(Analecta Husserliana 35) Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key - Intersubjectivity, Ethos, The Societal Sphere, Huma

Share Embed Donate

Short Description

Descripción: Julia Valentina Iribarne (Auth.), Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Eds.)-...






Editor-in-Chief: ANNA-TERESA


The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning Belmont, Massachusetts



Book 1

T H E T U R N I N G POINTS O F T H E N E W P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L E R A Husserl Research — Drawing upon the Full Extent of His Development

Book 2

HUSSERLIAN P H E N O M E N O L O G Y IN A N E W K E Y Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos

Book 3

HUSSERL'S L E G A C Y I N P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L PHILOSOPHIES New Approaches to Reason, Language, Hermeneutics, the Human Condition

Book 4

N E W QUERIES IN AESTHETICS A N D METAPHYSICS Time, Historicity, Art, Culture, Metaphysics, the Transnatural

The Editor acknowledges the assistance of Robert Wise in the technical preparation of these volumes.


Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos BOOK 2

Phenomenology in the World Fifty Years after the Death of Edmund Husserl Edited by A N N A - T E R E S A


The World Phenomenology Institute

Published under the auspices of The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning A-T. Tymieniecka, President


Librar y o f Congress Catalog1ng-1n-Pub1teat1o n Dat a

H u s s e r l l a n phenomenology I n a new ke y : 1 n t e r s u b j e c t 1 v 1 t y , e t h o s , s o c i e t a l s p h e r e , human e n c o u n t e r , th e p a t h o s / e d i t e d b y A n n a - T e r e s a Tym1 e n 1 e c k a . p. cm. — ( A n a l e c t a H u s s e r H a na ; v . 35 ) (Phenomenology I n th e w o r l d f i f t y y e a r s a f t e r th e d e a t h o f H u s s e r l ; bk . 2 ) E n g l i s h , F r e n c h , German, I t a l i a n , an d S p a n i s h . C h i e f l y p a p e r s fro m th e F i r s t W o r l d C o n g r e ss o f Phenomenolog y hel d 1n S a n t i a g o d e C o m p o s t e l a, S p a i n , S e p t . 2 6 - 0 c t . 1 , 1988. " P u b l i s h e d under th e a u s p i c e s o f th e Worl d I n s t i t u t e f o r A d v a n c ed Phenomenolo g l e a 1 R e s e a r c h an d L e a r n i n g . " Include s b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l r e f e r e n c e s . ISBN 978-94-010-5526-0 ISBN 978-94-011-3450-7 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-3450-7

1. P h e n o m e n o l o g y — C o n g r e s s e.s 2 . H u s s e r l , Edmund , 1859-1938- C o n g r e s s e s. I . T y m l e n l c k a , A n n a - T e r e s a. II . Series . I I I . S e r i e s : Phenomenolog y i n th e w o r l d f i f t y y e a r s a f t e r th e d e a t h of H u s s e r l ; bk . 2 . B3279.H94A12 9 vol . 35 [B829.5 ] 142' . 7 s — dc2 0 [142'.7 ] 91-753 3

Printed on acid-freepaper A l l Rights Reserve d © 1991 Springer Science+Busines s Media Dordrecht Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1991 Softcover reprint of the hardcove r 1st edition 1991 and copyrightholders as specified on appropriate pages within. No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduce d or utilized in any form or by any means , electronic or mechanical , including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.




World-Wide Phenomenology Fulfilling Husserl's Project: An Introduction




Intersubjectivity As the

Starting Point Les Sources de la Vie morale The Logical Space of Morality: A Possible Theory for the Foundation of Moral Values MARIANNINA FAILLA / Phenomenology and the Beginnings of the Moral Problem (Dilthey - Brentano - Husserl) JOHN E. JALBERT / Phenomenology As the Reawakening of the Platonic Philosophical Ethos PILAR BELDA PLANS / La Nocion de Valor en la Escuela fenomenol6gica ALEXIUS J. BUCHER / Phanomene einer Ethik GRACIANO GONZALEZ R. ARNAIZ / Responsibility As the Principle of Individuality: An Alternative to Husserl's Theory of Intuition BRUNON HOL YST / The Topicality of Husserl's Ethical Antirelativism MARIO SAN CIPRIANO / YUKIKO OKAMOTO /

3 13 43 53

67 79 93 107 123

PART TWO FOUNDATIONS OF MORALITY AND THE SOCIETAL WORLD Vom Sozialen Verantwortungsapriori im Sozialphiinomenologischen Denken Edmund Husserls RUDOLF BOEHM / Le Phenomenal et Ie Politique F. W. VEAUTHIER /


141 159



JES BJARUP / Phenomenology, the Moral Sense, and the Meaning of Life: Some Comments of the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and A-T. Tymieniecka FERNANDO RODRIGUEZ BORNAETXEA / La Actitud Natural y las Realidades Alternas OLA MOSTAFA ANWAR / Husserl's Influence on Sociology: A Study of Schutz's Phenomenology JACOB ROGOZINSKI/La Chair de la Communaute HELENA GOURKO / The Historic Horizons of Meaning in the Japanese Social World

169 193 203 215 233

PART THREE THE HUMAN ENCOUNTER, THE SPHERE OF ONE'S OWN, EMPATHY HUBERTUS TELLENBACH / Analysis of the Nature of Human Encounter in a Healthy and in a Psychotic State ARMANDO RIGOBELLO / A Variation on "Reduction Within Reduction": "Interior Extraneity" CARMEN BALZER / The Empathy Problem in Edith Stein MARIA CARLA ANDRIANOPOLI / The Influence of Husserl in the Pedagogical Debate

247 259 271 279

PART FOUR BEYOND DICHOTOMIES IN PHENOMENOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: BODY, LIFE-WORLD, NEW APPROACHES ANNA-TERESA TYMIENIECKA / The Human Condition Within the Unity-of-Everything-There-is-Alive - A Challenge to Philosophical Anthropologies RICARDO PINILLA BURGOS / Toward an Open Anthropology: Developing Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology CHRISTER BJURVILL / The Philosophy of the Body LUIS FLORES / Corporalidad ANTONIO PIERETTI / The "Lebenswelt" and the Meaning of Philosophy

289 305 317 335 343



PEDRO LUIS BLASCO / Science and Dialectics in a Phenomenological Anthropology LOURDES GORDILLO ALVAREZ-VALDES / Towards a Phenomenological Methodology for Anthropology VICTOR MOLCHANOV / Strict Science and Lebenswelt in Husserl's Phenomenology A. ZVIE BAR-ON / A Problem in the Phenomenology of Action: Are There Unintentional Actions

355 363 369 377

PART FIVE THE HUMAN BEING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, ANALYTIC, AND THERAPEUTIC BREAKTHROUGHS OF PHENOMENOLOGY MAURIZIO DE NEGRI/Phenomenological Perspectives in Developmental Psychiatry RADMILO JOVANOVIC / Phenomenology in General Psychopathology and Psychiatry ADRIANA DENTONE / On the Possible Relationship Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis EVA SYRIstovA/ A Ballad on Laughter MANUEL VILLEGAS / Phenomenological Hermeneutics of the Therapeutic Discourse ODED BALABAN / A Phenomenological Approach to the Unconscious MIGUEL C. JARQUIN MARIN / La Responsabilidad del Orientador en el Desarrolo de la Autoestima MARIA LUCRECIA ROVALETTI / Existence and Guilt: A Discourse on Origins in Phenomenology




393 411 425 435 445 455 469


Fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl, the main founder of the phenomenological current of thought, we present to the public a four book collection showing in an unprecedented way how Husserl's aspiration to inspire the entire universe of knowledge and scholarship has now been realized. These volumes display for the first time the astounding expansion of phenomenological philosophy throughout the world and the enormous wealth and variety of ideas, insights, and approaches it has inspired. The basic commitment to phenomenological concerns found in all this variety makes this collection a most significant historical document. This second volume of the collection bears witness to a deliberate shift of attention from the earlier to the later phase of Husserl's reflections. We see how his issues - intersubjectivity, ethics, human encounter, the societal world, empathy, the sphere of the self, and the surpassing of dichotomies (bodylpsyche, etc.) - are now at the center of attention in the human sciences. Among the authors are H. Tellenbach, A. Rigobello, C. Balzer, C. Bjurvill, V. Molchanov, E. Syristova, O. Balaban, R. Boehm, M. Sancipriano, O. M. Anwar, Y. Okamoto, B. Holyst, T. Sodeika, and M. De Negri. The studies were gathered at the programs held by The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in the commemorative year 1988/1989, chiefly at the First World Congress of Phenomenology at Santiago de Compos tela, Spain, with the aim of assessing the current state of phenomenology. A-T. T.




