Another Great Debate the National Interest of the United States

Another "Great Debate": The National Interest of the United States Author(s): Hans J. Morgenthau Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Dec., 1952), pp. 961-988 Published by: American Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1952108 . Accessed: 23/09/2013 12:41 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

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The American Political Science Review VOL. XLVI ANOTHER

DECEMBER,

1952

NO. 4

"GREAT DEBATE": THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES HANS J. MORGENTHAU

University of Chicago

The controversywhich has arisen on the occasion of Ambassador Kennan's and my recent publicationsdiffersfromthe great historical debates on Americanforeignpolicyin two significant respects.It raises an issue more fundamentalto the understandingof Americanforeign policy and of all politics than those with which the previous'"great debates" were concerned,and it deals with the issue largelyin terms whichare not conduciveto understanding. The great debates of the past, such as the one over interventionvs. neutralityin 1793, expansion vs. the status quo beforethe Mexican and after the Spanish-AmericanWar, internationalcooperation vs. isolationin the 'twenties,interventionvs. abstentionin the late 'thirties -all evolved around clear-cutissues offoreignpolicy.In 1793 you were in favor of goingto war on the side of France or of remainingneutral. In the 1840's you approved of the annexationof Texas or you did not. At the turnof the centuryyou supported overseas expansion or you were against it. In the 'twentiesyou advocated joining the League of Nations or stayingout of it. In the late 'thirtiesyou wanted to oppose the Axis Powers by all means short of war or you wanted to abstain from intervening.What separates the "utopian" from the "realist" position cannot be so sharplyexpressedin termsof alternativeforeign policies.The verysane policiescan be and are beingsupportedby both schools of thought.What sets them apart is not necessarilya matter of practical judgment,but of philosophiesand standards of thought. The issue which the presentdebate raises concernsthe natureof all politics and, more particularly,of the American traditionin foreign policy. The historyof modernpoliticalthoughtis the storyof a contest between two schools whichdifferfundamentallyin theirconceptionof the nature of man, society,and politics. One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract 961

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principles,can be achieved hereand now. It assumes the essentialgoodness and infinitemalleability of human nature and attributes the failureof the social order to measure up to the rational standards to lack of knowledgeand understanding,obsolescentsocial institutions, or the depravityof certainisolated individualsor groups. It trustsin education, reform,and the sporadic use of forceto remedythese deficiencies.' The otherschool believes that the world,imperfectas it is fromthe rational point of view, is the result of forceswhich are inherentin human nature.To improvethe worldone must workwiththose forces, not against them. This being inherentlya world of opposinginterests and of conflictamongthem,moralprinciplescan neverbe fullyrealized, but at best approximatedthroughthe ever temporarybalancing of interestsand the ever precarioussettlementof conflicts.This school, then,sees in a systemof checks and balances a universalprinciplefor all pluralistsocieties.2It appeals to historicprecedentratherthan to abstractprinciples,and aims at achievementofthelesserevil ratherthan of the absolute good. This conflictbetween two basic conceptionsof man and politics is at the bottomof the presentcontroversy.It is the same conflictwhich found its classic expressionin the polemic of Burke against the philosophy of the French Revolution. Given the sad state of political thoughtin ourtime,it wouldbe vain to expectthe spokesmenofpolitical realismto speak withthe voice of Burke and the defendersof political utopianismto measureup to the standardsof Condorcetand Rousseau. Yet one has a rightto expect that scholars discuss the issue without resortto invectiveand with properregard for establishedfacts.3 1 This is the ideal type of the utopian position rather than the empirical description of any particular historic type. In actuality, and this is true particularly of the present, the utopian position in international affairs is not always consistent with its philosophic premises. 2 It ought not to need special emphasis that a principle of social conduct, in contrast to a law of nature, allows of, and even presupposes, conduct in violation of the principle. Robert W. Tucker, in "Professor Morgenthau's Theory of Political 'Realism'" in this REVIEW, Vol. 46, pp. 214-224 (March, 1952), has missed this and many other points in his zeal to find contradictions where there are none. "This [the realist] doctrine," writes one historian-Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Co6rdinate State," Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 67, p. 173 (June, 1952)-"is confessedly, nay gleefully, amoral. It prides itself upon being realistic and takes Machiavelli as its great teacher. It is contemptuous of the simple beliefs of honest men, jeers at the sentimentalism of those who believe that men may strive for peace among nations, and looks upon democracy as a hindrance to skilled diplomacy. It looks with a certain derisive superiority upon the great leaders of this nation from Jefferson and John Quincy Adams to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt and describes them as moralistic and sentimental, and suggests that our models ought to be

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In orderto refutea theorywhichpretendsto be scientific,it is first necessaryto understandwhat a scientifictheoryis. A scientifictheoryis an attemptto bringorderand meaningto a mass of phenomenawhich withoutit would remaindisconnectedand unintelligible.Any one who disputes the scientificcharacterof such a theoryeithermust produce a theorysuperiorin these scientificfunctionsto the one attacked or must, at the very least, demonstratethat the facts as they actually whichthe theoryhas are do not lend themselvesto the interpretation put upon them. When a historiantells us that the balance of power is not a universalprincipleof politics,domesticand international,that it was practiced in Europe only for a limited period and never by the United States, that it ruinedthe statesthat practicedit,' it is incumbent upon him to tell us how we can dispose by means of theoryof the historic data by which, for instance, David Hume demonstratedthe universalityofthe balance of powerand Paul Scott Mowrer5and Alfred Vagts6 its practice by the United States; what Kautilya was writing about in the fourthcenturyB. C. when he summarized-thetheoretical and practical traditionof Indian statecraftin termsof the balance of power;what the Greekcitystates,the Roman republic,and themedieval Richelieu,Clemenceauand Bismarck.Its adherentsbelieve that internationalwars instead of beingmade by men and supportedby institutionshumanlycontrivedhave their originin the natureof man himselfand are inevitable." Anotherhistorian,ArthurSchlesinger, Jr.,in "Policy and National Interest,"Partisan Review,Vol. 18, p. 709 (Nov.-Dec., 1951), however,gives AmbassadorKennan a clean bill of moral health. "But what differentiates," he writes,"the Kennan approach from that of, forexample,the followersof ProfessorHans J. Morgenthauis that he takes the revelationsofinternationalamoralityin his stride; morethanthat,he comprehends them in his understandingof the tragedyof history.Mr. Kennan, in otherwords,is deeply moral,ratherthan moralistic,like JudgeHull, or immoral,like the boys who have just discoveredthat politicsinvolvepower.""This dreadfuldoctrine,"we are told (by Tannenbaum,pp. 173-174), "has now won wide acceptance by teachersand scholarsin the fieldof internationalrelationsand has, in fact,become the leading themein such circlesin many of our largestuniversities.It has become the scienceof internationalrelations-and who would quarrelwith science, especiallywhenit comespackaged in good clear Englishand fromhighsources?But it is not science.It is, in fact,onlypoor logic based upon falsepremises,and its claimto be a scienceis onlya bit ofunholyconceit." It may be remarkedin passingthat to dispose of a scientifictheoryas "fashionable" or a "fad," as some do withregardto politicalrealism,may reveal somethingabout the state of mind of the writer,but reveals nothingat all about the scientificvalue of the theory. 4 Tannenbaum,in the articlecitedabove, and in "The AmericanTraditionin Foreign Relations," ForeignAffairs,Vol. 30, pp. 31-50 (Oct., 1951). Our ForeignAffairs(New York, 1924), pp. 246 ff. B"The United States and the Balance of Power," The Journalof Politics,Vol. 3, pp. 401-449 (Nov., 1941).

