Atty. Legaspi Case Digest

Ty v. CA GR# 127406, NOV. 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 86 Article 40 – Exception to the Rule

of Ofelia under the CC which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.

FACTS: In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991, Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court however ruled that Ofelia‘s marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions of the Art 40 of the FC.

Alcantara v. Alcantara GR# 167746, AUG. 28, 2007 531 SCRA 446

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be invoked in the case at bar. HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, ―The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.‖ This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first require a judicial declaration of the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a declaration before remarriage can be done hence Ofelia‘s marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect in ‘87) cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights

FACTS: Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a ―fixer‖ who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto. ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid. HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State‘s demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the

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marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondent‘s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

On February 11, 1987, Filipina filed a petition for legal separation before the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga and was later amended to a petition for separation of property. Judgment was rendered dissolving their conjugal partnership of gains and approving a regime of separation of properties based on the Memorandum of Agreement executed by the spouses. In May 1988, Filipina filed a criminal action for attempted parricide against her husband. RTC Manila convicted Fernando only of the lesser crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced him to 20 days imprisonment. Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Fernando on the ground of psychological incapacity on August 4, 1992. RTC and Court of Appeals denied the petition and motion for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal by certiorari, petitioner for the first time, raises the issue of the marriage being void for lack of a valid marriage license at the time of its celebration. The date of issue of marriage license and marriage certificate is contained in their marriage contract which was attached in her petition for absolute declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before the trial court. The date of the actual celebration of their marriage and the date of issuance of their marriage certificate and marriage license are different and incongruous.

Sy v. CA GR# 127263 / APR. 12, 2000 330 SCRA 550

The Issues: Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning for lack of marriage license at the time of the ceremony? Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity?

The case: For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, denying the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of the spouses Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy. The facts: Petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy contracted marriage on November 15, 1973 at the Church of our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. Both were then 22 years old. Their union was blessed with two children. On September 15, 1983, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Since then, the spouses lived separately and their two children were in the custody of their mother.

Held: A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the marriage void ab initio. The pieces of evidence presented by petitioner at the beginning of the case, plainly and indubitably show that on the day of the marriage ceremony, there was no marriage license. The marriage contract also shows that the marriage license number 6237519 was issued in Carmona, Cavite yet neither petitioner nor respondent ever resided in Carmona. From the documents she presented, the marriage license was issued almost one year after the ceremony took place. Article 80 of the Civil Code

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is clearly applicable in this case, there being no claim of exceptional character enumerated in articles 72-79 of the Civil Code. The marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the beginning. The remaining issue on the psychological capacity is now mooted by the conclusion of this court that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time heir marriage was solemnized. Petition is granted. The marriage celebrated on November 15, 1973 between petitioner Filipina Sy and private respondent Fernando Sy is hereby declared void ab initio for lack of marriage license at the time of celebration.

Cariño v. Cariño GR# 132529 / FEB. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 Article 40 In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4‘s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes. HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been

solemnized without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40 of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

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Ablaza v. Republic GR# 158298/Aug 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27 Facts: Isidro Ablaza – petitioner, is the brother of Cresencio Ablaza filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila on the ground that their marriage was celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. On appeal Isidro raised the lone issue: The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a party to the marriage. Issue: Whether or not Isidro not being a party in the said marriage has right to bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage. Ruling: Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. The following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and 2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Since the marriage in question is governed by the Civil Code the Court ruled that only the party who can demonstrate a "proper 16 interest" can file the action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity

about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano‘s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

Carlos v. Sandoval GR# 179922 / DEC. 16, 2008 574 SCRA 116 Facts: On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. Petitioner and respondent entered into compromised agreements to divide the land equally. In August 1995, petitioner filed an action with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II. Ruling: The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code.

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Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place. The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the marriage void.

Cynthia appealed to the SC and one of the issues raised is that A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC entitled ―rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages‖ is applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the family code and the phrase ―under the family code‖ in A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC pertains to the word ―petitions‖ rather than to the word ―marriages. Issue: Whether or not A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC pertains to petitions during the effectivity of the Family Code and not to marriages.

The absence of a provision in the Civil Code cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case. Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action.

Ruling: The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code. The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner‘s interpretation that the phrase ―under the Family Code‖ in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word ―petitions‖ rather than to the word ―marriages.‖

Bolos v. Bolos GR# 186400/October 20, 2010 634 SCRA 429

Facts: Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice -initially under the Islamic laws and tradition and under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur. In the marriage contract, Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as 'divorced.' Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano filed a complaint with the RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen. Tamano for being bigamous. Estrellita filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that Sen. Tamano and Zorayda are both Muslims who were married under the Muslim rites. The RTC rendered the aforementioned judgment declaring Estrellita's marriage with Sen. Tamano as void ab initio. CA affirmed decision. She asserts that such law automatically applies to the marriage of Zorayda and the deceased without need of registering their consent to be covered by it, as both parties are Muslims whose marriage was solemnized under Muslim law.

Facts: On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code where the RTC ruled in her favor. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect.

Juliano-Llave v. Rep (Tamano) GR# 169766, March 30, 2011

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Issue: Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous. Whether Zorayda and Adib, has legal standing to file a declaration of nullity of marriage of Estrellita and Sen. Tamano. Ruling: Muslim personal laws cannot benefit Estrillita, Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies to "marriage and divorce wherein both parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines. Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites. Moreover, the Muslim Code took effect only on February 4, 1977, and this law cannot retroactively override the Civil Code which already bestowed certain rights on the marriage of Sen. Tamano and Zorayda. Estrellita claims that only the husband or the wife in a void marriage can file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, this interpretation does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.

REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 FACTS: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City. In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and married an American. Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for ―Authority to Remarry‖ invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the rules of evidence. HELD: Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage. However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondent‘s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent‘s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor. ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas GR# 186571/ Aug 11, 2010 628 SCRA 266 FACTS: Gerbert Corpuz (―Gerbert‖) was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization. He later married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas (―Daisy‖). Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding because of his work. He returned after 4 months to surprise Daisy, but discovered that she was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada granted his petition for divorce. 2 years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Gerbert went to the Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian

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divorce decree on his and Daisy‘s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (―NSO‖) informed him that the marriage between him and Daisy still subsists under Philippine law. To be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to a NSO Circular. Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisy did not file any responsive pleading and offered no opposition to the petition. In fact, Daisy alleged her desire to file a similar case but was prevented by financial constrains. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert‘s. The RTC denied Gerbert‘s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was NOT THE PROPER PARTY to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a NATURALIZED CANADIAN CITIZEN. It ruled that ONLY THE FILIPINO spouse can avail of the remedy, under Art. 26, 2 of the Family Code. ISSUE: WON Art. 26, 2 extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: NO. The alien spouse can claim no right under Art. 26, ¶2 of the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the FILIPINO SPOUSE. Art. 26, 2 was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, Art. 26, ¶2 provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without Art. 26, ¶2, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond.

An action based on Art. 26, ¶2 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. However, no Philippine court can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse, whose status and legal capacity are generally

Toring v. Toring GR# 165321 / AUG. 3, 2010 626 SCRA 389 Facts: Ricardo and Teresita were married on September 4, 1978, On February 1, 1999, more than twenty years after their wedding, Ricardo filed a petition for annulment before the RTC. He claimed that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the celebration of their marriage. Ricardo opined that his wife was a very extravagant, materialistic, controlling and demanding person, who mostly had her way in everything; had a taste for the nightlife and was very averse to the duties of a housewife; was stubborn and independent, also most unsupportive, critical and uncooperative; was unresponsive to his hard work and sacrifices for their family; and was most painfully unmindful of him. Dr. Cecilia R. Albaran testified that a major factor that contributed to the demise of the marriage was Teresita‘s Narcissistic Personality Disorder that rendered her psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations. She based her diagnosis on the information she gathered from her psychological evaluation on Ricardo and Richardson (Ricardo and Teresita‘s eldest son). Issue: Whether or not Teresita is psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: We find the petition unmeritorious, In so far as the present factual situation is concerned, what should not be lost in reading and applying our established rulings is the intent of the law to confine the application of Article 36 of the Family Code to the most serious cases of personality disorders; these are the disorders that result in the utter insensitivity or inability of the afflicted party to give meaning

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and significance to the marriage he or she contracted. Furthermore, the psychological illness and its root cause must have been there from the inception of the marriage. From these requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first place because the affliction – already then existing – was so grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had assumed. We find the totality of the petitioner‘s evidence to be insufficient to prove that Teresita was psychologically incapacitated to perform her duties as a wife. The requirements for nullity outlined in Santos and Molina need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse. In other words, it is still essential – although from sources other than the respondent spouse – to show his or her personality profile, or its approximation, at the time of marriage; the root cause of the inability to appreciate the essential obligations of marriage; and the gravity, permanence and incurability of the condition. In the present case, the only other party outside of the spouses who was ever asked to give statements for purposes of Teresita‘s psychological evaluation was Richardson, the spouses‘ eldest son who would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case because he could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was happening between his parents until long after his birth.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes GR# 185286 / Aug 18, 2010 628 SCRA 461 Facts: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman, in 1972 when they were both nineteen (19) years old. They were simply classmates then in one university subject when respondent crossenrolled from the UP Los Baños campus. The casual acquaintanceship quickly developed into a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship. Petitioner was initially attracted to respondent who she

thought was free spirited and bright, although he did not follow conventions and traditions. Since both resided in Mandaluyong City, they saw each other every day and drove home together from the university. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner‘s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by the latter‘s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking marijuana. Thereafter, the newlyweds lived with the respondent‘s family in Mandaluyong City. All living expenses were shouldered by respondent‘s parents, and the couple‘s respective salaries were spent solely for their personal needs. Initially, respondent gave petitioner a monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from his salary. When their first child was born on March 22, 1977, financial difficulties started. Rearing a child entailed expenses. A year into their marriage, the monthly allowance of P1,500.00 from respondent stopped. Further, respondent no longer handed his salary to petitioner. When petitioner mustered enough courage to ask the respondent about this, the latter told her that he had resigned due to slow advancement within the family business. Respondent‘s game plan was to venture into trading seafood in the province, supplying hotels and restaurants, including the Aristocrat Restaurant. However, this new business took respondent away from his young family for days on end without any communication. To prod respondent into assuming more responsibility, petitioner suggested that they live separately from her in-laws. However, the new living arrangement engendered further financial difficulty. While petitioner struggled to make ends meet as the single-income earner of the household, respondent‘s business floundered. Thereafter, another attempt at business, a fishpond in Mindoro, was similarly unsuccessful. Respondent gave money to petitioner sporadically. Compounding the family‘s financial woes and further straining the parties‘ relationship was the indifferent attitude of respondent towards his family. That his business took him away from his family did not seem to bother respondent; he did not exert any effort to remain in touch with them while he was away in Mindoro. After two (2) years of struggling, the spouses transferred residence and, this time, moved in with petitioner‘s mother. But the new set up did not end their marital difficulties. In fact, the parties became more estranged. Petitioner continued to carry the burden of supporting a family not just financially, but in most aspects as well. In 1985, petitioner, who

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had previously suffered a miscarriage, gave birth to their third son. At that time, respondent was in Mindoro and he did not even inquire on the health of either the petitioner or the newborn. A week later, respondent arrived in Manila, acting nonchalantly while playing with the baby, with nary an attempt to find out how the hospital bills were settled. In 1989, due to financial reverses, respondent‘s fishpond business stopped operations. Although without any means to support his family, respondent refused to go back to work for the family business. Respondent came up with another business venture, engaging in scrap paper and carton trading. As with all of respondent‘s business ventures, this did not succeed and added to the trail of debt which now hounded not only respondent, but petitioner as well. Not surprisingly, the relationship of the parties deteriorated. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that respondent was having an extra-marital affair. She overheard respondent talking to his girlfriend, a former secretary, over the phone inquiring if the latter liked respondent‘s gift to her. Petitioner soon realized that respondent was not only unable to provide financially for their family, but he was, more importantly, remiss in his obligation to remain faithful to her and their family. One of the last episodes that sealed the fate of the parties‘ marriage was a surgical operation on petitioner for the removal of a cyst. Although his wife was about to be operated on, respondent remained unconcerned and unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. After the operation, petitioner felt that she had had enough of respondent‘s lack of concern, and asked her mother to order respondent to leave the recovery room. Still, petitioner made a string of ―final‖ attempts to salvage what was left of their marriage. Petitioner approached respondent‘s siblings and asked them to intervene, confessing that she was near the end of her rope. Yet, even respondent‘s siblings waved the white flag on respondent. Adolfo Reyes, respondent‘s elder brother, and his spouse, Peregrina, members of a marriage encounter group, invited and sponsored the parties to join the group. The elder couple scheduled counseling sessions with petitioner and respondent, but these did not improve the parties‘ relationship as respondent remained uncooperative. In 1997, Adolfo brought respondent to Dr. Natividad A. Dayan for a psychological assessment to ―determine benchmarks of current psychological functioning.‖ As with all other

attempts to help him, respondent resisted and did not continue with the clinical psychologist‘s recommendation to undergo psychotherapy. At about this time, petitioner, with the knowledge of respondent‘s siblings, told respondent to move out of their house. Respondent acquiesced to give space to petitioner. With the de facto separation, the relationship still did not improve. Neither did respondent‘s relationship with his children. Issue: WON the respondent is psychologically incapacitated Ruling: The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. The clinical psychologists‘ and psychiatrist‘s assessment were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent‘s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent‘s behavior and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In Kaplan and Saddock‘s textbook entitled Synopsis of Psychiatry, treatment, ranging from psychotherapy to pharmacotherapy, for all the listed kinds of personality disorders are recommended. In short, Dr. Dayan‘s recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that respondent‘s psychological incapacity is incurable. Moreover, Dr. Dayan, during her testimony, categorically declared that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

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Baccay v, Baccay GR No. 173138, Dec. 1, 2010; 636 SCRA 350 Facts: Noel married Maribel because Maribel claims that she is pregnant with Noel‘s child. After the marriage ceremony, Noel and Maribel agreed to live with Noel‘s family in their house at Rosal, Pagasa, Quezon City. During all the time she lived with Noel‘s family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased. Maribel never contributed to the family‘s coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support. Also, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel‘s claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her. He asked Maribel‘s office mates whether she manifested any signs of pregnancy and they confirmed that she showed no such signs. Then, sometime in January 1999, Maribel did not go home for a day, and when she came home she announced to Noel and his family that she had a miscarriage and was confined at the Chinese General Hospital where her sister worked as a nurse. Noel confronted her about her alleged miscarriage sometime in February 1999. The discussion escalated into an intense quarrel which woke up the whole household. Noel‘s mother tried to intervene but Maribel shouted ―Putang ina nyo, wag kayo makialam‖ at her. Because of this, Noel‘s mother asked them to leave her house. Around 2:30 a.m., Maribel called her parents and asked them to pick her up. Maribel left Noel‘s house and did not come back anymore. Noel tried to communicate with Maribel but when he went to see her at her house nobody wanted to talk to him and she rejected his phone calls. Noel filed declaration of nullity on the ground of Psychological Incapacity. Issue: WON Maribel is psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: In Republic of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[23] the Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and

nullity.The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at ―the time of the celebration‖ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their ―I do‘s.‖ The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, ―mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts‖ cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness

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must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x. xxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. (Emphasis ours.) In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that Maribel was psychologically incapacitated.

Agraviador v. Agraviador GR No. 170729, Dec 8, 2010; 637 SCRA 519 Facts: On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioner‘s family was apprehensive about this marriage because of the nature of the respondent‘s work and because she came from a broken family. Out of their union, the petitioner and the respondent begot four (4) children, namely: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended.[5] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-081. He alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. The petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she became ―very close‖ to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times. Issue: WON respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Ruling: We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit, and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage, pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence. The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent‘s psychological incapacity The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the

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concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition. The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not involve a species of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was, nonetheless, incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. Dr. Arturo Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this ―psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage. These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos. A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established.

Pimentel v. Pimentel GR# 172060/Sept 13, 2010 630 SCRA 437 Facts: On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner). On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved to suspend on the ground of prejudicial question.

an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. A prejudicial question is defined as: x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide, which punishes any person ―who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.‖ The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from murder or homicide. However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Issue: Is there a prejudicial question in the case at bar? Ruling: There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action

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8. Declaration Of Nullity; Arts. 36, 40, 45; Section 19 (1) AM 0210-11 SC; Arts. 147 & 148 Valdes v. RTC Br. 102, QC GR# 122749 / JULY 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221 Facts: Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdes sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdes. The Court declared plaintiff and defendant will own their 'family home' and all their other properties for that matter in equal shares following Article 147 of the Family Code on liquidation of properties of common-law spouses, hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Article 147 of FC is correctly applied in the case at bar. Ruling: The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and so applied in previous cases. The trial Court did not commit a reversible error in ruling that petitioner and private respondent own the "family home" and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles 102 and 129,[12] of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the

property regimes recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the contract is annulled ),are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that exists between common-law spouses.

MBTC v. Pascual GR# 163744 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246 Facts: Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP 58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one involving a lot. Florencia secured a waiver from Nicholson. Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell due, Metrobank, initiated a foreclosure proceedings over the properties. Getting wind of the foreclosure proceedings, Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the RTC in Makati City, a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. Issue: Whether or not the properties in contest form part of the conjugal properties of Nicholson and Florencia. Ruling: The property is deemed conjugal. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia severed their marital bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.

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In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the mortgage on the disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31, 1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership. Be that as it may, what governed the property relations of the former spouses when the mortgage was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it, Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed property even without the consent of Nicholson. However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2 undivided portion that Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the lot is null and void, Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of his undivided half.

Diño v. Diño GR# 178044/January 19, 2011 Facts: Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City. On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of the marriage. On a motion for reconsideration, the Trial court rendered a decision that A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. Ruling: For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other; 2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and 3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9 All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent. We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties‘ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.

Atienza vs. Brillantes, AM # MTJ 92-706/March 29, 1995 243 SCRA 32 Facts: Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila. In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children. Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his children for him. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children, as appearing in his 1986

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and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office. For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed by De Castro. Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant. Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent. Ruling: Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

9. RA 9262 – Law on Violation against Women and their Children; Support; Art. 213 FC Go Tan v. Tan GR# 168852 / SEPT. 30, 2008 567 SCRA 231 Facts: On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of R.A No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. The RTC issued a Resolution[12] dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismiss because RA 9262 does not cover parents-in-law. Ruling: Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats

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of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC.

Ang v. CA/ Sagud GR# 182835 / APR. 20, 2010 Facts: Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became ―on-and-off‖ sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him. Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the other woman and their child. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone. In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish‘s face superimposed on the figure. After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: ―Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter.‖ Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender‘s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.

Whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262. Ruling: -"Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.) Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster‘s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her." But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a couple‘s relationship, i.e., "a love affair. -Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones. The Court laid down the elements of the crime of violence against women through harassment are: 1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman; 2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the woman; and 3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

Issue: Whether or not a ―dating relationship‖ existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;

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Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua AM OCA IPI # 07-2630-RTJ APR 23, 2010 619 SCRA 59 Facts: In an Order dated March 22, 2007, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo questioned the dismissal of his motion since Milan never presented any evidence to controvert the evidence which he submitted in support of his motion to dismiss. Francisco Ocampo, thereafter, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was likewise denied by respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua in an Order dated April 3, 2007. On that date, respondent Judge issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), requiring complainant Ocampo to turn over the custody of their minor daughters to his wife, to stay away from his wife's residence at 1211 West Ayala Condominium, 252 Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City, to refrain from committing acts that would harass, intimidate or threaten and create an unreasonable risk to the health, safety or welfare of their minor daughters and his wife, and to provide monthly support of P50,000.00 to their minor daughters and his wife, exclusive of expenses for medication and education. Francisco Ocampo faulted respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua for issuing the TPO as the period to file his answer had not yet expired when respondent Judge issued the said Order. Moreover, he was directed to give monthly support of P50,000.00 to his wife and minor daughters, even if his wife alleged that he is not the father of the said minors and in the absence of any factual finding as to the resources of the giver and the necessities of the recipient. In directing the payment of support to his wife, respondent Judge also ignored the factual circumstances relating to the adulterous relations of his wife and the pendency of the legal separation case based on his wife's sexual infidelity and abandonment. Francisco Ocampo further alleged that respondent Judge caused the implementation of the TPO as if it was a matter of life and death. When her branch sheriff was not available, respondent Judge dispatched another sheriff to implement the Order. At that time, Francisco Ocampo, his minor daughters and family were having their Holy Week vacation. The sheriff went inside the house and

opened the rooms against the will of the occupants and without regard to their privacy. When the sheriff learned that Francesca and Fatima were still sleeping, he demanded that they be roused from their sleep, even as Ocampo assured him that he will peacefully bring his minor daughters to his wife. The sheriff also insisted that Francisco Ocampo pay the support of P50,000.00 right there and then, although he was told by Francisco that he did not have such amount of money. Francesca and Fatima refused to go with the sheriff, but because of the court order, Francisco Ocampo told them to go with him. Issue: Whether or not the issuance of the TPO is proper. Ruling: As regards the alleged suddenness of the scheduled TPO hearing, Justice Salazar-Fernando found respondent Judge ArcayaChua's explanation acceptable. Justice Salazar-Fernando was convinced by the reasons why respondent Judge issued the TPO. A preliminary determination of the facts of the case justified the issuance of the TPO as it appeared that the subject minors therein were the illegitimate children of the petitioner, Milan Ocampo, having been conceived through artificial insemination without the required written authorization or ratification of the husband, complainant Francisco Ocampo. The pertinent provision of the Family Code states: ART. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. Moreover, Milan Ocampo appended evidence of complainant Ocampo's alleged perversity and violent behavior. A sworn affidavit of Emelita S. Valentino, narrating alleged perverse behavior of

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complainant Ocampo, as well as the certification from the Philippine National Police of Meycauayan, stating acts of violence committed by complainant Ocampo on Milan, were appended to the Petition. The totality of the evidence thus presented, while not exactly conclusive, justified a prima facie determination of the necessity of a TPO. On the other hand: in the case of A.M. No. RTJ-07-2049 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs JUDGE EVELYN S. ARCAYACHUA, the Court held: Respondent Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan in SP Case No. M-6373, since a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife under R.A. No. 9262, the Anti–Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004. Indeed, as a family court judge, Judge Arcaya-Chua is expected to know the correct implementation of R.A. No. 9262.

10. Art. 40, FC; AM 02-10-11 SC; March 15, 2003; NCC; Rule 108 Niñal v. Bayadog GR# 133778 / MAR. 14, 2000 328 SCRA 122 Facts: Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner's successional rights. Norma

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code. Issue: Whether or not a person not a party in a marriage can file an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Ruling: Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as "husband and wife". Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have 21 taken place and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid.

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Ablaza v. Republic GR# 158298 / AUG. 11, 2010 628 SCRA 27 Facts: On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Carlos v. Sandoval GR# 179922 / DEC. 16, 2008 574 SCRA 116

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

Facts: On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II. Petitioner and respondent entered into compromised agreements to divide the land equally. In August 1995, petitioner filed an action with the following causes: (a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d) reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.

Issue: Whether or not the brother has legal standing in a suit of declaration of nullity of marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the brother of one of the spouse has a legal standing in a declaration of nullity case.

Ruling: "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."

Ruling: The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights. While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding for

Only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the 16 action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no

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declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil Code provide: ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. (Underscoring supplied) Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes succession by collateral 32 relatives. Conversely, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.

Cariño v. Cariño GR# 132529 / FEB. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 Article 40

solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4‘s funeral. ISSUE: Whether or not the nullity of the first marriages on the ground of lack of marriage license validates the subsequent marriage even without judicial declaration. Ruling: No. It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the ―death benefits‖ under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be void. Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.

Facts: In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4 contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was

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11. Arts. 40 & 41, FC; Art. 349 RPC; Civil & Criminal Bigamy; Art. 83, NCC;

Morigo v. People GR# 145226 / FEB. 06, 2004 422 SCRA 376 Facts: Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were sweethearts. Lucia left for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication. In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992. On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol. On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused‘s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place. On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. Issue: WON Lucio is guilty of bigamy. Ruling: The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he

contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge. A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void." The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.

Jarillo v. People GR# 164435 / SEPT. 29, 2009 601 SCRA 236 Facts: Victoria Jarillo and Rafael Alocillo were married in a civil wedding ceremony and church ceremony. Appellant Victoria Jarillo thereafter contracted a subsequent marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy, in civil ceremony in November 26, 1979 and on April 16, 1995, appellant and Emmanuel Uy exchanged marital vows anew in a church wedding in Manila. In 1999, Emmanuel Uy filed against Jarillo a case for annulment of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Thereafter, appellant Jarillo was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Jarillo insisted that (1) her 1974 and 1975 marriages to Alocillo were null and void because Alocillo was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2) her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Issue: Whether or not Jarillo can validly be convicted for bigamy.

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Ruling: The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner‘s two marriages to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, petitioner‘s marriage to Alocillo, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction, was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of petitioner‘s marriage to Uy make any difference.

Tenebro v. CA GR#150758 / FEB. 18, 2004 423 SCRA 272 Facts: Veronico Tenebro married 3 time, first with Hilda Villareyes, second, Leticia Ancajas, Nilda Villegas. Acajas filed a complaint for bigamy against Tenebro. Tenebro (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal. Issue: Whether or not the crime of bigamy is consummated despite the filing of declaration for nullity of marriage on the subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Ruling: Yes, bigamy has been consummated. As soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. There is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of

psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State‘s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.

Antone v. Beronilla GR No. 183824. Dec. 8, 2010 637 SCRA 615 Facts: On 12 March 2007, petitioner Myrna P. Antone executed an Affidavit-Complaint for Bigamy against Leo R. Beronilla. She alleged that her marriage with respondent in 1978 had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with one Cecile Maguillo in 1991. Pending the setting of the case for arraignment, herein respondent moved to quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He informed the court that his marriage with petitioner was declared null and void by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Biliran on 26 April 2007; that the decision became final and executory on 15 May 200 and that such decree has already been registered with the Municipal Civil Registrar on 12 June 2007. He argued that since the marriage had been declared null and void from the beginning, there was actually no first marriage to speak of. Absent a first valid marriage, the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute the

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crime of bigamy. In its comment/opposition to the motion,[11] the prosecution, through herein petitioner, maintained that the respondent committed an act which has all the essential requisites of bigamy. The prosecution pointed out that the marriage of petitioner and respondent on 18 November 1978 has not yet been severed when he contracted a second marriage on 16 February 1991, for which reason, bigamy has already been committed before the court declared the first marriage null and void on 27 April 2007. Issue: Whether or not the crime of bigamy is present in the case at bar. Ruling: The application of Mercado to the cases following Morigo even reinforces the position of this Court to give full meaning to Article 40 of the Family Code. Thus, in 2004, this Court ruled in Tenebro v. Court of Appeals: Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, xxx said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. xxx. (Emphasis supplied.) Finally, in Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico, this Court pronounced: In a catena of cases, the Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral. xxx To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.

12. Arts. 41 - 44, 49 FC; Art. 83 (2) NCC; Armas v. Calisterio GR# 136467 , Apr. 06, 2000 330 SCRA 201 Facts: Teodorico died intestate and was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to James William Bounds, who disappeared without trace in 1947. Teoderico and Marietta married after 11 years without securing a court declaration of that James was presumptively dead. Sister of Teoderico assails that Marietta is disqualified to be an heir because the marriage between her and Teodorico is void ab initio for being bigamous. Issue: Whether or not the failure of securing a court declaration that the previous husband of Marietta is presumptively dead makes her marriage to Teodorico void ab initio because of bigamy. Ruling: No, Before the effectivity of the Family Code, judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases is, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." Art. 83. XXXXX 2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court.

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Navarro v. Domagtoy A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088- JULY 19, 1996 259 SCRA 129 This is a complaint filed against Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, respondent judge solemnized the wedding (September 27, 1994)between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.Second, he performed a marriage ceremony (October 27, 1994) outside his jurisdiction. The Judge contends that, he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. ith respect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.

court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.

