Article VII Case Digests
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ARTICLE VII: THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT Section 1: Executive power 1. Executive power A. MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, ET AL. 2. Executive immunity A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO B. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 3. Head of State 4. Chief Executive 5. The Cabinet 6. Executive privilege Section 2: Qualifications of President 1. Citizenship and Qualification A. TECSON V. COMELEC Section 3: The Vice-President Section 4: Election and term of President and Vice-President 1. Election and Canvass A. MACALINTAL V. COMELEC B. CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE C. PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE D. FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO Section 5: Oath of Office Section 6: Residence and emoluments Section 7: Assumption of office 1. Vacancy situations at the beginning of the term Section 8: Assumption of office 1. Vacancy situations during the term A. ESTRADA V. DESIERTO B. ESTRADA V. ARROYO Section 9: Vacancy in the office of the Vice-President Section 10: Procedure Section 11: Temporary disability of the President 1. Temporary disability A. ESTRADA V, DESIERTO Section 12: Serious illness of the President Section 13: Prohibitions
1. Prohibitions A. DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN B. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNIION V. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY C. BITONIO, JR. V. COA D. PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA Section 14: Appointments extended by an Acting President Section 15: Prohibited appointments 1. Prohibited appointments A. IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA B. DE LA RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
MARCOS V. MAGLAPUS, ET AL. 177 SCRA 668 (1989) p. 339, Bernas casebook FACTS The case is a petition for mandamus and prohibition to ask the Court to order the respondents to issue travel documents to the Marcoses and to enjoin the implementation of the of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners' argument: The president has enumerated powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusio unius esy exclusio alterius. ISSUES W/N the President, in her exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines RULING/DOCTRINE THE PRESIDENT HAS THE POWER TO DO SO.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001 p. 344, Bernas casebook FACTS Petitioner's arguments: 1. His case in the office of the Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings. 2. As a former president, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether civil or criminal. ISSUES 1. W/N the former president Estrada enjoys executive immunity 2. What is the extent of the immunity RULING/DOCTRINE 1. HE NO LONGER HAS EXECUTIVE IMMUNITY. 2. THERE IS A JUDICIAL DISINCLINATION PRIVILEGE.
SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR 167 SCRA 393 (1988) p. 347, Bernas casebook FACTS President Corazon Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the President hid under the bed during an attempted coup. Petitioner's argument: 1. Immunity from suit imposes a correlative disability to file a suit – By filing a complaint, she would have to be a witness for the prosecution. This would defeat her privilege of immunity from suit since she would be exposing herself to the possible contempt of court or perjury. ISSUES W/N the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioner through the filing of a complaintaffidavit. RULING/DOCTRINE THE PRESIDENT MAY INITIATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS. RATIONALE. The rationale behind the granting of the immunity from suit of the President is to assure that the exercise of Presidential duties and functions is free from any hindrance or distraction. This considers how the job of the Chief Executive of the Government requires the officeholder's time and demands undivided attention. WHO MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE. The immunity from suit of the President may only be invoked by the holder of the office, not any other person in the President's behalf. WAIVING OF THE PRIVILEGE. There is no law that prevents the President from waiving the privilege. The President, thus, may waive the protection given by the privilege and may sub,it herself to the jurisdiction of the Court. This choice is solely the President's prerogative. The decision may not be assumed or imposed by any other person.
TECSON V. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004 p. 349, Bernas casebook FACTS Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for the Presidential elections under the KNP Party. In his certificate of candidacy, he represented himself as a natural-born Filipino. This is a consolidation of three cases raising issues regarding the citizenship requirement of presidential candidates. Victorino Fornier, the petitioner in one of the cases, filed a petition before COMELEC seeking to disqualify FPJ as a presidential candidate on the ground that he misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. 1. He claimed that FPJ could not be a natural-born since his parents were foreigners. Bessy Kelley Poe, his mother, was an American. Allan F. Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou. 2. The petitioner asserted that granted that Allan Poe was a Filipino, FPJ couldn't inherit the Filipino citizenship since he was an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Allan F. Poe was first married to a Paulita Gomez before being married to Bessy Kelley. Allan and Bessy were married only after a year from the birth of FPJ. ISSUES 1. W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the case 2. W/N FPJ can be disqualified as a presidential misrepresenting himself as a natural-born Filipino
RULING/DOCTRINE 1. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION – COMELEC decisions on disqualification cases may be reviewed by Court in an action for certiorari – it is the duty of the court to settle actual controversies involving enforceable and legally demandable rights and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Article VIII, Section 1) PETITION OF TECSON, ET AL. AND VELEZ – assailed the jurisdiction of COMELEC in dismissing their petition to disqualify FPJ for misrepresenting himself as a natural-born Filipino – urged the Court to take on the petitions – Court: DISMISS. Lack of jurisdiction and prematurity ARTICLE VII, SECTION 4, PAR. 7 – jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: contests on election, returns,
and qualifications of the President and the VP – post-election scenario – does not include candidates – quo warranto proceeding: an action against a person who usurps or intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office 2.