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emperorsand popes were doing if they did not apply the principles of the balance of power; and how the nations which eitherneglected these principlesor applied themwronglysuffered political and military defeatand even extinction,whilethe nationwhichapplied these principles most consistentlyand consciously,that is, Great Britain,enjoyed unrivalledpower foran unparalleledlengthof time. The historianwho wishesto replacethe balance of poweras the guiding principleof Americanforeignpolicy with the "humanitarianand pacific traditions"of the coordinatee'state"7 must firstof all explain how it has come about that the thirteenoriginalstates expanded into the full breadth and a good deal of the length of a continent,until today the strategicfrontiersof the United States.run parallel to the coastline of Asia and along the River Elbe. If such are the resultsof policies based upon "humanitarian and pacific traditions,"never in the historyof the world has virtue been more bountifullyrewarded! Yet our historianmust explain not only the great sweep of American expansion,but also the specificforeignpolicies which in theirhistoric succession make up that sweep. Is it easier to explain.the successive shiftsof American support from Great Britain to France and back again fromthe beginningof King George's War in 1744 to the War of 1812 in termsof the "coordinatestate" than in termsof the balance of power? The same question mightbe asked about the postponementof the recognitionof the independenceof the Spanish coloniesuntil 1822, whenthe Floridas had been.acquiredfromSpain and Spain had thereby been deprivedof the abilityto challengethe United States fromwithin the hemisphere.The same question mightbe asked about the Monroe Doctrine itself, about Lincoln's policies toward Great Britain and France,and about our successivepolicies withregardto Mexico and the Caribbean. One could go on and pick out at randomany foreignpolicy pursuedby the United States fromthe beginningto 1919 and one would hardly finda policy, with the exceptionperhaps of the War of 1812, which could not be made intelligibleby referenceto the national interestdefinedin termsof power-political, military,and economicrather than by referenceto the principleof the "coordinate state." This inevitableoutcomeof such an inquiryis well summarizedin these words: Ease and prosperityhave made us wish the whole world to be as happy and well to do as ourselves;and we have supposed that institutionsand principles like our own werethe simple prescriptionformakingthem so. And yet, when 7Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power versus the Co6rdinate State," (cited above, note 3), p. 173.

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issues of our own interestarose, we have not been unselfish.We have shown ourselves kin to all the world,when it came to pushing an advantage. Our action against Spain in the Floridas, and against Mexico on the coasts of the Pacific; our attitude toward firstthe Spaniards, and then the French, with regard to the control of the Mississippi; the unpityingforcewith which we thrustthe Indians to the wall wherevertheystood in our way, have suited our professionsof peacefulnessand justice and liberalityno betterthan the aggressions of other nations that were strong and not to be gainsaid. Even Mr. philanthropistand champion of peaceable and modest government Jefferson, thoughhe was, exemplifiedthis double temperof the people he ruled. "Peace is ourpassion," he had declared; but the passion abated whenhe saw the mouth ofthe Mississippiabout to pass intothe hands of France. Though he had loved France and hated England, he did not hesitate then what language to hold. "There is on the globe," he wroteto Mr. Livingstonat Paris, "one singlespot the possessorof whichis our naturaland habitualenemy.The day that France takes possessionofNew Orleansseals the unionoftwo nations,who,in conjunction,can maintainexclusivepossessionofthe sea. From that momentwe must marryourselvesto the Britishfleetand nation." Our interestsmustmarchforward, altruiststhoughwe are; othernationsmustsee to it that theystand off, and do not seek to stay us.

This realist appraisal of the Americantraditionin foreignpolicy was published in 1901 in the AtlanticMonthly.Its author was a professor of jurisprudenceand political economy at Princetonby the name of Woodrow Wilson.8 Nothingmoreneeds to be said to demonstratethat factsdo not support a revisionof Americandiplomatichistorywhichtriesto substitute "humanitarianand pacifisttraditions"and the "coordinatestate" for power politics and the balance of power as the guiding principleof American foreignpolicy. What, then, does support it? Three things: the way American statesmen have spoken about American foreign policy; the legal fictionof the "coordinatestate"; finally,and foremost, an emotionalurge to justifyAmericanforeignpolicy in humanitarian, pacifistterms. It is elementarythat the characterof a foreignpolicy can be ascertained only throughthe examinationof the political acts performed and of the foreseeableconsequences of these acts. Thus we can find out what statesmen have actually done, and from the foreseeable consequencesof theiracts we can surmisewhat theirobjectives might have been. Yet examinationof the factsis not enough.To give meaning to the factual raw material of history,we must approach historical realitywitha kind of rational outline,a map whichsuggeststo us the * "Democracy and Efficiency," Atlantic Monthly,Vol. 87, pp. 293-294 (March, 1901).

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possible meaningsof history.In other words,we put ourselvesin the position of a statesman who must meet a certain problem of foreign policy under certain circumstancesand ask ourselves, what are the rational alternativesfromwhich a statesman may choose who must meet this problemunder these circumstances,presumingalways that he acts in a rational manner,and which of these rational alternatives was this particularstatesman,acting underthese circumstances,likely to choose? It is the testingof this rationalhypothesisagainstthe actual facts and their consequences which gives meaning to the facts of historyand makes the scientificwritingof political historypossible. In the processof writingthe historyof foreignpolicy the interpretations by statesmenof their own acts, especially if they are made for public consumption,must needs have a strictlysubsidiaryplace. The by actors on the political scene is itself,of public self-interpretation course, a political act which seeks to present a certain policy to its presumedsupportersin termsof theirmoral and political folkloreand to those againstwhichit is directedin termswhichintendto embarrass and deceive. Such declarationsmay indeedshed lightupon the character and objectivesofthe policypursuediftheyare consideredin conjunction with,and in subordinationto, rational hypotheses,actions, and likely matterto interpretthe American consequences.Yet it is quite a different traditionofforeignpolicyin the lightofa collectionofofficialstatements which, like most such statements,present humanitarianand pacifist justificationsforthe policiespursued.If anybodyshouldbe bold enough to writea historyof worldpoliticswithso uncriticala methodhe would easily and well-nighinevitablybe driven to the conclusionthat from Timur to Hitler and Stalin the foreignpolicies of all nations were inspiredby the ideals of humanitarianismand pacifism.The absurdity of the resultis commensuratewiththe defectsof the method. It is onlyfroma methodwhichaccepts the declarationsof statesmen as evidence of the characterof the policies pursued,that the principle of the "coordinate state" receives a semblance of plausibility.Statesmen and internationallawyershave been wont to speak of the "equal dignity"of all states, regardlessof "wealth, power,size, population or culture,"9whichI take the principleof the "coordinatestate" to mean. It is also referredto as the principleof "federalismin internationalrelations."'" As itsprimeexamplesare citedthe relationsamongstthe states of the Union, the states of the Americansystem,the membersof the Commonwealthof Nations, and the membersof the Swiss Confederation.If the wholeworldwereorganizedin accordancewiththisprinciple, 9 Tannenbaum,p. 177.

10Ibid.

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as are alreadythesefourpoliticalentities,it is assumedthat the freedom, dignity,and peace of all nationswould thenbe assured. There is no need to examine the theoreticaland practical meritsof the principleof the "coordinate state," because for none of the four political entities mentioned does the idea of the "coordinate state" providethe principleofpoliticalorganization.The equality ofthe states as the political foundationof the United States became obsolescent when Chief JusticeMarshall's Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity of the Constitutionin favorof the federalgovernment,and it became obsolete when the Civil War proved Chief Justice Marshall's point. The equality of the states survives today only in the shadow and by virtue of the federal government'spolitical supremacy,and without the cohesiveforceof that supremacytherewould be no union of equal states to begin with. That these powers of the federalgovernmentare limited and qualified by the principleof federalism,that is, by the constitutionally grantedpowersofthe states,is quite a different matter; it concernsthe distributionof powersbetweenfederalgovernmentand states withina generalsystemof checksand balances, but has nothing to do withthe equality of the states as the alleged politicalfoundation of the American system of government.With the exception of the equality of senatorial representation,the principleof the equality of the states is today, as it has been foralmost a century,devoid of political content. It serves only as a principleof regional organization,of administrative decentralization, and, above all, of constitutional rhetoric. What it really signifieswas pointed out more than fifty years ago by W. A. Dunning when he summarizedhis answer to the question "Are the states equal underthe Constitution?"by sayingthat "the theoryof equal states fallsto the ground."" Similarly,the federalismof Switzerlandis the result of a long series of civil wars,the last one foughta littlemorethan a centuryago, which establishedthe predominanceof the German-speakingcantons within the confederation.Here too, it is the existenceof predominantpower, located in one segmentof the federalsystem,which makes federalism possible in the firstplace. By the same token, the unchallengeablesupremacy of the United States withinthe WesternHemispherehas throughoutbeen the backbone of the system of Americanstates. As long as this supremacyis secure,thereis, on the one hand, no need forthe United States to assert it in the political and militarysphere,and, taking it for granted,the United States can well affordto pursue a policy of the Good Neighbor; 11 William Archibald Dunning, Essays on the Civil War and Reconstructionand Related Topics (New York, 1931), p. 351.