Rep. v. Nolasco GR# 94053 / MAR. 17, 1993 220 SCRA 20 On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique, Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker, invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void. The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead,‖ and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a "cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.

Issue: Whether or not the acts of Respondent Judge is considered grave mistake which amounts to his being sanctioned.

Issue: Whether or not there is a reason to declare Janet presumptively dead.

Ruling: Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.

Ruling: No, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code: 1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such diligence as to give rise to a

Article 7 and 8 do not apply. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his

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"well-founded belief" that she is dead. The investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.

Valdez v. Republic GR# 180863 / SEPT. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646 Facts: Petitioner married Sofio on January 11, 1971 in Pateros, Rizal. In March 1972, Sofio left their conjugal dwelling. Petitioner and their child waited for him to return. Three years passed without any word from Sofio. In October 1975, Sofio showed up at Bancay 1st. He and petitioner talked for several hours and they agreed to separate. They executed a document to that effect. That was the last time petitioner saw him. After that, petitioner didn‘t hear any news of Sofio, his whereabouts or even if he was alive or not. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes on June 3 20, 1985. Subsequently, however, Virgilio‘s application for naturalization filed with the United States Department of Homeland Security was denied because petitioner‘s marriage to Sofio was 4 subsisting. Hence, on March 29, 2007, petitioner filed a Petition before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac seeking the declaration of presumptive death of Sofio. Issue: Whether or not Sofio can be declared presumptively dead. Ruling: It can be gleaned that, under the Civil Code, the presumption of death is established by law and no court declaration is needed for the presumption to arise. Since death is presumed to have taken place by the seventh year of absence, Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982. Consequently, at the time of petitioner‘s marriage to Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner‘s capacity to marry, and the marriage is valid under paragraph 2 of

Article 83 of the Civil Code (7 years of absence is considered presumptively dead). Further, considering that it is the Civil Code that applies, proof of "well-founded belief" is not required. Petitioner could not have been expected to comply with this requirement since the Family Code was not yet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio. To retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code requiring petitioner to exhibit "well-founded belief" will, ultimately, result in the invalidation of her second marriage, which was valid at the time it was celebrated. Such a situation would be untenable and would go against the objectives that the Family Code wishes to achieve.

Republic v. Tango GR # 161062 / JULY 31,2009 594 SCRA 560 Facts: The trial court had declared the wife of respondent Ferventino U. Tango (Ferventino), Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code. This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the RTC‘s Order, only questioning that the evidence presented by respondent was hearsay. Issue: Whether or not judgment on the declaration of presumptive death can be remedied by ordinary appeal. Ruling: No, by express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court‘s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court‘s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of

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Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him. Issue:

Title II. LEGAL SEPARATION (Articles 55-67) De facto Separation vs. Legal Separation/Article 63; See also Arts 86 (4), 99 & 126, 100 & 127, 135 (6), 204; Title XI, Chapter 2, Arts 239-248; Rule of Procedure on Legal Separation (A.M. No. 02-11-11 SC); Rule on Provisional Orders (AM 02-11-12 SC); See RA 9262 – compare Section 19 with Article 58; Rules on Revocation of Donations; Incapacity to Succeed by Will or Intestate Succession Manzano vs. Sanchez A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. MAR. 08, 2001 354 SCRA 1

WON the respondent Judge committed gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage. Held: Article 34 of the Family Code provides: No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the marriage.

Facts: Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated." Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage; 4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

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Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."

Bañez vs. Bañez GR# 132592 / JAN. 23, 2002 374 SCRA 340 Are multiple appeals allowed?

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu decided Civil Case No. CEB16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter‘s sexual infidelity; the dissolution of their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of respondent‘s one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the payment to petitioner‘s counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorney‘s fees to be taken from petitioner‘s share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar. Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10

Facts:

Thereafter, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The trial court granted petitioner Aida Banez‘ urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision on October 1, 1996 by approving the Commitment of Fees dated December 22, 1994; obliging petitioner to pay as attorney‘s fees the equivalent of 5% of the total value of respondent‘s ideal share in the net conjugal assets; and ordering the administrator to pay petitioner‘s counsel, Atty. Adelino B. Sitoy, the sum of P100,000 as advance attorney‘s fees chargeable against the aforecited 5%.[4] In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Bañez sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Bañez filed a consolidated written opposition to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.

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After several exchanges of petitions and motions, the CA rendered a decision setting aside the October 1, 1996 decision and further denying the motions for reconsideration by petitioner. Hence, she filed the instant case before the SC alleging that the CA erred in setting aside the questioned order. She further alleged that an action for legal separation is among the cases where multiple appeals may be taken. According to her, the filing of a record on appeal, pursuant to Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,[13] is required in this case. However, since respondent failed to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period as provided under the Rules of court (Sec 1-b, Rule 50), the same should be dismissed Issue: WON multiple appeals separation?

may be allowed in an action for legal

the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children, follow from the decree of legal separation.[19] They are not separate or distinct matters that may be resolved by the court and become final prior to or apart from the decree of legal separation. Rather, they are mere incidents of legal separation.[20] Thus, they may not be subject to multiple appeals. Petitioner‘s alternative prayers that in case we do not dismiss the appeal, we return the records to the trial court and require respondent to file a record on appeal, or we return the records to the trial court and retain only the pleadings and orders relevant to the appeal, are untenable. If we grant the first, we are effectively saying that the instant case is one involving multiple appeals, which it is not. If we allow the second, we are effectively applying by analogy, Section 6, Rule 44 and Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court, without petitioner showing support therefor in law or jurisprudence.

Held: NO xxx Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. In said case, the two issues raised by therein petitioner that may allegedly be the subject of multiple appeals arose from the same cause of action, and the subject matter pertains to the same lessorlessee relationship between the parties. Hence, splitting the appeals in that case would only be violative of the rule against multiplicity of appeals. The same holds true in an action for legal separation. The issues involved in the case will necessarily relate to the same marital relationship between the parties. The effects of legal separation, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of

Pacete vs. Carriaga GR# 53880 / MAR. 17, 1994 231 SCRA 321 Arts 58, 60; See also Arts 101 & 103 NCC; No defaults; AM 0211-11 SC FACTS: Concepcion Alanis and Enrico Pacete were married on April 30, 1938 and had a child. Enrico contracted a second marriage with Clarita dela Concepcion. Alanis learned of it on Aug 1, 1979. Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August

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1979. Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. The court received plaintiffs‘ evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21, and 22, 1980. CFI granted legal separation, conjugal properties half-and-half. Thus, this certiorari. ISSUE: WON CFI gravely abused its discretion in decreeing the legal separation of Enrico Pacete (P) and PR, and held to be null and void ab initio the marriage of P and Clarita Concepcion HELD: Yes, The Civil Code provides that ―no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated.‖ The above stated provision calling for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal separation must ―in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,‖ obviously in order to provide the parties a ―cooling-off‖ period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.

The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, ―if the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no c collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.

Sabalones vs. CA GR# 106169 / FEB. 14, 1994 230 SCRA 79 Article 61 (Administration issues pendente lite) See also, and compare with, Article 124 Facts: Petitioner Samson Sabalones being a diplomat was assigned in different countries and left to his wife the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15years. After his retirement he returned to the Philippines but not to his wife and children. After 4 years he filed an action for juridical authorization to sell their property in San Juan which belongs to the conjugal partnership and would use the proceeds of the sale for his hospital and medical treatments. Respondent (wife) opposed the authorization and filed an action for legal separation. Respondent alleges that that the house in San Juan was being occupied by her and their children and the lot in Forbes Park is being leased to Nobimichi Izumi, and that her husband never returned to them being the legitimate family and lived in a separate house in Fairview with Thelma Curameng and their children. Judge Umali found that petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Curameng. Court granted the decree of legal separation and the petitioner is not entitled to share in the conjugal properties and he is not entitled to support from his respondent wife.

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Decision of lower court was appealed and was granted the writ of preliminary injunction filed by the respondent to enjoin the petitioner from interfering in the administration of their properties. Petitioner argues that the law provides for joint administration of conjugal properties and no injunctive relief can be issued against the other because no right will be violated. Issue: WON article124 is applicable as regards to joint administration of conjugal properties

Held: Grant for preliminary injunction is valid; it is necessary to protect the interest of the respondent and her children and prevent the dissipation of the conjugal assets. Injunction has not permanently installed the respondent as the administrator of the whole conjugal assets

Article 61: after further petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall in the absence of a written agreement between the couple would appoint either one of the spouses or a 3rd person to act as the administrator.

Ong v. Ong GR# 153206 / OCT. 23, 2006 505 SCRA 76 X X X X x SSS v. Aguas GR# 165546 / FEB. 27, 2006 483 SCRA 383 Facts:

Presence of 2 requirements of valid injunction: o Existence of rights of the respondents to a share of the conjugal estate o There is evidence that entrusting the estate to the petitioner may result to the irresponsible disposition of assets that would cause injury to his wife and children Primary purpose of the provisional remedy of injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject of the action of the relations between the parties and thus protect the rights of the plaintiffs respecting these matters during the pendency of the suit. Twin requirements of valid injunction: o Existence of a right o Actual or threatened violation

Pablo Aguas died on December 8, 1996. Pablo‘s surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo was likewise survived by his minor child, Jeylnn. Her claim for monthly pension was settled. In April 1997, the SSS received a sworn letter from Leticia AguasMacapinlac, Pablo‘s sister, contesting Rosanna‘s claim for death benefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than six years before, and lived with another man, and that Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna. The SSS suspended the payment of Rosanna and Jeylnn‘s monthly pension. In an investigation, it was reported that the deceased had no legal children with Rosanna and that Rosanna left the deceased six years before his death and lived with Romeo while she was still pregnant with Jenelyn.

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Rosanna was advised to refund to the SSS the amount representing the total death benefits released to her and Jenelyn. Rosanna and Jeylnn file a claim/petition for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). Janet H. Aguas, who also claimed to be the child of the deceased and Rosanna, now joined them as claimant. SSC rendered a decision denying the claims for lack of merit and ordering Rosanna to immediately refund the SSS. On Appeal, the CA rendered a decision in favor of Rosanna. Issue: Whether or not respondents are entitled to the pension benefit. Held: The petition is partly meritorious. Jeylnn‘s claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime. Hence, Jeylnn‘s status as a legitimate child can no longer be contested. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, can not extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis. Respondents submitted a photocopy of Janet‘s alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn‘s because it was not verified in any way by the civil register.

the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support. Rosanna presented a copy of their marriage certificate verified with the civil register. But whether or not Rosanna has sufficiently established that she was still dependent on Pablo at the time of his death remains to be resolved. Indeed, a husband and wife are obliged to support each other, but whether one is actually dependent for support upon the other is something that has to be shown; it cannot be presumed from the fact of marriage alone. The obvious conclusion then is that a wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support" upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. Conversely, if it is proved that the husband and wife were still living together at the time of his death, it would be safe to presume that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown that she is capable of providing for herself. Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child. On the other hand, the records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it; hence, she cannot qualify as a primary beneficiary. Finally, while Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for support even if they were already living separately.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470 / OCT. 08, 1985 139 SCRA 13 Facts:

On the claims of Rosanna, it bears stressing that for her to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must prove that she was "the legitimate spouse dependent for support from the employee." The claimantspouse must therefore establish two qualifying factors: (1) that she is

Alice Van Dorn, a Filipino citizen and Richard Upton, an American citizen, were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the marriage, they resided in the Philippines and begot two children. In 1982, the parties

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were divorced in Nevada, United States. Alice has re-married in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice with the RTC stating that her business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties. He asks that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss. Hence, this petition. In her petition, Alice contends that Richard is estopped from claiming on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of property; hence, barred by prior judgment. Richard avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; the acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released Richard from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Richard is no longer the husband of Alice. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as her husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain that, under our laws, Alice has to be considered still married to Richard and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Alice should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Richard. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera GR# 80116 / JUNE 30, 1989 174 SCRA 652

Issue: Facts: Whether or not Richard still has the right over the alleged conjugal properties. Ruling: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on Richard as an American citizen. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to

Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and Private Respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. After about three and a half years of marriage, such disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. Petitioner, on

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the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. However, on June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Issue: Whether or not the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. Held: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse.

Limbona v. Comelec GR# 181097 / JUNE 25, 2008 555 SCRA 391

Facts: Petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona (Norlainie), her husband, Mohammad G. Limbona (Mohammad), and respondent Malik "Bobby" T. Alingan (Malik) were mayoralty candidates in Pantar, Lanao del Norte for May 2007 National and Local Elections. Malik filed a petition for disqualification against Mohammed on the ground that it failed to comply with the one-year residence rule. COMELEC disqualified Mohammad. Consequently, Norlainie filed a new certificate of candidacy as substitute candidate for Mohammad. Issue: WON Norlaine is disqualified for running as mayor on the ground of failure to comply with one-year residence. Ruling:

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioner's domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec found that Mohammad, petitioner's husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide:

Thus, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

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Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance with human experience. Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. However, petitioner's disqualification would not result in Malik's proclamation who came in second during the special election.

another case3 filed by Potenciano Ilusorio and his children, Erlinda I. Bildner and Sylvia K. Ilusorio appealing from the order giving visitation rights to his wife, asserting that he never refused to see her. On May 12, 2000, we dismissed the petition for habeas corpus4 for lack of merit, and granted the petition5 to nullify the Court of Appeals' ruling6 giving visitation rights to Erlinda K. Ilusorio.7 What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to reconsider the decision.8 On September 20, 2000, we set the case for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000, at 10:00 a. m., without requiring the mandatory presence of the parties. Issue(s):

Ilusorio v. Bildner GR# 139789 / 139808 / MAY 12, 200 332 SCRA 169

The Court laid down the issues to be resolved, to wit: (a) To determine the propriety of a physical and medical examination of petitioner Potenciano Ilusorio; (b) Whether the same is relevant; and (c) If relevant, how the Court will conduct the same.9

Facts:

Held:

Once again we see the sad tale of a prominent family shattered by conflicts on expectancy in fabled fortune.

Nevertheless, for emphasis, we shall discuss the issues thus: First. Erlinda K. Ilusorio claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium and that Potenciano's mental state was not an issue. However, the very root cause of the entire petition is her desire to have her husband's custody.13 Clearly, Erlinda cannot now deny that she wanted Potenciano Ilusorio to live with her.

On March 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, the matriarch who was so lovingly inseparable from her husband some years ago, filed a petition with the Court of Appeals1 for habeas corpus to have custody of her husband in consortium. On April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision dismissing the petition for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject, Potenciano Ilusorio. Thus, on October 11, 1999, Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed with the Supreme Court an appeal via certiorari pursuing her desire to have custody of her husband Potenciano Ilusorio.2 This case was consolidated with

Second. One reason why Erlinda K. Ilusorio sought custody of her husband was that respondents Lin and Sylvia were illegally restraining Potenciano Ilusorio to fraudulently deprive her of property rights out of pure greed.14 She claimed that her two children were using their sick and frail father to sign away Potenciano and Erlinda's property to companies controlled by Lin and Sylvia. She also argued that since Potenciano retired as director and officer of Baguio

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Country Club and Philippine Oversees Telecommunications, she would logically assume his position and control. Yet, Lin and Sylvia were the ones controlling the corporations.15 The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved during the hearing at the Court of Appeals on March 23, 1999.16 Potenciano himself declared that he was not prevented by his children from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to seeing his wife and other children whom he loved. Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not have the mental capacity to decide for himself. Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought before the Supreme Court so that we could determine his mental state. We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has been decided in the Court of Appeals. As to whether the children were in fact taking control of the corporation, these are matters that may be threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in habeas corpus.

wife and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce consortium.21 Obviously, there was absence of empathy between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.22

Ilusorio v. Bildner GR# 139789 / 139808 / JULY 19, 2001 361 SCRA 427 Facts:

Third. Petitioner failed to sufficiently convince the Court why we should not rely on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. Erlinda claimed that the facts mentioned in the decision were erroneous and incomplete. We see no reason why the High Court of the land need go to such length. The hornbook doctrine states that findings of fact of the lower courts are conclusive on the Supreme Court.17 We emphasize, it is not for the Court to weigh evidence all over again.18 Although there are exceptions to the rule,19 Erlinda failed to show that this is an exceptional instance. Fourth. Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for each other. We agree. The law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity.20 The sanction therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and

The undisputed facts are as follows: Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.

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Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio (age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49); Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39). On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano‘s arrival from the United States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children, Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potenciano‘s health deteriorated. On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition[10] for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter‘s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents[11] refused petitioner‘s demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City. Issue(s): May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. Held: As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention,[13] or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process,

where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.[14] It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.[17] The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral. The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio‘s liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right. The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never

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even prayed for such right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject‘s sanity. When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary. The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman‘s free choice.

Plaintiff argued that the subject property is really conjugal which the wife in the case at bar could not legally bind, and considering that the indebtedness was contracted by the wife only, the levy of the subject property not owned exclusively by the wife owned jointly with the husband is improper. Plaintiff based his argument on the fact that the property was "declared, under Tax No. 05378, in the name of Teodora B. Ong while the house erected thereon was declared under Tax No. 06022 in the name of Ramon C. Ong and Teodora B. Ong (Exhibits "B", "2B", "2-C, "4") (Decision, p. 4). It was the contention of the plaintiff that since the surname "Ong" (which is the surname of the husband Ramon C. Ong) was carried by Teodora in the aforesaid declaration, that indicates that the subject property was acquired during the marriage. By reason thereof, the property in dispute is presumed to be owned jointly by both spouses. Issue: WON the property is conjugal.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit. No costs. In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

Ong vs. CA GR# 63025 / NOV. 29, 1991 204 SCRA 299 Facts: Plaintiff Ramong Ong filed a complaint for the annulment of auction sale of a parcel of land, allegedly owned conjugally by the plaintiff and his former wife Teodora Ong, in favor of Francisco Boix. The auction sale was made due to failure of the wife to pay her loan obtained from Francisco Boix who lent her money in relation to her own logging business in Camarines Sur.

Held: NO, it is paraphernal. The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of the records of the present case, We hold that the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the personal debts of the wife. The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to property acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the spouse's name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

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As correctly pointed out by the respondent Court, the party who invokes the presumption that all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership (Art. 160, New Civil Code) must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. (Cobb-Perez, et al. vs. Lantin, et al., 23 SCRA 637; Jose Ponce de Leon vs. Rehabilitation Finance Corp., 36 SCRA 289). In the same manner, the recent case of PNB vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 435 affirms that: When the property is registered in the name of the a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. Furthermore, even assuming for the sake of argument that the property in dispute is conjugal, the same may still be held liable for the debts of the wife in this case. Under Art. 117 of the Civil Code, the wife may engage in business although the husband may object (but subject to certain conditions). It is clear from the records that the wife was engaged in the logging business with the husband's knowledge and apparently without any objection on his part. The acts of the husband show that he gave his implied consent to the wife's engagement in business. According to Justice AmeurfinaHerrera (then Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) in her concurring opinion, the rule that should govern in that case is that the wife's paraphernal properties, as well as those of their conjugal partnership, shall be liable for the obligations incurred by the wife in the course of her business (Arts. 117, 140, 172, 203, and 236, Civil Code; Art. 10, Code of Commerce, cited in Commentaries on Phil. Commercial Laws, Martin, T.C. Vol. 1, 1970 Revised Edition, pp. 1415). After all, whatever profits are earned by the wife from her business go to the conjugal partnership. It would only be just and equitable that the obligations contracted by the wife in connection with her business may also be chargeable not only against her paraphernal property but also against the conjugal property of the spouses.

Go vs. CA GR# 114791 /MAY 29, 1997 272 SCRA 752 FACTS: Private respondents spouses Hermogenes and Jane Ong were married on June 7, 1981, in Dumaguete City. The video coverage of the wedding was provided by petitioners at a contract price of P1,650.00. Three times thereafter, the newlyweds tried to claim the video tape of their wedding, which they planned to show to their relatives in the United States where they were to spend their honeymoon, and thrice they failed because the tape was apparently not yet processed. When they return, however, they found out that the tape had been erased by petitioners and therefore, could no longer be delivered. Furious at its loss, private respondents filed on September 23, 1981 a complaint for specific performance and damages against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial District, Branch 33, Dumaguete City. After a protracted trial, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring defendants Alex Go and Nancy Go jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs Hermogenes Ong and Jane C. Ong. Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, on September 14, 1993, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial courts decision.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the husband, petitioner Alex Go is jointly and severally liable with his wife Nancy Go regarding the pecuniary liabilities imposed

HELD: No. Petitioner Alex Go is absolved from any liability to private respondents and that petitioner Nancy Go is solely liable to said

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private respondents for the judgment award. Under Article 117 of the Civil Code (now Article 73 of the Family Code), the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In the instant case, SC is convinced that it was only petitioner Nancy Go who entered into the contract with private respondent. Consequently, SC rules that she is solely liable to private respondents for the damages awarded below, pursuant to the principle that contracts produce effect only as between the parties who execute them.

Agapay vs. Palang GR# 116668 / JULY 28, 1997 276 SCRA 340 Facts: Miguel Palang contracted his first marriage with Carlina (or Cornelia) on July 16, 1949. A few months after the wedding, in October 1949, he left for work in Hawaii. Miguel and Carlina‘s only child, Herminia Palang, was born on May 12, 1950. During his visit in 1964 to the Philippines, he stayed with his brother in Zambales. The trial court found that as early as 1957, Miguel had attempted to divorce Carlina in Hawaii. When he returned for good in 1972, Miguel refused to stay with Carlina but stayed alone in a house in Pozorrubio, Pangasinan. On July 15, 1973, 63 yr old Miguel contracted a second marriage with 19 yr old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan Pangasinan. A house and lot in Binalonan, Pangasinan was also purchased by Erlinda as sole vendee, but this was disclaimed by the notary public saying that the money used to buy the property was given by Miguel. On October 1975, Miguel and Cornelia Palang executed a deed of donation as a form of compromise agreement. The parties agreed to donate their conjugal property to their only child, Herminia Palang. Miguel and Erlinda had a son, Kristopher A. Palang. In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina‘s complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.

On July 11, 1979, Carlina Palang and her daughter Herminia filed an action for recovery of ownership and possession of the Riceland and house and lot both located at Binalonan, Pangasinan allegedly purchased by Miguel during his cohabitation with Erlinda Agapay. The RTC dismissed the case and ruled in favour of Agapay. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the trial court‘s decision and declared Carlina and Herminia Palang the owners of the properties in question. Issue: WON the house and lot in Pangasinan is a valid donation by Miguel to Erlinda. Held: With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be placed as the vendee. The transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

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Arcaba vs. Batocael GR# 146683 / NOV.22, 2001 370 SCRA 414 FACTS: Cirila Arcaba filed a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA, declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor, and its subsequent resolution denying reconsideration. On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of a lot located at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte. After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco. On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his name with the Registry of Deeds. Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian, and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room, while Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco, claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress. On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could enter the master's bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they ever had sexual intercourse. When Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco. Cirila testified that she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for the latter; that he could still walk with her assistance at that time; and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became

bedridden. Erlinda Tabancura testified that Francisco's sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets. He did not pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper , though he provided her family with food and lodging. A few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," in which he ceded a portion of the lot consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the donation was being made in consideration of "the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years." On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. On February 18, 1993, respondents who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, filed a complaint against petitioner 'for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos, recovery of possession, and damages, alleging that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code which provides that ―Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.‖ ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Article 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this case HELD: After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative. Was Cirila Francisco's employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public

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conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the surname "Comille." These documents show that Cirila saw herself as Francisco's common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last name. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply a caregiveremployee, but Francisco's common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law. It is difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the conclusion that she was Francisco's common-law spouse. Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

parents, in consideration of the impending marriage of the donees. Respondents- donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383. They registered the Inventario Ti Sagut with the Office of the Register of Deeds on May 15, 1970. In due course, the original title was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 was issued in the name of the respondents Benito and Tomasa. When the donor died, the 6 heirs left , including Respondent Benito, executed a Deed of Partition with Recognition of Rights on March 18, 1973 wherein they distributed among only three (3) of them, the twelve (12) parcels of land left by their common progenitors, excluding the land in question and other lots disposed of by the Locquiao spouses earlier. Disagreements arose among them. Petitioners Romana and Constancia filed a Complain for the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 84897 against respondents Benito and Tomasa before the RTC of Pangasinan on December 23, 1985. Petitioners alleged that the issuance of the transfer certificate of title was fraudulent; that the Inventario Ti Sagut is spurious; that the notary public who notarized the document had no authority to do so, and; that the donation did not observe the form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate public instrument. Issue: Whether or not the donation propter nuptias is valid?

Valencia v. Locquiao 412 SCRA 600 Facts: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao(donor) executed a deed of donation propter nuptias which was written in the Ilocano dialect, denominated as Inventario Ti Sagut in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao (hereafter, respondent Benito) and his prospective bride, respondent Tomasa Mara. By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4) parcels of land, including the land in question, as well as a male cow and one-third (1/3) portion of the conjugal house of the donor

Held: Yes the donation propter nuptias is valid. Unlike ordinary donations, donations propter nuptias or donations by reason of marriage are those ―made before its celebration, in consideration of the same and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.‖ The distinction is crucial because the two classes of donations are not governed by exactly the same rules, especially as regards the formal essential requisites. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be

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specifically described. However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that ―acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts‖. In other words, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code. Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express acceptance ―is not necessary for the validity of these donations.‖ Thus, implied acceptance is sufficient. It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.

Sunga-Chan v. CA GR# 164401 / JUNE 25, 2008 555 SCRA 275 Facts: In 1977, Lamberto Chua and Jacinto Sunga formed a partnership, Shellite Gas Appliance Center (Shellite). After Jacinto's death in 1989, his widow, Cecilia Sunga, and married daughter, petitioner Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, continued with the business without Chua's consent. Chua's subsequent repeated demands for accounting and winding up went unheeded, prompting him to file a Complaint for Winding Up of a Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and

Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment. RTC rendered judgment in favor of Chua, and found Cecilia and Sunga-Chan solidarily liable for any and all claims of Chua. RTC‘s judgment was upheld by the CA. Then the sheriff levied upon and sold at public auction Sunga-Chan‘s property in Paco, Manila, over which a building leased to PNB stood. Sunga-Chan questions the levy on execution of the subject property on the ground that it is an absolute community property with her husband Norberto Chan. Issue: Whether the absolute community of property of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Norberto Chan can be lawfully made to answer for the liability of Lilibeth Chan under the judgment. Held: Yes. The records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married after the effectivity of the Family Code. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited. Absent any indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, 1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her husband's benefit.

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Villanueva et., al vs. CA et al. GR# 143286 / APR. 14, 2004 427 SCRA 439 Facts: Plaintiff Eusebia Napisa Retuya, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas Retuya, having been married to the latter on October 7, 1926. Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children, namely, Natividad, Angela, Napoleon, Salome, and Roberta. Spouses Retuya resided at Tipolo, Mandaue City. During their marriage they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and Consolacion, Cebu. Also, defendant, Nicolas Retuya, is co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City. In 1945, defendant Nicolas Retuya no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein defendant, Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the above-mentioned properties Defendant, Pacita Villanueva, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation, she had no properties of her own from which she could derive income. In 1985, Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot talk anymore. Natividad Retuya knew of the physical condition of her father because they visited him at the hospital. From the time defendant Nicolas Retuya suffered a stroke on January 27, 1985 and until the present, it is defendant Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas‘ illegitimate children who has been receiving the income of these properties. Witness Natividad Retuya went to Procopio to negotiate because at this time their father Nicolas was already senile and has a childlike mind. She told defendant, Procopio that their father was already incapacitated and they had to talk things over and the latter replied that it was not yet the time to talk about the matter. Plaintiff, then, complained to the Barangay Captain for reconciliation/mediation but no settlement was reached, hence, the said official issued a certification to file action. Written demands were made by plaintiff, through her counsel, to the defendants, including

the illegitimate family asking for settlement but no settlement was reached by the parties. Further, plaintiff‘s witness, Natividad Retuya, testified that the parcel of land covered by tax declaration marked Exhibit "T" was the property bought by her father from Adriano Marababol for at the time of purchase of the property, defendant Pacita Villanueva had no means of livelihood. ISSUE: Whether the subject properties are conjugal. HELD: Petitioners claim that the subject properties are exclusive properties of Nicolas except for Lot No. 152, which they claim is Pacita‘s exclusive property. This issue is easily resolved. The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the effectivity of Family Code. Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage before they are presumed conjugal. Petitioners argue that Eusebia failed to prove this pre-requisite. We disagree. The question of whether the subject properties were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia is a factual issue. Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the subject properties were in fact acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. The tax declarations covering the subject properties, along with the unrebutted testimony of Eusebia‘s witnesses, establish this fact. We give due deference to factual findings of trial courts, especially when affirmed by the appellate court. A reversal of this finding can only occur if petitioners show sufficient reason for us to doubt its correctness. Petitioners in the present case have not.

