Ang Tibay v Court of Industrial Relations

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|   ||   |   !"#$% | - The respondent National Labor Union, Inc. prayed for the vacation of the judgment rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial. The union avers that: Teodoro's claim that there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather; that the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal; that the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood; that important documents attached are inaccessible to the respondents.   WON the union was denied procedural due process by the CIR &  ' The CIR, a special court created under CA 103, is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi - judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them. It may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. The CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules

recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) V
   

    
    
    
 
    
  


  



   
  


   

 The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. (2) 
 
 
 

  
 





 
  
   
    
 
  
  







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 This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. (4)    

 
 



          



  
   It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (5) V
 
  
 


  



 


  

    
  
  
 
   
   
   




  Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (6) ()(*+,-./,"+*("0,+1+()+,(,(2) ).3).)+ 1(),.+() (* + 2 ). *1+, (* + 1()+(," ). )(+ ,03 113+ +2, (* ,(.)+))/+.1,()' (7) ,(.")1()+(,4,+(),").+,.1,()),1 0))+++3+,+(+ 3(1.)/1)5)(2+(, ,,,)(." ).+,(),*( +  .1,()  )..'  The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. - In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood, the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law. - This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the CIR is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to

the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is grant ed, and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the CIR.   6 |7|76 8,1()1(9 :$| |
| | ;)"#: |  Special civil action of certiorari | - Leonides C. BASCONCILLO, filed a complaint with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Workersµ Assistance and Adjudication Office for illegal dismissal against Vinta Maritime Co., Inc. and Elkano Ship Management, Inc. - The employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the o
 They claim that he was /) * 2))/ ). )(/ (33(+)+ +( .)0/+, - In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right.

- These rules 

                . Proceedings before a POEA hearing officer are non-litigious, although they are still subject to the requirements of due process. Ô
 Petitioners were given their chance to be heard. Their answer, position paper and supporting documents had become parts of the records and were considered by the POEA and by the NLRC. 2. YES Ô  Where there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal. Verily, the burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. - Due process, the second element for a valid dismissal, requires NOTICE and HEARING. The employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and (2) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employerµs decision to dismiss him. Petition is u
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'' ('#$ ' 7 A||/,+#"# |  Petition for review | -Private respondent Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine is a citizen of India and holder of a Philippine visitorµs visa. she enrolled in the doctoral program in Anthropology of the University of the Philippines College of Social Sciences and Philosophy (CSSP) in Diliman, Quezon City. -After completing the units of course work required in her doctoral program, private respondent went on a two-year leave of absence to work as Tamil Programme Producer of the Vatican Radio in the Vatican and as General Office Assistant at the International Right to Life Federation in Rome. She returned to the Philippines to work on her dissertation entitled, "Tamil Influences in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines." -Dr. Realidad S. Rolda, chairperson of the U.P. Department of Anthropology, wrote a letter to Dr. Maria Serena Diokno, CSSP Associate Dean and Graduate Program Director, certifying that private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense. -After going over private respondentµs dissertation, Dr. Medina informed CSSP Dean Consuelo Joaquin-Paz that there was a portion in private respondentµs dissertation that was lifted, without proper acknowledgment, from Balfourµs Cyclopaedia of India and Eastern and Southern Asia (1967) and from John Edyeµs article entitled "Description of the Various Classes of Vessels Constructed and Employed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel, Malabar, and the Island of Ceylon for their Coasting

Navigation" in the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland Journal. -Nonetheless, private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Four (4) out of the five (5) panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. -The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved private respondentµs graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. -The University Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year 1992-1993. The list, which was endorsed to the Board of Regents for final approval, included private respondentµs name. -Dean Paz sent a letter to Dr. Milagros Ibe, Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs, requesting the exclusion of private respondentµs name from the list of candidates for graduation, pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. -Dean Pazµs letter did not reach the Board of Regents on time, because the next day, the Board approved the University Councilµs recommendation for the graduation of qualified students, including private respondent. Two days later, private respondent graduated with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Anthropology. -Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. -Dean Paz formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. Meanwhile, she recommended to U.P. Diliman Chancellor, Dr. Emerlinda Roman, that the Ph.D. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn. -In a letter Dean Paz informed private respondent of the charges against her. -The CSSP College Assembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondentµs doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the University Council. The University Council, in turn, approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the Board of Regents on August 16, 1993. -Meanwhile, in a letter, U.P. Diliman Chancellor Emerlinda Roman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. -During the meeting, Chancellor Roman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. Private respondent, on the other hand, submitted her written explanation in a letter. -Another meeting was held between Chancellor Roman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. | +. 0+)/ 2, ,1.. + 3+ ,3().)+ .. )(+ ++). +" /)/ ++ + (. (* /)+,.. .1..1,*(,1(.*.' -BOR withdrew degree -TC dismissed petition for mandamus filed by Arokiaswamy. CA reversed ordering BOR to restore her doctoral degree.   WON Arokiaswamy was denied due process &  ' Ô
    In this case, the trial court dismissed private respondentµs petition precisely on grounds of academic

