Ankersmit Politics of Aesthetics

Relerences Adlln10, T {1991 J nil' C ult lire Indl/stry. Lo ndon &. Nt'\\' Yurk Itl,w IL,dj.\l'. Arl'ndl, I I. ( 1973) ' Lying in Politics ', pp. 9-42 in idem, CrisesoJtlze UeplIlJlic. J l an1l\lIld~Wllrll l; Penguin. Baker, C.E. (2002) Media , Markers and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge UniV('rl>llY Prl'''s.

Benjamin, W (1992) II/Ilmillaliolls. H. Arendt (ed.). London: Font3na. Ca rlson, M. (\996) Performallce: A CririClllltirrocillcriotl. London & New York: Routledge. Durkhe im, E. ( 1995 [1 9 12]) The Elementary Forms of Religiolls Life. New York: The Free Press. Fairclough. N. (2000) New Labour: New Language? London : Routledge. Goffman, E. ( 1959) The Presentation of Self ill Everyday Life. New York : Anchor Books. HiBac h, A. (19 79) The Aesthetics of Politics: Wa lter Benjamin 's "Theories of Germa n Fascism"', New GermcIII Crit ique 17: 99- 119. Ho rkheimcr, M. and Adorno, T. (1979 194 7J) Dialectic of Elllightetlltient. London: Verso. Le Bon, G. (1 960 11 90 1 J) 71,e Crowd : A Sllldy of the Papillar Mimi . New York: Viking. Marsha ll , P.O. (1997) Celebrity mId Power. Fam e in COl/tempormy C lliwre. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press. Mayh ew, L. ( 1997) n,c New Public: Professional Commflllicarioll QluJ rhe Mean s of Socicd [nfluellce. Cambridge: C ambridge University Press. Meyrowitz, J. ( 1985) No Sellse of Place. 'm e Impac, of Eleerrollie Media 0 11 Social Behaviollr. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pels, D. (2003) Unhastelli"g Science. Alltol!Omy alld Reflexiviry ill 'he Social Theory of Knowledge. Liverpool : Liverpool U niversity Press. Pels, D., Hetherington, K. and Y.1ndenberghe, F. (2002) 'The Status of the Object: Performances, Mediations, and Techniques' in idem (eds) Sociality/ Materiality. The Status of the Object ill Social Sciellce, special double issue of 11,eory, C lIllUre CHId Society 19(5-6). Samuels, A. (200 I) Politics Oil the COllch. London: Profile Books. Schieffelin, E.L ( 1998) ' Problematizing Pe rformance', pp. 194-207 in F. Hughes- Freeland (cd.) RitllllJ, Performance, Media . Londo n: Routledge. Splichal, S. (2002) 'The Principle of Publicity, Public Use of Reason and Social Cont rol', Media,

r

CII/fllre (Illd Society 24( 1), 5-26. Thrift , N. (2000) 'Afterwords', SOciety (HId Space 18: 2 13-55. Turner, V (1982) From Ritua/ to Theater. Th e I-IWI1{/U Seriousness of Play. New York: Performing Arts Journal Publi ca ti on.~. Weber, M. ( 1988) 011 C lwrismci alld illstitwioll Bui/dillg: Selected Papers. S.N. Eisenstadt (cd.). Ch icago: University of C hicago Press . Weber, M. (1 99 4) Polit ical Writings. P. Lassman and R. Speirs (cds) . Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press. Wern ick, A. (199J) Promotional C ulture. London : Sage.

18

2 Democracy's Inner Voice Political Style as Unintended Consequence of Political Action l FRANK ANKERSMIT

In any given case political style might be unimportant or dangerous, bul obviously it can't be both. Robert Hariman, Polilical Style (1995)

The innere Stimme in Music and Politics In Robert Schum ann 's HlIIlloreske (\838) we encounter one of the most remarkable passages in the history of music. The historian of music Charles Rose n, in his brilliant The Romantic Generatioll ( 1996), wrote the following about t his passage: 'there are three staves: t he uppermost for the rig ht hand: the lowest for the left, the middle, which contains the melody, is not to be played' . Hence, th e pianist plays with ri ght and left hands th e accompaniment of a me lody that is clearly and unambiguously suggested by the score and which the listener will also hear, w hile at the same time, the score explicitl y forbids th e pianist to play this melody. The melody is here, as Schurnan n indicates hi msel f in the score, an inHere Stimme , an inner voice, which the listener, wit hout being aware of it, will furni sh himself. Put differently, the melody, also for Schumann the heart of the composition, will be listened 10 by the listener, without actually being heard by him. Hence, what one listens to, according to Rosen, 'is the echo of an unperformed melody, th e accompa niment of a song. The middle part is marked innere Stimme, and it is both interior and inward, a double sense ca lculated by th e composer: a voice between sop rano and bass, it is also an inner voice that is never exteriorised. It has its being within the mi nd and its ex ist ence only throug h its echo' (Rosen, 1996: 7). Certa inl y, precedents can be found in polyphony for this paradox of inaudible music; indeed, for the more subtle composers in polyp hony this was a musical trope as obvious as it was popular. We ca n think of the reall y

