an-introduction-to-chinese-philosophy-from-ancient-philosophy-to-chinese-buddhism.pdf

An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy

AN INTRODUCTION TO

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tnese

t OSO

From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism

JeeLoo Liu

Blackwell Publishing

,

© 2006 by JeeLoo Liu BLACKWELL PUBLISHING

350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK 550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia The right of JeeLoo Liu to be identified as the Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher. First published 2006 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd 1

2006

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Liu, JeeLoo. An introduction to Chinese philosophy: from ancient philosophy to Chinese Buddhism / JeeLoo Liu. p. em. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-2949-7 (hard cover: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-4051-2949-2 (hard cover : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-2950-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-lO: 1-4051-2950-6 (pbk . : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, Chinese.

I . Title.

B126.L564 2006 181'.11-dc22 2005034230 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Set in 10112pt Sabon by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall The publisher's policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards. For further information on Blackwell Publishing, visit our website: www.blackwellpublishing.com

Contents

Acknowledgments

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Comparative Philosophy Timeline Introduction: What Is Chinese Philosophy? I

X11l • • •

1

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Introduction

Yijing (l Ching): The Cosmological Foundation of

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IX

Preface

Part

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15

Chinese Philosophy

26

2

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects

47

3

Mencius (Mengzi)

65

4

Xunzi ( Hsun Tzu)

86

5

Mozi (Mo Tzu)

108

6

Laozi (Lao Tzu)

131

7

Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)

1 52

8

Hanfeizi ( Han Fei Tzu)

1 82

Part 9

II

Chinese Buddhism Introduction

209

The Consciousness-Only ( Wei-shi) School

220

Contents 10

The Hua-yan (Hua-yen) School

248

11

The Tian-tai (T'ien-t'ai) School

277

12

The Chan School (Zen Buddhism)

304

Notes

3 32

References and Further Reading

379

Appendix: Translation Conversion Table

407

Index

414

VI •

Ac now e gments

This book would not have been possible without the generous support from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Ex­ change, and the sabbatical leave from the State University of New York at Geneseo. I wish to thank Dr Ying-shih Yu (��If.f) for his assistance. I am grateful to the staff at the Information Delivery Service Depart­ ment of SUNY Geneseo for the prompt delivery of all requested materi­ als. Without their service, the research for this book would have taken much longer. I also wish to thank the philosophy editor at Blackwell Publishing, Jeff Dean, for seeing the potential in me and in my book. I firmly believe that no personal accomplishment is the result simply of one's own efforts. I would not have been able to produce this book without the vast amount of assistance I have received. My first knowl­ edge of Chinese philosophy came in the main from Master Yu (f#frf.�), under whose tutelage, for seven years, I studied most of the classics of Chinese philosophy. My Master's thesis advisor, Zhang Yong-jun (SLbk �), taught me everything I knew about Neo-Confucianism. lowe my training in analytic philosophy to all my former teachers who taught me various aspects of analytic philosophy, in particular, Chen Wen-xiu (�*)(Ji;), Lin Zheng-hong (;ftJE'lL.), Paul Yu (��.), Richard Feldman, Earl Conee, Robert Holmes, Douglas Dempster, and John Heil. I wish to acknowledge the contributions from all the students who took my Chinese philosophy course at SUNY Geneseo, and students from my Asian philosophy class at California State University at Fullerton, for their inquisitive pursuit inspired me to formulate my ideas. On a personal level, I wish to thank the following people for their encouragement and support: Paul Yu, Ying-shih Yu, Craig Ihara, Ellen Yu, Shi-ling Hsiang, Amy Steinberg, Ya-yen Yu, and, of course, my brother and sisters. Finally, I wish to dedicate this book to my mother Liu Lin Zhu-wei (§U;ftmlVl), who instilled intellectual curiosity in me;

Acknowledgments to my high school teacher Fan Qing-wen (ffi!!Z:J:), who pointed the way to philosophy for me when I was only 15; to my beloved husband Michael Cranston, without whom I would not have been where I am today, and to my two boys Collin and D illon, who have given me tremendous j oy in life.

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Pre ace

The aim of this book is to introduce two early periods of Chinese philosophy: ancient Chinese philosophy (ca. 600-200 BeE) and Chinese Buddhism (ca. 3 00 -900 AD) . My intended readers are people who are interested in learning about Chinese philosophy in a systematic and scholarly way. It is a serious book that a serious layman might enjoy reading; prior knowledge of Chinese is not required. I use Chinese words sparingly and adopt the commonly accepted translations of key notions in Chinese philosophy. This book could be adopted as a text­ book for college-level courses in Chinese philosophy or Asian philoso­ phy. For this purpose, I have included further discussion questions at the end of each chapter. This book could also be enjoyed by anyone who wishes to find a reliable entry into the study of Chinese philosophy. Ample supplementary references and recommended readings are supplied to assist further research in Chinese philosophy. A few things need to be explained before readers get to the content of this book. First, the approach used is analytic and the analysis is often comparative in nature. By " analytic, " I mean the philosophical approach that emphasizes the analysis of concepts, the formulation of arguments, the examination of basic assumptions, and the pursuit of clarity in language. When appropriate, I will formulate the arguments the philosopher uses and give a brief discussion. When no argument is clearly employed by the philosopher, I will analyze his basic philosophi­ cal assumptions, methodology, and key notions. In emphasizing " ana­ lytic," I wish to distinguish my approach from philological, hermeneutic, or sinological approaches to Chinese philosophy. By "comparative," I mean that I aim to link the study of Chinese philosophy to the study of Western philosophy. My intention is not to introduce these schools of thought merely as something from a distant past, but to encourage further philosophical investigation on the issues

Preface these ancient Chinese philosophers worked on. Ancient Chinese philos­ ophers may not have our contemporary philosophical terminology, but many of the issues they dealt with are of common philosophical inter­ est. Furthermore, among contemporary commentators on Chinese phi­ losophy, many have been trained in Western philosophy and their analyses often reflect their thinking modes with such background. In presenting what contemporary commentators argue about in their reading of Chinese philosophy, we cannot avoid using terminology in Western philosophy. Readers with prior knowledge of Western philosophy may find this comparative approach an aid to their understanding, while readers with no such background may wish to skip these discussions. Second, this book is not meant to serve as a history of Chinese philosophy. For that purpose, we already have Fung Yu-lan's compre­ hensive A History of Chinese Philosophy, translated by Derk Bodde. The content of the present book does not cover all schools in either ancient Chinese philosophy or Chinese Buddhism. I have chosen only the major schools that have shaped the core development of Chinese philosophy. For historical background, as well as for those other phi­ losophers or schools left out in this book, readers should consult Fung Yu-lan's History. A comparative chronology of Chinese and Western philosophy is prepared to enable readers to place each philosopher in his or her historical context. Third, presently there exist two popular Romanization systems for the pronunciation of Chinese terms: the Wade-Giles system and the Pinyin system. For example, "Dao" in the Pinyin system and "Tao " in the Wade-Giles system are different renditions of the same Chinese word, as are " ren " in the Pinyin system and "jen " in the Wade-Giles system. This book employs the Pinyin system, since it is now the more widely adopted one. However, many works on Chinese philosophy in the Western world were done in the Wade-Giles system. Readers may find it confusing to see different Romanizations of the same philoso­ pher's name or of the same concept. In an appendix, I have constructed a translation conversion table, which should help readers relate names in this book to names used in other works. Last, but not least, even though this book only focuses on the two early periods of Chinese philosophy, I do not want readers to get the wrong impression that Chinese philosophy has only two important periods. The restricted scope of this introduction to Chinese philosophy is purely a result of pragmatic consideration of the length of this book. Neo-Confucianism, dominating Chinese intellectual history between the eleventh and the seventeenth century, is another major part of Chinese philosophy. Contemporary Chinese nineteenth- and twentieth-century x

Preface philosophy is also a period that demands more attention from the West­ ern world. To understand the totality of Chinese philosophy, one needs to study those two major periods as well. But to do so, we need to start with a good understanding of the two early periods. I hope that readers will be inspired by this book to seek a more comprehensive knowledge of the whole development of Chinese philosophy. The first part of this book deals with seven ancient philosophers, representing Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, and Legalism respectively, as well as a major philosophical text, the Yijing (Book of Changes). The organization of the chapters is partly chronological, partly thematic. This arrangement is made in order better to present each school of thought and to facilitate a more focused analysis of the debates among different schools. Take Yijing for example. Part of the complete Yijing predates Confucius, while part of it was probably completed after the ancient period. However, its cosmology lays the foundation for both Confucianism and Daoism. Hence, this book begins with Yijing. After Yijing, I put three major Confucian thinkers (Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi) together, followed by Mozi. Even though Mozi predated Mencius and Xunzi, his view can be better grasped after we see what he objected to in Confucianism, since it was primarily developed from his dissen­ sion with Confucianism. Therefore, we will have a complete grasp of the major theses of Confucianism before we move on to Mozi's chal­ lenge of this doctrine. After Confucianism and Mohism, I present Daoism with two representative thinkers: Laozi and Zhuangzi. Their different metaphysical views and their unconventional ethical advice are the focus of these two chapters. Part I ends with Hanfeizi, the founder of Legalism, which became the dominant political ideology in Chinese history. Part II deals with four representative schools of Chinese Buddhism: the Consciousness-Only school, the Hua-yan school, the Tian-tai school and the Chan school. These chapters form the most groundbreaking part of the entire book, since no one has ever given these Chinese Buddhist schools any clear and comprehensive analysis before. I focus on the anti-realistic tenet dominant in Buddhism, and analyze how these schools differ in their own interpretations of the emptiness of the phe­ nomenal world. By arranging the four schools in a semi-chronological order, I also wish to show how Chinese Buddhism slowly steered away from the anti-realist thinking of Indian Buddhism. The four schools demonstrate the progressively realistic commitment emerging in the thought of Chinese Buddhists. I aim to present each philosophy with an unbiased attitude - the exposition does not reflect my personal philosophical leaning, but the Xl .

Preface collective thinking of contemporary commentators on various subject matters. Naturally, my analysis ultimately represents my own interpre­ tation of the philosophy. The primary texts for each philosophy are usually the philosopher's most representative work in its unabridged form in Chinese. The secondary sources include most of the available articles and books written in English. The discussion in each chapter thus aims to reflect the common interests and contested issues among contemporary commentators. When available, every chapter lists sev­ eral translations of comparable quality and recommends some contem­ porary articles written in the analytic style. Since Wing-tsit Chan's A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy is still the most comprehensive anthology to date, it is listed with every chapter. A recent anthology that covers only the ancient period, Readings in Classical Chinese Phi­ losophy, edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, contains excellent translations of seven ancient philosophers. It is listed with all chapters dealing with these ancient philosophers. With each chapter, I consult the Chinese texts first and then compare the available transla­ tions to find the best rendition. When I quote from a particular transla­ tor, I stress the translator's name. In cases where I end up using my own translation, I simply give the original textual reference. In the Western world, Chinese philosophy has often been misrepre­ sented as " non-philosophy, " as a form of religion. Two leading schools of thought in Chinese philosophy, Confucianism and Daoism, are often taught as part of the curriculum of World Religion. But Chinese phi­ losophy is not simply a way of living, a doctrine inviting believers or followers. It has its cosmological speculations, ethical principles, episte­ mological arguments, and its methodology. It challenges thinkers to build on philosophical assumptions and to engage in philosophical de­ bates. In comparison to Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy is based on different metaphysical assumptions and it takes different approaches to deal with the same social and moral concerns. The study of Chinese philosophy can thus provide philosophers with a fresh perspective on issues dealt with in the Western tradition. By writing a philosophical introduction to Chinese philosophy, I wish to give Chinese philosophy its proper status in the world of philosophy.

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Comparative p l OSOP •

Chinese Philosophy

Western Philosophy

600 BeE

Confucius (55 1-479 BeE) Laozi ( ? )

Thales (fl. 585 BeE) Anaximander (ca. 612-545 BeE) Anaximenes (fl. 550 BeE) Pythagoras (585-497 BeE) Heraclitus (540-475 BeE)

500 BeE

Mozi (ca. 480-392 ? BeE) Yang Zhu (ca. 440-360? BeE) Liezi ( ? )

Parmenides (b. 5 1 0 BeE) Anaxagoras (500-428 BeE) Empedocles (ca. 495-435 BeE) Protagoras (485-415 BeE) Zeno of Elea (fl. 450 BeE) Democritus (460-370 BeE) Socrates (469-399 BeE)

400 BeE

Zhuangzi (ca. 399-285 BeE) Hui Shi (380-305? BeE) Mencius (371-289 BeE) Gongsun Long (b. 380? BeE) Xunzi (ca. 340-245 BeE) 300 BeE

Hanfeizi (ca. 280-233 BeE) 200 BeE

Dung Zhongshu (ca. 179-104 BeE)

Plato (427-347 BeE) Diogenes (400-325 BeE) Aristotle (3 84-322 BeE) Epicurus (341-271 BeE)

Comparative Philosophy Timeline Chinese Philosophy

Western Philosophy

100 BCE

Huainanzi (d. 122 BCE) Yang Xiong (53 BCE-18 AD)

Cicero ( 1 06-43 BCE) Lucretius (99-55 BCE)

CE Wang Chong (27-1 00?)

Seneca (4 BCE-65 AD)

100

200

AD

AD

Wang Bi (226-249) 300

AD

Guo Xiang (d. 3 12) Seng-zhao (384-414) (Three-Treatise) 400

AD

Bodhidharma (470-534 ? ) (Chan) Hui-ke (487-593) (Chan) 500

AD

Hui-wen ( ?-577) (Tian-tai) Hui-si (514-577) (Tian-tai) Zhi-yi (538-597) (Tian-tai) Ji-zang ( 549-623) (Three-Treatise) Du-shun (557-640) (Hua-yan) Guan-ding (561-632) (Tian-tai) Dao-xin (580-63 6 ? ) (Chan) Xuan-zang (596-664) ( Consciousness-Only) 600

AD

Hong-ren (601-674) (Chan) Zhi-yan (602-66 8 ) (Hua-yan) Fa-zang (643-712) (Hua-yan) Shen-xiu (ca. 605-706) (Chan) Hui-neng (638-713) (Chan) Shen-hui (670-762) (Chan) 700

AD

Cheng-guan (738-839 ? ) (Hua-yan) Han Yu (768- 824) Li Ao (fl. 798 ) XIV •

Epictetus (55-135) Marcus Aurelius ( 1 2 1-1 80) Sextus Empiricus (ca. 200) Plotinus (204-270) Augustine (354-430)

Boethius (ca. 480-525)

Comparative Philosophy Timeline Chinese Philosophy

Western Philosophy

800 AD Lin Ji (ca. 81 0-866) (Chan) Huang Bo ( ?-ca. 850) (Chan) 900

AD

1 000 AD Shao Yong ( 1 0 1 1-1077) Zhou Dunyi ( 1 0 1 7-1073 ) Zhang Zai ( 1 020-1 077) Cheng Hao ( 1 032-1085) Cheng Yi ( 1 033-1 1 07)

Anselm ( 1 033-1 109)

1 100 AD Zhu Xi ( 1 130-1200) Lu Xiangshan ( 1 139-1 193) 1200

AD

Bonaventure (ca. 1221-1274) Thomas Aquinas ( 1224-1274) 1 300

AD

William Ockham (ca. 1285-1347) 1400 AD Wang Yangming ( 1 472-1 529)

1500 AD Liu Zongzhou ( 1 578-1645) 1600 AD Huang Zongxi ( 1 6 1 0-1695) Wang Fuzhi ( 1 6 1 9-1692)

1 700 AD Dai Zhen ( 1 723- 1 777)

Desiderius Erasmus ( 1466-1536) Niccolo Machiavelli ( 1 469-1 527) Thomas More ( 1478-1535) Michel de Montaigne ( 1 533-1592) Francis Bacon ( 1 561-1 626) Thomas Hobbes ( 1 588-1679) Rene Descartes ( 1 596-1 650) Baruch Spinoza ( 1 632-1677) John Locke ( 1 632-1704) Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz ( 1 646- 1 716) George Berkeley ( 1 685-1 753) Montesquieu ( 1 689-1 755) xv

Comparative Philosophy Time/ine Chinese Philosophy

Western Philosophy Joseph Butler ( 1 692-1 752 ) Voltaire ( 1 694-1778) Francis Hutcheson ( 1 694-1746) Thomas Reid ( 1 71 0-1796) David Hume ( 1 7 1 1-1776) Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( 1 712-1 778) Paul-Henri-Dietrich d'Holbach ( 1 723-1789) Adam Smith ( 1 723-1790) Immanuel Kant ( 1 724-1804) Edmund Burke ( 1 729-1 979 ) Jeremy Bentham ( 1 748-1832) Friederich Schiller ( 1 759-1805) Johann Gottlieb Fichte ( 1 762-1 814)

1 800 AD Kang Youwei ( 1 858-1927) Tan Sitong ( 1 865-1 898) Liang Qichao ( 1 873-1 929) Wang Guowei ( 1 877-1 927)

XVI •

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ( 1 770-1 8 3 1 ) Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling ( 1 775-1854) Arthur Schopenhauer ( 1 788-1 860) John Stuart Mill ( 1 806-1 873 ) Smen Kierkegaard ( 1 8 13-1 855) Henry David Thoreau ( 1 8 1 7-1862) Karl Marx ( 1 8 1 8 -1883) Friedrich Engels ( 1 820-1 895) Wilhelm Dilthey ( 1 833-19 1 1 ) Henry Sidgwick ( 1 83 8-1900) Ernst Mach ( 1 838-1916) Franz Brentano ( 1 838-1917) Charles Sanders Peirce ( 1 839-1 914) William James ( 1 842-1 910) Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche ( 1 8 44-1900) Gottlob Frege ( 1 848-1925) Alexius Meinong ( 1 8 53-1920) Edmund Husserl ( 1 859-1 93 8 ) Henri Bergson ( 1 8 59-1 94 1 ) John Dewey ( 1 8 59-1952) Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem (1861-1 916) Alfred North Whitehead ( 1 8 6 1-1947) Max Weber ( 1 864-1 920)

Comparative Philosophy Timeline Chinese Philosophy

Western Philosophy Benedetto Croce ( 1 866-1 952) Bertrand Russell ( 1 872-1 970) George Edward Moore ( 1 8 73-1958) Arthur Lovejoy ( 1 873-1 962) Ernst Cassirer ( 1 874-1945 )

Early 1900 AD Xiong Shili ( 1 8 85-1 968) Zhang Dongsun ( 1 8 86-1973) Zhang Junmai ( 1 8 87-1 969) Hu Shi ( 1 891-1 962) Liang Shuming ( 1 893-1 988) Jin Yuelin ( 1 895-1 9 84) Feng Youlan ( 1 895-1990) Fang Dongmei ( 1 899-1977) He Lin ( 1 902-1 992) Xu Fuguan ( 1 903-1982) Tang Junyi ( 1 909-1 978) Mou Zongsan ( 1 909-1 995) Zhang Dainian ( 1 909- ) Feng Qi ( 1 9 1 5-1995 ) Li Zehou ( 1 931- )

Moritz Schlick ( 1 882-1 936) Clarence Irvine Lewis ( 1 883 -1964 ) Karl Jaspers ( 1 8 83-1969) Ludwig Wittgenstein ( 1 8 89-195 1 ) Gabriel Marcel ( 1 8 89-1973) Martin Heidegger ( 1 8 89-1976) Rudolf Carnap ( 1 891-1 970) Susanne Langer ( 1 895-1 985) Herbert Marcuse ( 1 898-1979) Henry H. Price ( 1 899-1 984) Gilbert Ryle ( 1 900-1 976) Alfred Tarski ( 1 902-1 983) Karl Popper ( 1 902-1 994) Theodor W. Adorno ( 1 903-1 969) Jean-Paul Sartre ( 1 905-1980) Charles Leslie Stevenson ( 1 908-1979) Alfred Jules Ayer ( 1 910-1989) Albert Camus ( 1 9 1 3-1 960)

XVll •

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at Is Intra uctian: C inese P 1 asap y ? •

A Preliminary Explanation In this introduction, I shall attempt to offer not a definition of " Chinese philosophy, " but a description of some general traits of Chinese phi­ losophy. No definition of any philosophical development can ever be given, since philosophy itself is an organic body that defies definition. However, even when the goal is merely to describe Chinese philosophy, the description must still be incomplete. To be complete, the description of Chinese philosophy would have to include a comprehensive explana­ tion of the historical, social, political, and cultural background of China. This introduction cannot do that. What I sketch here are simply some general characteristics of Chinese philosophy that need to be known by anyone who wants to study Chinese philosophy. I shall explain what propelled the development of Chinese philosophy, what the key con­ cepts of Chinese philosophy are, what traditional Chinese pedagogy was, and how ancient philosophical ideas were recorded. This intro­ duction should give readers a sense of how and why the thinking and writing styles of Chinese philosophy are different from those of Western philosophy. However, readers should be cautioned that any such charac­ terization would tend to be oversimplified.

From Religion to Philosophy: The Motivation behind Chinese Philosophy Even though the prehistoric Chinese did embrace a worldview with a personified Supreme Being, whom they called "Shang-di" (the same term is currently used to translate the English word " God " ), this folk religion

Introduction never entered the realm of discourse of Chinese philosophy. The residue of this primitive belief was sometimes seen in such expressions as " the will of Heaven, " which was often identified with the people's prefer­ ences, or "the mandate of Heaven," which was sometimes used as a political j ustification for overthrowing the ruling power. However, the sense of a Divine Will, or Divine Intervention, was not taken as literally as it was in the Old Testament. The predominant belief held by ancient Chinese thinkers was that there was no " Creator" of the cosmos, no volitional act of creation, and no personal adjudicator in Nature. Their religion was more a form of Nature worship, though it was different from the ancient Greeks' assignment of personified gods or goddesses to various natural phenomena. Instead, the ancient Chinese believed that there was a spiritual correspondence between the world of Nature and the world of men. The universe was thought to be an organic system, with all parts integrated into an ordered whole. What is above men is Heaven; what is underneath men is Earth. In ancient Chinese usage, " Heaven" (tian) is not merely the sky as viewed from earth; nor is it a transcendent realm used in the Christian sense. " Heaven" stands for the totality of heavenly bodies and phenomena; in particular, it is often used to refer to the operation of the sun. " Earth" (di), on the other hand, generally refers to the ground on which everything exists. It includes various territories of the ground, but it is most frequently used to cover lowland territories such as valleys, gorges, basins, etc. To the ancient Chinese, the universe is the totality of Heaven, Earth, and all that exists in between. There was no beginning; the world has always existed. Since the ancient Chinese believed that there was a spiritual corre­ spondence between natural phenomena and human states of affairs, the common explanation for natural disasters was that they were causally related to some adverse human states of affairs. Drought was attributed to Heaven; flood to Earth. Either of these phenomena could bring about famine in human societies. For an agricultural society, famine poses the greatest risk to human survival, and yet in Chinese history it was a recurring threat. Even so, in the ancient Chinese worldview, there was no evil in Nature. Natural disasters were seen as part of the natural development of the world; hence, they did not stand for "evil." Either they were brought about by the natural correspondence between Nature and the human world, or they represented a form of "temporary de­ flection from the essential harmony of the universe," 1 not a positive force in itself. When the human world has accumulated sufficient dis­ order, the original harmonious state of the world is disrupted. Such disruptions bring about disturbances in Nature, which in turn bring disasters to human society. Some other infrequent natural phenomena

2

What Is Chinese Philosophy? such as hail, earthquakes, infestation of insects, etc., were seen as fore­ warning signs. These signs were also what naturally happened at the time when the cosmic harmony was disturbed. Therefore, Nature corre­ sponds to the human world, just as a bell would chime upon being struck. The implicit belief behind this cosmic correspondence is that every­ thing is interconnected in this cosmic whole, which has a cosmic rhythm shared by all. Max Kaltenmark says: " Conforming to the rhythm of the universe is the prerequisite of wisdom in all Chinese thinking. ,,2 A way to " tap into" this cosmic rhythm in ancient China was divination - the method of attempting to foretell the future through oracles or special rites. The earliest form of divination that we now know of was the method of tortoise-shell reading. To perform this divination, some encrypted words were first written on a tortoise shell. (These writings were the earliest writing samples found in China, dating back to 17001100 BeE.) The shell was then put into a fire until it started to crack at various points. The reader of the sign would decipher the code depend­ ing on how those words were separated. To perform this ceremony, one has to purify one's mind and body beforehand, in order to be in a heightened state of awareness of the cosmic spirit. From this divination, the reader could predict the future development of nature, and in turn decide the best course of action. In the Shang Dynasty (1766-1150 BeE), the king often would appeal to the divination performed by spe­ cially appointed augurs, in order to decide major affairs such as whether to launch a war or alter an existing policy. Later, in the Zhou Dynasty (c.1122 ?-256 BeE), the more commonly used divination was based on Yijing, the Book of Changes. In its origi­ nal form, this text was not a complete book. At the earliest stage, it probably contained merely some esoteric graphs and diagrams. From the initial 8 three-line trigrams, it developed into a complicated system of 64 six-line hexagrams. Judgments ( interpretations of the divination results) were then attached to these hexagrams as well as to each line within a single hexagram. The method of divination using Yijing was not restricted to the royal courts or the high priests; ancient scholars such as Confucius often appealed to it too. The questions being con­ sulted through this divination were no longer merely political affairs of the state; they could also be about what an individual should do in a given situation. To know how to make moral decisions is called "wis­ dom, " and the possession of wisdom, in this ancient context, signified one's spiritual concord with the spirit of the cosmos. In this respect, "wisdom" for the Chinese has not only a practical connotation, but also a religious origination. If " philosophy" is simply " love of wisdom" 3

Introduction (etymologically speaking), then Chinese philosophy can be seen as orig­ inating in a religious sentiment about the cosmic spirit. The construction of Yijing's trigrams and hexagrams is based on two elements alone: yin and yang. In the symbols of Yijing, yang is repre­ sented by a solid line; yin is represented by a broken line. Both yin and yang are part of the cosmic energy or the cosmic force. All trigrams and hexagrams reflect the various distributions and relations between yin and yang. Implicit in this ideology is the belief that the whole universe, Nature and human world alike, is nothing but the various distributions of, and relations between, yin and yang. The language of yin and yang takes on two dimensions: one is a naturalistic description of states of yin and yang; the other is a symbolic description of states of human relationships. In Yijing, these two dimensions are inseparable. This again reflects the ancient Chinese worldview that the world of Nature and the world of humans are indivisible. In summary, under the ancient Chinese pre-philosophical worldview, the world is an organic whole with order and regularities, not a chaotic conglomerate dominated by chance. The basic constituents of myriad things in the world are not matter, but energy or force of two natures: yin and yang, the movement of which follows a regulated rhythm. A sage, or one who is adept at deciphering the divination results, can tap into the cosmic rhythm because his mind and the cosmos are unified. This cosmic rhythm runs through Nature and the human world in the same way. Furthermore, the realm of the spiritual and the realm of the material are not sharply divided. The dead and the living are not situ­ ated in incommunicable worlds. One's spirit is not bound by one's body. Once the body is dead, the spirit can roam about in different dimen­ sions - above the living, below the living, or even among the living. There is, in addition, no separation of the self from the world. The subjective person and the objective world are not in opposition, but are parts of an integrated whole. How man lives his life is affected by what goes on in the universe; at the same time, how he lives will affect what continues in the universe. Just as the air we breathe joins the cosmic atmosphere, so what we do interacts causally with the world around us. This belief in the unity of Nature and the human world, mind and matter, body and spirit, or man and the universe, became the foundational thesis for Chinese cosmology.

4

What Is Chinese Philosophy?

Basic Concepts in Chinese Cosmology: Dao, Qi, Yin, and Yang Chinese cosmology is built on belief in the cosmic order or cosmic pattern, which serves not only as the source for all existence, but also as the governing rule for all cosmic developments. This basic assumption of the existence of a cosmic pattern became the core thesis of all major schools in Chinese philosophy.3 The universe is seen "as a self-contained organism functioning according to its own inherent pattern. ,,4 This pattern was commonly referred to as "Dao" by ancient philosophers. (Dao is capitalized when it is used to designate a unique, all-embracing Dao; it is not capitalized when it refers to the Chinese word " dao" or to the dao of particular things. ) The pursuit of Dao would become an ultimate goal shared by all Chinese philosophers. According to Bryan Van Norden's analysis: This word [dao] has several related senses. ( 1 ) The original sense was "way," in the sense of "path" or "road." It came to mean (2) "way," in the sense of "the right way to do something," or "the order that comes from doing things in the right way," (3) a linguistic account of a way to do something, or "to give a linguistic account," (4) a metaphysical entity responsible for the way things act.5

In other words, the word dao can be used as a common noun designat­ ing roads; it can be used as a moral term signifying the right way of doing things; it can be used as a verb meaning " to speak "; and it can be used as an ontological notion suggestive of the origin of the universe. These four senses, although on the surface widely different, are actually interwoven in the philosophical significance of Dao. In the context of Chinese cosmology, Dao stands for an "all-embracing entelechy" 6 - it is a life-giving force responsible for the creation of myriad things. This usage is seen in Yijing's Great Treatise, and Laozi (the originator of Daoism) seems to interpret Dao this way from time to time. Dao in this sense also governs the whole universe from its incep­ tion. Hence, Dao stands for the cosmic order, the Way things are. So an appropriate translation for dao is " the Way. " "The Way, " used in the singular, signifies the existence of a single cosmic order or a single cosmic pattern. It can be loosely rendered as the Truth, or the Reality. It can also be called the cosmic principle, in the same way that later Neo-Confucians used " Heavenly Principle" in place of Dao. The two words in Chinese, dao (the Way) and Ii (principle), are often used in 5

Introduction conjunction to signify reasons or truth. Under the holistic cosmic pic­ ture, the cosmic order also governs human affairs. Consequently, Dao takes on a moral connotation, as the right way for states of affairs in the human world to be. Since Dao is the "right way, " it also comes to stand for "the path (the Way) one ought to take. " In this sense, Dao stands for the highest moral precept for human beings. Confucius de­ finitely uses dao in this sense, as do other Confucians. Finally, dao as "to speak" reveals the assumption that our language depicts the reality as it is, and to speak the truth means to depict the Way. This assump­ tion was common to early Confucians. Laozi's opening remark in the Daodejing, "A dao that can be spoken of (dao) is not a constant Dao," could be seen as a direct challenge to this assumption. We would call such a view, which challenges the possibility of our language's accurate depiction of reality, language skepticism. Another important notion in Chinese cosmology is that of qi, in relation to which Dao should also be understood, since Dao is often seen as the rhythm or pattern of the movement of qi. There is no adequate English translation for qi, although it has been rendered variously as " energy, " " vital energy," " pure energy," " force," "material force, " " spirit," "vapor, " "air, " etc. Many commentators have pointed out the etymological root of the word "qi. ,, 7 Originally, it referred to the steam or vapor coming from boiling rice (the Chinese character for qi contains the character for rice as a component) . It came to represent the nourishing vapor or the moistening mist, both of which encompass the atmosphere, furnishing the bodies of all creatures and becoming the source of life. From this, the philosophical notion of qi was developed and came to stand for the ontological basis for all things. Benjamin Schwartz thinks that this notion is "the closest Chinese approximation of the Western concept of 'matter' ."8 But the two concepts are quite different, in that qi is dynamic, while matter is inactive; qi penetrates everything, while matter is solid; qi is constantly changing, while matter is static. Chinese cosmology treats qi as existentially prior to matter the condensation of qi constitutes matter. Everything is comprised of qi, and the various degrees of purity or impurity determine the levels of existence. Human beings are made out of the purest of qi, while lower animals are produced by qi with greater impurity. Qi is not volitional; hence, our creation is not the result of any intentional production. Qi condenses and rarefies, but it never gets exhausted or even diminished. Qi pervades the universe; in other words, the universe is simply the totality of qi in perpetual motion and constant alteration. In this cos­ mology, the cosmos is viewed as being composed of a great force (qi) that has no mind of its own. This great force permeates everything in 6

What Is Chinese Philosophy? the cosmos; as a result, everything is interconnected in this organic whole. In the Chinese conception, qi is divided into two strands: yin and yang. Both strands seem to manifest at once physical differences as well as symbolic differences. On the physical level, yin and yang are both competitive and complementary. On the one hand, the yin qi and the yang qi are competing forces or opposite forms of energy, which con­ stantly work against each other. Since both are part of the totality of qi, when yin grows, yang declines; when yang strengthens, yin weakens. The competition is constant and the flow of qi is always in motion; hence, change ( "yi" ) is the constant state of qi. On the other hand, yin and yang complement each other, since everything relies on both of them to exist. In the physical world, nothing can be either purely yang or purely yin. We can say that the cooperation of yin and yang is based on their mutual competition. Things can change, grow, decline, and get reborn, exactly because yin and yang work against each other. The change of seasons is a perfect illustration of the interaction between yin and yang. Viewed in this way, nothing that we humans deem to have "negative values" can be dispensed with. Yin and yang do not stand for a simplified polarization between good and evil or light and dark. The cosmic whole cannot be bifurcated into opposites, fighting for the eradication of the other. The apparent compe­ tition between yin and yang is actually the motivating force behind their cooperation. Hence, without one, the other could not exist. As Bodde explains this kind of dualism: Never . . . is the suggestion made by [all thinkers who adopt the yin-yang ideology1 that the one can or should wholly displace the other. Hence there is no real analogy with the dualisms based on conflict (light vs. darkness, etc.) so familiar to us in the West. On the contrary, the yin and yang form a cosmic hierarchy of balanced inequality in which, however, each complements the other and has its own necessary function.9

On a metaphorical level, yin and yang seem to represent symbolic traits, rather than physical differences, among things in the world. Yin repre­ sents everything that is female; yang represents everything that is male. In Chinese symbolization, the sun is yang, while the moon is yin; the mountain is yang, while the lake is yin; fire is yang, while water is yin; and heat is yang, while chill is yin. The traits of yang include being vigorous, firm, aggressive, active, and strong. The traits of yin include being docile, yielding, accommodating, passive, and gentle. All things associated with yang are thus symbolic representations of yang traits; all things associated with yin are symbolic representations of yin traits. 7

Introduction From the primitive form of Nature worship, the ancient Chinese developed a sense of admiration and affection toward the natural world around them. This religious spirit prompted a philosophical pursuit of the order of the universe and the ontological foundation for all existence. The ancient philosophers called this cosmic order and the ontological foundation for all things "Dao," even though different philosophers assigned different connotations to this notion. This pursuit of the cosmic order and the ontological foundation would later become the quest for the metaphysical " Buddha" in Chinese Buddhism, and the study of the Heavenly Principle (Li) in Neo-Confucianism.

Primary Concerns of Chinese Philosophers: Human Society, Human Conduct, and Human Nature Stemming from the religious spirit in pursuit of the welfare of human societies, Chinese philosophy's main focus is on such issues as how to rule the state, how to conduct oneself, how to do the right thing, etc., so that one does not disturb the cosmic order or deviate from Dao. There was a strong humanistic tendency even in the early stage of Chinese philosophical development. Humanism is the system of thought that focuses on the interests and well-being of human society. It is based on the values and characteristics that are believed to be best in human beings, rather than on any decrees by a supernatural authority. Ancient Chinese thinkers had an intense desire to find the best way to make the right political decisions, to alleviate social problems, and properly to conduct themselves. Sociopolitical philosophy and ethics are thus the two core areas in Chinese philosophy. In Part I, we shall see that almost all ancient Chinese philosophers attempted to define the best socio-political structure and the best moral guidance for the rulers as well as for the people. At the same time, since social structure, polity, and human conduct should all cohere with the cosmic order, Chinese philosophy is fundamentally rooted in its cosmology. This cosmology is manifested mostly in the philosophy of Yijing. Chinese philosophers were in general not motivated by a purely intel­ lectual pursuit of knowledge for knowledge's sake. Under the belief that it was the same Dao or principle that governed natural objects as well as human beings, they investigated natural objects as a means to the end of pursuing knowledge of Dao or principle. As A . C. Graham says:

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What Is Chinese Philosophy? From the Western viewpoint, pre-Buddhist Chinese philosophy is epistemo­ logically naive. For the Chinese however the purpose of seeking the one behind the many is to find, not something more real than what appears to the senses, but a constant Way behind the changing and conflicting ways of life and government claimed by competing schools as the Way of the sage kings. 1 0

Under the pursuit of Dao (the Way), when Chinese philosophers studied the external world and its objects, they were intent on finding some moral guidance in the way things are in Nature. This motivation pro­ pelled a form of moralistic epistemology, which is rather unique to Chinese philosophy. Another issue of common interest for Chinese philosophers is the understanding of our basic nature - the way we naturally are. Under the ancient Chinese worldview, "the universe is actually a natural harmony, and therefore imbued with a principle of goodness which . . . provides the basis for human goodness. " l l A common assumption of authors of the Chinese classics was that humans are fundamentally good by na­ ture, because they have the heavenly endowment of moral attributes. This view is particularly manifested in Yijing. Among ancient philoso­ phers covered in Part I, some describe this natural goodness as " natural innocence" (such as Laozi and Zhuangzi); some describe it as the "sprouts of morality" ( in particular, Mencius ) . There are, of course, some excep­ tions to this general trend. Xunzi, for example, argues that human nature is intrinsically bad. In spite of this, in all ancient philosophers' views, there was no assignment of " the original sin." Birth itself is celebrated as the union of yin and yang, as the joint creation of Heaven and Earth. Life is unquestionably valuable. Everyone is created through the union of two forces; hence, everyone is a blessed creation of Heaven and Earth. In summary, we could say that Chinese philosophy was fundamen­ tally developed by an earnest desire of philosophers to alleviate social problems, and to construct a better world for all humans. Chinese philosophers' eyes were not set on an abstract Realm of the Forms, intelligible and yet unreachable. They had a purely this-worldly con­ cern; their goal was to improve on the world given. By asserting the initial harmony of the cosmos and the intrinsic goodness of humans, they attempted to demonstrate how social reforms are possible. To all of them, any effective social reform must consist in a moral reform of the rulers as well as of the people. To teach others what constitutes virtue and to inspire others to act morally thus constituted the mission

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Introduction ancient Chinese philosophers all took upon themselves - even though some acted positively while some acted passively.

