assignment.docx

EN BANC [G.R. No. L-22257. May 25, 1977.] GO YU TAK WAI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, VIRGILIO GASTON and MARCIAL RAÑOLA, in their capacity as Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, respectively, composing the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration, respondents-appellants. Ponente: AQUINO, J. FACTS: On November 8, 1961 Go Yu Tak Wai arrived in Manila on board a plane of the Cathay Pacific Airways. She is a widow. She was provided with a passport issued by the Commissioner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China stationed at Macao. Stamped on that passport was her immigration non quota visa issued by the Philippine consulate at Hongkong. On March 22, 1962 a Board of Special Inquiry, investigated the application of Go Yu Tak Wai for admission as a returning resident. The Board found that the applicant arrived in the Philippines for the first time in 1930 with her late husband, Jose Go, a permanent resident who operated a store at Villalobos Street, Manila. In 1941 the spouses left for China. Jose Go died in 1948 in Amoy, China. Due to the war and the occupation of China by the communists, the applicant was not able to return to the Philippines. Chua Guat, a Chinese resident who allegedly managed Go's store in his absence, and Arsenio Clarin, a Filipino who allegedly prepared the travel papers of the Go spouses in October, 1941, corroborated the claim of Go Yu Tak Wai that she was a returning resident. The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that Go Yu Tak Wai had satisfactorily proven her right to admission as a returning resident notwithstanding her twenty-year absence from the Philippines and the fact that she had no re-entry permit. After due deliberation, they voted to exclude Go Yu Tak Wai. ISSUE: Whether, for purposes of section 27(b) of the Immigration Law, a resolution of the Commissioners which reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and which was adopted within one year from the promulgation of the said decision is sufficient. HELD: This Court had already held that "the operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and

adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed" because "the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted. Necessarily, the extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of Special inquiry". It follows that the trial court's decision should be reversed. However, only six (6) Justices (Fernando, Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion Jr., Martin, JJ. and the writer) voted for reversal. RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 27(b) specifies that as a rule the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry "shall be promulgated and the findings and recommendations, in proper cases, submitted not later than two days from the date of the deliberation". The absence of such a requirement with respect to the decision of the Board of Commissioners supports the view that such decision need not be promulgated within the one-year period. It suffices that the Commissioners should review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and deliberate upon it within one year from the promulgation of the Board of Special Inquiry's decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory period. OBITER DICTUM: As noted by the Solicitor General, section 27(c) expressly requires that the decision of the Commissioners in case of an appeal from the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, excluding an alien, should "be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision". In contrast, no such requirement is provided for in section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioners' decision in case they motu proprio review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. The trial court erred in holding that under section 27(b) a written decision should be signed and promulgated by the Commissioners within one year from the promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry. WHEREFORE, for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial court's decision, the same is considered affirmed. The Court has found it unnecessary to hold a rehearing. No costs. TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting: I dissent on the ground that it is patent from section 21 (b) of the Immigration Act as cited on pages 4-5 of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Aquino that "the decision of any two members of the Board [of Special