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Moreover, on whether Lot No. 152 is conjugal or not, the answer came from petitioners themselves. Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia. Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia. The burden is on petitioners to prove that the subject properties are not conjugal. The presumption in Article 116, which subsists "unless the contrary is proved," stands as an obstacle to any claim the petitioners may have. The burden of proving that a property is exclusive property of a spouse rests on the party asserting it and the evidence required must be clear and convincing. Petitioners failed to meet this standard. The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Otherwise, the law would be giving a stamp of approval to an act that is both illegal and immoral. What petitioners fail to grasp is that Nicolas and Pacita‘s cohabitation cannot work to the detriment of Eusebia, the legal spouse. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the date of Nicolas and Eusebia‘s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebia‘s death, are still presumed conjugal. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that any of the subject properties was acquired outside or beyond this period. Finally, petitioners‘ reliance on Article 148 of the Family Code is misplaced. A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the live-in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put,

proof of actual contribution by both parties is required, otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal sharing. Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152. In short, petitioners failed to prove that Pacita bought Lot No. 152 with her own money, or that she actually contributed her own money to acquire it.

De Leon v. De Leon GR# 185063 / JULY 23, 2009 593 SCRA 768 Facts: On July 20, 1965, Bonifacio O. De Leon, then single, and the People‘s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered into a Conditional Contract to Sell for the purchase on installment of a 191.30 square-meter lot situated in Fairview, Quezon City. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968, Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a civil rite officiated by the Municipal Mayor of Zaragosa, Nueva Ecija. To this union were born Danilo and Vilma. Following the full payment of the cost price for the lot thus purchased, PHHC executed, on June 22, 1970, a Final Deed of Sale in favor of Bonifacio. Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 173677 was issued on February 24, 1972 in the name of Bonifacio, "single." Subsequently, Bonifacio, for PhP 19,000, sold the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas), petitioners herein. The conveying Deed of Sale dated January 12, 1974 (Deed of Sale) did not bear the written consent and signature of Anita. On February 29, 1996, Bonifacio died. Three months later, the Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale. They secured the issuance in their names from the Quezon City Register of Deeds. Anita, Danilo, and Vilma filed a reconveyance suit before the RTC in Quezon City. In their complaint, Anita and her children alleged, among other things, that fraud attended the execution of the Deed of Sale and that subsequent acts of Bonifacio would show that he was still the owner of the parcel of land. The Tarrosas, in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, averred that the lot Bonifacio sold to them was his exclusive property inasmuch as he was still single when he acquired it from PHHC. As further alleged, they were not aware of the

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supposed marriage between Bonifacio and Anita at the time of the execution of the Deed of Sale. RTC ruled in favor of Anita and her children. CA held that the Tarrosas failed to overthrow the legal presumption that the parcel of land in dispute was conjugal. Issue: WON the property in question is part of the conjugal property of Bonifacio and Anita. Ruling: Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v. Court of Appeals teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the properties will still be considered conjugal. In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHC-Bonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor‘s obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed. In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.

encumbering any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife‘s consent. To a specific point, the sale of a conjugal piece of land by the husband, as administrator, must, as a rule, be with the wife‘s consent. Else, the sale is not valid. So it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is void ab initio, absent any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes. The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code. Since Art. 166 of the Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it follows that the acts or transactions executed against this mandatory provision are void except when the law itself authorized their validity. As a final consideration, the Court agrees with the CA that the sale of one-half of the conjugal property without liquidation of the partnership is void. Prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an equitable estate, and does not ripen into a title until it appears that there are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and settlement.26 The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the 1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the consequence of the husband alienating or

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Hernandez v. Mingoa GR# 146548 / DEC 18, 2009 608 SCRA 394

ISSUE: Whether or not the consent of the spouse is necessary for the validity of alienation of conjugal property?

FACTS: HELD: Domingo Hernandez, Sr. was awarded a piece of real property in 1958 by the PHHC as part of the government‘s housing program at the time. Title over the said property was issued in 1966 in the name of Hernandez, Sr., after full payment for the property was received by the PHHC. Neither [petitioners] nor Hernandez, Sr., took possession of the said property. On the other hand, the [respondents] took possession of the said property in 1966 and are in actual and physical possession thereof up to the present, and have made considerable improvements thereon, including a residential house where they presently reside. From 1966 (the time when the [respondents] were able to possess the property) to 1983 (the time when the [petitioners] had knowledge that the TCT in the name of Hernandez, Sr. had already been cancelled by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City) covers almost a span of 17 years; and from 1983 to 1995 (the time when the Heirs filed the original action) is a period of another 12 years. The Deed of Transfer of Rights, executed by Hernandez, Sr. in Camisura‘s favor, expressly states that the former, in consideration of the amount of P6,500.00, transfers his rights over the subject property to the latter. Notably, such deed was simultaneously executed with the SPA on February 14, 1963. Petitioners contend that the lack of consent on the part of Sergia Hernandez (the spouse) rendered the SPAs and the deed of sale fictitious, hence null and void in accordance with Article 1409 of the Civil Code.

No. The consent of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. to the contract is undisputed, thus, the sale of his ½ share in the conjugal property was valid. With regard to the consent of his wife, Sergia Hernandez, to the sale involving their conjugal property, the trial court found that it was lacking because said wife‘s signature on the SPA was falsified. However, Sergia‘s lack of consent to the sale did not render the transfer of her share invalid. It bears stressing that the subject matter herein involves conjugal property. Said property was awarded to Domingo Hernandez, Sr. in 1958. The assailed SPAs were executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr. covering the subject property was issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of the property to Melanie Mingoa and the issuance of a new title in her name happened in 1978. Since all these events occurred before the Family Code took effect in 1988, the provisions of the New Civil Code govern these transactions. We quote the applicable provisions, to wit: Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife‘s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. x x x. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.

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In Sps. Alfredo v. Sps. Borras,41 we held that: The Family Code, which took effect on 3 August 1988, provides that any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is void. However, when the sale is made before the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code. Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the disposition of conjugal property without the wife's consent is not void but merely voidable. Thus, the failure of Sergia Hernandez to file with the courts an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage and within ten (10) years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale of the subject property to third persons.

Matthews v. Taylor GR # 164584, June 22, 2009 590 SCRA 394 Facts: On June 30, 1988, respondent Benjamin A. Taylor (Benjamin), a British subject, married Joselyn C. Taylor (Joselyn), a 17-year old Filipina. On June 9, 1989, while their marriage was subsisting, Joselyn bought from Diosa M. Martin a 1,294 square-meter lot (Boracay property) situated at Manoc-Manoc, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, for and in consideration of P129,000.00. The sale was allegedly financed by Benjamin. Joselyn and Benjamin, also using the latter‘s funds, constructed improvements thereon and eventually converted the property to a vacation and tourist resort known as the Admiral Ben Bow Inn. All required permits and licenses for the operation of the resort were obtained in the name of Ginna Celestino, Joselyn‘s sister. However, Benjamin and Joselyn had a falling out, and Joselyn ran away with Kim Philippsen. On June 8, 1992, Joselyn executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of Benjamin, authorizing the latter to maintain, sell, lease, and sub-lease and otherwise enter into contract with third parties with respect to their Boracay property.

On July 20, 1992, Joselyn as lessor and petitioner Philip Matthews as lessee, entered into an Agreement of Lease (Agreement) involving the Boracay property for a period of 25 years, with an annual rental of P12,000.00. The agreement was signed by the parties and executed before a Notary Public. Petitioner thereafter took possession of the property and renamed the resort as Music Garden Resort. Issue(s): • The marital consent of respondent benjamin taylor is not required in the agreement of lease dated 20 july 1992. Granting arguendo that his consent is required, benjamin taylor is deemed to have given his consent when he affixed his signature in the agreement of lease as witness in the light of the ruling of the supreme court in the case of spouses pelayo vs. Melki perez, g.r. no. 141323, june 8, 2005. • The parcel of land subject of the agreement of lease is the exclusive property of jocelyn c. Taylor, a filipino citizen, in the light of cheesman vs. Iac, g.r. no. 74833, january 21, 1991. • The courts a quo erroneously applied article 96 of the family code of the philippines which is a provision referring to the absolute community of property. The property regime governing the property relations of benjamin taylor and joselyn taylor is the conjugal partnership of gains because they were married on 30 june 1988 which is prior to the effectivity of the family code. Article 96 of the family code of the philippines finds no application in this case. • The honorable court of appeals ignored the presumption of regularity in the execution of notarial documents. • The honorable court of appeals failed to pass upon the counterclaim of petitioner despite the fact that it was not contested and despite the presentation of evidence establishing said claim.

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Held: We find and so hold that Benjamin has no right to nullify the Agreement of Lease between Joselyn and petitioner. Benjamin, being an alien, is absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and public lands in the Philippines. Considering that Joselyn appeared to be the designated ―vendee‖ in the Deed of Sale of said property, she acquired sole ownership thereto. This is true even if we sustain Benjamin‘s claim that he provided the funds for such acquisition. By entering into such contract knowing that it was illegal, no implied trust was created in his favor; no reimbursement for his expenses can be allowed; and no declaration can be made that the subject property was part of the conjugal/community property of the spouses. In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent lease of the Boracay property by his wife on the theory that in so doing, he was merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would countenance indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord the alien husband a substantial interest and right over the land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have. Claiming that the Agreement was null and void since it was entered into by Joselyn without his (Benjamin‘s) consent, Benjamin instituted an action for Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with Damages against Joselyn and the petitioner. Benjamin claimed that his funds were used in the acquisition and improvement of the Boracay property, and coupled with the fact that he was Joselyn‘s husband, any transaction involving said property required his consent. In fine, the Agreement of Lease entered into between Joselyn and petitioner cannot be nullified on the grounds advanced by Benjamin. Thus, we uphold its validity. With the foregoing disquisition, we find it unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the petitioner.

Borromeo v. Descallar GR # 159310, Feb. 24, 2009 580 SCRA 175 Facts: Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, was assigned by his employer to work here in the Philippines where he met respondent Antonietta Descallar, a separated mother of two boys, with whom he had a livein relationship with. During the course of their relationship, a Deed of Absolute Sale was issued in their favor by Agro-Macro Subdivision respecting a house and lot where they transferred and lived together. When the deed was presented before the Registry of Deeds for registration, a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued only in the name of respondent and the registration was refused on the part of Jambrich on the ground that he was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the public domain. Consequently, Jambrich‘s name was erased from the deed of sale. In the meantime, Jambrich adopted the sons of respondent. However, not long after, the couple broke up and lived separately without settlement of their properties. While still in the Philippines, Jambrich met petitioner Camilo Borromeo with whom he was indebted in the amount of P150,000 relative to the purchases he made from the latter which he was not able to pay. Believing that his interest in his property with the AgroMacro Subdivision still exist, he sold the same by way of Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment to petitioner. When petitioner was about to register the deed, he discovered, however, that the property was already transferred in the name of respondent and had already been mortgaged. Petitioner then filed a complaint for recovery of the real property. Petitioner alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment which Jambrich executed in his favor.

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In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The decision was however reversed by CA on appeal. ISSUE: WON the petitioner as the successor-in-interest of Jambrich, who is a resident alien, has validly obtained the right over the subject property without violating the prohibition under the Constitution. HELD: YES. As the rule now stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits nonFilipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.29 Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner, viz.: [W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation [were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino

citizen from him, has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid. The rationale behind the Court‘s ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in subsequent cases,32 is this – since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nation‘s land for future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen, there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Villegas v. Lingan GR# 153839 / JUNE 29, 2007 526 SCRA 63 “Accurate ruling?” FACTS: Isaac Villegas was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In order to secure the payment of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), Isaac constituted a real estate mortgage over the said parcel of land in favor of DBP. The said loan and mortgage was subsequently transferred by the DBP to the Home Mutual Development Fund (HMDF).When the Isaac failed to settle his loan, the real estate mortgage he constituted over the property was foreclosed, the property was sold at public auction and, as the HMDF was itself the highest bidder at such public auction, a certificate of sheriffs sale was issued and, thereafter, registered with the Register of Deeds on March 8, 1996. By virtue of a power of attorney executed by Villegas ‗wife, Marilou C. Villegas in favor of Gloria Roa Catral, the latter redeemed the property from the HMDF. On May 17, 1996, Gloria R. Catral (Catral), by virtue of the same power of attorney, executed a Deed of Sale in favor of respondent.

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Isaac claims that the power of attorney executed in favor of Catral, his mother-in-law, created a principal-agent relationship only between his wife, Marilou Catral-Villegas (Marilou) as principal, and Catral, as agent, and then only for the latter to administer the properties of the former; that he never authorized Catral to administer his properties, particularly, herein subject property; and that Catral had no authority to execute the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, since from the very wordings of the power of attorney, she had no special authority to sell or convey any specific real property. On December 19, 1996, the RTC dismissed the Complaint and on appeal, CA affirmed in toto the RTC Judgment. Hence, this petition for review. ISSUES: (1) WON the wife of the petitioner Isaac, as successor-ininterest, may validly redeem the property in question (2) WON the petitioner husband Isaac has a cause of action against his respondent wife Marilou HELD: 1. YES. Section 6 of Act No. 3135 provides that ―in all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors-in-interest or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and after the date of sale; and such redemption shall be governed by the provisions of section 464 to 466, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. Section 27, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that ―real property sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner

hereinafter provided, by the following persons: xxxx a)The judgment obligor, or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the property; The successor-in-interest of the judgment debtor referred to in the above provision includes a person who succeeds to his property by operation of law, or a person with a joint interest in the property, or his spouse or heirs. Under the above provision, petitioner could have redeemed the property from Marilou after she had redeemed it. The pleadings filed and the records of this case do not show that petitioner exercised said right. Consequently, as correctly held by the CA, Marilou acquired ownership of the subject property. All rights and title of the judgment obligor are transferred upon the expiration of the right of redemption. And where the redemption is made under a property regime governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, Article 109 of the Family Code provides that property acquired by right of redemption is the exclusive property of the spouses redeeming the property. 2. NO. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements:(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. In the present case, there is no property right that exists in favor of the petitioner, and, with more reason, no such obligation arises in behalf of the defendant, herein respondent, to respect such right.There was no violation of a legal right of the petitioner. It must be stressed that there is no allegation or proof that Marilou redeemed the property in behalf of the petitioner. Marilou did not act as agent of the petitioner. Rather, she exercised the right of redemption in her own right as successor-in-interest of the petitioner.

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Under the circumstances, should there be any right violated, the aggrieved party is Marilou, petitioners wife. The property in question was the exclusive property of Marilou by virtue of her redemption. Thus, petitioner has no valid cause of action against the respondent.

company of several men, including policemen, forcibly took physical possession of the said land from the heirs of Petra Unating. Thus, they filed the instant action for recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of land against Jessie Pisueña.

Divested of all interest over the property, the petitioner has ceased to be the proper party who may challenge the validity of the sale. Moreover, since, as a rule, the agency, as a contract, is binding only between the contracting parties, then only the parties, as well as the third person who transacts with the parties themselves, may question the validity of the agency or the violation of the terms and conditions found therein. This rule is a corollary of the foregoing doctrine on the rights of real parties in interest. xxxxx Petition is denied.

On the other hand, defendant countered that the whole land in dispute was sold by Felix Villar and Catalina Villar to Agustin Navarra, as evidenced by Escritura de Venta Absoluta. And he and his wife purchased the said land from the heirs of Agustin Navarra.

Section 3. Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 116-120); Article 160 NCC Pisueña vs. Heirs of Petra Unating GR# 132803 / AUG 31, 1999 313 SCRA 384

After trial, the court a quo ruled that since the disputed lot was the conjugal property of Spouses Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar, its purported sale by Felix and Catalina Villar, to Agustin Navarra could be considered as valid. However, this validity pertained only to the share of the late Petra Unating considering that at the time of the sale, Aquilino Villar was still alive. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the said decision. Issue: W/N the lot in dispute is paraphernal property of Petra Unating hence would be covered by the CPG.

Facts: Held: Salvador Upod and Dolores Bautista are the heirs of Petra Unating and Aquilino Villar. They claimed that the land in dispute known as Lot 1201 was registered in the name of Petra Unating married to Aquilino Villar. However, sometime in 1950, after the death of Petra Unating, Aquilino Villar entered into an oral partnership agreement for ten years with Agustin Navarra involving the swampy portion of the lot in question consisting of around four hectares which was converted into a fishpond with the investment capital of Agustin Navarra and the net income shall be divided equally between Aquilino Villar and his children Felix Villar and Catalina Villar on one hand, and Agustin Navarra on the other hand. In 1958 when Agustin Navarra died, the heirs of Petra Unating repossessed the land in question until the defendant Jessie Pisueña, son-in-law of Agustin Navarra, disturbed their possession sometime in 1974. And finally, sometime in 1982, the defendant, with the

The Court ruled that the lot in dispute can properly be considered as a paraphernal property of Petra Unating. Concededly, properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. However, this prima facie presumption cannot prevail over the cadastral court‘s specific finding, reached in adversarial proceedings, that the lot was inherited by Petra Unating from her mother. Consequently, by virtue of the Deed of Sale they executed, Felix and Catalina effectively transferred to Agustin Navarra on February 4, 1949, their title over their two-thirds share in the disputed lot. However, they could not have disposed of their father‘s share in the same property at the time, as they were not yet owners. At the most, being the only children, they had an inchoate interest in their father‘s share. When Aquilino Villar died in 1953 without disposing of his one-third share in the disputed property, Felix and Catalina‘s

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inchoate interest in it was actualized, because succession vested in them the title to their father‘s share and, consequently, to the entire lot. Thus, that title passed to Agustin Navarra, pursuant to Article 1434 of the present Civil Code, which was already in force at the time of Aquilino‘s death in 1953.

Ching vs. CA GR# 124642 / FEB. 23, 2004 423 SCRA 356 FACTS: This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 27, 1995, as well as the Resolution on April 2, 1996 denying the petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration. The impugned decision granted the private respondent‘s petition for certiorari and set aside the Orders of the trial court dated December 15, 1993 and February 17, 1994 nullifying the attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp Investment Philippines under the name of petitioner Alfredo Ching. Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan ofP9,000,000.00 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). By virtue of this loan, the PBMCI, through its Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note for the said amount promising to pay on December 22, 1978 at an interest rate of 14% per annum. As added security for the said loan, on September 28, 1978, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of P38,000,000.00. On December 28, 1979, the ABC extended another loan to the PBMCI in the amount ofP13,000,000.00 payable in eighteen months at 16% interest per annum. As in the previous loan, the PBMCI, through Alfredo Ching, executed a promissory note to evidence the loan maturing on June 29, 1981.

PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans, hence ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against the PBMCI to collect the P12,612,972.88 exclusive of interests, penalties and other bank charges. Impleaded as co-defendants in the complaint were Alfredo Ching, Emilio Tañedo and Chung Kiat Hua in their capacity as sureties of the PBMCI. ISSUE: 1. Whether the petitioner-wife has the right to file the motion to quash the levy on attachment on the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines; 2. Whether or not the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. HELD: On the first issue, we agree with the petitioners that the petitionerwife had the right to file the said motion, although she was not a party in Civil Case. In this case, the petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the 100,000 shares of stocks in the name of petitioner-husband claiming that the said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the properties acquired during the marriage subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome the same. In this case, the evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of

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the petitioners. The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks with his exclusive money. The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp Investment Philippines solely in the name of the petitioner-husband does not constitute proof that the petitioner-husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same. The ruling of this Court in Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court buttresses the case for the petitioners. In that case, we ruled that he who claims that property acquired by the spouses during their marriage is not conjugal partnership property but belongs to one of them as his personal property is burdened to prove the source of the money utilized to purchase the same. In this case, the private respondent claimed that the petitioner-husband acquired the shares of stocks from the Citycorp Investment Philippines in his own name as the owner thereof. It was, thus, the burden of the private respondent to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the petitioner-husband alone. As held by the trial court, the private respondent failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion. For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners was benefited by the petitionerhusband‘s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.

It could be argued that the petitioner-husband was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of its top twenty stockholders, and that the shares of stocks of the petitioner-husband and his family would appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that the petitioner-husband‘s career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the New Civil Code. The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private respondent. On the second issue, we find and so hold that the CA erred in setting aside and reversing the orders of the RTC. The private respondent, the petitioner in the CA, was burdened to prove that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal purpose to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the tribunal, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the tribunal acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment and is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It was incumbent upon the private respondent to adduce a sufficiently strong demonstration that the RTC acted whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to, and even decide of, the controversy before certiorari will lie. A special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of its jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. After a comprehensive review of the records of the RTC and of the CA, we find and so hold that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed orders. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE AND REVERSED. The assailed orders of the RTC are AFFIRMED.

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Ferrer v. Ferrer GR# 166496 / NOV. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 570 Facts: Petitioner id the widow of Alfredo Ferrer, a half- brother of Respondents. She filed a Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages. She alleged that before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 67927. He applied for a loan with the SSS to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple‘s conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, in September 1991, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. TCT No. 67927 was cancelled, and TCT. No. 2728 was issued and registered in the names of respondents. According to petitioner, that when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo‘s lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, one-half thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo‘s lot.

No. Petitioner was not able to show that there is an obligation on the part of the respondents to respect or not to violate her right. The right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the ownerspouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner‘s spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner‘s right to be reimbursed.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner has the right to be reimbursed for the cost of improvements under Article 120 of the Family Code? Held:

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MBTC v. Pascual GR# 163744 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246

Held: The court ruled in favor of Nicholson. The disputed property is conjugal.

Facts: Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a three-door apartment standing thereon located in Makati City. The Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) covering the purchased lot (Lot no. 156283) was issued in the name of Florencia married to Nelson Pascual a.k.a. Nicholson Pascual. In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 FC, w/c was granted by the Quezon City RTC in 1995. In the same decision, the RTC, inter alia, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains, w/c the latter failed. On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a P58 million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation, Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their properties, including one lot no. 156283. Due to the failure of Florencia and the sps Oliveros to pay their loan obligation, MBTC foreclosed the property. Nicholson filed on June 28, 2000, before the Makati RTC a Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of the disputed property, alleging that the property, which is still conjugal property, was mortgaged without his consent. MBTC alleged that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia‘s name, was paraphernal. Florencia was declared in default. The RTC rendered judgment finding for Nicholson. The CA affirmed the RTC but deleted the award moral damages and attorney‘s fees. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is conjugal partnership property under Article 116 of the Family Code.

While Metrobank is correct in saying that Art. 160 of the Civil Code, not Art. 116 of the Family Code, is the applicable legal provision since the property was acquired prior to the enactment of the Family Code, it errs in its theory that, before conjugal ownership could be legally presumed, there must be a showing that the property was acquired during marriage using conjugal funds. Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. This article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. As Nicholson aptly points out, if proof obtains on the acquisition of the property during the existence of the marriage, then the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. Proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. When there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by the spouse, the fact that a title is in the name of the spouse is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse.

Muñoz v. Ramirez GR # 156125/Aug 25, 2010 629 SCRA 38 FACTS: Subject of the present case is a seventy-seven (77)-square meter residential house and lot located at 170 A. Bonifacio Street, Mandaluyong City (subject property), covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7650 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City in the name of the petitioner. The residential lot in the subject property was previously covered by TCT No. 1427, in the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married to Eliseo Carlos (respondents). On April 6,

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1989, Eliseo, a Bureau of Internal Revenue employee, mortgaged TCT No. 1427, with Erlinda‘s consent, to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to secure a P136,500.00 housing loan, payable within twenty (20) years, through monthly salary deductions of P1,687.66. The respondents then constructed a thirty-six (36)square meter, two-story residential house on the lot.

charges; the sale was with the implied promise to repurchase within one year, during which period (from May 1, 1992 to April 30, 1993), the respondents would lease the subject property for a monthly rental of P500.00; when the respondents failed to repurchase the subject property within the one-year period despite notice, he caused the transfer of title in his name on July 14, 1993.

On July 14, 1993, the title to the subject property was transferred to the petitioner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, dated April 30, 1992, executed by Erlinda, for herself and as attorney-in-fact of Eliseo, for a stated consideration of P602,000.00. On September 24, 1993, the respondents filed a complaint with the RTC for the nullification of the deed of absolute sale, claiming that there was no sale but only a mortgage transaction, and the documents transferring the title to the petitioner‘s name were falsified.

In a Decision dated January 23, 1997, the RTC dismissed the complaint. It found that the subject property was Erlinda‘s exclusive paraphernal property that was inherited from her father.

The respondents alleged that in April 1992, the petitioner granted them a P600,000.00 loan, to be secured by a first mortgage on TCT No. 1427; the petitioner gave Erlinda a P200,000.00 advance to cancel the GSIS mortgage, and made her sign a document purporting to be the mortgage contract; the petitioner promised to give the P402,000.00 balance when Erlinda surrenders TCT No. 1427 with the GSIS mortgage cancelled, and submits an affidavit signed by Eliseo stating that he waives all his rights to the subject property; with the P200,000.00 advance, Erlinda paid GSIS P176,445.27 to cancel the GSIS mortgage on TCT No. 1427; in May 1992, Erlinda surrendered to the petitioner the clean TCT No. 1427, but returned Eliseo‘s affidavit, unsigned; since Eliseo‘s affidavit was unsigned, the petitioner refused to give the P402,000.00 balance and to cancel the mortgage, and demanded that Erlinda return the P200,000.00 advance; since Erlinda could not return the P200,000.00 advance because it had been used to pay the GSIS loan, the petitioner kept the title; and in 1993, they discovered that TCT No. 7650 had been issued in the petitioner‘s name, cancelling TCT No.1427 in their name. The petitioner countered that there was a valid contract of sale. He alleged that the respondents sold the subject property to him after he refused their offer to mortgage the subject property because they lacked paying capacity and were unwilling to pay the incidental

The CA decided the appeal on June 25, 2002. Applying the second paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon. Fortun, the CA held that the subject property, originally Erlinda‘s exclusive paraphernal property, became conjugal property when it was used as collateral for a housing loan that was paid through conjugal funds – Eliseo‘s monthly salary deductions; the subject property, therefore, cannot be validly sold or mortgaged without Eliseo‘s consent, pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code. Thus, the CA declared void the deed of absolute sale, and set aside the RTC decision. ISSUE: Whether the subject property is paraphernal or conjugal. HELD: As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership. Pursuant to Articles 92 and 109 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either spouse, during the marriage, shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of each spouse. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda‘s exclusive paraphernal property.

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The court held that they cannot subscribe to the CA‘s misplaced reliance on Article 158 of the Civil Code and Calimlim-Canullas. As the respondents were married during the effectivity of the Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal partnership of gains (Articles 142 to 189) should have governed their property relations. However, with the enactment of the Family Code on August 3, 1989, the Civil Code provisions on conjugal partnership of gains, including Article 158, have been superseded by those found in the Family Code (Articles 105 to 133). Article 105 of the Family Code states: x x x x The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. Thus, in determining the nature of the subject property, we refer to the provisions of the Family Code, and not the Civil Code, except with respect to rights then already vested. Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Under this provision, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In the present case, we find that Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions. From April 6, 1989 to April 30, 1992, Eliseo paid about P60,755.76, not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan plus interest, since the petitioner advanced the P176,445.27 paid by Erlinda to cancel the mortgage in 1992.

Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions. Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary. The NBI finding that Eliseo‘s signatures in the special power of attorney and affidavit were forgeries was immaterial.

Imami v. MBTC GR # 187023/Nov. 17, 2010 635 SCRA 357 Facts: On August 28, 1981, Evangeline D. Imani (petitioner) signed a Continuing Suretyship Agreement in favor of respondent Metrobank, with Cesar P. Dazo, Nieves Dazo, Benedicto C. Dazo, Cynthia C. Dazo, Doroteo Fundales, Jr., and Nicolas Ponce as her co-sureties. As sureties, they bound themselves to pay Metrobank whatever indebtedness C.P. Dazo Tannery, Inc. (CPDTI) incurs, but not exceeding Six Million Pesos (P6,000,000.00). Later, CPDTI obtained loans of P100,000.00 and P63,825.45, respectively. The loans were evidenced by promissory notes signed by Cesar and Nieves Dazo. CPDTI defaulted in the payment of its loans. Metrobank made several demands for payment upon CPDTI, but to no avail. This prompted Metrobank to file a collection suit against CPDTI and its sureties, including herein petitioner. RTC ruled in favor of Metrobank. Metrobank then filed with the RTC a motion for execution, which was granted on December 7, 1999. A writ of execution was issued against CPDTI and its co-defendants. The sheriff levied on a property covering a lot registered in the name of petitioner. Petitioner argued that the subject property belongs to the conjugal partnership; as such, it cannot be held answerable for the liabilities incurred by CPDTI to Metrobank. Neither can it be subject of levy on execution or public auction. Hence, petitioner prayed for the nullification of the

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levy on execution and the auction sale, as well as the certificate of sale in favor of Metrobank. Issue: WON or not the property in question is conjugal. Ruling: All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Thus, the time when the property was acquired is material. Similarly, the certificate of title could not support petitioner‘s assertion. As aptly ruled by the CA, the fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses‘ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing.

Section 4. Charges Upon & Obligations of the Conjugal Partnership (Articles 121-123)

Ayala Invest & Dev't. Corp. vs. CA GR# 118305 / FEB. 12, 1998 286 SCRA 272 Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC). As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, Alfredo Ching, EVP of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBM's indebtedness to AIDC.

PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, AIDC filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. After trial, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. Pending appeal and upon motion of AIDC, the lower court issued a writ of execution and the Deputy Sheriff caused the issuance and service upon spouses Ching of a notice of sheriff sale on three (3) of their conjugal properties. Spouses Ching filed a case of injunction to enjoin the auction sale alleging that the judgment cannot be enforced against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Both the RTC and the CA ruled that the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Ching is not liable for the payment of the debts secured by the husband Alfredo Ching.

Issue: Whether the conjugal partnership should not be made liable for the surety agreement entered into by the husband in favor of his employer. Held: Yes.If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that contract falls within the term ". . . obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal

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partnership." The contract of loan or services is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is "for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. Article 121, paragraph 3, of the Family Code is emphatic that the payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except to the extent that they redounded to the benefit of the family. Here, the property in dispute also involves the family home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of administration for the benefit of the family.

Carlos vs. Abelardo GR# 146504 / ARP. 09, 2002 380 SCRA 361 Facts: Petitioner averred in his complaint filed on October 13, 1994 that in October 1989, respondent and his wife Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo approached him and requested him to advance the amount of US$25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot located at #19952 Chestnut Street, Executive Heights Village, Paranaque, Metro Manila. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, petitioner, in October 31, 1989, issued a check in the name of a certain Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged receipt thereof.1 The amount was in full payment of the property. When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the amount he loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.2Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner‘s inquiries on the amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.3

On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.4Thus, on October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172, docketed as Civil Case No. 4490-V-94. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine currency plus legal interest from date of extra-judicial demand.5Petitioner likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages, attorney‘s fees and costs of suit from respondent.6 As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner.7She claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount.8 In his separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 but claimed that: a. Defendant (respondent) xxx revived that otherwise dormant construction firm H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION of herein plaintiff which suffered tremendous setback after the assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino; b. Working day and night and almost beyond human endurance, defendant devoted all his efforts and skill, used all his business and personal connection to be able to revive the construction business of plaintiff; c. Little-by-little, starting with small construction business, defendant was able to obtain various construction jobs using the name H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION and the income derived therefrom were deposited in the name of such firm of plaintiff, d. Defendant xxx was made to believe that the earnings derived from such construction will be for him and his family since he was the one working to secure the contract and its completion, he was allowed to use the facilities of the plaintiff;

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e. The plaintiff seeing the progress brought about by defendant xxx to his company proposed a profit sharing scheme to the effect that all projects amounting to more than P10 million shall be for the account of plaintiff; lower amount shall be for defendant‘s account but still using H.L. CARLOS CONSTRUCTION. f. But, to clear account on previous construction contracts that brought income to H.L.CARLOS CONSTRUCTION, out of which defendant derived his income, plaintiff gave the amount of US$25,000.00 to defendant to square off account and to start the arrangement in paragraph (e) supra; g. That, the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It was his share of income on contracts obtained by defendant; Respondent denied having made death threats to petitioner and by way of compulsory counterclaim, he asked for moral damages from petitioner for causing the alienation of his wife‘s love and affection, attorney‘s fees and costs of suit.10 On June 26, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. Issue: • The court of appeals erred in finding insufficient evidence to prove that the amount of us$25,000.00 was a loan obtained by private respondent and his wife from petitioner. • The court of appeals erred in holding that the us$25,000.00 was given as private respondent‘s share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction, Inc. and that the filing of the complaint is a hoax. • The court of appeals erred in nullifying the award of damages for lack of proof thereof. Held: Early in time, it must be noted that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as

they redounded to the benefit of the family. The defendants never denied that the check of US$25,000.00 was used to purchase the subject house and lot. They do not deny that the same served as their conjugal home, thus benefiting the family. On the same principle, acknowledgment of the loan made by the defendant-wife binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family. Hence, defendant-husband and defendant-wife are jointly and severally liable in the payment of the loan. Defendant-husband cannot allege as a defense that the amount of US $25,000.00 was received as his share in the income or profits of the corporation and not as a loan. Firstly, defendant-husband does not appear to be a stockholder nor an employee nor an agent of the corporation, H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc. Since he is not a stockholder, he has no right to participate in the income or profits thereof. In the same manner that as he is not an employee nor an agent of H. L. Carlos Construction, Inc., he has no right to receive any salary or commission therefrom. Secondly, the amount advanced for the purchase of the house and lot came from the personal account of the plaintiff. If, indeed, it was to be construed as defendant-husband‘s share in the profits of the corporation, the checks should come from the corporation‘s account and not from the plaintiff‘s personal account, considering that the corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of its stockholders and officers. Even granting that the checks amount to US $3,000.000.00 given by the plaintiff to the defendant-spouses was their share in the profits of the corporation, still there is no sufficient evidence to establish that the US $25,000.00 is to be treated similarly. Defendant-husband in invoking the defense of compensation argued that if indeed they were indebted to the plaintiff, the latter could have applied their share in the proceeds or income of the corporation to the concurrent amount of the alleged loan, instead of giving the amount of P3,000,000.00 to them. This argument is untenable. Article 1278 of the Civil Code provides that compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own right, are debtors and creditors of each other. As its indicates, compensation is a sort of balancing between two obligations. In the instant case, the plaintiff and the defendanthusband are not debtors and creditors of each other. Even granting

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that the defendant-husband‘s claim to the profits of the corporation is justified, still compensation cannot extinguish his loan obligation to the plaintiff because under such assumption, the defendant is dealing with the corporation and not with the plaintiff in his personal capacity. Hence, compensation cannot take place.

SBTC v. Mar Tierra Corp GR# 143382 / NOV. 29, 2006 508 SCRA 419

The Court of Appeals, thus, erred in finding that respondent‘s liability was not proved by preponderance of evidence. On the contrary, the evidence adduced by petitioner sufficiently established his claim that the US$25,000.00 he advanced to respondent and his wife was a loan.

Respondent Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a P12,000,000 credit accommodation with petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company (SBTC). Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, Miguel J. Lacson and Ricardo A. Lopa who bound themselves jointly and severally with respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. The respondent corporation finally availed of its credit line and received P9M. Out of that amount, it was able to pay about P4M while the remaining balance remained outstanding as the corporation suffered business reversals and eventually ceased operating. To enforce its claim against the corporation on the remaining balance of the loan, petitioner filed a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation and individual respondents in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The RTC rendered a decision holding respondent corporation and individual respondent Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner for the remaining balance of the loan including interest and attorney‘s fee. It, however, found that the obligation contracted by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez.

The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code: Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: xxx (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Xxx While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

Facts:

Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, petitioner appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the trial court‘s decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE:

We also find sufficient basis for the award of damages to petitioner, contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is not entitled thereto.

WON the conjugal partnership may be held liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party?

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HELD: NO. Under Article 161(1) of the Civil Code, 8 the conjugal partnership is liable for "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." But when are debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone considered for the benefit of and therefore chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? We ruled as early as 1969 in Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia 9 that, in acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. In Ayala Investment and Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 10 we ruled that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. [11] On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. [12] It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. [13] In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party. [14]

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly for the latter‘s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. [15] The underlying concern of the law is the conservation of the conjugal partnership. [16] Hence, it limits the liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Buado v. CA GR# 145222 / APR. 24, 2009 586 SCRA 397 Facts: Spouses Buado filed a complaint for damages against Erlinda Nicol with Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, which originated from Erlinda Nicol‘s civil liability arising from the criminal offense of slander filed against her by petitioners. RTC rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages. It became final and executory and later on issued a a writ of execution. Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties insufficient to satisfy the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a notice of levy on real property on execution addressed to the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Eventually, a notice of sheriff‘s sale was issued. Two (2) days before the public auction sale on 28 January 1993, an affidavit of third-party claim from one Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to put up a sheriff‘s indemnity bond. The auction sale proceeded with petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of petitioners.

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Almost a year later on 2 February 1994, Romulo Nicol, the husband of Erlinda Nicol, filed a complaint for annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and the deputy sheriff. Respondent, as plaintiff therein, alleged that the defendants, now petitioners, connived and directly levied upon and execute his real property without exhausting the personal properties of Erlinda Nicol. Respondent averred that there was no proper publication and posting of the notice of sale. Furthermore, respondent claimed that his property which was valued at P500,000.00 was only sold at a ―very low price‖ of P51,685.00, whereas the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol was only P40,000.00. The case was assigned to Branch 21 of the RTC of Imus, Cavite.

of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

In response, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and that they had acted on the basis of a valid writ of execution. Citing De Leon v. Salvador, petitioners claimed that respondent should have filed the case with Branch 19 where the judgment originated and which issued the order of execution, writ of execution, notice of levy and notice of sheriff‘s sale. RTC dismissed respondent‘s complaint and ruled that Branch 19 has jurisdiction over the case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by appellant. Hence, the instant petition attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.

Section 5. Administration of the Conjugal Partnership Property (Articles 124-125); Article 165, 173, 1390 NCC; Rule on Forum Shopping; Article 124 FC v. Guardianship v. Summary Proceedings;

Issue: WON the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership

Melania Roxa (Petitioner) is married to Antonio Roxas, but are living separately. Melania found out that Antonio had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano sometime on March 30, 1987 covering a portion of their conjugal lot situated in Quezon City without her previous knowledge, much less her marital consent. Apparently, she was to put up a flea market in the lot and has already filed for a Mayor‘s permit but the same was denied on renewal because Cayetano also applied for the same permit and was earlier granted. She then filed a complaint for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent against Cayetano, who filed a motion to dismiss the same on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Held: No.There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency

Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. To reiterate, conjugal property cannot be held liable for the personal obligation contracted by one spouse, unless some advantage or benefit is shown to have accrued to the conjugal partnership.

Roxas vs. CA GR# 92245 / JUNE 26, 1991 198 SCRA 541 Facts:

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Issue: W/N a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife.

Held: Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property. Responsibility should carry authority with it. The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife. However, administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code)

Guiang vs. CA GR# 125172 / JUNE 26, 1998 291 SCRA 372 FACTS: The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable. Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect. This is a petition for review of the decision of the CA affirming the lower court and denying reconsideration, declaring a certain deed of sale, which involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her husband, null and void. Plaintiff Gilda and Judie Corpuz are legally married spouses and have three children, namely: Junie, Harriet and Jodie or Joji, 18, 17 and 15 years old respectively. The couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South Cotabato, from Manuel Callejo who signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The consideration was payable in installment, with right of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail to pay three successive installments. Gilda and Judie sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang, who have since then occupied the one-half portion and built their house thereon and are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes. Gilda left for Manila in June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad, in the Middle East, with the consent of her husband. Unfortunately, she became a victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South Cotabato, on March 11, 1990. After his wife's departure for Manila, Judie seldom went home to the conjugal dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel, restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet Corpuz went to school at King's College, Bo. 1,

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Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same time working as household help of, and staying at, the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned that her father intended to sell the remaining one-half portion including their house, of their homelot to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her mother informing her, who then replied that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however, did not inform her father about this; but instead gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that she [Guiang] would advise her father. However, Judie pushed through and sold to Luzviminda on March 1, 1990 thru a document known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the house standing thereon for a total consideration of P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness. 4 days after the deed of transfer, obviously to cure whatever defect in defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot transferred, Luzviminda as vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408, this time with Manuel Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original registered owner from whom the couple Judie and Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot, who signed as vendor for a consideration of P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a witness to the sale. The new sale describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC) Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple Gilda and Judie Corpuz. March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned home and found her children staying with other households. Gilda gathered her children together and stayed at their house. Her husband was nowhere to be found. She was informed by her children that their father had a wife already. For staying in their house sold by her husband, plaintiff was complained against by defendant Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay General Paulino Santos, for trespassing. On March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a document known as "amicable settlement". In full, the settlement provides for, to wit: That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz and her three children, namely: Junie, Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily the house of Mr. and Mrs.

Antonio Guiang, where they are presently boarding without any charge, on or before April 7, 1990. FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF THE LAW. Believing that she had received the shorter end of the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature on the amicable settlement. She was referred however to the Officer-In-Charge, Mr. de la Cruz, who in turn told her that he could not do anything on the matter. This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs. Corpuz had approached him. We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment of the settlement. Annulment not having been made, plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether the contract of sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable. 2. Whether the contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into an amicable settlement with them. HELD: First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract? Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of the Civil Code. The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent. This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the lower court:

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Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and void. Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said document through misrepresentation and coercion. In any event, its execution does not alter the void character of the deed of sale between the husband and the petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent. In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.

The legal provision is clear. The disposition or encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we compare the same with the equivalent provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:

Second Issue: Amicable Settlement Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the "amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in Barangay Case No. 38. The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts have resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the husband.(n) This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years . . . during the marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or

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Jader-Manalo vs. Camaisa GR# 147978 / JAN. 23, 2002 374 SCRA 498

Issue: Whether or not there is a perfected contract to sell of the conjugal property?

Facts: Held: Petitioner made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, respondent Norma Camaisa . After some bargaining, petitioner and Edilberto agreed upon the purchase price of the property to be paid on installment basis. Such agreement was a handwritten by petitioner and signed by Edilberto. When petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife‘s conformity and consent to the sale. The formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by petitioner.She and Edilberto met for the formal signing of the typewritten Contracts to Sell. After Edilberto signed the contracts, petitioner delivered to him two checks. The contracts were given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of his wife‘s signature. The following day, petitioner received a call from respondent Norma (wife), requesting a meeting to clarify some provisions of the contracts. During the meeting, handwritten notations were made on the contracts to sell, so they arranged to incorporate the notations and to meet again for the formal signing of the contracts. When petitioner met again with respondent spouses for the formal affixing of Norma‘s signature, she was surprised when respondent spouses informed her that they were backing out of the agreement because they needed ―spot cash‖ for the full amount of the consideration. Petitioner reminded respondent spouses that the contracts to sell had already been duly perfected and Norma‘s refusal to sign the same would unduly prejudice petitioner. Still, Norma refused to sign the contracts prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against respondent spouses before the Regional Trial Court.

There is no perfected sale. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article 124 of the Family Code provides: Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Underscoring ours.) Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that respondent Norma actively

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participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

Jardeleza vs. Jardeleza GR# 112014 / DEC. 05, 2000 347 SCRA 10

ISSUE: Whether Article 124 of the Family Code renders ―superfluous‖ the appointment of a judicial guardian over the person and estate of an incompetent married person. HELD: Very recently, in a related case Uy vs. Jardeleza, we ruled that Article 124 of the Family Code was not applicable to the situation of Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and that the proper procedure was an application for appointment of judicial guardian under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

FACTS: Uy vs. Jardeleza where the court ruled: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. and Gilda L. Jardeleza were married long before 03 August 1988, when the Family Code took effect. The union produced five children, namely: petitioner, Ernesto, Jr., Melecio, Glenda and Rolando, all surnamed L. Jardeleza. On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. then 73 years old, suffered a stroke and lapsed into comatose condition. Thereafter, petitioner commenced with the Regional Trial Court a petition for appointment of judicial guardian over the person and property of Dr. Jardeleza, Sr. and prayed for the issuance of letters of guardianship to his mother, Gilda L. Jardeleza. Subsequently, petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for the issuance of letters of guardianship to him, rather than to his mother. This was opposed by respondents. On 20 August 1993, the trial court issued an order dismissing the petition for guardianship. The trial court concluded, without explanation, that the petition is superfluous and would only serve to duplicate the powers of the wife under the explicit provisions of Article 124, second paragraph, of the Family Code.

―ART. 124. xxx In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. ― The situation contemplated under Art. 124 is one where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition, reverses and sets aside the resolutions of the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, in Special Proceedings No. 4689. The Court remands the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

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Uy (Jardeleza) vs. CA (Jardeleza) GR# 10955 / NOV. 29, 2000 346 SCRA 246 X X X X X X

Villanueva v. Chiong GR# 159889 / JUNE 05, 2008 554 SCRA 197 Facts: Respondents Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married sometime in January 1960 but have been separated in fact since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired a Lot situated at Poblacion, Dipolog City. Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold the one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners for P8,000, payable in installments. Thereafter, Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy the lot and build a store, a shop, and a house thereon. Shortly after their last installment payment on December 13, 1986,[5] petitioners demanded from respondents the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. Elisera, however, refused to sign a deed of sale. On May 13, 1992, Florentino executed the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioners. On July 19, 2000, the RTC, in its Joint Decision, annulled the deed of absolute sale dated May 13, 1992, and ordered petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all improvements therein. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision. Issue:(1) Is the subject lot an exclusive property of Florentino or a conjugal property of respondents? (2) Was its sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent valid?

Ruling: Anent the first issue, petitioners' contention that the lot belongs exclusively to Florentino because of his separation in fact from his wife, Elisera, at the time of sale dissolved their property relations, is bereft of merit. Respondents' separation in fact neither affected the conjugal nature of the lot nor prejudiced Elisera's interest over it. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Anent the second issue, the sale by Florentino without Elisera's consent is not, however, void ab initio. In Vda. de Ramones v. Agbayani, citing Villaranda v. Villaranda, we held that without the wife's consent, the husband's alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 is not void, but merely voidable. Applying Article 166, the consent of both Elisera and Florentino is necessary for the sale of a conjugal property to be valid. In this case, the requisite consent of Elisera was not obtained when Florentino verbally sold the lot in 1985 and executed the Deed of Absolute Sale on May 13, 1992. Accordingly, the contract entered by Florentino is annullable at Elisera's instance, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, conformably with Article 173. Fortunately, Elisera timely questioned the sale when she filed Civil Case No. 4383 on July 5, 1991, perfectly within ten years from the date of sale and execution of the deed.

De la Cruz v. Segovia GR# 149801 / JUNE 26, 2008 555 SCRA 453 FACTS Sometime in July 1985, Florindala wanted to purchase the Lot 503 and 505 located in Sta Mesa Manila for P180,000.00. Short of fund, she asked her sister Leonila to take the Lot 503 for P80,000. But Leonila with only P36,000 hard=earned savings, Florinda advanced her P64,000 for the full payment of the said lot. It was only on September 1991, did these sisters entered a payment scheme

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agreement. However, Florinda filed with RTC on March 1996, a complaint annulling said agreement on the ground, among others that since her husband, Renato did not sign, it is void. ISSUE Whether or not subject Agreement is void absent the husband‘s signature. HELD No. The absence of Renato‘s signature in the agreement bears little significance to its validity. Art 124 of the FC provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife, in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership. It requires the WRITTEN consent of the other spouse, of authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal property, without which the disposition is void. The foregoing The foregoing provision finds no application in this case because the transaction between Florinda and Leonila in reality did not involve any disposition of property belonging toFlorinda. At the outset, by paying the P36,000, Leonila shall have the Lot 503 and remaining balance be paid subsequently. Clearly, the transaction between sisters is that of a loan and not a sale of property. Though the lots are named under Florinda and her husband, it merely served as a security over the P64,000 advanced by Florinda. Even assuming that the transaction involves disposition of asset, the mere fact of Renato ,not signing on the agreement cannot negate the fact of his consent. First, he was present when the agreement was drawn by his wife and Leonila. Second, it was in fact presented to him for signature, but Florinda insisted that her signature already carried that of her husband.

Ravina v. Villa Abrille GR# 160708 / OCT. 16, 2009 604 SCRA 120 Facts: Respondent Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann. In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located at Kamuning Street, Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely in his name under TCT No. T-26471. Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro‘s lot. The house was finished in the early 1980‘s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex. In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots without Mary Ann‘s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale dated June 21, 1991. It appears on the said deed that Mary Ann did not sign on top of her name. On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school, Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from entering it. They waited outside the gate

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until evening under the rain. They sought help from the Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter. Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that one flunked at school. Thus, respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific Performance, Damages and Attorney‘s Fees with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao City. During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina testified that they bought the house and lot from Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the property. Issue: • The court of appeals erred when it declared x x x the sale of lot covered by tct no. 88674 in favor of spouses ravina, together with the house thereon, as null and void since it is clearly contrary to law and evidence. . • The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are not innocent purchasers for value, the same being contrary to law and evidence. • The court of appeals erred when it ruled that petitioners patrocin[i]a ravina and wilfredo ravina are liable for damages, the same being contrary to law and evidence. Held: Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, ―All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.‖ There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced to show that the subject

property was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro. Petitioners‘ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse‘s inability, the authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit: ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. (Emphasis supplied.) The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to

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the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the case. Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann‘s consent. On the second assignment of error, petitioners contend that they are buyers in good faith. Accordingly, they need not inquire whether the lot was purchased by money exclusively belonging to Pedro or of the common fund of the spouses and may rely on the certificates of title. The contention is bereft of merit. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller‘s certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter‘s capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.

during the time of the sale in 1991, Pedro was married to Mary Ann. However, Mary Ann‘s conformity did not appear in the deed. Even assuming that petitioners believed in good faith that the subject property is the exclusive property of Pedro, they were apprised by Mary Ann‘s lawyer of her objection to the sale and yet they still proceeded to purchase the property without Mary Ann‘s written consent. Moreover, the respondents were the ones in actual, visible and public possession of the property at the time the transaction was being made. Thus, at the time of sale, petitioners knew that Mary Ann has a right to or interest in the subject properties and yet they failed to obtain her conformity to the deed of sale. Hence, petitioners cannot now invoke the protection accorded to purchasers in good faith. Now, if a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, in consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of nonenrichment at another‘s expense, we sustain the appellate court‘s order directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon. However, this court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of the action. Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides that, ―(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.‖ On the last issue, petitioners claim that the decision awarding damages to respondents is not supported by the evidence on record.

In the present case, the property is registered in the name of Pedro and his wife, Mary Ann. Petitioners cannot deny knowledge that

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The claim is erroneous to say the least. The manner by which respondent and her children were removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991, while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas. Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: ―Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.‖ When a right is exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in this case that petitioners‘ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law standards.

cancellation of the title issued to the petitioners by virtue thereof. The RTC ruled in his favor and declared that the SPA was forged. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA. Hence the present case filed by petitioners imputing error to the CA for not applying the ―ordinary prudent man‘s standard‖ in determining their status as buyers in good faith. The petitioners submit that Article 173 of the Civil Code, not Article 124 of the Family Code, governed the property relations of the respondents because they had been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code; and that the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code should not apply because the other spouse held the administration over the conjugal property. They argue that notwithstanding his absence from the country Dionisio still held the administration of the conjugal property by virtue of his execution of the SPA in favor of his brother; and that even assuming that Article 124 of the Family Code properly applied, Dionisio ratified the sale through Atty. Parulan‘s counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting. ISSUE: WON Article 173 of the Civil Code and Article 124 of the Family Code should apply to the sale of the conjugal property executed without the consent of Dionisio. Held:

Aggabao v. Parulan GR # 165803 / Sept. 1, 2010 629 SCRA 563 Facts: Respondent Ma. Elena allegedly made a sale of two parcels of land with their improvements considered as conjugal property by presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by respondent husband Dionisio in her favor. The sale by Ma. Elena was made in favor of the spouses vendees/petitioners, who allegedly acted in good faith and paid the full purchase price, despite the showing by the husband that his signature on the SPA had been forged and that the SPA had been executed during his absence from the country and while he and Ma. Elena have been estranged from one another. When Dionisio learned about the alleged sale, he filed for an action for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of absolute sale executed by Ma. Elena, and the

NO To start with, Article 254[27] the Family Code has expressly repealed several titles under the Civil Code, among them the entire Title VI in which the provisions on the property relations between husband and wife, Article 173 included, are found. Secondly, the sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code. The proper law to apply is, therefore, Article 124 of the Family Code, for it is settled that any alienation or encumbrance of conjugal property made during the effectivity of the Family Code is governed by Article 124 of the Family Code.[28] Article 124 of the Family Code provides:

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Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband‘s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. Thirdly, according to Article 256[29] of the Family Code, the provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively provided no vested rights are impaired. In Tumlos v. Fernandez,[30] the Court rejected the petitioner‘s argument that the Family Code did not apply because the acquisition of the contested property had occurred prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, and pointed out that Article 256 provided that the Family Code could apply retroactively if the application would not prejudice vested or acquired rights existing before the effectivity of the Family Code. Herein, however, the petitioners did not show any vested right in the property acquired prior to August 3, 1988 that exempted their situation from the retroactive application of the Family Code.

Nonetheless, we stress that the power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878). Specifically, the apparent authority of Atty. Parulan, being a special agency, was limited to the sale of the property in question, and did not include or extend to the power to administer the property.[31] Lastly, the petitioners‘ insistence that Atty. Parulan‘s making of a counter-offer during the March 25, 1991 meeting ratified the sale merits no consideration. Under Article 124 of the Family Code, the transaction executed sans the written consent of Dionisio or the proper court order was void; hence, ratification did not occur, for a void contract could not be ratified.[32] On the other hand, we agree with Dionisio that the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating that in the absence of the other spouse‘s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

Fourthly, the petitioners failed to substantiate their contention that Dionisio, while holding the administration over the property, had delegated to his brother, Atty. Parulan, the administration of the property, considering that they did not present in court the SPA granting to Atty. Parulan the authority for the administration.