Intellectual Lineage and the Preservation of Philosophical Ideas For Chinese thinkers, being a member of a school is of utmost im­ portance. Students revere their teachers, addressing them as " masters." (What we today translate as " Confucius," " Mencius," " Laozi," " Mozi," " Zhuangzi, " and " Hanfeizi," are addressed by the Chinese as Master Kong, Master Meng, Master Lao, Master Mo, Master Zhuang, and Master Han Fei. ) What teachers do is to transmit Dao; hence, they are respected as the "transmitters of Dao . " To go against one's teacher's teaching would be considered a great betrayalY Therefore, Chinese philosophy is built on the continuation and further explication of teach­ ings of their revered predecessors, not on challenging them or construct­ ing new theories from scratch. Most of the works of ancient Chinese philosophy open discussions with "the Master said, " showing that these works were very likely students' notes of what their teachers taught. Even where the teachers themselves wrote philosophical treatises, some­ times the authentic works are compiled together with students' works attributed to their teachers. On some occasions, either out of respect for ancient thinkers or to elevate the importance of their own writing, the authors would even attribute their thought to ancient masters. Hence, we have the notorious problem about the authenticity of authorship in early Chinese philosophy. To see how Chinese philosophy was passed on largely through the extension of early teachings and explication of previous texts, we have to understand the academic background of Chinese schooling too. In Chinese intellectual history, the study of the classics is an integral part of education. The classics include the Book of Changes ( Yijing), the Book of Odes (Shi-jing), the Book of History (Shu-jing), the Book of Rites (Li-ji), and the Annals of Spring and Autumn ( Chun-qiu) . Later in history, these books came to be known as the "five classics . " They were seen as voicing the authority on truth and morality from as early as in Confucius' time. Confucius says of himself, " I transmit but do not create. I believe in and love the ancients. " 13 It is clear that he does not think he is developing a new philosophy. He views himself as someone who transmits the truth conveyed in the classics and continues the tradition of the old. Confucius often refers to the Book of Odes in his

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What Is Chinese Philosophy? teaching, while Mencius often cites the Book of History as the voice of truth. Other ancient Chinese philosophers also appealed either to the classics, to Confucius, or to Laozi in order to support their own theories. It is not because they were not confident in their own thinking, but because, to Chinese philosophers, to philosophize is to find the best transmissions of Dao. Typically, ancient Chinese students were given private tutorials from the age of 6. A small group of students gathered either at one of their homes, or at the tutor's studio, to receive lectures on the classics.14 The tutor typically dominated the whole lecture, leaving no room for open discussion. These tutors were often addressed as " master," which under­ scored their authority and their superiority. Students were expected to recite and to memorize the content of these classics, so that they could quote them in exams and, later in life, could apply the teachings to their own life. The merit of the student's comprehension would be based on his ability to synthesize and to elaborate on the teachings, not on his ability to challenge or revise the teachings. As young students grew up, they could choose their philosophical associations by joining a particu­ lar school to follow a particular " master. " Even within academic set­ tings for mature students, teachers normally lecture while students take notes. This tradition still applies today. Sometimes the pedagogy in­ volves questions and answers, but normally teachers were held in the highest esteem and thus were seldom challenged. Later in Chinese his­ tory, when official examinations were devised to select the best intellec­ tuals to become state officials, these examinations were also centered on the classics. Typically, the contestants had to write an expository essay on the selected quote from the classics. One can easily see why, under such an education system, students would develop a sense of awe not only of their masters, but also of whatever the masters taught. Ortho­ dox teaching is the norm; following the tradition is the respectable thing to do. A deviant interpretation could be seen as a novel ingenuity, but it also runs the risk of being seen as a misunderstanding of the original texts. Consequently, the development of Chinese philosophy leaned heav­ ily toward orthodoxy from the start.1S This is not to say, of course, that there is only one thread in the development of Chinese philosophy. There are often lots of competing schools at any given time. In the ancient period, for example, we have what is commonly called the " Hundred Schools" (bai-jia) . Between different schools, we often see interesting philosophical debates and exchanges. The disagreements be­ tween Confucians and Mohlsts, between Confucians and Daoists, and between Confucians and Buddhists present us with perfect examples of the philosophical disputes that took place in Chinese intellectual history. 11

Introduction Starting with Confucius, who modestly claimed that he only trans­ mitted the thought of antiquity and never wrote down his own theory or originated his own ideas, Chinese philosophers did not think highly of establishing intellectual fame through writing. The reason for the lack of systematic philosophical works in Chinese philosophy is directly linked to the philosopher's disinterest in establishing a particular doc­ trine to gratify his intellectual desire. Like their Western counterparts (Socrates, Plato, etc.), ancient Chinese philosophers were indeed inter­ ested in finding and defending truth. However, what they deemed truth must be what could help the world and the people. Before paper was invented in China ( in the first century AD), books had to be carved onto bamboo plates, which were then assembled with the aid of ropes. Writ­ ing would thus take too much time away from the philosophers' real goal - to make others listen to them and to bring about immediate social reform. Among their students, some were good at partaking in social or political reforms, while others were good at truthfully record­ ing what the teachers had said. When we read these ancient Chinese philosophical texts, we must recognize this division of labor. When we refer to, for example, Confucius or Mencius, we would be referring, not to the author of those texts, but to the originator of the thoughts preserved in the texts. Since the thoughts were conveyed in various contexts and recorded by different students, the philosophy often appears unsystematic or even inconsistent. A proper understanding of Chinese philosophy must therefore involve the readers' active attempts at sifting through disjointed remarks to find the common themes.

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What we here call "ancient Chinese philosophy" falls into two histor­ ical periods in Chinese history, both of which came about as the result of the decline of the golden age of the Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1 1 22?-256 BeE). After Zhou's royal court lost its prominent status in China and moved away from its central geographic location, many smaller nation­ states emerged as independent sovereignties. Initially, these nation-states co-existed peacefully, though secretly they amassed power, competing to become the strongest nation-state under Zhou. This period is called the " Spring-Autumn" period (722-4 8 1 BeE). At the time, China was dominated by five powerful nation-states, which came to be known as the "Five Hegemonies . " Eventually, these more powerful nation-states gave up their superficial attempts at peaceful coexistence and began to compete bitterly to aggrandize their territories; henceforth began the "Warring States" period (480-222 BeE). During the Spring-Autumn period, there were already signs of tur­ moil boiling up in China and there was a prevailing sense of uncertainty and insecurity. During the Warring States period, nation-states were constantly engaged in warfare, either in the name of protecting their satellite nations or for the sake of taking back lost land. Among them, the seven more powerful nations became known as the " Seven Supremacies." They no longer revered the impotent court of Zhou as "the Son of Heaven," and they began to regard themselves as equals to the king of Zhou. They formed shifting coalitions with one another and the diplomatic world was plagued by deceit, ruse, and subterfuge. Eventually, it was the nation-state Qin which, having conquered other nation-states with bloody warfare, brought about China's first reuni­ fication (22 1 BeE). During both the Spring-Autumn and the Warring States periods, the general populace was frequently threatened with death, starvation, and the deprivation of all material possessions.

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Ancient Chinese philosophy thus developed in a particularly strenuous political and social atmosphere, with various philosophe rs suggesting different ideas about how to solve the social and political problems. Diverse schools of thought emerged, which came to be known as the " Hundred Schools." Among the philosophers covered here in Part I, Confucius and the legendary Laozi belonged to the Spring-Autumn period, while Mencius, Xunzi, Mozi, Zhuangzi, and Hanfeizi belonged to the Warring States period. Confucianism comes about as an attempt to reconstruct social order and to restore wide-reaching peace. Advocated by Confucius and his followers, the theory is that if the ruler could set a good example to his people in his personal behavior and in his family relationships, and if the people could be morally transformed to preserve good personal conduct and to maintain good family relations, then all societal prob­ lems, large and small, would dissolve. This theory sounds overly simpli­ fied and optimistic, but it is based on a sophisticated social philosophy. Confucian society is founded on family units. Social order begins with family order. As Derk Bodde puts it: Society, in Chinese eyes, consists of a large number of small social units (the family, the village, the guild, etc.), each of which consists in turn of individuals varying greatly in their intellectual and physical capacities . . . . The welfare of the social organism as a whole depends upon harmonious co-operation among all of its units and of the individuals who comprise these units. This means that every individual, however high or low, has the obligation to perform to the best of his abilities those particular functions in which he is expert and which are expected of him by society.!

In the Confucian conception, society is like "a magnified family, the members of which, though differing in their status and functions, all work in harmony for the common good. ,,2 However, Confucianism does not attempt to construct a socialistic communal world, in which everyone is indeed related to one another as brothers or sisters. Con­ fucianism stresses natural family relations, and advocates love with dis­ tinctions - one always loves one's family first and foremost. This Confucian project of social reform begins from the top - from the ruling class. Confucius and his followers spent the major part of their adult lives traveling from one nation-state to another, in the hope of convincing the kings to embrace their ideals. The ideal ruler for the Confucians is someone who has perfect virtue ( one who obtains sage­ hood) internally. His internal virtue would then manifest itself exter­ nally as the best rulership. The motto representing the Confucian political 16

Introduction view is " internally a sage; externally a king. " In the Great Learning, a representative text of Confucian political philosophy,3 the ruler is advised to abide by three principles: ( 1 ) manifest a clear character, (2) show concern for the people ( or: renew the people),4 and ( 3 ) aim for the highest good. Under this mode of thinking, morality and politics are inseparable. Confucians often appealed to ancient sage kings such as Yao and Shun as their paradigms. These sage kings allegedly instituted civilization in primitive society, teaching the people language and moral­ ity along with basic skills for self-preservation. Confucians advocated the belief that if the contemporary ruler modeled himself on the sage kings, the whole world would be appeased. The Great Learning de­ scribes the eight steps needed to establish world peace, starting from personal moral cultivation through regulation of the family, the estab­ lishment of national order, and finally the manifestation of worldly order. The cultivation of personal virtue is likened to the root of a tree. "There is never a case when the root is in disorder and yet the branches are in order. ,, 5 At the same time, once the root is well planted, the branches will all grow healthily. Hence, a well-conducted personal life naturally leads to the moral transformation of the world. Such a worldwide reformation sounds fantastical. However, in terms of political philosophy, Confucians also devised practical means to assist the moral transformation of the people. To begin with, the com­ mon folk, whose primary concern is their material subsistence, need to be free of anxiety and trepidation for their livelihood. It is difficult to advocate moral cultivation for the people when the people are preoccu­ pied with the underdevelopment of their crops and the impending death of their family members. In Mencius' advice to the kings, he often emphasized the importance of setting up an effective agricultural plan so that soil could rest through rotation of crops and adequate labor could produce the maximum yield. What devastated the living condi­ tions of the people at that time was nothing more than a long war: young men were drafted and often killed, while the old, the frail, women, and children were left to tend the fields. In the Warring States period, ordinary people dropped dead like flies, and their bodies were simply dumped in the ditch because others had neither the time nor the energy to bury them properly. In view of this, Confucians were generally op­ posed to wars undertaken for the sake of conquest. However, they do believe that war is morally praiseworthy when it is launched to relieve the suffering of the people in neighboring countries. Confucians' pri­ mary concern is the livelihood of the general masses, with no regard to the boundaries of the nation-states at the time. With their humane hearts extended to all people in China, they totally understood that it 17

Ancient Chinese Philosophy was not possible to address the people's moral or spiritual transforma­ tion unless their livelihood was first taken care of. Confucians aim to transform the general masses by means of two cultural enhancements: rites and music. " Rites" incorporate a system of ritual codes for particular situations as well as codes of propriety for daily interactions. In formal ceremonies such as weddings and funerals, there are particular codes of proper conduct ranging from the length of the ceremony, the suitability of the attire, the proceeding of the partici­ pants, the preparation of foods, to the sacrifice of animals. Confucius even specified different mourning periods appropriate to one's emperor, one's father, or one's relatives. In daily life, Confucians also observe particular codes of conduct, including how one should address one's elders in the family or elders in the neighborhood; how one should interact with someone of the opposite sex; and how one should conduct oneself in various social contexts, etc. Under these social restraints, one is constantly aiming to be "proper" in respect to different interpersonal relations and social contexts. The ideal man is one who has adapted his own natural inclinations to social restraints such that he no longer needs to curb himself - he is naturally inclined to do whatever is proper in each given circumstance. In Confucian thinking, the value of ritual propriety is not in its being a measure of social control, but in its ability to separate a flock of human beings from a flock of beasts. Human society is possible exactly because humans conduct themselves under social codes of propriety. Without a sense of propriety, we would all follow our animal instincts, which would eventually lead to our mutual destruction. With rites, we manifest respect in our conduct for various social contexts as well as for other people. This behavioral manifesta­ tion can teach others to cultivate the same respect. In time, a society is civilized through its members' adherence to rites. Therefore, for Confu­ cians, the importance of rites in human society cannot be overstated. Rites can transform the people externally; music, on the other hand, has a transforming power from the inside. " Music" includes both the recitation of fine poetry and the performance of musical instruments. In Chinese, the same character stands for both music and joy, though the pronunciation is different. Music is a natural expression of one's joy; it also brings joy to its listeners. Furthermore, Confucius believed that music has the function of regulating one's emotions and harmonizing one's sentiments. When one of Confucius' best students governed a small city-state, he had the whole city playing music continuously for three months. When people are virtually " living in music," they no longer feel the need to be aggressive, bitter, hostile, jealous, or greedy. Their minds are at ease with the world around them. But not all music 18

Introduction can have this effect. Confucians believe that some melodies will pacify listeners, while others have a more rousing effect that could agitate listeners. We now have very little knowledge of the classical music in ancient China, but from the descriptions given, we understand that this kind of music was generally based on the harmony of chords. " Har­ mony" depicts a state of balance among various elements; it can be applied to music as well as to one's mental states. In the Doctrine of the Mean, another important Confucian text,6 it is said: " Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused it is called equilibrium. When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony. ,, 7 This comment reflects the common view in the ancient Chinese world of music that music acts as an expres­ sion of one's inner state. There are numerous stories about how a skilled listener could judge the musician's frame of mind - be it noble or violent - by listening to the music he plays. Harmonious music is an expression of its composer's or its players' balanced emotions. At the same time, harmonious music gradually pacifies the temperament of the listener through its regulation of unexpressed emotions. If the whole nation could be regulated with the right kind of music, the people would naturally become well-tempered citizens. Confucianism as a moral philosophy can be summarized as a philoso­ phy of ideal personhood. In the Confucian picture of human societies, there is a moral hierarchy of people with the highest moral attributes (the sages), people of superior moral attributes ( superior people ), people of petty concerns (petty people), and people of vile characters (tyrants and crooks). The goal of Confucians is to become better human beings themselves, and to help others become better human beings. Accom­ plishing this very goal constitutes what Confucians call the virtue of " humanity. " The virtue of humanity can be seen as the defining virtue of Confucian ethics. The ultimate goal in life for a Confucian is never to allow a momentary lapse in the task of self-improvement. By Confucius' standard, to be a superior person is never to forgo the virtue of human­ ity even " for as short as one meal's time. " The Doctrine of the Mean describes the superior person as one who is watchful over herself even when she is alone. She does not allow herself to indulge in idle or improper thinking. The reason is that what one harbors in one's mind will inevitably be manifested in one's appearance and one's conduct. What the whole person manifests is what is inwardly cultivated - the truth of a person's inner self will always be outwardly displayed. How­ ever, the point of becoming a better person is not just for outward display, but for one's own inner self. Confucians constantly examine themselves to see whether they have been honest with others, whether 19

Ancient Chinese Philosophy they have been conscientious in their tasks, and whether they have put into practice what they have learned from their teachers. A Confucian is thus someone who is always vigilant in his or her self-cultivation and self-examination. The second major school, Mohism, led by Mozi, is an attempt to reform the world morally by totally remodeling people's way of think­ ing. Mohism advocates loving one another equally and benefiting one another mutually. Mozi did not deny that human nature tends toward particular love, focusing primarily on self-interest and the interests of one's family. He believes that this particularist way of thinking is the root of all social and political problems plaguing the Warring States period. Therefore, he advocated universal love and love with no distinc­ tions. His theory stands in direct opposition to the Confucian con­ ception of constructing a family-based society. Mozi believed that to completely avert social disorder, everyone must renounce family rela­ tions and dispose of egoistic thinking and self-interested conduct. In Mozi's view, humans do many things detrimental to the nation and to the society in the name of family love and familial loyalty. But we should have only one form of loyalty - toward humanity at large. Everything we do must be done for the well-being of mankind. This universalist way of thinking cannot be promoted unless it can be universalized; i.e., unless everyone thinks and acts this way. Mozi thus set as his goal the re-education of the general masses to adopt this new way of thinking. To promote universal love and mutual benefits, Mozi brought out the authority of Heaven in support of his teaching. He reinstated religious sentiment into the rational discourse of ancient Chinese philosophy. He argued that Heaven commands all people to love one another equally and to benefit one another mutually. If one disobeys the Will of Heaven, one will incur harsh punishments from Heaven. He cited historical examples to demonstrate that those who fail to obey the Will of Heaven have all been severely punished. Mozi's philosophy of religion serves as a pragmatic means to the promotion of his ideal. It seems that he was trying to " scare" people into following the teaching of Mohism. To Mozi, having the ruler believe in the existence of a willful Heaven and having the people believe in the existence of formidable ghosts and spirits would be far more beneficial to the world than if they did not possess these beliefs. Therefore, one should promote such religious sentiments. Mohism is highly pragmatic. Mozi rejected the Confucian institutions of rites and rituals, since they are largely formalistic and impractical. The extensive mourning periods accorded by Confucian rites, for example, •

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Introduction take young men away from their daily tasks and allow them to pine away by their fathers' tombs. Mozi also condemned music, which, in his view, is a total waste of society's human resources. The time spent on learning, performing, and enjoying music can be better used to tend to farming, weaving, and governing. A modest society in which every­ one can be materially sustained is far superior to a culturally stratified society in which some are laborers while others have the leisure to enjoy high culture. On principle, Mohisrn- denounces anything that is extra­ vagant, and all things not necessary to basic survival are considered "extravagant. " Hence, Mozi promoted simple clothing that serves as j ust enough protection from the cold or heat, or simple food that is just enough to feed oneself. He wanted to establish a society that has no frills, no luxury, no sophistication, and no waste. In contrast to Confucianism and Mohism, both as a form of collect­ ive social reform, the third major school, Daoism, emerges as a form of individual deliverance. For Daoists, what matters the most is one's own spiritual elevation. Seeing that the world has gone beyond the point of salvation, Daoists in the ancient period generally chose to become recluses, by hiding their knowledge and their abilities and pretending to be ordinary farmers or fishermen. Among Confucius' contemporaries, many were reclusive Daoists, who simply scoffed at his efforts to futilely promote his ideal. To them, since the world was already in an irredeemable state, a better way to conduct oneself would be to live in isolation from the world. Laozi, the forefather of Daoism, based his political ideal not on antiquity as Confucius did, but on prehistoric primitive society. His theory is full of anti-social, anti-knowledge, and anti-civilization comments. In his utopia, people do not communicate, or exchange goods, with one another. Life is simple and secluded. We could see from this depiction that Daoism seems to have emerged from an escapist mentality, as a rejection of the contemporary world of tur­ moil. On the positive side, however, Daoism brings people to a higher spiritual realm in search of true freedom. It teaches one to forget worldly distinctions such as fame and wealth in the pursuit of internal tranquility. Under Daoism, one could learn to forget about the world and roam about in the world beyond. One could be liberated from the bondage set by one's present surroundings. Since Daoists do not wish to be bound by their present surroundings, they are more interested in abstract philosophical thinking. Laozi enter­ tained himself with such issues as the nature of Dao and the origin of the universe. Laozi took Dao in itself to be the source of all life forms as well as the totality of all existence. This Dao predates Heaven and Earth; it is Nonbeing, from which all beings emerge. Dao does not 21

Ancient Chinese Philosophy "create," however. All things simply follow naturally from Dao. At the same time, Dao does not cease to exist after all things have come into existence. Dao is eternal and all-encompassing. Dao nourishes everything but does not claim to be their master. Dao is fundamentally resistant to our conceptual depiction, since to name it is to confine it into our conceptual scheme. Dao is silent in itself; hence, we should not even attempt to begin our discourse on Dao. We should be silent as well. Following Laozi's skepticism of language and human conceptualization, Zhuangzi engaged in the philosophical examination of the nature of language and its correspondence with reality. He did not try to explicate the nature of Dao; rather, he focused more on demonstrating our nar­ row conceptions and prejudiced views. Zhuangzi pointed out that while his contemporary philosophers argue against one another to assert their own view as the truth, there is no objective way to settle the dispute. Whenever a j udgment is made as to who has won the debate, it merely reflects the third party's view. We all believe that our own view is correct, while others are wrong. But from the perspective of Dao, all particular truths present merely partial truths. Hence, no self-acclaimed truth is indeed true. Once we saw this as the Truth, we would cease all verbal disagreements. Zhuangzi explained that there is no right or wrong with regard to Dao. When we make the distinction between right and wrong, we have already deviated from Dao. In reality, Dao has no limitation, and speech has no finality. In terms of philosophy of life, Daoism represents the view that one should follow what naturally happens and not meddle with it. Human agency is not appreciated, because taking action is to go against nature. If we take an action to initiate a change, then we are not accepting things as they are. Even when we act merely to continue a state of affairs, we are not appreciating the fact that without our interference, things will go whichever way is the most natural to them. When this view is applied to politics, the doctrine of "inaction " naturally follows. Laozi thought that the best ruler is one who not only does not meddle with people's affairs, but also is not even known by his people. To Laozi, the best way to rule is to give up embellishment, embrace sim­ plicity, cast off selfishness, and temper material desires. If the ruler does nothing to enhance material existence, to increase social wealth, to employ able people or even to promote virtues, then the world will be in order " on its own accord. " To the Daoist, both the Confucian model of social reform and the Mohist model of psychological reform would interfere with the natural flow of Dao. Daoists do not embrace the humanistic spirit that marks both Confucianism and Mohism. To them, animals and inanimate things 22

Introduction are part of the world j ust as human beings are. To pay singular atten­ tion to human affairs is to go against Dao, which is impartial to all creatures. The Daoist principle of impartiality would thus go even fur­ ther than the Mohist principle of universal love. All things have equal value from the perspective of Dao. However, Daoism does not advocate the sentiment of love as Mohists do. It does not ask us to love all creatures equally; rather, it promotes a rational detachment from all particular love. It teaches us to view our loved ones as being in a mere transient state of the transformation of Dao. When Zhuangzi's wife died, instead of mourning, he gleefully celebrated her changing into a different form of existence - to be unified with Dao again. From this perspective, Daoism advises us to treat life's happiness and miseries equally, not to desire life or to abhor death. If we can truly obtain this mental state, then all suffering will be eliminated. In view of the Confucian project of moral transformation of rulers and the common people, Daoists think that it promotes only a second­ rate ideal. Both Laozi and Zhuangzi thought that the distinction be­ tween good and bad comes after Dao has declined. Using the metaphor of fish on dry land, Zhuangzi tells us that when fish are out of the water, they have to moisten one another with their saliva, whereas when they are in the great ocean, they don't even think about the necessity of water. Similarly, when the Confucian sees the need to cultivate morality in his own person as well as in others, it means that people are already living out of Dao. Why not set the fish back in the ocean ? the Daoist asks. Why not bring the people back to the world of Dao ? To return to the natural state of Dao, people have to eliminate de­ sires; to eliminate desires, all value distinctions must be renounced. In this respect, Daoism is quite similar to Mohism. Both schools denounce materialistic possessions; both schools disapprove of cultural refinements. Laozi thought that our senses are the culprit of our mind's demise. When we indulge in the senses' delight, we end up wanting more and seeking more because simple things can no longer gratify our senses. Laozi says, "There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. There is no fault greater than constant discontentment. There is no disaster greater than insatiable greed. ,,8 To Laozi, the ideal state of individual existence is to return to infancy, when we have not learned the pleasures of the senses. By the same token, the ideal state of society is to go back to the state of primitive society, where people did not even know what would be valuable, what should be cherished, or what could be pursued. Ignor­ ance is bliss, in a true Daoist sense. Finally, the fourth major philosophical school examined here is Legal­ ism, formulated by Hanfeizi. Legalism was a school of thought that 23

Ancient Chinese Philosophy descended from Mohism, minus the latter's idealism. Hanfeizi argued that Mohism does not go far enough in its emphasis on pragmatism, because the teaching of love is totally ineffectual. To accomplish what Mozi deems to be the best possible world, what we need is not love, but the severity of law and the harshness of punishment. Hanfeizi believed that harshness would bring obedience, while love would bring spoilage. From our empirical observation, he says, we see that in a severe house­ hold even the slaves would not rebel, but in a loving family children are often spoiled beyond rectification. He also criticized the Confucian model of moral politics. He argued that the ruler's virtue and kindness are not sufficient to end social unrest, while an awe-inspiring power can pro­ hibit violence and secure social order. Therefore, Hanfeizi concluded, a ruler should devote himself not to love, but to harsh punishment; not to virtue, but to law. Unlike the other schools, which cherish either antiquity or primitive society, Hanfeizi was a Modernist. He believed that what was ancient had no relevance to the present time. The ancient sages, however ideal they may have been, would not be able to rule his contemporary world. Times had changed; so should policies. Hanfeizi developed many polit­ ical tactics for the ruler to be effective; among them, punishment and reward are what he called the ruler's "two handles. " We can see that he believed, as Mozi did, that people are motivated and easily manipulated by punishment and rewards. Unlike Mozi, however, Hanfeizi placed the ultimate authority not in the invisible Will of Heaven, but in the con­ crete will of the ruler. The ruler is not even sanctioned by Heaven; the ruler is Heaven. Both Mozi and Hanfeizi took humans' egoistic nature as a given. But while Mozi tried to alter this nature, Hanfeizi simply constructed a practical political model on the basis of this very assumption. If humans are all egoistic, then they will always do what they deem to be in their best interests, which is almost without exception the opposite of the interests of the nation or of the ruler. Hanfeizi did not acknowledge the possibility that we could be rationally self-interested; that we might identify our own best self-interest with the general welfare of society. He did not even see the need to educate the people. If humans are by nature selfish, then even the best moral educator, such as Confucius himself, can only have limited success. To achieve the comprehensive, thorough, and across the board political reform that is the goal of Confucianism and Mohism, one must be a Legalist. The above introduction briefly outlines the similarities and differences between all four major schools of ancient Chinese philosophy. Confu­ cianism, as a philosophy of moral politics, moral families, and moral 24

Introduction self-cultivation, became the molding ideology of Chinese culture - it dominated the thought and behavior of Chinese intellectuals and gen­ eral masses alike. It shaped and sustained Chinese family relations and social structures for thousands of years. Daoism, with its spiritual ele­ vation and its teaching of tranquility, became the mental utopia for Chinese intellectuals. A common Chinese attitude is: "Be a Confucian in interactions with the mundane world; be a Daoist when retreating back to one's inner world. " Hence, Confucianism and Daoism can be seen as yang and yin; two complementary elements in Chinese culture and the Chinese mind. Legalism, as a philosophy of pragmatic rulership, be­ came the ideology embraced by Chinese emperors. It underlay the Chi­ nese political structure and helped maintain political stability in Chinese history. Mohism, although an influential school of thought for two to three hundred years, exited the intellectual stage along with the other multifarious ideas of the Hundred Schools. All schools in the ancient period, however dissimilar in their approaches, shared the same com­ mitment to their contemporary world. Their philosophies were all sug­ gested either as ways to solve, or as routes to evade, their contemporary social and political problems. None of these philosophers entertained an " other-worldly" transcendent realm as their intellectual enterprise. Ancient Chinese philosophy is fundamentally a this-worldly realist philosophy.

25

C I e T e Cosmo ogica Foun ation 0 C Inese P i osop y •

•

•

Introduction Yijing, commonly translated as the Book of Changers), is the single

most important work in the history of Chinese philosophy. It is not only the source of Chinese cosmology, but also the very foundation of the whole Chinese culture. Both the two leading Chinese philosophical schools, Confucianism and Daoism, drew cosmological and moral ideas from this book, which has been described as "a unique blend of proto­ Confucian and proto-[Daoist] ideas. " ! Yijing has also penetrated the Chinese mind. Every Chinese person, with or without philosophical training, would be naturally inclined to view the world the way Yijing depicts it - a world of possibilities as well as determination; a world dominated by yin and yang and yet alterable by human efforts. The dating of the compilation of Yijing is still a controversial issue among historians; hence, we cannot safely place the whole Yijing as either a pre-Confucian or a post-Confucian text. However, Confucius himself alluded to Yijing, and he was traditionally regarded as the author of some of the earlier commentaries on the hexagrams. Philosophically, we could also see how ancient Confucian thought was based on the cos­ mology laid out in Yijing. This explains why we open this book with the chapter on Yijing. •

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation

Yijing, as we currently have it, includes both the core text and the Ten Wings (ten supplementary texts).2 The construction of the core Yijing

was a cooperative effort spanning 1 ,500 years, from 2000 BeE to 500 BeE. In the first stage of formation, there was the diagram of eight trigrams, each of which consists of three lines that are either broken ) . The solid line represents yang; the broken line (- -) or solid ( represents yin. Allegedly, a legendary ruler, Fu Xi (ca. 2000 BeE), was respons-ible for the construction of this earliest form of Yijing. These trigrams represent the eight basic natural elements: heaven, earth, water, fire, wind, thunder, mountain, and lake. They depict how natural ele­ ments are formed out of the duality of yin and yang. The eight trigrams are as follows:

Qian

Kun

Zhen

Kan

Gen

Shun

Li

Dui

(Heaven) (Earth) (Thunder) (Water) (Mountain) (Wind) (Fire) ( Lake)

On the level of natural representations, these eight trigrams stand for eight basic natural phenomena. However, they also stand for other relations in a metaphorical sense. For instance, in one of the Ten Wings, the Discussion of the Trigrams (shuo-gua), the trigrams are associated with various things such as daughters and sons, different seasons, dir­ ections, colors, and various animals, among others. The exact reason behind these associations is lost, even though there have been many speculations by later interpreters. But at least we should see that the trigrams are not j ust fixed representations of nature. According to Richard Wilhelm's explanation, the eight basic trigrams further depict the con­ tinual process of change in the cosmos: These eight trigrams were conceiveo as images of all that happens in . heaven and on earth. At the same time, they were held to be in a state of continual transition, one changing into another, just as transition from one phenomenon to another is continually taking place in the physical world. Here we have the fundamental concept of the Book of Changes. The eight trigrams are symbols standing for changing transitional stages; they are images that are constantly undergoing change. Attention centers not on things in their state of being, but upon their movements in change. The eight trigrams therefore are not representations of things as such but of their tendencies in movement.3

27

Ancient Chinese Philosophy This interpretation gives us an insight into the whole construction of Yijing. If the eight basic units of Yijing represent not static states but dynamic potential for change, then their connotations cannot be fixed onto any particular natural phenomenon either. This cosmology is about constant flux; it is a philosophy of change. And this cosmology was envisaged as early ago as the first conception of the eight trigrams. The second development of Yijing took place when the eight trigrams were doubled in various combinations to form 64 hexagrams (i.e., a diagram of six lines) . According to the orthodox Chinese account, King Wen of the Zhou Dynasty (ca. 1 1 50 BCE) was the person responsible for the creation of 64 hexagrams. Traditional accounts also attributed the terse explanation on the decision of each hexagram ( "the Judgment" or gua-ci) as well as the explanation on each component line of the hexa­ gram (yiao-ci) to King Wen of Zhou, or to his son Duke Zhou (d. 1 094 BCE) At this stage, Yijing emerged as a philosophy of life. It was no longer j ust a book for divination. Each situation, symbolically repre­ sented by either the hexagram as a whole or a single line in the hexa­ gram, signifies a moral situation in life. The Judgment frequently refers to "the superior man," depicting his possible options in any given situ­ ation along with their possible outcomes. We could perhaps say that the ethics of Yijing was developed at this point. Allegedly, the third major development of Yijing came from Confu­ cius, who authored further commentary on the explanations given by King Wen of Zhou. This commentary, called Commentary on the Judg­ ment (tuan-zhuan), further turned the mystical oracle nature of the ancient text into a philosophical exposition of various situations in life. It serves both as an analysis of the various contexts and as a discussion on the moral duties of individuals in these contexts. Another important addition to Yijing was the Commentary on the Images (xiang-zhuan) . When the commentary is on the image of the whole hexagram, it is called "the Great Image" ; when it is on the image of each line, it is called "the Small Image . " These commentaries derive moral significance from the combination of the two trigram images (one above; one below) that make up a hexagram. They fully developed the sense of Nature's possessing moral attributes, or Nature's being symbolic repre­ sentations of various moral attributes. The Commentary on the Judg­ ment and the Commentary on the Images were both either attributed to Confucius and his immediate followers, or at least were seen as repre­ sentative of the Confucian philosophy in its early development. Apart from the Judgment, the Commentary on the Judgment, and the Commentary on the Images, there were some further commentaries added to the whole Yijing. Together, these supplementary texts were 28

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation called the Ten Wings of Yijing. Among these other commentaries, the most important texts are probably the two expository treatises on the first two hexagrams, Qian and Kun. These two treatises are called "wen-yan", translated as Commentary on the Words of the Text. The content of these texts is very much in line with Confucianism; hence, they have been traditionally attributed to Confucius himself. But since in these texts Confucius is often referred to as "the Master" (as in the Analects), it is likely that they were either recorded by his students or were even composed by later followers of the Confucian School. The remainder of the Ten Wings were probably attached to Yijing as late as in the Han Dynasty (206 BeE-AD 220). Of these later works, the Great Treatise (xi-ci-zhuan) received the most attention from Neo-Confucians. This treatise is divided into two parts. It covers a wide range of topics, including the nature of Yijing, the method of divination, the social reforms made by ancient sages, and the history of human civilization. It can be seen as one of the most important philosophical foundations for Neo-Confucianism. As the end product, Yijing consists of 64 hexagrams and the Ten Wings. The whole book is rich in metaphysical and ethical symbolism. All affairs of the world are supposedly represented by these hexagrams. In theory, Yijing provides a profound cosmological foundation for Chi­ nese philosophy. In practice, Yijing was commonly used in divination, a process in which advice is given to a particular person in a particular situation on how to accomplish success and avoid disaster. Thus, it could be called the guidebook of practical wisdom. Today it is often consulted by those seeking guidance with respect to love, career, poli­ tics, interpersonal relationships, and inner development. It also serves as the theoretical basis for Feng Shui, an art of the rearrangement of one's life and one's surroundings, which has been popularized in the Western world. In this chapter, we will study Yijing from the philosophical per­ spective. Even though Yijing may have been the compilation of multiple authors, later commentaries all seemed to build on earlier ones. Overall, there is no obvious discrepancy in the content of Yijing. Hence, in our analysis, we shall treat it as a whole text, not dissecting it into various historical fragments.

Yi: A Constantly Changing Universe The word yi means both "change" and " easy," jing means "classic." One explanation for the name of this book is that the method of divina­ tion used is much easier than the turtle-shell divination method used in 29

Ancient Chinese Philosophy an earlier dynasty; hence, the book received the name of "yi." But an explanation more commonly endorsed by traditional Chinese scholars is to say that the word yi means "change," and it refers to the alteration between yin and yang. Since yin and yang are constantly in motion, nothing can stay the same forever. We shall adopt this interpretation here. Under this interpretation, Yijing is fittingly translated as the "Book of Change. " It is a book about the cosmos and the human world. Since the universe is constantly changing, every condition bears the seed of change to a different condition. A theoretical motivation for developing a philosophy of change is that the basic element of the universe is taken to be qi, not atoms, or matter. Matter has a spatial and temporal stability that is not observed in the movement of qi. The constant change in the atmosphere can serve as a good illustration of the movement of qi. If the whole universe along with everything within it is composed of qi, then change is simply the constant state of affairs. Myriad objects are not individuated as spa­ tially confined things, which begin with the aggregation of atoms, end­ ing with the dissolution of atoms. Instead, each object is seen as a process of change, with the condensation of qi marking its beginning and the rarefaction of qi marking its end. Within each process of con­ densation and rarefaction, there is also the constant alteration between yin and yang. Therefore, nothing is assigned a fixed nature. Everything constantly grows, changes, matures, and declines. This is the natural process of the universe. In Yijing, such a cosmology of change is applied to the human con­ text. An important aspect of the construction of the hexagram is that each hexagram describes a movement, or a development, from the bot­ tom line to the top line. The six lines are called "changing lines," since they depict various moments of change. When an explanation is given to each line, it describes a temporarily frozen moment in time; there­ after, multiple developments could take place depending on the action taken at that particular moment in time. The development from the first stage to the last stage of the state of affairs represented in the same hexagram, according to the Great Treatise on Yijing, constitutes a causal relation. Each bottom line of the hexagram (the first line) describes the beginning of a development, and the top line (the sixth line) of the hexagram describes how things develop following the natural course of events. Therefore, "the beginning line is difficult to understand. The top line is easy to understand. For they stand in the relationship of cause and effect. The Judgment on the first line is tentative, but at the last line everything has attained completion. ,,4 Understood in this way, the 64 hexagrams demonstrate 64 sequences of causal relations. Each of the 30

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation six lines of the hexagram represents a stage in the causal development; hence, there are minimally 384 possible transitory situations. Under each given situation, the decision one makes, the action one takes, or even the attitude one chooses, can all contribute to the further develop­ ment of the state of affairs. The method of divination is also based on elements of change and non-change. Whether one uses the coin method or the yarrow stalk method,S one gets four possible numbers for each line: 6, 7, 8, 9. Both 6 and 8 signify yin (the broken line), but the former represents the old yin while the latter represents the young yin. When yin gets " old, " it necessarily changes into a yang. The same is true for the pair of 7 and 9 : 9 represents old yang and signifies an impending change into yin. In the Judgment for each line, only 6 is mentioned for each broken line (yin) and only 9 is used to stand for each solid line (yang). Hence, each line Judgment depicts a moment before change; a transient state of affairs. As Wilhelm explains: The hexagrams, consisting of six lines each, are, so to speak, representa­ tions of actual conditions in the world, and of the combinations of the light-giving, heavenly power and the dark, earthly power that occur in these situations. Within the hexagrams, however, it is always possible for the individual lines to change and regroup themselves; just as world situ­ ations continually change and reconstitute themselves, so out of each hexagram there arises a new one. The process of change is to be observed in the lines that move, and the end result is the new hexagram thus formed.6

When such a view is applied to all of life's situations, what Yijing teaches is that we need to adapt our conduct in accordance with our changing relations to the environment. Even if we do not change, other people and other things are constantly changing. Therefore, adapting to changes is far superior to ignorant persistence. The things that change around us are our situation in the local environment, our position in the current situation, our relations to others in the same situation, as well as the local environment's relation to the larger environment. In an adverse situation, one takes precautions and conceals one's brilliance; in a favorable situation, but in a low position, one bides one's time for the right moment to arise. If one has correspondence with or support from others, a new direction can be initiated; one who is isolated and mis­ trusted does not push their way forward. If the local environment is con­ ducive to the well-being of the larger environment, then we can conform to the local environment; if the local environment brings harm to the larger environment, then we should either quit it or alter it. Everything 31

, f

Ancient Chinese Philosophy has to do with the right moment, the right situation, the right people, and the right relations. All these elements are summed up in the notion of "time" (shi). "Being appropriate to the time" (shi-zhong) is the wis­ dom of life that Yijing teaches. However, even though the major concept in Yijing is change, the underlying background is non-change. Change is not possible without a frame of reference, which is non-change. Wilhelm says: In the [ Yijing) a distinction is made between three kinds of change: nonchange, cyclic change, and sequent change. Nonchange is the back­ ground, as it were, against which change is made possible. For in regard to any change there must be a fixed point to which the change can be referred; otherwise there can be no definite order and everything is dis­ solved in chaotic movement. This point of reference must be established, and this always requires a choice and a decision. It makes possible a system of coordinates into which everything can be fitted. Consequently at the beginning of the world, as at the beginning of thought, there is the decision, the fixing of the point of reference.7

In other words, the relation between the whole hexagram and each line within this hexagram is the relation between non-change and change. The Judgment ( or Decision) of each hexagram depicts the point of reference for the change of each line. This is why in the process of divination one always needs to consult the hexagram Judgment before assessing the connotation of the line Judgment, which signifies change. On the cosmic level, the non-changing frame of reference for the movement of qi is simply the totality of qi. This totality of qi is called " tai-ji." s If the totality of qi is unchanging, then each time yin expands, yang has to decrease; and vice versa. Even though the two forms of cosmic energy compete with each other, they also work in unison. There is thus a principle of harmony governing the competition between yin and yang. The Commentary on the Judgment for the 3 8th hexagram says: " Heaven and earth are opposites, but their action is concerted. Man and woman are opposites, but they strive for union. All beings stand in opposition to one another: what they do takes on order thereby. Great indeed is the effect of the time of Opposition. ,,9 The two oppo­ sites are governed by the principle of harmonious whole� Under this principle of harmony, the exchange between yin and yang takes up certain patterns. These patterns can be deemed the laws of the universe. Hence, there are two senses of "non-change." The first is in the uni­ verse's constancy, on whose foundation changes are detectable. A second sense is manifested in the laws governing all changes. 32

Yijing ( I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation According to R. L. Wing, there are two fundamental laws underlying physical changes in the universe: One is the law of polar reversal. In all things we see the seeds of their opposites: Just as new life carries in its genetic code the signal for its own decomposition, so too in every human affair lies the seed of a subtle but exacting change. The other law of change is periodicity. This law mani­ fests in cycles and rhythms, like the changing seasons, the growth cycles in plants, and the stages in the development of the individual's life and character.1o ,

Both these laws can easily be manifested in the movement of yin and yang. Since the totality of yin and yang is fixed, once yin or yang reaches its maximal state, the reversal of development is bound to take place. The natural laws governing the universe thus include the law of cyclical development - things that develop to one extreme would neces­ sarily tend toward the opposite. When the time is right, there is a necessity of return. Wilhelm explains the 24th hexagram Return this way: "The idea of Return is based on the course of nature. The move­ ment is cyclic, and the course completes itself. Therefore it is not neces­ sary to hasten anything artificially. Everything comes of itself at the appointed time. " l l The law of Nature ordains cyclical development because everything in the universe is constantly changing and trans­ forming. Things develop toward harmony, and yet once harmony is achieved, any further development will simply destroy it. "For it is just when perfect equilibrium has been reached that any movement may cause order to revert to disorder. " 1 2 From the principle of reversal, we derive the principle of periodicity. Each development eventually leads to its reversal; hence, each develop­ ment has its limit. In this way, the movement of qi and the interchange ,' between yin and yang sets up the regularity of the universe: weather goes through four immutable seasons and living things go through four inevitable stages of life (birth, maturation, degeneration, and death); similarly, events or human organizations go though four natural stages of development: initiation, growth, expansion, and, finally, deterioration. Knowledge of the inexorable order of things should make one take care when one is in a favorable situation; it should at the same time make one hopeful when one is in a pitfall. Nothing is fixed forever. Neither the good nor the bad will last long. What one needs is a keen perception of the incoming development. If one sees where one is in the whole progression of events, then one can take appropriate action either to enhance the trend when it is auspicious, or to alter it, at least to slow 33

Ancient Chinese Philosophy it down, when it is inauspicious. In the final section of this chapter, we shall deal with Yijing's philosophy of action. But before we turn to Yijing's philosophy as applied to life, let us take a look at another aspect of its cosmology.

