Anarchist Property - A Reconciliation of Socialist Equality and Libertarian Freedom

1 Anarchist Property: a Reconciliation of Socialist Equality and Libertarian Freedom Left-libertarians, in the analytic philosophy sense, believe that individuals ought to be full selfowners and that natural resources ought to be owned in some egalitarian manner. 1 The challenge for left-libertarians is to sketch out a theory of property rights that promotes both individual liberty and equality among individuals and does so in a manner that is not overly egalitarian at the cost of individual freedom or overly individualistic at the cost of equality. Left-libertarianism appears to be attractive to people who find themselves drawn to both libertarian and egalitarian conclusions. It is attractive to said individuals since it enables them to be libertarian without having to endorse either free market capitalism or the abolition of the welfare state and to be egalitarian without having to endorse authoritarian state socialism. Left-libertarianism strikes me as dissatisfying from both a libertarian and an egalitarian perspective. It is dissatisfying from both of these perspectives because it advocates social institutions and social structures that are both highly freedom restricting and based upon inegalitarian distributions of power and decision-making. Specifically, it advocates the nation state, capitalism and other such hierarchical centralised modes of social organisation in which a minority of individuals at the top of an organisation rule over the individuals below them. I take social anarchism, or as it is also known libertarian socialism, to be, from a libertarianegalitarian perspective, a superior political philosophy than left-libertarianism. This is because it reconciles liberty and equality through the advocacy of forms of social organisation that place an emphasis on individuals being among equals, engaging in autonomous action, and having a say in decisions that affect them. Specifically, networks of voluntary associations that are organised at all levels of society, including workplaces and neighbourhoods, according to principles of nonhierarchical direct democracy. Within the literature, the closest philosopher to my position is Vrousalis. 2 Vrousalis shares my position that social anarchist views on liberty and equality provide a better reconciliation than leftlibertarian alternatives. He attempts to show this by reconstructing social anarchist views on individual liberty and legitimate property rights into a commitment to a) effective self-ownership and b) joint ownership of the means of production. While I agree with Vrousalis’s conclusion that the social anarchist view provides a better reconciliation than left-libertarian views, I do not think that Vrousalis’s characterisation of the social anarchist view on both individual sovereignty and property rights is sufficiently detailed to fully capture the social anarchist position. I shall attempt to 1 Vallentyne, Left-libertarianism: A Primer in (eds.) Vallentyne and Steiner 2000 2 Vrousalis 2011

2 build upon Vrousalis’s work and provide a fuller account of social anarchism by expanding the commitments to effective self-ownership and joint-ownership into commitments to self-mastery and full-communist ownership. The structure of this essay will be as follows. I shall first outline Vrousalis’s conception of social anarchism and demonstrate that it is insufficient. I shall then outline full-communist ownership and demonstrate how it reconciles liberty and equality in a manner superior to left-libertarian alternatives. I shall end by defending full-communist ownership from a number of capitalist objections to socialist property. Before I proceed, I just wish to make four clarifications. First, when I speak of rights I mean rights in a Hohfeldian3 sense. Second, when I speak of anarchism I am referring to socialist political anarchism. I am not referring to philosophical anarchism or anarcho-capitalism. Third, when I speak of communism I mean a stateless, classless and moneyless society in which the means of production are collectively owned and controlled by the communities in which they are located, and in which economic activity is organised according to the principle from each according to their ability, to each according to their need.4 I am not referring to the totalitarian societies that were commonly labelled as communist in the twentieth century. 5 In order to help differentiate my sense of ‘communism’ from the Stalinist or Maoist sense of ‘communism’ I will use the phrase ‘fullcommunism’ to pick out communism in my sense. Fourth, in this essay I am concerned with abstract theoretical questions regarding principles and the manner in which these principles promote freedom and equality. I am not concerned with the practical question of how one would effectively implement the sort of society advocated by said principles. Vrousalis's Account of Social Anarchism Vrousalis characterises self-ownership by quoting Otsuka’s statement that self-ownership consists in the belief that individuals possess, “(1) a very stringent right of control over the use of one’s mind and body that bars others from intentionally using one as a means by forcing one to sacrifice life, limb or labour, where such force operates by means of incursions or threats of incursions upon one’s mind and body. . . [and] (2) a very stringent right to all of the income that one can gain from one’s mind and body (including one’s labour) either on one’s own or through unregulated voluntary exchanges with other individuals.”6 3 Hohfeld 1913 4 Marx 1875 5 See Kropotkin 1901 for an outline of anarcho-communism and Chomsky 1986 for an anarchist perspective

