Article 12 Cases Summaries

January 11, 2018 | Author: stikadar91 | Category: Corporations, Monopoly, Common Law, Government Information, Crime & Justice
Share Embed Donate


Short Description

Download Article 12 Cases Summaries...

Description

Article 12 Cases 1) Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India (1975) 3 SCR 616 2) Sukhdev Singh V. Bhagat Ram AIR 1975 SC 1331 3) RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 4) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 480 5) Pradeep Kumar Biswas and Ors. v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology and Ors., (2002) 5 SCC 111 6) Zee Telefilms Ltd. And Anr. V. Union of India AIR 2005 SC 2677

1) Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, (1975) 3 SCR 616 In this case it was decided that Indian Council of Scientific Research, a body though registered as a non-statutory body, but having a good deal of govt. control and funding, is not a State within the meaning of Art 12. But this decision was overruled by the SC in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case.

2) Sukhdev Singh V. Bhagat Ram, AIR 1975 SC 1331 The question was whether the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, the Industrial Finance Corporation and the Life Insurance Corporation established under statutes of Parliament are authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution. The majority of the judges in this case held that:  The State, being an abstract entity could undertake trade or business under Article 298 via an agency, instrumentality or a juristic person.  Statutory corporations are agencies/instrumentalities of the State for carrying on trade and business which would have been otherwise carried out by State itself.  Therefore the test must be to see whether a body is acting as an agency or instrumentality of the State. In this case the Court found that bodies like LIC, ONGC etc. were created by statutes, had statutory power to make binding rules and regulations and were under the pervasive control of the Gvt. In light of these facts plus the combination of State aid and furnishing of an important public service by these corporations, made the SC declare these corporations to be State under Art 12.

3) RD Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 The first respondent issued a notice inviting tenders from Registered IInd Class Hoteliers having at least five years experience for putting up and running a restaurant and two snack bars at the International Airport of Bombay. In spite of not satisfying this condition of eligibility, the tender of the fourth respondent was accepted giving rise to the appellant’s cause of action. It was alleged by the appellant that in so doing, he and others were deprived of an equal opportunity of submitting their tenders and being considered for the contract. While deciding this case, the Court had to first ascertain whether the International Airport Authority of India, a corporate body

constituted under the International Airport Authority Act, 1973 was ‘State’ under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in this case upheld the ratio of Sukhdev vs Bhagat Ram case and re-iterated the test, for finding out whether a body is ‘State’, as ‘If a statutory corporation, body or other authority is an instrumentality or agency of Government, it would be an 'authority' and therefore 'State' within the meaning of that expression in Article 12.’ Examination of the provisions of International Airport Authority Act, 1971 along this the above ‘Agency/Instrumentality’, the SC concluded International Airport Authority is undoubtedly an instrumentality or agency of the Central Government and falls within the definition of 'State'. The Court went on to conclude that just as Govt acting through its officers is subject to constitutional and public law limitations, similarly Gvt acting through agency is subject to equal restrictions. Therefore the International Airport Authority of India is subject to the limiting or restricting provisions of the Constitution and other public laws.

4) Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 480 Under challenge was the validity of admissions made to the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar for the academic year 1979-80 on grounds of arbitrariness. Admissions to candidates belonging to the State of Jammu and Kashmir were to be given on the basis of comparative merit which was to be determined by holding a written entrance test of 100 marks in specified subjects and a viva voce examination of 50 marks distributed across four factors mentioned in the admission resolution. The viva voce itself, and its specific holding to the petitioners’ cases was challenged. Before taking up the substantive question, the Court had to first decide whether the REC was an authority under Article 12 of the Constitution. In this case the Court held that in-order to be an agency or instrumentality of the Sate the impugned body or corporation need not necessarily be created by an Act or statue. The enquiry must not be how the juristic person was born but rather why it was born. The Court laid down following parameters to identify whether a body was State or not? 1) if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by the Government 2) where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation 3) whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or protected 4) existence of deep and pervasive State control 5) if the functions of the public corporation are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions 6) if a department of the Government is transferred to a corporation Applying these tests Regional Engineering College was held to be an instrumentality or agency of the State because of the deep and pervasive Gvt control over the society.

5) Zee Telefilms Ltd. And Anr. V. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677 Facts:

The Board of Control for Cricket in India had terminated a contract with the petitioner pertaining to the grant of exclusive television rights for a period of four years. This action was challenged as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Observations by the Court: 1. Board is not created by a statute. 2. No part of the share capital of the Board is held by the Government. 3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the Board. 4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such status is not State conferred or State protected. 5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State control. The control if any is only regulatory in nature as applicable to other similar bodies. This control is not specifically exercised under any special statute applicable to the Board. All functions of the Board are neither public functions nor are they closely related to governmental functions. 6. The Board is not created by transfer of a Government owned corporation. It is an autonomous body. 7. The facts established do not cumulatively show that the Board is financially, functionally of administratively dominated by or is under the control of the Government. Thus the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Board is not pervasive in nature. Such limited control is purely regulatory control and nothing more. Argument of the Appellant: 1) In the present day context cricket has become a profession and that the cricketers have a fundamental right under Article 19(1) (g) to pursue their professional career as cricketers. It was also submitted that the Board controls the said rights of a citizen by its rules and regulations and since such a regulation can be done only by the State the Board of necessity must be regarded as an instrumentality of the State. 2) Memorandum of Association and the rules and regulations and due to its monopolistic control over the game of Cricket the Board has all pervasive powers to control a person's cricketing career as it has the sole authority to decide on his membership and affiliation to any particular Cricketing Association, which in turn would affect his right to play cricket at any level in India as well as abroad. Issue: 1) On the basis of the argument of the appellant that the BCCI has controls one of the fundamental rights of the Indian citizens (cricketers) under Article 19(1) (g), would such a control make the BCCI ‘state’ for the purpose of Article 12? 2) Whether the duties carried out by the Board, in selecting the national cricket team etc. amounted to public duties? If they were public duties whether BCCI is state or not? Judgment:

1) To argue that every entity, which validly or invalidly arrogates to itself the right to regulate or for that matter even starts regulating the fundamental right of the citizen under Article 19(1) (g), is a State within the meaning of Article 12 is to put the cart before the horse. If such logic were to be applied every employer who regulates the manner in which his employee works would also have to be treated as State. 2) If the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted then the petitioner will have to first establish that the Board is a State under Article 12 and it is violating the fundamental rights of the petitioner. In this petition under Article 32 we have already held that the petitioner has failed to establish that the Board is State within the meaning of Article 12. 3) In the absence of any authorization, if a private body chooses to discharge any such function which is not prohibited by law then it would be incorrect to hold that such action of the body would make it an instrumentality of the State. The Union of India has tried to make out a case that the Board discharges these functions because of the de facto recognition granted by it to the Board under the guidelines framed by it but the Board has denied the same. In this regard we must hold that the Union of India has failed to prove that there is any recognition by the Union of India under the guidelines framed by it and that the Board is discharging these functions on its own as an autonomous body. 4) It cannot be denied that the Board does discharge some duties that can be said to be akin to public duties or State functions and if there is any violation of any constitutional or statutory obligation or rights of other citizens, the aggrieved party may not have a relief by way of a petition under Article 32. But that does not mean that the violator of such right would go scot-free merely because it or he is not a State. Though the remedy under Article 32 is not available, an aggrieved party can always seek a remedy under the ordinary course of law or by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution which is much wider than Article 32

View more...

Comments

Copyright ©2017 KUPDF Inc.
SUPPORT KUPDF