A Universe with Moral Attributes : The Foundation for Human Morality Yijing depicts a universe with goodness inherent in it. In Yijing, the eight

basic trigrams represent heaven, earth, lake, mountain, fire, water, wind, and thunder, each having certain moral attributes. The natural phenom­ enon that classical Confucians most often alluded to as the moral paradigm was heaven, or the sun. Heaven exemplifies the attributes of creativity, constancy, and steadfastness. As Yijing says, "The movement of heaven is full of power. Thus the superior man makes himself strong and untiring. " 1 3 The sun, on the other hand, exemplifies the attributes of warmth, kindness, and impartiality. For example, the 50th hexagram, Feng, depicts "the sun at midday" and asks that the ruler be like it. Wilhelm's explanation says that the ruler " must be like the sun at midday, illuminating and gladdening everything under the sun. ,, 14 Aside from ascribing these moral attributes to heaven and the sun, the basic eight trigrams also list other natural phenomena as signifying moral attributes: wind signifies a gentle penetrating power; lake signifies the attribute of joyousness; thunder represents forcefulness and fearfulness; mountain represents steadfastness and stillness; fire has the attributes of radiance and clarity; water has the attributes of humility and continuity. These other phenomena are more often cited as a model for man's behavior, rather than as having moral attributes themselves. But heaven and the sun, in contrast, seem to be ascribed moral attributes. From our contemporary perspective, we think that such an ascription must be metaphorical, not literal: how could Nature be moral when it has no awareness, no intention, and no volition? However, under Yijing's depiction, the universe is a universe with moral attributes; it is a moral universe. This philosophy of a moral universe is the very foundation of Confucian ethics. Confucians' sense of morality is grounded on their metaphysics of a moral universe. Humans' moral mission is defined in the context of a moral universe. Confucians typically regard the highest moral accomplishment of humans as that of aiding creation and fur­ thering other lives. They regard this task as the ultimate goal of Heaven and Earth. In this sense, Heaven and Earth, as well as the whole cosmos, 34

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation are rendered moral and intentional. Human beings are situated between Heaven and Earth; they have a moral commandment to continue the task of Heaven and Earth. This "Trinity" - Heaven, Earth, and Man not only depicts a moral structure of the universe, but also prescribes an ultimate moral duty (to be equal to Heaven and Earth) to human beings. When one attains the supreme status of being one of the Trinity, one 'becomes a " counterpart of Heaven.,, !5 This is how Confucianism defines "the sage " ; it is also what the ancient Chinese expected of a true ruler - the Son of Heaven. !6 Yijing opens with the hexagram of Qian and the hexagram of Kun. In the construction of the hexagram, Qian is made up of six unbroken lines and Kun is made of six broken lines. Hence, Qian is purely yang while Kun is purely yin. Since no real existence can be without both yin and yang, . what Qian and Kun stand for must be abstract principles. Wilhelm and Baynes ( 1 977) translate Qian as "The Creative," Kun as "The Receptive. " We can say that Qian stands for the Creative Princi­ ple, signified by Heaven; Kun stands for the Receptive Principle and is signified by Earth. In this cosmic philosophy, Heaven and Earth are seen as principles of generation and sustenance. But they are not mere " stand­ ins" for abstract principles. The thinkers behind Yijing project moral attributes onto Heaven and Earth. In their view, a moral universe is the source of our moral attributes and the inspiration for our moral con­ duct. The morally correct thing for humans to do is to "emulate" the moral attributes of Heaven and Earth. As the Great Treatise says, "Heaven creates divine things; the holy sage takes them as models. Heaven and Earth change and transform; the holy sage imitates them."!? That is to say, this philosophy asserts the absolute value of certain moral attributes. These attributes are not "good" in relation to human j udgments or human situations; they are good in the absolute sense because they are manifested in Nature. For humans to be moral is for them to possess these virtues within themselves. What are the moral attributes that have absolute values? We can sum up the most essential ones in Yijing as follows.

The four primary virtues In Yijing, there are four primary virtues assigned to each hexagram, though not all hexagrams have all four of them.!8 The one hexagram . that has these four primary virtues unqualified by any other restriction is the first hexagram, the Creative ( "Qian " ) . Wilhelm and Baynes trans­ late these four primary virtues as " sublime success; furthering through 35

Ancient Chinese Philosophy perseverance. ,, 19 In this rendition, the four virtues seem to be divided into two sets: [A] ( 1 ) sublimity, (2) success; [B] (3) furtherance, (4) perseverance. James Legge translates them as ( 1 ) great and originating, (2) penetrating, (3) advantageous, and (4) correct and firm.20 Alfred Huang translates them as (1) sublime and initiative, (2) prosperous and smooth, (3 ) favorable and beneficial, and (4) steadfast and uprightY The original Chinese words are: yuan, heng, Ii, zhen. The reason why these translators have used more than one term to render each of the four single words in Chinese is that each word carries with it compli­ cated meanings. The first, yuan, signifies the origin of life, the source of existence. This primary virtue is the virtue of the Creative Principle, which initiates life forms and turns non-being into being. The second word, heng, signifies the penetration of qi into all things. This primary virtue is thus the virtue of fostering life and furthering everything's development. Li signifies benefit. It represents the virtue of promoting others and aiding the completion of things. Finally, zhen signifies cor­ rectness. This last primary virtue is thus the virtue of rectifying every­ thing and making all life forms conform to standards appropriate to them. In the other hexagrams, this word often indicates "perseverance " as well. The connection may be that one should never deviate from the right course; hence, one should always persevere in what is correct. These four primary virtues depict the roots of human morality as manifested in Nature. What Heaven and Earth accomplish together, via the operation of qi, is to create, nourish, benefit, and rectify all things in between. The fundamental moral task for humans is to continue what Heaven and Earth commence and bring the task to its completion. All primary virtues are the ideal virtues that human beings should strive to obtain; they embody the supreme moral commandments from Heaven and Earth.

The good (shan) One remark in the Great Treatise was frequently quoted by neo­ Confucians as the definition of dao. It says: " One cycle of yin; one cycle of yang, this is called 'dao.' What continues it, is 'Good.' What com­ pletes it, is 'nature. ",22 Apart from seeing the definition of dao, we also see here the concept " Good" defined as the continuer of Dao. To con­ tinue Dao is to aid the creative and nourishing functions of Heaven and Earth, of yang and yin. This task constitutes the highest moral goodness for humankind. As the Commentary on the Judgment on the 27th hexagram Yi (Providing Nourishment) says: " Heaven and Earth provide 36

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Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation nourishment for all beings. The holy man provides nourishment for men of worth and thus reaches the whole people. ,,23 Human beings are related to all creatures as their preservers and nurturers; moreover, the sage (the holy man) is related to the rest of humankind as their leader and protector. The " Good" becomes a " Mandate from Heaven" - it depicts our categorical moral duty. Lik Kuen Tong explains: What the Great [Treatise] here means by the "Good" must not be con­ fused with the conventional conception of moral good which owes its specific meaning to the objectified and fixated posturality of a moral code or ethical system. The Good as the "continuer" of integrity and flexibility is the absolute good of Being itself in the primordial morality of its posturing power, not the "relative good" of our actions judged from the standards of our consequent moralities.24

We may say that since Yijing defines the " Good" on the basis of Dao, which governs the whole universe, this is Good in the absolute sense. To aid others in their fulfillment of life's potentials is not relative to indi­ vidual or cultural perspectives; it is simply good in and of itself. This unqualified assertion of the meaning of our moral sense and the content of our moral duty in Yijing became the theoretical foundation for Con­ fucian ethics.

Equilibrium (zhong) and harmony (he) Under the principle of reversal, once a development reaches its extre­ mity, the opposite development takes shape. Yijing describes a natural harmony in the world of Nature, which balances yin and yang in the state of equilibrium the balance between two extremes. The Chinese word zhong is commonly translated either as "equilibrium" or as " the mean," since it connotes both. The mean is not j ust the strict middle point between two extremes; rather, it is a state of intrinsic harmony. Hence, some elements could be more than others, as long as the in­ equality does not disturb the harmonious balance. The two notions, the mean and harmony, are often used in conjunction. Yijing's notion of the mean is not relative to human j udgment. It depicts a cosmic state both before, and after, any disturbance in the flow of qi. In other words, it is a natural state of the cosmos, to which all other unnatural states will eventually return. As the 24th hexagram Return says, " Return. Success. Going out and coming in without error. ,,25 We can envisage a cosmic pendulum in the constant movement of yin and yang. The goal of the -

37

Ancient Chinese Philosophy movement of qi is not to keep the pendulum resting still at the middle point, since this eliminates movement. With the constant swing between two ends, the pendulum maintains a consistent flow. This consistent movement is harmony itself. When the mean is understood as equili­ brium, the allowance for variance is much greater. A development to­ ward one end or the other is not necessarily violating the principle of the mean, as long as any deviation eventually returns to the mean. Since the flow of qi is naturally ordered in accordance with Dao, it contains within itself the natural state of equilibrium and harmony. Such is the Truth, or the Way (Dao), of the world. Based on the assumption of a morally ordered universe, Yijing takes the goodness of human nature as given. Humans are born with moral attributes. In Yijing, it is said that everything receives its true nature from the creative force of Qian and keeps being transformed by it until everything "comes into permanent accord with the Great Harmony. ,,26 Humans have the purest and the most harmonious combination of yin and yang; hence, we are the most superior of all living things. The thesis that human nature originally possesses equilibrium and harmony was later elaborated in one of the Confucian classics: the Doctrine of the Mean, allegedly written by Confucius' grandson. The Doctrine of the -Mean opens with this remark: What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way [Dao] . . . . Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are aroused, it is called equilibrium (the Mean). When these feelings are aroused and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world, and harmony its universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish.27

This esoteric remark is much better illuminated in the context of Yijing. If human nature comes from Heaven, then it is naturally good. To follow our nature is to " continue" Dao; hence, it is naturally good. Moral goodness for human beings is thus to follow our nature. Within our inborn nature are emotions such as pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy. Before these emotions are aroused, we are in a state of equilibrium, since our nature is equilibrium itself. Once our emotions are aroused, we need to moderate them so that they are in a state of harmony. In this way, moderation (the mean) and harmony are closely linked again. When the human world can attain equilibrium and harmony within itself and further extends them to the world of Nature, then the task of 38

Yijing ( I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation Heaven and Earth is completed. This is the ideal state of the world for all. We may say that in the philosophy of Yijing, there is no distinction between "what is" and "what ought to be. " Yijing sets up what is - the way the world is - as what ought to be. " Ought" implies moral duties or an ideal moral situation; it is specifically applied to the human world. But Yijing prescribes our highest moral duties in terms of the way the moral universe is. In other words, the moral attributes of the universe are what we humans ought to emulate. When human morality is grounded on an objective moral reality, it is part of the fabric of the world as well. This is a form of moral realism, which asserts objectivity and reality in moral values. Under this moral philosophy, what is "good" is not what God commands, not what social conventions decide, not even what human reason prescribes. Good is what is seen in Nature; it is what natural phenomena manifest. This philosophical system derives moral standards from observation of the external world, and the world is conceived differently from a mechanic, physicalistic worldview.

Yijing's Moral Philosophy: Contextual Prescriptivism Not only do natural phenomena provide moral models for human be­ ings, the relationships among natural phenomena also take up multiple symbolic moral connotations in Yijing. When the eight trigrams are doubled in various combinations, they form 64 hexagrams. The 64 hexagrams, as well as the six different lines that make up each hexa­ gram, exhaust all possible situations in the natural world. Human con­ texts in an abstract way are parallel to these natural contexts. Yijing prescribes the best way to act for each and every context. For example, the fifth hexagram, Xu, has water on top and heaven below, which signifies clouds rising up in the sky and the impending rainfall. There is nothing one can do but wait for the rainfall. This image symbolizes a time of waiting in the human context and the proper attitude is not to be anxious or agitated. "Thus the superior man eats and drinks, is joyous and of good cheer. ,,28 Its reverse combination - heaven on top and water below - makes up the sixth hexagram, Song, which signifies "con'flict," since there are two opposing forces in the elements: heaven tends upward while water tends downward. The Image of the hexa­ gram says: " Heaven and water go their opposite ways: The image of Conflict. Thus in all his transactions the superior man carefully considers 39

Ancient Chinese Philosophy the beginning. ,, )9 In a similar fashion, all other hexagrams represent different contexts for moral decisions that are derived from the sym­ bolic meaning of the different relationships between natural elements. Even though all contexts are different, there is a common cosmic structure inherent in all arrangements of hexagrams. This cosmic struc­ ture is the hierarchy between Heaven and Earth, between yang and yin. The Great Commentary on Yi [Da Zhuan] began with the following description: "Heaven is high, the earth is low; thus [Qian] and [Kun] are determined. In correspondence with this difference between low and high, inferior and superior places are established. " 30 The basic structure of the cosmos consists in various levels of the hierarchy. This cosmic order lays the foundation for the social hierarchy in the human world. As Heaven is above and Earth is below, those who are represented by yang should be placed higher than those who are represented by yin in the social ladder. This moral structure with the dominance of yang and the subordination of yin corresponds to the political hierarchy with the emperor at the top, the ministers in the middle, and the people at the bottom. It also corresponds to the familial hierarchy of parents' presid­ ing over children, the husband's expecting submission from the wife, and elder brothers' regulating younger ones. In terms of politics, Yijing provides a theoretical j ustification for the Chinese system of monarchy. In terms of society, Yijing affirms the hierarchical family relationships that came to be ingrained in Chinese culture. As Commentary on the Judgment says about the hexagram The Family: The correct place of the woman is within; the correct place of the man is without. That man and woman have their proper places is the greatest concept in nature. Among the members of the family there are strict rulers; these are parents. When the father is in truth a father and the son a son, when the elder brother is an elder brother and the younger brother a younger brother, the husband a husband and the wife a wife, then the house is on the right way. When the house is set in order, the world is established in a firm course.31

In this manner, Yijing assigns distinct roles to everyone in the family. Each person's doing his or her share within the family will ensure a greater harmony than what would be accomplished if each acted on his or her own. All contexts explicated in Yijing have their unique moral qualities, and the general precept is to act in accordance with the cosmic order (Dao). As the Image of the 34th hexagram, Da Zhuang, says, "Thus the superior man does not tread upon paths that do not accord with 40

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation established order. ,,32 To act according to what the context prescribes is to act in line with the cosmic order. This contextual prescriptivism is not moral absolutism in its crudest form, since it does not proclaim the same moral duty for everyone in all situations. Time - that is, the various elements in one's external environment - brings about different moral duties. Furthermore, this contextual prescriptivism does not even assign the same moral duty to everyone in the same situation; since different people have different personality traits ( being aggressive or being passive by nature, for example), they should act in accordance with their own strength or weakness. There are times to take up public offices; there are times to seek reclusion. There are times to persevere in one's conduct; there are times to give up trying. There are times to procure fellowship with others; there are times to remain isolated. There are times to take leadership; there are times to remain subordinate. As the Commentary on the Judgment for the 4 1 st hexagram says, "There is a time for decreasing the firm, and a time for increasing the yielding. In decreasing and increasing, in being full and being empty, one must go with the time. ,,33 The element of time is prevalent in all hexagrams. Yijing often talks about " the demands of the time." "The time" in Yijing means more specifically the variables in situations. Hence, the moral precept of going with the time and following one's natural traits is a form of situational ethics rather than a dogmatic form of moral absolutism. In each given situation, there is a natural development of cosmic elements. When the superior person is placed under a human circum­ stance that resembles the cosmic state, there are certain rules of conduct most appropriate to him or her. In this sense, the social context pre­ scribes the individual's moral duties. Under each given circumstance, there are correct ways to behave oneself. As Wilhelm explains, " Applied to human affairs . . . what the hexagram indicates is action in conform­ ity with the situation . . . . The superior man lets himself be guided; he does not go ahead blindly, but learns from the situation what is de­ manded of him and then follows his intimation from fate. ,,34 In Yijing, the moral advice often seems to consist of hypothetical imperatives in the spirit of egoism. The desired consequences seem to be "good for­ tune," " felicity," or minimally "no blame " ; the undesirable consequences seem to be " misfortune, " " harm, " " danger," " humiliation," etc. The oracles seem to be saying, "Act this way if you want to achieve felicity and success." However, the egoistic reading of the language of the Judgments in Yijing is definitely mistaken. According to the Great Trea­ tise on Yijing, a deeper understanding of Yijing will reveal that the pursuit of good fortune or the avoidance of misfortune is not intended 41

Ancient Chinese Philosophy solely for the individuals who do the divination. The Great Treatise says: "To be able to preserve joyousness of heart and yet to be con­ cerned in thought: in this way we can determine good fortune and misfortune on earth, and bring to perfection everything on earth. ,,35 What Yijing implicitly assumes is that all those who consult it are moral agents, who aspire to do the right thing and who have in mind the welfare of human society. For example, from the Image of the hexa­ gram Xiao Guo, "the superior man derives an imperative: he must always fix his eyes more closely and more directly on duty than does the ordinary man, even though this might make his behavior seem petty to the outside world. He is exceptionally conscientious in his actions. ,,36 In each and every hexagram, there is always a moral imperative given to the " superior man. " Therefore, authors of Yijing intended the Judg­ ments for the superior moral agents, not for the common folks with petty concerns for their self-interest. Yijing's moral philosophy should be understood in the background of its cosmology - its philosophy of change and its view of the moral, principled universe. There are things that constantly change in our moral contexts; there are also principles governing all changes. One's social roles change, but the larger hierarchy does not. One's relations to others change, but one's moral duties appropriate to each relation do not. One's situations change, but the moral imperative of being appropriate to the time does not. One's outward behaviors may change with circum­ stances, but one's inner virtues should not do so. In all situations, there is one absolute moral imperative overriding all other contextual moral duties: Adhering to the Good.

Yijing's Philosophy of Action: Causal Efficacy or Fatalism? How does one conduct oneself in a world that is constantly changing? How does one enjoy autonomy in one's action when each action seems to be " demanded" by the situation in which one finds oneself? What kind of philosophy of life does Yijing teach us? Is it an optimistic or a pessimistic philosophy? Is it fatalism, or does it grant human efficacy and human freedom? In Yijing, neither is everything completely determined, nor is every­ thing due to haphazard chance. Since human contexts correspond to natural contexts, we could foresee how things might progress from a given point on. An individual's moral decision in a given context dir42

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation ectly contributes to the interchange between yin and yang in the larger environment; hence, it can bring about a change in the state of affairs. Since the interchange between yin and yang is governed by natural laws, there is some predictability concerning further developments. "Here it is shown that the way to success lies in apprehending and giving actuality to the way of the universe [dao], which, as a law running through end and beginning, brings about all phenomena in time. Thus, each step attained forthwith becomes a preparation for the next. Time is no longer a hindrance but the means of making actual what is poten­ tial. ,, 37 In Yijing, each line symbolically represents a human context, and every moral deed or moral attitude one takes in the given context makes the causal contribution to the later development of that state of affairs. Herein lies human's causal efficacy. However, one's full effort does not always guarantee success. There are too many things beyond one's control. The initial situation in which one finds oneself is beyond one's control; hence, one can only adapt to the situation to find the best way to behave. Whatever is beyond one's control is called " destiny" or " fate, " which can be seen as one's moral constraints. In the Analects, Confucius himself often lamented that it was due to his fate that he failed to realize his political ideal. In Yijing, these moral constraints set limits to our options, but they are not deter­ ministic in nature. Yijing does not predict what each moral agent will do; it only predicts what consequences various moral decisions would bring about. Even when the given situation allows only one recom­ mended conduct, the choice still exists whether or not to comply with the recommendation. Acting against the prescribed conduct can bring danger to oneself and to one's environment. One nevertheless has a free choice. Hence, it would be wrong to use the divination in Yijing as a way to foresee our future. Our future is uncertain, because our actions have not yet been decided. Even if one has chosen the recommended conduct, the outcome is still not completely predictable. When one makes a moral deliberation or takes an action, there are many other elements taking place at the same time. For instance, other people's concurrent decisions and conduct could affect the larger state of affairs. One only has direct knowledge of, and control over, one's own undertakings. Hence, even if the whole universe is governed by Dao the law of yin and yang this ontological determination does not guarantee epistemic predictability. Given this epistemic limitation, what we should do is to conduct ourselves in the most appropriate way, and hope for the best. There is optimism in Yijing's philosophy of life, however. What the philosophy of change can guarantee is that nothing is fixed for good. -

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Ancient Chinese Philosophy Whether one is in a supremely good condition, or in a bad one, the good as well as the bad will not last long. This perspective cautions us to be wary of things that happen around us when we are content with where we are; however, it also makes us hopeful that the present woeful situation can turn around. Under this philosophy, one has to have a keen perception not only of one's present situation, but also of the possible changes that are coming one's way. If one perceives the begin­ ning of a wrong turn of events, one could terminate the change in time. As the Commentary on the Words of the Text says: A house that heaps good upon good is sure to have an abundance of blessings. A house that heaps evil upon evil is sure to have an abundance of ills. Where a servant murders his master, where a son murders his father, the causes do not lie between the morning and evening of one day. It took a long time for things to go so far. It came about because things that should have been stopped were not stopped soon enough.38

This commentary explains the first line of the hexagram of Kun, which symbolizes the formation of the negative force. When the sign of a negative trend first appears, one needs to recognize it as such and find ways to alter the direction of change. Naturally, when the trend is desirable, one would want to take action to encourage its further devel­ opment. One's causal efficacy, however, is not dependent solely on one's effort. Sometimes a development could be so entrenched that it would be impossible to stop it or even to slow it down. At this point, any resistance to change, however disagreeable the change may be, becomes futile. To act or not to act - that is the question. Tze-ki Hon calls each situation in life (as depicted by Yijing) "a field of action " : None of us act on our own, but as members of a team. As players in a field of action, the more we realize where we stand and from where to seek assistance, the better our chances of success. In this regard, the degree to which we are capable of controlling our future depends on how well we know our field of action, and how effectively we interact with it.39

In other words, there are no absolute moral successes for everyone in all situations, even if everyone is acting in accordance with Yijing's counsel. What Yijing portrays is situational confinement as well as situational possibilities. The given situation and its possibilities are the limits of life. We can work within the given limits of life, to find our choices. There is thus freedom of choice, though our options are limited and our 44

Yijing (I Ching): The Cosmological Foundation freedom is preconditioned by the intended consequences. One thing that needs to be emphasized in the end, however, is that our choice is only between acting and not acting, never between being moral and being immoral. Yijing would never advise that we alter ourselves (our inner virtues) to conform to society.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have covered some of the most essential theses of Yijing. But the philosophy of Yijing is much more complicated than what could be covered here. The Judgment for each hexagram as well as for each line in the hexagram can all be elaborated into a philosophy on values and realities. The first two hexagrams, Qian and Kun, for example, encompass the philosophy of yang and the philosophy of yin respectively. The philosophy of yang is also the philosophy of dragon; the philosophy of yin is also the philosophy of mare. The former depicts an aggressive, assertive, adventurous, and active attitude toward life; the latter depicts a receptive, devoted, yielding, and non-competitive attitude toward life. Later, we shall see that Confucianism takes on the philosophy of Qian, while Daoism takes on the philosophy of Kun. Yijing is indeed the archetype of Chinese philosophy. From as early as the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220 AD ) , many Chinese intellectuals would devote their whole life to the study of Yijing. There are countless com­ mentaries or philosophical treatises written on it in Chinese intellectual history. Yijing's tremendous impact on the development of Chinese thought cannot be underscored enough.

Further discussion questions 1

Can we define any cosmic pattern? Is there any semblance between cosmic patterns and patterns in human affairs? 2 Why must there be only 64 hexagrams and six lines in each hexagram? Do they really exhaust all possible situations in the universe or in the human world? 3 Can humans have freedom of will in a universe governed by q i? To what extent does the external environment condition one? To what extent can one alter the external environment? 4 How do human acts affect the larger environment? What kind of causation is implied in the interchange between yin and yang?

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Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Primary texts Alfred Huang. The Complete I Ching. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions, 1998. Richard John Lynn (trans.) The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994. Richard Wilhelm and Cary F. Baynes (trans.) The I Ching: Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Further readings Chung-ying Cheng. "On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16, 1989: 125-5 8. . '''Li' and 'Ch'i' in the I Ching: Reconsideration of Being and Non-being in Chinese Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14, 1987: 1-38. Shu-hsien Liu. "On the Functional Unity of the Four Dimensions of Thought in the Book of Changes." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 17, 1990: 359- 86. Bo Mou. "An Analysis of the Ideographic Nature and Structure of the Hexa­ gram in Yijing: From the Perspective of Philosophy of Language." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25(3), 1998: 305-20. Hellmut Wilhelm and Richard Wilhelm. Understanding the I Ching: The Wilhelm Lectures on the Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 979.

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Con ueius KOJ1.gzi In t e Ana ects •

Introduction In the Western world, Confucius (55 1-479 BeE) is generally regarded as the founder of the moral and political philosophy known as Confucian­ ism. The connotation is that this philosophy is his philosophy. The name "Confucianism" is less commonly used in China. In the Chinese tradition, Confucius is seen as the pioneering leader of a school of intellectuals known as " Ru-ists (ru-jia)." Ru-ism is the product of joint efforts by early "Confucians" including Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi, and the author (or authors) of two classics: the Doctrine of the Mean and the Great Learning. Yijing is also standardly taken to be a founda­ tional text for Ru-ism. Confucius himself did not write any systematic philosophical work. His thought is mostly preserved in the collection of his remarks (the Analects), supposedly recorded by his students. Some other philosophical documents were historically attributed to Confucius ( such as the Commentary on Yi) . However, the exact authorship of these documents cannot be established. In this chapter, we will only deal with Confucius as portrayed in the Analects. Confucius lived in a time of chaos and corruption, and he spent most of his life traveling from one nation-state to the next in an unsuccessful attempt to morally transform their rulers. His loyal students followed him in his travel so as to receive his teaching. In traditional Chinese society, the completion of education normally leads to political careers, since an intellectual's ultimate goal is to better the world. Some of Confucius' students did manage to obtain official positions and did try to put his political ideal into practice. But in a world where rulers were intent on amassing their power and expanding their territory, the chance of success for a Confucian political program was marginal. Confucius was once described by a contemporary as " the one who knows a thing

Ancient Chinese Philosophy in ng eri ev ers "p of t iri sp l is Th " it. do nts to wa ll d sti an cannot be do ne the goo d" becomes the defining character of all Confuc ian s. . In analyzing Confucius' phi loso phi cal concepts, we need to realIze that he did not take a definitional app roac h. As Antonio Cua remarks, " One main difficulty in understanding Confucian ethics lies in the ab­ sence of systematic exposition of its basic ideas, such as ren (humanity; humaneness), Ii (propriety), and yi (rightness) . ,,2 Confucius did not think that there could be a universal definition for a moral concept, which would be applicable to everyone in every situation. When students asked him to explain an ethical principle, Confucius would give an answer appropriate to each one's particular strengths, shortcomings, or per­ sonal background. Hence, we often see him giving different answers to the same question, when such questions were raised by different stu­ dents, concerning the meaning of a certain ethical concept such as "filial piety. " If we try to find a universal definition for a moral concept in his usage, we may end up concluding that he did not have a coherent conception. To understand his moral philosophy, we need to go beyond mere analysis of his moral concepts and look at the whole picture. Confucius says that there is a single unifying principle linking all his moral teachings.3 According to one of his leading students, Zengzi, this principle can be explained in terms of two key elements of Confucius' moral philosophy: one is called zhong, literally translated as "loyalty " ; the other is called shu, literally "empathy. ,,4 Why would loyalty and empathy be regarded as the " single" thread that unifies Confucius' moral philosophy? How are the two concepts related? In this chapter, we shall see that the basis of Confucius' moral philosophy is his con­ struction of a moral/social hierarchical structure, and that both loyalty and empathy must be understood in relation to this structure.

Moral Hierarchy and the Notion of Zhong (Loyalty) The goal of Confucius' moral philosophy is to construct a moral struc­ ture for society. Within this structure, individuals are not all equal in relation to one another. This moral structure corresponds to the polit­ ical hierarchy, with the emperor on the top, the ministers in the middle, and the people at the bottom. It also corresponds to the familial hierar­ chy of parents and children, husband and wife, and sibling relation­ ships, as shown in the chart.

48

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects The ruler

I

The ministers

I

The subjects Father

Husband

Elder brother

Teacher

Son

Wife

Younger brother

Student

I

I

I

I

Friend - Friend

In this moral hierarchy, everyone is assigned a moral role depending on how he or she is related to others. One's moral duties are defined in terms of the roles one plays in the politicaVsocial hierarchy. For exam­ ple, the duty of an emperor is to behave in a kingly fashion and to take care of the people's basic needs. A minister's duty is to assist the em­ peror in governing the people. The duty of an ordinary citizen is to obey the superiors. In the family, parents have a duty to love their children, while children have a duty to exemplify filial piety toward their parents. The husband's duty is to support the family, while the wife's duty is to manage household affairs. Siblings have a duty to love one another and younger siblings must respect or even obey the elder ones. Such rela­ tions can further extend to strangers: seniors should be respected by their juniors; the young should be loved and cared for by the adults. One's moral duties shift as one adopts various roles in life, of which there will always be several in accordance with one's various relation­ ships with different people. However, there is one moral obligation that applies to all roles and all people: the virtue of zhong (loyalty). " Loyalty" is generally understood to be a feeling or an attitude of devotion toward one's superior. In a political context, it is specifically defined as an allegiance to the ruler or the state. However, in the Analects, this notion has a broader dimension. For example, ConfucIUs' student Zengzi says: " Everyday I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends I have not been faithful; and whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher. ,,5 Being loyal and being faithful are seen as interrelated virtues and they have a signifi­ cant place in Confucius' teaching. Confucius is said to teach only four things: culture, conduct, loyalty, and faithfulness.6 He says: " [The super­ ior person] holds loyalty and faithfulness to be the guiding principle. He would never regard his friends as inferior to himself. He would never be afraid to acknowledge and correct himself when he has made

49

Ancient Chinese Philosophy a mistake. ,, 7 In all these quotes we do not see " loyalty" defined as a notion suitable only for a political context. Even in a political context, "loyalty" is defined as an attitude toward a task, not toward a person. When a student asks about politics, Confucius says, " Over daily routine, do not show weariness, and when there is action to be taken, [perform with loyalty] ."8 Loyalty is not a devotion directed specifically toward one's superior; rather, it is directed toward the role one plays - being loyal means doing one's best in whatever one does. in this sense, loyalty can be defined as " doing what one is supposed to do" or " being loyal to one's role . " In other words, a social role is not simply a social assign­ ment; it is also a moral assignment. Being loyal to one's role means being able to act in accordance with whatever moral obligations come with the social role. Loyalty is thus being loyal to one's moral obligations and fulfilling the duty that one's role dictates. When asked about how to govern, Confucius replies: "Let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a sub­ ject, the father a father, the son a son.,,9 This is not a trivial tautology. It compares the actual social role one adopts with the ideal moral role one is supposed to exemplify, and asks everyone to act up to the latter. Being loyal to one's role in relation to others is the meaning of zhong. David Nivison analyzes the notion ot zhong as merely a relation " directed toward superior, or at most toward equals. ,,10 A. C. Graham has a similar interpretation of zhong as "especially of devoted loyalty to a ruler, but also of wholeheartedness on behalf of inferiors." 1 1 But this understanding only grasps one aspect of the virtue of zhong. Subjects should naturally show respect toward their superiors, since that-is what the role of a subject commands. A ruler or a minister, however, should do their best to govern the people so as to command respect from them. Both ways of fulfilling the duty appropriate to one's role are covered under the notion of zhong. Confucius once discussed someone who showed no sign of delight when he was three times appointed officer and showed no sign of resentment when he was thrice removed from office. When this man was replaced by someone else, he always made sure that his successor knew how to take over his j ob smoothly. Con­ fucius thinks that we may not say this person is wise (in that he does not know how to keep his j ob), but he does have the virtue of zhong ( loyalty ) . 12 This loyalty is not targeted toward whoever appointed or dismissed him; it is directed toward his j ob. At the same time, one should not meddle in any job or social role which is not one's own. Confucius says: "Do not concern yourself with matters of government unless they are the responsibility of your office. " 1 3 This notion can be compared to Socrates' notion of a j ust city, as expressed in Plato's Republic: "A city is just when everyone does his own job . " When 50

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects people meddle in the affairs of others, then chaos and injustice ensue. If eveJ1yone does his own job and does it as best as he can, then the social structure will be harmonized and well ordered. As Chad Hansen puts it, it will be a "correct" structure.14 The "correctness" of a social structure is obtained when the name of each social role and its actuality correspond. This is what Confucius calls " the rectification of names. " Confucius once said that if he were ever offered a governmental position, his first priority would be to rectify names, because, lilf names are not correct, speech will not be in accordance with actuality; when speech is not in accordance with actuality, things will not be suc­ cessfully accomplished. When things are not successfully accomplished, ritual practice and music will fail to flourish; when ritual and music fail to flourish, punishment and penalties will miss the mark. And when punish­ ment and penalties miss the mark, the people will be at a loss as to what to do with themselves. IS

It is obvious that he takes the rectification of names to be the first step toward establishing social order. Why is it so important to make name and actuality correspond with each other? Benjamin Schwartz explains this relationship between social roles and names in this way: Thus the language of familial and social roles - words that refer to father, ruler, son, or minister - do not refer simply to bare biological or political facts but . . . every role is the bearer of its own role-norms. The word "father" carries the implication that the father will "act like a father" as well as the assumption that the language will provide information on how to do SO.16

In other words, the function of " names" in the Confucian language plays not just a descriptive role, but also a prescriptive role - they establish rules of conduct appropriate to each name. In such a moral language, names of social roles do not just pick out the social assign­ ment of various roles; instead, they refer to the ideal categories of " father, " "son, " "ruler, " " minister," etc. Once this language is imposed on human society, it regulates society's relations and its members' behavior. Therefore, the rectification of names is not about language per se; it is about action and ethics. Using the rectification of names as a means of establishing a correct social structure, Confucius defines universal expectations for each social role. That is to say, there are some general guidelines on how to be a father or a mother, how to be a husband or a wife, how to be a brother or a sister, etc. If everyone follows these guidelines and aims to be loyal 51

Ancient Chinese Philosophy

/

to his or her role as a parent, as a spouse, or as a sibling, then social conflicts resulting from anyone overstepping their boundaries would disappear. The notion of zhong, as applied in the Confucian moral hierarchy, comprises a moral theory that focuses on moral dutle5' or obligations, rather than on rights or entitlements. It constitutes a basic tenet of Confucianism, which is an ethics built on demands on oneself rather than on others. In contrast to the nghts theory, Confucianism is a form of deontology. Of all moral duties that Confucius advocates, the duty of filial piety is one that has penetrated Chinese culture the most. There is no fittmg translation of the Chinese notion "xiao" other than the commonly used "filial piety, " which stands for a strong sense of respect and loyalty to one's parents. Such a sense of loyalty extends beyond the parents' life­ time. Confucius says: "When a man's father is alive, look at the bent of his will. When his father is dead, look at his conduct. If for three years [of mourning] he does not change from the way of his father, he may be called filial . " 17 Confucius stresses the importance of a lengthy mourning period for one's parents - three years is the proper length to mourn for one's father. If a person changes his demeanor as soon as his father has passed away, then it shows how pretentious he had been in the presence of his father. Confucius thinks that we are fully dependent on our parents for survival and nourishment at least in the first three years of our life; hence, it is only natural that after they depart from us, we should spend three years keeping them in constant regard. During our parents' lifetime, Confucius says, we should "never disobey" them. When a student asked him to explain further what he meant by this, he said: "When parents are alive, serve them according to the rules of propriety. When they die, bury them according to the rules of propriety and sacrifice to them according to the rules of propriety. ,,18 The first com­ ment, " never disobey, " has often been taken to mean that parents can demand absolute obedience from their children. In traditional Chinese society, this expectation did prevail among parents. However, from Con­ fucius' elaboration of the first comment, we can see that he does not advocate blind obedience. Filial piety should be checked by "the rules of propriety. " Hence, it is a moral duty bound by the role one plays as a son or a daughter, and the rules of propriety should apply to parents and children alike. If parents act improperly, then children should be relieved from their duty of filial piety. Confucius further emphasizes the importance of the right mental attitude with regard to filial piety. He says: "Filial piety nowadays means being able to nourish one's parents. But we nourish even those dogs and horses that we raise. If there is no feeling of reverence, wherein lies the difference ? ,, 1 9 From this remark we 52

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects can see that in as early as Confucius' times, there was already an expec­ tation that sons should support their parents in their old age.21l "Sup­ porting one's parents with reverence," in today's context, would probably mean that we should not simply give our parents money or send them to a nursing home and let others perform our duty for us. We should serve them with reverence for as long as they live. This teaching was instrumental to the development of the large multi-generational family structures in traditional Chinese society.