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and thereis, on the otherhand, no opportunityforthe othermembers of the systemto challengethat supremacyeffectively. This is what the principleof the coordinatee state" amounts to in the WesternHemisphere. Consequently,wheneverthere was even a remote possibility that the supremacyof the United States mightbe challenged,generally throughinstigationfromoutside the hemisphere,the United States asserted its superiorpowerwithinthe hemisphereand acted as all states must act under similarconditions. Whateverpossibilityforcommonpoliticalactionthereremainsamong the membersofthe Commonwealthof Nations is the resultof the interests which these membersmay have in common.In other words,the memberstates may worktogetheror each ofthemmay workwithother nations,as theirinterestsdictate. Their membershipin the Commonwealth, as the examples of India, South Africa,Australia, and New Zealand clearlyshow,has no influenceupon thisdecision;that membership is but a faintremembranceof the timeswhen Great Britain could .securecooperationamong the memberstates on its termsby virtueof its superiorpower. What, then, have these four examples of the "coordinate state" in common which would establish them as a distincttype of interstate relationship,and what conclusionscan be drawn fromthem for the organizationof the 'world? The only thing that these four examples seem to have really in commonis the legal stipulationof the equality of the membersof the respectivesystemsand this characteristicis not peculiarto them,but a generalprincipleof internationallaw applicable to all sovereignstates. In the politicalspheretheyseem to have nothing in commonat all. What they tend to show, however,is the decisive importanceof the distributionof political power for the operationof federal and egalitarianrelationsamong states. The political cohesion of a federalsystemis the resultof superiorpower located in some part of it. It is by virtue of its superiorpower that the predominantpart can affordto grantthe othermembersof the federalsystema measure. of equality in the non-politicalsphere.These observationsbringus back to powerpoliticsand the balance of powerto whichthe principleof the "coordinatestate" was supposed to be the alternative. In truth, it is not the disinterestedconsiderationof facts which has given birthto the theoryof the "coordinatestate." That theoryis rather the response to an emotional urge, and since this emotion is not peculiarto a particularauthorbut typical of a popular reactionto the new role which the United States must play in world affairs,it deservesa briefanalysis. One of the greatexperiencesof our time"whichhave impressedthem-

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of the UnitedStates selvesupon the Americanmindis the emergence as a nationamongothernations,exposedto the same opportunities, temptations, risks,and liabilitiesto whichothernationshave been becomesthemoreshockingifit traditionally exposed.This experience is comparedwiththe expectationwithwhichwe foughtthe Second WorldWar. We expectedfromthatwara reaffirmation of the secure, detached,and independent' positionin worldaffairs whichwe had inheritedfromthe FoundingFathersand whichwe had been successful in preserving at least to the FirstWorldWar. By avoidingwhatwe thoughthad beenWilson'smistakes,we expectedto emergefromthat warifnotmoreindependent, moresecurethanwe werewhen certainly we enteredit. In fact,probablynot evenin the earlydays ofthe Republicwerewe moreexposedto dangerfromabroadthanwe aretoday, ofactionin takingcareofourinterests and neverhad we lessfreedom thanwe have today. It is naturallyshockingto recognize thata happychapterin thehistoryofthenationandin one'sownwayoflifehas cometo an end.There are thosewhoreconcilethemselves to theinevitable, albeitwithsorrow ratherthan withglee,and tryto-applythe lessonsof the past to the tasksat hand.Thereare otherswhotryto escapefroma disappointing and threatening realityintotherealmoffantasy.Threesuchescapist fantasieshavearisenin ourmidstin responseto thechallenge ofAmerican worldleadershipand power: the fantasyof needlessAmerican participation in war,thefantasyofAmericantreason,and thefantasy ofAmericaninnocence. The firstofthesefantasiespresumesthatthepresentpredicament is a resultnot of necessitybut offolly,the follyofAmericanstatesmen who needlesslyintervenedin two worldwars. The second of these fantasiesattributesthe presentpredicament to treasonin highplaces wherebythe fruitsof victorywerehandedto the enemy.The thirdof thesefantasiesdeniesthatthepredicament is real and prefers to think of it as an intellectual fraudperpetrated upon the Americanpeople. To supportthisfictional denialoftheactualitiesofthepresent, it draws upon a fictional accountof-thepast. The UnitedStatesdoes not need to bear at presentthe intellectual, moral,and politicalburdenswhich with go involvement in powerpoliticsand the maintenanceof the balanceofpower;forit has neverbornethemin thepast,neverhaving been thus involved.The goldenage of past politicalinnocencesheds its glow upon a but seemingly less innocentpresentand promisesa futurein whichall the worldwill followthe exampleof America, forswear powerpoliticsand thebalanceofpower,and accepttheprincias exemplified ple ofthe "coordinate state."Ourrearmament program,

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in the AtlanticSecurityPact, we are told,has nothingto do withthe ofas muchoftheworld balanceofpowerbut aimsat the"organization

as we can upon the basis of the coordinatestate....

It may prove

impossibleunderpresentconditionsto build such a systemwithout havingto fighta warwithRussia,butthenat leastwe willbe fighting, as we did before,forthe thingwe considerworthdefending withour Thus a fictionalaccountof the Americanpast, lives and treasure."'2 begunas an act of uncalled-for patrioticpiety,issuesin an ideology fora thirdworldwar.Escape we mustfromtheunfamiliar, unpleasant, and dangerous present, firstintothepoliticalinnocenceofthepast and fromthereintotheimmediate future ofa thirdworldwar,beyondwhich innocenceofthemoredistantfuturewill therevivedand universalized surelylie. in foreign tradition We havesaid thatto presenttheAmerican policy as havingbeen freefromconcernwithpowerpoliticsand the balance of poweris not warrantedby the factsof Americanhistory.Yet it mightstillbe argued,and it is actuallybeingargued,that,regardless of the evidenceof history, the Americanpeoplewillnot be reconciled to powerpoliticsand thebalanceofpowerand willsupportonlypolicies based upon abstractmoralprinciples.Whilein the past the United Statesmighthave pursuedbalanceofpowerpoliciesand whileit might be a goodthingifit diddo so again,theAmerican peoplewillnotstand forit. Heretheemotionalappealto patrioticpietyis joinedby calculaYet thecase formisrepresenting American tionsofpoliticalexpediency. to gainfromeither. history has nothing in all historiography Thereis a strongtendency to glorify thenational that tendencytakeson the aspects past,and in popularpresentations Even so penetrating a mindas JohnStuart ofthe jingoistwhitewash. ofan essayin whichhe proved,no doubtto Mill'scoulddeliverhimself of manyof his Englishreadersbut certainlyof few the satisfaction in the affairsof Euroothers,thatGreatBritainhad neverinterfered in thoseof the Indianstatesonlyfor pean nationsand had interfered theirown good.'3Yet it is the measureof a nation'smaturityto be able to recognizeits past forwhatit actuallyis. Whyshouldwe not admitthatAmerican hardheadedand foreign policyhas beengenerally practicalandat timesruthless? WhyshouldwedenyJefferson's cunning, thecrueltywithwhichtheIndianswere say,in thePugetSoundaffair, whichthetreatieswiththeIndians faithlessness with treated,.andjthe werecast aside? We knowthat thisis the way all nationsare when 195-196. Few Words on Non-Intervention,"Dissertationsand Discussions: Political, Philosophical,and Historical(London, 1875), pp. 153-178. 12 Tannenbaum,pp. 13

"A

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theirinterestsare at stake-so cruel,so faithless,so cunning.We know that the United States has refrainedfromseekingdominionsbeyondthe seas not because it is more virtuousthan other nations, but because it had the betterpart ofa continentto colonize. As has been pointed out elsewhereat greaterlength,the man in the street,unsophisticatedas he is and uninformedas he may be, has a surergrasp of the essentialsof foreignpolicy and a more maturejudgment of its basic issues than many of the intellectualsand politicians who pretendto speak forhim and caterto what theyimaginehis prejudices to be. During the recent'war the ideologues of the Atlantic Charter,the Four Freedoms,and the United Nations were constantly complainingthat the American soldier did not know what he was forsome utopian ideal, divorced fightingfor.Indeed, if he was fighting fromthe concreteexperiencesand interestsof the country,then the complaint was well grounded. However, if he was fightingfor the territorialintegrityof the nation and forits survival as a freecountry where he could live, think,and act as he pleased, then he had never any doubt about what he was fightingfor.Ideological rationalizations and justificationsare indeed the indispensable concomitantsof all political action. Yet there is somethingunhealthy in a craving for ideologicalintoxicationand in the inabilityto act and to see meritin action except under the stimulantof grandioseideas and far-fetched schemes.Have our intellectualsbecome, like Hamlet, too much beset by doubt to act and, unlike Hamlet, compelled to still their doubts by renouncingtheirsense of what is real?'The man in the streethas no such doubts. It is true that ideologuesand demagoguescan sway him by appealing to his emotions.But it is also true, as Americanhistory showsin abundance and as the popularsuccessofAmbassadorKennan's book demonstrates,that responsible statesmen can guide him by awakeninghis latentunderstandingof the national interest. II Yet what is the national interest?How can we defineit and give it the contentwhich will make it a'guide for action? This is one of the relevantquestionsto whichthe currentdebate has givenrise. It has been frequentlyargued against the realist conception of foreignpolicy that its key concept, the national interest,does not provide an acceptable standard for political action. This argumentis in the main based upon two grounds:the elusivenessofthe conceptand its susceptibilityto interpretations, such as limitlessimperialismand narrownationalism,which are not in keepingwith the Americantradition in foreignpolicy. The argumenthas substance as far as it goes, but it does not invalidate the usefulnessof the concept.