on the Soviet Union. 6 Otsuka 2005, p.15

3 Vrousalis goes beyond mere self-ownership and endorses effective self-ownership. 7 This is the view that in addition to not being intentionally forced to sacrifice life, limb or labour by others, individuals ought not to be forced by circumstances to sacrifice life, limb, or labour for others. Effective self-ownership is therefore secured by, and thus requires that, every individual have, or be provided with, adequate living space, access to food, shelter, and other basic necessities. An individual’s subsistence shell refers to exactly those resources that guarantee an individual’s effective self-ownership. Vrousalis characterises the social anarchist conception of property as consisting in the advocacy of joint-ownership, which is the position that “all the members of a community have a claim-right to an equal say in the disposal and distribution of natural and produced worldly resource”. 8 This advocacy of joint-ownership applies to those resources that are not part of an individual’s subsistence shell. Thus, to use Vrousalis’s example, if Able and Infirm are on an island with three coconut trees and ownership of one coconut tree is for argument’s sake sufficient to guarantee effective self-ownership, then Able and Infirm should possess one coconut tree each in order to be effective self-owners and jointly own the third coconut tree. The exercise of this claim right to an equal say in the disposal and distribution of worldly resources is to be mediated through forms of direct democratic organisation within the community, such as workers councils and people's assemblies.9 The Inadequacy of Vrousalis’s Account of Social Anarchism While social anarchists should endorse effective self-ownership, doing so is insufficient for a full characterisation of the social anarchist view on individual liberty. This is because a core component of the social anarchist view is that to be free individuals ought to be autonomous. 10 By autonomy, social anarchists have in mind people engaging in self-directed activity where this broadly speaking means that a person consciously determines the nature of the actions that they themselves engage in and the conditions under which they engage in such actions. 11 This notion of autonomy can be seen as an extension of effective self-ownership such that to be a full self-owner is not merely to possess certain rights or to have a subsistence shell but is to be a self-master. Vrousalis’s position on joint-ownership can be understood in either a strong or a weak sense. Strong joint-ownership holds that all resources beyond each individual’s subsistence shell ought to be 7 Such a move may be justified by the sort of argument provided by Mack 1995. 8 Vrousalis 2011, p.3 9 For concrete examples of such forms of organisation see Ness and Azzellimi (eds.) 2011 10 For example, see Bakunin, Man, Society, and Freedom in (ed) Dolgoff 1980, pp.234-242 11 I lack the space in which to develop a systematic anarchist theory of autonomy but such a theory would

be similar, although not identical with, republican notions of liberty as outlined by Pettit 2001.

4 jointly-owned such that an individual does not have the right to own resources beyond their subsistence shell unless they jointly own these resources with the other members of their community. Weak joint-ownership holds that individuals have the right to own resources beyond their subsistence shell in any manner that is consistent with social anarchist principles but that jointownership is the most morally desirable form of ownership. Strong joint-ownership is flawed because it fails as an accurate reading of social anarchism. This is because it entails that certain forms of property, which major social anarchist thinkers thought were allowable within an anarchist society, are not in fact allowable within an anarchist society. The main form of property in question is that advocated by individualist anarchists, such as Tucker. Tucker thought that individuals ought to be free to own a resource unless they were not the user or occupier of the thing owned. Tucker writes, "in the case of land, or of any other material the supply of which is so limited that all cannot hold it in unlimited quantities, Anarchism undertakes to protect no titles except such as are based on actual occupancy and use."12 Put more systematically, individualist anarchists held that whether or not a given individual has a right to own a scarce resource or not is contingent upon what they are doing with the resource in question. It is specifically contingent upon whether or not the individual who owns (in the descriptive sense) the property is identical with the individual who uses or occupies it. If there is a unity of possessor and owner then it is legitimate and an instance of personal property. If there is a separation between possessor and owner then it is illegitimate and an instance of private property. What an individual is the actual occupier or user of is not identical with what is within their subsistence shell and can in fact go beyond it. For example, a person may own twenty 3D printers with which they alone produce a variety of commodities that they sell for profit. They only need, say, five 3D printers to guarantee their effective self-ownership but despite this, for Tucker, they ought to have exclusive property rights over the other 3D printers since they are the sole users of the 3D printers. Such exclusive property rights rule out the rest of the community having a claim right to an equal say in the disposal and distribution of the 3D printers. Individualist anarchists thus believe that people have the right to own individually resources beyond their subsistence shell. The major social anarchist theorist Malatesta, whom Vrousalis cites 13 to support his reconstruction, did advocate joint-ownership, but he also thought, as the weak version holds, that joint-ownership was one, among many, type of property rights compatible with anarchist principles. As Malatesta writes, “we remain communist in our sentiment and aspiration, but we want to leave freedom of 12Tucker 1969, p.61 13 Vrousalis 2011, p.2 and p.3

