Articule - Egypt and Phoenicia in the Persian Period Partners in Trade and Rebellion - Betlyon John W

EGYPT AND PHOENICIA IN THE PERSIAN PERIOD: PARTNERS IN TRADE AND REBELLION

EGYPT AND PHOENICIA IN THE PERSIAN PERIOD: PARTNERS IN TRADE AND REBELLION

John W. Betlyon

I. Introduction The close connections between Egypt and Phoenicia are well documented as far back as the Late Bronze age, if not further. The Lebanon range of mountains was an important source for timber, and cities like Byblos were famous for their purple dye valued by Near Eastern and Egyptian royalty. Trade between the Nile Delta and the Canaanite city-states of the Levant followed the political and military developments of the time. In the Iron Age and Persian Periods, both Egypt and Phoenicia sought commercial power and stability-nothing more, nothing less. The changes which engulfed the region after the fall of Assyria swept the merchants of the eastern Mediterranean along with them. Once partners in trade, Egypt and Phoenicia would find themselves enemies in war and allies in rebellion by the time Alexander's Hellenistic armies took overall control.

II. Persian Conquests and Administration: ca. 539-470 BCE By 574 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar ruled the Near East from Babylon. Although he attempted to conquer Lower Egypt, his efforts failed. Providing for his army across long desert supply lines meant certain failure. Had the Babylonian king sought and favored Bedouin assistance in his Egyptian campaign, he might well have been successful. By the end of his reign, problems in the North preoccupied his mind, including the threat of war between Cyxares of Medea and Alyattes of Lydia. Nebuchadnezzar negotiated a truce between the two sides, and put himself in a position of power and political leverage in the region (Roux 1992:380). But reaching that point had not been easy. Egypt did not hide its anti-Babylonian position. In 592 BCE, Psammetichus II led a procession of his priests, court, and army to Philistia and Judah. Then they traveled up the coast to Tyre and Byblos, "to lift the spirits of the anti-Babylonian resistance and to cement alliances" (Redford 1992: 464). Phoenician city-states continued to supply timber to build ships, and Judah was to be the focal point of Babylonian oppo-

sition in the southern Levant. But Psammetichus II fell ill, and died in 589 BCE. His successor and son, Wahibre (called Apries by the Greeks), immediately went to Sidon to raise more support for the resistance. It was in this context that Nebuchadnezzar launched his 588 campaign against Judah-a campaign well documented in the ostraca written in Hebrew, found in Lachish (Stratum II). The ostraca show vividly that the Judeans could not defeat the Babylonians without Egyptian military aid. Apries marched with an expeditionary force in the fall of 588 (Torczyner 1938; Albright 1969: 321). The Babylonian response, however, was swift and strong, intimidating Apries and forcing the Egyptians to withdraw without helping Jerusalem-and Zedekiah-withstand Nebuchadnezzar's forces (Redford 1992: 466). Judean fortresses-such as Mezad Hashavyahu and Tel Kakbri-were lost to the Babylonians along with their East Greek mercenaries, and Nebuchadnezzar's victory was complete (Niemeier 2001: 22-23). Nothing stood in the way of his total domination of the eastern Mediterranean seaboard. But Nebuchadnezzar had other problems to deal with only a few years later. After Jerusalem fell in 587/586 BCE, the Judean Gedaliah was put in power as "governor" acting on behalf of the Neo-Babylonian throne. He ruled with NeoBabylonian protection from Mizpah (identified with Tell enNasbeh just north of Jerusalem). Although there were probably Babylonian soldiers protecting him, an armed band of Judeans attacked and killed him in 582 BCE. Nebuchadnezzar was forced to campaign a third time in Judah (after 596 and 587/6) to restore order (Bright 1986:344-346; Wiseman 1983:38; Galling 1964:51ff). This action probably did not require massive military force. Judah, as recent studies have shown, was in a state of complete collapse and disrepair following the terrible wars of Babylonian conquest in 597/6 and 587/6 BCE. Many people had already been deported to places in Babylonia. As in Assyrian times, deportation was the punishment reserved for those who stood in the way of imperial policy (Oded 1979: 43). The Babylonians did things differently than the Assyrians. The Assyrian rulers built fortresses and assigned troops to carry on "military operations other than war," operations which reestablished the peace and built inter-

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nal security. These operations also supported the rulers chosen to govern the provinces (Betlyon forthcoming). The Babylonians' rise to power had been so meteoric. Babylon went from being a province of the Neo-Assyrian Empire to ruling the Mediterranean world in a very short time period. The Babylonians may not have been ready to take on this great responsibility. Nebuchadnezzar appears to have been a man "in the right place at the right time" (Cf. Sack 1978). But his successors were ill prepared for the responsibilities they faced. In short, Babylonian policies of conquest, which included the wholesale destruction of Jerusalem, Lachish, and other parts of the region, were ill-fitted to a scheme of imperial administration in a post-war Levant. Judah was so weakened that the population appears to have been reduced by nearly 70% due to the military activities of the 590's and 580's (Carter 1999: 246-248). Except for the large public building at Tell en-Nasbeh, there is little evidence of public administration or possible military occupation in this southern Levantine region. Although the Babylonians did fortify regions in the north and east, military concerns in the south focused on attacking Egypt -an attack which failed. Babylonian governance differed significantly from Neo-Assyrian rule. Only a few military posts were occupied by troops (such as Mizpeh) and there is no evidence of substantial rebuilding in Judah to reinvigorate the economy. Instead, a unique pattern of Babylonian "administration" was established in the southern Levant. It was a laissez-faire approach to provincial governance. So long as tribute was being paid, the Babylonians appear to have allowed provinces to rule themselves. The border incursions and rebellions which erupted in the wake of the Neo-Assyrian collapse were contained by the 550's BCE. Nebuchadnezzar's successorsAmel-marduk, Nerglissar, Labashi-Marduk, and Nabonidushowever, were weak and too often corrupt. These rulers do not seem to have learned the "tricks" of Neo-Assyrian statecraft, which insisted on loyalty to the throne and assistance to help rebuild economies (Oded 1979: 43; Stern 2000: 46-47). However, Nabu-na'id had other pressing concerns. He was keenly aware of his nation's religious traditions leading him to excavate the ruins of the temenu of the Temple of Marduk in Babylon and rebuild it. He also focused on remodelling the Temple of Sin in Harran, to which he had a significant family attachment (Beaulieu 1989:205ff.; Roux 1992:381-382). Nabonidus was devout, but there is little evidence to suggest that he was politically or militarily astute or aware of the implications of his "benign neglect" of imperial problems. His son was unable to control affairs in the Babylon while his father was resident and campaigning in the faraway Arabian oasis of Tema. Nabonidus' invitation to the Persians to expel the Medes from Harran simply invited them to pursue further action in the region. But there were also the mid-sixth century economic problems, such as double-digit inflation, which also significantly contributed to Babylon's downfall (Saggs 1962:147-148, 261ff.). Cyrus conducted a series of successful campaigns to enlarge his Persian kingdom. He turned west into Lydia, occu-