· ... 11.l1kllll,: II'q', 1111111, ' 1111,1111111' 1III Idl ·... 1 kl'llIl ,dllllll 11t .lt , ill 1111 1111I1 -. l l d 1111'

Ill1l\ll I)! p l1lnll \I ' I'ldllll.1I 11':lht V :11 11 1111\ ' il1llplll II I llin\, Wi' "'\lhjl'l.t i Vl' l y

.\ '/Jul Il/Il ~ /'.

l'\IWllI'lli \ ' \ Ill ...

\llId /) Olllll'! III

II 'tdl,'('/1

! ' I" .\/ !JII '// IIII/'II' II I H,IIII ',. \/

A /'I/!JI 'II' \

TIll' 1. 1 : 1~"'llal lladilinll, on till' nllwr h :lnd , wn h It... \"lqdL I ... I ... PII lr:lIlsp:lITIlCY :In d lhl' unamhiguous, forhade this IXlradllx :lnd t hl'll' luH' It", theory of music leFt no room For it. It was only Romanticism that npt'rationaliscd and eage rl y exploited all the possibilities of making sil ence audible and of transforming into music wha t was not yet mus ic. Now, we may ask ourselves, is this ilmere Stiml1le a reality or a mere illusion, if we, as we have seen, did listen to it, but cou ld not possibly actually have heard it? Probably the answer to this question will depend on what ::me's musical affinities happen to be. Whoever is used to classic;]1 mus ic wi ll undoubtedly prefer to see Schumann 's invention as an illusion, :1S mere musical rheto ric: \ve were deliberately and artfu ll y deceived, for we believed to have :leard what "ve co uld not possi bly have heard. Schumann achieved this nvention by means of a reality effect, an effet de reeL in the termino logy of Roland Barthes, offending a healthy and recommendab le se nse of what 'eality is. And t his ce rtainly is how one cou ld look at the matter. But the romanticist will not be at a loss when confronted wit h this argu. llent, pointing ou t that this melody tha t was listened to but cou ld not be leard ca n be identified with just as much precision as w ha t we actua ll y did lear. There is an amount of quasi-mathematical precision in music e nsu ring hat the iI/Here Stillll1le is completely and unambiguously fixed by what we :ould o r did hear. And, the roman ticist conti nues, if we customarily associIte reality with w ha t can objectively be established, whereas fiction indeed )ermits us to leave this objective reality, then we should situate Schumann 's 111lere Still/me in the domain of reality rather than in that of fiction and Ilusioll. And that would also justify the amazing inference th;]t what is not _here, can nevertheless he part of reality. But wha t has all th is to do with politics? The main poi nt of my argument "ill be th:)t if we want to give co ntent to t he notion of 'po li ti cal reality', and o defin e what we shou ld see as slIch, the paradox of Schuman n's melody hat can be listened to without being heard w ill prove to be a most va luable nd fruitful ana logy. For, in a way much reminiscent of Schum ann 's irl11ere timme, two answers can be given to the question abo ut th e natu re of poliical rea lity. On the one ha nd \ve have, to use t he musical termino logy dopted above, those 'classical' politi cal theorists and political scient ists ccordi ng to whom there is a measurable politica l rea lity that shou ld be t he as is and sta rtin g point of all reflect ion on politics. To press the analogy wit h lusic a little furth er, within the classical conception of politics, nothing can e lislened 10 in politics that had not been actually heard before. Political nput ' on th e one hand and political 'output' on th e ot her, what 're~l1y' appe ned in the domai n of politics on the one hand and our pe rceptio n of it n the other - at all times t hese two are most directly and intimately inter:}nnected. There G ill and shou ld be no 'gap' or 'discrepa ncy' between this Ih .\.\ /(}I/ .