An Introduction What is the status of Husserl's phenomenology today? Does it play any significant role or is it relegated to strictly historical research? Has the phenomenology initiated by Husserl come to an end? There is hardly any orthodox Husserlian today. But what is or could be an orthodox Husserlian? These questions come to mind when, even after fifty years of discussions among scholars since the death of this great master of phenomenology, we do not have a unified interpretation of his thought. Moreover, such a unifying interpretation is altogether impossible in view of Husserl's unfolding of his ever-expanding doctrine down to the very end of his life, and of his reaching ever-new perspectives. The possibility of a consensus about his thought recedes further and further as rival or competing interpretations have stimulated new phenomenologists and younger representatives to move in their own directions, often stimulated by non-Husserlian factors and nourished by new ideas. Lastly, the now vast field of research claiming allegiance to phenomenology is diversified into numerous sectors inspired by the developing thought of other classic phenomenologists and their followers. As a matter of fact, it is often pointed out that phenomenology as a philosophical trend is not due to one single thinker but was somehow "in the air" at the beginning of this century. We trace its direct origins to Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl who, as the disciple interpreting the master's intuitions in his own fashion, had elaborated the starting point and foundations of phenomenology as a philosophia prima. Yet, we acknowledge that the vigor, decisiveness, convincing force, dissemination, as well as its launching as a new philosophical approach by Husserl was supported, invigorated and carried out by colleagues and friends who gathered around Husserl, such as Moritz Geiger, Fritz Kaufmann, Adolph Reinach, A. Pfaender, Oscar Becker and Max Scheler. They joined Husserl in his convictions while he inspired and formed a group of students around him. Their work not only contributed initially to launching the main porte parole of this new xi A - T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

xxxv, xi-xx.



way of thinking, the lahrbuch fUr Philosophie, but their own original phenomenological research has inspired in the past and is now inspiring phenomenological investigations in various regions of philosophical questions that they respectively undertook to investigate. In short, it is obvious that the powerful current of thought into which phenomenology gathered its momentum was the result of the meeting of several minds, meeting in a strong conviction and prompted by their personal inventive and talented efforts. It was truly a significant moment in the history of Occidental culture that gave rise to this trend as it is certainly also a significant situation of contemporary culture at large that phenomenology, after having formed a school of thought, did not fold its wings after one or two generations as did NeoKantianism but rather is being acutely heard within the world, not only Occidental or Oriental, but within the world wherever the present culture calls for genuine philosophical inspiration. In view of this vast expanse of thought and research which go on in the present day in lines of innumerable diversifications, we naturally must ask whether there is still a trend of shared features that could fall under the common label of "phenomenology." I answer this question emphatically in the affirmative. It is precisely in pointing to some basic ideas of Husserl that they converge. Don't we find, in fact, a pervading thread of the idea of intentionality, although extended to new areas? Is not the expansion of phenomenological inquiry due to the discovery of the work of constitution in previously unsuspected areas? In mentioning here just these two main tenets of classic phenomenology expanded into present-day thought, we cannot overlook the fulguration of thought provoked by inquiries into the later Husserl's intuitions and the subsequent discoveries of historical, cultural and life elements entering into and affecting present experience. Recognizing, on the one hand, the essential contributions to the classic phenomenological foundation-laying phase of phenomenology by Husserl's associates, then and now a valid source of our investigation, and, on the other hand, the innovative philosophical work by the following generation, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Rombach and others not forgetting such mavericks as Heidegger and Ortega y Gasset which improved upon the pioneering ideas of the Husserl of his earlier and middle period, we cannot fail to acknowledge the central role which the work of Husserl plays within the entire phenomenologically oriented



orbit and far beyond it. Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant critical re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and socalled "method" in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflection in which all the above-mentioned work has either its core or its source. In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least a satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl, through his already systematised and "authorized" work, and his courses, and later on in his spontaneous reflection (which did not find its way into a definitive corpus but was nevertheless sufficiently coherent with his previously established body of thought to be considered a continuation of it), uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts by philosophers (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, who drew upon this material and found there his own inspiration) who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the younger generation of philosophers today. It is also true that the present-day culture - not only this or that specific culture but what we might call the cultural spirit of the world shows a receptivity, a thirst for the ideas which only phenomenology appears able to offer. It is also true that the cultural climate of the last two decades fostered a new dynamism in those who are phenomenologically inspired, one even more vigorous than before. As its result, phenomenology today is completing an entire phase of its self-critical course, the third phase which I announced two decades ago (Analecta Husserliana, Vol. II, 1971). As a matter of fact, because of the fundamentally self-critical character of phenomenological principles (cf. A-T. Tymieniecka "Phenomenology Reflects Upon Itself," I and II in Analecta Husserliana, Vols. II and III), there is today an enormous proliferation of thought in new and very diverse directions which, however, remain attached to the basic tenets of phenomenology. And this crucial significance of the selfcritical principles of phenomenology applies in the strongest sense to Husserl himself who, as pointed out above, has not only sought to perfect his approaches and formulations but also in this self-critical



effort expanded his range of positive, constructive insights in various circuits of reflection. In fact, since the Second World War, Husserl research and the influence of his thought have followed the progressive advance of Husserl himself as the various posthumous publications secured by Husserl disciples and directed by the enthusiastic Fr. H. L. Van Breda and released from the Husserl Archives at Leuven to the expectant philosophical world. With each major volume the perspectives upon Husserl's thought have changed and expanded. Now, as we read in the latest publications of his inedita (e.g. Intersubjektivitiit, Ethische Vorlesungen, ...), Husserl's thought seems to have encompassed an entire cycle of philosophical reflection upon the human being within his life-world and even beyond it leading toward the divinity. It is from this complete cycle that the present-day generation of phenomenological scholars draws inspiration and enlightenment. For this and other major reasons which we will briefly treat below, the present fourvolume collection not only gives us the essential panorama of what phenomenology is at the present moment (we could say a truly culminating moment of its fruitful progress) - a vigorous thought inspiring inventive minds around the world in all cultures, languages, nations, political orientations, and economic conditions - but further makes a point of getting a fix on this newly self-completing phase of the phenomenological development as such. We could say that the "third phase" of phenomenology, into which two decades ago phenomenology was entering, leaving the classic and post-classic phases, has reached its full growth and precisely this in still one more quite major turn in the (then) unforeseeable enrichment of all lines of Husserlian thought and within innumerable ramifications of these lines. This collection is composed mainly from the papers submitted for the First World Congress of Phenomenology organized by The World Phenomenology Institute in September of the year 1988 in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, commemorating the fiftieth annivarsary of Husserl's death, as well as from selected work presented at other programs of the Institute which took place the same year and with the same intent in the US and England (cf. the report: "Phenomenology in the World Fifty Years after the Death of Edmund Husserl," Bk 1, p. xxi). These programs carried out on two continents, at two world congresses (the other being the XVIIth World Congress of Philosophy in Brighton, England, 1988) have been an exceptional occasion to bring together our collaborators dispersed in the world with many other phenomeno-



logically inspired scholars attracted by these rare opportunities to come together and air their views, interests, concerns. This accounts for the truly world-wide sounding of what phenomenology is today; it allows the surprisingly extensive and colorful fulguration of interests, problems and formulations of ideas to appear. It is not possible, in fact, to put the spectrum of philosophical issues in their original varied colorful richness which we have here into fixed philosophical categories; they are too full of ingenious new twists, aspects, insights, views, indications, hints. ... Consequently, in their arrangement we will follow a rather standard differentiation by disciplines and themes. Nevertheless, while declining to prematurely attempt a systematic, interpretative differentiation of this wealth of ideas which has emerged so profusely, we must indicate, first, their allegiance to phenomenology and to legitimizing it; second, we must trace the origin of this unexpected fecundity which phenomenology, now a century old, displays as on the first day. The first reason for this new wave of renewal of the entire field lies in the first place in the above-cited availability of the entire cycle of Husserl's thought, renewing all in itself already or having germinal thought toward it. But it can be traced also to four other factors. We will endeavor to trace them while we present the main sectors of our anthology. 1. The present collection of essays marks in a striking way the special new phase in strictly Husserlian research. Although inroads into phenomenology drawn from the integral Husserl corpus have already been initiated in recent years, as witnessed in the latest volumes of Analecta Husserliana and elsewhere, it is in the present collection that we see it in a vast spread of ideas, themes and insights; this collection does, in this sense, inaugurate the new integral phase in Husserl research proper. 2. Yet we gain not only new vistas and new precisions about the thought of Husserl on the one hand, but also a deeper view into the great puzzles of phenomenology, by confronting Husserl's thought with other great phenomenological (and other) thinkers. Our second book groups these studies. It covers a great range of issues, bringing them into a new light. Also, in the strictly thematic essays, viewed literally or obliquely, the great classic issues remain openly and intrinsically the focus of concentration. Throughout these studies and reflections by the



new generation of scholars we find not only the work of Husserl and the classic phenomenologists but also the ruminated and digested presence of the classic interpretations of Husserl (e.g., of E. Fink, R. Ingarden, L. Landgrebe and his school). The later thought of M. Merleau-Ponty, H. G. Gadamer, E. Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur, phenomenlogically inspired albeit divergent in other aspects, are either directly treated or implicitly alluded to. We might say that in this vibrantly new fragrance of thought we feel the new generation of scholars breathing the air of their forerunners. What makes this vaste expanse of thought phenomenological, or, what makes its allegiance to phenomenology, is, in the first place, the predominance of the direct concern with the great classic issues of Husserlianism: intentionality, evidence, consciousness, sUbject-object, intuition, constitution, reason, empathy, certainty, method, relation, transcendentalism, foundationalism, originality, time, horizon, historicity, intersubjectivity, life-world, etc. In the enormous variety of approaches, queries, insights, versatility of points of view, these dominant issues undergo an infinite adumbration in nuancement and refinement. 3. This richness and its spread is also due to the immersion of scholars in the debates going on in the philosophical streamlets of today - debates in which they participate and solidarize themselves vicariously - because it can be said that the entire span of the philosophical arena of today, whether positive or negative, constructive or decadent, is indebted to the vigorous Husserlian proclaiming of phenomenology and its unfolding. We distinguish Husserlian phenomenological concerns in all the streamlets of present-day philosophical thought. Whether it be structuralism, semiotics, dialogism, communicative action, existentialism in its various shades, deconstruction, etc., in spite of their emphatic disclaiming of any allegiance to phenomenology, each displays basic controversies or issues which can easily be shown to be related to or issuing from Husserl's inspiration. We may detect a Husserlian influence at the very heart. First of all we might say that Husserl's vigorous struggle against relativism and his quest for a neutral framework for the formulation and resolution of philosophical questions are visible in Habermas' efforts and those ... of Foucault where we see a startling example of the old drive for a unitary framework; the drive also underlies the most recent phenomenology of life (Tymieniecka). The old Realism/Idealism issue is still vigorously debated having taken on new forms, e.g., moving from transcendental idealism to the metaphysical "onto-"realism.