FPJ IS NOT DISQUALIFIED. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 1. Lorenzo Pou: death certificate – Filipino 2. Allan F. Poe: birth certificate – Espanol father, mestiza mother 3. marriage certificate: Allan F. Poe + Paulita Gomez (uncertified) 4. marriage certificate: Allan F. Poe + Bessie Kelley – Allan F. Poe: Filipino; Bessie Kelley: American 5. FPJ: birth certificate PUBLIC DOCUMENTS – Rules of Court (Section 44, Rule 130) – certified true copies of the originals – constitutes as prima facie evidence (believed to be true unless proven) – official records made by public officers in their performance of their duty are prima facie evidence of the facts presented therein TRUSWORTHINESS OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 1. sense of official duty in its preparation 2. penalty as a consequence to breach of duty 3. routine and disinterest 4. its publicity results to the likelihood of exposure of errors DEATH CERTIFICATE OF LORENZO POU – died on 11 Septermber 1954 at the age of 84 in San Carlos, Pangasinan – assumption: born in 1870 (Phil. A colony of Spain) – Petitioner: L. Pou was not in the Philippines (1898 – 1902) – Court: in the absence of any contrary evidence, it would be logical to assume that the place of residence of the person at the time of death is also the residence before the death PROOF OF PATERNITY/FILIATION – Petitioner: FPJ is an illegitimate child; to establish filiation or paternity of an illegitimate child, the rules of civil law must be followed CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN – 1889 to 1950
acknowledgment was required to establish filiation/paternity acknowledgment: judicial or voluntary JUDICIAL acknowledgment: during lifetime of parent VOLUNTARY acknowledgment: public document BIRTH CERTIFICATE – to acknowledge, there must be a signature of the parent – FPJ: no signature of Allan F. Poe, no will RUBEN F. BALANE, Amicus Curiae – authentic writing is included in “other public documents” – private writing admitted by the father to be his
CIVIL LAW – intended to govern the private and personal affairs of the family – purpose: organize the family, regulate property – citizenship: for civil relationships – present a bias against illegitimate children (due to Spanish laws) – legitimate/illegitimate civil status does not necessarily affect his political rights or his relationship to the State COURT ON CITIZENSHIP (Political law) – Rules on evidence will suffice RULES OF COURT (On evidence) – Section 39, Rule 130: ACT OR DECLARATION OF PEDIGREE a. for dead declarant b. pedigree at issue c. declarant is a relative of the person with questioned pedigree d. declaration must be made before controversy occurred e. relationship must be proven by evidence other than act or declaration RUBY KELLEY MANGAHAS – sister of Bessie Kelley Poe – notarized declaration – accepted as evidence to prove that Allan F. Poe recognize his paternal relationship with FPJ DNA TESTING – in cases where proof of filiation/paternity is difficult to obtain – Tijing v. CA: courts should apply results of DNA testing because to reject it is to deny progress JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., Amicus Curiae
– pronouncements of the Court regarding jus sanguinis are considered covered by the doctrine of stare decisis if it is relevant to the lis mota – if the pronouncement was not relavant to the lis mota, it is considered an obiter dictum PAA V. CHAN – Chan was not a Filipino since his mother was not proven to be a Filipino; commented on his being illegitimate – – –
no constitutional basis no relevance of legitimacy in elective public service no justice/rationality in disqualifying an illegitimate child INTENT of jurisprudence on illegitimate children – to help the child in ensuring whose parental authority would be recognized; not to prejudice or discriminate
1935 – – –
CONSTITUTION the fundamental law that prevailed at the time of birth of FPJ stated that children of Filipino fathers were Filipinos clearly no distinction made between legitimate and illegitimate
TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE – even if totality of evidence does not conclusively establish FPJ as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, he cannot be made guilty of misrepresentation
MACALINTAL V. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2009 p. 365, Bernas casebook FACTS The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal. The petitioner filed the petition as a taxpayer and lawyer. He claimed that the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 suffered from constitutional infirmity. He argued that Section 18.5, which empowered COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates, is unconstitutional since it violates paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. The said provision gives Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vice-president . ISSUES W/N Section 18.5 of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act violate the constitutional mandate of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution RULING/DOCTRINE IT IS CONGRESS' DUTY TO CANVASS THE VOTES AND PROCLAIM THE WINNING CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT. SWEEPING. The phrasing of Section 18.5 was “sweeping” that it included the proclamation of the president and vice-president. It was repugnant to the Constitution in the sense that it disregarded the authority given to Congress to do the canvassing and make the proclamation for the president and vicepresident. SECTION 18.4. This section also clashed with the Constitution regarding the certification of the votes. CONGRESS would not have allowed COMELEC to usurp the power that constitutionally belongs to it. The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, should be read together with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Note: Defensor-Santiago v. Fidel Ramos • Ramos won as the elected President • Santiago, the defeated candidate, filed an election protest • While the case was pending, she ran as Senator and was declared elected • She assumed office as a Senator • Supreme Court: Her election and assumption as Senator was deemed to be an abandonment of her protest. A Senator's term is 6 years. Since public office is a public trust, she made a pact with the people that she would serve for 6 years.