o

hll d ",Ill Ii :I g: 1I1 nr di ... l rq.an l)' wl' n' to pl"l'Sl'nt itSl'1t~ ttl IW l ll' i vl.' su rnethin g in the politi cal wo rl d that is not ' Il':dl y' tlwn'; WI' wOllld then have bccomc the will -less playt hing of illusions and or politicil myths. The Fact that we natu rall y and immediatel y resort to this kind of pejo rati ve qualification in this context clea rly suggests already how objectionable \ve wou ld tend to t hink such discrepan cies to be. We are thereFore naturall y inclined to agree with the 'classica l' poli tical theorist 's view that such a discrepancy woul d lack a flll1damel1tll1ll ill re and must therefore be considered an expression of irrationality, of p ri mitive instincts, i1' not worse. On the other hand, there are the politica l 'rornantics ' who reject t he input/output model of thei r 'classicist' opponents. They will not deny t hat in many cases, perhaps even most cases, t he mode l wi ll be adequate and helpfu l - just as in music we will ord inaril y have listened to what we have actually heard - but they also want to leave roo m for cases in which in political reality somet hing new is produced th at transcends the input/ output model. W hen such a new politica l real ity comes into bei ng, we seem to be listeni ng to a poli tica l il1nere Stirnme for which the classical input/ out put mode l is u nab le to accou nt. And, as wi ll become clear in th is chapter, this disagreemen t bet ween t he 'classical' and the 'romantic' poli tical theor ist is not of mere academic significance; the sou nd fun ctioning of our Western democracies requ ires that we are able and prepared to listen to that political inn-ere Stimme in the compl ex symphony of democratic politics. Perhaps we might observe here another argument in favour of the elective affinities between democracy and t he market that have already been emphasised by so many w ri ters. The va lue of a company or of a national cu rrency wil l not be found by fi guring out the values of th e compa ny's buildings, machi nes, assets, bJn k accounts, and so fort h, nor by d etermining a country's natural riches, its trade ba lance, and national savings. All t hese things may seem to be very 'rea l' and determinate and t herefore the obvious and solid basis for establishing va lue; neve rt heless it wi ll be the unpredictable and often unexplainable vagaries of t he stock exchange that give us the best definition of the eco nomic realit ies of a company or a nation. Hence, both in democracy and in economics it is in the il1nere Stimme of political and economic interaction that 'rea lity ' reveals itself. And there is no su rer way to disaster than the decision not to listen to this innere Stimme - as wi ll invariably be t he case when we deci de to igno re what real ity is li ke. W t'

1I"lIlt y.

\\,ull id ... Vl'lll

What is Political 'Reality'? If we wish to determine our own position in this debat e between 'classical' and 'romanti c' poli t ical theorists, it wi ll above all be necessary to propose a

21

1 '~I IIII \ ..1 !l lIlpll1 " 11111 ... 1 :-'lIgg{·:-.li vl· l'x;llIlpll' (I I :-'lIl h :1 UllIl ll'II:-': llion is prl'M'IIL{ 'd fly MIIII ,I Y I d! , II1 1. III , when hl' \Vrill'~ that the li tizens in a democracy arl' ~dwa y:-. IlI g\·d ' It I lunk upon gove rnm e nt as a mec hanism that is responsive to th eir wanl:-. ~Ind u pun these in turn as rat io nal refl ections of their interest and moral upbringing and therefore as stable and continuing ' (Edelman, 1971: 3). Put differently, on the one hand there is th e input of the political interests and desi res of the citizen, and, on the ot her, the output of political decision making, And the classical model of the natu re of (democratic) political reality requires us to conceive of th e output of political decision making in terms of the in put of those interests and desires of the citizen. This does not in th e least preclude, however, that in actual democrati c practice this relationshi p between input and output may be very comp lex and untransparent. This plausibility of th e classica l conception of the machinery of democracy is still furth er reinforced by what Combs and Nimmo recently referred to as 'the Myth of th e Good Citize n'. That is to say, by the wides pread presupposition that de mocracy is supported by 'peaceful citizens who by taste or by interest sincerely desire the we ll-being of th eir cou ntry ' (Combs and Nimmo, 1996: 28). This myth of the Good Citizen seems to e ndow the classica l political model with a solid and reliable foundation in the reasonable interests and desires of the citize n and presents democratic poli ti cs tl S a mo re or less complicated calcu lating machine that figures out th e correct resultant of al l th ese indi vidua l interests and desi res - wi thout addi ng anyt hing of itself, if t hings go as they should. In short, th ere is a popu lar ideology of dem ocrati c politics - t his myth of the Good Citizen - that seems to grant an immense plausibility to the 'classica l' conception of democrati c politics. "When th e roma ntic poli tica l theorists wish to attack the input/output model two argum ents are at their disposal. Or, rather, as will become clear in a moment, it is onl y th e second argument that is rea ll y decis ive, But since the first argument offers a few interesting perspectives, it deserves ou r attention within the present context as wel l. Withi n the first argument the input/ output model is rejected since it is said to be impossible in politics to identify clearly and unambiguously what fun ctions as input for the output of public political action, Input and output are simply insepa rable and the classical model therefore is an illusion. Even more so, it is an illusion that is at odds with the very nature and spirit of democracy; for is not this inseparabili ty of input and output one of the greatest virtues of democra cy? Is democracy not the politica l system attempting to link these two together more closely and intimate ly than any other political system? Does this classica l principle of th e separability of political input and political output not inevitably create a distance between the two wh ich, in its turn, inevitably invites th e danger t hat input and output no longer correspond? And if all t his does not sound implausible, would t hat not justify the conclusion that the classical model is a denial of th e ve ry idea of all democra cy? l \ lIlll('II "' :l11 1I 1I !I IIII\' 11(1 1 Il I 11 :-. 0 1 pnlllll:11 IlIplll :l lld