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The concept of the national interestis similarin two respectsto the such as the general welfare "great generalities"of the Constitution,and due process.It containsa residualmeaningwhichis inherentin the conceptitself,but beyondthese minimumrequirementsits contentcan run the whole gamut of meaningswhichare logicallycompatiblewith it. That contentis determinedby the politicaltraditionsand the total cultural context withinwhich a nation formulatesits foreignpolicy. The concept of the national interest,then,containstwo elements,one that is logicallyrequiredand in that-sensenecessary,and one that is variable and determinedby circumstances. Any foreignpolicywhichoperatesunderthe standardof the national interestmust obviouslyhave some referenceto the physical,political, and culturalentitywhichwe call a nation. In a worldwherea number of sovereignnationscompetewithand oppose each otherforpower,the foreignpolicies of all nations must necessarilyreferto their survival as theirminimumrequirements.Thus all nations do what they cannot help but do: protect their physical, political, and cultural identity against encroachmentsby othernations. It has been suggestedthat this reasoningerects the national state into the last word in politicsand the national interestinto an absolute standard forpolitical action. This, however,is not quite the case. The idea of interestis indeed of the essence of politics and, as such, unaffectedby the circumstancesof time and place. Thucydides' statement, born of the experiencesof ancient Greece, that "identity of interestis the surest of bonds whetherbetween states or individuals" was taken up in the nineteenthcenturyby Lord Salisbury's remark that "the only bond of union that endures" among nationsis "the absence of all clashinginterests."The perennialissue betweenthe realist and utopian schools of thoughtover the nature of politics,to which we have referredbefore,mightwell be formulatedin termsof concrete interestsvs. abstract principles.Yet -whilethe concernof politicswith interestis perennial,the connectionbetweeninterestand the national state is a productof history. The nationalstate itselfis obviouslya productof historyand as such modes of political organization. destined to yield in time to different As long as the worldis politicallyorganizedinto nations,the national interestis indeed the last word in world politics. When the national state will have been replaced by anothermode of organization,foreign policymust then protectthe interestin survival of that new organization. For the benefitof those who insist upon discardingthe national state and constructingsupranational organizationsby constitutional fiat,it must be pointed out that these new organizationalformswill

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eithercome into being throughconquest or else throughconsentbased upon the mutual recognitionof the national interestsof the nations concerned;for no nation will foregoits freedomof action if it has no reason to expect proportionatebenefitsin compensationfor that loss. This is true of treatiesconcerningcommerceor fisheriesas it is true of the great compacts,such as the European Coal and Steel Community, throughwhich nations try to create supranationalformsof organization. Thus, by an apparentparadox, what is historicallyrelativein the idea of the national interestcan be overcome'only throughthe promotionin concertofthe nationalinterestofa numberofnations. The survival of a political unit, such as a nation, in its identityis the irreducibleminimum,the necessaryelementof its interestsvis-a-vis other units. Taken in isolation,the determinationof its contentin a concretesituationis relativelysimple; forit encompassesthe integrity of its politicalinstitutions,and of its culture. of the nation's territory, Thus bipartisanshipin foreignpolicy, especially in times of war, has been most easily achieved in the promotionof these minimumrequirewith respect ments of the national interest.'The situation is different to the variable elementsof the national interest.All the cross currents of personalities,public opinion, sectional interests,partisan politics, and politicaland moralfolkwaysare broughtto bear upon theirdetermination. In consequence, the contributionwhich science can make to this field,as to all fieldsof policy formation,is limited.It can identify the differentagencies of the governmentwhich contributeto the determinationof the variable elementsof the national interestand assess their'relativeweight.It can separate the long-rangeobjectives of foreignpolicy fromthe short-termones which are the means for the achievementof the formerand can tentativelyestablishtheirrational relations.Finally, it can analyze the variable elementsof the national interestin termsof theirlegitimacyand theircompatibilitywith other nationalvalues and withthe nationalinterestof othernations.We shall address ourselvesbrieflyto the typicalproblemswithwhichthis analysis must deal. The legitimacyofthe nationalinterestmustbe determinedin the face and supranational ofpossibleusurpationby subnational,other-national, find level we subnational On the interests. group interests,represented particularlyby ethnicand economicgroups,who tend to identifythemselves withthe nationalinterest.CharlesA. Beard has emphasized,however one-sidedly,the extentto whichthe economicinterestsof certain groups have been presentedas those of the United States.14Group in14 The Idea of National Interest: An Analytical Study in American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934).

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terests exert, of course, constant pressureupon the conduct of our foreignpolicy, claimingtheiridentitywith the national interest.It is, however,doubtfulthat, with the exceptionof a few spectacular cases, the courseofAmericanforeign theyhave been successfulin determining policy. It is much more likely,given the nature of Americandomestic politics,that Americanforeignpolicy,insofaras it is the object ofpressures by sectionalinterests,will normallybe a compromisebetweendivergentsectional interests.The concept of the national interest,as it emergesfromthis contestas the actual guide forforeignpolicy,may well fall shortof what would be rationallyrequiredby the overall interestsof the United States. Yet the concept of the national interest sectionalinterestsis also whichemergesfromthis contestof conflicting more than any particularsectionalinterestor theirsum total. It is, as it were,the lowest commondenominatorwheresectionalinterestsand the national interestmeet in an uneasy compromisewhichmay leave muchto be desiredin view of all the interestsconcerned. The national interestcan be usurped by other-nationalinterestsin two typicalways. The case of treasonby individuals,eitherout of convictionor forpay, needsonlyto be mentionedhere;forinsofaras treason is committedon behalf of a foreigngovernmentratherthan a supranational principle,it is significantforpsychology,sociology,and criminology,but not forthe theoryof politics.The other case, however,is importantnot onlyforthe theoryofpoliticsbut also forits practice,especiallyin the United States. National minoritiesin European countries,ethnic groups in the UnitedStates,ideologicalminoritiesanywheremay identifythemselves, eitherspontaneouslyor under the directionof the agents of a foreign government, withthe interestsofthat foreigngovernmentand may promote theseinterestsunderthe guiseofthe nationalinterestofthe country whose citizensthey happen to be. The activitiesof the GermanAmericanBund in the United States in the 'thirtiesand of Communists everywhereare cases in point. Yet the issue of the national interestvs. other-national interestsmasqueradingas the nationalinteresthas arisen constantlyin the United States in a less clear-cutfashion. A countrywhich had been settled by consecutive waves of "forto identifyits own eigners"was bound to findit particularlydifficult national interestagainst alleged, seeming,or actual other-nationalinterestsrepresentedby certaingroupsamong its own citizens.Since virtually all citizensof the United States are, as it were, "more or less" foreign-born, those who were "less" so have frequentlynot resistedthe to temptation use this distinctionas a polemic weapon against latecomerswho happenedto differfromthemin theirconceptionof the na-