As already mentioned, the trends of structuralism, post-structuralism, deconstructionism, etc., can all be related to Husserl's main emphasis upon pure forms, absolute certainty, evidence of eidoi, etc. Had not, in the final account, his critique of reason in the hands of his followers and others in contemporary philosophy led to disastrous aporias? But it also stimulated the determined countering of the tendencies which lead to the total decadence of our culture, by seeking a major way out of them in a new attempt at rethinking the starting point and the context of phenomenology precisely in the phenomenology of life which takes all these aporias in its stride. Phenomenology appears to have laid bare the bone of contention to be taken up by the main debates in the decadent philosophies of the present historical moment; it has brought forth the subjacent arteries of issues denouncing the mystification or twist or biased approaches and subsequent formulations. (They are led astray into dead-end streets or float upon spurious waves at the thinnest surfaces of this human universe of discourse). The decisive issues thus brought forth by phenomenology such as objectivity/subjectivity, individualism/intersubjectivity, cognition of reality/transcendental constitution, idealism/realism, horizon, analysis and passive synthesis, life/reason, structure/ content, intellect/passions, cognition/action, individual/community, etc., constitute the centers of these streamlets and are reformulated according to the different starting points which the thinkers take, giving dynamism to the new debates in which these streamlets play. Consequently, immersed in a much vaster network of philosophical discussions than the strictly phenomenologically encircled one, the present-day scholar in phenomenology is in his very own insights and formulations of questions influenced by the philosophies of today through those of their aspects congenial to phenomenology and yet different due to their own biases. Hence we witness even in strictly Husserlian research and everywhere beyond it a wealth of new ingenious twists and new intuitions with which the great issues of the core of the phenomenological patrimony are adumbrated and enriched. The almost infinite proliferation of perspectives upon the great classic themes is overwhelming and eludes any hasty categorization. When we propose the picture of the phenomenological spirit within the entire world in which it is alive today, we cannot overlook the fact that when classic phenomenological ideas fall upon a ground quite different culturally from the one in which they emerged, these ideas



undergo specific variations and nuancements. Since it is the human being within this life-world that is the center of the phenomenological concern, different types and modalities of the life and societal world also play their role in giving a special "flavor" to the work of the spirit, special enrichment. This should not be understood, nevertheless, as indicating the dispersal of phenomenology today. Besides being differentiated into fields of study, some new vigorous self-critical attempts, instructed by the criticism of classic and post-classic phenomenological inquiry, bring forth a new interpretation of the phenomenological project in the reformulation of the philosophical enterprise as such in toto (unlike the attempts of those of the post-Husserlian period who took up some major innovative task but did not bring it to a conclusion that alone could allow a judgement as to the validity of the total effect, e.g., Ingarden, Merleau-Ponty, etc.). We find this reformulation within the present collection as a low but vigorous profile of this vast spread of thought, making its way through it and taking on substance. Yet the most remarkable thing which I have been emphasizing over and over again is that scholars from the West and East, from the North and South, from all the continents, social milieux, and political tendencies meet at conferences of The World Phenomenology Institute and find in our core themes, the phenomenology of human life and of the human condition a unique ground for intimate communication through and beyond all the divergencies which they otherwise bear. In fact, after we see the wheel of critical reflection upon the various phases of phenomenology turn its full cycle, we find at the pole opposite to Husserlian intentionality as the sovereign function of the human being, the passions; intentionality's constitutive/cognitive mode of operation is dethroned from its primordial position by the creative act of man and his creative function; the intentional network of functioning is challenged by the creative orchestration; and the life-world with the absolutism of transcendental consciousness at its center is, in its position of pole of reference, dismissed to a secondary command, receding to the subjacent life with its pre-human, pre-subject/object division, to the unity-of-everything-there-is-alive (Tymieniecka and the work of The World Phenomenology Institute expounded in the forum of the Analecta Husserliana series). 4. But, as we all know, Husserl's intent that phenomenology should



function as a philosophia prima with respect to all fields of scholarship, all fields of knowledge, has been fully realized. Indeed, from its incipient stage, phenomenology not only encompassed all the philosophical disciplines such as philosophy of mind, logic, aesthetics, ethics, ontology, anthropology, etc., but already was applied to jurisprudence (Reinach), social science and economics (Scheler), sociology (Schutz), religion (Otto), art (Geiger), biology (Conrad-Martius), etc. The early phenomenological schools of psychology and psychiatry have burgeoned (Binswanger, Bujtendinck, Boss, Straus, Minkowski), and their works are classics by now. But this first wave of the influx of phenomenology into the sciences of man has intensified and spread in the period after the Second World War and now, toward the end of the century in its tenth decade, it can be said without exaggeration that there is hardly any human science or art theory which does not bear directly or by proxy a mark of phenomenological inspiration in its incredibly varied and rich spectrum of ideas, insights, bents, illuminations, etc. Seeking to systematise the fruitful exchange between phenomenology and the sphere of knowledge, the sciences and the arts, our continuing research program carried out under the heading of "The Interdisciplinary Phenomenology of Man and of the Human Condition" coordinated in the systematic progression the world-wide research into what is called "phenomenological praxeology" by The World Phenomenology Institute for the past two decades. (cf. Analecta Husserliana, Vols. 1-32 and Phenomenological Inquiry, Vols. 3-14). Phenomenology has proven itself to be enlightening beyond the strict humanities, extending to biology, all branches of sociology, technical studies and architecture, and the phenomenology of life has much to contribute to ecology and environmental studies. In summary, phenomenology in all its variants is present beyond the scholarly sphere in all realms of educated life, on every continent, wherever the local culture seeks some serious and innovative philosophical inspiration. We conclude this survey by stating that, after a long period of reception, criticism, dissemination of germinal ideas, and progressive discovery of deeply seated intuitions, phenomenology in the world of scholarship, science, art, thought and culture has come of age. What



would be the most appropriate historical moment to bring it into the open? This is the conclusion that the reader, aware of the philosophicoscientific and cultural sphere of the present-day wide, wide world, will come to make after study of our four volumes.

A group of participants after the opening reception on the Campus Universitario.

A-T. Tymieniecka speaking at the official inauguration of the Congress.

Annie Kuipers (Kluwer Acad. Pub!') and Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka.





A thorough consideration of Husserl's thought can be accomplished by a way different from the way in which it is done in traditional discussion. With the purpose of stressing the systematic character that the philosopher sought for his philosophy, we take as our starting point absolute intersubjectivity, i.e., a consideration of his phenomenology as a monadology.l This Husserlian conception has belonged to the public domain since the publication of the Cartesian Mediations. The succint nature of the Fifth Meditation, however, resulted in its true value for the understanding of his philosophy as a whole going unrecognized. The most widespread treatment at times reduced that discussion to the presentation of a method, the phenomenological method, or explained it as the presentation of an egology which, at a later stage could be easily disqualified as solipsistic; insofar as it is so understood, the philosopher's thought is radically betrayed. If we have asserted that Husserl's phenomenology is a monadology, we shall now try to show that, unlike Leibniz's monads, these monads have windows; therefore, an important part of our discussion deals with the exposition of these monad's windows. To develop our position, we will start by giving a first description of intersubjectivity's eidos. Secondly - and so as to follow in our discussion an ascending order of stratification - we will attempt to demonstrate the existence of "orientation pole" of movements with and towards the Other even in the life-world's pre-reflective ambit. Thirdly, we will go on to consider the different strata of the ego's constitution of the Other. Lastly, we want to stress the systematic nature of this philosophy, which in the unfolding of its problems reaches the ultimate questions on the Good and on the meaning of human history. 1. INTERSUBJECTIVITY'S EIDOS

"Intersubjectivity" designates in Husserl the concrete interweaving of living human beings, whose lives in turn are intertwined with those of 3 A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

xxxv, 3-12.



predecessors in links that survive as tradition. The future dimension is reached by the unraveling of the telos which acts not inevitably, but with the strength of an idea in the Kantian way, and which points to the people of the future's coexisting in harmony, as a result of the exercise of being persons in authenticity. This intersubjective intertwining has the form of the living flowing present of the we, through which the personal temporalizations pass, insofar as the singular, isolated subjectivity can be reduced from the originally interrelated sUbjectivity. The features of this interrelationship become evident when we do the phenomenology of the different strata of constitution. II. INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE PRE-REFLECTIVE STRATUM

In a text of September, 1933,2 Husserl asserts that primordiality is a system of impulses having a transcendental character. The concept of "primordiality" designates the continuous original flow, a part of which is any impulse pretending to enter other currents from the lived body as a functioning center oriented to the life-world by movements that, though disorganized at their beginning, become configured with meaning during their course, the motor of this configuration being indeed the impulse; the very fact that a configuration is reached reveals the te/os by which these impulses are organized. The philosopher cares in particular to show two examples of that anonymous impulsive functioning that reaches its goal. The first one is the child's relationship to its mother, and the second, the sexual relationship. The first case concerns the infant who is still at the pre-ego level of functioning. Its own temporalization arises at an implicit temporalization horizon. It has a non-actualized world to which it is not "awake," but is affected by, and so receives hyle, and this is its first participation in the world of awake ego subjects who are already in living connection. The proto-child's instinctive habituality is exemplified in the fact that since its life in the maternal womb it has been able to move and so was born with that acquired experience; it has already lived with another in the original intersubjectivity, in its being incorporated in the viscera of a mother, who is not yet for it "the Other." The new-born child, "in the normal 'way of seeing things,' cries for its mother, for the satisfaction of its original needs, cries involuntary; often that 'works.' ... This first mother is a premise and source for desire satisfaction - when she arrives and is there, satisfaction is had."3