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Section 6. Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership Regime (Articles 126-128)

Partosa-Jo vs. CA GR# 82606 / DEC. 18, 1992 216 SCRA 692 Facts: The herein private respondent, Jose Jo, admits to having cohabited with three women and fathered fifteen children. The first of these women, Prima Partosa-Jo, claims to be his legal wife whom he begot a daughter, Monina Jo. The other women and their respective offspring are not parties of this case. In 1980, Prima filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation of conjugal property. The RTC rendered a decision and in the dispositive portion it stated support but not the separation of conjugal properties. On appeal, The petitioner contends that the respondent court has misinterpreted Articles 175, 178 and 191 of the Civil Code. She submits that the agreement between her and the private respondent was for her to temporarily live with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They never agreed to separate permanently. And even if they did, this arrangement was repudiated and ended in 1942, when she returned to him at Dumaguete City and he refused to accept her. Issue:

xxx xxx xxx (3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property. Abandonment implies a departure by one spouse with the avowed intent never to return, followed by prolonged absence without just cause, and without in the meantime providing in the least for one's family although able to do so. There must be absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. 6 This idea is clearly expressed in the above-quoted provision, which states that "a spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of returning." The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita. The fact that she was not accepted by Jo demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship. Moreover, beginning 1968 until the determination by this Court of the action for support in 1988, the private respondent refused to give financial support to the petitioner. The physical separation of the parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of their conjugal property.

WON the refusal of the husband to accept his wife constitutes abandonment which is a ground for the dissolution of their property regime. Ruling: The petitioner invokes Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads: Art. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:

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Alipio vs. CA GR# 134100 / SEPT. 29, 2000 341 SCRA 441 - Collection suits against the partnership; death of a spouse

Issue: W/N a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in anordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeableagainst the conjugal partnership.

Facts: Held: Jaring (Romeo) was the lessee of a 14.5 hec fishpond in Barito,Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. Lease was for 5 yrs ending on Sep. 12, 1990. In June 19, 1987 til the end of the lease period, Jaring subleased the fishpond to sps Alipio and sps Manuel. The stipulated rent is P485,600.00 payable in 2 installments of P300k and P185,600.00. The second installment due on June 30, 1989. Sublessees failed to pay entire second installment, leaving a balance of P50,600.00 w/c they failed to pay despite Alipio‘s demands. Thus, he filed a case against said sublessees asking for payment of the balance or rescission of the contract should they fail to pay the balance. Purita Alipio petitioned for the dismissal of the case invoking Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court claiming that such was applicable since her husband and co-sublessee passed away prior tothe filing of this action. Said rule has been amended by Rule 3, Sec. 20,1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Trial court denied Alipio‘s petition because she was a party to the contract & should be independently impleaded together w/the Manuel sps. Death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. Petitioner & Manuels were ordered to pay balance and P10k atty‘s fees and costs of suit. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case and held that the rule invoked is not applicable. The action for recovery of a sum of money does not survive the death of the defendant, thus the remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming thatsuch death totally extinguished their obligation. When the action is solidary, creditor may bring his action against any of the debtors obligated insolidum. Alipio‘s liability is independent of & separate from her husband‘s.(Climaco vs. Siy Uy, Imperial vs. David, and Agacoili vs. Vda de Agcaoili)

NO. Proper remedy would be to file aclaim in the settlement of the decedent‘s estate or if none has beencommenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters of administration or for the allowance of will, depending on whether itstestate/intestate. No shortcut by lumping claim against Alipios with those against the Manuels. CC Art. 161 (1) provides that the obligation of the Alipios is chargeable against their conjugal partnership since it was contracted by the spouses for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. When petitioner‘s spouse died, their CPG was dissolved & debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance w/ Rule 73, Sec.2 w/c provides that the community property will be inventoried, administered, & liquidated and debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. In Calma vs.Tanedo the Court held that no complaint for collection of indebtedness chargeable to the CPG can be brought against the surviving spouse. Claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation & settlement of the CPG. Surviving spouse‘s powers of administration ceases & is passed on to court-appointed administrator. This was affirmed in Ventura vs. Militante where Court held that lack of liquidation proceedings does not mean that the CPG continues. Creditor may apply for letters of admin in his capacity as a principal creditor. Note that for marriages governed by CPG, obligations entered into by sps are chargeable against their CPG & the partnership is primarily bound for the repayments. They‘ll be impleaded as representatives of the CPG and concept of joint/solidary liability does not apply. At best, it will not be solidary but joint.

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Relucio vs. Lopez GR# 138497 / JAN. 16, 2001 373 SCRA 578

Facts: Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition for ―Appointment as Sole Administratix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc.‖ against Alberto Lopez and herein petitioner Imelda Relucio. It was alleged by herein private respondent that Alberto Lopez is legally married to her, abandoned the latter and their legitimate children, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited with herein petitioner and that he arrogated unto herself full and exclusive control of administration of the conjugal property. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondent has no cause of action against her which was denied by the Regional Trial Court on the ground that she is impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party. On the Court of Appeals, the petition on certiorari filed by the Petitioner assailing the trial courts denial of her motion to dismiss was likewise denied. Hence, this appeal. Issue [1]: Whether respondent‘s petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the conjugal property accounting etc. against her husband Alberto Lopez established a cause of action against the petitioner. Issue [2]: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest. Whether the RTC correctly denied the petition of herein petitioner on the ground that she is imleaded as a necessary or indispensable party. Held [1]:The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. It is well settled that a cause of action is an act or omission of one party, the defendant in violation of the legal right of the other. The elements of the cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff as constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

A perusal of the ―Nature of the Complaint‖ filed by the respondent reveals that it is a complaint by an aggrieved party wife against her husband. Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner. The causes of action filed by respondent showed that petitioner is a complete stranger to the causes of action as regards judicial appointment, accounting by respondent husband, forfeiture of share of husband and support. Clearly, there is no rightduty relation between petitioner and respondent that can possibly support a cause of action. Held [2]: A real party in interest if one who stands ―to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit.‖ In this case, petitioner would not be affected by any judgment in the special proceedings filed by the respondent. It petitioner is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an indispensable party. An indispensable party is one without whom no there can be no final determination of an action. Nor can petitioner be a necessary party in the case below. A necessary party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to b joined as party if complete relief is to be accorded those already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In the foregoing, the trial court can issue a judge and accord complete relief as such judgment would be perfectly valid and enforceable against Alberto Lopez. Hence, the RTC erred in denying the motion to dismiss of the petitioner on ground of lack of cause of action.

De Ugalde v. De Ysasi GR# 130623 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 171 Facts: On 15 February 1951, Lorea de Ugalde (petitioner) and Jon de Ysasi (respondent) got married before Municipal Judge. Petitioner and respondent did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. They were separated sometime in April 1957. On 26 May 1964, respondent allegedly contracted another marriage with Victoria Eleanor Smith (Smith) before a judge in Pasay City. Petitioner further alleged that respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing of real and personal properties to her prejudice as the lawful wife. Petitioner

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alleged that she had been defrauded of rental income, profits, and fruits of their conjugal properties. On 12 December 1984, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains against respondent before the RTC. Respondent countered that on 2 June 1961, he and petitioner entered into an agreement which provided, that their conjugal partnership of gains shall be deemed dissolved as of 15 April 1957. Pursuant to the agreement, they submitted an Amicable Settlement in Civil Case No. 4791 then pending before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (CFI). The RTC dismissed the petition for dissolution of the conjugal. It noted that petitioner and respondent entered into an amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 4791. The amicable settlement was approved by the CFI and petitioner may no longer repudiate it.

Issue: Whether or nor there is a valid dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains in the amicable settlement entered into between the Pet. And Respondent?

termination of the conjugal partnership of gains in accordance with Article 126 of the Family Code.

MBTC v. Pascual GR# 163744 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246 X X X X X X

Diño v. Diño GR# 178044/January 19, 2011

Held: Yes. The finality of the 6 June 1961 CFI Order in Civil Case No. 4791 resulted in the dissolution of the petitioner and respondent‘s conjugal partnership of gains, as it is in accordance with Article 175 of the Civil Code (now Art.126 of the Family Code), which provides as follows:

X X X X X X

Art. 126. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled; (4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied) The finality of the 6 June 1961 Order in Civil Case No. 4791 approving the parties‘ separation of property resulted in the

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Section 7. Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership Assets & Liabilities (Articles 129-133) Partosa-Jo vs. CA GR# 82606 / DEC. 18, 1992 216 SCRA 692 Vda. De Consuegra vs. GSIS GR No.L-28093 / JAN. 30, 1971 37 SCRA 315 Jose Consuegra, in his lifetime married twice, to Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937 and on May 1, 1957, to Basilia Berdim, while the 1st marriage was still subsisting. He fathered 2 children (both already dead) from Rosario and 7 from Basilia. When he died on Sept 26,1965, the proceeds of his GSIS life insurance policy were paid to Basilia and their children being the beneficiaries stated in the policy. Rosario on the other hand filed a claim over the retirement insurance policy proceeds claiming to be Jose‘s only legal heir. Basilia also filed a similar claim asserting that. as beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy, the retirement insurance policy likewise belong to them. GSIS ruled that Rosario and Basilia are both Jose‘s wives, therefore the proceeds must be given to them, 1/2 portion each. Dissatisfied, Basilia filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to CFI praying that she and her children be declared as the exclusive beneficiaries of the said retirement insurance proceeds. Trial Court, quoting Lao vs Dee held that ― When 2 women innocently and in good faith are legally united in holy matrimony to the same man, they and their children, born of said wedlock, will be regarded as legitimate children and each family be entitled to ½ of the estate. Basilia appealed. Hence this case.

first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void, the conjugal partnership established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the NCC, she is entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the husband‘s share in the property here in dispute‖ quoting Trial Court‘s decision. And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity ―the only just and equitable solution is to recognize the right of the 2nd wife to her share of ½ in the property acquired by her and her husband and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. -Adjudication of the property rights of "Good faith" Survivors sl nd (1 valid subsisting & 2 , presumably void, marriages"; See Cariño v. Cariño 351 SCRA 127; San Luis v. San Luis 514 SCRA 294; Articles 147 & 148 FC)

MBTC v. Pascual GR# 163744 / FEB. 29, 2008 547 SCRA 246

ISSUE To whom should this retirement insurance benefits be paid, when no beneficiary was designated. HELD To both wives. GSIS intended that the life and retirement insurance be separate and distinct therefore, beneficiary of one insurance is not automatically the beneficiary of the other. ―Since the defendant‘s

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CHAPTER 5. SEPARATION OF PROP. OF THE SPOUSES & ADM. OF COMMON PROP. BY ONE SPOUSE DURING THE MARRIAGE (Arts 134-142)

CHAPTER 6. REGIME OF SEPARATION OF PROPERTY (Articles 143-146) Agapay vs. Palang GR# 116668 / JULY 28, 1997 276 SCRA 340 X X X X X

Maquilan v. Maquilan GR# 155409 / JUNE 08, 2007 524 SCRA 166 FACTS: Virgilio Maquilan filed a criminal case against his spouse Dita Maquilan and her paramour on the ground of adultery. The two accused were convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 1 year and 8 months to 3 years, 6 months and 21 days. On January 15, 2001, after the adultery case has been decided, Virgilio Maquilan filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages with RTC on the ground of Dita‘s psychological incapacity. However, during the pre-trial of the case, the Maquilan spouses voluntarily entered into a Compromise Agreement partially dividing their properties among themselves and their only son. On January 2, 2002, the Compromise Agreement was given a Judicial Imprimatur by the RTC but on January 15, 2002, Virgilio filed an Omnibus Motion to repudiate the Compromise Agreement and reconsider the judgment rendered on

the ground that his former lawyer failed to intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the agreement‘s consequential effects. The RTC judge denied the motion. Virgilio filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was also denied so he filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to the Court of Appeals claiming that the RTC committed grave error and abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding the validity of the Compromise Agreement; when it held that the Compromise Agreement was made during the cooling off period; when it denied his motion to Repudiate the Compromise Agreement and to reconsider the judgment rendered; and when it conducted the proceedings without the appearance and participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and or the Provincial Prosecutor. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Thereafter, Virgilio filed a Petition for Revie on Certiorari with the SC seeking to assail the judgment rendred by CA on the Compromise Agreement which sought to nullify. ISSUE: WON the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid HELD: No. The SC ruled that the Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties is an example of a separation of property allowed by law. Article 143 of the FC provides that separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause subject to judicial approval. Such is applicable even if the proceeding for the declaration of nullity of marriage is still pending. However, pursuant to Article 136 of FC, voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of gains and other persons with pecuniary interest. The Court also held that the purpose of the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General in cases of annulment and declaration of nullity of marriage is to ensure that the interest of the State is protected by preventing the collusion of the parties, and fabrication or suppression of evidence. Although the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement. The subject agreement is just an agreement between the parties to partially separate their properties

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and does not include anything in the merits of the case of Declaration of Nullity of Marriage for the Court to wary any possible collusion. The conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which deprives the person from the right to manage his property and dispose such inter vivos as provided for in the Revised Penal Code. Virgilio‘s contention that he was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement is also untenable. As stated in Salonga vs. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that negligence of the counsel binds the client and the recognized exceptions to this rule are cases where there is reckless gross negligence of counsel thereby denying the client of the due process of law or when its application results in the outright deprivation of one‘s property through technicality. Such exceptions are not evident in the case.

CHAPTER 7. PROPERTY REGIMES OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE (Articles 147-148); - See also A.M. No. 02-11-10 SC Valdes vs. RTC Br. 102, QC GR# 122749 / JULY 31, 1996 260 SCRA 221 Facts: Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married on 05 January 1971. Begotten during the marriage were five children. In a petition, dated 22 June 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family code. After the hearing the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court granted the petition directing the parties to start proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision. Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of that portion of the decision directing compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the Family Code contained no provisions on the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage." Parenthetically, during the hearing of the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing their desire to remain with their father, Antonio Valdez, herein petitioner. Issue: W/N the trial court correctly applied the law. Held: Yes. The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code. This particular kind of co-ownership applies when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated" in the provision (in the first paragraph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e., any "male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code. Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate property are not included in the co-ownership. When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal.

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Mercado – Fehr v. Fehr GR# 152716 / OCT. 23, 2003 414 SCRA 280

TO RESPONDENT BRUNO FRANZ FEHR: a. Upper Basement, LCG Condominium, with an area of 180.81 sq. m. and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14733; and b. Nissan Sentra with Plate No. FDJ-533 (1994 model)

FACTS: The marriage between Elna D. Mercado and Bruno F. Fehr on March 14, 1985 is declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of property existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof, a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to the rights previously acquired by creditors. Custody over the two minor children, MICHAEL BRUNO MERCADO FEHR and PATRICK FRANZ FEHR, is awarded to petitioner, being the innocent spouse. On August 24, 1999, the trial court issued an Order resolving the various motions filed by respondent after the case had been decided. After a careful scrutiny of the inventory of properties submitted by both parties, the Court finds the following properties to be excluded from the conjugal properties, namely: a) the Bacolod property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-137232, considering that the same is owned by petitioner‘s parents, Herminio Mercado and Catalina D. Mercado xxx and b) Suite 204 of the LCG Condominium covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14735, considering that the same was purchased on installment basis by respondent with his exclusive funds prior to his marriage, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983. xxx Accordingly, the conjugal properties of the petitioner and respondent shall be distributed in the following manner: TO PETITIONER ELNA MERCADO: a. Ground Floor, LCG Condominium, with an area of 671.84 sq. m., covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 14734; and b. Tamaraw FX (1995 model)

Thereafter, the parties shall own and enjoy their respective share of the monthly rentals derived from the properties adjudicated to them as stated above. The Petitioner and Respondent are further enjoined to jointly support their minor children, Michael and Patrick Fehr, for their education, uniforms, food and medical expenses. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said Order with respect to the adjudication of Suite 204, LCG Condominium and the support of the children. Petitioner alleged that Suite 204 was purchased on installment basis at the time when petitioner and respondent were living exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, hence the rules on co-ownership should apply in accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code. Petitioner further claimed that it would not be in the best interests of the children if she would be made to demand periodically from respondent his share in the support of the children. She instead proposed that the Upper Basement and the Lower Ground Floor of the LCG Condominium be adjudicated to her so that she could use the income from the lease of said premises for the support of the children. ISSUE/S: Whether Article 147 of the Family Code should apply in the case at bar HELD: It appears from the facts, as found by the trial court, that in March 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, petitioner left Cebu City and moved in with respondent in the latter‘s residence in Metro Manila. Their relations bore fruit and their first child, Michael Bruno Fehr, was born on December 3, 1983. The couple got married on March 14, 1985. In the meantime, they purchased on installment a

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condominium unit, Suite 204, at LCG Condominium, as evidenced by a Contract to Sell dated July 26, 1983 executed by respondent as the buyer and J.V. Santos Commercial Corporation as the seller. Petitioner also signed the contract as witness, using the name "Elna Mercado Fehr". Upon completion of payment, the title to the condominium unit was issued in the name of petitioner. In light of these facts, we give more credence to petitioner‘s submission that Suite 204 was acquired during the parties‘ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. The Family Code provides: Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly to the acquisition thereof if the former‘s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of their family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. (emphasis supplied)

marriage is nonetheless void, as in the case at bar. This provision creates a co-ownership with respect to the properties they acquire during their cohabitation. Thus, for Article 147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these elements are present in the case at bar. It has not been shown that petitioner and respondent suffered any impediment to marry each other. They lived exclusively with each other as husband and wife when petitioner moved in with respondent in his residence and were later united in marriage. Their marriage, however, was found to be void under Article 36 of the Family Code because of respondent‘s psychological incapacity to comply with essential marital obligations. The disputed property, Suite 204 of LCG Condominium, was purchased on installment basis on July 26, 1983, at the time when petitioner and respondent were already living together. Hence, it should be considered as common property of petitioner and respondent. As regards the settlement of the common properties of petitioner and respondent, we hold that the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership should apply. There is nothing in the records that support the pronouncement of the trial court that the parties have agreed to divide the properties into three—1/3 share each to the petitioner, the respondent and their children. Petitioner, in fact, alleges in her petition before this Court that the parties have agreed on a four-way division of the properties—1/4 share each to the petitioner and the respondent, and 1/4 share each to their two children. Moreover, respondent‘s argument that the three-way partition is in accordance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code does not hold water as said provisions relate only to voidable marriages and exceptionally to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.

Article 147 applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose

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In sum, we rule in favor of the petitioner. We hold that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of petitioner and respondent and the property regime of the parties should be divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149 for liquidation of the properties of petitioner and respondent in accordance with this Court‘s ruling. SO ORDERED.

Cariño v. Cariño GR# 132529 / FEB. 02, 2001 351 SCRA 127 Facts: The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño contracted two marriages: the first, on June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second, on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee Cariño (Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation starting 1982. In 1988, SPO4 Cariño became ill and passed away in 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 from ―MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,‖ while respondent Susan Yee received a total of P21,000.00 from ―GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).‖ In 1993, Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00 ―death benefits‖ which she (petitioner) received. Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default. Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She claimed that she became aware of the first marriage

only at the funeral, where she met petitioner. Respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number and a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads : This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives. On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, ordering defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Cariño, plus attorney‘s fees and costs of suit. ISSUE: Whether the second wife of SPO4 Cariño, given that the first marriage was contracted without a marriage license and void ab initio, is entitled to receive ―death benefits.‖ HELD: No. It does not follow that because the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the ―death benefits‖ under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. Therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. But the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage

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of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. One effect of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses. Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime would be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on ―Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.‖ Under Article 148, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man: the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. The disputed P146,000.00 ―death benefits‖ are renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Respondent Susan Yee could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said ―death benefits‖ of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them. As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs which applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. In contrast to Article 148, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed ―death benefits‖ were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, one-half of the subject ―death benefits‖ under scrutiny shall go

to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

San Luis v. San Luis GR# 133743 / 134029 / FEB. 06, 2007 514 SCRA 294 FACTS: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

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Petitioners, the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss contending that the venue was improperly laid and that the respondent‘s marriage to Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter‘s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration. RTC dismissed the two motions to dismiss filed by the Petitioners. CA affirmed. Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.

in this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.1awphi1.net Petitioners cite Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Court‘s rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

HELD: Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad‘s legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad‘s marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative. The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. involved a marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus,

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo‘s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during

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the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.

Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo GR# 136803 / JUNE 16, 2000 333 SCRA 628

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, we held that even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows: The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.

FACTS: On February 24, 1993, petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. filed a complaint2 for "Partition and/or Payment of Co-Ownership Share, Accounting and Damages" against respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-656 at the Regional Trial Court in Makati City, alleged that petitioner and respondent, both married and with children, but separated from their respective spouses, cohabited after a brief courtship sometime in 1979 while their respective marriages still subsisted. During their union, they set up the Superfreight Customs Brokerage Corporation, with petitioner as president and chairman of the board of directors, and respondent as vice-president and treasurer. The business flourished and petitioner and respondent acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in respondents name. In 1992, due to irreconcilable differences, the couple separated. Petitioner demanded from respondent his share in the subject properties, but respondent refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her name.

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent‘s legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parties be considered as co-owners of the properties, considering the present status of the parties as both married and incapable of marrying each other, even assuming that they lived together as husband and wife.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners‘ motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

HELD: Art. 144 of the Civil Code, applies only to cases in which a man and a woman live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage provided they are not incapacitated or are without impediment to marry each other,15 or in which the marriage is void ab initio, provided it is not bigamous. Art. 144, therefore, does not cover parties living in an adulterous relationship. However, Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a limited coownership in cases where the parties in union are incapacitated to marry each other. It states: In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding article,16 only the properties acquired by both of the

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parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credits. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. It was error for the trial court to rule that, because the parties in this case were not capacitated to marry each other at the time that they were alleged to have been living together, they could not have owned properties in common. The Family Code, in addition to providing that a co-ownership exists between a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, likewise provides that, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other, properties acquired by them through their joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. There is thus coownership eventhough the couple are not capacitated to marry each other. In this case, there may be a co-ownership between the parties herein. Consequently, whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether the properties involved in the case are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine and material. All but one of the properties involved were alleged to have been acquired after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the property acquired before the Family Code took effect if it is shown that it was really acquired under the regime of the Civil Code, then it should be excluded. Petitioner also alleged in paragraph 7 of his complaint that: Due to the effective management, hardwork and enterprise of plaintiff assisted by defendant, their customs brokerage business grew and out of the profits therefrom, the parties acquired real and

personal properties which were, upon agreement of the parties, listed and registered in defendants name with plaintiff as the unregistered co-owner of all said properties.17 Esmsc On the basis of this, he contends that an implied trust existed pursuant to Art. 1452 of the Civil Code which provides that "(I)f two or more persons agree to purchase property and by common consent the legal title is taken in the name of one of them for the benefit of all, a trust is created by force of law in favor of the others in proportion to the interest of each." We do not think this is correct. The legal relation of the parties is already specifically covered by Art. 148 of the Family Code under which all the properties acquired by the parties out of their actual joint contributions of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership. Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the other.18 The provisions of Art. 1452 and Art. 1453 of the Civil Code, then are no longer material since a trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership which is governed under Title III, Book II of the Civil Code.

Saguid vs. CA GR# 150611 / JUNE 10, 2003 403 SCRA 678 Facts: Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,2 but separated de facto from her husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July 1987.3 After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto‘s father. Their cohabitation was not blessed with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel "Saguid Brothers." Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacinto‘s relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict with petitioner‘s relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year cohabitation. On January 9, 1997, Gina filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery of Personal Property with Receivership against Jacinto. She alleged that from her salary of $1,500.00 a month as entertainer in Japan, she was able to contribute P70,000.00 in the completion of their unfinished house. Also, from her own earnings as an entertainer and fish dealer, she

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was able to acquire and accumulate appliances, pieces of furniture and household effects, with a total value of P111,375.00. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000.00, representing her contribution to the construction of their house, be reimbursed to her.

Diño v. Diño GR# 178044/January 19, 2011

TITLE V. THE FAMILY HOME Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue are co-owned by both parties. What law should be applied? Ruling: It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime therefore is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under this regime, "…only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ..." Proof of actual contribution is required. In the case at bar, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1987, which is before the date of the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, the court ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous union is without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties.

See also Article 2035, NCC CHAPTER 1. THE FAMILY AS AN INSTITUTION (Articles 149151) Hontiveros vs. RTC Br. 25, Iloilo City GR# 125465 / JUNE 29, 1999 309 SCRA 340 X X X X X Silva vs. CA GR# 114742 / JULY 17, 1997 275 SCRA 605 X X X X X X

See Articles 148, 256 (FC); Article 144 NCC

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CHAPTER 2. THE FAMILY HOME (Articles 152-162) Taneo vs. Court of Appeals GR# 108562 / MAR. 09, 1999 304 SCRA 308 X X X X X X

Honrado v. CA GR# 166333 / NOV. 25, 2005 476 SCRA 280 Facts: On December 11, 1997, Premium Agro-Vet Products, Inc. (Premium) filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money against Jose Honrado, who was doing business under the name and style of J.E. Honrado Enterprises. Premium sought to collect the amount of P240,765.00 representing the total price of veterinary products purchased on credit by Honrado from November 18, 1996 until June 30, 1997. Meanwhile the Spouses Jose and Andrerita Honrado filed a petition with the RTC of Calamba City for the judicial constitution of the parcel of land registered in Honrado‘s located in Calamba, Laguna, and the house thereon, as their family house, the estimated value of the property was not more than P240,000.00. The case of Premium against Honrado was granted by the RTC and a writ of execution was issued. The sheriff levied on the property above and was awarded to Premium as the higest bidder. In the meantime, The RTC of Calamba declared the property a family home, hence Honrado filed a Motion to Declare Properties Exempt from Execution under Article 155 of the Family Code.

Held: While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. The petitioner admits to having been notified of the levy of his property and of its sale at public auction at 9:30 a.m. on May 17, 2001 at the Municipal Hall of Calamba, Laguna. However, he did not bother to object to the levy and the projected sale on the ground that the property and the house thereon was a family home. The petitioner allowed the sale at public auction to proceed and the Sheriff to execute a certificate of sale over the property in favor of the private respondent for P650,204.10. He even vacated the property after the said sale. The petitioner remained silent and failed to seek relief from the Sheriff or the court until May 3, 2002, when he filed his motion to declare the property exempt from execution under Article 155 of the Family Code and Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules on Civil Procedure. Even then, there was no showing that, during the hearing of said motion, the petitioner adduced evidence to prove the value of the property and that it is, indeed, a family home.

Arriola v. Arriola GR# 177703 / JAN. 28, 2008 542 SCRA 666 FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. John Nabor C. Arriola filed Special Civil Action with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 254, Las Piñas City (RTC) against Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola for judicial partition of the properties of decedent Fidel Arriola. Respondent is the son of decedent Fidel with his first wife Victoria C. Calabia, while petitioner

Issue: W/N the property is exempt from execution.