pying Cilicia. Breaking his alliance with the Babylonians, he established Persian hegemony over the northern parts of Mesopotamia, and the East Greek cities of Ionia and Asia Minor. Before turning south, Cyrus solidified his hold on the Eastern frontier, taking Parthia, Aria, Sogdia, and Bactria (Roux 1992:385). By the time Cyrus moved on Babylon, a Babylonian proPersian party was lobbying for peaceful submission to his rule. Some ancient sources depict him as Babylon's "savior," who restored traditional religion and freed Babylon from the oppression of their own ruling family. Cyrus' attack came in the fall of 539 BCE. Babylon fell without a fight, the god Marduk marching beside Cyrus to occupy the city (Grayson 1975: 109-110; Beaulieu 1989:228-229). Acting immediately, Cyrus extended Persia's borders to the West, launching forays into Egypt and throughout Asia Minor. Cyrus was unsuccessful in the Nile Delta. But his successors, Cambyses and Darius I, carried on the fight later in the sixth century. Persian policies toward her subject people seemed to allow certain "freedoms," such as returning from exile to their homelands. The most famous example of this policy is the edict of Cyrus, recorded in Ezra 1, which dictated that the Jews would be permitted to return from Babylon to Yehud. Cyrus was neither an innovator nor a particularly benign ruler, as recent studies have shown (Hoglund 1992: 23; van der Spek 1982: 278-283). But from the perspective of the biblical writer, Cyrus' actions came about when "Yahweh stirred up the spirit of Cyrus" to do Yahweh's will. In other words, the biblical point-of-view understands all that happened from a religious, theocentric perspective. But how did this policy affect the western provinces of Babylon's former empire? As early as 876 BCE, Assurnasirpal received tribute from the Phoenician cities of Tyre, Sidon, Byblos and Aradus. Specifically, Phoenicia sent tribute to Nineveh in the form of silver and gold ingots, fine polychrome cloths and ivory (Harden 1971: 49). A few years later, Shalmaneser III received further tribute and defeated the king of Aradus, who thought he could act independently of Nineveh. All this is illustrated on the gates of Balawat and the Black Obelisk, now in the British Museum. The Black Obelisk depicts ships from Tyre bringing tribute to the mainland, while other Levantine monarchs watch from the seashore, including Jehu of Israel (Harden 1971: 49). The relationships between the Phoenician city-states and their Assyrian overlords were sometimes "rocky." In about 672, Tyre joined with Egypt to resist Esarhaddon. A stele found at Zinjirli depicts the Assyrian king with the kings of Tyre and Egypt on leashes doing obeisance at his feet (Harden 1971: 50 fig. 11). On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the Tyrians and other Phoenician states provided invaluable service to the Assyrians manning the merchant marine, which helped to fuel the Assyrian economy. Throughout the late eighth and seventh centuries, Assyrian royal policy sought to build up the economy to the benefit of the kingdom, rather than to tear it all down (Stern 2000: 53-54). When Nineveh fell to the Babylonians and Nebuchadnezzar extended Neo-Babylonian rule to the west, it was inevitable that problems would arise with the independently