22

will 1\ ' 1111 III II\' 1'\II111~ : d I I ,: dl ... t ... :llId ", .II Iw lil l i, ' Ill ! IlI wd l 0l11I1 lll.... " :-' 11 111\ ' Hln dng y III d\· llI u\..r:l l Y in thi:-. I , I ... \..' Wltl l \-vh:1l dl'll Hil l ;1\ y I ... 111 :1L't ual hi .. torit..:11 rl,:dit y. They will therefore I HI l he i. olltl' nl wll h thl' l)bM'rv:ltion th~n th e classical model contradicts "'Pllll' idl,;d nl c.il'llHKT:ltic polit ics. They will also want to de monstrate that d l'llIocra Lic fJrtlc lice is ~It odds with the classica l model. Murray Edelman has ll1ad l' clear in w hat res pect democrati c practice deviates from the classical llotinl1 of the se parability of political input and pol iti ca l output. One may th ink hl're primarily of his thesis according to w hic h 'politica l act ions chiefl y arouse o r satisfy peo pl e not by granting or withholding their stable sub... t:l11ti ve demands, but rather by changing the demands an d the ex pectations' (Edelma n, 197 1: 7). Put differently, the output (of political action) codetermines th e nature of the input and cannot be separated from it; or, in I': cl elman's own formulation, 'the significant "outputs" of politi cal activities uhjl'l t knowledge wit h a secret ~OllrCl' 0 1 lrllth d.'t'l' h 1'1(ldl. 'n in some inne r sanctuary o f the indi vidual - an alliance from wh rl h :-.n Ill lKh contempora ry philoso phy of acti on has originated, Style orga ni ses ite ms of hum an behaviour w ithout pretending to bring us to some deepe r level allegedly lying behind these items of be haviou r the m selves; for it does t his job of orga ni sing behaviour in th e space between the individua l human be ing in questi on and ourselves, so to spea k, and not by moving beyond t hat space into the sphe re of a hidde n, inn e r self o f t hat individua l. In th is way th e use of the noti on o f sty le with rega rd t o human act ion strange ly combin es a focus on what ca n publicl y be seen (as in behaviourism) w ith an interest in u niqu e ind ividual perso na li ty (wit h all its traditi ona l Ca rtesian re m inisce nces). Style t he re fore prese nts us w ith a m ix of objectivi sm and subj ecti vis m in ou r conce pt ion of hum an be havio ur that puts it apart from m ost of co nte m pora ry philoso phy of actio n. O n t he one hand, style is as old as hum anit y, since it is t he ca t ego ry that human ind ividua ls have alwa ys re lied upon in orde r to make se nse of each oth er's be haviour ' but o n th e oth e r, th e ca tego ry is new a nd revolutio nary since philosop hy of action has alwa ys shunned it on account o f its unscientific nature and 'superficia li t y'. Adm ittedl y, t he noti on of st yle is un scie ntific and 'superficial' in th e prope r se nse of that word, but thi s is precisely wh y we need it so much : for in our dea lings with other hum an beings we are interest ed in what goes a ll betweeu us, so in wha t is on th e surface of t he be haviou r of the othe r, so t o spea k, We are predominantly interested in w hat ta kes p lace on the imer. fa ce be t ween the ot he r and myse lf (to use co mpute r t e rm inol ogy) and not in som e d ee p, psyc ho logical tru th s abollt th e othe r. This will also m ake clear where we shou ld d raw th e boundary betwee n w hat can and cann ot be realised wh e n we have had the w isd om to ava il ou rse lves of th e noti on of st yle in our d ealin gs with oth e rs - and in politics, With regard t o wha t ca nn ot be rea lised} w he re others, as we have see n} expe ri e nce the m selves ' naively' an d non·stylistically, thi s naive ex pe ri e nce of the se lf is t he li m it that ou r stylisti C rep rese ntation of ot he rs and t he ir be haviou r w ill neve r be able to atta in . With regard to w hat can be ach ieved by the notion o f st yle, it will give us access to most of what makes cul ture and politics of signifi can ce and of va lue to us, For what is truly of interest t o us in cu ltu re a nd politics is not th e objec tive Co nte nt of \vhat is naive ly give n to us, is .not a quasi -Kant ian an sich of wha t cu lture and politics might m ea n t o themselves (supposing that we could make any sense at a ll of thi s effort to reach into th e all sich of culture and politics) , but what becomes accessib le to us in terms of th e 'se nti men tal' approac h of th ese two dom ains. As Schiller put it himself: 'Naivet y has its va lue in t hat it m ay com pletely grasp the finite, while th e oth e r [i.e., t he sentim e nta l) has thi s va lue in the approximat ion of t he infinite ' (S chille r, 1867: 130).

