August 23, 2010 - Digest

CASE DIGEST IN LABREL • AUGUST 23, 2010 • BUTOY™ TAU KAPPA PHI FRATERNITY 2010

DOLE Phil., V. PAWIS G.R. No. 146650, January 13, 2003

The petitioner and the respondent executed a CBA for the period starting February 1996 to February 2001. Under the bonuses and allowances section of the said CBA, a P10 meal allowance shall be given to employees who render at least 2 hrs of overtime work and free meals shall be given after 3 hours of actual overtime work. Pursuant to this provision, some departments granted free meals after exactly 3 hours of work. However, other departments granted free meals only after more than 3 hours of overtime work. The respondent filed a complaint against Dole, saying that free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work, not after more than 3 hrs. The parties agreed to settle the dispute to voluntary arbitration. VA: Ruled in favor of respondent, directing the petitioner to grant free meals after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work. CA affirmed. SC denied the petition of Dole. Whether or not (1) free meals should be granted after exactly 3 hrs of work; and (2) whether the petitioner has the right to determine when to grant free meals and its conditions. (1) Yes. The same meal allowance provision is found in their previous CBAs, the 1985-1988 CBA and the 1990-1995 CBA. However, it was amended in the 1993-1995 CBA, by changing the phrase “after 3 hrs of overtime work” to “after more than 3 hrs of overtime work”. In the 19962001 CBA, the parties had to negotiate the deletion of the said phrase in order to revert to the old provision. Clearly, both parties had intended that free meals should be given after exactly 3 hrs of overtime work. The disputed provision is clear and not vague hence the literal meaning shall prevail. No amount of legal semantics can convince the Court that “after more than” means the same as “after”. (2) No. The exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. It is subject to the limitations provided by law. In this case, there was a CBA, and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.

COLLEGIO V. ASSOC., 340 SCRA 587 – SUPRA (Surface Bargaining) SMC UNION V. CONFESSOR [SMC, Magnolia and SMFI] G.R. No. 111262, September 19, 1996

The original CBA, entered into prior to the spin-off, became effective July 1989 (effective until June 1994). This was renegotiated starting July 1992 - the bargaining unit was the petitioner-union - until July 1994. During the negotiations, the labor union insisted that the bargaining unit of SMC should still include the employees of Magnolia and SMFI, and that the renegotiated terms of the CBA be effective only for the remaining period of the existing CBA (for 2 years). SMC, on the other hand, contended that the employees who moved to Magnolia and SMFI automatically ceased to be part of the bargaining unit at the SMC, and that the CBA should be effective for 3 years in accordance to Art. 253-A of the Labor Code. Unable to agree on these issues, a deadlock was declared. A notice of strike was filed against SMC. SMC requested the NCMB to conduct a preventive mediation but no settlement was arrived at despite several meetings. Subsequently, the Sec of Labor assumed jurisdiction and issued the assailed order directing the renegotiated terms of the CBA to be effective for the period of 3 years from June 1992; and that the said CBA should cover only the employees of SMC and not of Magnolia and SMFI. Whether or not the (1) duration of the renegotiated terms of the CBA is to be effective for 3 years from June 1992; and whether (2) the bargaining unit of the SMC includes also the employees of Magnolia and SMFI. (1) Yes. ART. 253-A, The “representation aspect” refers to the identity and majority status of the union that negotiated the CBA as the exclusive bargaining representative of the appropriate bargaining unit concerned (Term of 5 YEARS). “All other provisions” simply refers to the rest of the CBA, economic as well as non- economic provisions, except representation (Renegotiated not later than 3 YEARS). [Check reasoning of Senator Herrera why the two terms were not sync together] (2) No. In determining an appropriate bargaining unit, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. The employees sought to be represented by the collective bargaining agent must have substantial mutual interests in terms of employment and working conditions as evinced by the type of work they performed. The different companies may have different volumes of work and different working conditions. For such reason, the employees of the different companies see the need to group themselves together and organize themselves into distinctive and different groups. It would then be best to have separate bargaining units for the different companies where the employees can bargain separately according to their needs and according to their own working conditions.

San Miguel Corp (SMC) formerly had 4 business divisions: beer, packaging, feeds and livestock, SAN MIGUEL Corp., V. LAGUESMA [NL Magnolia and agri-business. The 3rd and 4th divisions Magnolia] were separated in Oct 1992, and became two G.R. No. 111262, September 19, 1996 separate and distinct corporations: Magnolia Corp and San Miguel Foods Inc (SMFI), herein respondents. “THERE IS NO DELIGHT IN OWNING ANYTHING UNSHARED.” IBM_PRELOAD F:\BUTOY\LAW_SCHOOL\LABOR\CASE_DIGEST/August23,2010.doc

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CASE DIGEST IN LABREL • AUGUST 23, 2010 • BUTOY™ TAU KAPPA PHI FRATERNITY 2010