5 action to the experimentation of all ways of life that can be imagined and desired” 14 providing that these ways of life do not violate anarchist principles. After all, “free and voluntary communism is ironical if one has not the right and the possibility to live in a different regime, collectivist, mutualist, individualist15 -- as one wishes, always on condition that there is no oppression or exploitation of others".16 Malatesta further holds that individualist anarchist property ought to be abolished “by the force of circumstances, by the demonstrable advantages of communistic management, and by the growing spirit of brotherhood”. This is in contrast to capitalist property, which is “the fact that a few control the natural wealth and the instruments of production and can thus oblige others to work for them” and which ought “to be destroyed at once, even with violence if necessary”. Thus under anarchism “Free . . . is the peasant to cultivate his piece of land, alone if he wishes; free is the shoe maker to remain at his last, or the blacksmith in his small forge.” 17 Social anarchists thus believe that individualist anarchist property is allowable within an anarchist society, even though it grants individuals the right to own resources beyond their subsistence shell. Strong joint-ownership is therefore inconsistent with the social anarchist view on individualist anarchist property and so ought to be rejected if we are concerned with an accurate reconstruction of social anarchism. The failure of strong joint-ownership may tempt one to endorse weak joint-ownership as the social anarchist view on property. Recall that weak joint-ownership holds that joint-ownership is the most morally desirable form of property but that individuals ought to be free to own resources providing that this ownership is consistent with social anarchist principles. Weak joint-ownership as it stands is however inadequate as a theory of social anarchist property. This is because it does not specify what exactly these social anarchist principles that govern what can and cannot be legitimately owned are and so raises a variety of unanswered questions. The rest of this essay shall be concerned with outlining these social anarchist principles and so rendering the weak version of Vrousalis’s account of social anarchist property more fully developed. Social Anarchist Principles On this view so far, social anarchists advocate a bundle of property rights the exercise of which is consistent with all the types of resource ownership advocated by the different schools of anarchism.18 Joint-ownership is merely the best exercise of this distinct bundle of property rights. 14 Malatesta 1924 15 To those unfamiliar with Anarchist jargon a collectivist is a proponent of Bakunin’s economic system, a

mutualist is a proponent of Proudhon’s economic system and an individualist is a proponent of Tucker’s or Spooner’s economic system. 16 Malatesta in Richards (ed) 1965, p.103 17 Malatesta in Richards (ed) 1965, pp.97-98 18 One may wish to consider the occupancy and use theory of the individualist anarchists as the bundle of

6 An idea of what this bundle of property rights is can be gained by considering what social anarchists wish to prohibit. Social anarchists are opposed to any form of property that denies selfmastery in some significant respect. As Malatesta writes, anarchists respect “freedom for everybody . . . with the only limit of the equal freedom for others; which does not mean . . . that we recognise, and wish to respect, the ‘freedom’ to exploit, to oppress, to command, which is oppression and certainly not freedom.”19 Social anarchists are specifically opposed to two main types of situation. The first situation is when an individual’s ownership of resources enables them to use their resources in order to exercise power over other individuals and in so doing deny the autonomy of said individuals in some significant respect. For example, a Feudal lord who owns land and uses this land ownership to exercise power over peasants in an autonomy denying manner. The second situation is one in which an individual owns resources and excludes other individuals from access to these resources and in so doing prevents said individuals from being effective self-owners. For example, an individual who owns the only local source of water, say a reservoir, decides to exclude every other local from access to the reservoir. The owner thereby prevents every other local from being effective selfowners, as they lack access to water. I think that social anarchists should rule out situations of these types by holding that individuals have property rights but that these property rights may be trumped in situations where doing so is required to protect individual autonomy and secure effective self-ownership. Social anarchists can thus demarcate between legitimate personal property and illegitimate private property via holding that individuals ought not to continue to own resources if they a) exercise their rights over a resource and in so doing establish relations of domination and oppression and b) own resources beyond their subsistence shell and as a result of this ownership prevent others from having their effective self-ownership secured. Before I outline this conception of property rights in detail, I must first sketch an analysis of rights. An Analysis of Rights Following Christman,20 I view a property right as a triadic relation between a person and all other persons in regard to some particular thing. For the specifics of conceptualising property rights I take Attas’s21 analysis of property rights to be highly useful and shall largely stick to the core rights shared by all anarchists. I do not have the space in which to critique such a view but briefly put I hold that occupancy and use if reconstructed to deal with a number of problem cases ends up being theoretically unnecessary and so should be abandoned. 19 Malatesta in Richards (ed) 1965, p.53 20 Christman 1994, p.16 21 Attas 2006, pp.23-30