In the case of the sexual impulse, this reference towards the Other as Other and towards its correlative impulse is shown. Here are not two satisfactions to be considered separately. Husserl takes into account in this case particularly the mere protomodal satisfaction, the most elemental reference form; here is not two satisfactions isolated in one and another primordiality, "but a unity of both primordialities established by means of the satisfaction of each one in the other."4 On the basis of these examples we may say that in the life-world's original ambit, the monadic window is created by the functioning of the impulse towards the Other. In the former case, an impulse of the lived body not yet identified as one's lived body; in the latter, insofar as the tending toward the Other is experienced as an impulse of one's lived body and not as proceeding from the I-subject with its higher affections and cultural valuations; within that ambit is expressed the original lack of fulfillment and reference to the Other, a reference, the reciprocal character of which shall become more and more evident in an examination of the higher degrees of constitution. III. INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN THE REFLECTIVE STRATUM

1. The Static Approach to the Constitution of the Transcendental Other One

In this Fifth Meditation, Husserl expresses his intention to follow a static approach as regards the transcendental Other's legitimation. To that end he reaches, by way of methodological abstraction, the sphere of primordiality, understood as an ambit in which are excluded all references to the Other and to the world alluding to him, and in which are retained only, together with one's own lived body and own world, all the experiences (Erlebnisse) of one's mental processes, among them the experience of the Other. The experience of the Other to me - to speak from the ego of the meditating phenomenologist -, my empathy, shall then be the starting point for a retrospective inquiry into the operations that have produced it. A peculiar type of effectuation then reveals itself presentiation, a becoming explicit that follows on a repetition of the reductive operation, what Husserl calls a "double reduction."5 Husserl treats empathy in a discussion paralleling it with another effectuation of an analogous structure: memory. In this latter case, there is offered to the first phenomenological reduction a present consciousness which recalls, for instance, having



been in Paris in autumn; to a second reduction there appears a second consciousness, the consciousness which is the mental experience of being in Paris, as past. That is to say that, in the presentiation that is memory, two consciousnesses are simultaneously sustained: the present consciousness that remembers and the remembered consciousness. In the case of empathy, presentification reveals an analogous structure. Once the first reduction is practiced, the present consciousness which is a present positing of the alter ego is revealed; in a second reduction it appears that implicit in the first one there is a second consciousness, that of the alter ego, which appears as such, i.e., as the zero point of orientation in a world in which I am in turn pres entia ted by it as its alter. This static analysis takes up the philosopher's technical problem of the operation that legitimizes my positing of the transcendental Other from the eidos ego; through it it is shown that the Other's mental processes are for me not "present" but "presentiated," it also reveals the structure of repetition (Wiederholungsstruktur) characteristic of the empathic presentiation and its character as a window in the monads is shown.

2. The Genetic Approach to the Constitution of the Other 2.1. The Constitution of the Mundane Other To reach the operation that constitutes the mundane Other, Husserl begins with an abstractive operation, one different from that practiced in the static approach. Even if he does not say it explicitly, in the Fifth Meditation we can infer this difference from its results: the primordial sphere to be considered does not have at its disposition mental processes concerned with the Other: these are necessarily reduced, since we are going to witness the Other's genesis. To a scope of consciousness restricted in that way, something is presented which is first received as an empty apprehension which shall gradually be fulfilled. That body moving through space avoids being apprehended as a mere body. On the contrary, its conformation and behavior generate the operation of "pairing"6 in which I assert that it is a lived body. Such a pairing takes place in relationship to my lived body; in this relationship neither member has preeminence since they make up a living reciprocal evocation of a pair. Husserl defines it as "a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as association in



contrast to passive synthesis of identification."? That lived body there is apprehended from my lived body here as being psychic lived body, governed like my own by an I which as a zero point of orientation configures its world. s Along with the alien lived body an ego is simultaneously presentified to us, one whose appresented primordial sphere is not fulfillable by me; the mental processes being appresented to me are not mine, since in that case that ego would be I. That ego is alien, analogous to me, not identical, and apprehended by me "as if I was there." The analogizing modification apprehends it as concrete ego: "another monad is established appresentatively in my monad."9 The ego coexists with the alter and given their respective worlds they configure a world, a world in common. Thus does the exegesis of empathy in this stratum reveal in it the corresponding window of the monads. 2.2. The Constitution of the Person in the Social World

As long as our approach stays at the level of reduction to the sphere of primordiality, we shall exclude all references to the world as a cultural world and therefore all references to the Other's being "human." The realization of this occurs only when, shifting the context of our reduction, we approach the configured world as a social one whose subject of constitution is "man," in particular, the "person." When we are then situated in the ambit of the phenomenology of social action, it then becomes clear that for each one "the Other is the first man, not 1."10 I know myself as a man only in the performance of the reciprocal reference which allows me to establish that, just as I constitute the Other as a man, polarizing from his place there the world of objects that we have in common, so he, because he is such, in turn takes me to be a "man polarizing the world" in return. Husserl has called this approach to the social world, where spiritual subjects relate through "acts of personalistic communication." These acts imply the will to not only communicate but also to implement all possible means in order to be paid attention to and get an answer. The means for such communication, besides the privileged acts of speech, range from gestures to the use of objects, such as the branches put by gypsies along the road to inform their comrades which turn they have taken or the apple laid by the philosopher's own wife on his hat so that he would not forget to eat something before leaving. Pondering this stratum of reciprocal communication as a linking window between socii



allows us to see an essential feature of the monadic interweaving: each personal subject is not determined but is motivated, i.e., that which provokes the Other functions in oneself as an inspiration. Another feature of no less importance is that this interweaving is sustained by a common will; and this is the same will that sustains the effective reality of "higher order personalities," such as institutions or the State. If deprived of that common tendency to sustain them these become no more than words. In the revelation of the forms that the exercise of this common will take, love appears to the philosopher to be a privileged form: in this interweaving of wills wherein each one assumes the Other's will, each one tries harder in the same way that the Other tries harder, to the degree that each one's action, performed outside the knowledge of or even against the Other's consent are known to be confirmed just because they are his. "If I ever live in a community of aspiration with an Other, then I live as I in him and he in me."ll This reciprocity and community of will offers the framework for the formulation of the valuation issue in this field. Does this way of interrelating have a per se legitimation or may we conceive of it in a higher form? Asking this question leads us to the next step in our discussion. IV. THE ISSUE OF ETHICS AND THE MEANING OF HUMAN HISTORY

Husserl considers a higher, privileged form of love, the Christie love. Compared to this possibility, all other forms of interrelation appear to be partial. Christ's figure offers support which emphasizes that here the ethical reference is configured by the universal dimension of the love evoked by Christ. The Christ who loves his enemy, loves the "germinal soul," which is present in him as in all men; here is the ethical becoming being of every man as his ideal I, his endless task. "Christic love is first necessarily simple love. But it is linked to the aspiration (necessarily motivated by love) to enter a love community, into an ambit as big as possible, and, therefore, to the aspiration to enter into a relationship with all men, to open up to them and incorporate them into oneself, all in accord with practical possibility, the limits of which are set ethically and, so, consequently, through ethicallove"12 In this way, following the itinerary of the ascending strata of constitution of the life-world, from the intersubjectivity experienced by the protoinfant in its mother's womb, to the highest strata of constitu-



tion where the meaning of the Good and of man's life is posed, we reach the ambit, says the philosopher, of the "ethical-religious" issue. This is not the occasion to renew the debate, still open, on whether the philosopher in this discussion values the figure of Christ as a symbol or as the Redeemer. Weare instead interested at this time in setting another accompanying issue on the level of the dimension of love: we want to offer for consideration what, in our opinion, can be found in Husserl as a criterion for the moral valuation of actions, a critical guideline for the orientation of the development of human history. On our view this criterion of moral truth, which is not formulated as such by the philosopher, but one quite in line with the meaning of his thought as a whole, is the universality of the intersubjective experience grasped as givenness, where the exercise of its endless perfecting lies as a potential horizon. The unfolding of the implications offered to reflection reveals in all the strata of constitution, from the pre-reflective level to that of mundane and social constitution, a reciprocal intertwining of the ego with the alter. Once that character of reciprocity is stressed, we find ourselves in front of the Jactum of my acknowledgement - and with mine, because of the very meaning of the experience, that of everyone - of the equi-valence of the One and the Other, of the equality that is not identity but analogy within differentiation. From the moment when the empathic presentiation implies the positing of the Other as a subject having a world wherein I appear to him as the subject of my world which is not essentially different from his and in which it becomes clear that this reciprocity can de jure repeat itself endlessly, until it embraces all existing men, past and future, this equivalence becomes radically and definitely explicit. The operation of the ego who knows he is a man because that other whom he constitutes as man, a subject of social acts, in turn constitutes him as such, the operation which configures the "us," assumes all the differences in identity, be it of persons or of peoples or nations, to articulate them in a possible whole, that of "we human beings," what Husserl calls "the entirety of monads." What is unavoidable given the ego as starting point of the phenomenological analysis and given the presence of the Others in a relationship of reciprocal acknowledgement of what is most radical in their primordiality, is the revelation of this essential monadic equality. The phenomenologist's responsibility arises out of the fact that through his retrospective inquiry there is revealed the radical intertwining and



the radical equality of the reciprocal alteri and the tetos which lives in them in the form of a will to. ever more perfectly fulfill the individual and communal being of man, for the specific realization of the idea of the "entirety of monads," of the universal harmonious coexistence of all men. This is the meaning which begins to show itself in human history: that all men may reach coexistence in a higher form of humanization, which shall be such precisely because it shall be harmonious. If the ethical question is not What I must do but Why must I, Husserl would answer: I must because the universally experienced equi-valence of persons says that all my rights are basis for all others' having all the same rights. V. ON THE "SYSTEMATIC" CHARACTER OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY

If our discussion has up to this point presented the monadologic

character of phenomenology, it is necessary now to consider its systematic configuration. In what sense can we speak of a "system" in Husserl's thought? This question has been unavoidable ever since Hegel's philosophy gave us the paradigm of systematic thought. Husserl's philosophy can not be categorized in any of the three classical "systems" based on the the possible ways of relating thought and reality: "(1) The conceptual system derives from the real one; (2) The real system is a product of an order imposed by the conceptual one, and (3) The real system and the conceptual system are parallel and, for some reason, coincidental."13 Although for a long time phenomenology was identified with idealism, i.e., with the second of these systems, there is no doubt that the extended elucidation of the lifeworld and the position which the lived body has in the transcendental genesis as a whole make it difficult to assign it clearly such a character. We can not at this time give a thorough answer exhausting the reasons for which it is possible to consider the philosopher's thought to be "systematic." That would exceed the limits of what we are attempting here. We shall only say this: Husserl's philosophy is essentially open and is offered as a basis for future research; it is the philosophy of the beginning philosopher. But he already revealed this philosophy's method and the features of its problems, all giving it the character of strict science and that in the highest and most radical sense. He discovered, moreover, the incapacity of the world-constituting transcendental function that operates in intersubjectivity to acknowledge



itself as such in the "natural attitude." The importance of this revelation and the fact that most texts published during the philosopher's life were related to the unfolding of the issues of constitution may have led to the conviction that the scope of his thought was exclusively gnoseological. Today, on the contrary, we have the necessary indications to acknowledge that, staying within the transcendental ambit, with the ascending unfolding of the different strata of intersubjective constitution, we do reach the level of the questions of ethics and of the meaning of historical human existence. Husserl himself says so in a letter to E. Pearl Wekh. 14 In the intimacy of the transcendental ego, the radical intertwining of the "entirety monads" is revealed making explicit the original one-with-the-other and one-in-the other of concrete human beings and, at the same time, the human telos, which, as a potential horizon, attracts us to the perfection of personal and communal existence, in a universal sense. This last assertion could lead to the conviction that Husserl's philosophy is animated by a metaphysical optimism which would close the system, as if the advent of universal harmony and of authentic humanity were unavoidable. None of this appears in his works. First, the archon-like status of the philosopher encourages self-responsibility, for, as far as philosophy is concerned, no teleological need predetermines events. Secondly, there are texts in Husserl which show clearly that he guessed the possibility that our destiny could be a dehumanization of our world. Apropos this, we shall quote a question that should be read as an assertion: "Is it not a collapse of the human community a limit situation possible in which could be involved, not only myself, but all of us: in which we can trust nothing not in any man, not even for myself in myself, in which all the surrounding world, as our communal life-world, loses for us the character of a world wherein things can be forseen, wherein goals can be set and human life can be lived . .. ?" 15 The world's being is only apparently stable and is just the stability of a normal configuration. Following Husserl's line of thought, the question of the highest level of problems which can be philosophically addressed, i.e., the question of the world as a whole, the question which includes all horizons, arises just when such instability is made evident. It is our responsibility for progress towards the human telos that given its hierarchical character, is the only thing that can give plenitude to the system of his philosophical reflection.

University of Buenos Aires



E. Husser!, Erste Philosophie, II (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1956), p. 190. E. Husser!, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit, Part III (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973),p.594. 3 Ibid., p. 605. 4 Ibid., p. 594. 5 Husser!, Erste Philosophie, II, op. cit., pp. 82 and ff. and 132, 157 ff. 6 On this point, see Ichiro Yamaguchi, Passive Synthesis und Intersubjektivitiit bei Edmund Husser! (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), wherein this subject is discussed in detail. 7 E. Husser!, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), p. 142. 8 We treat here, from our own point of view, a polemicized subject which has been given different interpretations. The justifications. The justification of our position can be found in full in La intersubjetividad en Husserl, Bosquejo de una teoria, Vols. I and II (Buenos Aires: Ed. C. LoWe, 1987 and 1988). 9 Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 144. 10 Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit, Part II, Annex XL VIII, p. 418. 11 Ibid., p.I72. 12 Ibid.,pp.174-175. 13 Jose Ferrater Mora, Diccionario de Filosofia (Buenos Aires: Ed. Sudamericana, 1956), p. 1245. 14 Letter written between June 17 and 21, 1933, quoted in Husser!, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit, op.cit., Part III, p. LVIII. 15 Ibid., p. 213. 1





1. Le probteme du paraltelisme entre la logique et !'ethique L'interet de Husserl pour la vie morale marche de pair avec Ie developpement de sa pensee logique. Ainsi Ethos et Logos se donnent la main et s'aident l'un l'autre, avec une sorte de "parallelisme" dans leurs procedes specifiques. Malgre l'independance du Cogito, par rapport a la morale, on peut dire que l' attention et la bonne volonte, constituant des noyaux de concentration, donnent a la pensee un soutien qui lui est necessaire.' A son tour, la pensee offre a la volonte et a l' action morale son soutien raisonnable, bien que cela ne s'avere pas par une simple duplication des procedes logiques. En effet dans la morale on realise un nouveau type d'intentionalite qui se base sur les motivations et sur les directives du sujet moral, ainsi que sur ses connaissances. C'est pourquoi la connection de la logique avec !'ethique est toujours presente dans l'oeuvre husserlienne. Elle est la consequence non seulement de la constitution rationnelle de l'ethique, mais aussi, en particulier, des analogies qui surgissent entre l'evidence intellectuelle et l'evidence morale, dans les differentes spheres de "verite" qui leur sont propres. Husserl a toujours soin de distinguer les deux spheres: celle de la logique, avec l'apophantique, et celle des disciplines "paralleles", ou se situe l' hhique, qui sont l' axiologie et la pratique, avec leurs propres directives. Dans les Ideen I (1913), il precise: "on aboutit necessairement aux problemes qui concernent l'elucidation de la logique formelle, au niveau de la raison theorique, et celle des disciplines paralleles (paraUele Disziplinen), que j'ai appelees axiologie formelle et [tMorie de laJ pratique (formale Axiologie und Praktik)".2 Dans la VIe des Logische Untersuchungen (sa deuxieme edition a parue en 1921), a propos des syntheses de la sensibilite avec l'entendement, Husserl annonce d'avoir ouvert la voie a une "elucidation phenomenologique de l'evidence logique (et par la aussi eo ipso parallelement de l'evidence 13 A -T Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXv, 13-42. © 1991 Kluwer Academic Publishers.



dans la sphere axiologique et pratique"V Dans son livre consacre a la Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929), il se propose Ie programme de distinguer les differentes classes de significations et d'actes donateurs de signification. Selon ces classes se groupent les expressions concretes et enfin pleines de sens (Sinn) et aussi de sens moral. L'ensemble des oeuvres de Husser!, nous presente - dans un systeme - les expressions du jugement et celles de 1'affectivite et de la pratique, comme Ie sont les souhaits, les actes de la volonte et les ordres. Ce systeme se termine par une phenomenologie de la raison, dans Ie domaine transcendantal, qui embrasse "la raison dans 1'ordre du jugement (entre autre la raison specifiquement thiorique), la raison dans 1'ordre de la valeur et la raison dans l'ordre pratique".4 Bien que les disciplines de la pratique s'eloignent parfois de la base rationnelle, en preferant alors les suggestions de la vie sentimentale, neanmoins elles se conforment toujours a la morphologie systematique, par exemple dans Ie rapport "moyens-fins", qui regit tant la theorie que la pratique, y compris la morale. Husser! reconnait ce parallelisme, en precis ant encore que l' evidence axiologique et pratique s'appuie a 1'evidence doxique (croyance, certitude, position) et ala logique de la verite, dont nous nous occuperons plus loin. On entrevoit desormais ce que nous constaterons mieux dans nos analyses ethiques, c'est-a-dire la distinction des deux spheres et, en meme temps, 1'unite originaire du rapport de la pensee avec la vie, notamment avec la vie affective et morale. A propos de ce parallele, je voudrais en tirer une confirmation par une voie opposee. En effet Hans Reichenbach, qui erige une "scient~fic philosophy" inspiree du neopositivisme, refuse l' "ethico-cognitive parallelism" transmis par la tradition classique et distingue les predicats d'assertion (statements) et les locutions de l'ethique, qui enoncent des directives (directives) et ne peuvent pas etre - il dit - classifiees comme vraies ou fausses. Ainsi Reichenbach etablit les significations des imperatifs moraux, en les separant des significations cognitives et en les jugeant comme de moyens instrumentaux. II n'exclut pas pourtant qu'il y ait une connaissance correspondant a chaque imperatif: "Every imperative possesses a cognitive correlate, given by the correlate statement", ou l'action sociale joue un role tres important. Alors emerge de nouveau une certaine connexion entre la morale et la connaissance: la querelle du parallelisme entre l'evidence logique et 1'evidence axiologique et pratique - notamment morale - se retrouve actuelle, voire