Inquiry] shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision." The Act's provisions as well as public policy support such a construction that requires that a resolution or decision of the Board of Commissioners on a review motu proprio of the special inquiry board's decision (whether of admission or exclusion) must be put in writing and promulgated with due notice on the party affected within the statutory one-year period of finality. On the provisions of law involved, section 27 (b) of the Act provides mandatorily that "the decision of the board of special inquiry shall be promulgated and the findings and recommendation, in proper cases, submitted not later than two days from the date of deliberation." Section 27 (c) likewise provides for a summary period of seven days from submittal for decision within which the Board of Commissioners shall put in writing and promulgate its decision on an appeal of the alien or of a dissenting member of the board of special inquiry. Read in context, it seems obvious that the decision on a review motu proprio by the Board of Commissioners must be no less than a decision on appeal by either party, viz, it must be duly put in writing and promulgated within the more than adequate one year period fixed by the Act. Public policy and due process buttress such a construction. Where the alien has appealed from an adverse decision or a dissenting special inquiry board member has appealed a favorable decision, the applicant for admission knows as mandated by the law that a final decision must be handed down within seven days from submittal of the appeal for decision. Where there has been no appeal and the Board of Commissioners conducts a review motu proprio of which the applicant is likely unaware, both public policy and due process demand that where no adverse decision is promulgated within the statutory one-year period of finality, the decision of the special inquiry board shall have become final and beyond the Commissioners' authority to reverse or set aside thereafter. Such a view is certainly in consonance with law's policy of a definite date of fixed finality of the special inquiry board's decision — be it of inclusion or exclusion of an alien — and to reduce to the minimum any opportunity or occasion for anomalies and irregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens and applicants for admission under the procedures for appeal or review motu proprio established by the Act.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-28107. March 15, 1977.] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff , vs. TOMAS NAVASCA, FLORENCIO GERALDES, LORENZO SOBERANO and MANUEL MARQUEZ, defendants. PER CURIAM: FACTS: On December 18, 1962, Tomas Navasca, Florencio Geraldes, Lorenzo Soberano and Manuel Marquez were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide committed by a band before the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, the information reading as follows: That on or about March 17, 1959, in the Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above mentioned accused, all armed with deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, and with intent to gain and by means of force upon things and violence against persons, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally take, steal and carry away the sum of One Thousand Eight Hundred (P1,800.00) Pesos belonging to Go So alias OWA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount, and on the same occasion thereof, and in pursuance of said conspiracy, the above mentioned accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and shoot said GO SO alias OWA, thereby inflicting upon him injuries which caused his death. Before arraignment, the commitment of the accused Tomas Navasca to the National Mental Hospital was ordered and proceedings against him suspended after the court had adjudged him as suffering from mental disorder, on the strength of the report and recommendation of a courtappointed doctor, and after the court had satisfied itself "that he cannot understand the nature of the proceedings to be conducted against him."

Due trial proceeded against the remaining accused. ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of the crime robbery with homicide committed by a band. HELD: The evidence for the prosecution clearly established that the members of the band committed the crime of robbery on the occasion of which a homicide was committed, thus classifying the crime as one of robbery with homicide. It has also been established that the aggravating circumstance of band attended the commission of the crime and none of the members thereof attempted to prevent the same. The state of the evidence for the prosecution being such, we now assay the defense of the accused. The defense of all the accused is anchored on the inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession of Florencio Geraldes and the extra-judicial admission of Lorenzo Soberano on the ground that these were obtained by force and promise of freedom and hence, involuntary. As we have mentioned earlier, it does not behoove this Court to determine the voluntariness or involuntariness of both extra-judicial statements, it being enough that other evidence adduced at the trial fulfill the required quantum of evidence to convict the accused. Likewise, we have found that the extra-judicial statement of Soberano contains the indicia of voluntariness and his testimony in the court as prosecution witness negates the suspicion of a promise of freedom. Woven together with the other evidence of the prosecution, the pattern for the crime has thus been formed, and the claim of Soberano as to the involuntariness of his admission as well as that of his testimony must fall. Considering the length of time that has elapsed from the time the accused Tomas Navasca was committed to the National Mental Hospital, the Director of the said hospital should now conduct a full-blown examination of the mental state of the said accused for the purpose of determining his mental capacity to stand trial, and thereafter submit the proper report and recommendations to this Court. RATIO DECIDENDI: The crime established by the evidence for the prosecution is robbery with homicide attended by the aggravating circumstance of band. The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. The crime having been committed by a band, all the members thereof are liable for each of the assaults committed. No evidence was adduced by any of the accused that he had attempted to prevent the commission of the crime, hence all must be held liable for the crime of

robbery with homicide. There being one aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance to offset the same in the case of Florencio Geraldes and Manuel Marquez, the penalty of death was correctly imposed on them. The act of testifying for the prosecution, by Lorenzo Soberano should be considered in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a plea of guilty, hence there exist in the case of Lorenzo Soberano, one mitigating circumstance and one aggravating circumstance which offset each other. Consequently, Lorenzo Soberano was properly sentenced to reclusion perpetua. OBITER DICTUM: In the case of People vs. Apduhan, it is held that if the crime of robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be robbery with homicide with the aggravating circumstance of band and not robbery in band with homicide.