7 components of his account, although I shall differ from him in a few key respects. Attas distinguishes between the content and the form of a right. The content of a right is those features of it that have the thing owned as their subject, for instance the right to use a pen. The form of a right is those features of it that have the right itself as their subject, for example, the right to transfer to another person the right to use a particular pen. The content incidents specify the kinds of action on, with or deriving from the thing owned that are permitted by the right. There are two types of content incidents, control incidents and income incidents. Control incidents are rights to possess, use, and manage property. Rights of possession consist in the right to physically hold onto the thing owned. Rights of use consist in the right to engage in consumption, modification or other such employment or handling of the thing owned. Rights of management consist in the right to decide how a thing shall be used and by whom. Income incidents are rights to own the products of the exercise of one's control rights over a given thing. I take these to be the right to the fruits of one’s property and the right to revenue from the trade of one’s property.22 The right to the fruit of one’s property consists in the right to own those things that the property yields either naturally or as a result of its modification by a person. For example, the right to own the apples that grow on one’s apple tree or the right to own a chair that one produced given that one created the chair through the exercise of one’s control rights over raw materials that one owned. The right to the revenue from the trade of one’s property consists in the right to own goods derived from the sale of one’s property. The form incidents are rights of continuity and rights of transferability with respect to one’s control rights and income rights. Rights of continuity consist in the rights of immunity, indefinite duration, and reverting to owner when lesser rights lapse. These are specifically, the right to not have one’s rights taken away by force; there being no predetermined term when one’s rights lapse; and one retaining rights when one transfers them for a limited term such that one, say, retains ownership of one’s pen when one lets a friend use it for a day. Rights of transferability are the right to transfer a given right to another person. Full-Communist Ownership Given this framework, I can now specify what property rights social anarchists think individuals should have. This view is labelled ‘full-communist ownership’ since it consists in those rights that social anarchists believe ought to be enforced in a full-communist society. Full-communist ownership holds that individuals possess rights of control, income, continuity and transferability over resources; that individuals ought to be effective self-owners; and that the most 22 This differs from Attas, according to whom income rights consist in the right to fruits, profit and rent.

8 morally desirable manner in which to exercise these property rights is to voluntarily establish jointownership over resources, in particular over land, housing and means of production, with members of one’s community. Full-communist ownership further holds that there are two limitations on these property rights. These are a) the on-going ownership of the resources outside one’s subsistence shell is contingent upon whether or not one is dominating others through the exercise of one’s rights over these resources and b) the strength of one's right to ownership of land or housing beyond one's subsistence shell is that it can be trumped if other individuals must necessarily gain ownership of the land or housing in order to secure their effective self-ownership. Let us call a) the domination principle and b) the redistribution principle. I shall discuss each of these in turn. The domination principle in general holds that individuals have rights of continuity over a given property right to own a particular resource(s) outside their subsistence shell unless they exercise their rights over said resource(s) in such a manner as to establish a relation of domination over another. A relation of domination is established if one denies a person’s autonomy in some significant respect. When an individual exercises their property rights in such a dominating manner, they thereby forfeit their rights and their property may be legitimately expropriated. Those whom they were dominating gain a right to own those resources that were being used to dominate them and so gain a right to expropriate those resources from the dominator. There may be cases in which large-scale expropriation occurs but an individual chooses not to exercise their right to expropriate or in which an individual is unable to exercise their right to expropriate. In both cases, individuals ought to have those resources that they had a right to expropriate distributed to them after expropriation. This is important since anarchists do not wish people to lose out on owning what is rightfully theirs because they made a decision to not expropriate because they were, say, too afraid or uncertain or because they had a very bad cold on the day of expropriation and so spent the day in bed. The domination principle does not apply to those resources within one's subsistence shell because even if one uses these resources to establish relations of domination over another, one nonetheless still ought to have one's effective self-ownership guaranteed. In such instances, the relation of domination ought to be abolished but the individual ought to retain ownership of the resource(s) in question. Thus if a person uses a sewing machine to establish a relation of domination over another and said sewing machine is for argument’s sake part of their subsistence shell, then the relation of domination ought to be abolished but they ought to retain their right to own the sewing machine.