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Anthony is the son of decedent Fidel with his second wife, petitioner Vilma. On February 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision, ordering the partition of the parcel of land left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs John Nabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola in equal shares of one-third (1/3) each without prejudice to the rights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any; As the parties failed to agree how to partition among them the land, John Nabor sought the sale through public auction and petitioners acceded to it. Said auction had to be reset when petitioners refused to include the house standing on the subject land. ISSUE: Whether the subject house is covered in the judgment of partition of the lot and should be included in the sale through public auction. HELD: The subject house is covered by the judgment of partition. First, as correctly held by the CA, under the provisions of the Civil Code, the subject house is deemed part of the subject land. In general, the right to accession is automatic (ipso jure), requiring no prior act on the part of the owner or the principal. So that even if the improvements including the house were not alleged in the complaint for partition, they are deemed included in the lot on which they stand, following the principle of accession. Consequently, the lot subject of judicial partition in this case includes the house which is permanently attached thereto, otherwise, it would be absurd to divide the principal, i.e., the lot, without dividing the house which is permanently attached thereto. Second, respondent has repeatedly claimed that the subject house was built by the deceased. Petitioners never controverted such claim. There is then no dispute that the subject house is part of the estate of the deceased; as such, it is owned in common by the

latter's heirs, the parties herein, any one of whom, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, may, at any time, demand the partition of the subject house. Therefore, respondent's recourse to the partition of the subject house cannot be hindered, least of all by the mere technical omission of said common property from the complaint for partition. That said notwithstanding, we must emphasize that, while we treat the subject house as part of the co-ownership of the parties, we stop short of authorizing its actual partition by public auction at this time. It bears emphasis that an action for partition involves two phases: first, the declaration of the existence of a state of co-ownership; and second, the actual termination of that state of co-ownership through the segregation of the common property. What is settled thus far is only the fact that the subject house is under the co-ownership of the parties, and therefore susceptible of partition among them. Whether the subject house should be sold at public auction as ordered by the RTC is an entirely different matter. Respondent claims that the subject house was built by decedent Fidel on his exclusive property. Petitioners add that said house has been their residence for 20 years. Taken together, these averments on record establish that the subject house is a family home within the contemplation of the provisions of The Family Code, particularly: Article 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated. Article 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law. One significant innovation introduced by The Family Code is the automatic constitution of the family home from the time of its occupation as a family residence, without need anymore for the

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judicial or extrajudicial processes provided under the defunct Articles 224 to 251 of the Civil Code and Rule 106 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, Articles 152 and 153 specifically extend the scope of the family home not just to the dwelling structure in which the family resides but also to the lot on which it stands. Thus, applying these concepts, the subject house as well as the specific portion of the subject land on which it stands are deemed constituted as a family home by the deceased and petitioner Vilma from the moment they began occupying the same as a family residence 20 years back. It being settled that the subject house (and the subject lot on which it stands) is the family home of the deceased and his heirs, the same is shielded from immediate partition under Article 159 of The Family Code, viz: Article 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home. The purpose of Article 159 is to avert the disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. To this end, it preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing the following restrictions on its partition: first, that the heirs cannot extra-judicially partition it for a period of 10 years from the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein; and second, that the heirs cannot judicially partition it during the aforesaid periods unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. No compelling reason has been alleged by the parties; nor has the RTC found any compelling reason to order the partition of the family home, either by physical segregation or assignment to any of the heirs or through auction sale as suggested by the parties. More importantly, Article 159 imposes the proscription against the immediate partition of the family home regardless of its ownership. This signifies that even if the family home has passed by succession

to the co-ownership of the heirs, or has been willed to any one of them, this fact alone cannot transform the family home into an ordinary property, much less dispel the protection cast upon it by the law. The rights of the individual co-owner or owner of the family home cannot subjugate the rights granted under Article 159 to the beneficiaries of the family home. Set against the foregoing rules, the family home -- consisting of the subject house and lot on which it stands -- cannot be partitioned at this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of his heirs, the parties herein. Decedent Fidel died on March 10, 2003. Thus, for 10 years from said date or until March 10, 2013, or for a longer period, if there is still a minor beneficiary residing therein, the family home he constituted cannot be partitioned, much less when no compelling reason exists for the court to otherwise set aside the restriction and order the partition of the property. The Court ruled in Honrado v. Court of Appeals that a claim for exception from execution or forced sale under Article 153 should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Herein petitioners timely objected to the inclusion of the subject house although for a different reason. To recapitulate, the evidence of record sustain the CA ruling that the subject house is part of the judgment of co-ownership and partition. The same evidence also establishes that the subject house and the portion of the subject land on which it is standing have been constituted as the family home of decedent Fidel and his heirs. Consequently, its actual and immediate partition cannot be sanctioned until the lapse of a period of 10 years from the death of Fidel Arriola, or until March 10, 2013. It bears emphasis, however, that in the meantime, there is no obstacle to the immediate public auction of the portion of the subject land covered by TCT No. 383714, which falls outside the specific area of the family home. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED and the November 30, 2006 Decision and April 30, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED in that the house standing on the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 383714 is DECLARED part of the co-ownership of the parties John Nabor C.

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Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola but EXEMPTED from partition by public auction within the period provided for in Article 159 of the Family Code. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Kelly v. Planters Products GR# 172263 / JULY 09, 2008 557 SCRA 499 Facts: Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed an action for sum of money against him. PPI was able to secure judgment in its favor. Pursuant thereto, the alleged family home of spouses Kelley, covered by TCT No. 15079 located in Naga City, was sold on execution. Subsequently, spouses Kelley filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of levy and sale of the said property with damages in RTC Naga City, Branch 19. They anchor their action on the contention that the subject property was their family home which was exempt from execution. Issue: Whether spouses Kelley were correct in arguing that a family home is exempt from execution. Held: Yes. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas. Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after

the effectivity of the Family Code (August 3, 1988) are constituted as such by operation of law. All existing family residences as of August 3, 1988 are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code. The exemption is effective from the time of the constitution of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein. Moreover, the debts for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Otherwise (that is, if it was incurred prior to August 3, 1988), the alleged family home must be shown to have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially pursuant to the Civil Code. The rule, however, is not absolute. The Family Code, in fact, expressly provides for the following exceptions: Article 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For non-payment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by a mortgage on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. xxx xxx xxx Article 160. When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. xxx xxx xxx

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The case was remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 19 for determination whether or not the property covered by TCT No. 15079 is a duly constituted family home and therefore exempt from execution.

constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases.

Josef v. Santos GR# 165060 / NOV. 27, 2008 572 SCRA 57

Upon being apprised that the property subject of execution allegedly constitutes petitioner‘s family home, the trial court should have observed the following procedure:

FACTS:

1. Determine if petitioner‘s obligation to respondent falls under either of the exceptions under Article 155 of the Family Code;

Respondent, Otelio Santos, filed a case for collection of sum of money against petitioner, Albino Josef, for failure to pay the shoe materials which he bought on credit from respondent which the Marikina RTC and CA decided in favour of respondent. The SC dismissed the petition for review and the judgment became final and executory. A writ of execution was issued and some personal properties and a real property was sold on public auction with the respondent as winning bidder. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA claiming that the real property sold was his family home, thus, exempt from execution. The CA denied for failure to file a MR on the trial court‘s order granting the motion for execution, hence, this petition.

2. Make an inquiry into the veracity of petitioner‘s claim that the property was his family home; conduct an ocular inspection of the premises; an examination of the title; an interview of members of the community where the alleged family home is located, in order to determine if petitioner actually resided within the premises of the claimed family home; order a submission of photographs of the premises, depositions, and/or affidavits of proper individuals/parties; or a solemn examination of the petitioner, his children and other witnesses. At the same time, the respondent is given the opportunity to cross-examine and present evidence to the contrary;

ISSUE: Whether the sale on public auction of petitioner‘s family home to satisfy judgment award is legal. RULING: No. The trial court‘s Order of Execution did not resolve nor take into account petitioner‘s allegations in his Opposition, which are material and relevant in the resolution of the motion for issuance of a writ of execution. It should have made an earnest determination of the truth to petitioner‘s claim that the house and lot in which he and his children resided was their duly constituted family home and that the personal properties belonged to the children. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,

3. If the property is accordingly found to constitute petitioner‘s family home, the court should determine: a) if the obligation sued upon was contracted or incurred prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code; b) if petitioner‘s spouse is still alive, as well as if there are other beneficiaries of the family home; c) if the petitioner has more than one residence for the purpose of determining which of them, if any, is his family home; and d) its actual location and value, for the purpose of applying the provisions of Articles 157 and 160 of the Family Code. The family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family, a sacred symbol of family love and repository of cherished memories that last during one‘s lifetime. It is the sanctuary of that union which the law declares and protects as a sacred institution; and likewise a shelter for the fruits of that union. It is where both can seek refuge and strengthen the tie that binds them together and which ultimately

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forms the moral fabric of our nation. The protection of the family home is just as necessary in the preservation of the family as a basic social institution, and since no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect, the trial court‘s failure to observe the proper procedures to determine the veracity of petitioner‘s allegations, is unjustified. Indeed, petitioner‘s resort to the special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals was belated and without benefit of the requisite motion for reconsideration, however, considering the gravity of the issue, involving as it does matters that strike at the very heart of that basic social institution which the State has a constitutional and moral duty to preserve and protect, as well as petitioner‘s constitutional right to abode, all procedural infirmities occasioned upon this case must take a back seat to the substantive questions which deserve to be answered in full. The trial court‘s order of execution was nullified and it was directed to conduct an inquiry as to the nature of the properties as to whether or not exempt from execution.

Ramos v. Pangilinan GR # 185920 / July 20, 2010 625 SCRA 181 [See Articles 225, 229-231, 233; 240, 242 NCC] v. Article 154 FC Facts: Respondents filed in 2003 a complaint1 for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners in which the Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor. To satisfy their claims the Labor Arbiter levied properties of Ramos. Ramos moved for the exemption of a property which they alleged to be a family home. Respondents contend that Pandacan property is not the Ramos family home, as it has another in Antipolo, and the Pandacan property in fact served as the company‘s business address as borne by the company‘s letterhead. Labor Arbiter denied the motion to quash of the petitioners in which the NLRC affirmed. As to petitioners‘ claim that the property was covered by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains and as such only Ramos‘ share can be levied upon, the NLRC ruled that petitioners failed to substantiate such claim. Issue: WON the said property is a family home.

Cabang v. Basay GR# 180587 / MAR. 20, 2009 582 SCRA 172 X X X X X X

Ruling: Indeed, the general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. No doubt, a family home is generally exempt from execution provided it was duly constituted as such. There must be proof that the alleged family home was constituted jointly by the husband and wife or by an unmarried head of a family. It must be the house where they and their family actually reside and the lot on which it is situated. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter‘s consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the family. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of P300,000 in urban areas and P200,000 in rural areas.

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Two sets of rules are applicable: 1. If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988 – a) Constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. b) Judicial constitution of the family home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the registration of the court‘s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is located. c) Extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property. Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. 2. Family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 – a. There is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. b. The family home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. c. The debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988.

TITLE VI. PATERNITY & FILIATION See also RA 9255 - Use of Father’s Surname Rules Of Evidence (DNA) RA 9262 – Anti – Violence against Women & Children RA 9858 – Amendment to Art. 177, FC Article 345, Revised Penal Code (RPC)

Filial Privilege, Art 965 NCC, Sec. 25, Rule 130 [Rule Of Evidence] Lee v. CA GR # 177861, July 13, 2010 625 SCRA 66 FACTS Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in 1930‘s as immigrants from China and begot 11 children. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the 8 children of Tiu, the family‘s former maid, alleged that they too, were Lee and Keh‘s children. NBI, upon the request of Lee-Keh children found that Keh cannot be the 8‘s mother and that it was just part of Lee‘s grand design in making his 8 children from his 2nd family, legitimate, thus elevating their status and secure their future. Although, hospital records indicates that the name of the mother of these 8 children was Keh, this is in fact not possible, since the declared age of these children‘s mother did not coincide with Keh‘s actual age at the time of their birth. For example, Marcelo, the alleged eldest, was born by a 17-year-old mother, when Keh was already 38, and by a 23 year old mother, when Keh was already 40 and so forth. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to petition the court for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of Emma Lee (1 of the 8) the name Keh and replace the same with Tiu to indicate the true mother‘s name. Upon request by the Lee-Keh children, the court issued a subpoena ad testifacandum to compel Tiu, the presumed mother, to testify in the case. Tiu moved to quash the subpoena being violative of Sec 25 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which the court granted. Lee-Keh children filed an MR, and upon its denial, they filed civil action of certiorari to CA. CA held, among others that, only a duces tecum

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that can be quashed and not an ad testificandum. Emma filed an MR which the CA denied. Hence this case.

CHAPTER 1. LEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 163-171)

ISSUE Whether or not Tiu, who claims to be the stepmother of the 8 children, can be compelled to witness against her alleged stepchildren.

Benitez-Badua vs. CA GR# 105625 / JAN 24, 1994 229 SCRA 468

HELD Yes. Section 25 of Rule 130 of Rules of Court provides that ― Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend rom him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

Reyes v. Mauricio GR # 175080, Nov 24, 2010 636 SCRA 79 X X X X X

X X X X X Mariategui vs. CA GR# 57062 / JAN. 24, 1992 205 SCRA 337 FACTS: On June 26, 1953, Lupo Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia Montellano, he begot four children. With his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They had three children. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941. At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when he was still unmarried. These properties are described in the complaint as Lots of the Muntinglupa Estate. On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves a lot of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, the Lot was the subject of a voluntary registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees and the land registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties.

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On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot together with other Lots owned by their common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of the Lot to their co-heirs, they (children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots. Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father. The plaintiffs elevated the case to the CA on the ground that the trial court committed an error in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were lawfully married, and in holding that they (appellants) are not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance. On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title. ISSUE: WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate HELD: Yes, with respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, the Supreme Court held that the private respondents are legitimate children of the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testified that when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.

Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto‘s birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their brother Jacinto.

Babiera vs. Catotal GR# 138493 / JUNE 15, 2000 333 SCRA 487 Facts: Catotal filed a petition for cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista (Guinto) Babiera. From that petition, Catotal asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late spouses Eugenion Babiera and Hermogena Carinosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990 respectively. She claims that on September 20, 1996 a baby girl was delivered by ―hilot‖ in the house of spouses Eugenio and Hermogena, and that without knowledge of said spouses, a certain Flora Guinto, the mother of the child and housemaid of the said spouses caused the registration/recording of the facts of birth of her child by simulating that child was that of the spouses (then 65 and 54yrs old respectively), and made Hermogena appear as the mother by forging her signature. She also claims that she, then 15 years old, saw with her own eyes and personally witnessed Flora Guinto gave birth to Teofista Guinto. Issue: W/N Article 171 of the Family Code is applicable.

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Held: Article 171 of the FC is not applicable to the present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife‘s child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to Babiera. In other words, the prayer herein is not to declare that Babiera is an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that Babiera is not Hermogena‘s child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn Babiera‘s filiation to the Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.

Labagala vs. Santiago GR# 132305 / DEC. 04, 2001 371 SCRA 360

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated March 4, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land. Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. The trial court decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property. Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death. Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. Having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare." Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale. Petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property. ISSUE/S: (1) Whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.

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HELD: On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides: Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs. If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud. This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods. Respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation. At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.

Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal certificate. A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof. We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We find petitioner's silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not establish pedigree. Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. The similarity is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence. During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation. Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession.

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It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation. On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals. Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. Petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract. Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals: ...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law in fact no one at all - accepted the "donation" for Ida. In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Liyao vs. Tanhoti-Liyao GR# 138961 / MAR. 07, 2002 378 SCRA 563 Facts of the Case: On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed an action for compulsory recognition as ―the illegitimate child of the late William Liyao‖ against herein respondents. The complaint alleged that petitioner ―was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao,‖ petitioner having been ―recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime." Petitioner further alleged that: (a) Corazon (who at that time was still legally married to Ramon Yulo) cohabited with the late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William‘s untimely demise on December 2, 1975; (b) on June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. (Billy) and all the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao; (c) William supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs; (d) William Liyao would bring Billy to the office and other social gatherings and introduce him as his child. On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao. In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court was convinced that deceased William Liyao sired William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt acts of the latter; openly and publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The appellate court observed that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo were still legally married during the supposed time that William Jr. was conceived and born. Thus, in the absence of proof to the contrary, William Jr. is presumed to be the legitimate child of Corazon and Ramon.

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Hence, the present petition.

CHAPTER 2. PROOF OF FILIATION (Articles 172-174)

Issue: WON the CA erred in denying petitioner's action for recognition as illegitimate child.

Rodriguez vs. CA GR# 85723 / JUNE 19, 1995 245 SCRA 150

Held: Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. However, impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would amount o an insult to his memory. Thus, we cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother‘s alleged paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who successfully defeated the presumption.

FACTS: On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was brought before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Baguio-Benguet, by respondent Alarito (Clarito) Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez, petitioner herein. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother, Felicitas Agbulos Haber, as first witness. In the course of her direct examination, she was asked by counsel to reveal the identity of the plaintiff's father but the defendant's counsel raised a timely objection which the court sustained. The plaintiff filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari questioning the said order in case entitled ―Clarito Agbulos v. Hon. Romeo A. Brawner and Bienvenido Rodriguez." On March 18, 1988, this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 14276), which promulgated the questioned Decision dated November 2, 1988. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court‘s order and allowing the admission of said testimony. HELD: We find that had the appellate court sanctioned the trial court's disallowance of the testimony of plaintiff's mother, private respondent would have been deprived of a speedy and adequate remedy considering the importance of said testimony and the erroneous resolution of the trial court. On the merits of his petition, petitioner contended that Felicitas Agbulos Haber should not be allowed to reveal the name of the father of private respondent because such revelation was prohibited

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by Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Said Article provided: When the father or the mother makes the recognition separately, he or she shall not reveal the name of the person with whom he or she had the child; neither shall he or she state any circumstance whereby the other party may be identified.

acknowledgement of natural children of the same Code.

On the other hand, private respondent argued that his mother should be allowed to testify on the identity of his father, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The prohibition to reveal the name or circumstance of the parent who does not intervene in the separate recognition is limited only to the very act of making such separate recognition. It does not extend to any other act or to cases allowed by law. Thus, when a recognition has been made by one parent, the name of the other parent may be revealed in an action by the child to compel such other parent to recognize him also (I Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines 590 [1985]).

Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provided: In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: (1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; (2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; (4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. — A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. The prohibition in Article 280 against the identification of the father or mother of a child applied only in voluntary and not in compulsory recognition. This conclusion becomes abundantly clear if we consider the relative position of the progenitor of Article 280, which was Article 132 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, with the other provisions on the

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino is of the view that the prohibition in Article 280 does not apply in an action for compulsory recognition. According to him:

Justice Eduardo Caguioa also opines that the said prohibition refers merely to the act of recognition. "It does prevent inquiry into the identity of the other party in case an action is brought in court to contest recognition on the ground that the child is not really natural because the other parent had no legal capacity to contract marriage" (I Comments and Cases on Civil Law 380 [1967] citing In re Estate of Enriquez, 29 Phil. 167 [1915]). The action filed by private respondent herein was brought under Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which added new grounds for filing an action for recognition: namely, xxx xxx xxx 3) When the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father; 4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. Worth noting is the fact that no similar prohibition found in Article 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines has been replicated in the present Family Code. This undoubtedly discloses the intention of the legislative authority to uphold the Code Commission's stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of illegitimate children.

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Articles 276, 277, 278, 279 and 280 of the Civil Code of the Philippines were repealed by the Family Code, which now allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children (Art. 175). Under Article 172 of the Family Code, filiation of legitimate children is by any of the following: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a) Of interest is that Article 172 of the Family Code adopts the rule in Article 283 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that filiation may be proven by "any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father." WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court is DIRECTED to PROCEED with dispatch in the disposition of the action for compulsory recognition.

Solinap vs. Locsin Jr. GR# 146737 / DEC. 10, 2001 371 SCRA 711 X X X X

Heirs of Cabais vs. CA GR# 106314-15/OCT. 08, 1999 316 SCRA 338 Facts: Petitioners are legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died on April 16, 1982, leaving a parcel of land situated 3 in Basud, Tabaco, Albay, with an area of 1,638 square meters in the name of Pedro Cabais. The said property was inherited by Pedro Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia Cañeta by right of representation. His mother, Felipa Cañeta Buesa, who was the only daughter of Eustaquia Cañeta, predeceased the latter, leaving him as the only legal heir of Eustaquia. The respondents contend that Pedro did not proved his filiation with Felipa C. Buesa. That the baptismal certificate is not sufficient to prove his filiation. On October 15, 1979, shortly after Pedro Cabais had adjudicated to himself the property in question, a complaint for partition and accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of Victoria Cañeta and Heirs of Anastacio Cañeta against Pedro Cabais. During the pendency of case, Pedro Cabais died. Whereupon, the respondents herein entered the property in dispute and constructed houses thereon, depriving petitioners of possession thereof. Issue: WON the lower court erred in relying on the Baptismal Certificate of Felipa C. Buesa to establish the parentage and filiation of Pedro Cabais. Ruling: A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption of truth contained in such public document. This is pursuant to the rule that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The evidentiary nature of such document must, therefore, be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, which, being hearsay, is not a conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as a record of birth, an official or public document. In Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court declared that a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the

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administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk.

Cenido vs. Apacionado GR# 132474 / NOV. 19, 1999 318 SCRA 688 FACTS: Respondent spouses Amadeo Apacionado and Herminia Sta. Ana filed with the Rizal RTC a complaint against petitioner Renato Cenido for, "Declaration of Ownership, Nullity, with Damages" for a parcel of land in Binangonan, Rizal which the spouses allegedly owned by purchase from its previous owner, Bonifacio Aparato, whom they took care till death. The petitioner, Renato Cenido, who filed an earlier ejectment case against the spouses which was dismissed, claims that he is the illegitimate son of the deceased owner of the property and as the sole surviving heir, he became the owner of the property. This is evidenced by the tax declaration in his name and was confirmed by the Binangonan MTC in a compromise agreement between him and the deceased‘s brother as co-heirs. Respondent spouses replied that: (1) Cenido is not the illegitimate son of Bonifacio, Cenido's claim of paternity being spurious; (2) the ownership of the property was not the proper subject in the case before the MTC, nor were the spouses parties in said case. The trial court upheld petitioner Cenido's ownership over the property by virtue of the recognition made by Bonifacio's then surviving brother, Gavino, in the compromise judgment of the MTC. Concomitantly, the court also did not sustain the deed of sale between Bonifacio and the spouses because it was neither notarized nor signed by Bonifacio and was intrinsically defective. The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and held among others that the recognition of Cenido's filiation by Gavino, Bonifacio's brother, did not comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Family Code, hence, this petition. Victoria Cenidosa, in representation of petitioner Cenido, has manifested, through counsel, that petitioner has already died and that eight years before his death, Cenido sold the subject house and lot to Maria D. Ojeda who is now old and sickly, and is thus being

represented in the instant case by her daughter, Victoria O. Cenidosa. In the same vein, respondent Herminia Sta. Ana Apacionado also manifested that her husband, Amadeo Apacionado, has already died and is now being represented by his compulsory heirs. ISSUE: WON Tax Declaration in the name of petitioner should be nullified because his recognition or filiation failed to comply with requirements of the Civil Code and Family Code. HELD: Yes. Under the Civil Code, natural children and illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to support and successional rights only when recognized or acknowledged by the putative parent. The filiation of illegitimate children may be proved by any of the forms of recognition of natural children, namely: (1) voluntarily, which must be express such as that in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing; (2) legally, i.e., when a natural child is recognized, such recognition extends to his or her brothers and sisters of the full blood; and (3) judicially or compulsorily, which may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents. The action for compulsory recognition of the illegitimate child must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents. This is explicitly provided in Article 285 of the Civil Code, viz: Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. The illegitimate child can file an action for compulsory recognition only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. After the parent's death, the child cannot bring such action, except, however, in only two instances: one is when the supposed parent died during the

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minority of the child, and the other is when after the death of the parent, a document should be discovered in which the parent recognized the child as his. The action must be brought within four years from the attainment of majority in the first case, and from the discovery of the document in the second case. The requirement that the action be filed during the parent's lifetime is to prevent illegitimate children, on account of strong temptations to large estates left by dead persons, to claim part of this estate without giving the alleged parent personal opportunity to be heard. It is vital that the parent be heard for only the parent is in a position to reveal the true facts surrounding the claimant's conception. In the case at bar, petitioner Cenido did not present any record of birth, will or any authentic writing to show he was voluntarily recognized by Bonifacio as his illegitimate son. In fact, petitioner admitted on the witness stand that he had no document to prove Bonifacio's recognition, much less his filiation. The voluntary recognition of petitioner's filiation by Bonifacio's brother before the MTC does not qualify as a "statement in a court of record." Under the law, this statement must be made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother, sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a voluntary declaration by the parent, or if the parent refuses, by judicial authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born outside wedlock. The compromise judgment of the MTC does not qualify as a compulsory recognition of petitioner. In the first place, when he filed this case against Gavino Aparato, petitioner was no longer a minor. He was already pushing fifty years old. Secondly, there is no allegation that after Bonifacio's death, a document was discovered where Bonifacio recognized petitioner Cenido as his son. Thirdly, there is nothing in the compromise judgment that indicates that the action before the MTC was a settlement of Bonifacio's estate with a gross value not exceeding P20,000.00. Definitely, the action could not have been for compulsory recognition because the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Real Property Tax Code provides that real property tax be assessed in the name of the person "owning or administering" the property on which the tax is levied. Since petitioner Cenido has not proven any successional or administrative rights to Bonifacio's estate, the Tax Declaration in Cenido's name must be declared null and void.

Tijing vs. Court of Appeals GR# 125901 / MAR. 08, 2001 354 SCRA 17 X X X X X Estate of Ong v. Diaz GR# 171713 / DEC. 17, 2007 540 SCRA 480 Verceles v. Posada GR# 159785 / APR. 27, 2007 522 SCRA 518 Tayag v. Tayag-Gallor GR# 174680 / MAR. 24, 2008 549 SCRA 68 Facts: On 15 January 2001, respondent Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael Tayag. She alleged in the petition that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own. On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the decedent‘s estate. Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However, petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised. Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties subject of the petition using her own money. She claimed

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that she and Ismael Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties. Petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the putative father. Issue: W/N respondent‘s petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. Held: Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or compulsory recognition. Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Judicial or compulsory recognition, on the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents. The Court, in the case of Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by the death of the alleged father. But respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioner‘s opposition to her petition and motion for

hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedent‘s voluntary acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation. We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged therein.

Puno v. Puno Ent. Inc. GR# 177066 / Sept. 11, 2009 599 SCRA 585 FACTS: Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder. This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. Carlos L. Puno, died on June 25, 1963, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. On March 14, 2003, petitioner Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance against respondent. Petitioner averred that he is the son of the deceased with the latter‘s common-law wife, Amelia Puno. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions it entered into from 1962, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings, dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner did not have the legal personality to sue because his birth certificate

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names him as "Joselito Musni Muno." Apropos, there was yet a need for a judicial declaration that "Joselito Musni Puno" and "Joselito Musni Muno" were one and the same. The court ordered that the proceedings be held in abeyance, ratiocinating that petitioner‘s certificate of live birth was no proof of his paternity and relation to Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner submitted the corrected birth certificate with the name "Joselito M. Puno," certified by the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila, and the Certificate of Finality thereof. To hasten the disposition of the case, the court conditionally admitted the corrected birth certificate as genuine and authentic and ordered respondent to file its answer within fifteen days from the order and set the case for pretrial.

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. As correctly observed by the CA, only petitioner‘s mother supplied the data in the birth certificate and signed the same. There was no evidence that Carlos L. Puno acknowledged petitioner as his son. As for the baptismal certificate, we have already decreed that it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not of the veracity of the entries with respect to the child‘s paternity.

On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint in its Decision dated October 11, 2006. According to the CA, petitioner was not able to establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno since his birth certificate was prepared without the intervention of and the participatory acknowledgment of paternity by Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondent‘s books. Moreover, petitioner was not a stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator of the corporation. His action for specific performance therefore appeared to be premature; the proper action to be taken was to prove the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno in a petition for the settlement of the estate of the latter.

In any case, Sections 74 and 75 of the Corporation Code enumerate the persons who are entitled to the inspection of corporate books.

ISSUE/S:

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the books of the corporation as provided under Section 63 of the Corporation Code

The petition is without merit. Petitioner failed to establish the right to inspect respondent corporation‘s books and receive dividends on the stocks owned by Carlos L. Puno. Petitioner anchors his claim on his being an heir of the deceased stockholder. However, we agree with the appellate court that petitioner was not able to prove satisfactorily his filiation to the deceased stockholder; thus, the former cannot claim to be an heir of the latter.