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tionalinterestof the United States. Frequently,thisrationalizationhas been dispensed with and a conceptionof foreignpolicy with which a writerhappened to disagree has been attributedoutrightto foreign sympathyor influenceor worse. British influenceand interestshave served as standard argumentsin debates on Americanforeignpolicy. Madison, in his polemic against Hamilton on the occasion of Washington's NeutralityProclamation of 1793, identifiedthe Federalist position withthat of "the foreigners and degeneratecitizensamongus, who hate our republicangovernment,and the Frenchrevolution,"'5and the accusationmet witha favorableresponsein a majorityof Congressand of public opinion.However, these traditionalattemptsto discreditdissentingopinionas being influencedby foreigninterestsshould not obscure the real issue, whichis the peculiar vulnerabilityof the national interestof the United States to usurpationby the interestsof othernations. The usurpationofthe nationalinterestby supranationalinterestscan derivein our time fromtwo sources: religiousbodies and international organizations.The competitionbetween churchand state fordetermination of certaininterestsand policies,domesticand international,has been an intermittent issue throughoutthe historyof the national state. Here, too, the legitimatedefenseofthe nationalinterestagainstusurpationhas frequently, especiallyin the United States,degeneratedintothe demagogicstigmatizationofdissentingviewsas beinginspiredby Rome and, hence,beingincompatiblewiththe nationalinterest.Yet here,too, the misuse of: the issue for demagogic purposes must be considered apart fromthe legitimacyofthe issue itself. The more acute problemarises at the presenttime fromthe importance whichthe public and governmentofficials, at least in theirpublic utterances,attributeto the values representedand the policiespursued by internationalorganizationseitheras alternativesor supplementsto the values and policiesforwhichthe national governmentstands. It is frequentlyassertedthat the foreignpolicyof the United States pursues no objectives apart fromthose of the United Nations, that, in other words,the foreignpolicyof the United States is actually identicalwith the policyofthe UnitedNations. This assertioncannotreferto anything real in actual politicsto supportit. For the constitutionalstructureof internationalorganizations,such as the United Nations, and theirprocedural practicesmake it impossibleforthem to pursue interestsapart fromthose of the member-stateswhich dominate theirpolicy-forming 16 "Helvidius, in Answer to Pacificus, on President Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality," in Lettersand other Writings of James Madison (Philadelphia, 1867), Vol. 1, p. 611.

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bodies. The identitybetweenthe interestsofthe UnitedNations and the United States can only referto the successfulpolicies of the United States within the United Nations throughwhich the support of the United Nations is being securedforthe policiesof the United States.16 The assertion,then, is mere polemic,different fromthe one discussed in previously that the identificationof a certainpolicy with a supranational interestdoes not seek to reflectdiscreditupon the former,but to bestowupon it a dignitywhichthenationalinterestpureand simpleis supposed to lack. The real issue in view of the problemthat concernsus here is not whetherthe so-called interestsof the United Nations, which do not exist apart fromthe interestsof its most influentialmembers,have supersededthe nationalinterestof the United States,but forwhat kind ofintereststhe UnitedStates has securedUnitedNationssupport.While these interestscannot be United Nations interests,theydo not need to be national interestseither.Here we are in the presenceof that modern phenomenonwhichhas been variouslydescribedas "utopianism,""sentimentalism,""moralism," the "legalistic-moralisticapproach." The commondenominatorofall thesetendenciesin modernpoliticalthought is the substitutionforthe national interestof a supranationalstandard ofactionwhichis generallyidentifiedwithan internationalorganization, such as the United Nations. The national interestis here not being usurped by sub- or supranational interestswhich,howeverinferiorin worthto the national interest,are neverthelessreal and worthyof considerationwithintheirpropersphere.What challengesthe national interesthere is a mere figmentof the imagination,a product of wishful thinkingwhichis postulatedas a valid normforinternationalconduct, withoutbeingvalid eitherthereor anywhereelse. At thispointwe touch the core of the present controversybetween utopianism and realism in internationalaffairs;we shall returnto it later in this paper. The nationalinterestas such mustbe defendedagainstusurpationby non-nationalinterests.Yet once that task is accomplished,a rational ordermustbe establishedamongthe values whichmake up the national interestand among the resourcesto be committedto them. While the interestswhicha nation may pursue in its relationwith othernations are of infinite.variety and magnitude,the resourceswhichare available forthe pursuitof such interestsare necessarilylimitedin quantityand 16See, on thispoint,Hans J. Morgenthau,"InternationalOrganizationsand Foreign A Politicaland CulturalAppraisal, Eleventh Policy,"in Foundations ofWorldOrganization: Symposiumof the Conferenceon Science, Philosophyand Religion, edited by Lyman Bryson,Louis Finkelstein,Harold D. Lasswell, R. M. MacIver (New York, 1952), pp. 377-383.

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kind. No nation has the resourcesto promoteall desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must thereforeallocate their scarce resuch sourcesas rationallyas possible.The indispensableprecondition'of rational allocation is a clear understandingof the distinctionbetween the necessaryand variable elementsof the national interest.Given the contentiousmanner in which in democraciesthe variable elementsof the national interestare generallydetermined,the advocates of an extensive'conceptionof the national interestwill inevitablypresentcertain variable elementsof the national interestas thoughtheirattainment were necessary for the nation's survival. In other words, the necessaryelementsof the national interesthave a tendencyto swallow up the variableelementsso that 'inthe end all kindsof objectives,actual or potential,are justifiedin termsof national survival. Such arguments have been advanced, for instance, in support of the rearmamentof WesternGermanyand of the defenseof Formosa. They must be subjected to rational scrutinywhich will determine,howevertentatively, theirapproximateplace in the scale ofnationalvalues. The same problempresentsitselfin its extremeformwhen a nation pursues,or is asked to pursue,objectiveswhichare not onlyunnecessary for its survival but tend to jeopardize it. Second-ratenations which dream of playingthe role of great powers,such as Italy and Poland in the interwarperiod, illustratethis point.-So do great powers which dream of remakingthe world in their own image and embark upon world-widecrusades,thus strainingtheirresourcesto exhaustion.Here scientificanalysis has the urgenttask of pruningdown national objectives to the measure of available resourcesin orderto make theirpursuit compatiblewithnationalsurvival. Finally, the national interestof a nation whichis consciousnot only of its own interestsbut also of that of othernationsmust be definedin termscompatiblewith the latter. In a multinationalworldthis is a requirementofpoliticalmorality;in an age oftotal war it is also one ofthe conditionsforsurvival. In connectionwith this problemtwo mutuallyexclusive arguments have been advanced. On the one hand, it has been argued against the theoryof internationalpoliticshere presentedthat the concept of the conceptof enlightened national interestrevivesthe'eighteenth-century self-interest, presumingthat the uniformlyenlightenedpursuitof their self-interest by all individuals,as by all nations,will of itselfbe conducive to a peaceful and harmonioussociety. On the other hand, the point has been made that the pursuitof theirnational interestby all nations makes war the permanentarbiter of conflictsamong them. Neitherargumentis welltaken.

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The concept of the national interestpresupposesneithera naturally harmonious,peacefulworldnorthe inevitabilityofwar as a consequence of the pursuitby all nationsof theirnationalinterest.Quite to the contrary,it assumes continuousconflictand threatof war,to be minimized throughthe continuousadjustment of conflictinginterestsby diplomatic action. No such assumptionwould be warrantedif all nationsat all times conceivedof theirnational interestonly in termsof theirsurvival and, in turn,definedtheirinterestin survival in restrictiveand rational terms.As it is, theirconceptionof the nationalinterestis subusurpation,and misjudgject to all the hazards of misinterpretation, ment to whichreferencehas been made above. To minimizethese hazards is the firsttask of a foreignpolicy whichseeks the defenseof the nationalinterestby peacefulmeans. Its' secondtask is the defenseofthe national interest,restrictivelyand rationallydefined,against the national interestsof othernationswhichmay or may not be thus defined. If they're not,it becomesthe task of armed diplomacyto convincethe nations concernedthat their legitimateinterestshave nothingto fear froma restrictiveand rationalforeignpolicy and that theirillegitimate interestshave nothingto gain in the face of armed mightrationallyemployed. III We have said beforethat the utopian and realist positionsin international affairsdo not necessarilydifferin the policies they advocate, but that they part company over theirgeneralphilosophiesof politics and their way of thinkingabout matterspolitical. It does not follow that the presentdebate is only of academic interestand withoutpractical significance.Both camps, it is true,may supportthe same policy reasons. Yet if the reasons are unsound,the soundnessof for different the policies supportedby them is a mere coincidence,and these very same reasonsmay be, and inevitablyare, invokedon otheroccasions in supportof unsound policies. The nefariousconsequencesoffalsephilosophies and wrongways ofthinkingmay forthe timebeingbe concealed by the apparent success of policies derivedfromthem. You may go to war,justifiedby yournation's interests,fora moral purposeand in disregardof considerationsof power; and militaryvictoryseems to satisfy both yourmoralaspirationsand yournation'sinterests.Yet the manner in whichyou waged the war, achieved victory,and settled the peace cannothelpreflecting yourphilosophyofpoliticsand yourway ofthinking about politicalproblems.If these are in error,you may win victory on the fieldof battle and still assist in the defeat of both your moral principlesand the nationalinterestofyourcountry.