freedom but the Court of Appeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. It said: It is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College Assembly culminating in its recommendation to the University Council for the withdrawal of petitionerµs Ph.D. degree, petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withdrawal of the degree was consummated. Petitionerµs subsequent letters to the U.P. President proved unavailing.

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A";'7 "## +D|33 1+,D - GLORIOUS was found guilty of dollar-salting and misdeclaration of importations by the GTEB and, as a result of which, the export quotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the GTEB decision, GLORIOUS filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court, contending that its right to due process of law was violated, and that the GTEB decision was not supported by substantial evidence. - Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLORIOUS, the Court issued a resolution ordering GTEB to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLORIOUS. - However, GLORIOUS filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted - GLORIOUS filed another motion to dismiss with prejudice, which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution. - More than 2 years later, GLORIOUS filed with the GTEB a petition for the restitution of its export quota allocation and requested for a reconsideration of the GTEB decision dated April 27, 1984. - GLORIOUS again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by evidence. - Moreover, it alleged that the GTEB decision canceling its export quotas was rendered as a result of duress, threats, intimidation and undue influence exercised by former Minister Roberto V. Ongpin in order to transfer GLORIOUS' export quotas to "Marcos crony-owned" corporations De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation [DSA] and AIFC. - GLORIOUS further alleged that it was coerced by Mr. Roberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into joint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of DSA and petitioner AIFC which were allowed to service GLORIOUS' export quotas and to use its plant facilities, machineries and equipment. - GTEB denied the petition of GLORIOUS. An appeal was then taken to the Office of the President. - At this point, AIFC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLORIOUS' appeal claiming that the GTEB decision has long become final, and

that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export quotas which were legally allocated to it. - The Office of the President ruled in favor of GLORIOUS, finding the proceedings before the GTEB in 1984 irregular, and remanded the case to GTEB for further proceedings. - The MR of AIFC was subsequently denied. ,,,: 1. WON the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION and 2. WON the final judgment constitutes res judicata on the ground that the final judgment in was a judgment on the merits. &.D #' 'In finding that GTEB proceedings were irregular, the OP didnµt commit GAD as GTEB indeed violated the right to due process of Glorious. GTEB failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun. The decision penned by Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma and the resolution penned by Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Mariano Sarmiento II are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. They outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export quotas were cancelled by GTEB The findings are supported by the records. | D.)1()1(.0,+*.,1(,.+(+3+,' ' ' - The dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. Hence, the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid-air cannot, under the circumstances, constitute res judicata. ,())/: - For a judgment to be a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: . . . (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) the court which resolved it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be identity between the two cases, as to the parties, subject matter and cause of action. - The well-entrenched principle is that "a judgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point." (Deang v. IAC). - The protestation of Glorious Sun of non-disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subsequent accommodation by the GTEB of its request for copies of the relevant documents. - The petitioner claims that the subsequent disclosure of the documents by GTEB to Glorious Sun in 1987 cured the defect of non-disclosure of evidence in 1984 under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR and other subsequent cases. - The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision and referred to in the 1987 decision as being "intact" relates to what the GTEB labeled as Documents used by GTEB and "Additional Documents" which, as earlier discussed, were either not disclosed to Appellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence. - At any rate, the conclusions of GTEB as to the excessiveness of Appellant's import prices drew a controverting statement from its own Raw Materials Importation Regulation Division,