32

\Vt '

.., 11111 rid 11 " tI " ,I ' I II L1 1 I I,, '

II llt ' h.~ l1d , ,lIld

I

drlll ' lt ' nt 1, 111' 1 \\" "' 11 1I ,1t1111 ' ,rlld II \\' 11 ,11 \ I', \111 li n ' 1Iltlll l ' PI 1'1,J lll t '" ,1I 1t1 lilt , \ "11 1111 \\'1\1. .1 , till tilt' nl lh ' l , " ,IIIIIH

hi ' 1III ' ~ , ,,, " n'd Oil tl ll' . . , ,,I,, ti l tilt ' 1\,I.,ll\',' ( rll),HI"q tl ,n y til kllt\wl\'\I~I' ( 1.1..' , 1h,' . " ,.I,' lh :lt :111 \ \ \11 pll'..,,'n1 rd l..'o lu g ll' :-' n l k nll w k d g l..' ' l'qlllrl' U.., to UHI:-. u.l l'r ,rll (kt.i :-..vl') , Fur III :I ,,-,' rl :lIll ..,,'nM' titl'!'l' i~.. no :-.ell -knmv ll. 'd j.!,l' lhal lou ld IUlh li o n :.IS suc h an ahsolllll' rnl'~I Surl' o f all kno\Vled~l' and insi~ht : T1:1ivl'l y b Il'll ,I pote nt ial object of knowledge to itself in th e way that th e se ntimenta l e m 111..' . Nai ve t y should not be see n as a kind of idea l of knowledge that ca n on ly ,,"'y mptoticall y be approached in t e rms o f the se ntim e ntal : for the dO llla in n l till' nai ve su i generis lies outside or beyo nd the reac h of (se IF-)re tl ec ti oll. vV he ll o pposing the naive and th e sentim e nta l, Schi lle r assu res us th at 'o nl y lhl' latte r recogni ses diffe ren t degrees and progress ', an obse rvati on that is hot h t ru e and mi sleadin g. It is mislead ing in that it invites all t hese m od e ls Ill' scie ntifi c kn owledge aiming at the approx imati on o f ultimate tru t h th :l t "o ntemporary p hil osophy of sc ie nce has imprin ted upon our minds. But here th is ultimate truth - th e naive - is not a goa l to be approxima t ed as much as possible. O n the ot he r hand, Schi lle r 's state me nt is true in th e se nse that it expresses the inSight that the st ylistic or aesthetic underst anding of the oth e r wi ll depe nd o n the degree of the substitutabi lity o f our st ylistic c haract e ri stisations of the other fo r th e ot her 's actual be haviour - at least insofar as thi s behaviour is see n from our own specific poi nt of view', We ca n summarise t his as follows. All ou r knowl edge of, grasp of, or inSight into sociopolitical rea lity can be divided into three ca tegories. In th e first place the re is ' na ivet y' as inte nd ed by Schill er: he re the self is ne ithe r objectified nor th ema t ised ; it is expe rie nced - if it is ex pe rie nced at all - as bei ng ;) m ere con ti nuation of nature and of rea lity. But , in th e second place, the naive self ma y become the dom inant pa rtner in t he relationship be t ween t he self and n:ltu re or reali ty, Th en re fl ectio n about nature or reality may becom e a di sgu ised fo rm of naive self-re fl ec ti on, He re we ha ve, in Schi lle r 's word s, an 'extension' (Erweitenmg) of th e self ove r th e non-self; a nd insofar as we wou ld be pre pared t o use he re t he notions of (se lf)re fl ecti on, we shou ld d esc ribe th is as the pec ul ia r kind of recogniti on o f th e se lf that will be give n to one afte r one has made, u nwitti ngly and uninte nt ionall y} th e whole of reality int o a mirror-image of t he self. The self can he re d iscern in realit y onl y variants of itself - but it re mains unaware o f thi s bound less extension of th e self and it can pe rsist in this ignorance since this exte nsion t ook place und e r the aegis of a nam e less, anonymous and transcendenta l self. T his is the world of natural law philosophy and of muc h, though not ali, of th e social scie nces. But in th e third place, there is an att itude t owa rd s or an understanding of th e worl d t hat respect s tha t th ere is a wo rld alie n t o us. This is the domai n o f t he se ntim e ntal, of the awa re ness of be ing an ou t side r, of bei ng in a re la tio nship t o natu re or (political) rea li ty wi thout being an int egral part o f it (as in the naive) - and yet we wish to return to nature and (political) reality.