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motivated Phoenicians. In ca. 574, after a long siege, Nebuchadnezzar defeated Tyre and finally brought all of Phoenicia under his rule (Harden 1971: 50). Thirty-five years later, Cyrus moved into the Levant, and all of Phoenicia, Syria, and Cyprus formed the fifth satrapy of his new empire. Although Phoenicia was not really independent, her city-states' naval power became the mainstay of Persian power at sea-both military and commercial. In particular when Persia faced off with the Greeks, the Phoenician navy was central to the "order of battle." The Phoenicians were no strangers to conflict with the Greeks, who were their maritime and commercial rivals. In 539, Sidon was the principle city of the Phoenicians; Tyre was weak, and recovering from Nebuchadnezzar's siege. Apparently for a time, Sidon was the site of a palace for the Persian king; and excavations have unearthed several capitals in the Susan Persian style, "in the form of bull-protomai" (Harden 1971: 50). This palace may have been the Persian forward "command post" near the via maris and the sea routes to Lower Egypt. Initially, Persian interests focused on promoting a thriving economy and on extending boundaries to the northwest and southwest. Cambyses waged a major campaign to extend Persian rule into Egypt. The Greeks were already there, with their trading emporium and fortress at Naukratis in the Nile Delta (Gray 1969: 17; Niemeier 2001: 21-24). Amasis, the Egyptian king, was pre-eminently Philhellene; he married into the dynasty of Psammetichus II whom he overthrew, and he also married Ladice, a Greek woman from Cyrene. He strengthened Egyptian ties with Greece, making "rich presents to various Greek shrines after the destruction of the temple at Delphi (548 BCE), including a thousand talents weight of alum for its rebuilding"(Gray 1969: 17). Amasis made his intentions clear when earlier he had forged alliances with Croesus of Lydia, Polycrates of Samos and Nabonidus of Babylon-all enemies of Persia (Boardman 1973: 140-141). Cambyses had problems to solve at home before embarking on a campaign against Egypt. He distrusted his own brother, Smerdis (Bardiya), and had him killed (according to the Behistun inscription of Darius I). He pressured Cyprus to ally with him against their Egyptian friends. According to Herodotus, a Greek renegade, Phanes, assisted him in securing water supplies for his army as they moved along the coastal road from Gaza to the city of Pelusium, where the Egyptian forces, with their Ionian and Carian mercenaries, were deployed for battle. With Arab help, the Persian forces attacked the Egyptians at Pelusium and routed them, forcing them back on Memphis. With the capture of the capital city, Psammetichus III, who had been king of Egypt for only six months, was lost. By May 525 BCE, Cambyses was recognized as king of Egypt. His plans to continue his campaign to the West, into Libya, Cyrene, and perhaps even Carthage, ended in disaster-apparently a sandstorm in the el-Khargeh oasis (Herodotus 3.26). The archaeological evidence shows the effects of Persia's invasion on the Greek presence in Egypt. The fort at Daphnae was abandoned. The importation of Greek pottery to Naukratis practically ceased (Boardman 1973: 129). The gar-

rison which was stationed there as early as the sixth century was undoubtedly destroyed (Niemeier 2001: 21-22). Unlike Cyrus' policies in Syria, Babylonia, and Yehud, where the local gods were worshipped or acknowledged by the Persian Great King, Cambyses desecrated the corpse of Amasis, and openly mocked the religious customs of the Egyptians. The papyri from Elephantine mention the destruction of Egyptian temples, "while the Jewish temple at Elephantine was left unharmed"(Cowley 1923: 30; Gray 1969: 22). Before returning to Persia, Cambyses received the name of Re-mesuti, "born of Re;" he worshipped and made offerings to all the great gods in Sais, as all good Egyptian kings had done before him. Still, his less than tolerant attitude towards Egyptian religious traditions stands in sharp contrast to that of Cyrus. Herodotus attributes these anomalies in policy to a mental breakdown on the part of Cambyses. Indeed as he traveled to Persia in the spring of 522, he took his own life. But before doing so, he had established Persian rule further to the south and west than any Near Eastern ruler had ever done, and he administered Persian rule with a thoroughness matched only by his conquest of Egypt (Gray 1969: 23). In periods of interregnum, subject populations often found excuses to revolt against their distant Persian overlords. The Egyptians, however, took little part in the revolts against the Achaemenids which broke out in 522 BCE, and which took Darius I months to subdue. Aryandes, the Persian whom Cambyses chose to rule Egypt, remained in his position until Darius removed him from office and put him to death on the suspicion that he had plans to take imperial power to himself. A first small revolt in ca. 485 BCE led to a brief enthronement of a native Egyptian, although Darius quickly restored power to Persia. Darius maintained Persian hegemony in Egypt with the establishment of strong garrisons of troops at Memphis, Daphnae in the eastern Delta, Marea in the western Delta, and at Elephantine in the south on the Nile. A naval force was also stationed in Lower Egypt. Persians made up the bulk of this military force, but Jews and other Semites were part of it, as were some Egyptians (Gray and Cary 1969: 190-191). Evidence suggests, however, that Darius significantly softened the negative attitude toward Egyptian religion, mollifying the bad feelings engendered by his predecessor. He also adopted an Egyptian name, Stitu-Re, proclaiming his devotion to Re (Gray 1969: 24-25). He repaired the temple of Ptah in Memphis, and built a great temple in the oasis of Khargeh. He made offerings to the gods and provided funds to the priests to maintain their rituals and the priesthoods. In an inscription found at Sais, the Egyptian priest, Uzahor, described how Darius commanded him to re-establish the city's "Temple-school," because this would awaken "to new life all that was falling into ruin, in order to uphold the name of all the gods, their temples, their revenues, and the ordinances of their feasts forever" (Gray 1969: 25). Darius was also busy rebuilding the infrastructure of the Egyptian economy. Among these projects was the completion of a canal linking the Nile with the Red Sea, a project which