Shu (Empathy) : A Confucian Golden Rule The other half of Confucius' "single thread " is the notion of shu (em­ pathy). The importance of this virtue in Confucius' moral philosophy can also be seen in another exchange he had with a student. When asked to give one word that can serve as the guiding principle for one's entire life, Confucius replied that it is "shu", and further elaborated: "Do not impose upon others what you yourself do not desire."21 This moral guideline is sometimes called the Confucian Golden Rule, in contrast with the Golden Rule in the Christian tradition: "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. " The Christian Golden Rule commands what one ought to do, whereas the Confucian Golden Rule states what one ought not to do. Are the positive and negative formulations morally significant? If so, which one is a better moral principle? According to Allinson, the positive and the negative Golden Rule are different, and the latter is superior to the former in that ( 1 ) it expresses modesty and humility, (2) it does not presume that one necessarily has knowledge of what the good is - what is good for oneself and whether it would be good for other people, and (3 ) it is less likely to lead to abuse or moral harm to others.22 Ivanhoe calls the Christian Golden Rule "the principle of reversibility. " He says: Reversibility might be regarded as a formal principle which guides me, in the performance of specific actions, to only proper actions - that is, if before I perform a given action, I first conduct a kind of "thought experi­ ment" and imagine how I would feel if I were in the place of the person or persons who will be affected by my proposed action. If I would be willing to be treated in the way I imagine, then I can act in the proposed way. 23

But one problem with this moral principle, as Ivanhoe points out, is that " it can end up being a disguised way of advocating the adoption of one's personal preferences. For example, 'the principle of reversibility 53

Ancient Chinese Philosophy would seem to urge a masochist to become a sadist - to adopt the motto: ' hurt others as you would have others hurt you'. ,,24 The Confu­ cian Golden rule, on the other hand, does not seem to have this prob­ lem. At first appearance, the negative formulation seems to be a better moral principle. But to see a deeper comparison, we need to consider their applications. Both the Christian and the Confucian Golden Rules concern actions, not j ust preferences, in interpersonal interactions. They are not asking others to adopt an individual's maxims or moral preferences; they are simply asking for the individual's sanction of her own behavior. Both principles are stated as a form of categorical imperative, that is, they are to be followed not because of some other desired consequences for oneself. Both principles presume that I do not act in a certain way toward others simply because I want them to do the same for me. Both principles are based on the assumption that people's wants and desires are similar and thus we can use ourselves as the measure to gauge other people's minds. Furthermore, any moral consideration for­ mulated in accordance with the Christian Golden Rule can easily be converted into a moral consideration in the spirit of the Confucian Golden Rule, and vice versa. For example, " wanting others to treat us with respect" can be rendered "not wanting others to treat us with disrespect" ; "not wanting to be robbed by others" can be rendered "wanting others to show consideration for our property. " Therefore, a good case can be made that the two formulations are basically identical. But a case can also be made to show that the two principles are slightly different. If the Golden Rule is to be used as the only moral principle for our action toward others, then there is no universal guideline for us other than our own wishes. Whether our judgment is morally permissible thus depends on what kind of people we are. The positive formulation of the Golden Rule commands us to do unto others what we would have them do unto us. What would we have other people do unto us? At a mini­ mal level, we would want others to respect us, to help us when we are in need, to show us love and concern, etc. It is a reasonable demand on us that we do the same for others. However, if we are of the greedier type, then we might want more from others. We might like it that others give us their money, that others forgive all our shortcomings, that others do us great favors with no strings attached. But at the same time, we find it difficult to do so unto others. In this case, the Christian Golden Rule becomes an impossible command. A reclusive person may simply want to be left alone. Following the Christian Golden Rule, that person would not do anything for anyone else. Other conceivable problems 54

•

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects with this moral principle might be the masochist becoming a sadist, a one-directional love turning into a pathetic clinging, etc. Basically, people's desires and wishes are so various that we cannot simply impose on others what we ourselves wish them to do for us. Would Confucius' notion of shu, or the negative Golden Rule, fare better? It commands us not to do unto others what we ourselves do not desire. What don't we want others to do unto us? At a general level, we do not wish others to humiliate us, to laugh at us, to steal from us, to harm us, or simply to mistreat us in any way. It is reasonable that we do not treat others in these ways either. And even if we desire others to act in a certain way toward us, the Confucian Golden Rule does not coun­ sel us to act this way toward others too. It thus avoids the problem of subjective imposition of preferences that we see in the positive formula­ tion. It is arguable whether we know what is undesirable more than we know what is desirable, smce people's displeasure can be Just as idiosyn­ cratic as their preferences. However, there seems to be more common ground in what people do not desire than in what they do desire. If we gauge others' wishes by checking what we ourselves would not desire, we would have set a reasonable constraint on our action that would affect others. Hence, the Confucian Golden Rule, even if not morally superior to the Christian Golden Rule, is at least more applicable. How does this notion of shu (empathy) fit into ConfuciUs' moral hierarchy, and how does it link up with the notion of zhong ( loyalty) to constitute his unifying principle? As explained earlier, in this moral hierarchy indiviauals are interconnected in a social web that includes multilayers of relationships. One needs to be loyal to the different roles one plays relative to the other person. Now with shu (empathy), one can also extend oneself to appreciate what the other person in the opposite role would desire. For example, a father can do his best as a father to edify his son. But if he remembers how much he resented his own father's dictatorship, then he should modify his discipline and not impose too much restramt on his son. A student might wish to cheat in her studies. However, once she realizes how disappointed she would be as a teacher, she should understand that her duty is to work honestly instead. The extension of oneself can go beyond the person of an oppo­ site role to reach people of similar roles. For example, if we do not wish our family members to be harmed, then we should not harm any stranger who is also a family member to someone else. If we do not want our children to starve or freeze, then we should give charity to other parents who cannot afford food and clothing for their children. If everyone were to think and act this way, society would have no theft, robbery, rape, murder, or hunger. Loyalty to one's role is not sufficient for securing 55

Ancient Chinese Philosophy social harmony unless it is accompanied by everyone's empathetic understanding of other people's wishes. In this way, the two notions, zhong and shu ( loyalty and empathy), are equally essential to the estab­ lishment of Confucius' ideal society.

Moral Cultivation and the Establishment of the Moral Ideal: From the Superior Person (Junzi), to the Man of Humanity ( Ren), to the Sage (Sheng) In the Confucian moral society, people are categorized into different groups according to their varying degrees of moral cultivation. One who is morally exemplary is called "the superior person" ( junzi, some­ times translated as "the gentleman" ) . Those who not only have superior moral characters themselves, but also help others to cultivate them­ selves, are men of humanity (men of ren); and finally, those who can extend benevolence to all people and bring succor to the multitude, are the sages (sheng)Y The complete moral self-cultivation is a process that one is committed to undertake throughout one's life. Very few people can actually attain the final state of sheng. If moral perfection is the end-state of our being, then we are not born perfect. Under Confucius' view, however, we are perfectible. How to define human nature IS one of the most vital issues in Confu­ cianism. But unlike later followers, Confucius himself seldom discusses human nature. He focuses more on the pursuit of moral cultivation instead. In other words, Confucius is more interested in what we can become than in what we are born with. But before we understand our moral goal, we need to have a look at what we are born with. One thing Confucius affirms about human nature is that people are alike by nature. "Men are close to one another by nature. They diverge as a result of habituation. ,,26 If we are similar by nature, then what is our nature ? Confucius holds the view that we are born with righteousness, but we have many desires that can lead us astray. Even he himself could not claim to have all his desires stay within the bounds of propriety until he had reached the age of 70Y Therefore, in his view, we are not born perfect, but we can become perfect. Confucius uses " habituation" to explain the varying degrees of good­ ness and badness in people. Habits are formed through repeated prac­ tices. What kind of practice leads to goodness and what kind of practice 56

,

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects leads to badness? In Confucius' distinction of junzi (the superior per­ son) and xiaoren (the petty person) we get a clue: the concern with what is right or virtuous itself leads to superior personhood, while the concern with profit or possession leads to inferior personhood. As Con­ fucius says: "The superior person is concerned with virtue; the petty person is concerned with property. The superior person is concerned with sanctions; the petty person is concerned with personal favors. ,,28 Confucius is not necessarily against wealth or profit, but he is against wealth accumulated, or profit made, through improper ways. If one wishes morally to cultivate oneself, one needs first to set one's priority on doing the right thing, not on amassing one's own profit. When the priority is on profit, it is tempting to forgo principles j ust to make a few more bucks. If someone is intent on getting rich, then she may feel ashamed the first time she embezzles money. But through repeated prac­ tices, she will eventually become habituated in gaining wealth improp­ erly. Hence, without a secure moral principle, one can easily sink into the category of the petty people. Confucius also says: "The superior [person] seeks the Way and not a mere living. . . . The superior [person] worries about the Way and not about poverty. ,,29 To learn the Way (Dao) is the ultimate goal in life; furthermore, the pursuit of the Way is a never-ending process. If we desire material goods and physical comfort, then we cannot pay full attention to the cultivation of our moral attributes. Confucius says: "A fellow who is ashamed merely of shabby clothing or meager food is not even worth conversing with. ,,30 To pay full attention to one's moral growth is constantly to examine oneself. Have I failed to cultivate my virtues? Have I failed to delve more deeply into what I have learned? Have I been able to move in the direction of what I just learned to be right? Have I been able to rectify my own misdeeds? A person interested in the pursuit of the Way is thus always diligent and never self-excusing. As Benjamin Schwartz puts it: "The moral cultivation is a long and difficult process, not everyone can accomplish the final goal. ,,31 Those who aim for the final goal are called junzi, the superior person. They are supenor not by nature, but by their constant practice of self­ examination and self�reform. Why must we seek to learn the Way and to morally cultivate our­ selves? Why can't we rest content with our physical comfort? For Con­ fucius, the goal in life has to do with the meaning of being human. He has an all-embracing moral notion that depicts what it is to be human: ren (humanity). It is difficult to find a single moral concept in Western ethics comparable to the notion of reno Ren is not a moral principle that gives us specific guidance in life; nor is it accomplishable by a single act. 57

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Ren is not about action; rather, it is about a state of being. To be more exact: ren represents an ideal state of human being. Ideally, human

beings subsist between Heaven and Earth, playing the same roles that Heaven and Earth play. In the Confucian cosmology (as explained in the context of Yijing), Heaven and Earth are ascribed many moral attributes, the most prominent of which is ren.32 While Heaven nour­ ishes all living things and Earth sustains them with no discrimination, we should aid our fellow human beings and other creatures in their quest for self-completion. In this context we can understand why Con­ fucius says, " If one sets one's heart on [ren], one will be without evil. "33 Seeing the meaning of "ren," we can realize that simply cultivating our own moral attributes is not a sufficient aim in life. We need to help . others fulfill their moral personhood as well. This is how Confucius defines " men of humanity" : " If one wishes to establish one's moral character, one also establishes the moral characters of others; if one wishes to obtain one's goal, one also helps others obtain their goals. ,,34 To be a man of humanity is thus the common goal of all superior people. As Confucius says: "The superior person aims to help others fulfill what is good in them; he does not help others carry out what is bad in them. ,,35 Confucius once explains ren as "to love one's fellow men.,,36 To love others is not simply to be benevolent or compassionate toward them. One can be benevolent or compassionate by helping others in practical ways: giving them money, providing them with com­ fort, offering them kind words, etc. The Confucian ideal of ren, on the other hand, is to help others to become better people themselves, or, put another way, to help others in their attainment of the state of reno An individual cannot achieve the state of ren if he or she does not also try to help others reach that same goal. The person who can not only help those nearby cultivate themselves but can also spread this effort to the multitude must be more than someone of humanity; that person must be a sage. The difference be­ tween a person of humanity and a sage could be in the sheer number of people such altruistic efforts can reach. Confucius seems to think that only when the person of humanity also has the status of a king can he be deemed a sage. He regarded ancient kings such as Yao and Shun as sages. His own student, Yan Hui, could not be seen as a sage, however morally perfect he was. Today, the Chinese people regard Confucius as the Ultimate Sage (Zhi-sheng). This could be seen as testimony to the idea that tar-reaching altruistic efforts in helpings others cultivate them­ selves could also be accomplished through philosophy and education. All the moral principles discussed so far (being loyal to one's social role, not imposing on others what we ourselves do not desire, helping •

58

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects others establish their characters or obtain their goals) rely heavily on the individual's subjective judgment. An obvious difficulty is this: if we are not born with perfect knowledge of the Way, if the pursuit of the Way is a never-ending process, then we cannot know what we should be doing at any given moment in our life. It seems that we do need some external guidance from time to time. This is where another important Confucian moraI concept, Ii (propriety, rituals), comes in. Li is about propriety, about what is the right thing to do in a given context. The formalized aspect of Ii is rituals and rites, but there has to be more to it than this. Rituals and rites are a matter of social conventions, and sometimes they can become inflexible and frivolous. Herbert Fmgarette wrongly interprets Confucius' notion of Ii to represent some kind of " sacred ceremony" or " holy rites" that have a magical power to shape people's daily behavior.37 Confucius could not possibly think that we should simply do whatever social conventions prescribe without any personal moral judgment. As Antonio Cua points out, " it is ritual, as comprising customs, conventions, or formal rules of proper conduct, that provides the starting point of individual morality. ,,38 In fact, textual evidence shows that Confucius does not interpret Ii to consist merely of formal ceremonies, and he does not think that morality simply lies in observing the rites. He says: "The superior person regards righteousness as his essence, and practices it in accordance with propriety. ,, 39 In other words, the observance of propriety has to come from an internal moral sense - righteousness. Confucius only uses rituals as an external amend­ ment to one's subjective state of mind. It is the ideal mental state, ren, which bestows value on rituals. Confucius says: "A man who is not ren what has he to do with the ritual ? ,,40 It is because a person has ren as her goal that she would want to do what is proper in each context. She would " refrain from looking at that which is contrary to propriety, from listening in a way that is contrary to propriety, from saying things that are contrary to propriety, and from making any move that is con­ trary to propriety. ,,41 For example, it would not be proper to look at what other people do, or listen to what they say, in their private quar­ ters. It is not because we have no means to do so; we should simply choose not to do it. I may have a strong urge to peep or to pry, but I should use self-restraint so that all my actions are in accordance with propriety. The essence of propriety comes from self-restraint. The sense of propriety should be established from within a person, not from a rigid set of public rules and social conventions. In our society today, many people do not consider propriety as a standard for their conduct. They might use obscene language in public simply because they feel like it. They might insult others for no reason -

59

Ancient Chinese Philosophy other than that they are in a foul mood. They might act vulgarly simply because they consider it their " right" to do whatever they please. They don't observe social contexts or assess whether their behavior is im­ proper. They regard self-restraint as a restriction on their personal free­ dom, and they believe that self-expression takes precedence over social etiquette. However, Confucius teaches that to restrain oneself as a way to return to propriety is simply ren itself. He says: "To master oneself and return to propriety is humanity (ren) . If a man (the ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will return to humanity. To practice humanity depends on oneself. ,,42 Social standards of propriety and social conventions of rites and rituals serve a different function from that of the law. There are many ways in which propriety can be violated. However, for one reason or another we prefer not to establish laws that would ban them altogether. If everyone were concerned with whether or not his or her actions were proper in all situations, there would be less indecent behavior around us. The for­ malized aspect of propriety - rites and rituals - should serve merely as a reminder of the importance of propriety itself. Through propriety, we preserve human decency - that is how we maintain our humanity (ren). Therefore, for Confucius, to establish a society that has all its members fulfilling their moral ideals, an emphasis on propriety would be much more effective than the employment of laws and punishments. Here we turn to the final topic, the political ideal for Confucius.

From the Self to the State: The Confucian Political Ideal An ideal political state is one that is governed by a ruler who has reached the ultimate goal of moral cultivation. This ideal ruler is called the sage king. In Confucius' opinion, the proper role of government is not j ust to keep its people materialistically gratified and physically secure, but also morally to cultivate them. Confucius says: "To govern is to rectify. ,,43 That is to say, the ruler's job is primarily to rectify his people's conduct. To do this, the rulers themselves must first be morally correct. Virtue and rulership are thus inseparable in Confucius' political philosophy. Raymond Dawson describes the Confucian model of gov­ ernment in this way: " [I]t is an agency for ensuring that the influence and example of men of superior moral qualities is brought to bear on the population. ,,44 Confucius thinks that this ideal of a sage king is not a mere ideal that can never be realized (unlike Plato's "philosopher 60

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects king " ) - in ancient times before him, there had been sage kings (Yao and Shun), who had maintained a moral, harmonious state. From our contemporary perspective, we might ask: how does virtue guarantee political success? To answer this question, we have first to understand that Confucius' political ideal is designed for a small monarchic p olity. Within a small nation-state, as those existed in his times, the ruler's virtues were easily observed by the people. Confucius believed that if people respect the ruler, then they will be more likely to follow his rules. He says: " If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command. If the ruler does not set himself right, he will not be obeyed no matter how many orders he issues. ,,45 At a time when rulership was not backed by any theory of the divine right of the sovereign, the ruler needed to " earn" the respect of the people. By " setting himself right," Confucius meant not just that the ruler should be correct in his personal conduct, but also that he should be correct in his administrative j udgment. Confucius says: " If you promote the straight and set them above the crooked, then the people will be obedient. "46 If the ruler has good judgment on the ministers he chooses to manage the state, then the people will not contest. If the people see that those governing them are all morally upright, then they will be inspired to be righteous themselves. Such an inspired moral transformation is not the result of an ulterior motive: if I act in a righteous way, I too could be promoted to a high position. Confucius belIeves that the people will · readily emulate a morally exemplary person, because virtue has the power of moving and transforming people. He says, "Virtue never stands alone. It is bound to have neighbors. ,,47 This remark gives an interesting portrayal of the power of virtue. If a single person acts with impeccable virtue, then those around him will gradually be inspired to act virtu­ ously. Eventually, the whole neighborhood will be occupied by virtuous people. If a virtuous civilian could have such an impact, then a virtuous sovereign would have an even greater impact on the people. Confucius uses two analogies to describe how effortless such virtuous rulership could be. He once said that the virtuous ruler can be compared to the Pole Star, "which commands the homage of the multitude of stars with­ out leaving its place. ,,48 He also said that if the ruler himself wishes to be good, his people will be good, because "the character of a ruler is like wind and that of the people is like grass. In whatever direction the wind blows, the grass always bends. ,,49 Finally, according to Confucius, law and punishment can only re­ strain people's behavior; it cannot alter their mind. Under strict laws and punishments, people will simply want to avoid being caught. But if they are taught to observe Ii ( propriety), then they will develop their 61

Ancient Chinese Philosophy own moral sense and will want to do the right thing of their own accord. Confucius says: If you try to lead the common people with governmental regulations and keep them in line with punishments, the law will simply be evaded and the people will have no sense of shame. If, however, you guide them with virtue and keep them in line by means of [propriety], the people will have a sense of shame and will moreover reform themselves. 50

Confucius' political philosophy can be sharpJy contrasted with that of Machiavelli. According to Machiavelli, a ruler need only be virtuous when aoinK so will be to his advantage, and sometimes the rufer must learn how not to be virtuous. Machiavelli also says: " It's far better to be feared than loved if you cannot be both."sl He argued that the ruler cannot be idealistic and · must deal with the actual conditions of the world. People in general are selfish, fickle, forgetful, and greedy. When the ruler's behavior is bound by virtue, he cannot always use the most efficient means to deal with his people. But if he uses harsh law and stiff punishment, then he can at least be sure that they would not dare to VIolate his rules. Confucius' political philosophy is exactly the opposite of this kind of Machiavellian politics. He does not see the reality and the ideal as two separate realms. For him, the goal for an individual as well as for a state is always to strive for the ideal. As we saw earlier, this affinity toward the good is innate in us. When properly inspired, everyone will want to be good and to act in the correct way. It is only when we rest content with the present state and concede the impossibility of improvement that we fail to follow the Way. If, under the moral model of a sage king, everyone were constantly to practice self-examination to see if he were truly loyal to his roles (zhong), if he were to extend himself to empa­ thize with others (shu), if he were to help others attain their moral 1(ersonhood (ren), it he took care to observe propriety in all situations (Ii), then the Way (Dao) would prevail and we woufd have an ideal world.

Conclusion Confucius depicted a lofty ideal for individuals and for the state. His ideal human being is one who never lapses in the pursuit of self­ improvement. Our moral cultivation is like climbing a virtue ladder - we can always become better since there is always room for imp rov eme nt. 62

Confucius (Kongzi) in the Analects . Learning to know the Way (Dao) and to lead a life in accordance with the Way are the ultimate goals in life. Knowledge is for the moral growth of the individual learner; education is for building moral charac­ ter. But at the same time, Confucius also focused on the moral duty to make others better. A Confucian always thinks of himself or herself as a member of human society. To better oneself is not as good as bettering the whole human race; to have a happy life oneself is not as 'good as making everyone's life happy. The most efficient way to accomplish these ends is to improve the politics of the state. Therefore, the i deal Confucian is one who is inwardly a moral sage, outwardly a humane king. By setting up a " moral king" as the ideal, the Confucian political pnilosophy treats virtue and politics as inseparable from each other. On the personal level, what · Confucius teaches is an adherence to virtue in the way one conducts oneself on a daily basis. A virtuous person does not seek recognition from others. As Confucius says, "Do not worry that you are not known to others; worry rather that you yourself lack ability. ,,52 Hence, Confucians should scrutinize themselves constantly. What one should care about is only whether one's words and deeds correspond to each other, or whether one's reputation matches the truth. Some people only appear to be virtuous and thus earn the respect from their peers, but Confucius calls such a person "the thi�f of virtue. ,,53 Later on, Mencius would give a nice explanation of thi� phrase: If you try to condemn them, there is nothing you can point to; if you try to censure them, there is nothing to censure. They are in agreement with the current customs; they are in harmony with the sordid era in which they live. That in which they dwell seems to be loyalty and [faithfulness]; that which they do seems to be blameless and pure. The multitude delight in them; they regard themselves as right. But you cannot enter into the Way of Yao and Shun with them . . . [Confucius] says, "I hate that which seems but is not. ,,54

We can thus conclude that a Confucian is a person who is true to virtue, true to the Way, and true to him- or herself.

Further discussion questions What is the moral justification for a Confucian hierarchy? Is democracy compatible with such a hierarchical structure? 2 What are the different implications between the positive Golden Rule in Christ; �n ethics and the negative Golden Rule in Confucian ethics ? Both principles demand that we gauge others' preferences or dislikes on the basis 1

63

Ancient Chinese Philosophy of our own; hence, both differ from the Kantian moral principle that re­ quires us to think of everyone, including ourselves, as disinterested, purely rational beings. Which approach could generate a more universal application? 3 What virtues does Confucius stress in his moral teaching? How, are these virtues different from other virtue ethicists' recommendations? 4 How does Confucius define "filial piety " ? How is it different trom the common Western expectation of sons or daughters? What is the expectation on children within your own family tradition? 5 Joel Feinberg ( 1 980) discusses an imaginary Nowherevillel where people are compassionate, sympathetic, honorable, and are endowed with a strong sense of duty, but the notion of rights is lacking. Would a Confucian society be like this Nowhereville? What would be missing if a moral society did not have the notion of rights?

Primary texts Wing-tsit Chan (ed.) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 73 (ch. 2; excerpts). Raymond Dawson. Confucius: The Analects. Oxford World's Classics paper­ back. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds.) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2003 (ch. 1; excerpts). D. C. Lau. Confucius: The Analects. New York: Penguin Classics, 1 979 .

Further readings Robert Allinson. "The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formulation. " Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 12, 1985: 305-1 5. Herbert Fingarette. "Following the 'One Thread' of the Analects." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47(35), 1 979: 375-405. Philip Ivanhoe. "Reviewing the 'One Thread' of the Analects." Philosophy East & West 40( 1 ), 1 990: 1 7-33.

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enCIUS •

engzl •

Introduction Mencius (372-289 BeE) flourished more than 1 00 years after Confucius. He became the second most important philosopher in the Confucian tradition. Mencius not only defended Confucius' view against other competing schools at the time, he also expanded it into a more system­ atic theory. The main source of Mencius' thought is in a collection of his remarks, The Mencius (Mengzi). During his lifetime, Mencius was known to be someone who loved to argue. He wrote: Do I really like to argue ? I simply have no alternative . . . . If the doctrines of Yang School [Yang Zhu, ca. 440-360 BCE) and Mo School [Mozi, 480-392 ? BCE) do not subside and the teaching of Confucius is not proclaimed, the people will be misled by heresies and the path of morality will be blocked. When the path of morality is blocked, we are virtually leading animals to devour men. Sooner or later men will start devouring one another. Therefore, I am apprehensive. I wish to safeguard the way of ancient sages to fend off these deviant and extreme doctrines. 1

Mencius made it his lifelong mission to advocate Confucius' ideals to contemporary rulers and to other intellectuals of his time. Like Confu­ cius, he focused on two aspects of moral cultivation: how to be a good ruler and how to be a good person. Both teachings are based on Con­ fucius' conviction: humans are perfectible. Mencius tried to answer the question: why are we perfectible? The reason given was that we are fundamental1y good by nature. Therefore, Mencius' main argument was to establi�h the claim that human nature is good. This claim would later become the hallmark of Mencius' philosophy.

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Mencius often used metaphors and analogies in his debates and lectures. David Wong calls this method "analogical reasoning" or "reason­ ing by analogy. ,,2 D. C. Lau wrote: It is not unusual for a reader of the Mencius to be left with the impression that in argument with his opponents Mencius was a sophist with little respect for logic. Not the least contributory factor to this impreSSIOn is the type of argument which centers around an analogy. Yet it is difficult to believe that a thinker of Mencius' caliber and reputation could have indulged consistently in what appears to be pointless argument or that his opponents were always effectively silenced by non sequiturs. The fault, we suspect, must lie with us.3

In other words, if we don't see the point of his arguments, then we need to have a better understanding of the style of his argument. In this chapter, we will pay close attention to Mencius' argumentation. Argu­ ment by analogy is likely to have been a common method of debate at the time, since others used the same method to challenge Mencius. But those challengers often failed to win the argument. Mencius was clearly an expert in forming a persuasive analogy. To judge the success of an analogical argumentation, we have to remember that an analogy can at best be just that: an analogy. It shows similarities, but not exact identi­ ties, between the fact one wishes to establish and the example one cites. There are always some disanalogies in the two states of affairs being compared. The skill lies in making the similarities intuitively appealing and in reducing the relevance of the dissimilarities. But we should take care not to put too much emphasis on the examples themselves, and thereby lose track of the main claim that Mencius tried to establish. Finally, in this chapter we will examine Mencius' political philosophy. Mencius had the same political mission as Confucius: to persuade his contemporary rulers to adopt his political ideals. He had limited success in his lifetime, in that he did win the respect and sponsorship of some kings. But ultimately, most of the kings were merely paying lip service to Mencius' teachings. Placing moral hierarchy over political hierarchy, Mencius insisted that as he was the king's moral and political mentor, the king should come and see him and not the other way around. Once, as he was on his way to pay the king a visit, a messenger arrived at his door to deliver a summons from the king. Mencius was offended that the king had treated him like an ordinary citizen, and made the excuse that he was too sick to obey the summons. The next day, he attended a friend's funeral despite his student's concern that the king might find out that he was not sick after all. On that day, the king sent a doctor to 66

Mencius (Mengzi) check on Mencius' health, and his student sent a messenger to warn Mencius not to return home, but to go to the king's court immediately. Mencius refused to do so; instead, he went to a friend's house to stay overnight. This kind of haughty conduct was politically reckless in such a context, since the king could easily command his death. Mencius regarded proper respect and personal honor to be more important than his own life. But at the same time, however disappointed he was at the king's insincerity, he was still hoping that the king would one day change his attitude. When he finally gave up on the king and left the country, he took three long days to take his departure, hoping in vain that the king might send someone to persuade him to stay. This expect­ ant and yet proud attitude may be a bit hard for contemporary readers to appreciate. But it reveals Mencius' personality and his sincere concern for the realization of his political ideals. In this chapter, our major interests lie in Mencius' philosophy of human nature, his moral philosophy, and his political philosophy.

What Is Human Nature ? The investigation of human nature4 has been a shared undertaking by Western and Eastern thinkers alike. By " human nature, " we cannot possibly mean simply what we were born with. Infants do not yet have the practice of reasoning, but few thinkers would deny that reason is part of human nature. Infants do not yet have fully developed sexual desire, but few thinkers would deny that sexual desire is innate in humans. Perhaps we could say that "nature" means one's potential, inclinations, or capacities. If that is the case, then the way we are as mature beings is not simply the manifestation of our nature. It is, rather, the outcome of the fulfillment of our potential, inclinations, and capaci­ ties. In other words, our nature is not an "end-state" of our existence; it is instead a beginning state. If human nature is a mere beginning state of our existence, then it does not predetermine what we will become. To say that we have a tendency toward good does not mean that we cannot turn bad; to say that we have a tendency toward bad also does not mean that we cannot be made good. Neither tendency can prevent us from turning the other way. What is the point then in arging that humans have a tendency toward good or that they have a tendency toward bad? Shouldn't human nature be called morally neutral instead? A. C. Graham ex­ plains tht> meaning of " nature " in Mencius this way: "the [xing] (nature) of an animate thing . . . meant the course on which life completes its 67

Ancient Chinese Philosophy development if sufficiently nourished and not obstructed or injured from outside. ,, 5 In other words, nature is not j ust any tendency or any incli­ nation; rather, it is the natural tendency or inclination of a creature. The opposite development not projected in one's original nature is thus not natural, but the result of external conditioning. " Nature" is often used in opposition to "nurture, " which includes all sorts of environmental influences: parental care, family discipline, peer conduct, educational enforcement, social norms, etc. Theoretically speak­ ing' nature would be what is present prior to all these results of nurture. However, realistically we cannot see how a person behaves until she has been exposed to all sorts of environmental influences. Without nurture, nature cannot begin to be manifested. Therefore, a dichotomy between nature and nurture seems impossible in practice. If we employ empirical observation to gather evidence for the goodness or the badness of hu­ man nature, we will never come up with a reliable account. Mature human beings are the mixed results of both nature and nurture, and it is simply not feasible to separate the two factors in all individual cases. What then is the point of the debate over whether human nature is good or bad? What the debate does is to help settle on issues of nurture: what is the best way to construct a harmonious, moral society? If we believe that humans have tendencies toward the bad, then we would advocate ways to curtail these tendencies: laws and punishments, for example. If we believe that humans have inclinations toward good, then we would advocate ways to enhance these inclinations: education and encourage­ ment, for example. As we shall see, the debate between Mencius, who advocated that human nature is good, and Xunzi, who held the view that human nature is bad, would turn into a debate between Confucian politics, which stresses moral paradigms, and Legalistic politics, which emphasizes stiff laws and harsh punishments. The application of this theoretical debate thus has grave consequences.

Mencius' Assumptions on Human Nature and Human Mind/Heart To begin with, for Mencius nature is a species-specific notion. He quoted from an ancient Book of Odes: "Where there is a thing, there is a norm.,, 6 Different kinds of things would have different norms. These norms define their respective natures. The nature of a dog cannot be the same as the nature of a cow, just as the nature of a cow cannot be 68

Mencius (Mengzi) the same as the nature of a human.7 Therefore, human nature is what distinguishes humans from all other animals. Mencius further argued that humans are separated from animals exactly because moral virtues are innate to them. Since all humans belong to the same species (Mencius uses the notion kind), all humans would have the same nature. Hence, Mencius assumes that human nature is universal in all human beings. Taking barley as an example, he says: Sow the seeds and cover them. The soil is the same and the time of planting is also the same. They grow rapidly, and by the time of the summer solstice they have all ripened. Although there are some differ­ ences, these are due to the richness of the soil, and to unevenness in the rain and in human effort. Hence, in general, things of the same kind are all similar. Why would one have any doubt about this when it comes to humans alone?8

Barley is a natural kind. No matter how it grows, it will never turn into rice. Human is also a natural kind. No matter how someone develops, he or she will never become a beast ( in the biological sense) . From this analogy, we can see Mencius' idea about human similarities and human differences: he would argue that humans are alike by nature, and the differences we see in mature human beings are due to external environ­ ment and individual effort. One could rebut the above claim by arguing that a human's physical and biological attributes may indeed be determined by its biological kind. But when it comes to a human's goodness or badness, we are dealing with a moral attribute that cannot be determined biologically. Mencius' reply would be that the human mind is also a human organ or a capacity that comes with birth.9 The mind can learn to think well just as it can learn to have a fully developed moral sense, but the capacities or potential for thinking and morality must be innate in us. He says: Mouths have the same preferences in flavors. [The great chef] Yi Ya was the first to discover that which our mouths prefer. . . . The fact that, when it comes to flavors, the whole world looks to Yi Ya is due to the fact that mouths throughout the world are similar. . . . Hence, I say that mouths have the same preferences in flavors, ears have the same preferences in sounds, eyes have the same preferences in attractiveness. When it comes to hearts, are they alone without preferences in common ? What is it that hearts prefer in common? I say that it is the fine patterns and righteous­ ness. The sage first discovered what our hearts prefer in common. Hence, fine pa2,erns and righteousness delight our hearts like meat delights our mouth.lO

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Ancient Chinese Philosophy This argument can be formulated as follows: 1

2 3 4 5

We humans are alike in our tastes for flavor, our ears for music, and our eyes for beauty such that we would recognize great chefs, great musicians or great beauties. Our minds cannot be so different from our sensory organs that they are not shared by all humans. Therefore, we must all be alike in our minds too. There are sages among human kind. Sages are people whose excel­ lent moral attributes are generally recognized.ll Therefore, our minds must appreciate morality just as our taste buds appreciate great foods.

In this argument, Mencius compares our mind to our sensory organs, and uses sages as an analogy to those chefs, musicians, or artists who have won the recognition of the populace in terms of their power to please the masses' taste buds, ears, and eyes. If we have a natural liking for the great chefs' culinary production, for example, then we should have a natural liking for the sages' moral conduct. In the context of our contemporary understanding of mental development, Mencius' analogy between the mind and sensory organs seems weak. Even if we grant him the assumption that the mind is a human organ that comes with certain innate capacities, his analogy between sages and great chefs or great musicians is still questionable. The reputation of great chefs or great musicians is often established in a small group of people with similar tastes. A vegetarian would not appreciate the best steak chef; an avid rock and roll fan may not appreciate the best philharmonic orchestra. Even when we go back to infancy, we still cannot establish a universal claim on babies' general liking or dislike in tastes, sounds, and sights. So Mencius' argument cannot rule out the possibility that some people naturally prefer morality while some people naturally prefer vice. Mencius' view on human nature is mostly introduced in the context of a refutation of the view presented by his contemporary philosopher Gaozi. Gaozi's theory, as recorded in the Mencius, can be summarized as follows: A B

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The word "nature" simply means life, j ust like the word "white" simply means white.1 2 Human nature is more like a blank slate (like a willow tree that can be made either into wooden cups or into wooden bowls; like a water flow that can be directed either to the east or to the west) . Human nature itself is indifferent to good and evil. L l

Mencius (Mengzi) C D

Desires for food and sex are what come naturally to us. They thus define our nature. 14 Moral virtues such as humanity (ren) and righteousness (yi) are manufactured by human efforts. I S

To refute Gaozi's view, Mencius first challenged his analogies. The anal­ ogy of the willow tree and cups or bowls is inappropriate, because one has to cut down the tree, disfigure the wood, in order to make wooden cups or wooden bowls. If Gaozi claims that one can be made humane or righteous j ust as trees can be made into cups or bowls, then he is saying that humanity and righteousness would harm or even maim human nature. This latter claim is something that Gaozi himself would not have accepted. Mencius further pointed out that the analogy of water, on the other hand, is better, but Gaozi has failed to observe a more natural trend of water: that it tends to flow to the low ground. Mencius argued that we could use water as an analogy to human na­ ture: human has a natural tendency j ust as water has a natural trend. By this analogy, humans do not have a morally neutral nature that can be made to be either good, or bad. As Mencius says: There is no man who is not good; there is no water that does not flow downwards. Now in the case of water, by splashing it one can make it shoot up higher than one's forehead, and by forcing it one can make it stay on a hill. How can that be the nature of water? It is the circum­ stances being what they are. That man can be made bad shows that his nature is no different from that of water in this respect.16

Mencius also challenged Gaozi's interpretation of the meaning of the word "nature . " He argued that if "nature " simply means life, just as "white" simply means white, then the nature of dog would be no differ­ ent from the nature of cow, and the nature of cow would be no different from the nature of human, since they all have life. Again, this conclu­ sion would not be acceptable even to Gaozi himself. Even had Gaozi accepted Mencius' interpretation of "nature" as one's "natural tendencies," he still would not have agreed with Mencius that humans naturally tend toward goodness. Gaozi noted that humans nat­ urally desire food and sex; hence, the two desires are within human nature. He even conceded that our love for others could be innate in us, but he insisted that our desire to do the right thing is imposed on us from the outside. Here the debate between Mencius and Gaozi becomes intricate. l\1encius did not seem to object to Gaozi's claim that the desire for food and the desire for sex are part of human nature, or to the claim 71

Ancient Chinese Philosophy that love for family members is innate in us. He focused instead on Gaozi's claim that the desire to do the right thing is imposed on us from outside. This is the famous debate on whether righteousness (yi) is internal or external. "Being internal" in this context means "coming from one's heart"; "being external " means "being imposed on oneself from outside." The debated issue can be formulated as this: is the standard according to which one does the right thing determined from one's mind/heart, or from external conventions? Gaozi used the exam­ ple of showing respect to the elderly to demonstrate his view on the externality of righteousness. He argued that if someone is older than I am, then I treat him with respect just because he is older. It does not matter whether this man is a stranger to me, or someone I truly respect. His age alone determines how I should act toward him, j ust as the whiteness of an object impels me to treat it as white. Therefore, what counts as the right thing to do in this context is truly determined by an external standard.17 The significance of this debate is that if Gaozi were to succeed in proving that the sense of righteousness was the result of external demands, then the individual on her own could not know how to do the right thing in each context. If the individual does not know what to do on her own, then she does not have moral autonomy. When we j udge individuals to be lacking in moral autonomy, we would want to place an indefinite number of external restraints on their behavior. The whole Confucian project of one's moral self-cultivation would thus be aborted. To rebuff this serious claim of Gaozi, Mencius pointed out that in respecting the elderly, the feeling of respect ultimately comes from one's own heart. Even if in different contexts we have to consider different conducts accordingly, there is one thing all considerations share in common: we wish to do the right thing in the right context. This wish then, Mencius argues, is the sense of righteousness. Mencius uses the example of toasting an older person on various occasions to demon­ strate that even though one's conduct could be modified in accordance with contextual propriety, one's feeling of respect for the elderly is the same in all situations. Therefore, righteousness, or the desire to do the right thing, comes from one's own heart. It is not imposed on the moral agent from outside. Along with the sense of righteousness, there are other moral senti­ ments innate in us. Mencius' view is that human nature contains the seeds ( or sprouts) of moral virtues; among them, he lists humanity (ren), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. From having the tendency to­ ward goodness to actually being a good person, one needs to cultivate these moral seeds to bring them to maturity. At the same time, man can be made to do evil, when the environment is not conducive to his moral 72

Mencius (Mengzi) cultivation, or when he does not put in enough effort. After we have examined Mencius' arguments for the existence of the moral tendency in human nature, we will turn to his explanation of moral failures.