- Findings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality, and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. This general rule, however, is not without exceptions. - As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. - Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. - Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the findings are initiated by fraud, imposition or collussion; where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest." (Mapa v. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 [1989]) - In the case at bar, the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export quota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. While it is true that such allocations as alleged by the Board are mere privileges which it can revoke and cancel as it may deem fit, these privileges have been accorded to petitioner for so long that they have become impressed with property rights especially since not only do these privileges determine the continued existence of the petitioner with assets of over P80,000,000.00 but also the livelihood of some 700 workers who are employed by the petitioner and their families . -Finally, American Inter-Fashion is hardly the proper party to question the Malacañang decision. It was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. It was created obviously to be the recipient of export quotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. It was sequestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of injustice inflicted on another private corporation.  
: MFR is GRANTED. The instant petition is DISMISSED. The question decision and resolution of the Office of the President are hereby AFFIRMED. 
  
 | -concurring: I concur in the result reached by the Court, that is, that petitioner American Interfashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse of discretion or act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the President in rendering its decision in OP Case No. 3781 dated 7 September 1989.

 |  6'7 |  |$   ;)#" %%% |  Petition for review of decision of CA | - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision.

- Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied. - Moral instituted an action for   and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the   case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on    CA sustained TC. - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.   1. WON the order of the TC is proper 2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report & 1. NO. - Section 3, Rule 16, of the ¢
       mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of   and the trial courtµs jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitionerµs motion to dismiss was being denied. - Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not st ated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on  may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified. 2. NO. - o  is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of  that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. - In her petition for  , respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the u
    

   and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner

DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. - Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in !  u  that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondentµs removal from office was grounded. DPetition is granted.

 |  6'7 |  |$   ;)#" %%% |  Petition for review of decision of CA | - Sec Pefianco of DECS seeks to nullify CA decision. - Ex-Sec Gloria filed complaint against Moral, Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent Moral with the pilferage of some historical documents. - DoJ Special Prosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. Moral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding Moral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. - Moral did not appeal but filed a Petition for Production of DECS Investigation Committee Report. Her petition was twice denied. - Moral instituted an action for   and injunction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. - Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the   case principally for lack of cause of action, but the trial court denied his motion. Thus, he elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on    CA sustained TC. - Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec Pefianco.   1. WON the order of the TC is proper

2. WON Moral is entitled to a copy of the Report & 1. NO. - Section 3, Rule 16, of the ¢
       mandatorily requires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. - The challenged Order of the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of   and the trial courtµs jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitionerµs motion to dismiss was being denied. - Judges should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not st ated any basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before resort to higher courts on  may be had, would be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict compliance with the rules was justified. 2. NO. - o  is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of  that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. - In her petition for  , respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the u
    

   and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. - Primarily, respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final. - Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary, it was held in !  u  that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. - More importantly, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondentµs removal from office was grounded. Petition is granted. As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense. Indeed,

if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree. Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain oneµs side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the Zafaralla committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position. It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice. It is noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.

,3(,+()Petition for mandamus DISMISSED | &|
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  1+(#"# |  Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction | - The Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. F. Sharp & Company informing it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. - C. F. Sharp & Company, not being the agent or operator of the vessel, referred the notice to A. V. Rocha, the agent and operator thereof, who answered the notice stating, among other things, that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not required by law to be manifested. Rocha stated further: "If this explanation is not sufficient, we request that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense." - The Collector of Customs replied to Rocha stating that the television set in question was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. In said letter, the collector imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within 48 hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of seizure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. - Petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance, which

was granted. Respondent interposed present appeal.   WON the requirements of administrative due process have already been complied with & NO - Rocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as required by Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Under said section, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of P5,000.00. This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. - True it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative, where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded, but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right. That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case. The decision appealed from is affirmed.