dans une aptitude neo-positiviste. 5 De son cote, Husserl reconnait une "difference essentielle" entre les domaines: (1) de la verite theoretique et (2) de l' axiologie, qui se conforme a des situations motivees dans la condition humaine, aboutissant a une comparaison et a un choix parfois categorique. 6 La publication de plusieurs manuscrits inedits - en particulier des Cours universitaires d'Ethique (Ethische Vorlesungen) qui s'etendent, dans l'ensemble, de 1889 a 1924: en 1928 Husserl, mis a la retraite, laisse la chaire de Fribourg - nous confirme la persistance de l'accord logique-moral dans la formation de la pensee husserlienne. 7 Pour Ie moment, il suffit de preciser que les propositions de la logique formelle reglent les actes de la volonte et aboutissent a la formation de l'evidence morale, dans Ie contexte pratique. Neanmoins la raison pure, bien que necessaire, ne suffit pas a constituer les sources de la vie morale, qui ressent, comme telle, des essors originels proven ant du monde de la vie (Lebenswelt). En effet Husserl reconnait, par sa Gefiihlslogik, la necessite du sentiment, pour constituer la vie morale. C'est par la "neutralisation" de l'attitude naturaliste, que l'on peut accueillir la sensibilite dans une conception ethique. 8 C'est ainsi que l'on atteint les profondeurs de l'ame (Gemiitssphiire).9 L'etique phenomenologique s'annonce done comme une doctrine soutenue par un support rationnel-raisonnable (verniinftig): et Husserl, pour souligner l'aspect "raisonnable" emploie Ie terme "einsichtig"; mais telle ethique s'inspire aussi des elans affectifs du monde de la vie. En tous les cas elle s'organise selon un type d'idealite qui vise aux valeurs objectives, au dela des enonces empiriques. L'ethique ne s'en tient pas exclusivement a la condition humaine realisee, mais elle vise aussi Ie realisable. La verite morale ne se retrecit pas dans les Ii mites des enonces positifs du "vrai" et du "faux", car elle se developpe aussi par l'imagination libre, selon la norme des valeurs et la preference du "mieux", pour atteindre la plenitude du sens, dans la bonne conduite. Plus loin, nous irons a la recherche de cette verite qui se recherche, dans les circonstances de la vie. III La "pratique formelle" nous dirige vers la droiture du vouloir, vers l'accord des volitions avec les valeurs et vers Ie "devoir-etre" et la realisation du realisable. l ! Cette envergure aboutit a l'imperatif: "Cherche, avec prudence, Ie mieux, parmi les choses realisables".12 Husserl developpe aussi une "pratique materielle" concernant les normes de l'action dans une communaute sociale (soziale Gemeinschaft von Personen), la matiere des valorisations et l'etre realise (Realisierung)P



L'analyse cognitive de Husserl conclut a sa Formale und transzendentale Logik (1929), ou l'on trouve, en ce qui concerne la logique formelle, la distinction bien connue entre: (1) la morphologie pure des jugements; (2) la logique de la consequence (non-contradiction); (3) la logique de la verite (correspondance avec les choses). Et respectivement: (1) les jugements encore vides de signification; (2) les jugements distincts (dans la consequence); (3) les jugements clairs (dans la logique de la verite).14 En parallele, notre analyse, menee a travers les oeuvres principales et les manuscrits de Husserl, est valable pour la verite morale, ou se forme enfin - de fac;on critique - un jugement "vrai" (adequat a l'etat de choses) et une decision "vraie" (adherente a la realite) qui s'oriente a l'action, voire a la conduite morale et sociale. En effet tout ce qui concerne l' evidence, la coherence et la verite se pose aussi bien comme une base pour Ie jugement moral, dans la region des valeurs objectives. Mais, a propos du "parallelisme", il faut faire des reserves. J'ai deja fait allusion a ce que les fonctions logiques (empiriques, perceptives et conceptuelles) ne se doublent pas telles quelles dans Ie domaine moral. En effet ces fonctions ne restent accessibles, par l'examen reducteur, qu'a la raison pure et ne debordent point de la, meme en reglant la volante, l'action et la vie sentimentale; tandis que, dans la vie morale, Ie jugement ne peut que ressentir les situations du monde du la vie quotidienne et les motivations relatives, meme en adherant a des principes rationnels et a des formes pures. 15 II faut souligner que l'ethique de Husserl n'est pas affectee par Ie logicisme, ni meme sa logique n'est affectee par l'absolutisme que Theodor W. Adorno (Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, 1956, nouvelle edit. Frankfurt a.M. 1972) lui reproche. Husserl nous presente une critique de la raison, qui ne refuse pas l'apport du sujet (et meme du sujet psychique) a la facuIte de connaitre. II reconnait les limites du "remplissement" des intuitions, car les intentions significatives "ont besoin de plenitude" dans les differents degres de la connaissance (Log. Unters. cit. VI, §21, p. 76 sq.). Pas d'absolutisme, donc: ni dans la logique, ni dans la morale! 16

2. Principes theoretiques de la vie morale A fin de s'approcher des sources de la verite morale, on peut lire d'abord les notes d' Adolf Grimme au Cours universitaire d'Ethique (Ethische Vorlesungen) donne par Husserl en 1914 et consacre a



"Ethik und Wertlehre": cours presque contemporain a la premiere edition des Ideen 1(1913).17 L'ethique formelle y est presentee comme une doctrine qui conduit l'action morale par des normes rationnelles "a priori", c'est-a-dire depassant la contingence empirique. Ainsi Husser! fonde son "Apriori Ethik" sur des propositions theoriques, ou meme theoretiques etablies par une evidence apodictique, dans la forme de l'unite. L'Ethique n'est pas seulement une technique (Kunstlehre) enracinee dans la psychologie des fonctions du temperament (GemiitesFunktionen), car elle se base de far,;on plus etendue et essentielle sur des propositions theoretiques a priori (theoretische Apriori-Satzen). L'Idee du Bien ne peut pas etre tiree des faits, d'ou l'on ne peut tirer aucune idee, ni de la psychologie, ou il manque Ie concept de donner des normes pour Ie "vrai" bien (Normierung). Ainsi, chez Husserl, l'Idee du Bien est une hyper-realite (Uberrealitiit), qui surpasse les choses.1 8 Sa contrepartie est Ie mal, en particulier Ie vice (dissolution des moeurs) Avec Ie tournant de la phenomenologie transcendantale, l' a priori se caracterise davantage comme door:;, essence morphologique, et comme la structure constitutive des experiences possibles, dans la conscience et dans Ie monde. 19 En particulier l'a priori de l'ethique n'est pas simplement une forme pure de la connaissance, car il informe plutot les situations de la vie humaine, afin d'y obtenir, comme nous Ie verrons plus loin, la realisation morale et rationnelle de ce qui est "bien" pour tout Ie monde, dans une situation determinee. Husser! decele aussi un a priori materiel, qui opere comme intermediaire entre la forme pure et la matiere, tant dans la logique que dans la pratique, et qui caracterise les principes moraux. En general l' a priori materiel de Husser! s'approche des "schemes transcendantaux" de Kant et englobe Ie contenu de notions generales, telle que celle de classe, (logique). On Ie peut reconnaitre aussi dans des modeles de la vie morale, par exemple la sympathie et Ie desir (ethique). Dans ses Ethische Vorlesungen, Husser! presente: (1) un a priori axiologique, en parallele avec l' a priori theoretique (logique et ontologie); (2) un a priori normatif (noetique, ethique, etc.) et (3) un a priori phenomenologique, concernant "l'essence des contenus primaires, du flux temporel, de l'instance (Frage) , du desir, etc.".20 Or, dans Ie courant du neopositivisme, Moritz Schlick, organisateur du "Wiener Kreis", s'oppose explicitement aux "recherches logiques" de Husser! et aux "series des valeurs" de Scheler. II reconnait les proposi-



tions analytiques comme celles qui sont vraies grace a leur forme tautologique: "Qui a compris Ie sens d'une tautologie, connait en meme temps leur verite: c'est pourquoi elles sont a priori". A l'oppose, il precise que dans les propositions synthetiques on doit d'abord comprendre la signification empirique (Sinn); ensuite l'on etablira si elles sont vraies ou fausses: c'est pourquoi, elle sont a posteriori?] Dans cette opposition tranchante, l' a priori materiel ne trouve point de place, car il se reduit a une structure tautologique: "Unsere 'materialen' apriorischen Siitze sind in Wahrheit rein begrifflicher Natur, ihre Geltung ist eine logische, sie haben tautologischen, formalen Charakter".22 Tout qu'il fasse une elaboration "a these", tendant a transferer au domaine de la logique et de la linguistique tous les concepts ontologiques prop res a l' essence ideale, Schlick ressent une inspiration morale enthousiaste, qui atteint Ie sens de la vie: selon lui, "1'ecole de Vienne se comporte a 1'egard des questions de valeur et de morale, de la meme fa90n que la philosophie de Socrate: pour elle 1'ethique est une tache philosophique et elle sait que 1'eclaircissement des concepts moraux est infiniment plus important pour 1'homme que tous les problemes tMoriques".23 Mais la morale, dans sa purete formelle, ne depend pas des faits empiriques de l'existence, car elle s'enonce par les propositions categoriques (normes) du devoir-etre, imposees par 1'ordre rationnelraisonnable et par la forme essentielle du Bien, voire de la plenitude de la valeur (Pratique formelle). Enfin la morale se realise par l'action, dans la Lebenswelt et par 1'amelioration de la vie humaine (Pratique materielle). Et c'est la recherche d'une vie pleine et complete (vollkommenes Leben), qu'exige, dans sa racine, la metaphysique (Metaphysik fordert).24 Husserl meme l'avoue dans ses Cours d'Ethique, ou il suit un penchant secret qui dure dans sa pensee et qui se termine par l'idee de ["'absolutes Sein", persistant de l'epoque des Ideen I (1913) a celle de la Krisis der europiiischen Wissenschaften (1936). On peut preciser qu' a son tour la vie est disposee, des ses origines organiques, a ses propres formations rationnelles (V. plus loin, II, 3). Les facteurs psycho-physiologiques s'interposent entre Ie moi pur et Ie monde, bien qu'ils soient contingentes et ne puis sent pas avoiren eux-memes la necessite du code moral. En 1902, Husserl nous parle d'une Gefiihlslogik et, en 1920, d'une ethique de la sensibilite (Gefiihl): il nous laisse entendre que c'est la vie - la vie vraie et durable - qui nous donne, tout au debut, la sensibilite de ce qui est mieux pour nous,