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Neccho had begun nearly a century earlier, but had abandoned. The Persians were keenly interested in economic growth and amassing wealth. By the end of the sixth century, trade with Greece was increasing, as the appearance of Athenian wares in Naukratis and elsewhere attests (Boardman 1973: 139). Athenian silver coins also appeared, probably coming into Egypt from East Greek merchants, travelling via Phoenicia. Although Egypt paid a very high annual tribute to Persia-more than 700 talents, the country's agricultural wealth far outweighed the tax burden. In his early years, ca. 522-520 BCE, Darius dealt with revolts in the eastern provinces of the empire. The prophet Haggai used this opportunity to prophesy that the earth was "shaking," and proposed that Zerubbabel, the Jewish prince over Jerusalem, assert himself as the "chosen,"-Messiah-of Yahweh. It is probably a tribute to Darius that nothing came of this prophecy, and Zerubbabel and Haggai disappeared from history. Darius I very capably administered his conquered realms. The Great King ruled in consultation with his counselors from Persia; local satrapies were governed by satraps and their councils. While the king's authority was absolute, Persian government was tolerant of local concerns and traditions. No native vassal kings were created in subjugated countries, for this would only engender rebellion. As "King of Egypt," Darius I was able to claim continuity of the royal traditions of the Egyptians. This was surely the case until the revolt of the 460's. The Egyptian Revolt Leads to Changes in Persian Imperial Policy Sources used to reconstruct the events of the Egyptian revolt of the first half of the fifth century BCE vary extensively in their understanding of what happened. Some scholars have labeled the sources "tendentious"(Hoglund 1992:97; Hill 1951: 343-344). Still, a careful reading of various ancient authors can yield a better understanding of the revolt. Kenneth Hoglund has carefully reviewed the material. The Egyptian revolt, he argued, came on the heals of Persia's defeat by the coalition of Greek city-states under Athenian leadership at Marathon and Salamis (Starr 1989: 29-34). To Egypt, it must have appeared that Persia was weakening, particularly when Darius I died and Xerxes I came to power. We will not be concerned here with the details of the various sources, whether Greek or Egyptian. Diodorus Siculus' claim that the revolt began when the death of Xerxes became widely known in Egypt seems not only plausible, but highly probable. By 464 BCE, the garrison at Elephantine was aware that Artaxerxes was the new king (Cowley 1923:15-17; Horn and Wood 1954: 8-9; and Porten 1980: 6-7). When news of Darius I's death spread through Egypt in 486 BCE, some parts of the nation immediately revolted, "suggesting that once news of a change in monarchs had spread rapidly from the Iranian plateau to Egypt, the effort to seize the opportunity for national independence was soon to follow" (Hoglund 1992: 138-139). Diodorus claims that the rebels immediately expelled Persia's leadership and made Inaros the king; the year would have been ca. 464 BCE. Inaros is a Hellenized form of the Egyptian

irt-Hr-itw,

meaning "May the eye of Horus be against them" (Hoglund 1992: 139; Guentch-Ogloueff 1941: 117). He is identified as a Libyan, apparently one of the powerful chieftains of the Libyan tribes from the Egyptian West. He is, interestingly, not identified as "king of the Egyptians" until after the revolt. Herodotus' assertion that he was a son of Psammetichus is probably a reference to a non-royal Psammetichus-the name being quite popular during the Twenty-Sixth Dynasty (Cf. Redford 1983: 90 n. 171). So Inaros was a leader of one of the large ethnic groups resident in the western Delta. So also was Amyrtaeus, his associate, who was called "Great Chief of the Meshwesh," the western Delta "marsh dwellers"(Thucydides 1.110). All of this means that the Egyptians revolted against Persia internally-without outside help or instigation. Following Hoglund's reconstruction, after assembling loyal forces, the revolutionary army "moved down the Canopic branch of the Nile" (Hoglund 1992: 142). The Persian Satrap mustered his forces and advanced to meet the revolutionaries. Achaemenes, one of Xerxes' brothers, was killed in action at Papremis, a site probably located along the westernmost branch of the Nile (Lloyd 1975: 270-272). Inaros' forces won an early victory there, and he called on Athens for aid to completely defeat the Persians in Egypt. Persian forces took refuge in Memphis, which was the satrapal seat of government and the site of a Persian military garrison (Porten 1980: 29, 53-54; Kraeling 1953: 32). Kraeling estimates that 10,00012,000 troops may have been stationed in Memphis, basing his estimate on Herodotus' discussion of the rations consumed by the troops. Ctesias estimated that up to 200,000 Persian troops were in Egypt at the time-a figure which must be grossly inflated. News of the Persian naval defeats at Salamis (479 BCE) and Eurymedon (ca. 466 BCE) circulated widely throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Further news of the battlefield death of Achaemenes in the Delta may have given Athenian and Delian League allies hope that Persia's hold on Egypt was nearly over. The factors which convinced Athens to lead an expeditionary force to Egypt to fight the Persians, however, remain unclear. The economy was expanding, and Athens's leaders may have seen an opportunity to solidify their leadership of the Delian League with a sweeping victory. This military action would also open Egypt's markets for Athenian exploitation (Meiggs 1972: 102-103). Even with the arrival of Athenian forces in the Delta, however, the "White Fortress" at Memphis did not fall easily, frustrating Inaros' claims to the Egyptian throne and Athenian aspirations to dominate the eastern Mediterranean trade zone. Persian Imperial efforts to stifle the rebellion initially focused on an emissary from Artaxerxes to Sparta, who attempted to entice the Spartans to revolt, which would have forced the Athenians to return home. Sparta refused the Persian bribes (Lewis 1977: 50-51). The Great King had no alternative other than to muster an expeditionary force to crush the revolt in the Delta. Persia perceived the Athenian presence to be more dangerous than the native Egyptian rebels. Diodorus noted that Persian and allied forces gathered in Cilicia and