CONGRESSMAN LOPEZ V. SENATE AND HOUSE G.R. No. 163556, 8 June 2004 p. 366, Bernas casebook FACTS The case is a petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress. It created a Joint Committee that would preliminary canvass the votes of the candidates for president and vice-president in the May 2004 election. ISSUES W/N the Congress committed grave abuse of discretion RULING/DOCTRINE IT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. (Dismissed) COURT JURISDICTION. The Court has jurisdiction following the principle that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the initiatory proceedings, like the complaint or petition. The Court deemed that the petition provided sufficient allegations of violations of the Constitution. SECTION 4, ARTICLE VII expressly provides that Congress has the power to promulgate its rules for canvassing the certificates. (Congressional prerogative) JURISPRUDENCE: Arroyo v. De Venecia – The Court has no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution.
Santiago v. Guingona – Doctrine of separation of powers: no authority to interfere when there is no showing of abuse of discretion; co-equal branches
PIMENTEL V. JOINT CANVASSING COMMITTEE 22 June 2004 p. 366, Bernas casebook FACTS The case is a petition for prohibition. The petitioner, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., sought to declare null and void the existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminary canvass the votes cast for the Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 2004 elections. Petitioner's argument: 1. The adjournment of the Congress on 11 June 2004 of its last regular session means that its term has terminated and expired. This means that all pending matters and proceedings have expired. ISSUES 1. 2.
W/N the Court has jurisdiction over the case W/N the aforementioned function of the committee is null and void
RULING/DOCTRINE 1. THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION. This is pursuant to the Court's power to determine if there was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the part or any instrumentality of the Government. 2.
THE PETITION HAS NO BASIS ON THE CONSTITUTION. RULES OF SENATE = ARTICLE VII, SEC. 4. This provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for the President or the Vice-President. TERM OF CONGRESS. Contrary to the argument of the petitioner, the term of Congress did not terminate/expire upon the adjournment of its regular session. He was referring to Article VI, Section 15 of the Congress. This provision pertained to the regular annual legislative session and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session. The term of office of Senators is 6 years. The term of office of Member of the House of Representatives is 3 years. It is the legislative functions of the Members of Congress that end upon the adjournment of its regular session. This does not affect its non-legislative functions. It shall adjourn upon the accomplishment of its functions. Therefore, there is no legal impediment for the creation of the Joint Committee.
FERNANDO POE, JR. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO P.E.T. Case No. 002, 29 March 2005 FACTS FPJ died before his election protest could be decided. Mrs. FPJ claimed that because of the paramount interest of the Filipino people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the election protest. ISSUES W/N the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter's protest case? RULING THE WIDOW MAY NOT SUBSTITUTE/INTERVENE. RULE 14 OF PET RULES. The fundamental rule in presidential election protests is that only the interested parties may file for the protest. This means that there are only two persons who may file: the second and third placers. They are the interested parties since they are the ones who may benefit from the decision. SUBSTITUTION. On one hand, in cases of substitution, the Tribunal has no rule. On the other hand, the Tribunal does allow for the analogous and supplementary application of the Rules of Court. RULE 3, SECTION 16; RULES OF COURT. The Rules of Court allows for the substitution of a legal representative. JURISPRUDENCE Vda. De De Mesa v. Mencias De la Victoria v. COMELEC – allowed substitution of interested parties – denied the substitution of widow or children – substitution of real interested parties is allowed – interested parties: who would benefit/injured by judgement 2 ASPECTS: RIGHT TO PUBLIC OFFICE + PUBLIC INTEREST. The nobility of the intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an election protest.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO G.R. No. 146710-15, 2 March 2001 p. 371, Bernas casebook FACTS 1998
Estrada: President; Arroyo: VP
Chavit Singson accused Estrada of receiving money from jueteng lords Guingona accused petitioner with similar allegations and of taking money from Singson on excise tax on cigarettes Drilon to the Blue Ribbon Committee to do a joint investigation.