Mencius' Arguments for the Goodness of Human Nature To substantiate the claim that "there is no human who does not tend toward goodness, ,, 18 Mencius came up with several arguments. He says: "The reason why I say that humans all have hearts that are not unfeel­ ing toward others is this. Suppose someone suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well: everyone in such a situation would have a feeling of alarm and compassion - not because one wanted fame among their neighbors and friends, and not because one would dislike the sound of the child's cries. From this we can see that if one is without the heart of compassion, one is not a human. ,, 19 This remark can be formulated into the following argument (Argument One) : 1

2 3 4

Anyone who sees a young child about to fall into a deep well is bound to feel anxiety and commiseration in the heart. He feels this way not to gain friendship with the child's parents, not to seek the praise of others, and not because he detests hearing the child's screaming. This example shows that people cannot bear to see the suffering of others. This very feeling is the beginning of humanity. Therefore, humans have the beginning of humanity in their nature.

It is interesting to note that when Rousseau tried to establish the claim that man is a creature of compassion, he used a similar example of someone's watching "a wild beast tear a child from his mother's breast, crush the child's frail limbs with its murderous teeth and tear out the living entrails with its claws. " Rousseau remarked, "What terrible agitation must be felt by this witness of an event in which he has no personal interest! What anguish he must suffer in seeing it and being ,,20 unable to do anything to help the fainting mother or the dying child! In the same way, Mencius is here engaged in a kind of thought experi­ ment, in which he asks us to consider the scenario of watching the imminent death of a young child and to draw the same conclusion that he does. With this kind of argument, one could perhaps challenge the first premise: not everyone would naturally commiserate in the given 73

Ancient Chinese Philosophy scenario. But Mencius is not making any universal claim on human responses; rather, he is making a general claim, or, as Philip Ivanhoe calls it, a "generic" claim.21 Hence, a few counterexamples would not have defeated his claim. If it is generally true that most people would have the kind of reaction that Mencius depicts, then it is generally true that most people would naturally have commiseration in the heart. Of course, having this natural sentiment is far from being moral: one could ignore the child and do nothing to save him; one could see the child as the enemy's child and proceed to push the child into the well. As David Wong observes: "An innate compassionate impulse is not compassion in the full sense.,,22 Establishing the claim that humans have a natural compassionate impulse, or the beginning of humanity, is merely a first step toward proving that all humans are naturally good. Mencius next argues: Life is something I desire; righteousness is also something I desire. If I cannot have both, I will forsake life and select righteousness. Life is something I desire, but there is something I desire more than life. Hence, I will not do just anything to obtain it. Death is something I hate, but there is something I hate more than death. Hence, there are calamities I do not avoid . . . . From this we can see that there are means of obtaining life that one will not employ. From this we can also see that there are things that would avoid calamity that one will not do. Therefore, there are things one desires more than life and there are also things one hates more than death. It is not the case that only the worthy person has this heart. All humans have it. The worthy person simply never loses it.23

1

2 3

4 S

6

•

Everyone desires life and detests death. But if you humiliate some­ one by giving him food, he would not accept the food even if he needs it for survival. Hence, there is always something that one desires more than life itself, or something that one detests more than death itself. If there is something that one would not do to preserve life and to avoid death, then one is not simply a creature for whom self-sur­ vival is the only goal (whereas other animals are). Therefore, we all have our own principle on what to do and what not to do, even when it comes to matters of life and death. A righteous person is simply someone who holds on to his own principle in all matters. Therefore, we all have within ourselves what it takes to be a right­ eous person.

As stated, this argument (Argument Two) is not even valid. One could perhaps say that from Premise 1 to Premise 2 Mencius is committing a 74

Mencius (Mengzi) form of hasty generalization. One example, even if it is a well-known real-life example, does not warrant the claim that we are not simply creatures driven by our innate desire for survival. However, Mencius is not making such a faulty inference here. His point is rather to use it as an illustration of a general human trait, as stated in Premise 2. If there is always something that one would not do even for the sake of sur­ vival, then one's existence is more elevated than the basic level of survival (contra Gaozi's claim that "nature " simply means life). Having a principle regarding what not to do is in essence the beginning of the virtue of righteousness. Hence, the sprout of righteousness is innate in us j ust as the sprout of humanity is. Having established the claim that the beginning of humanity and righteousness is prevalent in all of us, Mencius went on to construct his view that human nature contains the beginning of all four essential virtues: humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. He says: Humans all have the heart of compassion. Humans all have the heart of disdain. Humans all have the heart of respect. Humans all have the heart of approval and disapproval. The heart of compassion is [humanity] . The heart of disdain is righteousness. The heart of respect is propriety. The heart of approval and disapproval is wisdom. [Humanity], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to us externally. We inherently have them.24

We can expand this comment into the following argument (Argument Three) : 1

2

All humans naturally have feelings of commiseration, awareness of shame and dislike, the sentiment of respect and reverence, and a sense of right and wrong. The feeling of commiseration the sprout of humanity; the aware­ the sprout of righteousness; the senti­ ness of shame and dislike ment of respect and reverence the sprout of propriety; the sense of right and wrong the sprout of wisdom. Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom constitute goodness. Therefore, all humans have the sprouts of goodness within their nature. =

=

=

=

3 4

In the first premise, Mencius is again making a general statement about humans. We sometimes experience pity for someone else's suffering; we sometimes feel ashamed of our own behavior, or we are disdainful of others' conduct; we sometimes have a sense of respect or awe for certain things or certain people; we sometimes make judgments on right 75

Ancient Chinese Philosophy and wrong. Mencius called these sentiments the " four sprouts " (or " four beginnings " ) of morality. In his view, humans and other animals are very similar in many biological aspects, with only these moral sprouts distinguishing humans from other animals. That is why he would call these four moral sprouts or moral inclinations " human nature. " Being in possession of them does not guarantee having the fully developed virtues of humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. But they are nonetheless the common ground for human morality. From the above arguments, we can see that Mencius believed that morality is rooted in humans' natural sentiments. The origin of morality is not pure human reason, but human emotions. The foundation for ethics is not social conventions, but human nature. According to Mencius, morality gets developed in human societies because the moral sense is natural to human beings; in other words, we are born with this moral sense. We can probably call Mencius' ethical theory the naturalistic

view of morality.

The Explanation for Moral Failures If humans naturally tend toward goodness and if all humans have the seeds of morality in their mind/heart, then why don't we see sages everywhere? The mere fact that Mencius needed to advocate the pres­ ence of moral sprouts, and the importance of moral virtues, demon­ strates that even in his times, most people were not acting in the moral way. So, what explains the discrepancy between humans' innate good­ ness and their manifest badness? If morality is natural to us and yet we are not moral, then there must be some reasons why we fail morally. If people often fail morally, then there has to be a way to teach people to avoid moral failures. Mencius' explanation for moral failures and his pedagogy on moral cultivation are thus closely linked. Even though Mencius stressed the existence of moral sprouts in hu­ man nature, he never denied that the desire for physical comfort and material goods is also part of human nature. He called our sensory organs "the minor part" and the mind/heart "the major part" of our bodies.25 According to Mencius, the senses would desire food, sex, and other material goods on their own, and these desires seem to be compet­ ing with the desire of the mind/heart. Under this view, our mouth de­ sires delicious food, our ears desire pleasing sounds, and our eyes desire beautiful sights, j ust as our mind/heart desires moral virtues. The mind/ heart has four functions: thinking (reflecting); feeling (having emotions and sentiments); willing (zhi: that which makes resolution); and the 76

Mencius (Mengzi) employment as well as the cultivation of the moral qi. Moral failures, in most cases, are the result of the mind/heart's not fulfilling its functions. With the competition between mind/heart and senses, between moral volition and sensory desires, Mencius endeavored to explain why innate moral inclinations do not guarantee mature morality. Sometimes our sensory desires and our moral sense can direct us to different directions; hence, we have moral conflicts. If we go with our sensory desires and deviate from the moral path, then we are paying too much attention to the minor part, while neglecting the major part of ourselves. For exam­ ple, someone who is intent on having the most delectable food may spend all her time thinking about ways to obtain it. In Mencius' j udg­ ment, this person is enslaving the mind/heart to serve the senses. Fur­ thermore, the mind/heart's not fulfilling its function contributes greatly to our moral failures. The mind's main function is to think or to reflect on one's behavior. If the mind does not think, does not reflect, then it cannot compete with the senses. Secondly, if one's mind does not have a strong will, then even when one wishes to do good, one can easily give up midway. Thirdly, one's heart contains all the natural moral senti­ ments. If one does not employ these sentiments in one's moral delibera­ tion, then one can easily lose sight of one's intrinsic goodness. Finally, if one's mind does not employ the qi properly or if the mind fails to cultivate the right qi, then this energy can interfere with the resolution and lead the mind astray. The notion of qi in the Mencius is hard to analyze fully.26 It could be viewed as a form of energy that occupies the whole of the human body, being controlled by the mind/heart, or in particular, by the will. Mencius sometimes used the expression "the flood-like qi" to describe it. In response to his student's demand for an explanation of this "flood-like qi," Mencius says: It is difficult to put into words. It is a qi that is supremely great and supremely unyielding. If one cultivates it with uprightness and does not harm it, it will fill up the space between heaven and earth. It is a qi that unites righteousness with [Dao] . . . It is produced by accumulated righteousness . . . . If some of one's actions leave one's heart unsatisfied, it will starveY .

If the qi is cultivated by one's accumulated righteousness, then it can be viewed as one's moral spirit. But at the same time, this qi also seems to have a physical dimension in that one can fix one's resolution (zhi) to direct the flow of one's qi. With resolution, one can move the qi to aid one in overcoming undesirable temptations.28 Mencius thinks that one's moral spirit (qi) can be manifested in one's appearance or in one's 77

Ancient Chinese Philosophy comportment. He says: "That which a [superior person] follows as his nature, that is to say, [humanity], righteousness, [propriety], and wis­ dom, is rooted in his heart, and manifests itself in his face, giving it a sleek appearance. It also shows in his back and extends to his limbs, rendering their message intelligible without words. ,,29 What is within us will naturally be manifested externally. O ur eyes, in particular, are the telling mark of our inner world: "Of what is present within a person, nothing is more ingenuous than the pupils of the eyes. The pupils can­ not hide one's evil. If, in one's bosom, one is upright, the pupils will be bright. If, in one's bosom, one is not upright, the pupils will be shady. ,dO If we want to understand others' intent, therefore, there is no better way than to look at their eyes while listening to their words. Mencius' explanation for the causes of moral failures can be summar­ ized as follows: 1

2

3

78

The mind does not think (one lacks reflection on what is good in one's nature}. 3 1 Mencius quotes Confucius' remark, " Hold it fast

and you will preserve it. Let it go and you will lose it. ,,32 He thinks that this is a perfect description of the mind. If the mind does not perform its function of thinking, then soon it will be lost in one's pursuit of physical pleasures.33 One's lost mind/heart is not retrieved. Mencius says: "A basket of food and a bowl of soup - if one gets them then one will live; if one doesn't get them then one will die. But if they are given with con­ tempt, then even a homeless person will not accept them. If they are trampled upon, then even a beggar won't take them. However, when it comes to a salary of ten thousand bushels of grain, then one doesn't notice propriety and righteousness and accepts them . . . . Is this indeed something that one can't stop doing? This is called losing one's fundamental heart. ,,34 Some people would not go against their own principles for a small gain; however, they would do j ust any­ thing in order to aggrandize their wealth and power. In so doing, they are forgetting that initially there was something that they would not have done under any circumstance. Losing the sense of what not to do is losing the sense of righteousness. One undernurtures one's moral endowment. Using the analogy of planting, Mencius explains the constant effort needed to develop moral sprouts. Even if there is something very easy to grow, if one exposes it to sunshine for one day and then to coldness for the next ten days, it simply will not survive.35 Similarly, our moral sprouts cannot mature into moral characters or ethical behavior if we occa­ sionally do one good deed, and then repeat bad acts continually.

Mencius (Mengzi) 4

One pays too much attention to the minor qualities in their nature (such as the desires for food and sex) or to the minor parts in their bodies (sensory organs such as the palates). Mencius says, " Those

who follow their greater part become great humans. Those who follow their petty part become petty humans. ,,36 Mencius believed that material desires can often distract one from one's effort in cultivating virtues. Even though he never advocated the elimination of physical desires, he did exhort people to reduce physical desires. He says: "There is nothing better for the nurturing of the heart than to reduce the number of one's desires. When a man has but few desires, even if there is anything [in his original heart that] he fails to retain in himself, it cannot be much; but when he has a great many desires, then even if there is anything [in his original heart that] he manages to retain in himself, it cannot be much. ,,37 5 One maims one's good nature with repeated vile deeds. Using the analogy of a barren Mount OX,38 whose trees had been completely hewn down with axes or hatches and whose newly formed shoots have been constantly grazed by oxen and sheep, Mencius states that if one abuses one's originally good nature with repeated bad deeds, then one will end up being not far from brutes. Those who become tyrants, sociopaths, professional hit men, serial killers, etc., are those who have maimed their initial human nature. Few would believe that there is any trace of goodness left in these people. Bryan Van Norden thinks that the analogy of Mount Ox demonstrates that Mencius held the view that " some humans have no sprouts of mor­ ality. ,,39 However, even with the barren Mount Ox, Mencius points out that it is not in the nature of the mountain not to have any trees. By the same token, it is not that these depraved people do not have moral sprouts or intrinsically good human nature. As soon as the abuse is stopped, a vile person could be morally renewed, just as a barren mountain could grow new trees. Therefore, Mencius' claim on the universality of moral nature is not curtailed even when it comes to extremely vicious people. 6 Weakness of the will or weakness of the desire to do good. 40 As the mind can fail to think, so too can it fail to firm up one's initial resolution to do good. For example, we can decide that we will give to charity on a regular basis. But such good resolutions often do not last long. Soon we are back to the old habit of giving in to our own extravagant indulgences, rather than giving money to charities. Such weakness of the will also explains our failure in moral cultivation. 7 Self-denial or self-abandonment. Mencius says: " Those who have the four moral sprouts and yet tell themselves that they cannot be 79

Ancient Chinese Philosophy

�

moral are ones who deprive themselves. ,,41 According to Mencius, there are two kinds of acknowledgment of inability: one is genuine inability when the task is beyond one's physical capacity; the other is merely one's inaction when the task is within one's power. Doing the right thing is not beyond one's physical power; thus, one is never j ustified in denying oneself the ability to do good. Most people, when they claim that they cannot do certain moral deeds, are simply finding excuses for themselves. Mencius seemed to view this prob­ lem as the major reason why the rulers of his time were not humane. With the above explanations, Mencius argued that the absence of good in most people, or the presence of evil in some people, does not disprove his theory that human nature is good. One's heart naturally feels commiseration, shame, reverence, and rightness (the four moral sprouts) . But if one does not extend these good feelings, then the moral sentiments remain mere sentiments and do not generate moral behavior. Therefore, the mind has to do a lot in order to transform the moral sprouts in one's nature into fully fledged morality. For Mencius, the debate on human nature was not purely for theoretical interest. Follow­ ing Confucius' path, he aimed at the actual moral transformation of individuals; and furthermore, of the whole of human society. There­ fore, he continued to investigate the most effective ways for moral cultivation.

Moral Education and Methods of Moral Cultivation To say that human nature is good is not to say that humans are good; to say that there is no one who does not tend toward goodness is not to say that there is no one who is not good. Mencius did not have a naive view of the moral reality of humans. For him, moral cultivation is not at all an easy task. Since there are so many possible routes to moral failure, he has to point to a feasible way to establish one's moral virtues. The one method that he emphasized the most was "extension. ,,42 In an example widely discussed by contemporary scholars (Mencius l A:7), Mencius tried to teach the king of his host country to recognize the goodness in his own heart. The king had previously seen an ox being led to be slaughtered for sacrifice, and was moved by its fright­ ened looks. He ordered the ox to be spared but replaced it with a sheep instead, since the ceremony could not be relinquished. From a logical 80

Mencius (Mengzi) standpoint, the king's behavior is inconsistent - what is the moral differ­ ence between killing an ox and killing a sheep? Some people in the king's court thus thought that he replaced the ox with the sheep because the former was more expensive than the sheep. Mencius had a more charitable interpretation of the king's action: the king simply did not see the frightened looks of the sheep. Mencius pointed out that in sparing the ox, the king showed the humane root (the heart of commiseration) in his heart. If he could extend this humane root, then he would love his people and become more sympathetic to their suffering.41 This method of extension can be applied in other cases. A basic teaching of Confucianism is to acknowledge our natural inclination to love our own family more than we would love a stranger. This is the Confucian doctrine of " love with distinction, " which was contested by Mozi and his followers.44 Mencius says that to spread humanity, we do not need to deny these natural inclinations and try to achieve impartial­ ity in our sentiment. We only need to extend these natural preferences to others, to empathize with others who have the same feelings toward their own family members. Morality is not over and above our partial love; it is simply a demand on us to take one step further. Mencius says, "Treat with respect the elders in one's own family, and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in one's own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families. ,,45 If one has respect and concern for some­ one else's parents, then one would not cheat them or rob from them. If one has tenderness toward someone else's children, then one would never want to see them starve or freeze, let alone harm them. Even the most malicious people would have a soft spot for someone or some­ thing. If they can recognize this sentiment as the beginning of humanity and work to preserve and enlarge it, they could eventually become sages. On the other hand, if they refuse to extend the humane sprout and keep hardening themselves with cruel thoughts, eventually they will be no different from brutes. Hence, the vast difference between sages and brutes is really formed by an ability to extend or not. The regrettable fact, however, is that even if this method of extension is easy to follow, not many people will heed Mencius' advice. The king who had compassion toward the trembling ox did not succeed in loving his people enough to relinquish warfare, to end his people's suffering, or to gratify their natural desires. After defeating the many excuses that the king offered for his own conduct, Mencius eventually lost hope in the transformation of this king and left the country. What makes a humane king, what constitutes good rulership, thus became a maj or concern for Mencius. 81

Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Mencius' Political Philosophy: Governance with Humanity Mencius' political philosophy expands on Confucius' moral politics. Whereas Confucius merely discusses the magical power of moral trans­ formation when sages become kings, Mencius is more intent on giving practical guidance and realistic strategies. Almost half of the Mencius is devoted to his view on the best ways to govern a nation. Mencius advocated "governance with humanity. " To him, the foun­ dation of humane governance was the maintenance of the people's live­ lihood. Mencius advised the king: Do not interfere with the agricultural seasons, so that there will be enough grain to feed everyone; do not allow nets with too fine a mesh to be used in large ponds, so that there will be enough fish and tortoise for people to eat; do not allow hatches and axes to enter the forests at all time, so that there will be enough timber for people to use.46

For the king to practice humane governance, he should also reduce punishment and lessen taxation. If the king pays attention to these details, then the people will all have a comfortable life. Mencius be­ lieved that ensuring a comfortable life for the people is really the begin­ ning of truly humane governance. Of course, the one thing that would definitely destroy the people's comfortable life is warfare. Mencius lived in a time when neighboring countries were constantly attacking one another and all kings were intent on aggrandizing their own power. He believed that if a king is intent only on warfare, his people are bound to suffer. Adult males are drafted, and there is then no one to tend the fields; consequently, old people and young children starve to death, with no one to bury them. If the people cannot even know for sure whether they will make it to the next day, then how could they possibly have the leisure to engage in their moral cultivation? Therefore, the success of moral transformation of the people really lies in the ruler's avoidance of offensive warfare. Not all warfare can be avoided, however. Sometimes there are wars that have to be embarked on because they are "just wars. " For Mencius, the criterion of whether a war is just lies not on how the war would benefit the king or his people, but on whether the war will benefit the people of the enemy country. If the people of that country have been starving, freezing, exploited, and abused by their king, then they will welcome the siege. They will not put up any resistance; instead, they will bring food and drink to reward the incoming troops. Therefore, whoever wins 82

Mencius (Mengzi) the hearts of the people will win the war. As Mencius says, "A humane king has no match. ,,47 Mencius likened the role of rulers to that of parents. When parents think about the well-being of their children, the last thing they would want to see is that their children are starving or freezing. A humane king, according to Mencius, should have the same heart. When Mencius uses parenthood as the analogy of rulership, his emphasis is more on parental love than on discipline and regulations. Humanity begins with family love. If the king can extend his love for his own children to his people, then the people will all love him j ust as they love their own parents. If they love him as their own parents, then they will even die for him when the situation demands it. Clearly, what Mencius taught is the opposite of Machiavelli's teaching - it is far better to be loved than feared if the ruler cannot be both. One novel idea that Mencius introduced into Chinese political think­ ing is the idea of revolution. If the king is not humane - i.e., if he abuses the people instead of taking care of their welfare - then he can be legitimately removed. This view may appear contrary to what Confu­ cius teaches: the sociopolitical hierarchy in which the ruler is revered as the ruler, while the subjects always remain subjects. However, Mencius defended his view by pointing out that when the ruler abuses his power, then he is already not a genuine ruler, but a " lone man " loathed by everyone. To remove a lone man from his throne, according to Mencius, is not usurpation. However, even though Mencius argued that the valid­ ity of rulership depends on the people's judgment, he does not think that the task of royal replacement should be placed in the people's hands. As A. C. Graham points out, " Mencius is not a defender of popular revolution . . . . Ideally he thinks the tyrant should be removed by his own ministers, and among ministers by those of the old­ fashioned kind, those of his own blood. ,,48 The people will not have the political expertise or the military competence to succeed in this task. A revolution initiated by the people will probably bring the whole nation into complete chaos. Therefore, the task should fall on the shoulders of the ministers who originally assisted the ruler. These ministers them­ selves have to have some qualifications: they must have the people's well-being in mind and be wise enough to make the right judgment. There is only a very slight margin between legitimate overthrow and illegitimate usurpation, and the margin is set by the ministers' intent. Confucianism has often been charged with supporting Chinese feudal­ ism. But from what Mencius teaches, we should see that he would never support a form of feudalism that does not contain a humane king, prudent ministers, and contented people. 83

Ancient Chinese Philosophy

Conclusion A major difference between Confucius and Mencius is that the former focuses more on individuals while the latter focuses more on the state. Confucius stressed self-discipline; Mencius stressed moral expectations on the king. In turning his emphasis toward rulership, Mencius did not reject Confucius' moral picture that centers on self-cultivation. Rather, he tried to enhance the realizability of the whole Confucian moral ideal. His political philosophy would turn out to play an important role in shaping the history of Chinese politics. Mencius' philosophy of human nature and human mind also intro­ duced to the forefront of Chinese philosophy a topic on which Con­ fucius did not elaborate. This issue would later become one of the main topics in Neo-Confucianism. In Mencius, moreover, we witness the be­ ginning of philosophical argumentation in Chinese philosophy.

Further discussion questions 1

2

3

4

5

84

Is the standard according to which one does the right thing determined by one's heart or by external conventions ? Do we have an innate sense of the distinction between right and wrong? Between Mencius and Gaozi, who has the better argument? Do you think that sympathy, or a sense of commiseration, is natural to humans? Can this sentiment be a foundation for morality as Mencius argues? Do we have the "moral sprouts " that Mencius discusses? Are moral propensities biological traits of human beings? Why is the pursuit of physical desires incompatible with the cultivation of moral attributes? Why is the pursuit of profit inferior to the pursuit of knowledge? What is wrong with a life of pure pleasure and sheer profit? Can one justify the moral preferences assumed by both Confucius and Mencius? Can the method of extension be established as a universal moral principle? If we all extend our respect for elders in our family to include the elders in other fami l ies, if we all extend our tenderness toward our children to include children in other families, can we bring about a moral society? Is this method of extension sufficient to establish morality? Aristotle argues that moral virtues are habits, which can be acquired by doing certain virtuous acts. But these habits could be lost in one's lifetime. They thus need to be sustained by intellectual virtue - reason. In a similar way, Mencius argues that moral character requires constant fostering and maintenance. It can be lost if we do not make constant efforts to preserve the original good. What does Mencius propose as a way to sustain our moral habits? How does his method compare with Aristotle's method?

Mencius (Mengzi) 6

In contrast to the Western ethicists' predominant interest in establishing a universal moral principle on the basis of human reason, Mencius establishes an ethical theory on the basis of human emotions. Can you compare the strengths and weaknesses of each approach ? What do you think should be the foundation for human ethics - reason, or emotion?

Primary texts Wing-tsit Chan, ed. A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 973 (ch. 3; excerpts). Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds.) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2003 (ch. 3; excerpts). D. C. Lau. Mencius. London: Penguin Books, 1 970.

Further readings Eric L. Hutton. "Moral Connoisseurship in Mengzi." In Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002, pp. 163-86. D. C. Lau. " On Mencius' Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument." Asia Major, N. S., vol. X, 1 963. Reprinted in D. C. Lau. Mencius, vols. 1 & 2. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1 984, pp. 334-56. Kwong-loi Shun. "Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16, 1989: 3 1 7-43. Bryan W. Van Norden. "Kwong-loi Shun on Moral Reasons in Mencius. " Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 1 8, 1991: 353-70. David B. Wong. "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi." In Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002, pp. 187-220.

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C apter 4 Xunzi Hsiin Tzu

Introduction Xunzi (ca. 3 1 2-2 1 0 BeE) is the third major figure in early Confucian­ ism, but his influence is often deliberately understated by later Con­ fucians. The chief reason is that he opposes the main view of Mencius, widely regarded by Neo-Confucians to be the authentic successor of Confucius. Xunzi's status in Chinese philosophy is also controversial among contemporary scholars. Some take him to be the greatest phi­ losopher, whose writings "constitute the single most sophisticated philo­ sophical explanation and defense of the Confucian point of view, " ! while some accuse him of being inconsistent, dogmatic, unphilosophical, or even someone who "pandered to the tyrannical passion for pun­ ishment."2 The main text we have of Xunzi is a collection of essays entitled The Xunzi. Xunzi himself allegedly wrote most of these es­ says. His focus is on an individual's scholarship and moral cultivation and the various aspects of rulership, quite in line with the general emphasis of Confucius and Mencius. However, his work is more ana­ lytic in that he gives a more systematic analysis of the key notions in ancient Confucianism. His treatises include topics such as the nature of Heaven, the significance of Ii (propriety; rites and rituals), and the func­ tion of music. But above all, Xunzi's distinctive claim is his famous slogan: " Human nature is bad; his goodness is the result of man's deliberate effort. ,, 3 In this chapter, as the concluding chapter on ancient Confucianism, we shall discuss three major themes: Xunzi's view on the nature of Heaven, his theory of human nature, and his exposition on the significance of rites and rituals.

Xunzi (Hsun Tzu)

A Naturalistic View of Heaven In contemporary analytic tradition, " naturalism" means the metaphys­ ical view that everything is part of the natural world that natural sciences investigate, or the semantic view that a suitable philosophical analysis of any concept must show it to be amenable to empirical in­ quiry.4 Xunzi's view of Heaven (tian) is close to the spirit of naturalism, but in Xunzi's times, the power or the credibility of science was not yet an issue of concern. In this context, we shall mean by "naturalism" the simplified view that the only things that exist are natural or physical things and that philosophical inquiry should be backed by empirical investigation. Xunzi's ontology is naturalistic in the sense that it does not posit any supernatural being as the governor of human affairs. It is anti-superstition even if it is not necessarily anti-religion. This ontologi­ cal view marks an important development in the history of Chinese thought. Xunzi clearly takes a big step away from primitive society's natural worship toward rationality. Xunzi's notion of Heaven is devoid of anthropocentric connotation, which is closely associated with the folk religion prevalent in ancient China. Xunzi says: "Heaven does not suspend the winter because men dislike cold; earth does not cease being wide because men dislike great distances. " s As we explained in chapter 1 , the ancient Chinese used the term " Heaven" (tian ) to refer to all natural phenomena associated with the sky, such as the sun, the rain, the cloud, the thunder, etc. In Xunzi's times, the role of a god with personal will was slowly diminishing in Chinese cosmology. However, there was still a prevailing view among the ancient Chinese that these natural phenomena were reflections of states of affairs in the human world. Sometimes these reflections were even interpreted as rewards or punishments, even though the assign­ ment of rewards and punishments was not deemed to be from a willful supernatural being. The implicit moral seems to be that humans should conduct their worldly affairs in agreement with the Way (dao), so as to avoid any natural phenomenon that is destructive of their well-being. Neither Confucius nor Mencius encouraged this kind of thinking, but they did not work to dispel such a belief either. Their notion of Heaven has a moralistic connotation in that Heaven does correspond to the goodness and badness in human society, though not always in a way comprehensible to us. Their attitude seems to be that we should simply pay attention to our own conduct in this world, and let Heaven take its own course. What we can accomplish is our own doings; what we cannot control is the fate, or " Heaven's Mandate," which we receive 87

Ancient Chinese Philosophy from Heaven. This view does not promote the superstitious folk prac­ tices of praying to Heaven or seeking to please Heaven, but nor does it denounce the religious attitude toward Heaven. Moreover, both Con­ fucius and Mencius seem to endorse the general belief that "Heaven's Mandate typically manifested itself in the political arena, where the righteousness of a ruler earned the sanction of Heaven in the struggle with his competitors. ,,6 There is, under this view, a causal connection between the ruler's moral conduct and the political prosperity that Heaven invests in him. Xunzi, on the other hand, argues that Heaven is simply the totality of natural phenomena and changes of natural phenomena have nothing to do with human affairs. Order or chaos in the human world also do not bring about changes in the state of Heaven. Xunzi says: "Heaven's ways are constant. It does not prevail because of a sage like Yao; it does not cease to prevail because of a tyrant like [fie] . " ? There is simply no causal connection between natural phenomena and human affairs. Fur­ thermore, by calling Heaven's ways " constant, " Xunzi seems to hold the view that there are lawful regularities in the operations of natural phenomena. These natural laws do not depend on human cognition or perception. When humans fail to recognize the law behind occasional seemingly irregular phenomena, they call those phenomena " anoma­ lies." But Xunzi argues that our failure to perceive the regularities should not give us a reason to deny the constancy of Heaven's operations. In ancient times, there were some natural phenomena, such as eclipses of the sun and moon or the appearance of a meteor shower, which people could not explain. The common folk took these to be signs of the wrath of Heaven, and they were apprehensive whenever such phenomena took place. Xunzi points out that these occasional phenomena, as well as the regularly observed natural phenomena, are simply "the changes in Heaven and Earth and the transformations of yin and yang. " He says: "To marvel at them is alright, but to fear them is not. ,, 8 The change of attitude from " fear" to "marvel" is a first step away from the supersti­ tion of natural worship. It stands for an initial stage toward establishing a rational investigation of nature. Xunzi's affirmation of the constancy of Heaven could be seen as a generalization derived from empirical observation. Based on this postu­ late, he argues against any causal claim between states of affairs in the natural world and human states of affairs. An unjustified causal claim is one that connects two things that have no real causal connections. For example, we now think that astrology unjustifiably connects the posi­ tions and aspects of stars and planets with an individual's personality or daily affairs; that Feng Shui unjustifiably connects the success or failure 88

Xunzi (Hsun Tzu) of a business or a marriage with the location and placement of house­ hold objects; that many forms of superstitio n unjustifiably connect an individual's mishaps with trivial daily events, such as encountering a black cat, etc. In the same vein, Xunzi regards any claim on causal connections between the ruler's conduct and natural events as unwar­ ranted. Drought can happen to a bad ruler just as it can happen to a good one. Heaven operates in its own way; the human world acts out its own course. Even though sometimes the operations of Heaven hap­ pen to be favorable to the livelihood of human beings, natural phenom­ ena and human morality are not causally related. However, Xunzi does not therefore think that we should only be concerned with human affairs and pay no attention to the working of Heaven. What we need to study is the operations of Heaven in their own right. Xunzi says: The ranks of stars move in progression, the sun and moon shine in turn, the four seasons succeed each other in good order, the yin and yang go through their great transformations, and the wind and rain pass over the whole land. All things obtain what is congenial to them and grow to life, receive what is nourishing to them and grow to completion.9

If we follow the four seasons in planting and harvesting, then we can get the maximum yield for our crops. If we store up water before a foreseeable drought or if we store up food before an impending famine, then even the inevitable drought or flood cannot ruin the order of society. In other words, men should study the regularities of natural phenomena and react accordingly. If we are always prepared, then even when something happens unexpectedly, we will not be devastated. It is not Heaven, but this kind of advanced preparation and good govern­ ance, that guarantees prosperity to a great ruler. Xunzi asserts that the constancy of Heaven can be empirically observed through our senses. He calls our sense organs (eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and body) "the heavenly faculties. " lo Xunzi thinks that our senses can detect the taxonomies of natural objects and properties as they exist in themselves. He asks: And how does one go about distinguishing between things that are the same and those that are different? One relies upon the senses. Things which are of the same species and form will be apprehended by the sense as being all the same thing. Therefore, after comparing such things with other things of a similar nature, one may settle upon a common designa­ tiro:1. In this way one arrives at a common name for all the things of one class, which everyone agrees to use when the occasion demands.l l

89

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Apart from the reliability of our sense organs, another dependable source of our knowledge is our mind. Xunzi calls the mind (or the heart in the biological sense) "the heavenly ruler. ,, 12 The mind/heart is a ruler since it is in charge of sensory organs. Its function is to employ the data collected by sensory organs and make its own distinctions. Xunzi says: Speech, events, delight, anger, grief, joy, love, hate, and desire are distin­ guished by the mind. In addition, the mind possesses an overall under­ standing. Because of this overall understanding, it may rely upon the data of the ear and understand sounds correctly or rely upon the data of the eye and understand forms correctly. But this overall understanding must always wait until it has received new data from the senses and match it with the data already recorded in the mind concerning a particular class of objects, before it can arrive at a correct understanding of the object.13

Here Xunzi gives a crude description of his theory of cognition: the mind receives sense data from the senses, on the basis of which the mind forms conceptions. Concepts are the result of the mind's faculty of understanding. However, there can be no concepts without sense data. This remark is surprisingly similar to those of modern empiricists. In these and other remarks made by Xunzi, we see the rudiments of a naturalized epistemology and philosophy of language, which can be summarized as follows: A

B

C

D

90

Our sense organs and our mind are part of nature j ust as natural objects and properties are. They correctly perceive the taxonomies of natural objects and properties because they are developed naturally. The function of the eye is to perceive various shapes, colors, etc.; the function of the ear is to perceive various tones, pitches, etc.; the function of the mouth is to perceive various tastes; the function of the nose is to perceive various smells and odors; the function of the body is to perceive pain, itchiness, cold, heat, smoothness, rough­ ness, etc. No organ can take the place of another to acquire differ­ ent perceptions proper to the other organ. The function of the mind is to understand. The mind sorts the various data collected through different senses and organizes them into different categories. After comparing the similarities among similar objects and properties, the mind assigns a common denomin­ ator for things of the same nature. Hence, we have the introduction of names and concepts. People agree upon the use of names and concepts, because all people (with normal faculties) have the same perceptions and understanding.

Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu) E

Therefore, our language and our understanding correctly and uniquely match the natural world.

This view reinforces the basic presupposition of realism in classical Con­ fucianism, which Xunzi further supports with a theoretical explanation. In addition to refuting the anthropocentric view of Heaven, Xunzi also attacks other forms of irrational beliefs or superstitious practices. For instance, he rejects the belief in the existence of ghosts. He says: Always when people [claim to 1 see ghosts, it is at times when they are aroused and excited, and they make their judgments in moments when their faculties are confused and blinded. At such times they affirm that what exists does not exist, or that what does not exist exists, and then they consider the matter settled.14

Our sense organs usually function accurately such that if we do not perceive ghosts, then ghosts simply do not exist. As for the occasional claims of ghost-sighting, Xunzi's analysis is that those who claim to have seen ghosts must be deluded both in vision and in mind. To Xunzi, death is simply the termination of existence. He says, "Birth is the beginning of man, death his end.,,15 There is no other form of life that we can call the "afterlife." Therefore, there are no ghosts. Xunzi also attacks the common folk practice of physiognomy, the method of foretelling one's fortune or misfortune by studying one's physical ap­ pearance. He lists many examples of historical figures who are either tall or short, large or small, beautiful or ugly, well-proportioned or ill­ proportioned to show that there is simply no causal connection between people's accomplishments and their physical appearance. These unjusti­ fied causal beliefs are the roots of superstitions. Even though Xunzi is against superstitions, he is not completely against religion. His view on all religious ceremonies and practices is that they serve a " humane function. ,, 1 6 When one performs divination as one does with Yijing, the purpose is to stress the gravity of the affair to be undertaken. When the ruler performs a certain religious ritual with respect to Heaven or Earth, the function is to demonstrate how he cares about his people's welfare. Xunzi says: One performs the rain sacrifice and it rains. Why? I say: There is no special reason why. It is the same as when one does not perform the rain sacrifice and it rains anyway. . . . One performs divination and only then derides on important affairs. But this is not for the sake of getting what one seeks, but rather to give things proper form. Thus, the gentleman

91

Ancient Chinese Philosophy looks upon this as proper form, but the common people look upon it as connecting with spirits. j 7

With regard to the rites of the dead, Xunzi justifies them by saying, "The rites of the dead can be performed only once for each individual, and never again. They are the last occasion upon which the subject may fully express respect for his ruler, the son may express respect for his parents. " 18 In other words, even if there are no gods or ghosts, the performance of a certain religious ceremony in worship of gods or in memory of ancestors can demonstrate respect toward nature or ances­ tors. Such a demonstration is meant to teach the common people the right attitude, which is to have respect for nature and for ancestors. As Wing-tsit Chan puts it: The influence of supernatural forces over man is completely ruled out by [Xunzi] . What he calls spirits is but cosmic change and evolution. To him, in religious sacrifice, whether there are really spiritual beings to receive them does not matter. The important thing is one's attitude, especially sincerity, in the performance. Thus sacrifices are "ornaments," or refined manifestation of an inner attitude.19

If religious rituals can accomplish this goal, then they are not harmful to human society. As we shall see later in this chapter, Xunzi thinks that these rituals or ceremonies are actually indispensable exactly because of the humanistic function they serve. In conclusion, Xunzi's notion of Heaven is quite congenial to our modern view of nature. But his view is different from our modern naturalistic view in that it still preserves the moralistic connotation that Confucius and Mencius associate with Heaven. His view on morality is that our conduct should emulate the attributes we assign to Heaven. He says, "The sage purifies his [heavenly] ruler, rectifies his [heavenly] organs, sufficiently provides for his [heavenly] nourishment, follows the [heavenly] government, and nourishes his [heavenly] feelings so as to bring completion the work of [Heaven] . ,,2o We can perhaps put Xunzi's ethical thesis into this simple slogan: "To be moral is to be in agreement with Heaven. "

On Human Nature Against Mencius' theory of the goodness of human nature, Xunzi says: " Human nature is bad; his goodness is the result of man's deliberate effort. ,,21 This debate between Xunzi and Mencius on human nature has 92

Xunzi (Hsun Tzu) captured the interest of many contemporary scholars. On the surface, Mencius and Xunzi seem to hold directly opposite views, but if we study their overall theory of moral cultivation, moral education, and rulership, then we see that their views are actually quite similar. As A. C. Graham says: " It is indeed far from easy to locate any issue of fact on which they disagree. Both recognize the need of learning, the moral acceptability of all fully reconcilable desires, the function of the heart as arbiter between them, and the possibility of anyone becoming q sage. ,,22 Some scholars argue that there is no genuine disagreement between the two philosophers on the nature of human beings; what they have is simply a terminological dispute on the use of the term "nature. ,,23 Others argue that the two philosophers disagree more on the nature of morality and the method of moral education, than on the nature of human beings.24 To see the genuine disagreement between Xunzi and Mencius, we need to take a close look at Xunzi's definition of "nature " versus " deliberate effort," his analysis of the content of human nature and his arguments for the claim that human nature is bad. To begin with, since Xunzi separates "deliberate effort" and "nature" as the sources of good and evil, let us see how he defines the two concepts. He defines "nature" as " whatever one is born with; whatever comes naturally and not from one's doing.,,25 Xunzi thinks that human nature is what one receives from Heaven; and as we saw in the previous section, Heaven for Xunzi is simply the totality of natural phenomena associated with the sky. Therefore, there is no teleological design or moral connotation associated with human nature. What one has at birth are basically one's biological characteristics, which are not so different from those of other animals. Xunzi says: "The basic nature of man is that which he receives from Heaven. The emotions are the substance of the nature and the desires are the responses of the emo­ tions. ,,26 In other words, he takes the content of human nature to in­ clude human desires and human emotions. Desires are related to our sense organs: our eyes prefer pleasing appearances; our ears prefer agree­ able music; our mouth prefers delectable tastes; our nose prefers fra­ grant smells. These desires are natural to us. We don't need to learn to have these desires, since all sensory organs naturally prefer things that are agreeable to the senses. At the same time, our mind/heart also has natural emotions, in which Xunzi includes " love, hate, joy, anger, sorrow, or happiness. ,,27 When the mind/heart loves a certain thing or finds it enjoyable, it generates the corresponding desire. This is why Xunzi calls desires "the responses of the emotions. " Xunzi defines " goodness" and "evil" in this way: "All men in the world, past and present, agree in defining goodness as that which is 93

Ancient Chinese Philosophy upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, and evil as that which is unbalanced, dangerous, violent and chaotic. This is the distinction be­ tween good and evil." 28 If "goodness" is defined as " order and har­ mony," while "evil " is defined as "chaos and violence," then what we need to find out is whether the world will be peaceful and orderly, or violent and chaotic, when everyone follows his or her inborn nature. Xunzi thinks that humans are all egoists in that they would want to satisfy their own desires first and foremost. If humans follow their natural emotions and desires without any restraint, then the world will be brought to total chaos and eventual ruin. Without proper modifica­ tions of the inborn nature, everyone will become a villain. Human nature is bad in the respect that it naturally leads to an evil state. As for the source of human goodness, Xunzi attributes it to human beings' deliberate effort (wei). The original Chinese term "wei," mean­ ing literally " man-made" or " artificial, " has been translated as "con­ scious activity " (Watson), "activity " ( Chan), "human artifice " (Lau), or " deliberate effort" (Ivanhoe and Van Norden ). Xunzi does not associate any negative connotation with the term "artificial " ; what he means is simply whatever is mixed with human effort. Since human goodness is the result of people's deliberate effort, this deliberate effort, which forms the basis of human culture, is good. Xunzi defines it as "acting upon the decision of the mind's deliberation; a habit or a routine that is devel­ oped after the accumulation of these deliberations and practices. ,,29 Among human beings' deliberate efforts Xunzi lists rites and righteous­ ness, moral principles and moral teachings, laws and regulations, etc. What deliberate effort accomplishes are all forms of moral conduct and moral sentiments. The whole process of human civilization acts against man's innate desire to aggrandize his possession and gratify his senses. Therefore, Xunzi declares, the goodness of human beings is the result of their deliberate effort. In this sense, human goodness is man-made, or

artificial.