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Phoenicia, where they rested and trained for the campaign to follow (Diodorus 11.75). The palace at Sidon may have been a part of this campaign, serving as a forward "command post" during the mobilization and reception of forces embarking for the "theater of operations" in Egypt. Sites in the southern Levant, such as Tell el-Hesi, Tell eshShariah, and Tell Jemmeh, were also used as logistical bases and "power projection platforms," from which Persian forces were supplied and projected into the area of operations in the Nile Delta (Betlyon forthcoming). We have discussed these logistical bases elsewhere--bases which supplied food, clothing, weapons, and all the necessary combat service and combat service support the Persian armed forces may have required in their campaign against Egypt (Betlyon 1991: 3942; Bennett and Blakely 1990: 134-137). Persian forces moved south along the coast, while naval forces, presumably Phoenician war ships, sailed offshore protecting the army from potential raids by Greek marines (Diodorus 11.77.1). 'Akko was used by the Persians as a marshaling area for forces against Egypt in ca. 374 BCE and it may have been a rally point to suppress this 464 BCE rebellion as well. There are no clues in the ancient sources to suggest how the forces moved to the south, whether along the coast around Mount Carmel, or through the passes at Yoqne'am or Megiddo (Cf. Hoglund 1992: 152). It may be that all three routes were used to facilitate movement of forces on such a massive scale. The concentration of logistical bases just northeast of Gaza may indicate that this area near 'Ashdod was the final staging area for the invasion. The forces moved on Egypt in ca. 457/456 BCE, and immediately broke the Greek/ Egyptian siege of Memphis. This battle was decisive, destroying Inaros' forces. The Delian League's troops retreated north into the Nile to the island of Prosopitis, where they came under siege by other Persian forces (Herodotus 2.41; Hoglund 1992:154-155). The Greeks were overwhelmed, and most died. The loss of so many troops and over 200 ships was devastating to the Athenian state and its economy, hampering Athens' ability to collect its Delian League tribute in later years (Meiggs 1963: 4-9). Following the Egyptian disaster, Athens took extraordinary steps to heal its wounds with Sparta and to reassert control over the Delian League (Hoglund 1992: 156-157). At the same time, Persian forces occupied Egypt, and expanded their efforts to "hold on" to other areas of the Near East, including Syria, Phoenicia, and Yehud. At least in the southern Levant, with potential future problems in Egypt, the Persians began construction of a series of fortresses in all major population centers and other areas requiring special security considerations. These forts-the Chronicler's biraniyot-were the keystone in the Persian army's "military operations other than war," including peace keeping operations, guarding industrial sites, patrolling major highways and road junctions, support for local authorities, rebuilding infrastructure, and caring for important public installations such as water supplies, and tax collection (Cf. Betlyon forthcoming; US Army Field Manual 100-20). These operations significantly changed Persia's approach to imperial satrapal governance. With military

forces, albeit small units, stationed throughout the region, the likelihood of revolts was greatly reduced. Professional military forces helped Persia to maintain its imperial control after the Egyptian revolt. With little fear of more rebellion, the Persians turned their attention to more pressing economic issues and moved to increase their market share of the eastern Mediterranean trade. This share, after all, was another viable weapon in the fight against Athenian efforts to control the monetary economy in the Aegean/Mediterranean sphere of influence. Phoenicia in the mid-fifth century BCE Sidon, Tyre, Byblos, and Aradus were the principle citystates of Phoenicia in the period following the Egyptian revolt. Phoenicia's naval forces played an important part in the deployment which defeated the Egyptian rebels and their Athenian allies. In return for Phoenician loyalty, it is reasonable to expect that Persia granted the Phoenicians some extra liberties. We doubt that the Phoenicians were particularly interested in the political machinations of their Persian overlords. The Phoenicians had always been more interested in economic development and profits. Phoenician merchants and tradesmen built their reputations on receiving raw materials and processing them into luxurious, high-priced goods. Phoenician markets included the entire Mediterranean basin, with her colonies as far west as Carthage, Sardinia, Marseille, and Cartagena on the Iberian peninsula (Cf. Boardman 2001: 3641). As early as the Late Bronze Age, Phoenician (or Canaanite) merchants were travelling throughout Asia Minor to Greece and westward. Phoenician commercial settlements were built in the Delta and in Memphis in the Iron Age, where Herodotus mentioned a part of the city called the "Tyrian Camp," in which a temple of 'Ashtart was founded (2.112; Harden 1971:55-56). A monetary economy was evolving rapidly in the region. This new economy required increasing supplies of coined money from mints in Greece and East Greece. Now in the mid-fifth century, Persian authorities began to strike coins in gold and silver, supporting this new economic and monetary growth. Smaller denominations were needed to more readily facilitate commercial growth and the inherent payment of tariffs, taxes, and tribute (Betlyon 1992: 10791080). Mints opened in Tyre and Sidon in the mid- to late-fifth century, with other mints to follow in Byblos and Aradus. These new mints struck coins in silver and bronze denominations bolstering the Persian economy. Initially the mints struck small silver denominations. Over time, more denominations appeared, struck on weight standards which supported Persian economic initiatives in Asia Minor and Egypt-that is, coins struck on the Persian and Phoenician standards. Phoenicia had always been an important trading partner with Egypt. The cessation of hostilities in the revolt and the beginnings of coinage no doubt increased the possibilties for trade between the two longtime commercial partners. These coins were probably also used to pay the mercenary soldiers garrisoning Persia's fortresses throughout the Levant (Cf. Machinist 1994: 365-380).