9 We can now turn to the redistribution principle. The redistribution principle holds that since individuals ought to have their effective self-ownership guaranteed it follows that they have a prima facie claim right to gain ownership of another individual’s land or housing beyond said individual's subsistence shell if doing so is necessary for securing their effective self-ownership. It is not the claim that one’s first course of action when faced with a person who lacks effective self-ownership due to lack of ownership of housing or land is to expropriate. After all, their effective selfownership could be more easily and peacefully secured by an anarchist federation allotting them some land and housing that is currently owned in common. But were one in, for whatever reason, a situation in which the only realistic course of action to secure an individual’s effective selfownership is to expropriate another's property then doing so is prima facie the morally right course of action. Having outlined the details of full-communist ownership in the abstract I shall now illustrate it concretely by applying it to capitalism and sketching out what full-communism would look like. Applying Full-Communist Ownership to Capitalism Capitalism is characterised by the private ownership of the means of production, land and housing and by, in particular, two types of social relations. These are wage labour and landlordism. I shall discuss each in term. Wage labour, in the strict socialist sense of the term, is a relation between a worker and a capitalist employer23 in which the worker sells their labour to the capitalist employer. A worker is any individual who a) sells their labour to a capitalist employer in exchange for a wage, b) does not own the means of production that they use at work and c) produces commodities for the individual(s) who do own the means of production that they use at work, namely, capitalist employers. A capitalist employer is any individual who a) owns means of production and b) hires people to produce commodities for them, some of whom must be workers.24 Workers ought to be distinguished from independent contractors, who despite also selling their labour for a wage, nonetheless own the means of production that they use at work and do not necessarily sell their labour to capitalist employers. 25 For example, a casting agent who owns their own means of production, say a laptop, and who sells their labour to actors, who are of course not 23 A capitalist employer is a type of capitalist, a capitalist being any individual who owns capital and invests

it in firms. 24 The general category of 'people' is required since capitalist employers may hire people other than workers to produce commodities for them, such as independent contractors. 25 This distinction has a basis in law. Mr Justice Cooke ruled in the high court case ‘Market Investigations Ltd v Minister for Social Security 1969’ that one factor for distinguishing between employees and independent contractors is that independent contractors own their own equipment.

10 necessarily capitalists. Landlordism is a relation between a landlord and a tenant in which a landlord owns housing and the tenant pays rent to the landlord in order to live in the housing such that the housing becomes the home of the tenant. Landlordism is thus distinct from those relations that characterise hotels since when one pays a hotel owner to live in a room one does not thereby possess this room as one's home. Let us apply full-communist ownership to these social relations. Anarchists take wage labour and landlordism to be autonomy denying. A sketch of an anarchist argument for this is as follows. Under capitalism, capitalist employers, in virtue of their private ownership of the means of production, possess the right to determine what their employees will produce and how their employees will produce it. It is because of this that decision-making power within capitalist workplaces is concentrated into the hands of CEOs and boards of directors. Power within capitalist institutions flows from the top to the bottom such that workers lack decision-making power and must do as capitalists instruct them. Workers thus lack autonomy. Workers remain nonautonomous even in capitalist workplaces where the capitalist chooses not to actively exercise their power to determine the nature of the productive process and grants this power to the workers while themselves retaining ultimate ownership of the workplace. This is because the relative autonomy that such privileged workers have is a product of the capitalist’s will. The capitalist decides that the worker can determine their work and so the workers are autonomous to the extent that the capitalist thinks it is fitting. They may lose this autonomy if and when the capitalist decides and so are not properly autonomous, as their freedom is granted to them by a master who retains the right to take such freedom away. Under capitalism even if workers have the autonomy to determine the nature of their work, they do not have the power to determine the conditions under which their work is done, namely one in which their freedom is not granted to them from above by a benevolent autocrat. They lack this power because they do not own the place in which they work and so must, if they are to be truly autonomous, own their workplace. Landlordism is likewise autonomy denying. Landlords require that tenants must pay rent and adhere to the rules stipulated by the landlord if they are to continue to have a home. The vast majority of tenants are not in a position to not pay rent or to not adhere to the landlord’s rules since doing so renders them homeless. As a result, people’s decisions to pay rent or adhere to the landlord’s rules are not autonomous decisions. Even if tenants were in a position to freely decide to pay rent or adhere to the landlord’s rules they would still not be autonomous. Such tenants would be in a position to decide where they lived and