Respondent filed with the DOLE a petition for CE among all regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the North Luzon sales area. Petitioner at first opposed contending that its bargaining history in its sales offices, plants and warehouses is to have a separate bargaining unit for each sales office. Nevertheless, SMC agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit through their substitute lawyer’s decision. MA: Certified respondent union as the sole bargaining agent for all the personnel; On appeal, Seceretary of Labor denied. SC affirmed the previous order. Whether or not (1) respondent union represents an appropriate bargaining unit, and (2) whether petitioner is bound by its substitute lawyer's act of agreeing to consider the sales personnel in the north Luzon sales area as one bargaining unit. (1) Yes. There are only around 55 employees in the entire North Luzon sales area. It would not be for the best interest of these employees if they would further be fractionalized. Indeed, the test of grouping is mutuality or commonality of interests. RATIO: The adage "there is strength in number" is the very rationale underlying the formation of a labor union. [SMC V. LAGUESMA, G.R. No. 110399, August 15, 1997 – supra] (2) Yes. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is concerned, we find that this mistake was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner's lawyers. Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's labor case should have adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to the matters involved in the case and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this was not done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner. [VILLA RHECAR BUS v. DELA CRUZ xxx...As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be called for.]

GOLDEN FARMS INC., V. SECRETARY G.R. No. 102130 July 26, 1994

the National Federation of Labor (NFL) and petitioner. And third, the employees represented by PFL had allegedly been disqualified by the Court. Respondent PFL opposed. It countered that the monthly paid office and technical employees should be allowed to form a separate bargaining unit because they were expressly excluded from coverage in the Collecting Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between petitioner and NFL. In its reply, petitioner argued that the monthly paid office and technical employees should have joined the existing collective bargaining unit. MA: Granted the petition and ordered that a certification election be conducted. Appeal and MR of petitioner both were denied. Whether or not petitioner's monthly paid rank-and file employees can constitute a bargaining unit separate from the existing bargaining unit of its daily paid rank-and-file employees. Yes. The employees enjoy the constitutional right to self-organization and collective bargaining. In the case, the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of petitioner primarily perform administrative or clerical work. In contradistinction, the petitioner's daily paid rank-and-file employees mainly work in the cultivation of bananas in the fields. It is crystal clear the monthly paid rank-and-file employees have very little in common with its daily paid rank-and-file employees in terms of duties and obligations, working conditions, salary rates, and skills. This dissimilarity of interests warrants the formation of a separate and distinct bargaining unit for the monthly paid rank-and-file employees of the petitioner.

PHIL LAND (PLASLU) V. CIR G.R. No. L-14656, November 29, 1960 There were 2 unions sought to be the sole bargaining representative of San Carlos Milling Co., herein petitioner, Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) and respondent Allied Workers' Association of the Philippines (AWA). After the certification election, PLASLU in an urgent motion, protested on the ground of the ineligibility of some voters (242 votes cast by stevedores and piece workers) in favor of AWA; but the motion was opposed by AWA on the ground that as a protest of the election it was filed late. Nevertheless, AWA won in the election. MR of PLASLU was denied.

Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the production and marketing of bananas for export. On February 27, 1992, private respondent Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL) filed a petition before the Med-Arbiter praying for the holding of a certification election among the monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file employees of petitioner Whether or not temporary or casual employees Golden Farms. Petitioner moved to dismiss the are permitted to vote in a CE. No. The 242 stevedores petition on three (3) grounds. First, respondent PFL and piece workers, whose votes have been failed to show that it was organized as a chapter challenged, were employed on casual or day to day within petitioner's establishment. Second, there was basis and have no reasonable basis for continued or already an existing collective bargaining agreement renewed employment for any appreciable substantial between the rank-and-file employees represented by time — not to mention the nature of work they perform “THERE IS NO DELIGHT IN OWNING ANYTHING UNSHARED.” IBM_PRELOAD F:\BUTOY\LAW_SCHOOL\LABOR\CASE_DIGEST/August23,2010.doc

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CASE DIGEST IN LABREL • AUGUST 23, 2010 • BUTOY™ TAU KAPPA PHI FRATERNITY 2010

— they cannot be considered to have such mutuality of interest as to justify their inclusion in a bargaining unit composed of permanent or regular employees. [Labor Union vs. Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al. G.R. No. L-10321, February 28, 1958] The basic test of a bargaining unit's acceptability is whether it will best assure to all employees is whether it will be assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. The final results of the certification election show that the petitioner PLASLU garnered a majority of the votes cast by eligible voters. Consequently, said petitioner should be certified as the sole collective bargaining representative of the employees of the San Carlos Milling Co.

UST V. BITONIO, 318 SCRA 185 – SUPRA (Rights of Members)

“THERE IS NO DELIGHT IN OWNING ANYTHING UNSHARED.” IBM_PRELOAD F:\BUTOY\LAW_SCHOOL\LABOR\CASE_DIGEST/August23,2010.doc

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