a partir de la genese passive du pnSsage. 25 L'attention d la vie (Bergson) nous impose, aux origines de nos actes de conscience, les elans genereux de la vie sentimentale, lorsque la forme idea Ie (et aussi bien la forme de la sensibilite, reduite d son essence proprement humaine) conduit la vie meme a ses buts raisonnables, qui tirent de leurs propres raisons necessaires une force normative (parfois imperative). C'est la la vie authentique, qui dure et qui nous fait vivre encore. Ainsi la vie constitue l'etan, la moralite en donne la mesure. 26 La mesure est donnee dans l'ordre des va leurs, qui ne sont pas entierement une production de l'esprit. En effet il faut reconnaitre ce qui de la veritable valeur nous est deja donne dans un etat de choses. La valeur n'est pas une chose, mais elle est bien une "propriete des choses". Il est vrai que Husserl separe l'objet de la valeur et Ie monde; mais c'est la une operation faite pour atteindre, dans sa purete, l'intelligible de la valeur, qui enfin recouvre et valorise Ie monde. Ce retour de la conscience au monde, apres la neutralisation (bwxn), est donc indispensable, afin d'y reconnaitre l"'etat des choses" (Sachverhalt) auquel se rapporte l'etat de valeur" (Wertverhalt).27 Bien loin de reduire la valeur a ce qu'y en introduit Ie sujet psychique (individuel ou social), ou a ce que l'histoire (Geschichte, pas encore Historie ou s'avere la "genese de l'humanite") nous transmet, ou a n'importe quelle autre expression du sujet empirique, Husserl distingue un double ordre d' objectite 28 ayant aussi une envergure morale: (1) celle de la chose qui vaut et qui a un caractere de valeur, une qualite de valeur (Wertheit); (2) celle de la valeur concrete elle-meme, c'est a dire l'objectite-valeur (Wertobjektitiit).29 La qualite de valeur s'impose comme une tension en avant, vers sa realisation parfaite. Dans ce contexte, Husserl emploie Ie mot "Objektitiit" avec insistence. Dans les Ideen I, on trouve en effet une predisposition a la pratique formelle, qui n'implique pas l'affirmation de l'objet existant; tandis que les Ethische Vorlesungen no us donnent la pleine objectivite (Objektivitiit) de la realisation morale, dans la pratique materiel/e, comme nous Ie verrons mieux plus loin. 3D A ce point, Husserl precise que les distinctions qu'il vient de faire peuvent etre transposees dans la sphere volitive, ou Ie "se decider" (sich entschliessen) comporte un grand nombre d'elements noetico-noematiques. D'un cote nous trouvons des positions de valeur et des positions de choses; de l'autre nous avons la decision (Entschluss), en tant qu'espece propre appartenant au domaine volontaire (decider une



chose et se decider). Notre auteur reconnait ici, a l'interieur de l'acte volontaire, Ie "voulu comme tel", c'est-a-dire Ie noeme propre au vouloir, et l'''intention volitive" (Willensmeinung), avec son penchant intentionnel noetique a proceder "dorenavant", vers les choses, par un commencement absolu dans l'interiorite libre (Ideen I, §95, p. 239). En effet la volonte s'exerce par l'auto-decision et par l'action. Elle vise la realisation (Realisierung) et ne peut pas se contenter de l'idealite: elle cherche a se realiser dans l'avenir, c'est la son domaine (E. Husserl, Ethik und Wertlehre, Ms. Grimme cite, pp 19 sqq.). Du point de vue de la morale, on va de l' ethique formelle a l' ethique materielle, car l'intention volontaire du "mieux" ethique nos conduit a l' action, qui se termine par des relations qui realisent aussi Ie bien des autres. De meme dans la vie sentimentale parait Ie fond veridique de la croyance et de l'opinion (06~a), que chacun peut se former par ses vues individuelles et par les representations sous-jacentes, dans Ie domaine moral. Alors on forme des "syntaxes doxiques", par l'emploi du "et" (jugement conjonctif) et du "ou" (jugement disjonctif). Husserl en donne un exemple tres delicat: "La mere qui regarde avec amour son groupe d'enfants embrasse en un seul acte d'amour chaque enfant separement et tous ensemble".3! II parait encore ici Ie parallele logicoethique; mais encore ici il faut dire que l'instance ethique deborde Ie cadre rigide de la representation dans Ie rapport "sujet-objet" et aboutit aux operations tres singulieres et f1exibles de l'amour et de la vie. Ainsi Emmanuel Levinas, contre la rigidite d'une representation "totalisante et totalitaire", propose une "Sinngebung ethique", c'est-adire essentiellement respectueuse de l'Autre. 32 Enfin Husserl reconnait bien une extension non-egologique du "monde de la vie" et notamment des instincts innes, qui s'eveillent dans une genese passive: "die wach werdenden Instinkte im Stromen der 'passiven', der 'Ich-losen', der Urboden konstituierenden Zeitigung".33 Husserl precede, en quelque maniere, l'instance - soulevee par Aron Gurwitsch - de considerer un champ de conscience non appartenant a l'ego; mais il confine ce champ dans la sphere instinctive, qui se termine enfin par 1"'Ich-Pol" des Affektionen. 34 Cependant Husserl con90it une sorte de "realite psycho-physique" des autres (Psychophysisches als "Reales": Ms. A V 6,1932), avant de former avec eux une union personnelle, voire une "coIncidence" (Deckung), en particulier avec ceux qui lui sont les plus familiers. Mais notre auteur n'ecarte jamais Ie rapport pour ainsi dire inter-polaire (parmi les "Moi-Poles") qui est



enfin un rapport intersubjectif dans la forme et interpersonnel dans la substance. Enfin comment est-il possible d'operer une "deconstruction" sans faire, avec Ie Cogito ("Ie pense"), une analyse intellectuelle? Alars toujours s'impose une synthese a nouveau: encore une fois l'on echappe au declin de la conscience de sops

3. Les origines de la verite morale et religieuse Edmund Husserl, l'auteur des Cartesianische Meditationen, ne se contente pas de la certitude: ilIa depasse dans la recherche de la verite (logique, morale et sociale). De toutes les deux il etablit d'abord les modalites d'operation, avec leur necessite rationnelle, leurs types d'evidence et leurs degres de clarification, jusqu'a ce que "l'essence se donne purement elle-meme a la conscience" (Ideen I, §67,p. 156). Dans Ie domaine de la praxis, l'hhique se balance entre: (1) l'evidence de la connaissance apodictique de la verite morale s'appelant au noyau d'etre absolu - dans nous-memes et dans Ie monde - dont nous sommes conscients; (2) l'evidence de la certitude morale, suffisante pour regler nos moeurs, selon une inspiration personnelle, bien que cette certitude ne se fonde pas toujours sur une determination irrefutable, car elle depend aussi des opinions courantes et de la foi que nos interlocuteurs meritent par leur conduite. Ainsi, dans les progres de ses Ideen I, Husserl procMe de la problematique concernant les structures originelles noetico-noematiques a la phenomenologie de la raison, qui comprend Ies entrelacements entre les divers types de verite: theorique, axiologique et pratique (notamment morale).36 On y apprend que, pour la recherche de la verite dans ses differents types, l'on ne s'appuie pas toujours sur l'evidence absolue ni sur une croyance inebranlable, avec la plenitude du sens. Aussi bien dans la morale, il se peut que l'on doive se contenter d'une verite relative (ou probable), qui jaillit de la vie individuelle par un fort penchant, lorsque "quelque chose parle" en faveur d'une proposition. Sans etre elle-meme du tout rationnelle, cette proposition peut neanmoins avoir part a la raison. 37 Bien sur la verite absolue (absolute Wahrheit) on la recherche dans la "philo sophie premiere" (erste Philosophie) et on l'atteint originairement dans la "perception immanente", qui est vraiment adequate a son objet, plutot que dans la "perception transcendante", dirigee sur Ie monde. Celle-ci remonte bien a l'''etre originaire des choses" (E. Husserl), mais elle est soumise a leurs



apparitions fuyantes. Je voudrais interpreter Ie principe transcendantal de la philosophie premiere de Husserl ("L'unique etre absolu est l'etre du Sujet comme etre constitue pour soi des l'origine") en ce sens que l'on puise mieux la verite absolue dans les sources de sa propre vie interieure que dans les rapports avec Ie monde. 38 Dans Ie domaine moral, il est plus correct de repondre d /'appel de I'absolu a l'interieur de nous-memes, que d'y jaire appel, d'une fa~on intransigeante, dans nos relations avec les autres. II se peut qu'il manque I'evidence d'une verite absolue (parfaite) et que ron s'en tienne a une conjecture vraisemblable. Alors quelque chose "parle" en faveur du jugement "S est p", quelque chose amene a croire que la liaison predicative "S p" est vraie. Ainsi la verite (Y. plus haut, I, 1) s'ebauche par un jugement vague, qui a deja une structure predicative (vide), mais pas encore un contenu determine et bien enchaine dans son contexte (rempli). Pareillement dans Ie domaine ethique, lorsque nous n'arrivons pas a une verite complhe, peut-etre quelque chose nous dit (spricht) que notre conduite est de meme conforme a une verite morale et que telle conduite est vraie dans son fond ou vraisemblable (ou probable) et non vaguement bien intentionnee, car les jugements qui I'inspirent sont vrais ou vraisemblables (ou probables). En plus, la certitude morale qui adhere aux faits et aux personnes et qui n'est pas - c'est bien sur -la certitude mathematique, repose elle-meme sur des jugements positifs et sur une certaine evidence prioritaire (urdoxische Evidenz). En effet, aux experiences sentimentales et morales, il faut que precede spontanement, dans la sphere doxique, une attention intellectuelle, dirigee vers les croyances et enfin vers les actes de preference et de choix. Enfin Husserl nous amene a reconnaitre une verite par l' evidence axiologique et pratique, qui constitue, d'une certaine fa~on, Ie pendant d'une verite par l' evidence doxologique et theorique. A propos des spheres affectives et volitives, il precise les contenus de verite propres a ces spheres. Alors les buts vraiment humains sont juges comme des vrais buts, ou des buts reels pour I'homme, et les moyens correspondants sont qualifies vrais ou reels moyens moraux. 39 Husserl, qui taxe de scepticisme la morale empiriste,40 admet neanmoins que la raison pratique procede souvent par des conjectures. Parce que la verite morale s'adapte a la mobilite de la vie, elle applique la logique de la verite (Y. plus haut, I, 1) aux situations reelles, avec une adaequatio qui est bien