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'' ('#%:  71 #" %%% |  Special civil action for certiorari | - Petitioners were among the employees of the Provincial Engineering Office who were dismissed by Gov. Paredes, allegedly to scale down operations. - Petitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). MSPB found that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations, and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. It held that while reduction in force due to lack of funds is a valid ground for termination, employees to be terminated must be determined after being found to be the least qualified (in terms of relative

fitness, efficiency and length of service) - MSPB later issued an order directing the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits. - At first, the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. The matter was brought up to the CSC, wherein indirect contempt proceedings were held. This prompted the Governor to finally comply with the order of reinstatement. The provincial treasurer also partially released some of the backwages. - But the problems did not stop there. Later, the Provincial Administrator, for and in behalf of Governor Plaza, wrote a letter to respondent Commission on Audit. It claims that COA is the proper authority to determine disbursement as regards the backwages. In its decision, COA ruled that the payment of backwages has become the personal liability of former Governor Paredes, it appearing that the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith. - Pursuant to the ruling of COA, the provincial treasurer stopped the payment of backwages.  = 1. WON the COA, in the exercise of its power to audit, can disallow the payment of back wages of illegally dismissed employees by the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur which has been decreed pursuant to a final decision of the Civil Service Commission & 1. NO. Ô
 - First, COA based its ruling on the MSRB decision. A careful perusal of said Decision will disclose that the MSPB never made a categorical finding of fact that former Governor Paredes acted in bad faith and hence, is personally liable for the payment of petitioners' back wages. Indeed, the MSPB even found that there was lack of funds which would have justified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural infirmities in its implementation - m       

" Second, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process were violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities - Third, the MSRB decision became final and executory. Final judgments may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court, not even by the Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department of Government Decision of COA set aside

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'' ('>$% | |"´';) "#! |  Petition for a writ of   | - Dr. Antonio Nubla, father of Alicia Nubla, a minor of 16 years, filed a verified complaint against Emilio Suntay in the Office of the City Attorney of Quezon City, as follows: The accused took Alicia Nubla from St. Paul's Colleges in Quezon City with lewd design and took her to somewhere near the U.P. compound in Diliman, Quezon City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. Alicia Nubla is a minor of 16 years. - Petitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the DFA. Petitioner left the Philippines for San Francisco where he is at present enrolled in school. The offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the CFI of Quezon City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. The private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order "directing such government agencies as may be concerned, particularly the NBI and the DFA, for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the Philippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law." The Court granted the motion. - Respondent Secretary cabled the Ambassador to the United States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Francisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The Embassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State Department that Emilio Suntay's presence outside the Philippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government, that his passport has been withdrawn, and that he is not considered under the protection of the Philippines while abroad. However, this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be judicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary requesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered, and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. The respondent Secretary denied counsel's request and the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. - Petitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be carried out only "through the cancellation of his passport," the said order is illegal because "while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the Secretary's discretion is abused, the court cannot, in the first instance, take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled." - Petitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Foreign Affairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports, "such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing," because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

  1. WON the order of the respondent Court is beyond or in excess of its jurisdiction 2. WON petitioner is entitled to hearing before his passport can be cancelled & 1. NO Ô When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in t he exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. (Section 6, Rule 124.) Moreover, the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him. In issuing the order in question, the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of justice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion, he cannot be enjoined from carrying it out. 2. NO Ô  Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. Petition is denied 

& 6
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:| $$ 7#"# |  Appeal from an order of CFI. | - American citizen George de Bisschop (petitioner-appellee) was allowed to stay in the Philippines for 3 years as a prearranged employee of the Bissmag Production, Inc., of which he is president and general manager. - He applied for extension of stay with the Bureau of Immigration. This was denied when Immigration Officer Benjamin de Mesa discovered that Bissmag Inc. was a gambling front, and that de Bisschop is suspect of evading payment of his income tax. In a letter dated September 5, 1959, the Board of Commissioners advised him to depart within 5 days. De Bisschop requested for a copy of the decision, but the legal officer of Bureau of Immigration replied that no formal decision, order or resolution is promulgated by the Board for reasons of practicability and expediency. - To forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings, de Bisschop filed the present case.  

1.

WON Commissioners of immigration are required by law to conduct formal hearings on all applications for extension of stay of aliens; 2. WON Commissioners are enjoined to promulgate written decisions. & 1. NO Ô  Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of immigration authority. Administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Ô
 - Courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. - This is not a violation of the due process clause; the letter advising Bisschop to depart in 5 days was a mere formality, and far from final, because the requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. - It is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. As per ;./((D F. 3(1,, (* 2 , )(+  )1,,  -.1 3(1,, 01 (* + 3(1,,  0),(*21 +
()0)+ , 1. ()" ). + (. (* ,(1+ 0)+)." , 3