The stockholder‘s right of inspection of the corporation‘s books and records is based upon his ownership of shares in the corporation and the necessity for self-protection. After all, a shareholder has the right to be intelligently informed about corporate affairs. Such right rests upon the stockholder‘s underlying ownership of the corporation‘s assets and property. Similarly, only stockholders of record are entitled to receive dividends declared by the corporation, a right inherent in the ownership of the shares.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidence in this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L. Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect respondent‘s books and be entitled to receive dividends from respondent, absent any showing in its transfer book

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that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Puno were transferred to him. This would only be possible if petitioner has been recognized as an heir and has participated in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated October 11, 2006 and Resolution dated March 6, 2007 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

CHAPTER 3. ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN (Articles 175-176) David vs. CA GR# 111180 / NOV. 16, 1995 250 SCRA 82 Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a married man and the father of four children. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine and Cathy Mae. The relationship became known to private respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to Villar's house and introduced him to Villar's legal wife. After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted by his legal family. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Hence, on July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, issued an Order declaring that ―the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J. T. David is hereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitioner Daisie T. David.‖ On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that question of custody over an illegitimate child cannot be decided in habeas corpus. The CA further ruled that until the issue on custody and support shall have been determined in a proper case, it is for the

best interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily remain under the custody of respondent. Issue : WON the custody of Christopher may be decided in a habeas corpus case. WON petitioner is entitled to the custody of Christopher. Held: Rule 1021 §1 (Habeas Corpus) makes no distinction between the case of a mother who is separated from her husband and is entitled to the custody of her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole parental authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of her child. In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children, especially considering that she has been able to rear and support them on her own since they were born. Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life of affluence that private respondent promises if the child lives with him. It is enough, however, that petitioner is earning a decent living and is able to support her children according to her means.

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Tonog vs. CA GR# 122906 / FEB. 07, 2002 376 SCRA 523 FACTS: On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They cohabited for a time and lived with private respondent‘s parents and sister in the latter‘s house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the family. A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents. Private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin Faith which the trial court affirmed. Petitioner, in turn, filed a petition for relief from judgment. Trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner‘s motion for custody of their child, Gardin. Then, the private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA which the appellate court dismissed but was subsequently approved by filing of a Motion of Reconsideration. Hence, this petition

given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that ―[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.‖ It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. However, this is not intended to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Indeed, we have recognized that both parents ―complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.‖ Neither does the law nor jurisprudence intend to downplay a father‘s sense of loss when he is separated from his child: While the bonds between a mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent, whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare of the child which is the paramount consideration.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in granting the custody of illegitimate Gardin Faith to the father. HELD: SC find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. In arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be

For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for ―compelling reasons.‖ Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child‘s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.

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In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a statement against petitioner‘s fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter. It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

Aruego vs. CA GR# 112193 / MAR. 13, 1996 254 SCRA 711

People vs. Magtibay GR# 142985 / AUG. 06, 2002 386 SCRA 332 Facts: Raymundo Magtibay was convicted having committed the crime of rape, in which case he is sentenced with reclusion perpetua. The said rape bore a child on the victim. Issue: What is the status of the child and what are the liabilities, rights and obligations imposed upon the father of the child? Ruling: Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental authority over his children, no further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the childs status. Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victims child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

Guy v. CA GR# 163707 / SEPT. 15, 2006 502 SCRA 151 FACTS SIma Wei (Rifino Guy Susim) died intestate on October 29,1992 leaving an estate valued at 10M. His known heirs are his surviving spouse and their 5 children. On June 1997, minors Karen and Kamille Wei, as represented by their mother, alleging as the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the decedent, filed a petition of administration before the RTC.

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ISSUE Whether or not the two alleged children of the deceased are barred by prescription from proving their filiation. HELD Citing Bernabe v Alejo ― that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the FC took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired by the FC. Art 172 provides, the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment 2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate or 2. Any other means allowedby the Rules of Court and special laws. Art 172 provides, the action claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of 5 yrs within which to institute the action. Art 175 provides further that illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime.However, if the action is based upon open and continuous

possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. A natural child having a right to compel acknowledgement, but who has not been in fact acknowledged, may retain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother. In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.

De La Cruz v. Gracia GR# 177728 / JULY 31, 2009 594 SCRA 648 X X X X X

Uy v. Chua GR# 183965 / SEPT. 18, 2009 600 SCRA 806 X X X X X

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CHAPTER 4. LEGITIMATED CHILDREN (Articles 177-182); RA 9858 De Santos vs. Angeles GR# 105619 / DEC. 12, 1995 251 5CRA 206 X X X X X

at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by an impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: (1) rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; (2) it would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; (3) there will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; (4) it is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of the marriage; and (5) it will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child.

TITLE VII. ADOPTION Abadilla vs. Tabiliran, Jr. A.M No. MTJ-92-716. / OCT. 25, 1995 249 SCRA 447 Facts: Repondent Judge Tabiliran was married to Teresita Banzuela. Sometime in 1965, Banzuela left and abandoned their family home in Zamboanga del Norte and thereafter her whereabouts could not be known. In 1970, Tabiliran began cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan, with whom he had three children born in 1970, 1971 and 1975, respectively. Tabiliran and Baybayan got married in 1986. In the marriage contract, Tabiliran represented himself as single. Petitioner is a clerk of court assigned in the sala of respondent, charging Tabiliran for gross immorality. Issue: W/N their children were legitimated by their subsequent marriage. Held: As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, the three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and Banzuela. The applicable provision in this case is Article 269 of the Civil Code, which states that: Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who,

See also: See Domestic Adoption Act of 1988 (RA 8552) as amended by RA 9523 (March 2009) A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC - Re: Proposed Rule on Domestic Adoption Inter country Adoption Act of 1995 (RA 8043) Amended IRR on Inter-Country Adoption (January 8, 2004) Republic vs. Vergara GR# 95551 / MAR. 20, 1997 270 SRCA 206 FACTS: On June 25, 1990, spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the RTC of Angeles City to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel, a member of the US Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. RTC disregarded the 16year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only 15 years and 3 months and 15 years and 9 months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would

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defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child. The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law. ISSUE: Whether spouses Dye are qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states: Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt: xxx xxx xxx (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law and hee is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does

not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. Rosalina cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel R Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.

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Republic vs. Miller GR# 125932 / APR. 21, 1999 306 5CRA 183 FACTS: On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag. At the hearing on September 1988, respondents adduced evidence showing that, they are both American citizens and they were childless on account of a medical problem of the wife. That they maintains their residence at Angeles City. That minor Michael Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the custody of respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep concern for the future of their son prompted the natural parents who have no visible means of livelihood to have their child adopted by respondents. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption by respondents. On May 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption. In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court. ISSUE: WON the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the prohibition under the Family Code.

filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Republic vs. Toledano GR# 94147 / JUNE 08, 1994 233 SCRA 9 FACTS:

HELD: The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him. Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of

Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens filed a petition to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to

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the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. The RTC granted the petition.

Republic vs. CA & Hughes GR# 100835 / OCT. 26, 1993 227 SCRA 401

ISSUE: Whether the spouses may adopt Solomon. HELD: Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt,vi z.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.

X X X X X X

Republic vs. CA & Bobiles GR# 92326 / JAN. 24, 1992 205 SCRA 356 Facts: On February 2, 1988, Zenaida Corteza Bobiles filed a petition to adopt Jason Condat, then six (6) years old and who had been living with her family since he was four (4) months old, before the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City. Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the Court issued an order dated February 15, 1988 setting the petition for hearing on March 28, 1988. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition. The trial Court ruled for the adoption of Jason Condat by spouses Bobiles and that his last name be changed to Bobiles. The petitioner contends that the Family Code shall be retroactively applied because while it was on appeal the Family Code took effect. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. Issue: WON Family Code should be applied in this case. Ruling: Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, private respondent had the right to file a petition for adoption by herself, without joining her husband therein. When Mrs. Bobiles filed her petition, she was exercising her explicit and unconditional right under said law. Upon her filing thereof, her right to file such petition alone and to have the same proceed to final adjudication, in accordance with the law in force at the time, was already vested and cannot be prejudiced or

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impaired by the enactment of a new law. The jurisdictional, as distinguished from the purely procedural, aspect of a case is substantive in nature and is subject to a more stringent rule. A petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to comply with a law which was not yet in force and effect at the time. As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as one of the petitioners in the petition for adoption filed by his wife, his affidavit of consent, attached to the petition as Annex "B" and expressly made an integral part thereof, shows that he himself actually joined his wife in adopting the child. In determining whether or not to set aside the decree of adoption the interests and welfare of the child are of primary and paramount consideration. Ordinarily, the approval of the adoption rests in the sound discretion of the court. This discretion should be exercised in accordance with the best interests of the child, as long as the natural rights of the parents over the child are not disregarded. In the absence of a showing of grave abuse, the exercise of this discretion by the approving official will not be disturbed. Republic vs. CA/Wong GR# 97906 / MAY 21, 1992 209 SCRA 189 X X X X X X X X

Cang vs. CA GR# 105308 / SEPT. 25, 1998 296 SCRA 128 X X X X X X X Lahom vs. Sibulo GR# 143989 / JULY 14, 2003 406 SCRA 135 X X X X X X X

In re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle and Michael Jude P. Lim GR# 168992-93 / MAY 21, 2009 588 SCRA 98 X X X X X X

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TITLE VIII. SUPPORT See also: RA 9262 & IRR David vs. CA GR# 111180 / NOV. 16, 1995 250 SCRA 82 Facts: Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent is a married man and the father of four children, all grown-up. After a while, the relationship between petitioner and private respondent developed into an intimate one, as a result of which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two more children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988. David introduced her children to the legal family of Villar, and the said children were accepted and brought in to the house of Villar. In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for the next school year. On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J. The RTC found for Daisie and ordered Villar to give temporary monthly support to the three minor children. CA reversed and held that it is in the best interest of Christopher J to remain with Villar until the issue on custody and support have been determined in a proper case. Issue: W/N the minor children of Daisie and Villar is entitled to support from the latter considering that custody is with the mother. Held: In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who,

as a consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that private respondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." Although the question of support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressed willingness to support the minor child. The order for payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who is entitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is "a moral or legal obstacle thereto."

Gan vs. Reyes GR# 145527 / MAY. 28, 2002 382 SCRA 357 FACTS: Bernadette S. Pondevida, being quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida, wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An exasperated Bernadette thereafter instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual basis for the claim of support. His motion, however, was denied by the trial court. Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private

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respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. In its Order declaring petitioner in default the trial court noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default. After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent. On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing. ISSUE: Whether a judgment for support must have good reason for its immediate execution.

HELD: A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of execution by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify the setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the legitimate bounds of judicial discretion. Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that should he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of support would be most likely denied. Petitioner claims that in an action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's mother would be a

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valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a reputation for accuracy.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and upholding the validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by the Regional Trial Court – Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

De Asis vs. CA GR# 127578 / FEB. 15, 1999 303 SCRA 176 Facts: On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, in her capacity as the legal guardian of the minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, before the RTC of Quezon City, alleging that the defendant Manuel is the father of subject minor Glen, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands. In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide support for him. On July 4, 1989, Vircel D. Andres, through counsel manifested that because of the defendant‘s judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor child, it was ―futile and a useless exercise to claim support from defendant‖. Because of such manifestation, and defendant‘s assurance that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of

the complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City RTC, which then dismissed the case with prejudice. On September 7, 1993, another Complaint for maintenance and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with prejudice Civil Case Q-88-935. In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject MTD, the trial court ruled that res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law. Petitioner‘s MR of the said Order was likewise denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari which petition was found devoid of merit and dismissed. ISSUE: Whether an action for support can be barred by res judicata. HELD: No, the right to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the law in point, reads: ―Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. Xxx‖ Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a compromise. Article 2035, ibid, provides, that: ―No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:(1) The civil status of persons;(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;(3) Any ground for legal separation;(4) Future support;(5) The jurisdiction of courts;(6) Future legitime. The raison d‘ etre behind the proscription against renunciation, transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated, thus:―The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support, which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced. Xxx To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is contrary to public policy. The manifestation sent in by respondent‘s mother in the first case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the vinculum that

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gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondent‘s mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to support. It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties. Although in this case, the admission may be binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation. The dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has no effect of res judicata on the subsequent case for support. In the case of Advincula vs. Advincula, this Court ruled: ―The new Civil Code provides xxx and that the right to receive support cannot be renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art. 301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the subject of compromise (Art. 2035). This being true, it is indisputable that the present action for support can be brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available, as her needs arise. Xxx It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the filing of another action, asking for the same relief against the same defendant.‖(emphasis supplied) Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-935 and the lower court‘s pronouncement that such dismissal was with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.

People vs. Magtibay GR# 142985 / AUG. 06, 2002 386 SCRA 332 FACTS: Rachelle R. Recto was being raped by herein accused-appellant Raymundo Magtibay on September 15, 1997 at Barangay Sagada, Oriental Mindoro. Because of accused-appellant‘s threat on her life, Rachelle kept silent about the incident. It was not until she became pregnant that she was constrained to tell her mother what happened. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy. On August 5, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment that herein accused Raymundo Magtibay is sentence to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether the accused should acknowledge and support the child born out of rape. HELD: There was no showing that Rachelle has previously been sexually abused or she had sexual relations with other men during that time. Thus, with respect to the acknowledgment and support of the child born out of rape our recent ruling in People vs. Justiniano Glabo states: Concerning the acknowledgment and support of the offspring of rape, Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides for three kinds of civil liability that may be imposed on the offender: a) indemnification, b) acknowledgment of the offspring, unless the law should prevent him from so doing, and c) in every case to support the offspring. With the passage of the Family Code, the classification of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction was eliminated and they now fall under the specie of illegitimate children. Since parental authority is vested by Article 176 of the Family Code upon the mother and considering that an offender sentenced to reclusion perpetua automatically loses parental

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authority over his children, no ―further positive act is required of the parent as the law itself provides for the child‘s status.‖ Hence, accused-appellant should only be ordered to indemnify and support the victim‘s child. However, the amount and terms of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing in accordance with Article 201 of the Family Code.

Sy v. CA GR# 124518 / DEC. 27, 2007 541 SCRA 391

X X X X X X X

Lacson v. Lacson GR# 150644 / AUG. 28, 2006 499 SCRA 677

Facts: The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Lea‘s efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would

admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edward‘s mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Paul‘s College in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate. Edward contended that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support. The RTC ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the amount of TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that which they received from defendant for two years and that which they received by way of support pendent lite. The CA affirmed the decision, hence, this appeal. Issue: WON the amount of support ordered by the RTC valid in the case at bar. Ruling: Yes, petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. Petitioner‘s above posture has little to commend it. For one, it conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with

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his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education, or, in short, whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Petitioner‘s suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best gratuitous and selfserving. Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents who are no less petitioner‘s daughters.

Mangonon v. CA GR# 125041 / JUNE. 30, 2006 494 SCRA 1 FACTS: Ma. Belen B. Mangonon and Federico Delgado were civilly married. At that time, Belen was only 21 years old while Federico, 19 years old. The marriage was annulled as it was solemnized without the required consent per Article 85 of the Civil Code. Within 7 months after the annulment of their marriage, Belen gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. She and her second husband Danny Mangonon raised her twins as Federico had totally abandoned them. When the twins were about to enter college in the USA (where they settled in), they, however, were financially incapable of pursuing college education. Demands were made upon Federico and the latter‘s father, Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the required college education of the twins, but they remained unheeded. Considering the impending deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes, Belen and her children filed the petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support before the RTC, seeking that

they be declared as legitimate children of Federico, and as granddaughters of Francisco pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code; and that in default of Federico, Francisco as the grandfather be ordered to provide general and educational support for the twins. In his Answer, Francisco maintained that Belen and her second husband should be responsible, the latter having voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural father. Even assuming that he is responsible for support, Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer beyond what Belen and the father could afford. RTC ruled in favor of Belen and directed Federico and Francisco to provide a monthly support (pendente lite) for the education of the twins. CA affirmed the RTC decision. Unsatisfied with the decision, Belen brought this instant petition. Here, Federico argues that assuming he is indeed the father of the twin sisters, he has the option under the law as to how he would provide support. Francisco, on the other hand, posits that because Belen and her twins are now US citizens, they cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on support as ―[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.‖ At the time of the filing of the present Petition, Rica was able to obtain a tuition fee grant and a Federal Stafford loan from the US government. In order to defray the remaining balance of Rica‘s education for said school year, Belen claims that she had to secure a loan under the Federal Direct Student Loan Program. Meanwhile, Rina was given a financial grant, federal work study assistance and a Federal Stafford loan. ISSUE: Who should be made liable for support of the twins? HELD: The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. Francisco‘s assertion that Belen had the means to support

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her daughters‘ education is belied by the fact that Belen was even forced by her financial status in the USA to secure the loan from the federal government. The fact that she was compelled to take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough money to enable her to send her daughters to college by herself. Moreover, even the twins themselves were forced by the circumstances to secure loans under their names so as not to delay their entrance to college. There being prima facie evidence showing that Belen and Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, Belen and Federico are primarily charged to support their children‘s college education. In view of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. Francisco, being the majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Inc. and Citadel Shipping; owner of Citadel Corporation; Chairman of the Board of Directors of IslaCommunication Co.; stockholder of Citadel Holdings; and owner of real properties here and abroad, has the financial means to support his granddaughters‘ education. He, in lieu of Belen and Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite. Anent Francisco and Federico‘s claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, Art. 204 of the Family Code provides that the obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, which should be considered. In this case, Francisco could not avail himself of the second option. With the filing of this case, and the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned them.

Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. Guided by this principle, we hold Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, Francisco has the financial resources to pay this amount given his various business endeavors. Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they entered college until they had finished their respective studies. The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on Belen and her twin daughters raised by Francisco is best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual payment.

Uy v. Chua GR# 183965 / SEPT. 18, 2009 600 SCRA 806 X X X X X X

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Lim v. Lim GR# 163209 / OCT. 30, 2009 604 SCRA 691

Perez v. CA GR# 118870 / MAR. 29, 1996 255 SCRA 661

X X X

Facts:

TITLE IX. PARENTAL AUTHORITY Rule on Custody of Minors & Writ of Habeas Corpus (SC AM 0304-04) Rule on Juveniles in Conflict With the Law (2002) SC Rule on Guardianship of Minors (A.M. 03-02-05) SC Rule on Examination of Child Witness (2000) See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) & IRR Re: Proposed Rule on Guardianship of Minors (SC AM No. 0302-05) RA 8972 "Solo Parents' Welfare Act of 2000” & Implementing Rules and Regulations of 2002 See RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) and Implementing Rules & Regulations Article 2176 & 2180; RA 6809 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS (Articles 209-215) Santos Sr. v. CA GR# 113054 / MAR. 16, 1995 242 SCRA 407 X X X X

Ray Perez, private respondent, and Nerissa, his wife who is petitioner herein, were married in Cebu on December 6, 1986. After six miscarriages, two operations and a high-risk pregnancy, petitioner finally gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York on July 20, 1992. Petitioner who began working in the United States in October 1988, used part of her earnings to build a modest house in Mandaue City, Cebu. She also sought medical attention for her successive miscarriages in New York. She became a resident alien in February 1992. Private respondent stayed with her in the U.S. twice and took care of her when she became pregnant. Unlike his wife, however, he had only a tourist visa and was not employed. On January 17, 1993, the couple and their baby arrived in Cebu. After a few weeks, only Nerissa returned to the U.S. She alleged that they came home only for a five-week vacation and that they all had round-trip tickets. However, her husband stayed behind to take care of his sick mother and promised to follow her with the baby. According to Ray, they had agreed to reside permanently in the Philippines but once Nerissa was in New York, she changed her mind and continued working. She was supposed to come back immediately after winding up her affairs there. Ray wanted to raise their son near his parents while Nerissa did not want to rely on her in-laws. Despite mediation by a priest, Nerissa and Ray failed to reconcile. Nerissa stayed with her parents and filed a petition for habeas corpus asking Ray to surrender their one-year old son to her. The RTC granted custody to Nerissa. The CA reversed and granted cutody to the father. Issue: W/N the mother has a better right over the custody of the minor child.

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Held: When the parents of the child are separated, Article 213 of the Family Code is the applicable law. Since the Code does not qualify the word "separation" to mean legal separation decreed by a court, couples who are separated in fact, such as petitioner and private respondent, are covered within its terms. The provisions of law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word "shall" in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character. It has long been settled that in custody cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child.

Silva vs. CA GR# 114742 / JULY. 17, 1997 275 SCRA 206 FACTS: Parents have the natural right, as well as the moral and legal duty, to care for their children, see to their proper upbringing and safeguard their best interest and welfare. This authority and responsibility may not be unduly denied the parents; neither may it be renounced by them. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each other is lost, the attachment and feeling for their offsprings invariably remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to suffer absent, of course, any real, grave and imminent threat to the well-being of the child.

Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales, an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage, and had two children: Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. A rift in their relationship surfaced, which, when Gonzales decided to resume her acting career over Silva‘s vigorous objections. The assertion was quickly refuted by Gonzales who claimed that she, in fact, had never stopped working throughout their relationship. At any rate, the two eventually parted ways.

In February 1986, Gonzales refused to allow Silva, in apparent contravention of a previous understanding, to have the children in his company on weekends. Silva filed a petition for custodial rights over the children before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was opposed by Gonzales who averred that Silva often engaged in "gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral and social values of the children. In an order, dated 07 April 1989, the trial court rendered judgment directing respondent to allow petitioner visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case should he take out the children without the written consent of the mother or respondent herein. Silva appeared somehow satisfied with the judgment for only Gonzales interposed an appeal from the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals. In the meantime, Gonzales got married to a Dutch national. The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. On 23 September 1993, the appellate tribunal ruled in favor of Gonzales. Citing Article 3 and 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the CA denied visitorial and/or temporary custodial rights to the father. The children concerned are still in their early formative years of life. The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A home with only one parent is more normal than two separate houses — (one house where one parent lives and another house where the other parent with another woman/man lives). After all, under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are supposed to use the surname of and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. The child is one of the most important assets of the nation. It is thus important we be careful in rearing the children especially so if they are illegitimates, as in this case. Silva comes to this Court for relief.

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The issue before us is not really a question of child custody; instead, the case merely concerns the visitation right of a parent over his children which the trial court has adjudged in favor of petitioner by holding that he shall have "visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays, but in no case (could) he take out the children without the written consent of the mother . . . ." The visitation right referred to is the right of access of a noncustodial parent to his or her child or children. There is, despite a dearth of specific legal provisions, enough recognition on the inherent and natural right of parents over their children. Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "(f)amily relations include those . . . (2) between parents and children; . . . ." Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their company and to give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding. The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the "natural and primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth. There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed, although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as well. Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or inexistent marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their children. There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare is always the paramount consideration. The Court shares the view of the Solicitor General, who has recommended due course to the petition, that a few hours spent by petitioner with the children, however, could not all be that detrimental to the children. The Court appreciates the apprehensions of private respondent and their well-meant concern for the children; nevertheless, it seems

unlikely that petitioner would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a parent's natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it fit to understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case (can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the mother." WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED, reversing thereby the judgment of the appellate court which is hereby SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Vancil v. Belmes GR# 132223 / JUNE. 19, 2001 358 SCRA 707 Facts: Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2) children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes. Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC in Cebu a guardianship proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent who were 6 and 2 years old, respectively, claiming that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father‘s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00. On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr. On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had filed a similar petition for

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guardianship before the RTC in Pagadian City and asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing. Opposition was denied by RTC but was reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the parents should be given preferential right to be appointed as guardian over the persons and estate of the minors?

In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled: "The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents‘ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving grandparent."

Held:

Laxamana v. Laxamana GR# 144763 / SEPT. 3, 2002 388 SCRA 296

Yes.

FACTS:

The respondent, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right over that of petitioner to be his guardian. This ruling finds support in Article 211 of the Family Code which provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father‘s decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Petitioner and respondent got married on 1984 and was blessed with 3 children. All went well until the Petitioner became drug dependent. Petitioner underwent certain therapies and confinements. Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it became difficult for respondent and her children to live with him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent. Thus, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and transferred to the house of her relatives.

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to his custody. In SagalaEslao vs. Court of Appeals,4 this Court held: "Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‗the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood,‘ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship." Petitioner‘s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus: "Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

Petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the instant petition for habeas corpus praying for custody of his three children. Respondent opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement, the court issued an order granting visitation rights to petitioner and directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties further agreed to submit the case for resolution after the trial court‘s receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination. On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed decision awarding the custody of the three children to respondent and giving visitation rights to petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review.

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ISSUE: Whether the trial court considered the paramount interest and welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent.

training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to live with. There is no showing that the court ascertained the categorical choice of the children.

HELD: SC ruled that the instant case be REMANDED to the RTC for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of petitioner and respondent to take custody of their children. Pending the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with respondent but subject to petitioner‘s visitation rights. In controversies involving the care, custody and control of their minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing before the court who shall make the selection according to the best interest of the child. The child if over seven years of age may be permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as social and moral situations of the opposing parents. Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that said psychiatric report, which was the court‘s primary basis in awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the youth. While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that he is not yet ―completely cured‖ may render him unfit to take custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, education, as well as moral and intellectual

In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean further delay, the children‘s paramount interest demand that further proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of both petitioner and respondent to assume custody of their minor children.

Roehr v. Rodriguez GR# 142820 / JUNE. 30, 2003 404 SCRA 495 X X X X X

Viesca v. Gilinsky GR# 171698 / JULY. 04, 2007 526 SCRA 533 Facts: Petitioner and respondent, a Canadian citizen, met sometime in January 1999 at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel where the former worked as a hotel manager. On 22 October 2001, their son Louis Maxwell was born. On 30 October 2001, respondent executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity of the child. Subsequently, the Civil Registrar of Makati City issued a Certification granting the change of Louis Maxwell‘s surname from ―Viesca‖ to ―Gilinsky.‖ Unfortunately, the relationship between petitioner and respondent soured and they parted ways during the early part of 2003. On 6 February 2004, respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell at any time of any

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given day; he be entitled to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell during weekends and on such occasions the child shall be allowed to spend the night with his father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-week vacation in any destination with his child. During the pendency of respondent‘s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise agreement. Respondent alleged that petitioner had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend a night with him at any day of the week. Petitioner asserted that by approving respondent‘s prayer that he be given the right to enjoy Louis Maxwell‘s company ―every Friday of each week starting from 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. of the following day,‖ Judge Mariano altered Clause II(b) of the Compromise Judgment which states that ―(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the father once a week.‖ As the Compromise Judgment did not specifically provide for the day and time of the week when Louis Maxwell should be in the company of respondent, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction when it rendered its 16 June 2005 Order. Issue: WON the Order should be declared invalid as it violates the compromise agreement of the parties. Ruling: A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties. Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata, although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is decreed.

Clause II(b) states that ―(t)he child shall be allowed to spend the night with the father once a week.‖ The sentence seems simple enough to be understood by a layman. Petitioner claims that the parties did not specify the day and time of the week when private respondent could enjoy the overnight company of Louis Maxwell in order to give the parties ―some flexibility‖ and to give them the opportunity to arrange the schedule themselves. And yet, all of these could have been avoided had the parties opted to be more specific in their agreement. The question thus becomes: can the trial court modify, by motion of one of the parties, a Compromise Judgment? We hold in the negative.

Sy v. CA GR# 124518 / DEC. 17, 2007 541 SCRA 391 FACTS: On 19 January 1994, Mercedes Tan Uy-Sy filed a petition for habeas corpus against Wilson Sy. Mercedes prayed that said writ be issued ordering Wilson to produce their minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah and that after hearing, their care and custody be awarded to her. Wilson prayed that the custody of the minors be awarded to him instead. Wilson maintained that Mercedes was unfit to take custody of the minors first, because she abandoned her family in 1992; second, she is mentally unstable; and third, she cannot provide proper care to the children. RTC caused the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus and awarded custody of the children to Mercedes. Wilson appealed. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was not able to substantiate his contention that Mercedes was unfit to have custody of the children. On respondent‘s supposed abandonment of the family, the appellate court found instead that Mercedes had been driven away by Wilson's family because of religious differences.