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Sidonian and Tyrian local mints struck silver types which included ethnics unique to the Phoenician mints: Sidon, for example, always depicted a war galley on the obverse types (Betlyon 1982: 4ff.). Tyre, on the other hand, struck coins bearing the likeness of Ba'al Milqart riding on the back of a seahorse on the obverse, and the Athenian-style owl with the Egyptian crook and flail-symbols of authority and kingship in ancient Egypt-on the reverse (Betlyon 1982: 42ff.). These types identified the Phoenician mints in the regional economy. The Egyptian artifacts on the Tyrian series raise certain questions: Why did Tyre use Egyptian symbols to identify their own coin series? Furthermore, why did they employ the Athenian owl-a symbol of their principle economic competitor? Sidon depicted the Great King of Persia on the reverse of her coins. The King is followed by the Sidonian king in his role as chief priest of the Great King's cult. That is not so unusual; however the Sidonian king was usually dressed in "traditional Egyptian style" (Betlyon 1982: 9-10). Do these types reflect the close commercial ties between the satrapies? There was the Ophir trade via the Red Sea port of Etzion-Geber. By which the Phoenicians brought African goods to the Mediterranean coast to tempt the growing markets of Greece, East Greece, and Italy. Phoenician goods often exhibited Egyptian characteristics, particularly their metalwork (Harden 1971: 155, 188-192). Even some of their stone sarcophagi and stele from the Phoenician mainland depict rulers and deities in Egyptian style (Harden 1971: 180-182; Bey and Reinach 1892). We may ask how close the Egyptians and Phoenicians were in the mid-fifth century BCE and later. What factors brought them together as vassals of the Great King, or as commercial partners, or even as allies in rebellion against the Persians? All three of these possibilities presented themselves. In the Egyptian revolt of the 460's BCE, the Phoenicians were simply part of the Persian expeditionary force sent to quell the rebellion. We agree with Gerhard Herm that Phoenician participation was probably "reluctant" at best (1973: 155). The Egyptians were among the Phoenicians "oldest friends," people who had helped to shape Phoenician civilization. Following this military action when Cambyses sent forces into the western desert to take Libya and Cyrene and possibly Carthage, the Tyrians refused to go along. Enough was enough, and the Phoenicians were not going to threaten their own colonies in the central and westesn Mediterranean. Herodotus reminds us that the entire Persian fleet was made up of ships from Sidon and Tyre; "Cambyses' whole navy was dependent upon the Phoenicians," and the Great King knew this. The Phoenician tax burden was apparently lighter because of this important military requirement levied by the Persians. From a purely economic perspective, the Pax Persica gave the merchants of Lebanon precisely what they needed to prosper-peace and order. The excellent Persian post and road network also helped, as did the gold daric issued by Darius I to stabilize and standardize the monetary system (Herm 1973:154-156). By 464 BCE, the Egyptians were again vassals under Artaxerxes I, vassals with the Phoenicians, with whom trade

was reinstated. The Phoenicians maintained their separate city-states under Persia. Their commercial ventures prospered, except in periods of imperial interregnum. The nature of Persian kingship lent itself to this volatile predicament. In ancient Iran, as among other Indo-European peoples, a king was elected from a certain family which had the charisma of kingship. The ruler was elected by the warriors, making the king a "king of many kings" (Frye 1963: 91; Widengren 1959: 242257). The king was said to be descended from the gods and to be divine. He was a priest and chief among the religious leaders of the nation. When the king died, his "personal fire" was extinguished and mourning by his family or servants sometimes took the most extreme forms of suicide or mutilation. It is no wonder that revolt sometimes broke out when word of a Great King's death reached the outer extremities of the realm.

III. Phoenician, Cypriot, and Egyptian Resistance to Persian Dominion Periods following the death of a king were often times for rebellion. Artaxerxes I died in 424 BCE. He was succeeded for a short time by Xerxes II, who died in 423 BCE, to be succeeded by Darius II (423-404 BCE). Artaxerxes II became king in 404 and ruled until 359, when Artaxerxes III reigned until 338 BCE. At that time, Arses ruled for two to three years to be followed by Darius III, who fought Alexander the Great in the period 333 to 330 BCE (Frye 1961: 281). To maintain control during these unstable periods, the Persians imposed a sort of military organization over and above the satrapal governments. Units of approximately 100 soldiers-usually mercenaries from vassal nations-were stationed in many places. In Yehud, the size of the small biraniyot, or "fortified towers/fortresses," is even smaller suggesting that these units (called degel in Old Persian) were probably subdivided into smaller units of 10's or 20's. These units were tasked with the daily "operations other than war" which maintained the peace and stability the merchants desperately wanted (Frye 1961: 105). The Persians, under Darius I and his successors, developed a complex system of taxation. Taxes were paid by nobles and by military leaders on holdings of land granted to them by the Great King. This was the institution of the qashtu, a piece of land granted to a military servant of the king as part of his remuneration, a portion of the profits from which go to the crown (Frye 1961: 107-109). Taxes on the land were dependent upon the land's potential yield in crops. Texts preserved from the late fifth century BCE in Babylon provide a detailed account of this system and the collection of taxes for the imperial government (Cardascia 1951: 7 foll.). The taxes imposed by the Persians covered everything from harbor fees, market tolls, tolls on gates and roads, to tolls on frontier crossings, taxes on domestic animals, as well as corvee labor. Corvee was imposed to provide labor to construct roads, public buildings and the like, and was employed both by satrapal and imperial officials. Public works were usually paid for by local authorities and local taxes, while gold and silver streamed to Persepolis and Susa. Gold remained the domain of the Great King, and only he could authorize strik-