Cardinal Sin's pastoral statement Catholic Bishop Conference Corazon Aquino Fidel Ramos Arroyo resigned as Secretary of the Dept. of Social Welfare and Services
resignations: 4 senior economic advisors of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers Sec. Mar Roxas (Department of Trade and Industry defected from ruling coalition: Senate President Franklin Drilon House Speaker Manuel Villar 47 representatives from Lapian ng Masang Pilipino Articles of Impeachment (HS Villar) signed by 115 representatives (more than 1/3 of all members of HR) Drilon was replaced by Pimentel (Senate President) Villar was replaced by Fuentabella (Speaker) Opened impeachment proceedings; oath of senator-judges
dramatic point of impeachment: Clarissa Ocampo's testimony (Sr. VP of Equitable-PCI Bank) signature of “Jose Velarde”; 500M investment agreement
Espiritu's testimony (Secretary of Finance) jointly owned BW Resources Corporation w/Dante Tan accused of insider trading
2nd Envelope; 11-10 vote of senator-judges (against opening) resignations: Pimentel as SP public prosecutors (Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance) INDEFINITE POSTPONEMENT EDSA II January 19
Chief of Staff of AFP, Gen. Angelo Reyes, defected agreed to snap election; not included in candidates PNP Chief, Panfilo Lacson, withdraw support of gov't
day of surrender Arroyo's oath of office
discharged powers and duties of President recognition from foreign governments
ESTRADA: legal problems Petitioner's arguments: 1. The Court has no jurisdiction since the case at bar concerns a political issue. Used Lorenzo v. Aquino to support argument. 2. He did not resign as President nor did he suffer from a permanent disability. The office of the President was not vacant when Arroyo took oath of office.
ISSUES 1. W/N the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2. W/N Estrada the petitioner resigned as President 3. W/N the petitioner was only temporarily unable to act as President 4. W/N the petitioner was immune from criminal prosecution 5. W/N the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity
RULING 1. IT IS A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. 2. ESTRADA RESIGNED.
3. 4. 5.
HE WAS NOT TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT. PETITIONER WAS NOT IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY.
DOCTRINE 1. IT IS A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY. JURISPRUDENCE: Tañada v. Cuenco – political questions are concerned with the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure – power of judicial review: controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, determine if there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of government – SC has the prerogative to determine what to do to prevent grave abuse of discretion LEGAL DISTINCTION: EDSA I + EDSA II. - distinguished due to the argument using Lorenzo v. Aquino EDSA I
exercise of the people the: power of revolution
exercise of the people of the: power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the - installed through direct exercise government for redress of grievances of power of the Filipino people in defiance of the provisions of the - not revolutionary in character, 1973 Constitution, as amended Arroyo swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution - gov't established by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial review since it is created not by the constitution extra constitutional: not subject of judicial review
intra constitutional: subject to judicial review (resignation and succession)
Freedom of speech Right of assembly – legally demandable rights – guaranteed in 1987 Constitution (Article III, section 4) – indispensable
Democracy: the people count, sovereign people can assemble to petition
2. ESTRADA RESIGNED. RESIGNATION – its validity is not governed by any formal requirement – may be written or oral, may be express or implied – so long as clear, it will be given legal effect – elements are easily distinguished 1. intent to resign 2. intent is coupled by acts of relinquishment ESTRADA'S RESIGNATION – no formal written letter of resignation but can be determined from acts and omissions/ totality of the evidence – totality test: confirmed in his final statement in M. press release 1. acknowledgment of Arroyo's oath-taking as President 2. emphasis placed on leaving the seat of presidency for the sake of peace and healing process of country; no indication of returning to seat 3. expression of gratitude to people; implied reference to the opportunity given to him to govern 4. assurance he will not shrink from future challenge; implied reference to the period after occupying office of president 5. called on supporters to join in the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity; implied: no solidarity without his resignation PETITIONER: TEMPORARY LEAVE – supported the claim by presenting a letter addressed to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Reps. – stated that assigned the VP as Acting President – Court: the nature of the letter is mysterious; when was it made?; resignation cannot be changed according to whim PETITIONER: CANNOT RESIGN – petitioner's ground: RA 3019, section 12 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act); no public officer is permitted to resign if there is a pending criminal or administrative investigation – Court rejected the interpretation INTENT/LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – prevent the act of resignation/retirement as a shield/protection of a public official from investigation of pending criminal or administrative investigations or from prosecution – if the public official resigns/retires, it shall not result to the
