became a secondary factor in the war, though sporadic Rathor resistance continued. In early 1680, Aurangzeb left the suppression campaign in the hands of Prince Azam and his two brothers, Muazzam and Akbar. For nearly a year the Mughals had only mixed success in dealing with the harassing activities of the Rajputs in each kingdom. This situation changed after Raj Singh’s death in September 1680. His death removed the chief bond of unity between the Sishodias and the Rathors. The new Rana Jai Singh was lukewarm to Ajit Singh's cause. Throughout this period a continuing series of secret Rajput emissaries entreated Prince Akbar to rebel against his father and seize the throne with Rajput support. Finally, on January 1 1681, Akbar crowned himself emperor. However, he was defeated by Aurangzeb and escaped to Maharashtra. Akbar’s flight suddenly converted what had been merely an awkward rebellion by the Rathors to a full-blown imperial crisis. These developments suggest that Aurangzeb's Rajput policy had caused widespread concern, not only among the Rajputs but in a section of the Mughal nobility as well. This treaty signaled the end of the Rajput rebellion against Aurangzeb. The war lasted till 1681. By now both parties desired peace – the Rajputs because they had tired of war, and the Emperor because matters had taken a serious turn in the south and required his urgent presence there. As a result, the Treaty of Rajsamudra was signed, according to which Jai Singh was acknowledged as the Rana of Mewar and given a mansab of 5000. In return, he ceded certain tracts (3 parganas) of his territory to the Mughal Empire, i.e., Pur, Mandal and Badnor, but this territory was returned 3 years later. The demand for jaziya was also dropped. The fortress of Chittor was not to be repaired. He also had to supply a contingent of 1000 Rajputs for service in the Deccan. The Mughals would withdraw their forces from Mewar. The treaty of proved to be the basis of a lasting peace between the Sisodian Rajputs and the Mughals. Jai Singh was honoured and his younger brother Bhim Singh was posted at Ajmer as a mansabdar in the imperial service. These cordial relations continued under Jai Singh’s successor Rana Amar Singh, who ruled from 1698-1707.

In Marwar, however, during the period 1681-1707, the war continued to be waged intermittently and with varying degrees of intensity. After the failure of Akbar’s rebellion, most of the Rathors had deserted Durga Das and returned to Marwar. They now decided to accept imperial rule and attempted to obtain positions in the Mughal administration of the state. After the Treaty, Durga Das and his followers were completely isolated. They tried to gain the support of the Maratha leader, Shambhuji, who was also at war with Aurangzeb. But although Shambhuji granted them asylum and provided for their maintenance, his initial reaction to the rebels was cool. The Emperor left for Deccan on 8 September 1681, and his presence in the south prevented Shambhuji from giving the rebel prince any substantive support. The effect of the breach with Marwar and Mewar on the Mughal Empire should not be overestimated. The scale of the Mughal military operations in the area after the treaty with the Rana in 1681 was too small to effect the Mughal operations elsewhere, or to constitute a serious drain. We may, however, agree with Jadunath Sarkar that “the loss caused to Aurangzeb by his Rajput policy cannot be measured solely by the men and money he poured on that desert soil”. Inability to settle the issues concerning these states affected the prestige of the empire and increased the area of lawlessness. Above all, it created doubts about the political sagacity of Aurangzeb as well as his bonafides in his dealings with non-Muslims. This helped to swell the tide of political disaffection and religious discord in the country, and was also reflected in the efforts of various royal princes to intrigue with the Rajput rajas, and to form their own groups and factions. Aurangzeb's breach with Marwar and Mewar does not signify his breach with the Rajputs as such. The rebellion had only involved the Rathors and Sisodias. The other clans had not only remained aloof, but had also served under the Mughals. The Waqai Sarkar Ajmer gives frequent reports of Rajput