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Mercedes' stay in Taiwan likewise could hardly be called abandonment as she had gone there to earn enough money to reclaim her children. Neither could her act of praying outdoors in the rain be considered as evidence of insanity as it may simply be an expression of one‘s faith. Regarding the allegation that Mercedes was unable to provide for a decent dwelling for the minors, to the contrary, the appellate court was satisfied with proof of her financial ability to provide her children with the necessities of life. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in awarding the custody of the minor children solely to Mercedes. HELD: There is no merit in the petition regarding the question of care and custody of the children. The applicable provision is Section 213 of the Family Code. In case of legal separation of the parents, the custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless otherwise directed by the court in the interest of the minor children. But when the husband and wife are living separately and apart from each other, without decree of the court, the court shall award the care, custody, and control of each child as will be for his best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent he prefers to live with if he is over seven (7) years of age unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness or poverty. In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. However, the law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mother‘s love and devotion for which there is no substitute. Generally, the love, solicitude and devotion of a mother cannot be

replaced by another and are worth more to a child of tender years than all other things combined.

Madriñan v. Madriñan GR# 159374 / JULY. 12, 2007 527 SCRA 487 X X X X X

Lim v. Lim GR# 163209 / OCT. 30, 2009 604 SCRA 691 X X X X X X

CHAPTER 2. SUBSTITUTE & SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Arts 216-219) St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos GR# 143363 / FEB. 6, 2002 376 SCRA 473 X X X

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CHAPTER 3. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PERSONS OF THE CHILDREN (Articles 220-224) Obedencio vs. Murillo A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753. February 5, 2004 Facts: On May 3, 2000, Obedencio and his wife assisted their 14year-old daughter, Licel, in filing with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, Hall of Justice in Cagayan de Oro City, a criminal complaint for rape allegedly committed upon her when she was 11 years old by her uncle, Dexter Z. Acenas. After the preliminary investigation, which the accused did not attend, the case was filed in respondent judge‘s sala. On May 25, 2001, following Licel‘s abduction from their house, Obedencio sought to secure from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise, respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier on May 22, 2001. According to respondent judge, Licel had come to court, accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Emmanuel Hallazgo. There she was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance. Obedencio specifically lamented the absence of any subpoena or notice of hearing from the court to him, his wife, or their counsel. He believes that since Prosecutor Hallazgo, Licel‘s maternal grandparents, and the accused are relatives, this fact contributed to the unjust dismissal of the case. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), through Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock, found respondent judge liable for ignorance of the law for unjustly dismissing the case.

should have known that Licel filed the criminal complaint with the assistance of her parents, who are her natural guardians.12 It was incumbent upon respondent judge to inquire into the reason behind their nonappearance before the court instead of simply relying on the bare explanation of the defense counsel that he and his client could not find Licel‘s parents.13 Respondent judge ought to remember that the accused, Dexter Acenas, is the maternal uncle of the victim. That Licel came to court with her maternal grandparents, and not her parents, on the day she was examined to affirm her affidavit of desistance, should have alerted respondent judge to be more circumspect. Being still a minor, Licel cannot fully comprehend for herself the impact and legal consequence of the affidavit of desistance. Given her tender age, the probability is that Licel succumbed to illicit influence and undue pressure on her to desist from pursuing her complaint. Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, on May 22, 2001, when she was presented before respondent‘s sala to affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have been executed with the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a minor is incompetent to execute such an instrument. The Rule on Examination of a Child Witness,14 which took effect on December 15, 2000, governs the examination of child witnesses who are victims of, accused of, or witnesses to a crime. In the absence or incapacity of the parents to be the guardian, Section 5 (a)15 of said rule provides that the court may appoint a guardian ad litem to promote the best interests of the child. This rule was already in effect when respondent judge dismissed the rape case on May 22, 2001.

Issue: W/N it is mandatory to give notice of hearing to Obedencio and his wife for the case involving their minor child. Held: Article 220(6)10 of the Family Code gives to complainant and his wife the right and duty to represent Licel in all matters affecting her interest. Thus, they were entitled to be notified and to attend every hearing on the case. As a judge, respondent is dutybound to acquaint himself with the cases pending before him.11 He

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CHAPTER 4. EFFECT OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY UPON THE PROPERTY OF THE CHILDREN (Articles 225-227) Lindain v. CA GR# 95305 / AUG. 20, 1992 212 SCRA 725

While defendants contend that the sale was valid, as the value of the property was less than P2,000, and, considering the ages of plaintiffs now, the youngest being 31 years old at the time of the filing of the complaint, their right to rescind the contract which should have been exercised four (4) years after reaching the age of majority, has already prescribed.

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the complaint for annulment of a sale of registered land, thereby reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City.

The RTC of San Jose City rendered a decision for the plaintiffs and declaring the Deed of Sale to be null and void.

When plaintiffs were still minors, they were already the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-63540. On November 7, 1966, their mother, Dolores Luluquisin, then already a widow and acting as guardian of her minor children, sold the land for P2,000 under a Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land to the defendants spouses Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila. The Deed of Absolute Sale was registered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Nueva Ecija. TCT No. NT-66311 was issued to the vendees, Apolonia Valiente and Federico Ila.

It upheld the sale and dismissed the complaint of the heirs who thereupon filed this petition for review alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court and in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in total disregard of the findings of facts of the trial court and contrary to the provisions of law on contracts and guardianship.

The defendants admitted that the property in question was sold to them by the mother of the minors as evidenced by a Deed of Sale and although at first they were reluctant to buy the property as the sale would not be legal, the registered owners thereof being all minors, upon advice of their counsel, the late Atty. Arturo B. Pascual, and the counsel of Dolores Luluquisin, Atty. Eustaquio Ramos, who notarized the documents, that the property could be sold without the written authority of the court, considering that its value was less than P2,000, they bought the property and had it registered in their names under Certificate of Title No. 66311. Plaintiffs contend that the sale of the lot by their mother to the defendants is null and void because it was made without judicial authority and/or court approval.

Upon appeal to the CA, the decision was reversed and another one was entered dismissing the complaint.

ISSUE: Whether judicial approval was necessary for the sale of the minors' property by their mother. HELD: Art. 320 of the New Civil Code, which was already in force when the assailed transaction occurred, provides: Art. 320.— The father, or in his absence the mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental authority. If the property is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond subject to the approval of the Court of First Instance. Under the law, a parent, acting merely as the legal (as distinguished from judicial) administrator of the property of his/her minor children, does not have the power to dispose of, or alienate, the property of said children without judicial approval. The powers and duties of the widow as legal administrator of her minor children's property as provided in Rule 84 by the Rules of Court entitled, "General Powers

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and Duties of Executors and Administrators" are only powers of possession and management. Her power to sell, mortgage, encumber or otherwise dispose of the property of her minor children must proceed from the court, as provided in Rule 89 which requires court authority and approval. The private respondents' allegation that they are purchasers in good faith is not credible for they knew from the very beginning that their vendor, the petitioners' mother, without court approval could not validly convey to them the property of her minor children. Knowing her lack of judicial authority to enter into the transaction, the private respondents acted in bad faith when they went ahead and bought the land from her anyway. One who acquires or purchases real property with knowledge of a defect in the title of his vendor cannot claim that he acquired title thereto in good faith as against the owner of the property or for an interest therein. The minors' action for reconveyance has not yet prescribed for "real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years" (Art. 1141, Civil Code). Since the sale took place in 1966, the action to recover the property had not yet prescribed when the petitioners sued in 1987. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and that of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City dated May 25, 1989, being correct, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

Pineda v. CA GR# 105562 / SEPT. 27, 1993 226 SCRA 754 Facts: On 23 September 1983, Prime Marine Services, Inc. (PMSI) procured Group PoIicy from Insular Life to provide life insurance coverage to its sea-based employees enrolled under the plan. On 17 February 1986 six covered employees of the PMSI perished at sea when their vessel sunk. They were survived by petitioners who are the beneficiaries under the policy. Petitioners sought to claim death

benefits due them and, for this purpose, they approached the President and GM of PMSI, Capt. Roberto Nuval. They were made to execute, with the exception of the spouses Alarcon, SPA authorizing Capt. Nuval to, among others, ―follow up, ask, demand, collect and receive" for their benefit indemnities of sums of money due them.‖ Unknown to them, however, the PMSI filed with Insular formal claims for and in behalf of the beneficiaries, through Capt. Nuval. On the basis of documents duly submitted, Insular issued six (6) checks amounting to P290K payable to the order of petitioners. On 3 July 1989, petitioners sought to recover their benefits from Insular but the latter denied their claim on the ground that its liability to petitioners was already extinguished upon delivery to and receipt by PMSI of the six (6) checks issued in their names. Petitioners filed a complaint against Insular before the Insurance Commission (IC). On 20 June 1990, the IC rendered its decision in favor of petitioners holding that: x x x Insular did not observe Section 180 of the Insurance Code, when it issued or released two checks in the amount of P150,000.00 for the three minor children (P50,000.00 each) of complainant, Dina Ayo and another check of P40,000.00 for minor beneficiary Marissa Lontok, daughter of another complainant Lucia Lontok, there being no showing of any court authorization presented or the requisite bond posted. Section 180 partly reads as follows: In the absence of a judicial guardian, the father, or in the latter's absence or incapacity, the mother of any minor, who is an insured or a beneficiary under a contract of life, health or accident insurance, may exercise, in behalf of said minor, any right, under the policy, without necessity of court authority or the giving of a bond where the interest of the minor in the particular act involved does not exceed twenty thousand pesos x x x On appeal, the CA reversed the IC ruling that the requirement in Section 180 of the Insurance Code has been amended by Art. 225 Family Code. Issue: Whether the decision of the CA was correct. Held: We cannot agree with the opinion of the public respondent that since the shares of the minors in the insurance proceeds are less than P50,000.00, then under Article 225 of the Family Code their mothers could receive such shares without need of either court appointments as guardian or the posting of a bond. It is of the view that said Article had repealed the third paragraph of Section 180 of the Insurance Code. The pertinent portion of Article 225 of the

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Family Code reads as follows: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. It is clear from the said Article that regardless of the value of the unemancipated common child's property, the father and mother ipso jure become the legal guardian of the child's property. However, if the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, a bond has to be posted by the parents concerned to guarantee the performance of the obligations of a general guardian. It must, however, be noted that the second paragraph of Article 225 of the Family Code speaks of the "market value of the property or the annual income of the child," which means, therefore, the aggregate of the child's property or annual income; if this exceeds P50,000.00, a bond is required. There is no evidence that the share of each of the minors in the proceeds of the group policy in question is the minor's only property. Without such evidence, it would not be safe to conclude that, indeed, that is his only property. (therefore, court authorization is needed)

Cabales v. CA GR# 162421 / AUG. 31, 2007 531 SCRA 691 FACTS: Rufino Cabales died on July 4, 1966 and left a 5,714-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Rizal, Sogod, Southern Leyte to his surviving wife Saturnina and children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco, Leonora, Alberto and petitioner Rito. On July 26, 1971, brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto sold the subject property to

Dr. Cayetano Corrompido for P2,000.00, with right to repurchase within eight (8) years. The three (3) siblings divided the proceeds of the sale among themselves, each getting a share of P666.66. The following month or on August 18, 1971, Alberto secured a note (―vale‖) from Dr. Corrompido in the amount of P300.00. In 1972, Alberto died leaving his wife and son, petitioner Nelson. On December 18, 1975, within the eight-year redemption period, Bonifacio and Albino tendered their payment of P666.66 each to Dr. Corrompido. But Dr. Corrompido only released the document of sale with pacto de retro after Saturnina paid for the share of her deceased son, Alberto, including his ―vale‖ of P300.00. On even date, Saturnina and her four (4) children Bonifacio, Albino, Francisco and Leonora sold the subject parcel of land to respondents-spouses Jesus and Anunciacion Feliano for P8,000.00. On December 30, 1985, Saturnina and her four (4) children executed an affidavit to the effect that petitioner Nelson would only receive the amount of P176.34 from respondents-spouses when he reaches the age of 21 considering that Saturnina paid Dr. Corrompido P966.66 for the obligation of petitioner Nelson‘s late father Alberto, i.e., P666.66 for his share in the redemption of the sale with pacto de retro as well as his ―vale‖ of P300.00. On July 24, 1986, 24-year old petitioner Rito Cabales acknowledged receipt of the sum of P1,143.00 from respondent Jesus Feliano, representing the former‘s share in the proceeds of the sale of subject property. In 1988, Saturnina died. Petitioner Nelson, then residing in Manila, went back to his father‘s hometown in Southern Leyte. That same year, he learned from his uncle, petitioner Rito, of the sale of subject property. In 1993, he signified his intention to redeem the subject land during a barangay conciliation process that he initiated and on 1995, petitioners filed before RTC a complaint of redemption of the subject land plus damages. RTC ruled against the petitioners. On appeal the CA modified the decision. It held that the sale by Saturnina of petitioner Rito‘s undivided share to the property was unenforceable for lack of authority or legal representation but that the contract was effectively ratified by petitioner Rito‘s receipt of the proceeds on July 24, 1986. The appellate court also ruled that petitioner Nelson is co-owner to

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the extent of one-seventh (1/7) of subject property as Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto‘s rights when she repurchased his share to the property. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in recognizing petitioner Nelson Cabales as co-owner of subject land but denied him the right of legal redemption and not recognizing petitioner Rito Cabales as co-owner of subject land with similar right of legal redemption. HELD: Explaining the nature of the sale, the SC rued that: The first sale with pacto de retro to Dr. Corrompido by the brothers and co-owners Bonifacio, Albino and Alberto was valid but only as to their pro-indiviso shares to the land. When Alberto died prior to repurchasing his share, his rights and obligations were transferred to and assumed by his heirs, namely his wife and his son, petitioner Nelson. But the records show that it was Saturnina, Alberto‘s mother, and not his heirs, who repurchased for him. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Saturnina was not subrogated to Alberto‘s or his heirs‘ rights to the property when she repurchased the share. Upon redemption from Dr. Corrompido, the subject property was resold to respondents-spouses by the co-owners. Petitioners Rito and Nelson were then minors and as indicated in the Deed of Sale, their shares in the proceeds were held in trust by respondentsspouses to be paid and delivered to them upon reaching the age of majority. As to petitioner Rito, the contract of sale was unenforceable under Article 1403 of the Civil Code as she did not have the legal authority to do so. Saturnina as the legal guardian only has the plenary power of administration of the minor‘s property. It does not include the power of alienation which needs judicial authority. However, when he acknowledged receipt of the proceeds of the sale on July 24, 1986, petitioner Rito effectively ratified it. This act of ratification rendered the sale valid and binding as to him.

With respect to petitioner Nelson, on the other hand, the contract of sale was void. He was a minor at the time of the sale. Saturnina or any and all the other co-owners were not his legal guardians with judicial authority to alienate or encumber his property. It was his mother who was his legal guardian and, if duly authorized by the courts, could validly sell his undivided share to the property. Consequently, petitioner Nelson and his mother retained ownership over their undivided share of subject property. Petitioners may redeem the subject property from respondentsspouses but they failed to do so within thirty days from notice in writing of the sale by their co-owners vendors. In the instant case, the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sale was made in 1978. We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioner Nelson was a minor when the sale was perfected. Nevertheless, the records show that in 1988, petitioner Nelson, then of majority age, was informed of the sale of subject property. Moreover, it was noted by the appellate court that petitioner Nelson was likewise informed thereof in 1993 and he signified his intention to redeem subject property during a barangay conciliation process. But he only filed the complaint for legal redemption and damages on January 12, 1995, certainly more than thirty days from learning about the sale. Further, the sale as to the undivided share of petitioner Rito became valid and binding upon his ratification on July 24, 1986. Petitioner Nelson, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, can no longer redeem subject property. But he and his mother remain coowners thereof with respondents-spouses. Accordingly, title to subject property must include them.

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CHAPTER 5. SUSPENSION OR TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Arts 228-233) Silva vs. CA GR# 114742 / JULY. 17, 1997 275 SCRA 206 X X X X Bondagjy vs. Bondagjy GR# 140817 / DEC. 07, 2001 371 SCRA 64 Facts: Respondent Fouzi (then 31 years of age) and Sabrina (then 20 years of age) were married on February 3,1988, at the Manila Hotel, Ermita, Manila under Islamic rites. Out of their union, they begot two (2) children, namely, Abdulaziz, born on June 13, 1989,2 and Amouaje, born on September 29, 1990. Sometime in December 1995, the children lived in the house of Sabrina's mother in 145 Tanguile Street, Ayala Alabang. Fouzi alleged that he could not see his children until he got an order from the court. Even with a court order, he could only see his children in school at De La Salle-Zobel, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Respondent alleged that on various occasions Sabrina was seen with different men at odd hours in Manila, and that she would wear short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and bathing suits. Such clothing is detestable under Islamic law on customs. Fouzi claimed that Sabrina let their children sweep their neighbor's house for a fee of P40.00 after the children come home from school. Whenever Fouzi sees them in school, the children would be happy to see him but they were afraid to ride in his car. Instead, they would ride the jeepney in going home from school. He filed a petition before the Shari' a District Court for the custody of his children in which it ruled that Sabrina is unworthy to care for her children.

Ruling: The burden is upon respondent to prove that petitioner is not worthy to have custody of her children. We find that the evidence presented by the respondent was not sufficient to establish her unfitness according to Muslim law or the Family Code. What determines the fitness of any parent is the ability to see to the physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the children, and the ability to give them a healthy environment as well as physical and financial support taking into consideration the respective resources and social and moral situations of the parents. The record shows that petitioner is equally financially capable of providing for all the needs of her children. The children went to school at De La Salle Zobel School, Muntinlupa City with their tuition paid by petitioner according to the school's certification. We do not doubt the capacity and love of both parties for their children, such that they both want to have them in their custody. Either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. In cases where both parties cannot have custody because of their voluntary separation, we take into consideration the circumstances that would lead us to believe which parent can better take care of the children. Although we see the need for the children to have both a mother and a father, we believe that petitioner has more capacity and time to see to the children's needs. Respondent is a businessman whose work requires that he go abroad or be in different places most of the time. Under P.D. No. 603, the custody of the minor children, absent a compelling reason to the contrary, is given to the mother.

Issue: WON the Shari‘ a Court erred in ruling that Sabrina is unworthy to care for her children.

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Title X. FUNERAL (Articles 305 -310, NCC) Title XII. CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN (Articles 356 – 363, NCC) PD 603 – “The Child and Youth Welfare Code” RA 9262 (Anti Violence against Women and Children [VAWC]) and IRR; RA 9523

Title XIII. USE OF SURNAMES (Articles 364-380, NCC) RA 9255 – “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father (Amending Art. 176 of the Family Code)”; IRR of 9255 Passport Law (RA 8239) De la Cruz v. Gracia GR# 177728 / July 31, 2009 594 SCRA 648 FACTS: For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique‘s parents at Teresa, Rizal. On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique‘s parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz "Aquino" at Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the child‘s birth, using Dominique‘s surname Aquino, with the Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the child‘s Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique‘s father Domingo Butch Aquino. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled "AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique,

during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, acknowledging that he is the father of Jenie‘s unborn child. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie‘s application for registration of the child‘s name because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child (either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 – Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity – or the Authority to Use the Surname of the Father). Jenie and the child filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against respondent before the RTC of Antipolo City. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the child‘s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255, which permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child‘s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. The trial court, however, dismissed the complaint "for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines "private handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as an instrument executed in the handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes paternity to the child. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: WON the unsigned handwritten statement of the deceased father of the minor can be considered as a recognition of paternity in a ―private handwritten instrument‖ within the contemplation of Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, which entitles the said minor to use his father‘s surname.

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HELD: Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child‘s paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature, thus: Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners. In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique‘s Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. In Herrera v. Alba, the Court summarized the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code and the Rules on Evidence which include provisions on pedigree under Sections 39 and 40 of Rule 130. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the

writing must be the writing of the putative father. In the case at bar, there is no dispute

Remo v. Sec of Foreign Affairs GR No. 169202 March 5, 2010 X X X X X X

Title XIV. ABSENCE (Articles 381-396, NCC) See Article 41 FC; Rule 107, 1997 Revised Rules of Court Arts. 774 & 777; Art. 1456; Arts 22, 2142-2175; Wills & Succession Chapter 1. Provisional Measures in Case of Absence Chapter 2. Declaration of Absence Chapter 3. Administration of the Property of the Absentee Chapter 4. Presumption of Death Chapter 5. Effect of Absence Upon the Contingent Rights of the Absentee

Valdez v. Republic GR# 180863 / SEPT. 08, 2009 598 SCRA 646 X X X X

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Title X. EMANCIPATION AND AGE OF MAJORITY See RA 6809; 2176 & 2180 NCC Title XVI. CIVIL REGISTER (NCC) See RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law) and Implementing Rules and Regulations See Rules 103 & 108, 1997 Revised Rules of Court Republic v. Bolante GR# 160597 / JULY. 20, 2006 495 SCRA 729

X X X X X X

Republic v. Kho GR# 170340 / JUNE. 29, 2007 526 SCRA177 Facts: On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira (surnamed Kho) filed before the RTC of Butuan City a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some entries in their birth certificates. In the case of Carlito and his siblings, he requested the correction in his birth certificate of the citizenship of his mother to Filipino instead of Chinese, as well as the deletion of the word married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because his parents, Juan Kho and Epifania Inchoco (Epifania), were allegedly not legally married.

With respect to the birth certificates of Carlitos children, he prayed that the date of his and his wife‘s marriage be corrected from April 27, 1989 to January 21, 2000, the date appearing in their marriage certificate. On April 23, 2001, Carlito et al. filed an Amended Petitionin which it was additionally prayed that Carlitos second name of John be deleted from his record of birth;and that the name and citizenship of Carlitos father in his (Carlitos) marriage certificate be corrected from John Kho to Juan Kho and Filipino to Chinese, respectively. By Decision of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in the record of birth of Carlito, as follows: (1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino; (2) delete John from his name; and (3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents. The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy Nona, and Heddy Moira. Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc (Marivel) as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name Maribel as Marivel. With respect to the marriage certificate of Carlito and Marivel, the corrections ordered pertained to the alteration of the name of Carlitos father from John Kho to Juan Kho and the latters citizenship from Filipino to Chinese. Petitioner, Republic of the Philippines, appealed the RTC Decision to the CA, faulting the trial court in granting the petition for correction of entries in the subject documents despite the failure of respondents to implead the minors mother, Marivel, as an indispensable party and to offer sufficient evidence to warrant the corrections with regard to the questioned married status of Carlito and his siblings parents, and the latters citizenship. The CA found that Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which outlines the proper procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry, was observed in the case. Issue: W/N the changes sought by respondents were substantial in nature, hence could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel and respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.

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Held: It can not be gainsaid that the petition, insofar as it sought to change the citizenship of Carlitos mother as it appeared in his birth certificate and delete the married status of Carlitos parents in his and his siblings respective birth certificates, as well as change the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel involves the correction of not just clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature. Rather, the changes entail substantial and controversial amendments. In Republic v. Valencia, however, this Court ruled, and has since repeatedly ruled, that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108. The effect of Republic Act No. 9048 is to make possible the administrative correction of clerical or typographical errors or change of first name or nickname in entries in the civil register, leaving to Rule 108 the correction of substantial changes in the civil registry in appropriate adversarial proceedings. Thus, when all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.The decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. As such, indespensible parties such as Marivel and respondent‘s mother need not be impleaded. Silverio v. Republic GR# 174689 / OCT. 19, 2007 537 SCRA 373 FACTS: When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once,

then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a person‘s sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual. Feeling trapped in a man‘s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that petitioner had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

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An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People‘s Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner. The Court is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner‘s misfortune to be trapped in a man‘s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition. Judgment was rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner‘s first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioner‘s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic, granting the Republic‘s petition and setting aside the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: Whether the change of name and sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex reassignment is allowed by law

HELD: Petitioner claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. A Person‘s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname

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which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioner‘s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one‘s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner‘s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

The petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner‘s first name was not within that court‘s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner‘s petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment The determination of a person‘s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: xxx xxx xxx (3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the

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change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

A person‘s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person‘s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner‘s cause. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied) Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person‘s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil

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registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioner‘s petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry,

where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Petitioner pleads that "the unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and the realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Cagandahan GR# 166676 / SEPT. 12, 2008 565 SCRA 72 Facts: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. She alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. To prove her claim, Jennifer presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the

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Department of Psychiatry, UP-PGH, stating that she was suffering from CAH. He explained that genetically, respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs — female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her. The RTC ruled in favor of Jennifer and ordered the changes of entries in her birth certificate: 1) the name ―Jennifer‖ to ―Jeff‖ and 2) gender from ―female‖ to ―male‖. Subsequently, the OSG appealed the RTC‘s decision, arguing it was a violation of Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar (an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries). The OSG further contends that the petition is fatally defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2 (b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, Jennifer counters that she has substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether Jennifer substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court. Held: Yes. There is substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar. The determination of a person's sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ―No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.‖ Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the

correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. Respondent undisputedly has CAH. CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. We are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth

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inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one's sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. In so ruling, we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondent's congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

On 8 March 1995, Nieves Baldos filed in the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, cancellation of the late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth. She claimed that Reynaldo was not really her son. RTC ruled in favour of Reynaldo as the documents adduced on record are the best evidence of the parties‘ relationship. Nieves appealed to the CA. She insisted that the late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth was contrary to Presidential Decree No. 651 (P.D. No. 651). CA affirmed RTC. ISSUE: Whether the late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth is valid. HELD:

As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

Baldos v. CA GR# 170645 / July 9, 2010 624 SCRA 615 FACTS: Reynaldo Pillazar, alias Reynaldo Baldos, was born on 30 October 1948. However, his birth was not registered in the office of the local civil registrar until roughly 36 years later or on 11 February 1985. His certificate of live birth indicated Nieves Baldos as his mother and Bartolome Baldos as his father. Nieves Baldos also appeared as the informant on the certificate of live birth.

SC affirmed CA. Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the coverage of P.D. No. 651, as amended. The late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth falls under Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Civil Registry Law, which took effect on 27 February 1931. As a general law, Act No. 3753 applies to the registration of all births, not otherwise covered by P.D. No. 651, as amended, occurring from 27 February 1931 onwards. Considering that the late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth took place in 1985, National Census Statistics Office (NCSO) Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1983 governs the implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case. Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered in the office of the local civil registrar within 30 days from the time of birth. Any report of birth made beyond the reglementary period is considered delayed. The local civil registrar, upon receiving an application for delayed registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least ten days a notice of the pending application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the registration and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be registered, he should register the same.

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Reynaldo‘s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have gone through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only on 8 March 1995, after the lapse of ten long years from the approval on 11 February 1985 of the application for delayed registration of Reynaldo‘s birth, that Nieves registered her opposition. She should have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo. At the time of her application for delayed registration of birth, Nieves claimed that Reynaldo was her son. Between the facts stated in a duly registered public document and the flip-flopping statements of Nieves, we are more inclined to stand by the former. Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for petitioners who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity. Petitioners miserably failed to do so. Thus, the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly denied for lack of merit the petition to cancel the late registration of Reynaldo‘s birth.

Corpus v. Sto. Tomas GR# 186571 / Aug 11, 2010 628 SCRA 266 X X X X X X X X

Republic v. Mercadera GR # 186027 / Dec. 8, 2010 637 SCRA 654 Facts: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048). Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. ―Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied‖ and removes ―correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil register from the ambit of Rule 108.‖ The Local Civil registrar refused to grant the prayer. In the RTC, the Court ruled in favor of Mercadera. The OSG interposed and appealed to the decision of the lower Court. The OSG posits that the conversion from ―MARILYN‖ to ―MERLYN‖ is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. The CA was not convinced and affirmed RTC order.

Issue: WON the change of name of Marilyn to Merlyn proper under Rule 108 in the case at bar. Ruling: In Republic v. Valencia, the Court insofar as substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. ―If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary

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procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.‖ The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means ―to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from.‖ To change means ―to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.‖ In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P. Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters ―ch‖ for the letter ―d,‖ so that what appears as ―Midael‖ as given name would read ―Michael.‖ In the latter case, this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was plainly clerical, such that, ―changing the name of the child from ‗Midael C. Mazon‘ to ‗Michael C. Mazon‘ cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog, himig).‖ Thus CA ruling is hereby affirmed.

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