11 so to select the rules that they will have to adhere to from a limited pre-existing set of rules determined for them by an external authority figure, namely a landlord. Such tenants would not be in a position to determine the nature of the rules themselves. But if people are to be autonomous they must have direct control over the conditions in which they live and so must have the power to themselves determine the specific nature of those rules that they follow within their home. A landlord that one chooses to live under is still a lord, just as a king that one votes for is still a monarch. In both instances one is choosing a ruler and so is still being ruled, as opposed to governing one’s life oneself. Such self-governance thus requires that one owns one’s own home. From the domination principle and the anarchist view that relations of wage labour and landlordism are autonomy denying, it follows that anarchists believe that workers and tenants possess the right to expropriate their employer capitalist or landlord. The nature of this expropriation is as follows. In workplaces, individual workers have the right to expropriate, and so individually own, those resources that they alone used in the workplace, such as their office computer. This does not apply to resources that are a crucial component of collective production. Thus, an individual worker does not possess the right to individually expropriate a blast furnace even if they were the only worker to use it. This is because the blast furnace is crucial for the wider activities of production within, say, the steel mill. Those resources that are used either collectively or individually but which are necessarily required for acts of collective production, ought to be expropriated by the entire workplace and owned in common among the workers, for example, an assembly line or the building the assembly line is in. Individuals can if they so choose decide that the resources that they individually used ought to be owned in common by either the whole workplace or by a group of workers within the workplace. A cleaner for example may decide that their mop and bucket ought to be owned by all the cleaners, but not be owned by the IT staff. With respect to rented land or housing, tenants possess the right to expropriate the housing that they rented. If the housing is within a distinct building, such as inside a tower block of flats, then individuals possess the right to collectively expropriate the building with their fellow tenants. Given the proviso that the domination principle does not apply to resources within a person’s subsistence shell, we can infer that anarchists believe that workers have a right to expropriate a factory from a capitalist but do not possess the right to expropriate a capitalist’s toothbrush or those means of production that they do not use to deny the autonomy of anybody, such as their sewing machine at home. This view on expropriation is neither new nor innovative as it can be found in the work of

12 Kropotkin. He writes that the anarchist revolution aims at “abolishing the exploitation of man by man” via “the complete expropriation of all those who have the means of exploiting human beings”.26 That is to say “everything that enables any man — be he financier, mill-owner, or landlord — to appropriate the product of others’ toil.” 27 More concretely, “when we see a Sheffield cutler, or a Leeds clothier working with their own tools or handloom, we see no use in taking the tools or the handloom to give to another worker. The clothier or cutler exploit nobody. But when we see a factory whose owners claim to keep to themselves the instruments of labour used by 1,400 girls, and consequently exact from the labour of these girls . . . profit . . . we consider that the people …are fully entitled to take possession of that factory and to let the girls produce . . . for themselves and the rest of the community”.28 All I have done is thus expand upon Kropotkin's views. Envisioning Full-Communism Under full-communism, individual autonomy is achieved through voluntary association into egalitarian social relations. That is to say, joint ownership of resources would emerge from people voluntarily deciding to own certain resources in common with other people. This association is voluntary since each individual would be an effective self-owner as their subsistence shell would be secured for them by resource distribution, and if it is warranted, resource redistribution. Individuals would further possess the right to decide if they lived in a market economy or a moneyless planned economy or any other alternative economic form that is not ruled illegitimate by the domination principle. They would thus also possess the right to engage in economic activity as an individual producer, such as an artisan, or as an independent contractor, such as a plumber, or as a member of a jointly owned workplace. Joint-ownership promotes individual autonomy by ensuring that individuals determine the use of those resources that they jointly own with others. This is done through collective decision making. Specifically, the owners of the resource(s) have meetings in which individuals make proposals on courses of action regarding the resource and the group agrees to implement or not implement said proposals. To this end, the group would utilise particular forms of democratic decision making, such as majority rule, in which each member has a vote and a proposal is passed if the majority of the group vote for it, or forms of consensus, in which a proposal is only passed if everybody agrees to it. In order to organise at a large scale, particular associations of individuals who jointly owned resources would enter into free agreement with other associations in order to create a confederation 26 Kropotkin 1992, pp.206-207 27 Kropotkin 2007, p.61 28 Kropotkin in Walter and Becker (ed.) 1998, p.105