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Any numberof examplescould illustratethe real yet subtle practical consequenceswhichfollowfromthe different positionstaken. We have chosentwo: collectivesecurityin Korea and the liberationofthe nations that are captives of Communism.A case forboth policies can be made fromboth the utopian and realistpositions,but withsignificantdifferences in the emphasisand substanceof the policiespursued. Collectivesecurityas an abstractprincipleofutopianpoliticsrequires that all nationscome to the aid ofa victimofaggressionby resistingthe aggressorwith all means necessaryto frustratehis aims. Once the case of aggressionis established,the duty to act is unequivocal. Its extent may be affectedby concernforthe nation's survival; obviouslyno nation will commitoutrightsuicide in the service of collectivesecurity. But beyond that elemental limitationno considerationof interestor power, eitherwith regardto the aggressoror his victimor the nation actingin the latter'sdefense,can qualifythe obligationto act underthe principleof collectivesecurity.Thus high officialsof our government have declaredthat we intervenedin Korea not forany narrowinterestof ours but in supportofthe moral principleof collectivesecurity. Collectivesecurityas a concreteprincipleof realistpolicy is the ageold maxim, "Hang togetheror hang separately,"in moderndress. It recognizesthe need for nationA under certaincircumstancesto defend nation B against attack by nation C. That need is determined,first,by the interestwhichA has in the territorial integrityof B and by the relation of that interestto all the otherinterestsof A as well as to the resourcesavailable forthe supportof all those interests.Furthermore,A must take into account the power whichis at the disposal of aggressor C forfightingA and B as over against the power available to A and B forfightingC. The same calculationmust be carriedon concerningthe power of the likelyallies of C as over against those of A and B. Before going to war forthe defenseof South Korea in the name of collective security,an American adherent of political realism would have demandedan answerto thefollowingfourquestions: First,what is our interestin the preservationof the independenceof South Korea; second, what is our power to defendthat independenceagainst North Korea; third,what is our powerto defendthat independenceagainst China and the Soviet Union; and fourth,what are the chancesforpreventingChina and the Soviet Union fromenteringthe Korean War? In view of the principleof collectivesecurity,interpretedin utopian terms,our interventionin Korea was a foregoneconclusion.The interpretationof this principlein realisttermsmightor mightnot, depending upon the concretecircumstancesof interestand power,have led us to the same conclusion.In the executionof the policy of collectivese-

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ofChineseand to thepossibility curitytheutopianhad to be indifferent to applytheprincipleof Russianintervention, exceptforhisresolution on the side of the collectivesecurityto anybodywhowouldintervene could The realist oftheinaggressor. nothelpweighing thepossibility in termsofthe ofa greatpoweron thesideoftheaggressor tervention interests engagedand thepoweravailableon theotherside.17 could not bringitselfto takingresoThe Trumanadministration or the lutelythe utopian realistposition.It resolvedto intervenein good measureon utopiangroundsand in spiteof militaryadvice to it allowedthemilitary commander to advanceto theYalu thecontrary; oftheriskoftheintervention ofa greatpoweragainst Riverindisregard couldbe carriedoutonlybymeansofa general whichcollective security on the war,and thenrefusedto pursuethe war withfulleffectiveness realistgroundsof the risk of a thirdworldwar. Thus Mr. Truman in 1952is caughtin thesame dilemmafromwhichMr. Baldwincould extricatehimselfin 1936 on the occasionof the League of Nations sanctionsagainstItaly's attack upon Ethiopiaonlyat an enormous loss to Britishprestige.Collectivesecurityas a defenseof the status quo shortof a generalwar can be effective onlyagainstsecond-rate in terms, powers.Appliedagainsta majorpower,it is a contradiction forit meansnecessarily a majorwar. Of thisself-defeating contradictionMr. Baldwinwas as unawarein the'thirties as Mr. Trumanseems in thesecogent dilemma to be in 1952.Mr. Churchill Mr. Baldwin's put terms:"First,the PrimeMinisterhad declaredthat sanctionsmeant he was resolvedthattheremustbe no war;and thirdly, war;secondly, he decideduponsanctions.It was evidently impossible to complywith thesethreeconditions."SimilarlyMr. Trumanhad declaredthat the effective'prosecution of'the Korean War meantthe possibilityof a thirdworldwar; he resolvedthat theremustbe no thirdworldwar; and he decideduponintervention in the KoreanWar. Here,too, it is to complywiththesethreeconditions. impossible areinherent Similarcontradictions in theproposalswhichwouldsubstituteforthecurrent ofthe policyofcontainment oneoftheliberation nationspresently the captivesofRussianCommunism. This objective can be compatiblewiththeutopianor realistposition,but thepolicies designedto secureitwillbe fundamentally different according to whether theyare based upon one or theotherposition.The clearestcase to 17 The differencein these two attitudes is well illustrated by the following passage from a recent Moon Mullins cartoon. An elderly representative of the utopian school asks little Kayo:- "Remember the golden rule. Now, supposing that boy slapped you on the right cheek, what would you do?" Whereupon Kayo replies realistically: "Jest how big a boy are you supposin'?"

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date for the utopian justificationof such policies has been made by RepresentativeCharles J. Kersten of Wisconsinwho pointed to these four"basic defects" of the "negative policy of containmentand negotiated coexistence It would be immoraland unchristianto negotiatea permanentagreement withforceswhichby everyreligiouscreed and moralpreceptare evil. It abandons nearlyone-halfofhumanityand the once freenationsof Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Lithuania, Latvia, Esthonia and China to enslavementof the Communistpolice state. It is un-Americanbecause it violates the principleof the AmericanDeclaration of Independence,whichproclaimsthe-rightsof all people to freedomand theirrightand duty to throwofftyranny. It will lead to all-out World War III because it aligns all the forcesof the non-Communistworld in militaryoppositionto and against all the forcesof the Communist world, including the 800,000,000 peoples behind the Iron Curtain. The policy of mere containmentis uneconomic and will lead to national bankruptcy.18

This statementis interestingforits straightforwardness and because it combinesin a rathertypical fashionconsiderationsof abstract morality and of expediency. The captive nations must be liberated not only because their captivityis immoral,unchristian,and un-American, but also because its continuationwill lead to a thirdworldwar and to national bankruptcy.To what extent,however,these considerationsof expediencyare invalidated by theirutopian settingwill become obvious froma comparisonbetweenthe utopian and the realistpositions. From the utopian point of view there can be no difference between the liberationof Esthonia or Czechoslovakia, of Poland or China; the captivityof any nation,large or small,close or faraway, is a moral outrage which cannot be tolerated. The realist,too, seeks the liberation ofall captivenationsbecause he realizesthatthe presenceofthe Russian armies in the heart of Europe and theircooperationwith the Chinese armiesconstitutethe two main sourcesofthe imbalanceofpowerwhich threatensour security.-Yetbeforehe formulatesa programof liberation,he will seek answersto a numberof questionssuch as these: While the United States has a generalinterestin the liberationof all captive nations,what is the hierarchyofinterestsit has in the liberation,say, of China, Esthonia, and Hungary?And whilethe Soviet Union has a general interestin keeping all captive nations in that state, what is the hierarchyof its interestsin keeping,say, Poland, Eastern Germany, and Bulgaria captive? If we assume,as we muston the historicevidence 18

New York Times, August 14, 1952, p. 1.