ouverte aux possibilities du meliorisme. En meme temps, notre auteur fait une certaine place a la logique de la sensibilite et du sentiment (Gefiihlslogik), en faisant entrer en ligne de compte une verite morale qui se nourrit d'inspirations spontanees peut-etre faibles du point de vue rationnel, mais de meme irrefutables pour la vie sentimentaleraisonnable. En m'approchant de la conclusion de cette premiere partie, je voudrais preciser qU'une action conforme aux fins humaines peut etre jugee comme une action "veritable" et qu'une action dijforme, destructive de l'homme, peut etre consideree "fausse", ou meme irreelle. C'est la un critere general pour l'ethique, c'est-a-dire que l'action veritable peut continuer dans la duree reelle de la vie (H. Bergson) et n'arrive jamais d se contredire et d se supprimer elle-meme. II faut encore souligner que, dans les Ideen et les manuscrits moraux de Husserl, la methode phenomenologique montre son efficacite propre a une analyse qui s'etend a la profondeur de l'ame (Gemiit). Bien que l'action morale ait toujours un rappel a la necessite rationnelle-raisonnable (verniinjtig), il se peut que dans Ie jugement moral quelque chose "parle" vaguement en faveur d'un propos de generosite et d'amour veritable, sans que l'on puisse assumer tout cela dans une proposition apodictique. Alors il est possible qu'il vaille mieux obeir a la faiblesse (et a la douceur) d'une telle suggestion genereuse, plutot que se soumettre a l'evidence (et parfois a la brutalite) d'une ratiocination naturaliste. Enfin l'on pourra verifier spontanement en soi-meme Ia bonte du choix, par la complaisance intime que cette faible suggestion procure. Avec autant de spontaneite la conscience inspire les remords, apres une action mauvaise: Ie chatiment peut succeder d'ailleurs au crime; mais personne ne peut contraindre autrui d'avoir des remords et de se repentir d'une faute. 41 Enfin a l' evidence morale s'unit une evidence religieuse en vertu d' un pres sentiment (Ahnung) instinctif de la conscience individuelle, qui se depasse infiniment vers un but n'ayant pas d'avance une structure cognitive complete. II y a la l'experience te!eologique de Ia foi.42 Husserl ne construit pas un systeme de theologie rationnelle, bien que plusieurs endroits de ses manuscrits nous donnent des indications utiles a en dessiner les premieres lignes. En effet, il ne se remet pas au jideisme, car il s'adonne aux symboles de la foi avec une sorte de parallelisme logico-religieux. Ainsi, ses considerations theologiques s'appellent a



l' evidence, a la liberte, aux teleologies. 43 II envisage Ie rapport de l'homme avec Dieu comme une attitude de priere et une recherche du salut, par un processus oriente a un telos infiniment lointain. Dans Ie manuscrit F I 14, que j'ai deja cite et qui obeit a une inspiration morale, on trouve Ie debut d'une solution du probleme theologique, unissant ensemble la comprehension de la teleologie originaire qui appartient a la conscience absolue et l'''idee de la conscience la plus parfaite", qui nous conduit a l'idee de la Divinite. 44 Dans ce contexte, 1'idee de Dieu se renverse dans la proposition "Dieu comme Idee" (Gott als Idee), Idee non pas entendue comme une abstraction, mais comme la presence infinie de 1'Esprit qui vit dans l'Idee. 45 Mais je voudrais preciser que, puisque cette Idee - cette Vie de Dieu - est infinie, elIe nous transcend, car nous sommes finis: Ie "lieu" de cette transcendance est eminemment Ie rapport avec les autres, dans la subjectivite universelle, ou Dieu demeure. 46 Husserl ne refuse pas une certaine inspiration de l'argument "ontologique" (Saint Anselme), soutenant la necessite intrinseque de l'etre, a laquelle il arrive a travers l'idee de la conscience la plus parfaite et du monde Ie meilleur possible, bien que dans Ie meme manuscrit (p.59), il affirme une selection (Sonderung) necessaire entre l'idee et l'existence.47 Je voudrais ajouter que l'Idee de Dieu ne vient pas simplement a combler Ie vide de la conscience, angoissee par Ie sens tragique de l'existence, car cette Idee provient plutot du Principe de toutes les plenitudes (perfections), qui s'annonce a 1'homme et aussi bien Ie depasse. 48 Bien que la foi, par l"'evidence" religieuse, ne dissipe pas tout Ie mystere, Ie manuscrit de 1911, apres ses enonces theoretiques a propos de la personnalite, se dirige a la recherche de la plenitude de la vie (vollkommenes Leben) et parvient donc a la theologie, par une sorte d'argumentation ontologique, Au contraire, dans les Ideen I, conc;ues a peu pres dans la meme periode, la theologie est consideree par ses apories, dans la problematique du Principe absolu, qui n'a pas une transcendance, au sens ou Ie monde en a une, ni une immanence, au sens ou il est immanent l'etre comme vecu dans la conscience. 49 Dans Ie manuscrit susdit, qui oMit a une inspiration morale, on trouve ainsi Ie debut d'une solution positive du probleme de Dieu, tandis que, dans les Ideen I, par la problematique que l'on y debat, au sujet du principe et du telos, Dieu est considere comme Ie concept-limite (Grenzbegriff) necessaire, que 1'athee non plus ne peut renier. 50




1. Intersubjectivite et "realisation" ethique

Avec son passage de la chaire de Gottingen a celle de Freiburg i.B (1916), Husserl developpe encore sa pMnomenologie transcendantale. Ensuite on trouve, dans Ie manuscrit de Freiburger Vorlesungen (le90ns faites en 1920 et repetees en 1924), l'approfondissement de I'ethique pure, qui s'assortit bien a la philosophie tMoretique de la derniere periode. En effet on y apprend la construction d'une ethique de l' a priori et d'une axiologie, qui se referent a I'essence des actes immanents dans la conscience et a leurs operations originelles. 51 La construction d'une ethique sincere (echte Ethik), qui ne se lie pas aux principes de I'edonisme ni a ceux de l'utilitarisme, se base encore sur d'autres manuscrits, que I'on trouve pUblies dans les trois grands volumes, deja cites, Zur Phiinomenologie der Intersubjektivitiit. C'est ainsi que l' ethique individuelle, qui privilegie les actes intentionnels de la conscience solitaire, neanmoins orientee aux valeurs objectives, trouve son integration dans Ie systeme de I'intersubjectivite transcendantale, aboutissant a une nouvelle tMorie critique de la societe. 52 On ne peut qU'admirer l'effort que Husserl y a fait pour etablir la fonction de l'intropathie (Einfiihlung), en eclairant, dans la me sure du possible, tout ce qui appartient au monde d'autrui. Ce monde se montre a chacun de nous comme etranger, mais il offre a tous, dans leur milieu, une sphere d'appartenance commune. En allant a la recherche de l'objectivite immanente dans l'intersubjectivite, Husserl procede de la perception du "corps propre" (eigenes Leib) a la perception du corps des autres 53 et a l'explication (Deutung) de la presence de l' alter ego, a travers une "apperception analogique".54 Ainsi la connaissance d'autrui est elle-meme directe; mais I'auto-connaissance est du premier ordre ("Primordinales 'ego''') et vraiment immediate. 55 Notre auteur n'ignore pas les difficultes que I'on rencontre a communiquer avec la psychologie de la "monade" etrangere; mais il enrichit son analyse par plusieurs elements d' Appriisentation des autres, qui nous eclairent, par les aspects qui se presentent (Priisentation), les aspects qui se cachent. En depit des expressions les plus connues de l"'idealisme transcendantal" de Husserl, sa doctrine morale montre avec insistance un fort penchant pour une sorte de "realisme" ethique et pour Ie depassement de n'importe quel solipsisme, car I'action



morale nous engage a vouer nos efforts aux autres personnes, telles qu'elles sont en chair et en os, avec leur "identite" personnelle, leurs jouissances, leurs douleurs, leurs besoins reels. Ainsi la methode phenomen%gique, orientee a l' ontologie, nous conduit a reconnaitre intentionnellement, dans son integralite, la personnalite des autres et a exiger d'etre, a notre fois, reconnus par eux. Moins encore sur Ie terrain moral, Ie contenu de cette relation, qui devient interpersonnelle, se borne a un echange de sollicitations externes: on trouve beaucoup a expliquer - par un "recit" sur la "realite" et sur la "condition humaine" de no us memes et des autres - avant que une ligne imperative s'impose. Dans ce recit, Ie rappel a l'ontologie (et aussi bien a la mdaphysique) du noeud interpersonnel est un motif, enfin exemplaire, qui revient, de fa
View more...


Copyright ©2017 KUPDF Inc.