dismissal of the pending investigations or prosecution IMPEACHMENT CASE – not “pending” – majority of the senator-judges walked out; public and private prosecutors filed Manifestations of Withdrawal of Appearances – proceeding was postponed indefinitely
3. HE WAS NOT TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO ACT AS PRESIDENT. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS: 1. Arroyo, as VP, has no power to determine whether or not the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of President 2. Congress has the ultimate authority to determine such inability (Article VII, Section 11) CONGRESS RECOGNIZED ARROYO AS PRESIDENT – evident rejection of Estrada's claim of temporary inability 1. House Resolution: support for assumption into office by Arroyo 2. Senate Resolution: confirmation of A's appointment of Guingona as VP 3. Senate Resolution: Impeachment Court as functus officio 4. Senate Resolution: call for COMELEC to fill vacancy in Senate 5. Congress: sent bills to be signed into law to Arroyo 6. Estrada: no recognition from Cabinet, gov't sector, AFP, PNP COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO REVIEW/REVISE CONGRESS (Jurisprudence: Tañada v. Cuenco) – doctrine of separation of powers – question is political in nature
4. PETITIONER WAS NOT IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. (p.344)
5. THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY. PETITIONER: OMBUDSMAN HAS DEVELOPED A BIAS – argues that investigations of Ombudsman should be stopped since they have developed a bias due to the prejudicial publicity on his guilt JURISPRUDENCE People v. Teehankee Larranaga v. CA
– high profile and high stake criminal trials often draw the attention of the media and is often presented with pervasive publicity – right to a fair trial is not incompatible to free press – the responsible press is regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration – pervasive publicity does not automatically mean it has impaired the impartiality of the trial judge – judges are learned of the law and are trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances TEST – – –
OF ACTUAL PREJUDICE proof that the judge has been unduly influenced by the publicity not mere allegation appellant has the burden of proof
EPILOGUE Ombudsman – duty to balance right of the State to prosecute the guilty and right of an accused to fair trial Prosecutor – duty to do justice, less to prosecute Rights in democracy – rule of law, not rule of man; not a number game; has respect for the minority; minority can convince the majority if it is wrong
VITUG, concurring – there was no express statement of “resignation” but it can be deduced from his acts; acts present the reality and true intentions MENDOZA, concurring – Public office is a public trust; lost of trust meant he was only Pres. by name – disability may be physical, mental, or moral BELLOSILLO, concurring – “disability” must be properly construed – no functioning government (objective) – View of petitioner's permanent disability (objective) 1. huge sector of civil society 2. mass resignation of Cabinet members 3. withdrawal of support of armed forces and national police 4. acknowledgement of Congress of Arroyo 5. Papal Nuncio KAPUNAN, concurring separate opinion
facts and circumstances do not unmistakably indicate resignation for complete operative resignation: 1. intent to resign 2. act of resignation – Intent = voluntary and free to choose; cannot resign under duress – People power is not the mode prescribed by the Constitution to create a vacancy in the Presidency – Sovereign power of the people =/= popular sovereignty – Constitutionalism placed limits in political institutions and in ourselves – Concur: irreversible fact; court can do no less – –
PARDO, concurring – “constrained to resign” YNARES-SANTIAGO, concurring separate opinion – against mob rule – may encourage the use of “people power” to intimidate the government – Sovereignty resides in the people within the bounds of the Constitution SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, concurring separate opinion – resignation must be voluntary and willingly done, express and definite – if under duress, voidable and may be repudiated – concur: Court has to present the fact that exists, Arroyo is de jure gov't