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ing coins in gold. Satrapal mints struck silver coins, but usually with the same figures of a royal archer on bended knee on the obverse type (Frye 1961: 110). Autonomous cities, such as the Phoenician city-states, struck silver and copper of a different form, and potentially on different standards for economic reasons. We have little information to prove economic cooperation between Phoenicia and Egypt in the years following the 464 BCE revolt. However, there is also little doubt that this economic cooperation occurred. The growing economic ties with Athens and Corinth strengthened all of the coastal Mediterranean economies. While the Persians failed militarily to conquer Greece, their great wealth gave them ample gold with which to bribe local Greek and East Greek rulers, making it difficult for Athens to build a unified Greek federation, and keeping the empire safe from Greek attack. However, it was not "safe" from Greek influence. In Anatolia and elsewhere along the coast, Greek language and customs became more and more prevalent. Xerxes I, in the wake of Darius I's death, was much less lenient with Egypt than his predecessor(Herodotus 8.7). He no longer pretended to be a successor to the Pharoahs, nor did he respect native customs or religious practices. Similar treatment was meted out to Babylon after it revolted, and this may be the reason that Egyptian and Babylonian influence were on the wane throughout the region (Frye 1961: 118). Xerxes' personal interests focused on rebuilding Persepolis and building up his harem. He was assassinated in 465 BCE. Artaxerxes I came to power by this intrigue. The Egyptians apparently again revolted against the crown. But this time the Persians had forces in place, and by 455 BCE, the Egyptian rebellion was put down. Darius II stabilized affairs for a while, although he had rebellions to put down as well. Upon his death in ca. 404 BCE, Artaxerxes II had to fight Cyrus, Darius II's younger brother, to secure the throne. The Egyptians were quick to capitalize on this instability, revolting yet again. Problems at home and elsewhere particularly in East Greece, meant that the Persians were never able to reconquer Egypt. It remained free under a native dynasty. The southern provinces of 'Abernahara', such as Yehud and the city-states of 'Ashqelon and Gaza, became even more important in this period, forming the new frontier with Egypt. The troops and logistical bases in the region provided critical security to guard the border. When the satraps of central Anatolia revolted in the 360's, it must have seemed as if the entire Persian empire was about to collapse. Artaxerxes III, however, rose up in 359 and, with a blood thirsty zeal, saved the empire. Satraps who had revolted and issued their own coinage were won back to Achaemenid allegiance. But then, some of the Phoenician city-states revolted. This period of history is difficult to follow because the sources are few, and usually written long after the fact. The varying fortunes and allegiances of the leaders in the region seemed always to involve Greeks and Greek interests (Frye 1961: 118-119). In the coinage of the Sidonian king 'Abd'ashtart I, who reigned from ca. 372-362/361 BCE, there is evidence of rebellion against the Great King. In the eighth year of 'Abd'ashtart

I's reign, according to his monetary dating system, new coin types were struck which changed the silver "double-sheqel" reverse to delete the image of the Great Persian King riding in a chariot followed in obeisance by the Sidonian king. The new reverse depicted 'Abd'ashtart's head, with the abbreviation of his name written in Phoenician characters ('ayin-bet) (Betlyon 1982: 13-14). Moreover, 'Abd'ashtart I changed the standard on which he struck coins, ceasing to issue coins on the Phoenician standard and switching to the Athenian standard (Betlyon 1982: 13 no. 32). The year was 365/364 BCE, precisely the time when Sidon sheltered the Egyptian king Tachos, who was trying to escape Persian capture (Judeich 1892: 166, 209). This revolt, engineered by Tachos, coincided with the end of Artaxerxes II's reign. It was another war in which Egypt enticed Cyprus and Sidon to participate. This effort by Egypt and Sidon to thwart Persian control may have been their first unified attempt to do so, but it was not their last. 'Abd'ashtart I is remembered as a wealthy, powerful monarch. He received an Athenian embassy on its way to the Persian court and consequently was "granted the honor of proxenia by the Athenians" (Cf. Bey and Reinach 1892-1896: 390). The numismatic evidence from Sidon suggests that the satrap, Mazday, took over the mint for a few years, instituting military rule over the city state. From ca. 362/361-358 BCE, coins were once again struck on the Phoenician standard with the Aramaic inscription Mazday, prominently displayed on the coin's reverse. The reverse types reverted once again to the Great King receiving worship from the Sidonian leader (Betlyon 1982: 14-15). Under Artaxerxes III, a new loyal king, Tennes, was put on Sidon's throne. Tennes ruled for approximately five years when Cyprus and Egypt again tried to throw off Persian domination. Tennes stopped issuing standard coins types in ca. 352 BCE. With the death of Artaxerxes II, Egypt's revolt gained momentum, and Tennes apparently again led Sidon to war. The first campaign of Artaxerxes III to put down the revolt in 351/350 BCE failed (Ghirshman 1954: 2-1; Kienitz 1953; Vandier 1954: 189-190). This revolt was serious. Sidon seems to have fallen to Persian arms either during this first campaign or early in the second attack in 345 BCE-an attack which finally crushed Egyptian resistance as well. The coins suggest the latter, because it was Persia's failure to subdue the revolt at its inception which enticed Tennes to join the fray, taking parts of neighboring provinces down with him. Dan Barag has suggested that destruction layers identified from Hazor, Megiddo, 'Atlit, Lachish, and Jericho may all be connected with this revolt (Barag 1966: 7). Isocrates (To Philip 101-102) urged Philip of Macedon to attack Persia in ca. 347/346 BCE, since the satrapies were able to hold out so long against a weak central government. Isocrates wrote that Cilicia, Phoenicia and Cyprus revolted only after Artaxerxes III failed to subdue Egypt early in the struggle (ca. 351/350 BCE) (Betlyon 1982: 35 n. 66). In this same period, the Tyrian mint struck coins using new methodologies and a new standard. The new Tyrian series included Attic-standard didrachms, struck on new types with thinner, better made flans (Betlyon 1982: 52ff.). Some have