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of two centuries,that Russia would nevergive up controlover Poland withoutbeing compelled by forceof arms, would the objective of the liberation of Poland justify the ruin of westerncivilization,that of Poland included,whichwould be the certainresultofa thirdworldwar? What resourcesdoes theUnited States have at its disposal forthe liberation of all captive nations or some of them? What resourcesdoes the Soviet Union have at its disposalto keep in captivityall captive nations or some of them?Are we more likelyto avoid national bankruptcyby embarkingupon a policyof indiscriminateliberationwith the concomitant certaintyof war or by continuingthe presentpolicy of containment? It mightbe that in a particularinstancethe policiessuggestedby the answersto these questions will coincidewith RepresentativeKersten's proposals,but therecan be no doubt that in its overall character,substance,emphasis,and likelyconsequencesa utopian policyof liberation differsfundamentallyfroma realist one. The issue between liberationas a utopian principleof abstract moralityvs. the realist evaluation of the consequenceswhich a policy of liberationwould have forthe survivalof the nation has arisenbeforein Americanhistory.Abraham Lincoln was faced with a dilemma similar to that whichconfrontsus today. Should he make the liberationof the slaves the ultimatestandardof his policy even at the risk of destroying the Union,as manyurgedhimto do, or shouldhe subordinatethe moral principleofuniversalfreedomto considerationsof the nationalinterest? The answer Lincoln gave to Horace Greeley, a spokesman for the utopianmoralists,is timelessin its eloquentwisdom."If therebe those," he wroteon August22, 1862, whowouldnotsave theUnionunlesstheycouldat thesametimesave slavery, I do notagreewiththem.Iftherebe thosewhowouldnotsavetheUnionunless theycould at the same timedestroyslavery,I do not agreewiththem.My is to save theUnion,and is noteitherto save paramount objectinthisstruggle or to destroyslavery.If I couldsave the Unionwithoutfreeing anyslave I all theslaves,I woulddo it; and woulddo it,and ifI couldsave it by freeing ifI couldsave it byfreeing someandleavingothersaloneI wouldalso do that. WhatI do aboutslavery,and thecoloredrace,I do-becauseI believeit helps to save the Union;and whatI forbear, I forbearbecauseI do notbelieveit wouldhelpto save theUnion.I shalldo lesswhenever I shallbelievewhatI am I shallbelievedoingmore doinghurtsthecause,and I shalldo morewhenever willhelpthecause. I shalltryto correcterrorswhenshownto be errors;and I shalladoptnewviewsso fastas theyshallappearto be trueviews. I haveherestatedmypurposeaccording to myviewofofficial duty;and I intendno modification ofmyoft-expressed personalwishthatall meneverywherecouldbe free.

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IV The foregoingdiscussionoughtto shed additionallight,if this is still needed,upon the moralmeritsofthe utopian and realistpositions.This question, more than any other,seems to have agitated the critics of realismin internationalaffairs.Disregardingthe voluminousevidence, some ofthemhave picked a fewwordsout oftheircontextto provethat realismin internationalaffairsis unprincipledand contemptuousof morality.To mentionbut one example,one eminentcriticsummarizesmy position,whichhe supposes to deny the possibilityof judgingthe conduct of states by moral criteria,in these words: "And one spokesman finds'a profoundand neglectedtruth,'to use his words,in the dictumof Hobbes that 'there is neithermoralitynor law outside the state.'"9 These are indeed my words,but not all of them. What I actually said was this: and neglected Thereis a profound dictum truthhiddenin Hobbes'sextreme thatthestatecreatesmorality as wellas law andthatthereis neither morality norlawoutsidethestate.Universalmoralprinciples, suchas justiceorequality, are capableofguidingpoliticalactiononlyto theextentthattheyhave been givenconcrete contentand havebeenrelatedtopoliticalsituations bysociety.20 It mustbe obvious fromthispassage and fromall my other writings on the subject21 that my positionis the exact oppositefromwhat this criticmakes it out to be. I have always maintainedthat the actions of states are subject to universalmoral principlesand I have been careful to differentiate my positionin this respectfromthat of Hobbes. Five points basic to my positionmay need to be emphasizedagain. The firstpoint is what one mightcall the requirementof cosmic hu19 A. H. Feller, "In Defense of International Law and Morality," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 282, p. 80 (July, 1952). 20 In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951), p. 34. 21 See, for instance, "The Machiavellian Utopia," Ethics, Vol. 55, pp. 145-147 (Jan., 1945); "Ethics and Politics," in Approaches to Group Understanding,Sixth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver (New York, 1947), pp. 319-341; "The Escape from Power in the Western World," in Conflictsof Power in Modern Culture, Seventh Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, edited by Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, pp. 1-12; ScientificMan vs. Power Politics (Chicago, 1946), Chaps. 7, 8; "Views of Nuremberg: Further Analysis of the Trial and Its Importance," America, Vol. 76, pp. 266-267 (Dec.7, 1946); "The Twilight of International Morality," Ethics, Vol. 58, pp. 79-99 (Jan., 1948); "The Political Science of E. H. Carr," World Politics, Vol. 1, pp. 127-134 (Oct., 1948); Politics Among Nations (New York, 1948), Ch. 14; "National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the National Interest," The American Scholar, Vol. 18, pp. 207-212 (Spring, 1949); "The Pathology of Power," American Perspective, Vol. 4, pp. 6-10 (Winter, 1950); "The Moral Dilemma in Foreign Policy," in The Year Book of World Affairs,1961 (London, 1951), pp. 12-36.

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militywith regardto the moral evaluation of the actions of states. To knowthat states are subjectto the morallaw is one thing;to pretendto knowwhat is morallyrequiredofstates in a particularsituationis quite another.The human mindtends naturallyto identifythe particularinterestsof states, as of individuals,withthe moral purposesof the universe.The statesmanin the defenseofthe nation'sinterestsmay, and at times even must, yield to that tendency;the scholar must resistit at every turn. For the light-heartedassumptionthat what one's own nation aims at and does is morallygood and that those who oppose that nation's policies are evil is morallyindefensibleand intellectuallyuntenable and leads in practiceto that distortionofjudgment,born of the blindnessof crusadingfrenzy,whichhas been the curse of nationsfrom the beginningof time. The second point which obviouslyneeds to be made again concerns of the restraintswhichmoralityimposesupon the acthe effectiveness tionsofstates. A discussionofinternational morality mustguardagainstthetwoextremes the influence eitherof overrating ofethicsuponinternational politicsor else thatstatesmen and diplomatsare movedby anything ofdenying elsebutconofmaterialpower. siderations Ontheonehand,thereis thedualerrorofconfounding themoralruleswhich to observeas wellas withthose peopleactuallyobservewiththosetheypretend whichwritersdeclaretheyoughtto observe.... On the otherhand,thereis the misconception, usuallyassociatedwiththe generaldepreciationand moral condemnation of powerpolitics,discussed above,thatinternational politicsis so thoroughly evilthatit is no use looking forethicallimitations ofthe aspirations forpoweron theinternational scene. Yet,ifwe ask ourselves whatstatesmen and diplomatsare capableofdoingto further thepowerobjectivesoftheirrespective nationsand whattheyactually do, we realizethattheydo less thantheyprobablycouldand less thanthey actuallydid in otherperiodsofhistory.They refuseto considercertainends and to use certainmeans,eitheraltogether or undercertainconditions, not becausein thelightofexpediency or unwise,but betheyappearimpractical causecertainmoralrulesinterpose an absolutebarrier. Moralrulesdo notpermitcertainpoliciesto be considered at all fromthepointofviewofexpediency. Such ethicalinhibitions operatein ourtimeon different levelswithdifferent effectiveness. Theirrestraining function is mostobviousand mosteffective in thesacredness ofhumanlifeintimesofpeace.22 affirming In connectionwith this passage we have given a numberof historic examplesshowingthe influenceof moral principlesupon the conduct of foreignpolicy.An example taken fromcontemporaryhistorywill illus22

Morgenthau,PoliticsAmongNations,pp. 174-175.

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trate the same point. There can be littledoubt that the Soviet Union could have achieved the objectivesof its foreignpolicyat the end ofthe Second World War withoutantagonizingthe nations of the West into that encirclingcoalition which has been the nightmareof Bolshevist foreignpolicy since 1917. It could-have mitigatedcunningforits own sake and the use of forcewith persuasion,conciliation,and a trustderived fromthe awarenessof a partial communityofinterestsand would therebyhave minimizedthe dangersto itselfand the rest of the world whichare inherentin the objectivesofits policies.Yet the Soviet Union was precludedfromrelyingupon thesetraditionalmethodsofdiplomacy by its generalconceptionofhumannature,politics,and morality.In the general philosophyof Bolshevismthereis no room forhonest dissent, the recognitionofthe intrinsicworthofdivergentinterests,and genuine conciliationbetween such interests.On all levels of social interaction oppositionmust be destroyedby cunningand violence,since it has no rightto exist,ratherthan be met halfway in view of its intrinsiclegitimacy. This being the general conceptionof the political moralityof Bolshevism,the foreignpolicyof the Soviet Union is limitedto a much more narrowchoice of means than the foreignpoliciesof othernations. The United States, for instance,has been able, in its relationswith the nations of Latin America,to replace militaryinterventionand dollar diplomacy with the policy of the Good Neighbor. That drastic changewas made possibleby the generalconceptionofpoliticalmorality whichhas been prevalentin the United States fromits very inception. Thd United States is a pluralistsocietywhichpresupposesthe continuing existenceand legitimacyof divergentinterests.These interestsare locked in a continuingstrugglefor supremacyto be decided by force only as a last resort,but normallythrougha multitudeof institutional agencies which are so devised as to allow one or the other interesta temporaryadvantage but none a permanentsupremacyat the price of the destructionof the. others. This moralityof pluralism allows the United States, once it is secure in that minimumof vital intereststo which we have referredabove, to transferthose principlesof political moralityto the internationalscene and to deal withdivergentinterests there with the same methods of genuine compromiseand conciliation whichare a permanentelementof its domesticpolitical life. The thirdpoint concernsthe relationsbetweenuniversalmoral principlesand politicalaction.I have always maintainedthattheseuniversal moral principlescannot be applied to the actions of states in theirabbut that theymust be, as it were,filtered stractuniversalformulation, throughthe concretecircumstancesof time and place. The individual may say for himself:"Fiat justitia, pereatmunrdus";the state has no