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. L-44323. March 2, 1977.] ELENA GENOBIAGON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO LAYOS, respondents. Ponente: AQUINO, J. FACTS: Antonio Layos sued Elena Genobiagon in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for the partition of a lot located at Cebu City with an area of 403 square meters, together with the building thereon. Layos alleged that he owned nine-tenths (9/10) of the property because he purchased that portion from Elena's mother, two brothers and sister, and that Elena owned one-tenth (1/10) thereof. Elena Genobiagon alleged in her answer that she owned more than one-tenth of the land and that Layos has no cause of action against her. She assumed that her parents, Flavia Sosas and Felipe Genobiagon, were married. The trial court in its decision found that Flavia Sosas bought the lot in 1953 on the installment basis. After paying all the installments, she secured

in 1960 a title in her name for the said lot. She sold the property to Layos in 1973. The trial court also found that when Flavia Sosas acquired the lot she was no longer living with Felipe Genobiagon. The trial court concluded that the lot in question belonged exclusively to Flavia Sosas and was not jointly owned by her and her common-law husband, Felipe, and that Layos acquired full ownership thereof when he purchased it from Flavia. From the trial court's adverse decision, Elena Genobiagon perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals. That Court, on Layos' motion, dismissed her appeal on the ground that her eight-page mimeographed brief does not contain any page references to the record and does not even have any statement of facts. ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal of the petitioner. HELD: The Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction in dismissing the appeal of Elena Genobiagon because her brief does not contain a statement of facts with page references to the record. It would be absurd to say that the Court of Appeals, in applying section 1[g] of Rule 50, gravely abused its discretion. RATIO DECIDENDI: Elena Genobiagon's appeal by certiorari to this Court is devoid of merit. The dismissal resolution of the Court of Appeals is based on section 16[d] Rule 46 of the Rules of Court which provides that the appellant's brief shall contain in the "'statement of facts', a clear and concise statement in a narrative form of the facts admitted by both parties and of those in controversy, together with the substance of the proof relating thereto in sufficient detail to make it clearly intelligible, with page reference to the record." Section 1[g], Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, for want "of page references to the record as required in section 16[d] of Rule 46." OBITER DICTUM: Elena Genobiagon's eight-page brief shows that her counsel has not understood the trial court's decision. For example, in the first assignment of

error, her counsel argues that the trial court erred in not declaring that Flavia Sosas and Felipe Genobiagon were not legally married. That contention is wrong because, as already noted, the trial court found that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant had presented in evidence any marriage contract or marriage certificate of Flavia (Sosas) Genobiagon and Felipe Genobiagon. That means that the trial court found that Flavia Sosas and Felipe Genobiagon were not married. BARREDO, J., concurring: Reading Section 1 (g) of Rule 50, on Dismissal of Appeal, together with Section 16 (d) of Rule 46, which states that among other requisites, the appellant's brief shall contain a Statement of Facts, with page references to the record, it is very clear that even if a Statement of Facts is made in appellant's brief, omission of the corresponding page references to the record is a ground for dismissal addressed to the sound discretion of the court. I hold that this ground of dismissal is not mandatory and may be overlooked when the circumstances of any given case demand a different course of action in order not to defeat the ends of justice. But when there is a complete omission of the Statement of Facts, the rule should be otherwise. In such a situation, it is obvious that there is not only a literal violation of the rules — there is manifest evidence of gross indifference of counsel to the lawyer's duty to duly present the case of his client in a brief, simple and comprehensible manner that would enable the court to have adequate basis for action, without having to meander by itself into the mazy labyrinths of the records without chart or compass, spending in doing so precious time and effort which it could otherwise devote to other cases, with the consequent corresponding impairment of the interests of justice as to everyone concerned. prLL Because of the fact that petitioner's one-tenth interest in the land in controversy was annotated in the title, her ownership of such fraction thereof may not be ignored as part of the indefeasibility of the title itself. By her own acts at the pre-trial, as recounted in the main opinion, she has laid whatever right could spring in her favor from such annotation open, to doubt, and with the fatal faults above-discussed of her brief, it stands to reason that no inequity can result even if the controversy were laid to rest where the Court of Appeals has buried it.