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suggested that this change of weight standard did not occur until Alexander the Great conquered the region in 332 BCE. However, some of these Attic-standard Tyrian coins have been discovered in pre-Alexandrine archaeological contexts, cementing our insistence that these standard changes occurred as early as 352 BCE (Betlyon 1982: 53-54; Cross1969: 53-54; Cross 1974: 57-59). The mint at Aradus participated in this insurrection as well, shifting its minting standard from the Persic to the Attic in ca. 352/351 BCE (Betlyon 1982: 86-88). This change of standard was short lived, perhaps limited to only a few months. Aradus was close to the mouth of the Orontes Riverone of the principle "highways" leading into the Persian hinterlands. Massive military action along the coast quickly restored the Aradian mint to the Persic standard, with which Persepolis was much more comfortable (Betlyon 1982: 106 notes 92-93; Rainey 1968-1971: 70-71). When the smoke cleared, Sidon had been burned, betrayed by its own king to the Persians. Tennes defected, resulting in his own death and the deaths of some 40,000 Sidonians, who are said to have died in their own burning of the city, ca. 348/ 347 BCE (Diodorus 16.45.4-6; Betlyon 1982:18). Captives from Sidon were sent to Babylon and Susa, continuing the policy of deporting rebellious populations to distant places (Frye 1961: 119). Mazday again was put in charge of the Sidonian mint-it was just too important economically to close it permanently (Betlyon 1982: 18). Eventually local dynasts loyal to Persia were restored to the Sidonian throne. After Artaxerxes III subdued Sidon, he pressed the attack to the South where he saw the road open to Egypt. For a brief period, Persian authority over Lower Egypt was reestablished. The fighting in the Delta was probably not so much Persian fighting Egyptian but Greek mercenary fighting Greek mercenary. A native Egyptian dynasty continued to rule in most of Upper Egypt. However, Artaxerxes III managed to restore some of Persia's tarnished past glory (Frye 1961: 119), if only for a fleeting moment. After Bagoas assassinated the Great King and much of the Achaemenid royal house, Darius III Codommanus, a distant family member, was made King. Darius III kept control of Egypt, but was ill prepared to thwart the oncoming Macedonian armies (Frye 1961: 120). When Alexander the Great reached Phoenicia in ca. 332, Aradus, Byblos, and Sidon surrendered to his authority, and their mints were closed. Tyre resisted his advances, was besieged and fell. 'Uzzimilk-the Tyrian king--and his son died fighting the Hellenistic onslaught (Betlyon 1982: 58-59; Rawlinson 1889: 511-529). Only the mint of Byblos escaped these fourth century problems. Byblos was the smallest of the major Phoenician cities, and continued to support trade and commerce as it had for centuries.

and political interests were nearly the same, resulting in a number of failed collaborations against Persepolis in the early fourth century. Persian control of the eastern Mediterranean seaboard and the Nile Delta, however, was ultimately impossible with expanding Greek interest in the riches of the Orient and the lucrative spice trade coming from the East. On several occasions, Egyptian and Phoenician forces joined together to resist Persia. Egypt fought valiantly for many years, seeking any excuse to fight for independence from her foreign rulers and oppressors. Perhaps it was the very success of the Persians' administration of their empire which laid the basis for Alexander's dominion in the late fourth and third centuries BCE. Despite many rebellions and problems, the Persians maintained power for over two hundred years. The Persians did not have a great affinity for the people of the Mediterranean seaboard or the Nile Delta. Their interests were "for profit." Taxes, tribute, and increased commerce satisfied the Persian kings. It was not their ideas or their political savvy which increased Persian influence in East Greece throughout the fifth and fourth centuries BCE. What won them friends was their money, which was liberally used to bribe vassals and other states into situations which kept the city-states of mainland Greece "off balance," until Philip of Macedon united the Greeks under his own banner. This was the beginning of the end for Darius III, whose forces could not match the tactical military skills of the Macedonian hoplites. The Egyptians and Phoenicians had long been friendly, both interested in commerce and living stable, peaceful lives. Close relationships with Athens and the other leading Greek cities were to their advantage. It is no wonder that both regions prospered under Hellenistic rule.

IV. Conclusions The fifth and fourth centuries BCE were not a time of Persian-Egyptian enmity or Persian-Phoenician enmity. They were a time of tremendous rivalry between Persian and Greek worlds. In many respects, Phoenician and Egyptian economic Copyright John W Betlyon and PennState University - 2001 - All Rights Reserved - Page 8

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1954 - The Fifth-Century Jewish Calendar at Elephantine. Journal of Near Eastern Studies 3: 1-20. Judeich, W. 1892 - Kleinasiatische Studien. Marburg: N. G. Elwertsche Verlags-buchhandlung. Kienitz, F. K. 1952 - Die politische Geschichte Agyptens vom 7. Bis 4. Jahrhundert vor Der Zeitwende. Berlin: Academie-Verlag. Kraeling, E. G. 1953 - The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: New Documents from the Fifth Century B. C. from the Jewish Colony at Elephantine. New Haven: Yale University Press. Lewis, D. M. 1976 - Sparta and Persia. Cincinnati Classical Studies n.s. 1. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Lloyd, A. B. 1975 - Herodotus Book II: Introduction and Commentary. Etudes prÈliminaires aux religions orientales dans l'Empire Romain, 43. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Meiggs, R. 1963 - The Crisis of Athenian Imperialism. Harvard Studies in Philology 67: 1-36. 1972 - The Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Niemeier, W.-D. 2001 - Archaic Greeks in the Orient: Textual and Archaeological Evidence. Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research 322: 11-32. Oded, B. 1979 - Mass Deportations and Deportees in the NeoAssyrian Empire. Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert. Porten, B. 1968 - Archives from Elephantine: The Life of an Ancient Jewish Miliitary Colony. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rainey, A. F. 1968-1971 - The Satrapy "Beyond the River." Australian Journal of Biblical Archaeology 1: 51-78. Rawlinson, G. 1889 - History of Phoenicia. London: Longmans, Green, and Co. Redford, D. B. 1983 - Notes on the History of Ancient Buto. Bulletin of the Egyptological Seminar 5: 67-101. 1992 - Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Roux, G. 1992 - Ancient Iraq, 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Books. Sack, R. 1978 - Nergal-sarra-usur, King of Babylon, as seen in the Cuneiform, Greek Latin and Hebrew Sources. Zeitschrift fur Assyriologie 68:129-149. Saggs, H. W. F. 1962 - The Greatness that was Babylon. New York: Hawthorn Books. van der Spek, R. J.

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