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rightto say so in the name of those who are in its care. Both individual and state must judge politicalaction by universalmoralprinciples,such as that of liberty.Yet whilethe individualhas a moralrightto sacrifice himselfin defenseofsuch a moralprinciple,the state has no moralright of libertyget in the to let its moral disapprobationof the infringement way ofsuccessfulpoliticalaction,itselfinspiredby the moralprincipleof national survival.There can be no politicalmoralitywithoutprudence, that is, withoutconsiderationofthe politicalconsequencesof seemingly moral action. Classical and medieval philosophyknew this and so did Lincoln when he said: "I do the verybest I know how, the verybest I can, and I mean to keep doingso untilthe end. If the end bringsme out all right,what is said against me won't amount to anything.If the end bringsme out wrong,ten angels swearingI was rightwould make no difference."The issue between utopianismand realism,as it bears on this point, has been put most succinctlyby Edmund Burke, and what he has to say in the followingpassage about revolution,that is, civil war, may well be applied mutatismutandisto all war. Nothing universalcan be rationallyaffirmedon any moral or any political subject. Pure metaphysicalabstractiondoes not belong to these matters.The lines of moralityare not like the ideal lines of mathematics.They are broad and deep as well as long. They admit ofexceptions;theydemandmodifications. These exceptionsand modificationsare not made by the process of logic-,but by the rules of prudence.Prudence is not only the firstin rank of the virtues politicaland moral,but she is the director,the regulator,the standardofthem all. Metaphysicscannot live withoutdefinition;but Prudence is cautious how she defines.Our courtscannot be morefearfulin suffering fictitiouscases to be broughtbeforethem forelicitingtheir determinationon a point of law than prudent moralistsare in puttingextremeand hazardous cases of conscience to define,what upon emergenciesnot existing.Withoutattempting,therefore, nevercan be defined,the case of a revolutionin government, this,I think,may be safelyaffirmed-thata sore and pressingevil is to be removed,and that a good, great in its amount and unequivocal in its nature,must be probable almostto a certainty,beforethe inestimablepriceofour own moralsand the wellbeing of a number of our fellow-citizensis paid for a revolution.If ever we ought to be economistseven to parsimony,it is in the voluntaryproduction ofevil. Every revolutioncontainsin it somethingofevil.23 23 The Works of The Right Honorable Edmund Burke, 4th ed. (Boston, 1871), Vol. 4, pp. 80-81. Cf. also Burke, "Speech on A Bill for Shortening the Duration of Parliaments," May 8, 1780, in Works, Vol. 7, p. 73: "I must see, to satisfy me, the remedies; I must see, fromtheir operation in the cure of the old evil, and in the cure of those new evils which are inseparable from all remedies, how they balance each other, and what is the total result. The excellence of mathematics and metaphysics is, to have but one thing before you; but he forms the best judgement in all moral disquisitions who has the greatest number and variety of considerations in one view before him, and can take them in with the best possible consideration of the middle results of all."

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Fourth,the realistrecognizesthat a moral decision,especiallyin the political sphere,does not implya simple choice betweena moral principle and a standard of action whichis morallyirrelevantor even outrightimmoral.A moral decisionimpliesalways a choiceamong different moral principles,one of whichis given precedenceover others.To say that a political action has no moral purposeis absurd; forpolitical action can be definedas an attemptto realize moral values throughthe medium of politics, that is, power. The relevant moral question concerns the choice among different moral values, and it is at this point that the realist and the utopian part company again. If an American statesman must choose between the promotionof universal liberty, which is a moral good, at the risk of Americansecurityand, hence, of libertyin the United States, and the promotionof Americansecurity and of libertyin the United States, whichis anothermoral good, to the detrimentof the promotionof universalliberty,whichchoice oughthe to make? The utopian will not face the issue squarelyand will deceive himselfinto believingthat he can achieve both goods at the same time. The realistwillchoosethe nationalintereston bothmoraland pragmatic grounds;forifhe does not take care of the nationalinterestnobodyelse will,and if he puts Americansecurityand libertyin jeopardy the cause of libertyeverywherewill be impaired. Finally, the political realist distinguishesbetween his moral sympathies and the political interestswhich he must defend.He will distinguish with Lincoln between his "officialduty" whichis to protectthe national interestand his "personal wish" whichis to see universalmoral values realized throughoutthe world. The issue has been admirably put by Father WilfredParsons of Catholic Universityin defendingAmbassador Kennan's position: Mr. Kennan did not say state behavioris not a fitsubject formoraljudgment) but onlythat it should not sway our realizationof the realitieswithwhichwe have to deal. Msgr. Koenig continues: "Should we accept power realitiesand aspirationswithoutfeelingthe obligationofmoraljudgment?"And he appeals to the presentwriterand other political scientiststo say whetherthis doctrine agreeswithPope Pius XII's messageson peace. I am sure that most political scientists,and also Mr. Kennan, would agree with the Monsignorthat we should not accept those realities"withoutfeeling the obligationof moral judgment." But there is a difference betweenfeeling this obligation (and even expressingit) and allowingthis feelingto sway our actions in concretenegotiationsthat deal with the national or world common good. We can still feel and yet deal. To make my meaning clearer,I understoodMr. Kennan to hold that we went offthe beam with Woodrow Wilson,when we began to make our moral disapprobationan essentialpartof our foreignrelations,even sometimesat the

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expense of our own and the world'scommongood. Logically,such an attitude would inhibitour dealingwithBritain,France and a host ofcountries.Pius XI, speaking of Mussolini afterthe Lateran Treaty, said he would deal with the devil himselfifhe must.Here was moraldisapprobation,but it was not "carried over into the affairsof states." This relativeposition,and not the absolute one ofMsgr. Koenig (withwhich in itselfI agree), is, I think,the issue raised by Mr. Kennan, and it is worth debating on that basis.24

The contestbetweenutopianismand realismis not tantamountto a contestbetweenprincipleand expediency,moralityand immorality,althoughsome spokesmenforthe formerwould like to have it that way. The contestis ratherbetweenone typeofpoliticalmoralityand another type of political morality,one taking as its standard universal moral principlesabstractlyformulated,the other weighingthese principles againstthe moralrequirements'of concretepoliticalaction,theirrelative merits to be decided by a prudent evaluation of the political consequences to whichtheyare likelyto lead.25 These points are re-emphasizedby the foregoingdiscussion.Which attitude with regard to collectivesecurityand to the liberationof the captive nations,the utopian or the realist,is more likely to safeguard the survivalof the United States in its territorial, political,and cultural identityand at the same timeto contributethe mostto the securityand libertyof othernations?This is the ultimatetest-political and moralby whichutopianismand realismmust be judged. 24.America,Vol. 86, p. 700 (March 29, 1952). See also Algernon Cecil, "The Foreign Office," in The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919 (New York, 1923), Vol. 3, p. 605, concerning Lord Salisbury: "Always, however, the motive of his policy was to be found in the political interests as opposed to the political sympathies of Great Britain; and in this way his treatment of Foreign Affairsis at the opposite policy from that of Palmerston or Gladstone." Cf. also the general remarks in Alexander H. Leighton, Human Relations in a Changing World (New York, 1949), pp. 155 ff. 25 See, on this point, Shirley R. Letwin, "Rationalism, Principles, and Politics," The Review of Politics, Vol. 14, pp. 367-393 (July, 1952); L. Susan Stebbing, Ideals and IIlusions (London, 1941); Vernon H. Holloway, Religious Ethics and the Politics of Power (New York, 1951); and Dorothy Fosdick, "Ethical Standards and Political Strategies," Political Science Quarterly,Vol. 57, pp. 214 ff. (1942).

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