ESTRADA V. ARROYO G.R. No. 146738, 3 April 2001 p. 392, Bernas casebook FACTS Petitioner's arguments: 1. The Angara Diary cannot be used as evidence in Court to resolve the issue of his resignation since it is violates the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence. 2. The Court misinterpreted Article VII, section 11. Interpretation: Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between majority of the Cabinet and the President. The Court cannot review this issue since it is a political question. 3. The members of the Court who went to EDSA II should inhibit themselves as there is a need for the neutrality of impartial judges. ISSUES 1. W/N the Angara Diary is inadmissible as evidence 2. W/N the issue of the respondent's temporary inability is a political question 3. W/N the Justices who were present in EDSA II should inhibit themselves RULING/DOCTRINE 1. THE ANGARA DIARY IS VALID EVIDENCE. NOT AN OUT OF COURT STATEMENT. The diary was not an out of Court statement. It was part of the proceedings and the petitioner was furnished a copy of it. Thus, he cannot be surprised of the use of the Diary in the proceedings. Both parties used the diary in their pleadings. The petitioner had many opportunities to contest the use of the Diary but failed to do so. HEARSAY. Evidence is hearsay when it depends, in whole or in part, the credibility and competency of persons other than the witness who produced it. Reasons for excluding hearsay as evidence: 1. absence of cross-examination 2. absence of demeanor of evidence 3. absence of the oath NOT ALL HEARSAY IS INADMISSIBLE. It is accepted by the court when it is relevant, trustworthy, and necessary. RULES OF EXCLUSION. The Court held that it was necessary to determine whether the hearsay evidence is exempted from the rules of exclusion. Ruled of Court: rules of exclusion do not include admissions of a party
The Angara Diary contains direct statements of the petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of a party. Admissions are not covered by the hearsay rule. ADOPTIVE ADMISSION. Petitioner argued that the diary was not his, hence, not binding on him. The doctrine of adoptive admission contradicts his argument. An adoptive admission is a party's reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party's reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by another person. Executive Secretary Angara suggested that the petitioner consider the option of a dignified exit. The petitioner did not object the suggestion but merely said that he'd never leave the country. His silence can be taken as an admission. RES INTER ALIOS ACTA. Petitioner argued that the use of the Angara Diary violated the rule on res inter alios acta. This rule provides that the rights of a party cannot by prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as provided in the Rules of Court. On this argument, the Court stated that among the exceptions to the rule are the admissions made by a copartner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara was considered as the alter ego of the petitioner and was called the 'Little President'. In the rules of evidence, the admissions of an agent are binding on the principal. BAN ON HEARSAY. The ban on hearsay evidence does not include independently relevant statements. 1. statements that are the facts in issue 2. statements that are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue 2.
THE COURT CANNOT SUSTAIN THE ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER. PETITIONER. The petitioner himself submitted that the Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to decide whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. This submission was sustained by the Court and Congress, based on its acts, has already determined and dismissed the alleged temporary inability of the petitioner to govern. SEPARATION OF POWERS. If the petitioner feels that the Congress has erred in its decision, the Court has no power to correct the alleged error due to the principle of separation of powers. Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgement. Its wisdom may only be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before the court of justice. CHANGE OF ARGUMENT. The petitioner attempted to change his argument by saying that the issue is whether or not the President is a de jure or de facto is a judicial question. The Court held that the case at bar does not present such issue. Such matter is up to Congress to determine since it is a political judgement that the Court cannot review. These actions were done pursuant to Article VII, section 8 and 11.
Article VII, section 8 = resignation/inability to govern at the beginning of term Article VII, section 11 = Congress has ultimate authority Petitioner: Congress' acts cannot be given legal significance because 1. acts are post facto 2. declaration of presidential incapacity cannot be implied There is nothing in the provision that states that the declaration of Congress of the President's inability must always be a priori or before the assumption of the Vice-President of the office. The special circumstances of the situation must be noted. The resignation of the petitioner took place when Congress was not in session and had no reasonable opportunity to act a priori. It is also undisputed that the letter sent by the petitioner was received by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives before the respondent took her oath of office. This is a priori recognition of by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the respondent's constitutional succession of the presidency. This was, in effect, followed post facto by various resolutions by the Senate and the House. 3.
THERE IS NO NEED TO INHIBIT THEMSELVES. SPECTATORS. The Justices who were present in EDSA II merely accepted the invitation of the respondent to attend her oath taking. They were mere spectators of a historic event. COURT EN BANC RESOLUTION. “This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by a proper party.”
DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN 177 SCRA 354 (1989) p. 398, Bernas casebook FACTS Petitioner: Doromal – Commissioner of the PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Governance) Memorandum – approved by Ombudsman, filed in Sandiganbayan – Petitioner willfully and unlawfully participated in business through his family owned corporation, Doromal International Trading Corporation – DITC participated in biddings conducted by DECS and National Manpower & Youth Council Petitioner's argument: Memorandum of the Ombudsman should be quashed because the Special Prosecutor in Sandiganbayan admitted that he did not possess any document signed or submitted to DECS when he became PCGG Commissioner ISSUES W/N petitioner violated Article VII, section 13 RULING/DOCTRINE HE VIOLATED ARTICLE VII, SECTION 13. – a signed document is not a sine qua non (necessary condition) – he had an indirect interest since DITC was a family corporation which he was President of – similar to Civil Service Law
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991 p. 399, Bernas casebook FACTS Petitioners' arguments: 1. E.O 284 is unconstitutional since it allows Cabinet members, their undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices other than their primary position. This is contrary to Article VII, Section 13. 2. There are only 2 exceptions provided by the clause “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” of Article VII, Section 13. (1) The Vice-President may be appointed as Cabinet member. (2) The Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. 3. Article VII, Section 13 applies specifically to the President, VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants. Thus, its exceptions does not include Article IX-B, Section 7, par. 2, which concerns officers and employees of the Civil Service. Respondents' arguments: 1. “Unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” includes Article IX-B, Section 7 (appointive officials). ISSUES W/N Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional RULING/DOCTRINE IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HISTORY. In construing the constitution, it is important to note the objective being sought by its adoption and the evils being prevented or remedied. During the presidency of Ferdinand E. Marcos, it was common practice to designate the members of the Cabinet, their deputies, and assistants as members of governing bodies or boards of various government agencies and instrumentalities. The practice of holding multiple government offices eventually led to abuses of public officials for the purpose of self-enrichment. It was this blatant betrayal of public trust that led to the discontent of the Filipino of the Marcos regime. INTENT. It is evident that the Constitutional Commission envisioned a remedy to the situation and prevent the evils that take place due to the holding of multiple government offices. Justice Isagani Cruz said that the strongest points of the 1987 Constitution were its assurance that there would no longer be a scandalous practice of holding numerous offices of Cabinet Members and
its prohibition of collecting excessive compensation. It can be seen that the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose strict prohibitions upon the President and his/her official family regarding the holding of other offices or employment in the government. COMPARISON.
BOTINIO, JR. V. COA G.R. No. 147392, 12 March 2004 p. 407, Bernas casebook FACTS Petitioner: Benedicto Ernersto R. Bitonio, Jr. – appointed as Director IV of the Bureau of Labor Relations in DOLE (Department of Labor and Employment) – was designated as the DOLE representative in the Board of Directors of PEZA (Philippine Economic Zone Authority) Republic Act No. 7916, Section 11 – creation of the PEZA and its Board of Directors – Members of the board will receive a per diem (representation and transportation allowance) COA – issued a notice of disallowance of the petitioner's per diems – pursuant to SC's decision in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary Petitioner's arguments: 1. He is entitled to per diems as provided in RA 7916. It is valid and in effect unless declared unconstitutional. An administrative directive (COA Memorandum) cannot repeal or amend a statute (RA). 2. RA 7916 was enacted 4 years after the Civil Liberties Union case. It is presumed that the legislature was aware of the decision of the Court. 3. The constitutionality of RA 7916 was not challenged. Hence, it remains in force. 4. His position as Director IV was not included in the enumeration of officials prohibited from receiving additional compensation. ISSUES W/N COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors' meetings as representative of the Secretary of Labor RULING COA CORRECTLY DISALLOWED THE PER DIEMS. JURISPRUDENCE: Dela Cruz v. Commission on Audit – the Court upheld the decision of COA in disallowing the payment of honoraria and per diems to officers who sat as members of the Board of Directors of the NHA (National Housing Authority) – included the alternates of superiors in an ex oficio capacity
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary – explained that an ex oficio position is part of the principal office – thus, there is no right to receive additional compensation – such services are already compensated in the compensation he receives in his principal position PRINCIPAL AND REPRESENTATIVE. As a representative, the petitioner sat in the same capacity as his principal. Whatever rules and laws that govern the member in the Board also applies to the representative. His attendance in the Board was due to the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, he cannot claim that his position as Director IV is not covered by the Court decision and by the provision is of no merit. CONSTITUTION. The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, is superior over statutes. No law can render the Constitution nugatory. It should be the law that would conform to the Constitution. If a law infringes upon the Constitution, it is within the power of the Court nullify the effectivity of such unconstitutional law. Thus, the petitioner's argument that the enactment of the RA was 4 years after the Court decision is of no merit. LEGISLATIVE PREORGATIVE. The Court issued a clarificatory resolution regarding its decision on the Civil Liberties Union. It clarified its decision regarding the extent of legislative prerogative. It stated that exclusive legislative competence to provide funds for a public purpose is not unlimited. It must be exercised within the framework provided by the Constitution, from which it draws its powers. AMENDMENT. RA 7916 was later amended by RA 8748. Notable changes provided by the amendment: 1. deleted: the option of designating representatives to the Board by different Cabinet members 2. deleted: paragraph about the payment of per diems to Board Members
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER V. ELMA G.R. No. 138965, 30 June 2006 p. 412, Bernas casebook FACTS Respondent: Elma – had concurrent positions as Chairman of the PCGG (Presidential Commission on Good Governance) and CPLC (Chief Presidential Legal Counsel). Petition: to declare null and void the concurrent positions of the respondent Legal basis: Article VII, Section 13 Article IX-B, Section 7 ISSUES W/N the position of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC is prohibited by Article VII, Section 13 and Article IX-B, Section 7 RULING/DOCTRINE IT IS PROHIBITED. JURISPRUDENCE Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary – Article IX-B, Section 7 is the general rule. It only allows appointive officials to hold more than one government office if provided by the Constitution or the primary functions of his position. – Article VII, Section 13 provides the exceptions specifically for the President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants.