13 of associations. A confederation is thus just a group of several associations with each association retaining the right to leave the confederation at any point. A confederation does not have power over its constituent associations but instead performs the role of institutionalising communication between associations and decision making involving multiple associations. If necessary, multiple confederations of associations can federate with one another to form confederations of confederations of associations. Crucially, power remains at the bottom in the hands of each constituent association. All those who perform a set role within a confederation do so because they have been mandated this task by the members of the association that they are a member of. They can be instantly recalled and replaced by their association if they are thought to not be doing their job correctly or not serving the interests of the association’s members. This decentralised and federal mode of organisation thus ensures that individuals will not easily be able to establish themselves in positions of power over others and so ensures that individuals are in a position to exercise their property rights autonomously. In situations in which holding a democratic assembly is highly counterproductive, such as during a battle, individuals may decide to delegate the responsibility of decision making over certain activities to a person of their choosing. Such delegates are of course instantly recallable and replaceable by those delegating to them.29 Reconciling Liberty and Equality Full-communist ownership reconciles liberty and equality since it advocates the voluntary establishment of forms of egalitarian resource ownership that have built into them egalitarian forms of decision making and organisation that serve to protect an individual’s autonomy within a group of people. Full-communist ownership reconciles liberty and equality in a manner superior to left-libertarian alternatives for three main reasons. First, full-communist ownership is far more egalitarian than leftlibertarianism. This is because left-libertarianism limits its egalitarianism to the egalitarian ownership of natural resources, where this usually consists only in egalitarian constraints on the individual appropriation of natural resources 30, and in most cases, a particular form of egalitarian taxation on those who individually own or gain income from the use of natural resources or egalitarian redistribution of the value produced by said natural resources. 31 Full-communist ownership in contrast advocates the far more egalitarian positions that a) natural and produced resources ought to be jointly owned by the communities in which they are located, such as workers 29 This was in fact done by anarchists during the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39. See Bolloten 1991, p261-2 30 Otsuka ,Steiner and Vallentyne 2005, pp.2-3 31 Vallentyne in (eds.) Vallentyne and Steiner 2000, pp.8-11

14 owning their own workplaces, b) joint-ownership ought to be organised via egalitarian, decentralised, nonhierarchical and democratic modes of organisation, and c) inegalitarian forms of ownership that produce significant autonomy denial, such as capitalism, ought to be forcefully abolished by collective acts of expropriation by those being dominated. Thus from a purely egalitarian point of view, full-communist ownership is favourable to left-libertarianism. Second, full-communist ownership is far more libertarian than left-libertarianism. This is for two reasons. The first reason is that, unlike left-libertarianism, it allows individuals to own natural resources such as land without having to pay a tax for doing so and without having to meet stringent requirements on appropriation, such as having to gain the permission of wider society in order to be free to appropriate a natural resource. The second reason is that the left-libertarian characterisation of freedom has its adherents supporting highly un-libertarian social relations, such as wage labour or landlordism, since such social relations do not violate full self-ownership or their egalitarian notions of ownership. Full-communist ownership in contrast prohibits such un-libertarian social relations and advocates forms of organisation and decision making that are conducive towards individual self-mastery, as opposed to merely not violating full self-ownership. As a result, individuals in a full-communist society would be far freer than in a left-libertarian society. One may worry that the libertarian view on owning and appropriating natural resources will come at the cost of the inegalitarian conclusion that any instance of unequal resources ownership after the initial act of appropriation is allowable. But this is not a problem for full-communist ownership since inegalitarian property distributions almost always coincide with unequal power relations and so certain individuals denying the autonomy of others. Were this to happen then expropriation would be justified due to the domination principle. If inegalitarian property distribution does not result in an unequal power distribution that results in autonomy denial then I cannot see what there is to worry about. Third, full-communist ownership places a great emphasis on voluntary association among equals and so advocates social structures that foster both a sense of individuality and a sense of community. Democratic assemblies in particular do this since in order to participate effectively in a democratic assembly one must learn to make decisions for oneself and by making decisions with one’s equals one develops social bonds with those individuals. These social structures in turn ensure that individuals are in a social environment that is both a space in which individuals are free to develop their own capacities, since they are autonomous within them and stand in social relations to individuals that they have social bonds with; and in which individuals actively do develop their own capacities, since merely by participating in said social structures they will inevitably engage in capacity developing activities such as determining the nature of their own work. Left-libertarianism

15 in contrast does not place theoretical emphasis on the development of individuality and community and advocates social structures that are arguably actively detrimental to such development, such as wage labour. Capitalist Objections to Full-Communist Ownership I shall consider a variety of standard arguments for capitalist property rights that attempt to show that an important value or valuable state of affairs is realised by capitalist property rights, but not by socialist property rights. I shall argue that such arguments do not apply to full-communist ownership and in fact can be used as arguments for full-communist ownership. I shall be focusing on the arguments of Hayek and Brennan specifically. Hayek argues that capitalist private property is superior to socialist property because it, unlike socialist property, decentralises power. He writes, “private property is the most important guaranty of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves. If all the means of production were vested in a single hand, whether it be nominally that of “society” as a whole or that of a dictator, whoever exercises this control has complete power over us” 32 Full-communism would be a socialist society and yet still meet Hayek’s requirement that power be decentralised via the decentralised ownership of the means of production. In full-communism the ownership of the means of production would be decentralised among individuals who own means of production both within and beyond their subsistence shell and among members of a specific community who jointly own means of production, such as an individual workplace or a federation of workplaces. Such an anarchist society not only meets Hayek’s requirement that power be decentralised but also meets this requirement to a greater extent than capitalism does. Firstly, in a full-communist society, unlike a capitalist society, all individuals own means of production since doing so is a requirement for them being effective self-owners. Secondly, in a capitalist society, power is centralised both within workplaces, as the capitalist or their appointed managers wield power over wage labourers, and within housing, as the landlord or their appointed managers wield power over tenants. In a fullcommunist society, by contrast, power is decentralised as each individual either works as an individual producer or jointly owns a workplace with their fellow workers and participates democratically in workplace decisions that affect them; while each individual owns their own home 32 Hayek 2001, p.108