33

till' dllltt .IHI HI tIll' "'l· HIIIIII.: nt.d , \\", \\lt ll bnl ,III, IIltnl 1.1~l · n 11"1\, · \1111.11\,· ,,· 11 ;1\,,;11'· 11' · ...... 11) hULl! tlw 1'11111 ', 1"-11 1.1. ·. . , II Iwd.1 IIHIlI1t'nl ago. WI' h:1\'e..' now k·lllht' 'egocentricity' o l th .. 11.11\,' ""'lIllt,lt 1... .::. lIli !'>o Illul...h urged 011 U!) by !..'lhics, by Cartesian and Kanll:ln phdU:-'Ollph y 01 mind and all its modern SUCcessors (think, for example, of the highly c ha racteristic 'egocent ricity' of the Cartesian cogito). Now we no lo nger project ourselves o n the wo rl d, but reac h se lf-reflection and/o r self-awareness via the OIller. We sec ourselves as the ot her w ill see us (as we ourse-Ives ma y beco me aware of th e style of our previous beha viour o nly at a later phase in our life and, hen ce, from the perspective of that later alter ego). In this third, 'se ntiment:J I' paradigm, not t he self (o r some gener.:ilised intersu bjective t ranscendental self) but the other is th e beginning of all wisdom. T his is the paradigm that we enco unte r in aesthetics and in the wr iting of hist ory; and the most importan t instrume nt it has to offer us is the not ion of style. ,\ ... ... \11111 ..... \\ 1' l'lll1'l

Ollt ... l ·hl· ... .

The Political Styles of Democracy In no political system is this stylistic understanding of the other rnore cnlcia l and indispensa ble than in representative democracy. As the concept of 'representative' democ ra cy already clearly indicates, it is on ly thanks to how the state 'represents' the electorate, and in its turn, how the clectomte constnlcts for itself a 'represent:Jtion ' of the state and of politics, that all the mechanisrns of a representative democracy start to move and to function properly. This typically aesthetic notion of representation (cf. Ankersmit, 1997; 2002) suggests how the notion of democratic style could best be operationa lised. For, JS may be clear on the basis of the foregOing, the understanding that the electora te and the state mutually have of each ot her is not 'naive', not a form o r derivative of socia-scientific knowledge, but essentiall y stylistic: the object of political Lillderstandi ng is Lhe sty le of the other, whether of the state or of (groups With in) th e electorate. And the de libe rate st yle lessness of 'n::l ive', economic and bureauc ratic understanding thJt dominates contemporary political d iscourse - however use ftd these discourses may sometimes be - will ultimately result in a bloc kage of the mechan isms that keep the machine of representat ive democracy going. An econom ic or bureaucra tic reality wi ll then usurp the place o f a political rea lity o f an il111ere Stimme res ulti ng from t he interacti on between the 'right hand' and th e 'left hand ' of the represented and of the representative. One of the major problems of co ntemporary Western democracy is that because of all the clutter of socia-scientific data _ of statisti cs bureaucracy and so on - the e lectorate and the state simply are no longe r ab l ~ to recogni se and und e rstand each oth er. Only style ca n gua rantee this mutual recognit ion and understanding - and give us access to 'th e ot her' again. Just as eithe r the right hand or th e left hand may be t he main co ntributor to t he development of t hi s political iI/Here Stimme, so it ,.... ill also be possible