officers joining the Mughal army with their contingents. The rebellion, thus, did not initiate any great decline in the fortunes of the Rajput nobility. Though in the period 1679-1707, we find only 73 Rajput officers out of a total 575 – mere 12.6% compared to the proportionate number of Rajputs in 1658-78, which was 14.6% - this may be held out to mark a decline. It should, however, be kept in mind that this was a general decline suffered by the nonDeccani elements. If we take the non-Deccani nobles alone, then the number of Rajputs amounted to 16.6% of the total in 1658-78, while in 1679-1707, the Rajputs numbered 17.6%. The rulers of Amber, Bikaner, Bundi and Kota continued to serve in the Mughal armies even after 1679. Raja Anup Singh of Bikaner and his son, Kesari Singh, as well as Rao Bhao of Bundi and his son and successor, Anirudha Kishore Singh, served in the Deccan and also against the Jats. Almost every Rajput state had its contingent fighting in the Deccan alongside Aurangzeb’s army. Thus we cannot say that there was a special discrimination against Rajputs after 1678 and they still formed an influential group within the imperial nobility. Scholars like J. N. Sarkar and S. R. Sharma have presented the Rajput rebellion as a Hindu-Muslim confrontation. However this is not consistent with the facts of the revolt. Aurangzeb’s appointment of Indra Singh and the Rajput support for Prince Akbar seem to belie the idea of a Hindu-Muslim conflict. It may also be argued that with the gradual consolidation of the Mughal Empire in the north, and the shift of emphasis to the conquest of the Deccan and the compulsion of accommodating the local ruling elements, specifically the Marathas into the nobility, alliance with the Rajputs had lost its urgency. Instead, it was the Rajput rajas now that needed the alliance more than the Mughals in

order to maintain their internal positions and to augment their limited resources by grant of jagirs outside Rajasthan in addition to their watan. A careful study of the rebellion thus makes it clear that the rebellion was neither a general uprising by the people of Marwar against Mughal authority nor a concerted effort by the Rathor clan to resist Mughal imperialism; it was merely an internal feud between competing factions of the Rathor clan for control of the offices and revenues of Marwar. Although more recent historians have recognized the complexities of Mughal-Rajput relations in the reign of Aurangzeb, the tendency to reduce the Rajput rebellion to a Hindu-Muslim confrontation remains. However this distorts the motives of both the rebels and Aurangzeb. The war was not a communal confrontation, as it has been made out to be in the 20 th century, but a struggle between a traditional, parochial political system and an expansionist empire. Moreover, they were intra-clan wars, in which the Mughals were forced to interfere. Thus overall, it cannot be said that Aurangzeb reversed Akbar’s policy. The relations should just be seen in the specific context of the problems that he faced in his period, be it political, institutional or financial. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Jadunath Sarkar – History Of Aurangzib, Volumes III & IV S. M. Jaffar – The Mughal Empire From Babar To Aurangzeb Zahiruddin Faruki – Aurangzeb And His Times Visheshwar Sarup Bhargava – Marwar And The Mughal Emperors (A.D. 1526-1748) G. N. Sharma – Mewar And The Mughal Emperors (1526-1707 A.D.) J. F. Richards – The Mughal Empire (From The New Cambridge History Of India Series) Satish Chandra – Medieval India: From Sultanat To The Mughals, Part Two: Mughal Empire (1526-1748 A.D.) 8. Satish Chandra – Mughal Religious Policies, The Rajputs And The Deccan 9. Robert C. Hallissey – The Rajput Rebellion Against Aurangzeb: A Study Of The Mughal Empire In The Seventeenth-Century India 10. M. Athar Ali - The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb 11. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.) – The Mughal State, 1526-1750 a. Some Notes On Rājput Loyalties During The Mughal Period – Norman P. Ziegler 12. ARTICLES :a. The Religious Issue In The War Of Successions (1658-1659) – Muhammad Athar Ali b. A Re-Examination Of The Factors Leading To The Breach Between Aurangzib And Rana Raj Singh – Satish Chandra