Quimson v. Ozatea – There is no legal objection to a government official to hold more than one government office and perform the functions of both provided that there is no incompatibility. People v. Green - An incompatibility exists when one is a subordinate of the other. If one office/function allows for intervention to the other, there is incompatibility. INCOMPATIBILITY. As CPLC, it is the duty of the respondent to give independent and impartial legal advice and review investigations of the heads of various executive departments and agencies. PCGG is an agency under the Executive Department. IMPARTIALITY. It is questionable whether the respondent can be impartial
regarding his functions as CPLC that would interfere with his functions as Chairman of PCGG. This is the situation that the law seeks to prevent.
IN RE APPOINTMENTS OF VALENZUELA AND VALLARTA A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC, 9 November 1998 p. 413, Bernas casebook FACTS • Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta were appointed by the President as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Bago City and Cabanatuan City respectively. • Relevant constitutional provisions: 1. Article VII, Section 15 – 2 months immediately preceding the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term 2.
Article VIII, Section 4 – vacancy in SC shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof
Article VIII, Section 9 – vacancy in the lower courts shall be filled within 90 days from the submission of the list
ISSUES 1. W/N during the period ban provided in Article VII, Section 15 the President is required to fill the vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Article VIII, Section 4 and 9. 2. W/N he can make appointments to the judiciary during the period of the ban in the interest of public service. RULING/DOCTRINE THE PRESIDENT CANNOT MAKE APPOINTMENTS IN THE JUDICIARY DURING THE PERIOD BAN. COURT'S VIEW: Article VII, Section 15 – the President is neither required nor allowed to make appointments to the courts during the period ban
Article VIII, Section 4 and 9 – the President is required to fill the vacancies in the court unless Article VII, Section 15 prohibits such appointment Prohibition on appointments – takes place once every 6 years INTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION.
JOURNAL OF THE COMMISSION - presented that the intent of the framers was to avoid a vacancy in the Supreme Court ANALYSIS OF THE PROVISION. Against 2 types of appointments: 1. for buying votes 2. for partisan considerations – against Omnibus Election Code MIDNIGHT APPOINTMENTS Aytona v. Castillo – appointments 45 days before regular election/ 30 days before special elections – shown by number and time of making – permitted: vacancies in important positions, few, spaced to afford assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration – does not deprive the new administration of appointments – exception: if the vacancy will prejudice public service or endanger public safety CONFLICT IN TIME FRAMES – the prevention of of vote buying and similar evils outweigh the avoidance of delays – delays in lower courts can be prevented by temporary designation; does not necessarily need appointments – prohibited appointments results to long lasting and permanent effects and can affect results of elections – exists only every 6 years – Constitution should be construed in its entirety, not separate provisions IMPERATIVE APPOINTMENTS (during period of ban) – in Supreme Court – when reduced number does not result into a quorum PROCEDURE – originals of appointments in the judiciary are sent by the Office of the President to the Office of the Chief Justice – Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, in behalf of the Chief Justice, advice the appointees of their appointments and the date of the commencement of their required orientation seminar conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy for new Judges – for the authenticity of the appointment – avoids defective appointments – Judge Valenzuela: no formal notice from Court
CASE: APPOINTMENTS ARE VOID (w/o prejudice to their being considered anew by the JBC for re-nomination) – made during the ban – prohibited due to the prevention of vote-buying – no showing of compelling reason to justify the making of the appointment during the period of ban
DE LA RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 131136, 28 February 2001 p. 417, Bernas casebook Petitioner: Conrado L. de la Rama – Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon – sought the recall of the appointments of 14 municipal employees on the ground that they were given their positions through midnight appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja (Article VII, Section 15) CSC (Civil Service Commission) – ruling: Article VII, Section 15 specifically applies to appointments made by the President or the Acting President 2 months immediately prior to the next presidential elections. Supreme Court – deemed the CSC decision proper
MENDOZA, J., dissenting: – such reading of the provision is simplistic – must note the broad principle that the appointing authority must not make appointments prior the elections unless required by the imperatives of public service – principle: public office is a public trust – Aytona v. Castillo: good faith, morality, propriety