Along with goodness or moral attributes in general, other cultural human attributes, such as being lawful, courteous, etc., are also listed as artificial by Xunzi. The distinction between natural attributes and artifi­ cial attributes is simply the distinction between nature and effort: be­ tween what one is given and what one can work for. Xunzi says: Mencius states that man is capable of learning because his nature is good, but I say that this is wrong. It indicates that he has not really understood man's nature nor distinguished properly between the basic nature and conscious activity [wei]. The nature is that which is given by heaven; you cannot learn it, you cannot acquire it by effort. Ritual principles, on the

94

Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu) other hand, are created by sages; you can learn to apply them, you can work to bring them to completion. That part of man that cannot be learned or acquired by effort is called the nature; that part of him which can be acquired by learning and brought to completion by effort is called conscious activity. This is the difference between nature and conscious activity.30

From this criticism of Mencius, we can see that Xunzi does take "nature" to mean something different. As we explained in chapter 3, what Mencius takes to be "nature" is one's potential or innate inclinations - that which can be cultivated and matured by one's effort. Here we see that what Xunzi means by "nature" is what is given or completed at birth - that which cannot be further advanced by later education or conscious effort. Xunzi lists the eye's ability to see or the ear's ability to hear as part of one's nature, since "you cannot acquire clear sight and keen hearing by study. ,,31 This view of humans' natural capacities may not be completely accurate by today's standard. However, there does seem to be a distinction between what we have as natural attributes and what we have as cultural attributes. D. C. Lau summarizes Xunzi's distinction between human nature and human deliberate effort (he calls it " human artifice" ) in this way: Human nature is that which ( 1 ) is made what it is by heaven, (2) cannot be learned, ( 3 ) cannot be improved through application and (4) is not the result of reflection by the mind, while human artifice is that which ( 1 ) is invented by the sages, (2) can be learned, (3) can be improved through application, and (4) is the result of reflection by the mind.32

We can say that for Xunzi, human nature is what humans share with other animals, while human goodness is what humans develop out of a long process of civilization. Therefore, it is human beings' deliberate effort, rather than human nature, that distinguishes humans from other animals. This is just the opposite of Mencius' claim. Having examined Xunzi's view on human nature, let us now look at his arguments against Mencius' theory. Xunzi says: The nature of man is evil; his goodness is the result of his [deliberate effort]. Now, man's inborn nature is to seek for gain. If this tendency is followed, strife and rapacity result and deference and compliance dis­ appear. By inborn nature one is envious and resentful of others. If these tendencies are followed, injury and destruction result and loyalty and faithfulness disappear. By inborn nature one possesses the desires of ear and eye and one likes beautiful sounds and sights. If these tendencies are

95

Ancient Chinese Philosophy followed, lewdness and licentiousness result, and the pattern and order of propriety and righteousness disappear. Therefore if a man follows his nature and his feelings, he will inevitably result in strife and rapacity. When such mentality is combined with rebellion against or disregard for social order, he will end in violence. Therefore there must be the civilizing influences of teachers and laws and the guidance of propriety and right­ eousness. Under such influences, the man will develop the attitude of deference and compliance, which, combined with culture and order, will lead to his being disciplined. From this point of view, it is clear that the nature of man is evil and that his goodness is the result of [deliberate effort] .33

Let us formulate this argument as follows (Argument One): 1

2

3 4

5

By inborn nature, one is fond of profit and gain; by inborn nature, one has envy and resentment of others; by inborn nature, one possesses desires for sensory pleasures. If the tendency to seek profit and gain is followed, then strife and rapacity result while respect and compliance disappear; ( ii) if the tendency to have envy and resentment of others is fol­ lowed, then harm and destruction result while loyalty and faithfulness disappear; ( iii) if the tendency to meet one's sensory desires is followed, then lewdness and licentiousness result while propriety and right­ eousness disappear. Therefore, if one follows one's inborn nature, evil will ensue. The virtues we see in humans such as respect, loyalty, faithfulness, pro­ priety, righteousness, etc. must all be from the influence of teachers and laws. Therefore, man is by nature bad; his goodness is created by deliber­ ate effort. (i) (ii) ( iii) (i)

To examine this argument, we must see if we accept Xunzi's first premise, which is an empirical claim of human emotions. A sweeping empirical claim such as this is hard either to endorse or to refute, since it depends on the stock of evidence one gathers. By this claim alone, Xunzi is not refuting Mencius' observation of the moral inclinations that humans naturally have. He is merely pointing out those other inclinations that Mencius does not emphasize. If Mencius could make a sweeping empirical claim about the good human inclinations, Xunzi could also make a sweeping empirical claim about the bad inclinations that humans have. His argument is thus at least as strong, or as weak, 96

Xunzi (Hsun Tzu) as that of Mencius. The second premise in this argument states a condi­ tional claim, with the hidden assumption that the resources in the world are limited. If people want the same things and their desires cannot all be satisfied, then it seems predicable that they will end up fighting for the things they all want. Therefore, if humans all follow their naturally egoistic and antagonistic attitude, then the world will end up in the state of strife and chaos. From this first conclusion, stated as (3), Xunzi introduces premise (4), which does not seem to follow directly from what has been stated so far. We should regard it as a separate supposi­ tion. Since Xunzi gives an argument in support of this claim elsewhere, we shall not analyze it here. Aided with this new claim, Xunzi derives his conclusion that human nature is bad. Xunzi further gives a paradoxical argument. He says: Every man who desires to do good does so precisely because his nature is evil. A man whose accomplishments are meager longs for greatness; an ugly man longs for beauty; a man in cramped quarters longs for spacious­ ness; a poor man longs for wealth; a humble man longs for eminence. Whatever a man lacks in himself he will seek outside. But if a man is already rich, he will not long for wealth, and if he is already eminent, he will not long for greater power. What a man already possesses in himself he will not bother to look for outside. From this we can see that men desire to do good precisely because their nature is evil. 34

1

A man whose accomplishments are meager longs for greatness; an ugly person longs for beauty; a man in cramped quarters longs for spaciousness; a poor man longs for wealth; a humble man longs for emmence. Hence, whatever a man lacks in himself he will seek outside; what a man already possesses in himself he will not bother to look for outside. Therefore, if people desire to be good, then they do not already have goodness in themselves. •

2 3

To this argument (Argument Two), A. C. Cua offers a good critique. After considering an objection to the above argument that a scholar can desire to seek learning without being totally unlearned himself, Cua says: If it be said that a scholar can desire and seek learning, one can point out that the object that he desires and seeks is more learning, and this logi­ cally implies that he does not possess what he seeks . . . . The point is that if I desire and seek an object x, assuming that I clearly know x . then I cal'not be said to desire and seek x unless I do not possess x . But it follows also that a good man can seek and desire goodness, in the sense of .

.

97

Ancient Chinese Philosophy more goodness, without himself lacking in some degree of goodness. There are different degrees of moral goodness. From the conceptual observation about the notion of desire as logically involving the lack of the object desired, [Xunzi] cannot establish the claim that "men desire to do good precisely because their nature is bad. ,,35

In other words, we could desire to have more money, but this does not mean that we have no money; we could desire to become better, but it does not imply that we are not already good. Xunzi's argument simply fails to establish his claim. The next two arguments can be discussed together. Argument Three is based on the assumption that what is nature is what cannot be learned or taught. Argument Four is based on the assumption that what is nature is what one is born with. First, Argument Three:36 1 2 3

By human nature we mean the product of Heaven, not something learned or worked for. But we learn to be good and we work hard on making ourselves better. Therefore, the nature of man is bad; his goodness is made by humans' deliberate effort.

Next, Argument Four:37 1 2

3 4 5

Mencius claims that evil comes from the loss of our original nature. But as soon as we are born, we begin to depart from our original state of naivete and simplicity, and thus must inevitably lose what Mencius regards as man's original nature. Therefore, if Mencius is right, then all men inevitably become evil. But the view that all men inevitably become evil is absurd. Therefore, evil cannot come from the loss of our original nature; instead, it must already be part of our original nature.

Both arguments are clearly based on Xunzi's definition of "nature . " Mencius certainly would not agree with Xunzi's first premise in Argu­ ment Three, or his second premise in Argument Four because for Mencius, human nature is in a developmental state. One can realize, cultivate, or edify one's nature. Hence, it is not true that one's birth state prescribes the totality of one's nature such that one cannot learn to improve on it. As a refutation of Mencius' view, these two arguments are, as A. C. Graham puts it, " a little off target. ,,38 Xunzi asks: " If propriety and righteousness are products of accumu­ lated effort and to be regarded as [inherent] in man's nature, then why 98

Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu) are Yao and ( sage-king) Yu highly honored, and why is the superior man highly honored ? " He answers: Yao, Yu and the superior man are highly honored because they can trans­ form nature and arouse effort. As effort is aroused, propriety and right­ eousness are produced. Thus the relation between the sages and propriety and righteousness produced through accumulated effort, is like the potter pounding the clay to produce the pottery. . . . [The tyrant Jie, the bandit Zhil and the inferior man are despised because they give rein to their nature, follow their feelings, and enjoy indulgence, and lead to the greed for gain, to quarrels and rapacity. It is clear that man's nature is evil and that his goodness is the result of his [deliberate effortl .39

From this comment we can formulate the following two arguments (Argument Five and Argument Six) : 1

2

3

1 2 3

If, as Mencius claims, goodness comes from one's inborn nature, then anyone who follows his or her own nature must be good and anyone who receives outside influences is likely to be bad. But what we call "the superior man" is someone who is influenced by teachers and laws, and what we call " the inferior man " is some­ one who gives rein to his feelings and enjoys indulgence. Therefore, human nature is bad; a person's goodness comes from his or her own deliberate effort (and thus Mencius is wrong) . If goodness is natural, then there is no effort involved and sages are just doing what is natural to them. But we praise sages exactly for their accumulated moral efforts in transforming their original nature. Therefore, human nature is bad; a person's goodness comes from his or her own deliberate effort.

Xunzi argues that at birth, man does not already possess propriety and righteousness, the two main virtues constitutive of a civil society. He does, however, acknowledge man's inborn capacities to learn moral principles and to practice moral conduct. He says: Any man in the street has the essential faculties needed to understand benevolence, righteousness, and proper standards, and the potential abil­ ity to put them into practice . . . . Any man in the street can understand the duties required of a father or a son and can comprehend the correct relationship between ruler and subject. Therefore, it is obvious that the esuld not describe his own chapter as a "discourse. " They suggest rendering the title as "Equalizing Theories of Things" instead. However, commentators of the other camp argue that "theories of things," as a term in Chinese, was introduced long after Zhuangzi's times. I think that the best rendition of the title is "On the Equality of Things and Theories," which I have seen only in Kuang-ming Wu's writings. This rendition avoids the difficulty the other two renditions encounter and fits best with the content of the whole chapter. 7 As Herrlee G. Creel puts it, while Laozi "gives a great deal of advice to kings and feudal lords and ministers on how to get and hold power," Zhuangzi "is in the main politically indifferent or even anarchistic" ( 1 970: 6).

350

Notes to pp. 1 54-7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20 21 22

2.5

24 ' 25 26 27 28 29 30

,

Zhuangzi, ch. 7 (Watson 1964: 95). Yeh 1983; Berkson 1996. Lee, J. H. 1998. Lee, K. S. 1996. Kjellberg 1994, 1 996; Raphals 1 996. Li 1993. Parkes 1 983; Hall 1 984. Wu, L. C. 1986. Owens 1990. Even though contemporary analytic commentators commonly associate various forms of skepticism with Zhuangzi, a few people argue that he is not a skeptic at all. See, for example, Sun 1 953; Cheng 1977. Some other interpretations are left out here for the sake of brevity. One of these is epistemic nihilism, suggested by Deborah and David Soles. They argue that Zhuangzi is an epistemological nihilist "who rejects, as meaningless, any talk of knowledge" ( 1 998: 1 6 1 ) . They say, "It is not that knowledge is something that perhaps we could have had but happen to lack; rather there is no such meaningful concept or category that might or might have instances" (ibid. ). Epistemological nihilism is different from radical skepticism, according to the Soles, in that a skeptic is still interested in eventually gaining true knowledge, while an epistemological nihilist sim­ ply declares the whole pursuit meaningless. They think that for Zhuangzi, there is no "perspective-free" knowledge; there is no " God's-eye view per­ spective. " All forms of knowledge are equally limited and therefore unsat­ isfactory. However, in attributing this ultimately negative view to Zhuangzi, the Soles seem to leave out Zhuangzi's extensive portrayal of "the True Man" and "the Perfect Man" who have gained true knowledge of Dao. Hansen 1983: 35-9. Berkson 1996: 98. Ivanhoe 1996: 199. See Berkson 1996; Chinn 1997; Kjellberg 1 996; Schwitzgebel 1996 and Van Norden 1 996. Raphals 1996: 26-49. Allinson 1989: 23. There are others who accept Graham's anti-rationalism interpretation. David Loy ( 1 996) and Mark Berkson ( 1 996) are two examples. Graham 1983: 9. Graham 1989: 194. Lee, J. H. 1998: 458-9. Ibid. 463. Goodman 1985; Sun 1953; Berkson 1996; Ivanhoe 1996. Berkson and Ivanhoe did not specifically attribute "realism" to Zhuangzi. But Berkson says: "there is a way the world really is, a true reality, an underlying Dao" ( 1 996: 1 1 8). Ivanhoe says: "The Dao is a metaphysical concept; it is the deep structure of the pattern and processes of the world" ( 1 996: 201 ). Both of these comments seem to me to be giving a realist interpretation of Dao.

35 1

Notes to pp. 1 57- 68 31

32 33 34 35 36 37

38

39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46

47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 352

In my article "A Daoist Conception of Truth: Laozi's Metaphysical Real­ ism vs. Zhuangzi's Internal Realism" (2003) I argue that the combination of these views constitutes internal realism as defined by Hilary Putnam. I shall not repeat the argument here. Sun 1953: 138. Zhuangzi, ch. 2 (Watson 1 964: 41). Ibid. (Watson 1964: 38). Ibid. ch. 17 (Watson 1964: 99). Ibid. ch. 2 (Watson 1 964: 35). Jung Lee offers an interesting analysis of this passage. He says, "For [Zhuangzi], the indexicality of demonstratives, the basis of all judgments, undergirds his conceptual relativity" ( 1998: 456). So, he takes this discus­ sion of "this" and "that" to be a discussion on indexicals. As Christoph Harbsmeier points out, "Zhuangzi nowhere directly and dogmatically states that we cannot know. He only persists in asking 'How do we know?' He is not an adherent of the dogma that we cannot know anything" ( 1 993: 25). Zhuangzi, ch. 2 (Watson 1964: 43). Ibid. (Watson 1 964: 43-4). Ibid. (Watson 1 964: 35). Ibid. (Watson 1 964: 34). Ibid. (Watson 1 964: 44). Chung-ying Cheng also separates two levels of truth. He thinks that Zhuangzi's skepticism and his metaphysics of [dao] "reinforce each other and form a dialectical process of establishing a theory of distinction between lower level (limited) truth and higher level (unlimited) truth" ( 1 977: 141). Zhuangzi, ch. 2 (Watson 1964: 39). The closest Zhuangzi gets to describing Dao is the following seemingly paradoxical remark: "The Way has its reality and its signs but is without action or form. You can hand it down but you cannot receive it; you can get it but you cannot see it. Before Heaven and earth existed it was there, firm from ancient times. It gave spirituality to the spirits and to God; it gave birth to Heaven and to earth. It exists beyond the highest point, and yet you cannot call it lofty; it exists beneath the limit of the six directions, and yet you cannot call it deep. It was born before heaven and earth, and yet you cannot say it has been there for long; it is earlier than the ancient times, and yet you cannot call it old" (chapter 6: Watson 1964: 77). Sun 1 953: 145. Zhuangzi, ch. 1 (Watson 1964: 27). Watson 1964: 5. Zhuangzi, ch. 22 (Watson 1968: 244). Ibid. ch. 2 (Chan 1973: 1 82). See Ivanhoe's explication and critique of Wong's position ( 1 996: 202-9). Kjellberg 1 996: 14. Ivanhoe 1996: 200. Berkson 1996: 108.

Notes to pp. 1 68 -74 56 57 58 59 60 61

62

63 64

65 66 67

68 69 70 71 72 73 74 ;5 76 77

78

79

Yearley 1983: 130. Ibid. 133. Zhuangzi, ch. 6 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 231). Ibid. ch. 22 (Watson 1968: 239). Ibid. ch. 6 (Watson 1964: 84). Using Confucius as his spokesperson, Zhuangzi says, "For those who thrive in the Way, don't bother about them and their lives will be secure" ( ibid. Watson 1 964: 84). "Their skin is like frost, and they are gentle and restrained like virgins. They don't eat the five grains but sip wind and drink dew. They chariot the cloudy mists, ride the flying dragons, and wander beyond the four seas. By concentrating on their spirit, they keep things from harm and ripen the harvest" (ibid. ch. 1 : Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 207). Ibid. ch. 6 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 230). "Cook Ding" is the translation for "pao-ding," which in Chinese either means "someone who manages the kitchen," or "some cook named 'Ding'. " Here I adopt the second interpretation. Zhuangzi, ch. 3 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 220). This quote contains a slight modification of the original translation. Ibid. ch. 6 (Watson 1964: 83). As John C. H. Wu puts it, " [Zhuangzi] did not believe, as later degenerate [Daoists] came to believe, in the cult of physical immortality. . . . When he spoke of the 'True Man' whom water would not drown, nor fire burn, nor death kill, he was really speaking of the spirit or soul of man, which is not something physical and is therefore beyond the realm of time and space" ( 1963: 1 9 ) . Zhuangzi, ch. 6 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 231). Ibid. ch. 4 (Watson 1964: 63). Ibid. (Watson 1 964, 60-1 ). Major 1975: 265. Zhuangzi, ch. 17 (Watson 1964: 106). Ibid. ch. 4 (Watson 1 964: 59). Ibid. ch. 1 (Watson 1964: 24) . Ibid. ch. 6 (Watson 1964: 87). Ibid. ch. 4 (Watson 1964: 58). Even though Zhuangzi emphasizes "survival" as an important goal of life, he does not advise fear of natural death. As Major puts it, " [Zhuangzi] saw no reason to fear a natural death in nature's good time, but an untimely death at the hands of a cruel and unnatural world was very much to be avoided" ( 1 975: 275 ). As Graham points out: "The 'Inner Chapters' show a remarkable interest, not shared by later [Daoists] even in [Zhuangzi] itself, in cripples, freaks, mutilated criminals, who are able to accept and remain inwardly unaltered by their condition" ( 1 989: 202). This is the "therapeutic" view again. See Ivanhoe 1996; Van Norden 1 996; Graham 1989.

353

Notes to pp. 1 74-82 80

81 82 83 84 85 86

87 88

89 90 91 92 93

94 95

96 97 98

David Loy says: "Daoism and Buddhism agree that there is no such per­ sonal identity or continuity [as the self ], which means that we are, in effect, depreciating everything that exists in order to cherish something illusory" ( 1 996: 53). Zhuangzi, ch. 6 (Chan 1973: 192). Ibid. ch. 1 8 (Watson 1964: 1 1 3). Ibid. ch. 6 (Watson 1964: 84). Ibid. ch. 2 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 2 1 7-1 8 ) . Ibid. ch. 6 (Chan 1973: 194). Whether in the afterlife there is any awareness of the present life is left an open question. As we have seen, the story of Lady Li is based on the pos­ sibility that we are simply transported to a different world and we can still remember our previous regret about dying. Zhuangzi would not assert either form of afterlife, since his attitude would be: "How can I ever know? " Zhuangzi, ch. 22 (Watson 1968: 235). In ch. 32 in the Miscellaneous Chapters, the story of Zhuangzi's imminent death is told. Zhuangzi instructs his students not to prepare a sumptuous burial for him. He says, "I will have heaven and earth for my coffin." When students express the concern that the crows and kites will eat his corpse, Zhuangzi replies that it is either the crows and kites above ground or the mole crickets and ants underground who will devour his body, "Wouldn't it be rather bigoted to deprive one group in order to supply the other? " (Watson 1968: 361). Graham 1989: 203 . Legge 1979: 1 8 ; italics in original. Zhuangzi, ch. 2 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 219). Ibid. ch. 6 (Chan 1973: 197). Wenyu Xie puts it well: "It becomes clear that what Zhuangzi wants to analyze is not cosmology, as he clearly rejects the feasibility of investigating the origin of all things in his criticism of the Daodejing. Rather, he wants to penetrate into human existence" (2000: 484-5 ) . The same story is also recorded in chapter 32 in the Miscellaneous Chapters. See Watson 1968: 360-1. Eric Schwitzgebel, for instance, seems to suggest such an interpretive attitude. He says, "Zhuangzi is setting himself up to have what he says taken less seriously . . . I doubt, then, that Zhuangzi would be too bothered if the reader did not place much credence in his words" ( 1 996: 72 ). The Analects, 14: 41 (Chan 1973: 43). Zhuangzi, ch. 4 (Watson 1 964: 63). Ibid. ..

Chapter 8 1

354

Hanfeizi (Han Fei Tzu)

"Legalism" is a term derived from '''law.'' The school of thought repre­ sented by Hanfeizi was originally called the School of fa - the School of

Notes to pp. 1 83-91

2 3

4 5

6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 i8 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26

Law. Therefore, "legalism" seems a fitting rendition and has been adopted by almost all translators. Arthur Waley, however, opts to call this school "the Realists," for the reason that the major principle behind this school is that government must be based on "the actual facts of the world as it now exists" ( 1 982: 1 5 1 ) . Liao 1939. See, for example, Liang, E. 1976; Liang, L. 1 976; Ti 1 978; Tong 1 982/83; Yang 1978. The opening paragraph of Chung-ying Cheng's "Legalism versus Confucianism: A Philosophical Appraisal" ( 1 9 8 1 ) gives the political background of this movement. Lee 1975: 3 l . Several commentators have made the same observation. Yih-jing Lin ( 1 989) calls Hanfeizi's theory of human nature "psychological egoism," which is the claim that humans are by nature self-interested. See also Wang 1977; Ho 1988; Goldin 200 l . Hanfeizi, ch. 17 (Watson 1964: 86). Ibid. ch. 49 (Watson 1964: 98). Cf. ibid. ch. 54. Hanfeizi says, "In ancient times when [Cang Jie) created the system of writing, he used the character for 'private' to express the idea of self­ centeredness, and combined the elements for 'private' and 'opposed to' to form the character for 'public.' The fact that public and private are mutu­ ally opposed was already well understood at the time of [Cang Jie). To regard the two as being identical in interest is a disaster which comes from lack of consideration" (ibid. ch. 49; Watson 1 964: 106). Fung 1983: 327. Hanfeizi, ch. 49 (Watson 1 964: 103). Ibid. ch. 14 (my translation). Analects 2:3 (Chan 1973: 22). Hanfeizi, ch. 49 (Watson 1964: 1 0 1 ). Fung 1983: 313. Hanfeizi, ch. 50 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 341). Lee 1975: 45. Ibid. 45. Hanfeizi, ch. 50 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 34 1). Ibid. (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003 : 341 ) . Ibid. (Chan 1973: 253). Ibid. (Chan 1973: 254). Lee 1975: 4 l . Hanfeizi, ch. 47 ( Liao 1 939, vol. 2: 248 ) . These arguments are paraphrased from Hanfeizi's own remarks. They do not exhaust all the arguments that he has made, but they are representa­ tives of his general line of reasoning. Hanfeizi says, "According to human nature, none are more affectionate than parents who love all children, and yet not all children are necessarily orderly. Although the parents' love is deep, why should they cease to be

355

Notes to pp. 1 91 -2 disorderly? Now the love of ancient kings for their people could not have surpassed that of parents for their children. Since children do [not] neces­ sarily cease to be disorderly, then why should people be orderly? Further­ more, if the ruler sheds tears when punishment is carried out according to law, that is a way to show humanity but not the way to conduct a govern­ ment. For it is humanity that causes one to shed tears and wish for no punishment, but it is law that punishment cannot be avoided. Ancient kings relied on laws and paid no heed to tears. It is clear that humanity is not adequate for a government" (Hanfeizi, ch. 49; Chan 1973: 257-8). 27 Hanfeizi says, "If we had to depend on an arrow being absolutely straight by nature, there would be no arrow in a hundred generations. If we had to depend on a piece of wood being perfectly round by nature, there would not be any wheel in a thousand generations. There is not one naturally straight arrow or naturally round piece of wood in a hundred generations, and yet in every generation people ride carriages and shoot birds. Why? Because of the application of the methods of straightening and bending. Although there is a naturally straight arrow or a naturally round piece of wood [once in a hundred generations] which does not depend on any straightening or bending, the skilled workman does not value it. Why? Because it is not just one person who wishes to ride and not just one shot that the archer wishes to shoot. Similarly, the enlightened ruler does not value people who are naturally good and who do not depend on reward and punishment. Why? Because the laws of the state must not be neglected and government is not for only one man. Therefore the ruler who has the technique does not follow the good that happens by chance but practices the way of necessity" (ibid. ch. 50; Chan 1973: 253-4). 28 Hanfeizi says, "Confucius was a sage known throughout the empire. He cultivated his own character and elucidated his doctrines and traveled extensively within the four seas (China). People within the four seas loved his doctrine of humanity and praised his doctrine of righteousness. And yet only seventy people became his devoted pupils. The reason is that few people value humanity and it is difficult to practice righteousness . . . . On the other hand, Duke Ai of Lu was an inferioc ruier. When he sat on the throne as the sovereign of the state, none within the borders of. the state dared refuse to submit. For people are originally submissive to power and it is truly easy to subdue people with power. Therefore Confucius turned out to be a subordinate and Duke Ai, contrary to one's expectation, be­ came a ruler. . . . Nowadays in trying to persuade rulers, scholars do not advocate the use of power which is sure to win, but say that if one is devoted to the practice of humanity and righteousness, one will become a true king. This is to expect that every ruler must be equal to Confucius and that all people in the world are equal to his [seventy-odd] followers. This is absolutely impossible" (ibid. ch. 49: Chan 1973: 258 ) . 29 Hanfeizi says, "When the sage rules the state, he does not depend on people to do good for him, but utilizes their inability to do wrong. If he depends on people to do good for him, we cannot even count ten within

356

Notes to pp. 1 93-201

30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38

39 40 41 42 43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53

the state, but if he utilizes the people's inability to do wrong, the whole country may be regulated. A ruler makes use of the majority and neglects the minority, and so he does not devote himself to virtue but to law" (ibid. ch. 50: Chan 1973: 253 ) . Lee 1 975: 40. Wang 1 977: 39. Hanfeizi, ch. 38 (my translation). Schwartz 1985: 327. Fung 1983: 3 1 8 . Hanfeizi, ch. 1 1 (my translation) . Ibid. ch. 17 (Watson 1964: 86). Ibid. ch. 38 (Chan 1973: 256). This notion is more complicated than the notion of power or authority in the political context. As Arthur Waley points out, the Chinese word for "power," "potency," or "force" and the Chinese word for "position," "circumstance," or "situation," are one and the same ( 1 982: 1 8 1 ). In Hanfeizi's usage, one possesses power in virtue of one's political position or surrounding circumstances. Outside of political context, the word also signifies a necessary tendency in the natural development of affairs. Peter R. Moody aptly calls it "the sum of the determining conditions" ( 1 979: 320). Here I am following the common practice in emphasizing the polit­ ical dimension of this notion. Hanfeizi, ch. 43 (Chan 1 973: 255 ). Ibid. ch. 7 (Watson 1 964: 30). Ibid. (Chan 1973: 256-7). Ibid. ch. 5 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 3 0 1 ) . Ibid. (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 299). These two chapters are "Explicating the Laozi" (ch. 20) and "Metaphors for the Laozi" (ch. 2 1 ) . These chapters express the most abstract philo­ sophical thinking that is distinguishable from the rest of the book. Nat­ urally, many commentators doubt their authenticity. Burton Watson's Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings, for example, does not include them. However, Hanfeizi makes similar remarks, though in a less abstract context, in other chapters. See, for example, ch. 8, where he also gives his exposition of "Dao." It is reasonable to conclude that he did derive philosophical inspir­ ation for his practical political theory from the abstract philosophy of Laozi. Hanfeizi, ch. 20 (Chan 1973: 2 6 1 ) . Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. ch. 5 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 298). Ames 1994: 5 l . Hanfeizi, ch. 5 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 298-9). Ibid. (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 298 ). Lee 1975: 34.

357

Notes to pp. 201-1 9 54 Hanfeizi, ch. 49 (Chan 1973: 260). 55 Ibid. ch. 5 (Ivanhoe and Van Norden 2003: 298-9). 56 Moody 1979: 323. 57 Hanfeizi, ch. 14 (Liso 1939, vol. 1 : 124; my modifications in square brackets). 5 8 Wang 1 977: 48.

Part II 1

2 3

4 5 6 7

8

9 10

11 12 13 14 15

16

358

Introduction

Litian Fang ( 1 989) gives a good explanation of the social and intellectual setting of China at the time, which rendered the acceptance of Indian Buddhism possible. Wright 1959. Pure Land Buddhism (jing-tu-zong), although probably the most popular form of Buddhism in China, focuses more on religious practices. Hence, we shall not deal with this school. "Shakyamuni" means "the sage from the tribe of the Shakyas." See Masao Abe's "Zen and Buddhism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3, 1976: 236. Ibid. Sunyata is usually translated as "emptiness" or "void." In Buddhism, it is also a designator for the Truth, the Ultimate Reality, or the Substance. The Buddha apparently was not the inventor of the view that the essence of life is suffering. According to Radhakrishnan, "That life is suffering and the object of the world only lures and torments, seemed to be the heritage from the Upanishads" ( 1 962: 277). This quote is my translation from the Chinese text, The Contemporary Interpretation of Indian Buddhism, written by a scholar in Hong Kong, Ru-jun Wu. Kalupahana 1992: 86. According to Kalupahana, the central conception of Buddhism is the "theory of dependent arising" ( 1992: x). This notion is expressed as "dependent origination" by the Dalai Lama. Here I use "dependent co-arising," which is also a common translation for this notion. More on this in chapter 9. For example, the tree is the effect of the seed while, at the same time, the form of the tree is the cause of the seed. Cf. Zeuschner 1981: 401-2. Kalupahana 1992: 77; italics in original. According to Derk Bodde's note: "Hinayana Buddhism, which is closer to the tenets of original Buddhism, has to this day remained dominant among the Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia. Mahayana Buddhism, which is an enormously elaborated and sophisticated development of primitive Buddhism, received its chief growth in the countries north and northeast of India: Central Asia, China, and Japan, especially China" (Fung 1983, vol. II: 238). Ibid.

Notes to pp. 220-2

Chapter 9 1

2

3

4

5 6

7 S

The Consciousness-O nly ( Wei-Shi) School

There are other existing translations for the name of this school, such as the " Representation-Only School" (see Hamilton 1938), the "Mere Idea­ tion School" (see Bodde's translation of Fung 1983), the "Mere Conscious­ ness School" (see Wei 1973; Kern 1 9 8 8 ), or the " Mere Conception School" (Kalupahana 1 992). Here I follow Chan's translation in his Sourcebook ( 1 973 ). The story of his pilgrimage inspired later writers to come up with various versions of the trip, the most notable of which is Wu Cheng-en's The Journey to the West, first published in 1592. It became one of the four classic works in Chinese literature. The background of Xuan-zang's writing of this book and the selection of Dharmapiila's commentary over the rest was told by Kuiji, in his annota­ tion to Cheng Wei-Shi Lun. This story has been treated as authentic by most scholars historically. Recently, however, Dan Lusthaus challenged Kuiji's story. He questions the existence of ten commentaries or even the fact that Dharmapala wrote a commentary. He speculates that the whole story of the transmission of Cheng Wei-Shi Lun could have been invented by Kuiji to secure his own status within the school. See Lusthaus 2002: ch. 1 5 . According to Hamilton and La Vallee Poussin's comparative study, Xuan­ zang's text often contains words whose equivalents are not found in the other Tibetan or Sanskrit texts or even in the other Chinese translations (see Hamilton 1 938.) Dan Lusthaus's comparative studies of the original text, Xuan-zang's translation, and another Chinese translation of the Thirty Stanzas also shows how Xuan-zang took liberties with his translation. See Lusthaus 2002: ch. 12. Cf. Wei 1973: 80-9. There are, unfortunately, very limited resources for studying the thought of this school. Of the Twenty Stanzas, the only English translation is by Clarence Hamilton (1938); of Cheng Wei-Shi Lun, the only complete Eng­ lish translation is by Tat Wei ( 1 973), who based his translation on the French translation by Louis de La Vallee Poussin ( 1 928). Both of these English translations are presently out of print, and only a limited number of libraries have a copy of these books. Hamilton's translation is largely readable, and it includes a lot of footnotes based on Xuan-zang's student Kuiji's commentary. Tat Wei's translation retains most of the Sanskrit terms and is thus difficult to read. For an alternative, we also have the excerpt in Chan's Sourcebook ( 1973 : ch. 23), which contains most of the important discussion of the original book. I therefore recommend it. Dan Lusthaus's Buddhist Phenomenology (2002: 273-350) also contains a comparative translation of Vasubandhu's Thirty Stanzas. See Part II's Introduction for the explanation of this notion. The details of the transformations will be discussed later in this chapter.