34

III IIldl, .II,·, till tI .. 11.1-.1 ', "I lilt' 1\llq~lIlllg. w ll .11 11111 ... 1 h. · 11t\· 1'11111.11 \ til \· It.· llIl·I1t. II V 1IIII Itll . .1 ,.\,11 '" III II·PIl·".' Il!all "l· dl ' ltlihl,ll V (Iltllugh I iLl'l,'O III add llt. tt Ihl .. d,ll ·'. III II ,I'" \l'l Illlply any lh lng Wi th Iq-:.nd ll) lh"11' Il·bIIVl· 111t· l it~) . A d .... ltlh IIIUI IIlad t.· hy Schiller prov~~ to Ill' Iwiplu ll ll...'rl' Otlll.' ;1~;lI n : 1 am lhinking heft' 01 his distinctio n between thL' dq!,ial and tht.' ~;Iliril' al ... lyles. For Schille r elegiac poetry and e legiac politiGll sty le co rn::sp?nd with lhe naive; they cu lti vate natu re and what is natural at the expense at cullurl', art and artificiality. And, as Schiller explicitly points ou t , the curious paradox is th:.1t in th is W:JY the natura l beco mes idealistic and the world o f' art and culture realistic: from our prese nt (sentimenta l) perspective not clIltllre, hUI IICl1llre presents itself as a sha ky and uncertJin co nstru ction. In this way Schiller ni cel y :Jnd e lega ntl y succeeds in turning Rousse:.lu upside down. Obvious exam ples of' th is elegiac and idea li stic democratic political style an: t he idyll ' of natura l law theory and th e idea l(s) of direct democ ra cy. Opposite to the elegiac style Schill er places satirica l poetry, which correspo nds with the sentimental: 'Sa tiri ca l is the poet who takes as his subject the estrangement from reality and the opposition between reality and the idea l (the effect both have on the human mind is in each case t he same) (Schi ller, 1867: 133). In connecti on to the world of politics we may think here of the political style that is ordinarily ca lled Machiavellistic: in Machiavellism the satire of political action results from the rejection of the ideal as the highest political reality. For th is reason we may agree with Robert Hariman when he writes that ' the realist style is the lx!sis of Mac hiavelli 's persuasive success, it has shaped his text's subsequent history of interpretation, a nd it ope rates as a powerful mode of comprehension and actio n in the modern world '. And in agreement w ith Schiller's not ion of the sa tirical as a subcategory of th e se ntimental, he also situates Mac hi c1Vell i's e ndeavour to bring back the idea (i.e. Machiave lli 's ow n high-pitched republicanism) to nature, that is, to political reality (Hariman, 1995: 13). In recent ana lyses of the comedies that Mac hi ave lli wrote (suc h as La Mcmdragola) sc holars Jl so attem pt to identify in these comedies this same peculiar combinatio n of comedy, sa tire and rea lism that is so much the ou tstanding Feature of his poli tica l writings (for exam ple, Fen iche l-Pitkin, 1987: 110- 14) . Hence, w he re th e idyll of th e naive politic:J1 st yle placed us in the universe of the citizen li ving in a direct democra cy, t he sati re of t he se nt imental d e m ocra ti c style has its elective affini t y w ith the democratic poli tic ian's di lemmas of \Vh:.1t most prudent and effective use he should make of poli tical power. But m ore important than t he st yle of na ive id yll and that of se ntim e ntal s: 'An artistic style is not to be seen a:-. :1 rL'upL' lor "how to p~int a portrait ". The term "style " rather denotes:l gcneril l way of making or doing things .. , For instance, the st ylistic req uirement of unity of time, place and ac ti on, w hi ch any successful classicist playw righ t had to meet, was not mere ly a co nstraint; it also opened a vast array of possibil ities t hat wo uld otherwise have rema ined unexp lored. Style ca n be a source of creativity ' (Westerman, 1997: 32). We observed above th e po litica l creativity of democ ratic politics, and it seeills li ke ly that the notion of political style is idea lly suited fo r explai ning this crea ti vity. This politic::!l creativity pre-eminently manifests itself in the creation of a new polit ica l rea lity, new in the se nse that it transcends the mo re elementary and primary rea lities o f \vhat is in th e minds of th e individua l participants in the domai n of politics. It is a new poli tica l reali ty beca use it is superimposed upon the more COncrete rea lity of already ex isting political des ires! ideo logies, adm in istrat ive habi ts or mec hanisms whose complex interacti o n we havc tri ed to elucid ate in terms of Schu mann 's illIlere Still/me . For w hat is true of Schumann 's i,lIlere Stimme is true as we ll of this democra tic extra, superimposed reality: it ca nn ot be 'hea rd' but it ca n be ' listened to' and this ca n be done w ith th e same objectivity and accuracy as what is act uall y 'hea rd'. 1'11111 Iplt · ...

111.1 1 I '"

OI ... OIIII - po l lll( .

.I

, 111l11'k",IV

.1\

p,ld ...

\\' 1\

II I hi'

1'1.1 \1 It

I l'; lI lt y_ S i ll ' t l l1· 11 · I,llt · lt ·I..Olllllh'IH I ...

Precisely because we still find ourselves here in a kind of indete rminate limbo betwee n what is already and what is not yet rea lity - obviously th e kind of li mbo in which all creativity will preferably loo k for its proper homeprecisely for this reason! whatever ultimate ly solidifies into a poli tica l rea li ty that will become recogn isable to all of us in due time, will mnke here its first en try into the domai n of poli tics. T his politi cal hl11ere Stim me is the refo re the birthplace of all the mechan isms that wi ll keep representative democracy alive. Dcmocracy di es when this political iI/Here Slilllme is smothered, or w hen ou r political ea rs ha ve become unable or unwilling to listen to it an ymore. If we wish to investiga te more closely the peculiar real ity of this politica l

i,-mere Stim me, the noti on o f politica l sty le wi ll be ou r best guide. For political style shares with the rea lity of the politica l innere Stimme th e capacit y to bridge this so enigmatic and Protean ga p bet wee n w hat is already and what wi ll become political reality. In our co ntemporary de moc racies, it is onl y in ter ms o f political styl e tha t the poli ticia n may become recognisable at all to th e e lectorate: Buffon's Ie sty le, c!es f l'homme meme is pre-em ine ntl y true of how the citizen co nceives of the poli tician. Not political ideology, neither a polit ica l programme nor politica l ac hievement - and it is far frol11 me to belittl e these things - but polit ica l st yle, therefore, is t he tru e lrail d 'union bet wee n politics an d the politician on the one hand and t he e lectorate