16 and can if they so choose jointly own whole areas of housing with others. Thus favouring the decentralisation of power via the decentralisation of ownership is a reason to support fullcommunist ownership over capitalist property. In ‘Why Not Capitalism?’ Brennan argues for capitalist property, and against socialist property, by holding that capitalist property rights ensure that individuals are able to implement their ideas and visions, pursue projects over time and express and develop themselves. This is because such actions often requires that we have sustained and exclusive control of objects over time. For example, a person needs sustained and exclusive control over a piece of farmland in order to pursue their project of creating just the kind of farm that they want. Or a person may gain meaning and selfconfidence from the fact that other people want to buy the things that they produce and so need to have sustained and exclusive ownership of those items required for such production and trade. Socialist property rights allegedly do not enable people to pursue their projects. Brennan states, “In an imaginary ideal socialist economy, the nice socialists would no doubt let Willie plow the collectively owned fields with the collectively owned plow. But that’s not good enough. Willie wants a farm that he can shape according to his vision. He wants the farm to be his, not because he’s selfish and mean, but because he wants to realise his own personal plans and ideas of how farming should go. For that to happen, he needs to have property that he can use at will and that others will refrain from using”33 Brennan’s argument, however, applies only to socialist conceptions of property rights that at the very least hold that all means of production ought to be owned in common and that no individual ought to be free to own means of production by themselves. It does not apply to full-communist ownership, according to which an individual is free to not only individually own means of production but to also produce commodities with said means of production and engage in trade with others. Such an individual would be free to pursue their own projects with their own property. Thus, in full-communism Willie would be free to individually own a farm and shape it according to their own vision. Furthermore, since under full-communism a far greater number of people would own resources than under capitalism it follows that more people would be able to pursue their projects than under capitalism. Thus, if Brennan’s argument is a reason to favour capitalist property rights, it is also a reason to favour full-communist ownership over capitalist property rights. Brennan might object that his argument does not justify full-communist ownership because in such a society, individuals would not be free to hire wage labourers or to rent out land or housing and so would not be free to pursue their own projects. However, not all projects ought to be allowed. 33 Brennan 2014, p.93

17 Sadistic individuals who mainly gain self-expression, self-value and meaning from owning slaves ought not to be free to pursue their project of being a slave owner. Likewise, individuals ought not to be free to pursue their project of being a capitalist since doing so results in the oppression of others. This move is not particularly radical given that Brennan himself would wish to prohibit projects that involve, say, murder or theft. All the anarchist is doing is prohibiting a greater number of projects than Brennan does and doing so for the same kind of reason that Brennan would prohibit murder, namely that it violates certain fundamental rights or illegitimately infringes upon individual autonomy. Furthermore, while the removal of the option to be a capitalist limits the freedom of those individuals whose projects involve being capitalists, it is the case that doing so results in greater overall freedom. This is because prohibiting capitalist property removes an autonomy denying social relation and replaces it with social relations conducive towards the protection and expansion of autonomous action. Conclusion This essay has drawn two main conclusions. The first conclusion is that if an individual is from a theoretical point of view drawn towards left-libertarianism due to its reconciliation of liberty and equality, then said individual should be drawn more strongly to social anarchism due to fullcommunist ownership providing a far more libertarian and egalitarian reconciliation of liberty and equality. The second conclusion is that, contrary to defenders of capitalism, a) the advocacy of socialism is not inconsistent with the advocacy of freedom and individual property rights and b) the advocacy of capitalism is inconsistent with the advocacy of freedom due to the autonomy denying nature of wage labour and landlordism. As the founder of anarchism Bakunin writes, “we are convinced that liberty without socialism is privilege, injustice; and that socialism without liberty is slavery and brutality”.34 Libertarian-egalitarian minded individuals may still prefer left-libertarianism to social anarchism due to practical concerns, such as doubts about the practical feasibility of a communist economy. Such practical considerations are however beyond the scope of this essay and so I shall merely conclude that from a purely theoretical point of view, social anarchism provides a rival and superior account of the reconciliation of liberty and equality than left-libertarianism does.

Bibliography 34 Bakunin 1867

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