359

Notes to pp. 223-30 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16

17

18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27

360

In the Chinese Consciousness-Only School, the words "consciousness" and "mind," along with "thought" and "cognition," are used interchangeably. According to Kalupahana's interpretation of Vasubandhu's philosophy, how­ ever, such a conflation constitutes a gross misunderstanding of Vasubandhu's metaphysical view. Kalupahana argues that Vasubandhu "was no meta­ physical idealist. " He thinks it is unfortunate that in the Chinese transla­ tions, all these four terms are "lumped together and defined as synonyms" ( 1 992: 1 86). Since we are dealing with the Chinese (Xuan-zang's) modifica­ tion of Vasubandhu's philosophy, we will use the two terms interchange­ ably and elaborate on the idealistic theme in Xuan-zang's own philosophy. Chan 1973: 386. There are many other plausible interpretations of these three phrases. Cf. Fung 1983: 329-30. Chan 1973: 389; my italics. Ibid. 393. Lusthaus 2002: 459. "The Middle Way, " sometimes translated as "the middle path," is the translation for Sanskrit Madhyamaka. It is the name of a branch of the Mahayana School, whose main doctrine is that things are neither existent nor nonexistent. It stands as the middle way between the School of Being and the School of Non-Being (the School of Emptiness). See Part II Introduction. According to Xuan-zang's A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness­ Only, this is the consciousness "whose fruits ripen at a later time . . . because it possesses in abundance the nature to ripen at later times" (Chan 1973: 380). Ibid. 386; italics mine. Ibid. 382. Ibid. Thirty Stanzas, verse 17. Kern 1988: 284. Chan 1973: 382 (square brackets in original ). Different Buddhist schools interpret "nirvana" differently. That the term denotes a separate realm is the consensus of the Theravada Schools. In this respect, the Consciousness-Only School's teaching is closer to Theravada than to Mahayana. See Part II's Introduction, where the differences be­ tween the two branches are explained. Chan 1 973 : 383. Ibid. 382 (parenthesis mine). The transformation here should be taken in a different sense. When con­ sciousness is transformed into wisdom, it is not engaging in the threefold transformation that result from defilement or perfuming. Consciousness is actually being eliminated or terminated in this process. Derk Bodde uses "turned over" to supplement the connotation of "transformation" in this context. He translates Fung's comments this way: "At this time the eight kinds of consciousness are all 'turned over' or transformed into . . . true Wisdom, and become untainted, i.e., devoid of all tainted seeds" (Fung

Notes to pp. 230-5

28 29

30 31

32 33 34

35

36

37 38 39 40

1983: 338). Dan Lusthaus also uses "Overturning the Basis" to explain the process of turning consciousness into wisdom (which he translates as "enlightened cognitive abilities"; 2002: 5 1 1 ). Wei 1 973 : 767-9. The detailed explanation of the methods of cultivation and the stages of attainment is given in Book IX of Xuan-zang's A Treatise on the Establish­ ment of Consciousness-Only. In this Book, Xuan-zang describes the "five stages" in the "Holy Path of Attainment," which are: (i) the stage of moral provisioning; (ii) the stage of intensified effort; (iii) the stage of unimpeded penetrating understanding; (iv) the stage of exercising cultivation; (v) the stage of ultimate realization. See Wei 1973: 669-809. Ibid. 769. According to Lusthaus, "Tathata" means "seeing everything, including so-called appearance, just as it is. " He says: "Claming that nirvana is a cognitive object is problematic. More commonly Buddhists, especially in Mahayana, use the term tathata to denote the object of Awakened cogni­ tion" (2002: 255). In this sense, nirvana is an ontological state, while tathata is a cognitive (epistemic) state. Thirty Stanzas, verses 28-30 (Chan 1 973: 394-5); brackets and parenthesis in original. Lusthaus 2002: 533. The discussion on the insistence on dharmas first appears in Vasubandhu's Commentary on his own Twenty Stanzas. The same discussion is recorded in Xuan-zang's A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, though the original Thirty Stanzas, on which A Treatise on the Establish­ ment of Consciousness-Only comments, does not contain this discussion. These claims were all made by Vasubandhu's contemporary schools of thought. Xuan-zang's major disciple Kuiji identified each of these theories in his commentary. Hamilton ( 1 938) lists these annotations in his foot­ notes. My interpretation of what these schools say is primarily based on the following introductions to Indian philosophy: Chatterjee and Datta 1968; Banerjee 1 974; Raju 1971. According to Chatterjee and Datta, '' 'Carvaka' is the word that generally stands for 'materialist.' But the original meaning of this word is shrouded in mystery. According to one view, 'Carvaka' was originally the name of a sage who propounded materialism. The common name 'Carvaka' is de­ rived from this proper name and means the followers of that sage, i.e., a materialist. According to another view, 'Carvaka' was even originally a common descriptive name given to a materialist, either because he preaches the doctrine of 'eat, drink and be merry' (carv - eat, chew), or because his words are pleasant and nice (caru - nice, vak - word) " ( 1 968: 55-6). Cf. Twenty Stanzas, Stanza XI and Commentary (Hamilton 1938: 47). Raju 1971: 144. Cf. Twenty Stanzas, Stanza XI and Commentary (Hamilton 1938: 47). This interpretation follows the commentary of Xuan-zang's major disciple Kuiji. See Hamilton 1938: 51, n. 8 5 . ,

361

Notes to pp. 235-41 41 42

43 44 45

46 47 48 49 50 51

52 53

54

55 56 57

58

362

Cf. Twenty Stanzas, Stanza XIII and Commentary (Hamilton 1938: 51-3). According to Raju, "the word Vedanta means the end of Veda, because the Upanisads form its last part, and it also means the final teaching of the Vedas. The Vedas are supposed to teach different philosophies to different men with different levels of maturity, and the Vedanta is meant, it is said, for those men whose minds are the most mature" ( 1 971: 49). Ibid. Cf. Twenty Stanzas, Stanza XIV and Commentary (Hamilton 1938: 55-7). The discussion on the insistence of the self appears only in Xuan-zang's A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only. It is not in the origi­ nal Thirty Stanzas by Vasubandhu. Lusthaus 2002: 428 . Ibid. Cf. A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only (Chan 1973: 375; Wei 1973: 1 5-17). Cf. ibid. Cf. ibid. (Chan 1973: 376; Wei 1 973 : 17). There are two other variations of this theory; one claims that the self is separate from the five aggregates, the other claims that the self is neither identical with nor separate from the five aggregates. Since the latter two theses do not contribute any new view of the self, and the refutations simply point out their incoherence, I shall skip those two theories here. Cf. A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only (Chan 1973: 376; Wei 1973: 1 7-1 9). Different Buddhist schools often interpret the Buddha's teachings differently, and they all have their textual support. It would seem that the Buddha does not have a consistent teaching. According to the Consciousness-Only School, some of the teachings were meant for people with little intelligence or people at the initial stage of their learning. It argues that only the Consciousness­ Only is the Buddha's real intent. As we shall see in the next two chapters, both Tian-tai and Hua-yan schools also analyze the various teachings of the Buddha into different stages or levels. The arguments are from Xuan-zang's A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Book V, ch. 2: "Proofs of Consciousness-Only." Cf. Wei 1973: 507-25. Wei 1973: 507. This problem is dealt with in Verses and Commentaries 1-2 of the Twenty Stanzas. What is described here could be what we now call the "eye floaters syn­ drome," which is when people see tiny black lines floating in their visual fields. These floaters are probably caused by tiny bits of vitreous gel or cells casting shadows on the retina. This is an extended translation of the original text. The original text uses "hungry ghosts" and the "pus river" as the illustration. To understand the point, one has to know the whole story about the transmigration of differ­ ent life forms and the hellish creatures discussed in Buddhism.

Notes to pp. 242-9 Chan 1973: 389. As Chan explains: "This school treats regularity [consistency and continu­ ity of ideas] as simply characters of dharmas and as such, to be explained in terms of cause and effect. In this process of mutual cause and effect, certain seeds regularly perfume in a certain way, and therefore people with similar seeds in them are perfumed in the same way" (ibid. 390). 61 · This problem is introduced in Verses and Commentaries 19-20 of the Twenty Stanzas. But Vasubandhu's answer to the objector's question is not satisfactory. Xuan-zang takes up further discussion in his Treatise. The following discussion is based on Xuan-zang's Commentary on Stanza 1 7, in his A Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only (see Chan 1 973: 391-2). 62 The original objection is: "If external matter is really nonexistent, it may be granted that it is not a sphere of objects for one's inner consciousness. But the mind of another person really exists. Why is it not an object of one's own consciousness ? " (ibid. 391 ). 63 Ibid. 392. 64 Ibid. 391. 65 Hamilton 1938: 77.

59 60

Chapter 1 0 1

2 3

4 5

6

7

The Hua-yan (Hua-yen) School

The Sanskrit title for this scripture is Avatamsaka. Thomas Cleary ( 1 993) translates it as "The Flower Ornament Scripture," while Wing-tsit Chan ( 1 973 ) translates it as "The Flowery Splendor Scripture. " Chan 1 973 : 406. According to Garma C. C. Chang's analysis, "Li, in different contexts, can mean 'principle,' 'universal truth,' 'reason,' 'the abstract,' the 'law,' 'noumenon,' 'judgment,' 'knowledge,' and so forth" ( 1 971: 142). Chang says: " [Shi] can mean a 'thing,' an 'event,' the 'particular,' the 'concrete,' 'phenomenon,' 'matter,' and so on" (ibid.). These ten gates (theories) describe the ten fundamental aspects of the nature of existence. They include the nature of dependent arising, the nature of characterless non-generation, the entry into nirvana, etc. In this chapter, we will not discuss them separately from the general analysis of Fa-zang's metaphysical theory. For their names and descriptions, see for example Fa-zang's "A Treatise on the Gold Lion" (Chan 1 973: 41 1-13), and Yu-lan Fung's explanation (Fung 1983: 341 ). Chan translates this as "the realm of facts," and Cleary translates it as "the realm of phenomena." But I think Yu-lan Fung's "the realm of things" is a better translation since it preserves the literal meaning of the original Chinese phrase. There are various Chinese translations of the Hua-yan Sutra, differing in length (most notably the following three versions: 60 scrolls, dated 420 AD; 80 scrolls, dated 699 AD; 40 scrolls, dated 798 AD ) . Cleary'S translation

363

Notes to pp. 249-54 ( 1 993) is based on the longest version, 80 scrolls, which was produced by a monk named Shikshananda (652-710). This text is divided into 39 books (chapters). In the first entry of the suggested primary text at the end of this chapter, I list the chapters I would recommend for various reader interests. 8 These are all selected in Cleary 1983. 9 In Chan 1973. 10 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 10: 300 (page references here and in subsequent such notes are from Cleary 1993 ). 1 1 Cleary 1983: 1 57. 12 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 29: 8 80-6. 13 Ibid. ch. 2: 175. 14 Ibid. ch. 5 : 248 . 1 5 There is another sense of "emptiness" which all Buddhist schools reject: the sense of annihilation or extinction. The difference between "void" or "nil," and "annihilation" or "extinction," is that the former set depicts a constant state while the latter set depicts the negation of a previously existing state - the state of being. As Chang explains, "The common sense notion of death is a typical example of emptiness of annihilation: life exists for a period, then it is annihilated by external or natural causes and is reduced to nothingness" ( 1 971: 63). Since for Buddhists phenomena are by nature empty and noumenon is eternally empty, their notion of empti­ ness cannot be taken to mean this temporary state of annihilation. 16 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 14: 375. 1 7 Cf. Cheng-guan, "Mirror of the Mysteries of the Universe of the Huayan" (Cleary 1983: 105). 1 8 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 14: 382. 19 Ibid. ch. 29: 880. 20 Ibid. ch. 20: 452. 21 "The Mysterious Gates of the Unitary Vehicle of the Hua-yan" (Cleary 1983: 145 ) . 22 "Cultivation of Contemplation of the Inner Meaning of the Hua-yan" (Cleary 1983: 165). 23 Ibid. 24 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 20: 445. 25 Ibid. 449. 26 There are, of course, a few commentators who also point out the idealis­ tic spirit of Hua-yan Buddhism. See, for example, Chang 1971 and Lai 1986. 27 Fung 1983: 359. 28 Cook 1979: 380. 29 Ibid. 369. 30 Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Fung 1983: 356). 31 "A Treatise on the Gold Lion" (Chan 1973: 413; parentheses in original). 32 Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Chan 1973: 414).

364

Notes to pp. 254-7 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

40 41

42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57

Ibid. 421 . Chang calls this view the radical "momentarilism" of Buddhism ( 1 971 : 73 ). Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Chan 1973: 416). Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 5: 243. Ibid. 246. Ibid. ch. 10: 301. In this respect, the Ten Reality Realms from Hell to the Realm of Buddha are marked by each sentient being's conception of the world. In reality, there are not ten distinguishable realms - what we see is merely a figment of our imagination. Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 5: 244. In this respect, Hua-yan Buddhism is very different from Berkeley's ideal­ ism, which uses perception and perceptual qualities as the foundation of the perceptible world ( "To be is to be perceived" ) . It is also separable from Berkeley's objective idealism, which posits some Supreme Being as the basis of the experiential world. Even though Hua-yan Buddhism also embraces the view of the One Mind, it does not see the One Mind as the ontological foundation of phenomenal worlds. Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 5: 213. Ibid. ch. 9: 296. Ibid. Ibid. ch. 4: 1 8 8 . Ibid. ch. 5 : 213. Ibid. 243. Ibid. 215. Ibid. ch. 27: 821. This plurality of worlds view, however, does not seem to be preserved in the thinking of Hua-yan patriarchs. Fa-zang only presents the phenomenal world as "the Realm of Things," and he seems to be concerned with only one realm as such. It could be interpreted that the Realm of Things, as Fa-zang interprets it, is the coexistence and interpen­ etration of the multiple phenomenal worlds. The relationship of harmon­ ious interpenetration and mutual identification of multiple worlds is not emphasized. The Sutra says, "What are mundane phenomena? Material form, sensation, perception, conditioning and consciousness" (ch. 22: 488). Ibid. ch. 29: 880. Ibid. ch. 26: 75 1 . Ibid. ch. 10: 301. Ibid. 300. Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Fung 1983: 345 ). Ibid. ch. 24: 522. Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Fung 1983: 353 ) . ,

365

Notes to pp. 258-63 58

The opposite of holism is atomism. In contemporary philosophy of lan­ guage and philosophy of mind, holism has been associated with the truth or meaning of sentences and with thought or belief ascription. It is called "meaning holism" or "mental holism" respectively. 59 Francis Cook thinks that what Fa-zang advocates is close to a form of organic holism, the thesis that the whole world is an organic whole system in which every part is an indispensable part. He says: "there is no whole apart from parts and no part separate from the whole. Conse­ quently, the parts that conjunctively make up the whole are not independ­ ently existing individuals at all; they are empty of independent being. The individual is simply a function of the whole environment and at the same time is the whole" ( 1 979: 378 ) . I think to call Fa-zang's theory "organic" holism is to imbue too much realism into his worldview. Organic holism regards the world as an organic whole because the world was presumably evolved as a whole. Fa-zang's holism, on the other hand, bases the interconnectedness of parts and whole on the reasoning that it is the same Mind, the same noumenon and the same principle that encompasses the whole Realm of Things. The world as a whole is not an independently self-arising organic whole. Its very nature is illusory. One argument in support of this interpretation is to point to the fact that Fa-zang's exam­ ple of the world is a gold lion, not a real lion. The whole lion body is constructed out of the same substance; it is not an organic body. 60 Cleary 1983: 2. 61 Cook 1979: 379. 62 " Contemplation of the Realm of Reality" (Cleary 1983: 1 1 3). 63 Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Fung 1983: 353). 64 Charles Wei-Hsiin Fu explains that seeing all things harmoniously coexist is the highest stage of spiritual progress, in which "the enlightened man . . . reaches a thoroughly naturalistic and humanistic understanding of the relational origination of all things in the world as the true Dharma-realm itself" ( 1 984: 241-2). 65 For the complete list of other reasons, see Chang 1971: 25. 66 The Hua-yan School emphasizes the "nonduality" or the identity of the two levels, however. 67 Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 20: 301. 68 "Mirror of the Mysteries of the Universe of Hua-yan" (Cleary 1983: 11 1). 69 "A Treatise on the Gold Lion" (Chan 1973: 409). 70 As Whalen Lai remarks, with the metaphor of water and waves, "it makes sense . . . to speak of nirvanic suchness participating in the creation of the samsaric waves - and, in such a way, that the latter . . . is in essence (in 'wetness') no different from the original body of water (or from one another)" ( 1 986: 3 ) . 71 "Cessation and Contemplation in the Five Teachings" (Cleary 1983: 5 8 ) . 72 "Contemplation of the Realm of Reality" (Cleary 1983: 95).

366

Notes to pp. 263-70 73 74 75

76

77 78 79

80 81 82 83 84 85

86 87

88 89 90 91 92

"Mirror of the Mysteries of the Universe of the Hua-yan" (Cleary 1983: 1 04-5 ). Cleary 1983: 107. By identifying the phenomenal world with the noumenon, Hua-yan patri­ archs do not thereby assert the reality of the phenomenal world. Rather, their emphasis is that the world in which we live is nothing but the empty noumenon. In other words, what they assert is not that the noumenon is as real as the phenomenal world, but that the phenomenal world is as empty as the noumenon. The various forms of " skepticism" were discussed in chapter 7, in the context of Zhuangzi's philosophical view. This quote is from Berkson 1996: 98. Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 21: 462. Ibid. ch. 14: 379. Thomas Cleary explains the position this way: "The nature of mental construction is the conceptual order (including perceptual order) which we learn to accept as 'the world.' The relative nature is the conditional existence of the world of experience as a relationship of sense faculties, sense consciousness, and sense data. Thus we can see that the order is a mental projection or construction rather than an inherently fixed property of an objective world as conceived" ( 1 983: 22) . Gimello 1976: 120-I . Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 26: 744. Ibid. ch. 14: 375. Ibid. 377. Ibid. 377. "Cessation and Contemplation in the Five Teachings" (Cleary 1983: 6 1 ) . Du-shun explains the significance of experiential realization in the context of his explication of the fourth teaching: the end of words and views. In his explication of the fifth teaching, the Rounded Teaching, which is exemplified by the Hua-yan Sutra, he also says that it is necessary to "strike down conceptual attachments. " Cleary 1993: I . The Sutra says, "In each atom the Buddhas of all times appear, according to inclinations. While their essential nature neither comes nor goes, by their vow power they pervade the world" (ch. 4: 20 1 ) . Ibid. ch. 24: 523. Ibid. ch. 29: 8 84. Ibid. ch. 5 : 250. Ibid. ch. 1 : 65. According to the Sutra, the manifestations vary in nature from one sen­ tient being to another. It says: "Buddha manifests all bodies according to sentient beings' minds" (Ibid. ch. 24: 527). Therefore, even though Hua-yan claims that all phenomena are manifestations of one Buddha, this view is not the same as the Consciousness-Only School's objective idealism. ,

367

,

Notes to pp. 2 70-8 93 94 95 96

97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107

108 109 110 111 1 12 113 114

Ibid. 525. Cook 1972: 404. Ibid. 414. Since bodhisattvas have already entered the realm of reality that is beyond time, they are regarded as "immortal" in a sense. They enter the mundane world through each birth, and they go through the same process of birth, aging, illness, and death as ordinary people do. But they can re-enter the world with all memories of their multiple past lives intact. So, they are "trans-world" beings. Hundred Gates to the Sea of Ideas of the Hua-yan Sutra (Fung 1983: 358). Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 25: 625. "A Treatise on the Gold Lion" (Chan 1973: 414). " Cessation and Contemplation in the Five Teachings" (Cleary 1983: 5 8 ) . Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 25: 534. Ibid. 539. Ibid. 565. Ibid. ch. 26: 708. One basic teaching of the Buddha is "no self. " However, for the Theravada schools, one's goal is one's own final release from the mundane world. Chinese Mahayana Buddhists therefore criticize what they called "Hinayana" (small-vehicle) Buddhists for the latter's attachment to the self and their implicit self-love. Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 26: 745. According to the Hua-yan Sutra, it is not just that worldly pleasures will eventually lead to pain and suffering; it is rather that "mundane pleasures are all suffering" (ibid. ch. 25: 535). Hua-yan Sutra, ch. 9: 295. Ibid. ch. 1 : 66. Ibid. ch. 5: 250. Chan 1973: 408. The notion of Ii (principle) originated in Yijing (The Book of Changes). Lai 1980: 245. Gimello 1 976: 125-6.

Chapter 1 1 1 2 3 4 5

368

The Tian-tai (T'ien-t'ai) School

David Chappell in his Foreword to Paul Swanson's Foundations of T'ienT'ai Philosophy ( 1989: viii). In his Introduction to his translation of the Lotus Sutra (2002: xvii). Donner and Stevenson 1 993: 5. Ng 1 993: 10. Zhi-yi's thought is actually quite different from that of his teacher Hui-si in many respects. In particular, Hui-si continues the idealistic tradition of Indian Buddhism and treats the Mind as the substance of this world, while

Notes to pp. 2 78-84

6

7 8 9 10 11

12

13 14 15 16

17 18 19 20 21 22

23 24 25

Zhi-yi clearly denies that the Mind is the substance. Hui-si claims that worldly phenomena "are merely products of mind, and are thereby false in appearance and without reality" (Fung 1983: 367), but Zhi-yi clearly states that the world is not the product of the Buddha or of any mind. I do not think that Hui-si's The Method of Cessation and Contemplation in Mahayana is representative of Tian-tai philosophy. In this chapter, the main tenets of Tian-tai are explained according to Zhi-yi's view. My inter­ pretation of Tian-tai philosophy is thus different from the one given by Fung. According to Guan-ding's account in his introduction to The Great Calming and Contemplation, Zhi-yi studied with Hui-si, who studied with Hui-wen, and Hui-wen was a student of Nagarjuna's philosophy. Swanson 1989: ix. Ng 1 993: x. See ch. 7. Ng 1 993: 4. The Indian notion of gods and hell beings are unlike their Western counter­ parts in that Indian gods and hell beings are not eternal beings - they too can die and re-enter the cycle of transmigration. Asura (in Sanskrit) is "one of the six modes of existence, sometimes reck­ oned among the higher modes and sometimes among the lower. In the sense of a higher or good mode of existence, asura refers to the lower gods who dwell on the slopes or summit of the world mountain Sumeru or in castles of air. Seen as a lower or evil mode of existence, the asuras are the enemies of the gods. They belong to the sensual desire realm" (The Shambhala Dictionary of Buddhism and Zen, trans. Michael H. Kohn. Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1991: 13). The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 1 14). Ibid. 127. The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 1 8 1 ). This analysis was given by a Chinese monk in the sixteenth century. See Jui-Liang Chang (Rei-liang Zhang), 'The Philosophical Method of Chih-I (zhi zhe zhi zhe xue fang fa) . " National Taiwan University Philosophical Commentary 14, 1988: 1 8 1 (in Chinese). The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 1 82). Ch. 1 6 (Watson 2002: 1 02). The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1 993: 1 8 8 ) . , Swanson 1989: 13. Hurvitz 1 962: 275. The original Chinese phrase does not have a verb. The literal translation would be "one thought three thousand worlds. " The word "contain" is added in English. The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 1 8990). The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 210). The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 1 94).

369

Notes to pp. 284-90 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35

36 37

38 39 40 41 42 43 44

3 70

The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 1 9 8 ) . The Great Calming and Contemplation, vol. 5 (my translation) . Ibid. (Donner and Stevenson 1 993: 190). The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 252). Guan-ding's Introduction to The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1 993: 1 07). This passage comes from Fahua xuanyi (The Esoteric Meaning of the Lotus Sutra). In Da-zheng-zang, vol. 33: 783 (my translation) . The Chinese word for this truth literally means "falsehood," and has been translated either as " provisional existence" or as "conventional existence. " Using the term "conventional" assumes the intervention of human activ­ ities such as languages and descriptions, but the Buddha's teaching is not about how human conventions introduce the demarcation of objects. The nature of things is such that they all depend on other factors (natural as well as artificial) to exist. Therefore, I opt for "provisional existence. " Hurvitz 1962: 274. Swanson 1989: 153. Some commentators take the truth of the Middle Way to be a mere restate­ ment of the first two truths. But under that interpretation, the truth of the Middle Way adds nothing new to the original Two Truths of the Madhyamika school. I think the truth of the Middle Way is a statement of the ultimate reality itself, explaining how this reality is both the phenom­ enal world and nirvana. This new truth reintroduces the realist tenet back to Chinese Buddhism. The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 176). Tian-tai's theory of "suchnesses" is much more complicated than what I can explain here. Zhi-yi not only talks about "Ten Suchnesses," he also discusses how "one hundred suchnesses" and "one thousand suchnesses" are generated. He says, "Each one of these ten dharma realms contains the ten suchlike [characteristics] . The ten dharma realms [therefore] contain one hundred suchlike [characteristics] . Also, one dharma realm contains the [other] nine dharma realms, therefore there are one hundred dharma realms and one thousand suchlike [characteristics] . " [The Esoteric Mean­ ing (Swanson 1989: 1 82). Ibid. (Swanson 1989: 1 80). Ch. 20 (Watson 2002: 1 1 0). Watson 2002: xxvii. The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 176). Ibid. (Swanson 1989: 167). The Great Calming and Contemplation (quoted and translated by Ng 1993: 166). Donner and Stevenson seem to adopt this interpretation. They say: "For. Tian-tai thinkers, it is the Middle that is ultimately real and fundamental. The two truths of emptiness and provisionality are secondary derivations - false or, at best, provisional constructs devised to convey the ultimate reality of the Middle in a language consistent with the conventions of

Notes to pp. 290-8

45 46 47 48 49 50

51 52

53 54 55 56 57

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

deluded experience" (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 12). Paul Swanson appears to adopt the same interpretation. Swanson 1989: 13. Ibid. 1 1 8 . The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 1 82 ) . Ibid. (Swanson 1989: 253 ). The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 178). As David Chappell explains it: "A major problem in the development of Buddhism in China was the need to reconcile and integrate the widely disparate doctrines and practices which arrived from India. From the first to the sixth century AD, more and more monks and scriptures arrived representing different schools of Indian Buddhism and offering various messages about the true teachings of the Buddha. It became increasingly obvious to the Chinese that these different teachings would not all be equally true. Rather than discard any doctrine or practice, the Chinese finally adopted a convenient theory developed within Mahayana, namely that the Buddha had given different teachings and adopted different meth­ ods of instruction on different occasions in order to accommodate the different capacities of his listeners" ( 1 983: 21-2 ) . The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 165). The following summary is based primarily on Chappell, 1983, supplemented by discussions in Yu-Kwan Ng's book on Chinese Buddhism, zhong-gua fo-xue de xian-dai quan-shi. Taipei, Taiwan: wen-jin Publishing, 1 998, pp. 48-53. As is said in the Lotus Sutra, "This Lotus Sutra is preached for those with profound wisdom" (ch. 3; Watson 2002: 5 1 ). Ch. 3 (Watson 2002: 43-50). Ch. 2 (Watson 2002: 14). Ibid. 15. Zhi-yi's evaluation of the Lotus Sutra is based on the text itself. In the Lotus Sutra, it is written that the subtle Buddha Law expressed in the Sutra "is not something that can be understood through pondering or analysis. Only those who are Buddhas can understand it" (ch. 2; Watson 2002: 9). Ibid. The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 203). Watson 2002: xxviii. The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 255) . Ibid. 256. Ch. 3 (Watson 2002: 28). The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 169). Ibid. (Swanson 1989: 190). The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 214). The theory of evil nature is not seen in the three major Tian-tai texts written by Zhi-yi. It was first introduced in his later work, guan-yin xuan-yi. His major follower Zan-ran turned this theory into a main doctrine of the Tiantai philosophy. So the theory of evil nature is usually attributed to Zan-ran. ,

371

Notes to pp. 298-304 68 The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 1�5). 66 Ng 1 993: 78. 70 Ibid. 71 The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 198). 72 Ibid. (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 196). 73 The Esoteric Meaning (quoted by Ng 1993: 171-2). 74 Sheng-yan Fa-shi, Da-sheng-zhi-guan-fa-men-zhi-yan-jiou ( Research on Mahayana Gates for Contemplation) . Taipei, Taiwan: fa-gu-wen-hua Publishing, 1997, p. 195. 75 Zhi-yi's remark quoted by Master Sheng-yan, 200 (my translation). 76 Ibid. 77 Hurvitz 1 962: 273. 78 The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 140). 79 Ibid. 272. 80 Ibid. Besides defining "mind" and "thought," Zhi-yi also defines "con­ sciousness" as "full discriminative identification. " However, he immedi­ ately adds this warning: "Whoever [clings to] such distinctions as absolute falls into perverted mind, perverted thoughts, and perverted views" (ibid.). When we deal with the analysis of Tian-tai's terminology, we should keep this warning in mind. 8 1 Ibid. (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 195). 82 The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 1 77). 83 Ibid. 178. 84 Ibid. 1 90. 85 The Method of Cessation and Contemplation in Mahayana (Chan 1973: 399). 86 The Great Calming and Contemplation (Donner and Stevenson 1993: 204). 87 The Esoteric Meaning (Swanson 1989: 190).

Chapter 1 2 1

3 72

The Chan School (Zen Buddhism)

According to Alan Watts, the Sanskrit word dhyana is best left untranslated: '''Meditation' in the common sense of 'thinking things over' or 'musing' is a most misleading translation. But such alternatives as 'trance' or 'absorp­ tion' are even worse, since they suggest states of hypnotic fascination. The best solution seems to be to leave dhyana untranslated and add it to the English language as we have added Nirvana and Tao. As used in Bud­ dhism, the term dhyana comprises both recollectedness (smritti) and [con­ templation] samadhi, and can best be described as the state of unified or one-pointed awareness. On the one hand, it is one-pointed in the sense of being focused on the present, since to clear awareness there is neither past nor future, but just this one moment . . . which Western mystics have called the Eternal Now. On the other hand, it is one-pointed in the sense of being a state of consciousness without differentiation of the knower,

Notes to pp. 304-7 the knowing, and the known" ( 1 957: 54-5 ) . However, unlike "nirvana," and perhaps "Tao [Dao]," dhyana has not become part of the common English vocabulary. Here I am following the general practice in translat­ ing dhyana into "meditation." 2 Many contemporary historians have challenged the verity of this legend. Some argue that Bodhidharma's identity was questionable, and some argue that the third patriarch Shen-can probably did not exist. See for example Hu 1 953; Fung 1983; and Yampolsky 1 990. 3 For example, Huei-nan Yang argues that Shen-xiu's view follows "the orthodox teachings" of Hong-ren and Dao-xin, while Hui-neng's view deviates from such a tradition ( " Shen Hsiu and Tao Hsin's Way of Zen: A Comparison" ( in Chinese), 1 9 8 8, pp. 205-25 ). 4 The Platform Sutra records Hui-neng's biography, anecdotes of his en. counters with other disciples, and his teachings. It was probably written by one of his followers. Over the years, the text expanded and more stories were added. It may not be a reliable historical text, but its doctri­ nal content is what is important in our study. 5 Suzuki 1 964: 85. 6 Yampolsky 1990: 249. 7 Yampolsky dates the Dun-huang manuscript to sometime between 830 an.d 860 (ibid. 90). 8 Many. Chan practitioners will probably deny that there is a "philosophy" of mind in the Chan School. They are likely to point out that one of Chan's fundamental teachings is that we should discard philosophizing and conceptualization. It is indeed true that the essential spirit of Chan is practice, not theory. But again, as with other Chinese Buddhist schools, the goal of this chapter is to analyze the theoretical foundations of this religious/ethical teaching. 9 Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 1 1 ). 10 As Richard Garner puts it, "the fundamental tendency of the southern school is to avoid both the transcendent and the phenomenological, and to focus attention on the world of everyday experience" ( 1 985: 162). 1 1 There seems to be consensus among contemporary scholars that what was passed on from Bodhidharma to Hong-ren was the Lankavatara Sutra, but what was emphasized from Hui-neng to later Chan masters was the Diamond Sutra. According to some documents recovered in the caves of Dun-huang, Bodhidharma handed over the Lankavatara Sutra to the sell­ ond patriarch Hui-ke, saying: "I have observed in this land of China there is only this sutra. If you depend upon this sutra, you will be able to save the world" (see Heinrich Dumoulin's "The Northern School of Chinese . Zen" in his 1994: 308). In an epitaph for Shen-xiu, it is also suggested that he " held the Lankavatara Sutra in special reverence and recom­ mended it to his disciples" (ibid. 322). In the Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, on the other hand, Hui-neng was described as having reached enlightenment when he heard someone reciting the Diamond Sutra. It was further alleged that when Hong-ren passed on the sacred robe to Hui,

3 73

Notes to pp. 307-1 0 neng, he also expounded the essence of the Diamond Sutra as his method of transmitting the True Teaching. 12 The Chinese version contains the Chinese phonetic rendition of " Bodhi," which means "enlightenment." The legend has it that the historical Buddha obtained enlightenment under a Bodhi tree. 13 Cleary 1998: 8 . 14 There was another version recorded in the Dun-huang text, which reads: "The mind is the Bodhi tree. The body is the mirror stand. The mirror is originally clean and pure. Where can it be stained by dust?" (Yampolsky 1 967: 1 32). It is not clear why there were two versions. Some commenta­ tors speculate that the author of the Platform Sutra was trying out differ­ ent formulations of basically the same idea. 1 5 Cleary 1998: 10. 1 6 Lai 1979: 250. 17 According to Suzuki: "When Hui-neng declared, 'From the first not a thing is,' the keynote of his Zen thought was struck, and from it we recognize the extent of difference there is between him and his predeces­ sors and contemporaries" ( 1 964: 24). This statement is thus revolutionary on Hui-neng's part. 1 8 In Steven W. Laycock's analysis: "Shen-[xiu], believing the mind to be analogous to a mirror, advocates a procedure: wipe away the dust. Huineng's iconoclasm will not, however, permit the analogy. . . . The mind is already enlightened, Self Nature is already self-transparent, and no proce­ dure which simply leaves us where it found us is of any avail in realizing the already-enlightened character of mind" ( 1 985: 192). 1 9 Lai 1979: 250. 20 Interestingly enough, Chan master Huang Bo later spelt out this criticism. When asked why Shen-xiu did not receive the sacred robe, Huang Bo replied, " Because he still indulged in conceptual thought - in a dharma of activity. To him 'as you practice, so shall you attain' was a reality" (Blofeld 1958: 64). 21 Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 35). 22 Hui-neng's Commentary of the Diamond Sutra (Cleary 1998: 127). 23 Chan 1973: 426. 24 In contrast to the Flower Ornament Sutra (the Hua-yan Sutra), the Lankavatara Sutra rejects the assumption of the existence of atoms. It says: "Analyzed down to atoms, there is indeed no form to be discrim­ inated as such; what can be established is the [truth of] Mind-Only" (Lankavatara Sutra, ch. 2; Suzuki 1 932: 49). 25 Zeuschner 1 978: 69. 26 Quoted in ibid. 71. 2 7 Ibid. 28 Lankavatara Sutra, ch. 2 (Suzuki 1932: 106). 29 Ibid. 143. 30 Ibid. 20. 3 1 Ibid. 1 09.

3 74

Notes to pp. 3 1 0-1 4 32 33 34

35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

46 47 48

49 ,50

;'

,

•

51 52 53 54 55 56 57

.

Ibid. Ibid. 172. Cleary translates "Tathagata" in Hui-neng's Commentary on the Dia­ mond Sutra as "the Realized One" ( 1998). According to Nyanatiloka's Buddhist Dictionary, Tathagata means "the 'Perfect One' . . . the One who has 'thus gone,' or 'thus come.' [It] is an epithet of the Buddha used by him when speaking of himself " (San Francisco, CA: Chinese Materials Center, Inc. 1 977, p. 133). Diamond Sutra (Suzuki 1960: 46 ). Suzuki 1 960: 4 1 . Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 20). See Huei-nan Yang "Shen Hsiu and Tao Hsin's Way of Zen: A Comparison" (in Chinese), 1988, pp. 205-25. Dumoulin 1994: 323. Zeuschner 1978: 74. Cleary 1998: 85. The Chinese words "guan" (to behold) and "jian" (to see) reflect these distinctions. The translations "to behold" and "to see" are meant to capture the differences in the connotations of the original Chinese words. Suzuki 1 964: 39. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 1 37. In the Platform Sutra he also states: "Ordinary mortals are themselves buddhas. . . . Deluded the moment before, you were an ordinary mortal; enlightenment the moment after, you are a buddha" (see Cleary 1998: 1 8 ) . "Tathata" means "suchness" or "Thusness. " See chapter 9 for related reference. Lankavatara Sutra, ch. 2 (Suzuki 1 932: 85). Ivan Strenski argues that the term "gradual" can be taken to mean some­ thing temporal, like "slow," but it may also mean "graded," and the graded method is not necessarily slower ( 1 980: 4). Whichever sense we use in "gradual," it is clear that in Shen-xiu's teaching, the preparation for enlightenment has to be a gradual process, even though the final leap may take only a moment. Suzuki 1 932: 108. In the history of Chan, there were stories about how the First Patriarch Bodhidharma sat in a cave facing the wall for many years before Ae started preaching. Lankavatara Sutra, ch. 1 (Suzuki 1932: 20-1). Suzuki 1969: 25. Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 6). Ibid. 1 7. Ibid. 35. Suzuki 1964: 50. However, the ,Lankavatara Sutra actually teaches both gradual and instantaneous purification. See the Lankavatara Sutra, ch. 2, sect. XIV

375

Notes to pp. 3 1 4-20

58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

81

82 83

3 76

(Suzuki 1 932: 49-50). Some commentators also argue that Shen-xiu never taught only gradual enlightenment, and that the characterization of the Northern Chan as "the school of gradual enlightenment" was actually the false accusation made by Shen-hui. Hui-neng's Commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Cleary 1 998: 129). Ibid. 87. Ibid. 143. Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 2 1 ) . Blofeld 1958: 82; emphasis in original. Ibid. 93. Watson 1993: 3 1 . Ibid. 26. Ibid. 34. Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 42). In the Platform Sutra, there is a record of a Chan master who "was well versed in the Tian-tai teaching. " And it says: "The words he spoke spon­ taneously agreed with the grand master of Chan" (ibid. 56). Hui-neng also appeals to the Lotus Sutra a number of times in his teaching. The connection between Chan and Tian-tai is not seen only in the thought of Hui-neng. Dumoulin points out that the fourth patriarch of the Chan School, Dao-xin, had a "proximity" to Tian-tai's teaching ( 1 994: 3 1 0). Lai 1977: 79. Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 23). Ibid. 53. Hui-neng's Commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Cleary 1998: 106). Ibid. 88. Ibid. 1 07. Ibid. 92. Suzuki translates it as "composite things." Hui-neng's Commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Cleary 1998: 144). Ibid. 1 12. Ibid. 1 1 9. Within the Chan School, there is no distinction between "nature" and "mind." In fact, if one insists on analyzing the differences between nature and mind, then one is, according to Chan masters, "on the wrong track. " The Chan School identifies Buddha with one's original mind and with one's essential nature. Both "mind" and "nature" designate one's inherent state of existence. Later in Neo-Confucianism, the debate between the School of Mind and the School of Nature takes the center stage. Hui-neng's Platform Sutra records a student's asking him to expound the meaning of "mind itself is Buddha" (Cleary 1998: 44). This shows that Hui-neng already used this slogan frequently. Many later Chan masters also used this slogan to expound the essence of Chan; for example, Huang Bo's teaching dealt especially with this thesis. Blofeld 1958: 29. Suzuki 1964: 5 1 .