38

tilt' tlll / I ' ll \1 11111 1' 1,,111 '1 1'\111111 . 11 ... Ivlt· '" 1111 ' , . IIt ·I'.III\, ' · II . lhllll ~~ . .11 lilt' I 1.11 \ h 111. 111\ .. \ 1I I lit , S I 11 11 It ' l 1.111 , ,>lI II ·d \' \ I I I \'p I , .... \ ' 111 : 1I 1\ l' \ Iv" It I l I : 11 V II I 1 l' l tlg III "' " 1·.1t h III h~ ' I, pili I t H .11 . . , \ It· .... tI II' .II 11 1t:1III wh, 'Il' l hi' PO lllll :.1 party ~lI HI t!l\' 1'1I11l!\I .1 1l ,, 1I1111.lkl · lIh ·1I III :-. t ( :lIltIOIl :-' c ll ort:-. to rL'dL'i ine their rclation ~ h ip 10 the \· Il'ltOr.lh· 0 1 \\'ha t ... Illluld, in thL'i r view, he seen as be ne ficia l and \. dll ahll· lutun' puhlic goa ls. s Whl' n a new polit ica l real ity comes into being it always invol ves the birth til ;1 new political style. H ence, the politica l theorist avoiding the notion of pl)lit ical st yle because he thinks the notion too di fficu lt or too cllmbersome \0 use is like somebody who decides that it \"ou ld be too much of an effo rt to learn the language tha t is used by t he people il111 0ngst whom he lives.

,1 l ltl

Notes 1 A Dutch version o r material conta ined in this chnptc r was published in Pds and tl' Vdde (l-ds) (2000); another (English) versio n appeared in AnkNsm it (2002: 133) . 2. Insofar as ethks has an .. mnity with our conscience, with our inner moral C01l\iCl ions and \\ Ith what practica l reason tell s us th"t we !>hould do, we may discern he re the unbridgeable gap Ill'tween the notions o r ethics and or styk·. Tlwre I.oul d he no science or l'th ks ror what ought tu be the style o r our behaviour. 3. The idyll is seen by Schiller:1s a subvariant or el egy: it occurs wht'n tilt' Il"lura l is e"'peril'need as an 'object of joy' (Gegellsttll1d der Frellde) . -J. Which ha:. tht· im portan t implicatio n that to representation must he granted the sa me l1lltological sta tus as things - i.e. 1I0t that of re;l lity. Sec for t:'x:l1npl~ Anker:.mit (1994: 90) . 5. Fo r :I number of striking illustrations of th is claim, s,'e Robertson (1995). Robertson d~1ll0 nst ra le s to what extent the e"olution of Anglo-Saxon democnlCY fou nd its ( I('arl'st t.'xpres~ ion in evolutions or political style and rhetoric .

References Ankersm it , F ( 1994) History lIlIll 'fi.W)()logy: fhe Rise lIIuf Fail 0/ Metaphor. Berkeley: Uni\"('rsity of California Pr c~s. An kersm it, F (1997) Aesthetic Politics: Political Philosophy fJeyolld Fflct mut Ilrlhlt!. Slanrtlrd : Stanrord Universit )' Press. Anke rsmil, F. (2000) 'The Representation of Experience', Metclphilosophy 3 1( 1- 2): 148-69. Ankcrsmi t, F (200 1) Historical Hepreselltatioll . St:mford : Stan ford Unive rsit y Press. Ankcrsmit, F. (2002) Po/ilim/ Represelltatioll . Stanford : Stanford Un iversit y Press. Combs, lE. and Nimmo, D. (1996) 'I1le Comedy of Democracy. Westport C r: Praeger. Edelman, M. (1971) Politics as Symbolic Actioll . Mass Arollscll and Quiescellce. C hicago: Markham . Edelman , M. ( 1988) Constructing the Po/itia d Spectacle. C hicago: University of C hi cago Press. Fenichct -Pitkin , H. (1 987) Forwlle is (j W OIII CW . Gender (I11t1 Polit ics ill the 11wIIght of Niccolo Meldliewell;. Berkeley: Uni versity of Cali fo rn ia Pr(' s.~. Il arim3n, R. (1995) Political Style. The Artisrry of POUier. Chicago: U ni\'ersit y of Chicago Press. Montcsquieu , C. de (19 73 [1 7481) De {'esprit des lois. Paris: Garnier. Pels, O. and te Vcldc, H. (cds) (2000) Politieke stij/. Ollel' presellratie ell op/I'ede/l ill de /loliriek . Amsterdam : Het Spinhuis. Robertson, A.W. (1 99 5) The Lmlguage of Democracy. Political Rhetoric i'l lire United SUI/CS and Britai", 1790- 1900. Ithaca and Lo ndon: Cornell Unive rsity Press.

39

I{"',I ' II

S I II

•

. \ ," ) "1:

~

( 1' 1' It 'II/I /' ( ,{'II,'t,I/"'11 ( .I"ll llh l,·, · 1\ 1/\ II" , I ' \0",, " 1111 ' "

\

I'

\P Il

[I Hil / )

' I I/wI 11 .11\,' Imd

S I 1111 /.:: 11 1 (,,11.1 tlll ~ l

WDt~'rrl1 ;Ul ,

1',( '

( I 'JIJ7)

L('ldl'n/ Nl'w Yurk : Bnll.

~'·1I1 11 1!