Notes to pp. 320-4 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94

95 96 97 98 99

Platform Sutra (Cleary 1998: 1 7). Ibid. 18. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 78. Ibid. 40. Ibid. 47. This remark is a modification of Hui-neng's remark. See Suzuki 1960: 86. Watson 1993: 48. Ibid. 23. An interesting contrast is the same story told by Tolstoy in his " Confes­ sions." Tolstoy describes the predicament of a traveler who was caught between two beasts waiting to devour him. He could go neither up nor down. In this frightful quandary, the traveler suddenly saw some drops of honey hanging from some leaves. So he decided to stick out his tongue to taste the honey drops. Tolstoy apparently got this story from the same source; however, his reflection on the moral of the story was totally different. He wrote: "Just so I hold on to the branch of life, knowing that the dragon of death is waiting inevitably for me, ready to tear me to pieces, and I cannot understand why I have fallen on such suffering. And I try to lick that honey which used to give me pleasure; but now it no longer gives me joy, and the white and the black mouse day and night nibble at the branch to which I am holding on. I clearly see the dragon, and the honey is no longer sweet to me. I see only the inevitable dragon and the mice, and am unable to turn my glance away from them. That is not a fable, but a veritable, indisputable, comprehensible truth. The former deception of the pleasures of life, which stifled the terror of the dragon, no longer deceives me. No matter how much one should say to me, 'You cannot understand the meaning of life, do not think, live! ' I am unable to do so, because I have been doing it too long before. Now I cannot help seeing day and night, which run and lead me to death. I see that alone, because that alone is the truth. Everything else is a lie. The two drops of honey that have longest turned my eyes away from the cruel truth, the love of family and of authorship, which I have called an art, are no longer sweet to me. My family - but my family, my wife and children, they are also human beings. They are in precisely the same condition that I am in: they must either live in the lie or see the terrible truth. . . . Since I lOve them, I cannot conceal the truth from them, - every step in cognition leads them up to this truth. And the truth is death" (Tolstoy, Confession. W. W. Norton & Company, Reissue, 1996). Tolstoy's gloomy reading of the story clearly shows that he had not mastered the teaching of Chan. See Watson 1999: 104-5. Cleary 1998: 7. Suzuki 1953: 33. Ibid. 34. Hui-neng'S Commentary on the Diamond Sutra (Cleary 1998: 134). ,

377

Notes to pp. 325-30 100 Ibid. 106. 101 Chung-ying Cheng 1 973: 77. Cheng tries to explain away the paradoxical nature of Chan koan. He analyzes it, and concludes that the apparent paradoxes are generated only by those who are not yet enlightened. Once one is enlightened, then one sees that the language of Chan goes beyond "the surface semantic structure" and refers to a "deep ontological struc­ ture. " This deep ontological structure "is a framework which does not admit any description of things according to a framework of specific categories or paradigms" (ibid. 9 1 ) . In other words, he thinks that nor­ mally our language refers to our mundane world and worldly things, but when it is used by Chan masters in paradoxical dialogues, it refers instead to a different ontological level - the ultimate reality. Cheng's article gener­ ated a host of responses. See for example, Bossert 1976; King-Farlow 1983; Levin 1976; and Tucker 1985. 102 See, for example, Cua 1 975, Kim 1 980-1, Rosemont 1 970b, Scharfstein 1 976. 1 03 Rosemont 1970b: 1 1 6. 104 Kim 1980-1: 1 10. 1 05 Blofeld 1958: 3 I . 106 Hui-neng says: "Some people who cling to emptiness repudiate the scrip­ tures, simply saying they don't need writings. If they say they don't need writings, then people shouldn't speak either, because speech has the char­ acteristics of writing . . . . Don't slander the scriptures, the obstacles caused by this error are countless" (Hui-neng's Commentary on the Diamond Sutra; Cleary 1998: 72 ). 107 Platform Sutra (Cleary 1 998: 44). 108 Ibid. I I . 109 Blofeld 1958: 40. 1 1 0 Ibid. 67. 1 1 1 Ibid. 3 8 . 1 12 Ibid. 67. 1 1 3 Watson 1 993: 53. 1 14 Ibid. 52-3. 1 1 5 Suzuki 1 964: 1 02. 1 1 6 Ibid. 8 8 -9. 1 1 7 Lusthaus 1985: 1 75 . 1 1 8 Lai 1977: 66. 1 1 9 Ibid. 73 .

378

Re erences an F urt er Rea ing

Introduction Allinson, Robert (ed.) ( 1995) Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots. New York: Oxford University Press, 6th impression. Bodde, Derk ( 1 942) "Dominant Ideas in the Formation of Chinese Culture. " Journal of American Oriental Society 62(4): 293-9. ( 1 953) "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy. " In Arthur F. Wright (ed.), The American Anthropologist Studies in Chinese Thought. The Ameri­ can Anthropological Association, vol. 55, no. 5, part 2, memoir no. 75. December: 1 9-80. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1971 ) "Chinese Philosophy: A Characterization. " Inquiry 14: 1 1 3-37. ( 1 974) "Conscience, Mind and Individuals in Chinese Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2: 3-40. -- ( 1 983) " On the Hierarchical Theory of Time: With Reference to Chinese Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 357-84. Creel, Herrlee G. ( 1953) Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. De Bary, William Theodore and Bloom, Irene (eds.) ( 1 999) Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd edn. Volume 1. From Earliest Times to 1 600. New York: , Columbia University Press. De Bary, William Theodore and Lufrano, Richard John (eds.) (200 1 ) Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd edn. Volume II. From 1 600 Through the Twentieth Century. New York: Columbia University Press. Feng, Qi ( 1 986/7) "Scientific Method and Logical Categories in Ancient China . " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 1 8, Winter: 3-28. Flew, Antony G. N. ( 1 979) "The Cultural Roots of Analytic Philosophy." Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 1-14. Fung, Yu-lan ( 1 966) A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (ed. Derk Bodde). New York: The Free Press. --

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References and Further Reading ( 1 983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. I. (trans. Derk Bodde) Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Graham, Angus C. ( 1 989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Kaltenmark, Max ( 1 969) Lao Tzu and Taoism (trans. from the French by Roger Greaves) . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Levi, Albert William ( 1 979) "Modern Cultural Roots of Analytic Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 15-35. Li, Chenyang ( 1 999) The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparat­ ive Philosophy. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Liu, Shu-hsien ( 1 974) "Time and Temporality: The Chinese Perspective. " Philosophy East and West 24: 145-53. ( 1 998) "Background for the Emergence of Confucian Philosophy. " In his Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Mingo Westport, CT: Praeger, ch. 1 . Needham, Joseph ( 1 95 1 ) "Human Laws and Laws of Nature in China and the West. " Journal of the History of Ideas, XII. Part I: 3-30; Part II: 194-230. Neville, Robert ( 1 980) "From Nothing to Being: The Notion of Creation in Chinese and Western Thought." Philosophy East & West 30( 1 ) : 21-34. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. Tang, Chun-I ( 1 962) "The T'ien Ming [Heavenly Ordinance) in Pre-Ch'in China," pts. I and II. Philosophy East & West 1 1 : 195-2 1 8; 12: 29-50. Van Norden, Bryan W. (ed.) (2002) Confucius and the Analects: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Wilhelm, Richard and Baynes, Cary F. (trans.) ( 1 977) The I Ching: Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Zhang, Dainian (2002) Key Concepts in Chinese Philosophy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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Part I

Ancient Chinese Philosophy Introduction

Bodde, Derek ( 1 953) " Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy." In Arthur F. Wright (ed. ), The American Anthropologist Studies in Chinese Thought. The American Anthropological Association, vol. 55, no. 5, part 2, memoir no. 75. December: 19-80. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 995) "Chinese Metaphysics as Non-Metaphysics: Con­ fucian and Daoist Insights into the Nature of Reality. " In Robert Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, 6th im­ pression. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 167-208.

380

References and Further Reading De Bary, William Theodore and Bloom, Irene (eds.) ( 1 999) Sources of Chinese Tradition, 2nd edn. Volume 1. From Earliest Times to 1 600. New York: Columbia University Press. Graham, Angus C. ( 1 989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press. Ivanhoe, Philip (ed. ) ( 1 996) Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. (eds.) (2003 ) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press.

Chapter 1 Yijing (1 Ching): The Cosmological Foundation of Chinese Philosophy Anderson, Allan W. ( 1 990) "The Seasonal Structure Underlying the Arrange­ ment of the Hexagrams in the Yijing. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy: 275-99. Anthony, Carol K. ( 1 98 1 ) The Philosophy of the I Ching. Stow, MA: Anthony Publishing Company. Baynes, Christopher ( 1 964) "The Concrete Significance of Number with Special Reference to the Book of Changes. " Systematics 2(2): 102-29. Blofeld, John. (trans.) ( 1 965) I Ching: The Book of Change. New York: Penguin Books. Bodde, Derek ( 1 953) "Harmony and Conflict in Chinese Philosophy. " In Arthur F. Wright (ed. ), The American Anthropologist Studies in Chinese Thought. The American Anthropological Association, vol. 55, no. 5, part 2, memoir no. 75. December: 19-80. Brown, Chappell ( 1 982) "Inner Truth and the Origin of the Yarrow Stalk Oracle." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 9: 1 97-2 10. ( 1 982) "The Tetrahedron as an Archetype for the Concept of Change in the I Ching." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 9: 1 59-68. Burr, Ronald ( 1 975) "Chinese Theories of Causation: Commentary. " Philosophy East & West 25: 23-9. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 976) "Model of Causality in Chinese Philosophy: A Com­ parative Study. " Philosophy East & West 26: 3-20. ( 1 977) " Chinese Philosophy and Symbolic Reference. " Philosophy East & West 27: 307-22. -- ( 1 987) '''Li' and ' Ch'i' in the I Ching: Reconsideration of Being and Non­ being in Chinese Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14: 1-38. -- ( 1 989) "On Harmony as Transformation: Paradigms from the I Ching:" Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 125-5 8 . -- ( 1 997) "Realirx and Divinity in Chinese Philosophy. " In Eliot Deutsch (ed. ), A Companion to World Philosophies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. --

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381

References and Further Reading Clarke, A. G. ( 1 98 7) "Probability Theory Applied to the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14: 65-72. Cook, Daniel J. and Rosemont Jr., Henry ( 1 9 8 1 ) "The Pre-established Harmony between Leibniz and Chinese Thought. " Journal of the History of Ideas 42: 253-68. Dixon, Paul W. ( 1 993) "Classical Taoism, the I Ching and our Need for Guid­ ance." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20(2): 147-57. Doeringer, F. M. ( 1 980) "Oracle and Symbol in the Redaction of the I Ching. " Philosophy East & West 30: 195-209. Fang, Tung-Mei ( 1 976) "The Creative Spirit of Confucius as Seen in the Book of Changes. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 7: 78-89. Feng, Jing-yuan ( 1 985) '''Qi' and the Atom: A Comparison of the Concept of Matter in Chinese and Western Philosophy. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 1 7, Fall: 22-44. Fleming, Jess ( 1 993a) "Categories and Meta-categories in the I Ching." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20(4): 425-34. ( 1 993b) "A Set Theory Analysis of the Logic of the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20(2): 133-46. ( 1 996) "Philosophical Counseling and the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23(3): 299-320. Goldenberg, Daniel S. ( 1 975) "The Algebra of the I Ching and Its Philosophical Implications." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2: 149-79. Hacker, Edward A. ( 1 987) "Order in the Textual Sequence of the Hexagrams of the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14: 59-64. ( 1 983) "A Note on the Formal Properties of the Later Heaven Sequence. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 169-72. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 3, pp. 57-94. Hatton, Russell ( 1 982) "A Comparison of Chi and Prime Matter. " Philosophy East & West 32: 159-74. Hershock, Peter D. ( 1 991) "The Structure of Change in the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 18: 257-85. Hon, Tze-ki ( 1 997) Teaching the Book of Changes. Education about Asia 2(2), Fall: 26-3 1 . Huang, Alfred ( 1 998) The Complete I Ching. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions. (2000) The Numerology of the I Ching: A Sourcebook of Symbols, Struc­ tures, and Traditional . Wisdom. Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions. Joseph, Audrey ( 1 980) "Karman, Self-Knowledge and I Ching Divination. " Philosophy East & West 30: 65-75. Lee, Jung Young ( 1 972) "Death Is Birth and Birth Is Death. " Systematics 9: 1 8 8 -200. Legge, James (trans. ) ( 1 964) I Ching: Book of Changes. Edited with Introduc­ tion and Study Guide by Ch'u Chai with Winberg Chai. New York: Univer­ sity Books. Leung, Koon Loon ( 1 982) "An Algebraic Truth in Divination." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 9: 243-5 8 . --

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382

References and Further Reading Liu, Shu-hsien ( 1 990) "On the Functional Unity of the Four Dimensions of Thought in the Book of Changes. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 7: 359-86. Liu, Zheng ( 1 993) "The Dilemma Facing Contemporary Research in the Yijing. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 24(4): 47-64. Loy, David ( 1 987) "On the Meaning of the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 14: 39-57. Lynn, Richard John (trans.) ( 1 994) The Classic of Changes: A New Translation of the I Ching as Interpreted by Wang Bi. New York: Columbia University Press. Mair, Victor H. ( 1 979) "A Reordering of the Hexagrams of the I Ching." Philosophy East & West 29: 421-4l . Mcevilly, Wayne ( 1 96 8 ) "Synchronicity and the I Ching. " Philosophy East & West 1 8 : 1 3 7-50. Milcinski, Maja ( 1 997) "The Notion of Feminism in Asian Philosophical Tradi­ tions. " Asian Philosophy 7(3 ) : 1 95-205. Mou, Bo ( 1998) "An Analysis of the Ideographic Nature and Structure of the Hexagram in Yijing: From the Perspective of Philosophy of Language." Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 25(3): 305-20. Reifler, Sam ( 1 974) I Ching: A New Interpretation for Modern Times. New York: Bantam Books. Schulz, Larry J. ( 1 990) "On the Concept of Freedom in the I Ching: A Decon­ structionist View of Self-Cultivation. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy: 301-1 3 . Shibles, Warren A. ( 1 999) "On Death: The I Ching As a Metaphorical Method of Insight. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 26(3): 343-76. Smith, Richard J. ( 1 998) "The Place of the Yijing in World Culture: Some Historical and Contemporary Perspectives." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25(4): 391-422. Stevenson, Frank W. ( 1 993) "Discourse and Disclosure in the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20(2): 159-79. Tadashi, Ogawa ( 1 998) "Qi and the Phenomenology of Wind. " Continental Philosophy Review 3 1 ( 3 ) : 321-35. Tang, Mingbang ( 1 987) "Recent Developments in Studies of the Book of Changes. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 19, Fall: 46-63. Tong, Lik Kuen ( 1974) "The Concept of Time in Whitehead and the I Ching. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 : 373-93. ( 1 990) "The Appropriation of Significance: The Concept of Kang-Tung in the I Ching." Journal of Chinese Philosophy: 3 1 5-44. Walker, Brian Browne ( 1 992) The I Ching or Book of Changes. A Guide to Life's Turning Points. New York: St Martin's Press. Wilhelm, Hellmut ( 1 977) Heaven, Earth and Man in the Book of Changes. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Wilhelm, Richard and Baynes, Cary F. (trans.) ( 1 977) The I Ching: Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wilhelm, Hellmut and Wilhelm, Richard ( 1 979) Understanding the I Ching: The Wilhelm Lectures on the Book of Changes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Wing, R. L. (200 1 ) Workbook of I Ching. New York: Broadway Books.

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383

References and Further Reading Wu, Joseph S. ( 1 975) "Causality: Confucianism and Pragmatism." Philosophy East & West 25: 13-22. Zhang, Dainan ( 1 987) "On Heaven, Dao, Qi, Li, and Ze." Chinese Studies in Philosophy 19, Fall: 3-45.

Chapter 2

Confucius (Kongzi) in the A nalects

Allinson, Robert ( 1985) "The Confucian Golden Rule: A Negative Formula­ tion." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 305-1 5. ( 1 992) "The Golden Rule as the Core Value in Confucianism & Christian­ ity: Ethical Similarities and Differences. " Asian Philosophy 2(2): 173-85. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed. ) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 2. Creel, H. G. ( 1 960) Confucius and the Chinese Way. New York: Harper & Row. Cua, Antonio ( 1 995) "The Concept of Li in Confucian Moral Theory." In Robert Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots. New York: Oxford University Press, 6th impression, pp. 209-35. Dawson, Raymond (2000) Confucius. The Analects. Oxford World's Classics paperback. New York: Oxford University Press. Dawson, Miles Menander ( 1 939) The Basic Thoughts of Confucius: The Con­ duct of Life. New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc. De Bary, William Theodore ( 1991) The Trouble with Confucianism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Feinberg, Joel ( 1 980) "The Nature and Value of Rights. " In his Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty: Essays in Social Philosophy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 7, pp. 143-5 8 . Fingarette, Herbert ( 1972) Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. New York: Harper and Row. ( 1 979) "Following the 'One Thread' of the Analects." Journal of the American Academy of Religion 47(35): 375-405. Graham, Angus C. ( 1989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part I, ch. 1, pp. 9-33. Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. ( 1 987) Thinking Through Confucius. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 3, pp. 57-94. Ivanhoe, Philip J. ( 1 990) "Reviewing the 'One Thread' of the Analects." Philo­ sophy East & West 40( 1 ): 1 7-33. (2000) Confucian Moral Self Cultivation. 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, ch. l . Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. (eds.) (2003) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Lau, D. C. ( 1 979) Confucius: The Analects. New York: Penguin Classics. Liu, Shu-hsien ( 1 972) "A Philosophical Analysis of the Confucian Approach to Ethics." Philosophy East & West 22: 4 1 7-25.

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References and Further Reading ( 1998) Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Mingo Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, ch. 2. Nivison, David ( 1 996) "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Philosophy. " In Bryan Van Norden (ed.), The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 59-76. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, chs. 2-3. Slingerland, Edward (trans. ) (2003) Confucius: Analects. Indianapolis, IN: . Hackett Publishing Company. Trapp, Rainer Werner ( 1998) "The Golden Rule," Grazer Philosophische Studien 54: 139-64. Van Norden, Bryan W. (ed. ) (2002) Confucius and the Analects: New Essays. New York: Oxford University Press.

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Chapter 3

Mencius (Mengzi)

Ames, Roger ( 1 991) "The Mencian Conception of Ren xing: Does it Mean 'Human Nature' ? " In Henry Rosemont, Jr. (ed. ), Chinese Texts and Philo­ sophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 143-75. Bloom, Irene T. ( 1 994) "Mengzian Arguments on Human Nature." Philosophy East & West 44( 1 ): 19-54. Repr. in Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub­ lishing Company, 2002, pp. 64-100. ( 1997) "Human Nature and Biological Nature in Mencius." Philosophy East & West 47( 1 ), January: 2 1-32. Chan, Alan K. L. (ed. ) (2002a) Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Hono­ lulu: University of Hawaii Press. (2002b) "A Matter of Taste: Qi (Vital Energy) and the Tending of the Heart (Xin) in Mencius 2A2." In Alan K. L. Chan (ed. ), Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 42-71 . Chan, Wing-tsit (ed. ) ( 1973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 3. Chen, Ning (2002) "The Ideological Background of the Mencian Discussion of Human Nature: A Reexamination." In Alan K. L. Chan (ed.), Mencius: Con­ texts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 1 7-41 . Chong, Kim-chong (2002) " Mengzi and Gaozi on Nei and Wai. " In Alan K. L. Chan (ed.), Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 1 03-25. Cua, Antonio S. (2002) "Xin and Moral Failure: Notes on an Aspects of Mencius' Moral Psychology. " In Alan K. L. Chan (ed.), Mencius: Contexts and Inter­ pretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 126-50. Graham, Angus C. ( 1 989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in. Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part II, ch. 1, pp. 107-37. ( 1 990) "The Background of the Mencian Theory of Human Nature." In A. C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature.

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References and Further Reading Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Repr. in Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub­ lishing Company, 2002, pp. 1-57. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 5, pp. 153-95. Heng, Jiuan (2002) "Understanding Words and Knowing Men." In Alan K. L. Chan (ed. ), Mencius: Contexts and Interpretations. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 1 5 1-68. Hutton, Eric L. (2002) "Moral Connoisseurship in Mengzi." In Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 163-86. 1m, Manyul ( 1 999) "Emotional Control and Virtue in the Mencius." Philosophy East & West 49( 1 ) : 1-27. (2002) "Action, Emotion and Inference in Mencius. " Journal Of Chinese Philosophy 29(2), June: 227-49. (2004) "Moral Knowledge and Self Control in Mengzi: Rectitude, Cour­ age, and Qi." Asian Philosophy 14( 1 ), March: 59-77. Ivanhoe, Philip (2002a) Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought of Mengzi and Wang Yangming. 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. (2002b) "Confucian Self Cultivation and Mengzi's Notion of Extension." In Xiusheng Liu & Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 221-41. Lai, Whalen ( 1 984) "Kao Tzu and Mencius on Mind: Analyzing a Paradigm Shift in Classical China. " Philosophy East & West 34: 147-60. Lau, D. C. ( 1 963) "On Mencius' Use of the Method of Analogy in Argument. " Asia Major, N. S., vol. X. Repr. in D . C. Lau. Mencius, vols. 1 & 2 . Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984, pp. 334-56. ( 1970) Mencius. London: Penguin Books. Legge, James ( 1 970) The Works of Mencius. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. Liu, Shu-Hsien ( 1 996) "Some Reflections on Mencius' Views of Mind-Heart and Human Nature." Philosophy East & West 46(2), April: 143-64. -- ( 1998) Understanding Confucian Philosophy: Classical and Sung-Mingo Westport, CT: Praeger, ch. 3. Liu, Xiusheng (2002) "Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory. " Philosophy East & West 52( 1 ): 75-97. Liu, Xiusheng and Ivanhoe, Philip (eds.) (2002) Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. Nivison, David ( 1 996) The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. Ed. Bryan Van Norden, La Salle, IL: Open Court, chs. 6-12. Richards, I. A. ( 1 964) Mencius on the Mind: Experiments in Multiple Defini­ tion. London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, ch. 3, pp. 65- 85. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 7. Shun, Kwong-loi ( 1 989) "Moral Reasons in Confucian Ethics. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 3 1 7-43.

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References and Further Reading ( 1 991) "Mencius and the Mind-Inherence of Morality: Mencius' Rejection of Kao Tzu Maxim in Meng Tzu [Mengzi] . " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 8 : 371-86. ( 1 996) "Ideal Motivations and Reflective Understanding." American Philo­ sophical Quarterly 33( 1) , January: 91-1 04. ( 1997a) Mencius and Early Chinese Thought. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. ( 1997b) "Mencius on Jen-Hsing. " Philosophy East & West 47( 1 ), Janu­ ary: 1-20. Tan Sor-hoon, "Between Family and State: Relational Tensions in Confucian Ethics. " In Alan K. L. Chan (ed.) (2002) Mencius: Contexts and Interpreta­ tions. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 1 69- 8 8 . Tu, Wei-ming ( 1 978) "On the Mencian Perception of Moral Self-Development." Monist 6 1 ( 1 ) : 72- 8 l . Van Norden, Bryan W. ( 1991) "Kwong-Ioi Shun on Moral Reasons in Mencius." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 8 : 353-70. Waley, Arthur ( 1982) Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (orig. pub. London: Allen & Unwin, 1939). Wong, David B. ( 1 991 ) "Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius? " Philosophy East & West 4 1 ( 1 ): 3 1-44. (2002) " Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi." In Xiusheng Liu and Philip Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 1 8 7-220.

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Chapter 4

Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu)

Allinson, Robert E. ( 1 998) "The Debate between Mencius and Hsiin-Tzu: Con­ temporary Applications. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25: 3 1-49. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed. ) ( 1 973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, ch. 6. Cheung, Leo K. C. (200 1 ) "The Way of the Xunzi." Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 28(3), September: 301-20. Cua, Antonio S. ( 1977) "The Conceptual Aspect of Hsiin Tzu's Philosophy of Human Nature. " Philosophy East & West 27(4): 373-89. ( 1 978) "The Quasi-empirical Aspect of Hsiin-Tzu's Philosophy of Human Nature." Philosophy East & West 28(4): 3-19. ( 1979) " Dimensions of Li (Propriety): Reflections on an Aspect of Hsiin Tzu's Ethics." Philosophy East & West 29(4): 373-94. ( 1 985a) Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun Tzu's Moral Epistemo­ logy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ( 1 985b) "Ethical Uses of the Past in Early Confucianism: The Case of Xunzi." Philosophy East & West 35(2): 1 33-56. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J . Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 39-68. -- (2002) "The Ethical and the Religious Dimensions of Li (Rites)." The Review of Metaphysics 55(3), March: 471-5 1 9.

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References and Further Reading Eno, Robert ( 1 990) "Ritual as a Natural Art: The Nature of T'ien in the Hsiin Tzu. " In his The Confucian Creation of Heaven: Philosophy and the Defense of Ritual Mastery. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 1 3 1-69. Goldin, Paul Rakita ( 1 999) Rituals of the Way: The Philosophy of Xunzi. La Salle, IL: Open Court. Graham, Angus C. ( 1 989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part III, ch. 2, pp. 235-67. Hagen, Kurtis (2000) "A Critical Review of Ivanhoe on Xunzi." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27(3), September: 36 1-73. Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 9, pp. 307-43. Hutton, Eric (2000) "Does Xunzi Have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature? " In T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 220-36. Ivanhoe, Philip ( 1994) "Human Nature and Moral Understanding in the Xunzi. " International Philosophical Quarterly 34(2), June: 167-75. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 237-49. Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. (eds.) (2003) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Kline III, T. C. (2000) "Moral Agency and Motivation in the Xunzi. " In T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 1 55-75. Kline III, T. C. and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (eds.) (2000) Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. Kupperman, Joel J. (2000) "Xunzi: Morality as Psychological Constraint." In T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 89-102. Lau, D. C. ( 1953) "Theories of Human Nature in Mencius and Shyuntzyy [Xunzi] . " Bulletin of the School of Asian and African Studies 15: 541-65. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 1 8 8 -2 1 9. Machle, Edward J. ( 1976) "Hsiin Tzu as a Religious Philosopher. " Philosophy East & West 26(4), October: 443- 6 l . ( 1 993) Nature and Heaven in the Xunzi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Martin, Michael R. ( 1 995) "Ritual Actions (Li) in Confucius and Hsiin Tzu." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73( 1 ), March: 1 3-30. Munro, Donald J. ( 1 996) "A Villain in the Xunzi." In Philip Ivanhoe (ed. ) Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 193-20l . Nivison, David ( 1 991) "Hsiin Tzu and Chuang Tzu. " In Henry Rosemont, Jr. (ed.), Chinese Texts and Philosophical Contexts: Essays Dedicated to Angus C. Graham. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 129-42. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 1 76-87. --

388

References and Further Reading ( 1 996) "Xunzi on 'Human Nature'. " In Bryan Van Norden (ed.), The Ways of Confucianism: Investigations in Chinese Philosophy. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 203-1 3. Rosemont, Jr., Henry (2000) "State and Society in the Xunzi: A Philosophical Commentary. " In T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Com­ pany, pp. 1-3 8 . Schofer, Jonathan W. ( 1 993) "Virtues in Xunzi's Thought: Issues in Comparat­ ive Analysis." The Journal of Religious Ethics 2 1 : 1 1 7-36. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 69- 8 8 . Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 7. Soles, David E. ( 1 999) "The Nature and Grounds of Xunzi's Disagreement with Mencius." Asian Philosophy 9(2), July: 123-33. Van Norden, Bryan W. ( 1 992) "Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views of Human Agency. " International Philosophical Quarterly 32, June: 161-84. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 103-34. Watson, Burton (trans. ) ( 1 963) Hsun Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press. Wong, David B. ( 1 996) "Xunzi on Moral Motivation." In Philip Ivanhoe (ed. ), Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics. La Salle, IL: Open Court, pp. 202-23. Repr. in T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Virtue, Nature and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 1 35-54.

Chapter 5

Mozi (Mo Tzu)

Ahern, Dennis M. ( 1 976) "Is Mo Tzu A Utilitarian? " Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 3: 185-93. Birdwhistell, Anne D. ( 1 984) "An Approach to Verification Beyond Tradition in Early Chinese Philosophy: Mo Tzu's Concept of Sampling in a Community of Observers. " Philosophy East & West 34: 175-84. Brandt, Richard B. ( 1 989) "Comment on Chad Hansen's 'Language Utilitarian­ ism'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 38 1-5. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed. ) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 9. Chang, Li-wien ( 1 979 ) "A Short Comment on Mo Tzu's Epistemology Based on 'Three Criteria'." Chinese Studies in Philosophy 10: 47-54. Ching, Julia ( 1 978) "Chinese Ethics and Kant." Philosophy East & West 28: 161-72. Creel, Herrlee G. ( 1 953) Chinese Thought: From Confucius to Mao Tse-Tung. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ch. 4, pp. 46-67. Duda, Kristopher (200 1 ) "Reconsidering Mo Tzu on the Foundations of Morality." Asian Philosophy 1 1 ( 1 ): 23-3 1 . ,

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References and Further Reading Hansen, Chad ( 1 989) "Mo Tzu: Language Utilitarianism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 355-80. Jenner, Donald ( 1 984) "Mo Tzu and Hobbes: Preliminary Remarks on the Relation of Chinese and Western Politics." Cogito 2: 49-72. Jochim, Christian ( 1 980) "Ethical Analysis of an Ancient Debate: Mohists ver­ sus Confucians. " Journal of Religious Ethics 8: 1 35-47. Johnston, Ian (2000) "Choosing the Greater and Choosing the Lesser: A Trans­ lation and Analysis of the Daqu and Xiaoqu Chapters of the Mozi." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27(4): 375-407. Lai, Whalen ( 1 991 ) "In Defense of Graded Love." Asian Philosophy: 5 1-60. ( 1 993) "The Public Good that Does the Public Good: A New Reading of Mohism." Asian Philosophy 3(2): 125-4l. Lau, D. C. ( 1 953) "Some Logical Problems in Ancient China. " Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53: 1 8 9-204. Lum, Alice ( 1 977) "Social Utilitarianism in the Philosophy of Mo Tzu." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4: 1 8 7-207. Scarre, Geoffrey ( 1 996) Utilitarianism. New York: Routledge. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 6, pp. 1 86-254. Soles, David E. ( 1999) "Mo Tzu and the Foundations of Morality. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 26( 1 ) : 37-48. rang Chun-1. ( 1 962) "The T'ien Ming (Heavenly Ordinance) in Pre-Ch'in China, II." Philosophy East & West 12: 29-50. Taylor, Rodney L. ( 1 979) "Mo Tzu on Spirits and Funerals." Philosophy East & West 29: 337-46. Vorenkamp, Dirck ( 1 992) "Strong Utilitarianism in Mo Tzu's Thought. " Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 19(4): 423-43. Watson, Burton ( 1963) Mo Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia Univer­ sity Press. Watson, Walter ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Principle for Dealing with Disorder. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 349-69. Winance, Eleuthere ( 1 961) "A Forgotten Chinese Thinker: Mo Tzu. " Inter­ national Philosophical Quarterly 1 : 593-619. Wong, David ( 1989) "Universalism versus Love with Distinctions: An Ancient Debate Revived." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 25 1-72. --

Chapter 6

Laozi (Lao Tzu)

Ahern, Dennis M. ( 1 977) "Ineffability in the 'Lao Tzu': The Taming of A Dragon." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4: 357-82. Ames, Roger T. (1983) "Is Political Taoism Anarchism? " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 27-47. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 7. Chang, Chung-yuan ( 1 974) "Tao: A New Way of Thinking." Journal of Chin­ ese Philosophy 1 : 127-52. 390

References and Further Reading Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 983) "Metaphysics of 'Tao' and Dialectics of 'Fa'." Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 251-84. Creel, Herrlee G. ( 1 970) What Is Taoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. ( 1 98 3 ) " On the Opening Words of the 'Lao-Tzu'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 299-330. Csikszentmihalyi, Mark and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (eds.) ( 1 999) Religious and Philo­ sophical Aspects of the Laozi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Danto, Arthur C. ( 1 973) "Language and the Tao: Some Reflections on Ineffabil­ ity. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 : 45-55. Fu, Charles Wei-hsun ( 1 973 ) "Lao-Tzu's Conception of Tao." Inquiry 16: 36791. Graham, Angus C. ( 1 989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part III, ch. 1 , pp. 215-35. Hahn, Robert ( 1 9 8 1 ) " Being and Non-being in 'Rig Veda X' in the Writings of the 'Lao-Tzu' and 'Chuang-Tzu' and in the 'Later' Plato. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 1 1 9-42. Hang, Thaddeus T'ui Chieh (2000) "Understanding Evil in the Philosophies of Mencius, Hsiin Tzu, and Lao Tzu. " In Sandra A. Wawrytko (ed. ), The Problem of Evil: An Intercultural Exploration. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, pp. 1-9. Hansen, Chad ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Linguistic Skepticism in the 'Lao Tzu'. " Philosophy East & West 3 1 : 321-36. ( 1992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, ch. 6, pp. 1 96-230. Hsu, Sung-peng ( 1 976) "Lao Tzu's Conception of Ultimate Reality: A Com­ parative Study. " International Philosophical Quarterly 16: 1 97-2 1 8 . ( 1 976) "Lao Tzu's Conception of Evil. " Philosophy East & West 26: 30116. Ivanhoe, Philip J. ( 1 999) "The Concept of de ( 'Virtue') in the Laozi. " In Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 239-57. Kaltenmark, Max ( 1 969) Lao Tzu and Taoism (translated from the French by Roger Greaves) . Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Kasulis, T. P. ( 1 977) "The Absolute and the Relative in Taoist Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 4: 383-94. Kato, Joken ( 1 970) "The Origin of the Oriental Idea of Correspondence with Nature. " Philosophical Studies of Japan 10: 95-1 14. Kohn, Livia and LaFargue, Michael (eds.) ( 1 99 8 ) Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Lau, D. C. ( 1 958) "The Treatment of Opposites in Lao-Tzu. " Bulletin of the School of Asian and African Studies 2 1 : 344-60. -- ( 1 96 3 ) Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching. NY: Penguin Books, pp. vii-xlv. Liu, JeeLoo (2003 ) "A Daoist Conception of Truth: Laozi's Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuangzi's Internal Realism. " In Bo Mou (ed.), Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., pp. 278-93.

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References and Further Reading Liu, Xiaogan ( 1998) "On the Concept of Naturalness ( 'Tzu-Jan') in Lao Tzu's Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25(4): 423-46. ( 1 999) "An Inquiry into the Core Value of Laozi's Philosophy. " In Mark Csikszentmihalyi and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Religious and Philosophical Aspects of the Laozi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 21 1-37. Mou, Bo (2000) "Ultimate Concern and Language Engagement: A Reexamination of the Opening Message of the 'Dao-De-Jing'." Journal of Chinese Philoso­ phy 27(4): 429-39. (2001 ) "Moral Rules and Moral Experience: A Comparative Analysis of Dewey and Laozi on Morality. " Asian Philosophy, 1 1 (3 ) : 16 1-78. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 6. Shien, Gi-ming ( 1 9 5 1 ) "Nothingness in the Philosophy of Lao-Tzu. " Philosophy East & West 1 : 58-63. Stern, Axel ( 1 949-5 1 ) "Remarks of Two Chapters of Laotse's Tao Teh Ching." Synthese 8: 65-72. Thompson, Kirill O. ( 1 990) "Taoist Cultural Reality: The Harmony of Aesthetic Order. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 7(2): 1 75-85. Wang, Qingjie ( 1997) "On Lao Tzu's Concept of 'Zi Ran'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24(3 ) : 291-321. Wawrytko, Sandra A. (2000) "The Problem of the Problem of Evil: A Taoist Response. " In Sandra A. Wawrytko (ed.), The Problem of Evil: An Inter­ cultural Exploration. Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, pp. 21-39. Welch, Holmes ( 1966) Taoism. The Parting of the Way, rev. edn. Boston: Beacon Press. Xie, Wenyu (2000) "Approaching the Dao: From Lao Zi to Zhuang Zi. " Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 27(4): 469- 8 8 . Zhu, Bokun ( 1 998) "Daoist Patterns of Thought and the Tradition of Chinese Metaphysics." Contemporary Chinese Thought 29(3): 13-71 .

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Chapter 7

Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu)

Allinson, Robert E. ( 1 986) "Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Evaluation and Trans-Evaluation in Chuang Tzu and Nietzsche. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13: 429-43. ( 19 8 8 ) "A Logical Reconstruction of the Butterfly Dream: The Case for Internal Textual Transformation." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 15: 3 1 939. ( 1 989) " On the Question of Relativism in the Chuang Tzu. " Philosophy East & West 39(1), January: 13-26. Ames, Roger T. (ed. ) ( 1 99 8 ) Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Behuniak, James Jr. (2002) "Disposition and Aspiration in the Mencius and Zhuangzi." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29( 1), March: 65-79. Berkson, Mark ( 1996) "Language: The Guest of Reality - Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness." In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe

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392

References and Further Reading (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 97-126. Burneko, Guy C. ( 1 986) "Chuang Tzu's Existential Hermeneutics." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13: 393-409. Callahan, W. A. ( 1 989) "Discourse and Perspective in Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation of Ziran." Philosophy East & West 39(2), April: 1 71-89. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 8 . Chang, Chung-yuan ( 1 977) "The Philosophy of Taoism According to Chuang Tzu." Philosophy East & West 2 7( 4), October: 409-22. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 977) "Nature and Function of Skepticism in Chinese Philosophy." Philosophy East & West 27(2), April: 137-54. Chinn, Ewing Y. ( 1997) "Zhuangzi and Relativistic Skepticism. " Asian Philo­ sophy 7(3), November: 207-20. Coleman, Earle J. ( 1 991) "The Beautiful, the Ugly, and the Tao." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 8 : 21 3-26. Cook, Scott (ed.) (2003 ) Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Creel, Herrlee G. ( 1970) What Is Taoism? And Other Studies in Chinese Cul­ tural History. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. Cua, Antonio S. ( 1 977) "Forgetting Morality: Reflections on A Theme in Chuang Tzu. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4: 305-28. Fleming, Jesse ( 1 991) "A Response to Kuang-Ming Wu's 'Non-World Mak­ ing'. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 8 , March: 5 1-2. Fox, Allen ( 1 996) "Reflex and Reflectivity: 'Wu-wei' in the Zhuangzi." Asian Philosophy 6 ( 1 ) , March: 59-72. Gaskins, Robert W. ( 1 997) "The Transformation of Things: A Reanalysis of Chuang Tzu's Butterfly Dream." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 24( 1 ), March: 1 07-22. Girardot, N. J. ( 1 978) "Chaotic 'Order' ('Hun-Tun') and Benevolent 'Disorder' ('Luan') in the Chuang Tzu. " Philosophy East & West 28, July: 299-321. Goodman, Russell B. (1985) "Skepticism and Realism in the Chuang Tzu. " Philosophy East & West 35(3), July: 23 1-7. Graham, Angus C. (1983) "Taoist Spontaneity and the Dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought'. " In Victor H. Mair (ed. ), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 3-23. ( 1 985) Reason and Spontaneity: A New Solution to the Problem of Fact and Value. London: Curzon Press. ( 1989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part II, ch. 3, pp. 1 70-2 1 1 . Hall, David ( 1 984) "Nietzsche and Chuang Tzu: Resources for the Transcend­ ence of Culture." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 1 : 139-52. Hansen, Chad (1983) "A Tao of Tao in Chuang-tzu." In Victor H. Mair (ed. ), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Hono­ lulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 24-55. --

393

References and Further Reading ( 1992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, ch. 8, pp. 265-303. Hara, Wing Han ( 1 993) "Between Individuality and Universality: An Explica­ tion of Chuang Tzu's Theses of Chien-tu and Ch'i-wu. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 20( 1 ), March: 87-99. Harbsmeier, Christoph ( 1 993) "Conceptions of Knowledge in Ancient China. " In Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (eds.), Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 1 1-30. Ivanhoe, Philip J. ( 1 996) "Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?" In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 196-214. Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. (eds.) (2003) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Kjellberg, Paul ( 1 994) "Skepticism, Truth, and the Good Life: A Comparison of Zhuangzi and Sextus Empiricus. " Philosophy East & West 44( 1 ) : 1 1 1-33. -- ( 1 996) "Sextus Empiricus, Zhuangzi, and Xunzi on 'Why be Skeptical? ' " In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J . Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativ­ ism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 1-25. Kjellberg, Paul and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (eds.) ( 1 996) Essays on Skepticism, Rela­ tivism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Kupperman, Joel J. ( 1 989) "Not in So Many Words: Chuang Tzu's Strategies of Communication." Philosophy East & West 39, July: 3 1 1-17. Lee, Jung H. ( 1 998) "Disputers of the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-tzu on Mean­ ing, Truth, and Reality. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25(4): 447-70. Lee, Kwang-sae ( 1 996) " Rorty and Chuang Tzu: Anti-Representationalism, Plu­ ralism and Conversation." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23(2): 175-92. Legge, Russel D. ( 1979) "Chuang Tzu and the Free Man." Philosophy East & West 29: 1 1-20. Li, Chenyang ( 1993) "What-Being: Chuang Tzu versus Aristotle." International Philosophical Quarterly 33(3): 341-53. Liu, JeeLoo (2003) "A Daoist Conception of Truth: Laozi's Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuangzi's Internal Realism." In Bo Mou (ed.), Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Loy, David ( 1 996) "Zhuangzi and Nagarjuna on the Truth of No Truth. " In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 50-67. Mair, Victor H. (ed.) ( 1983) Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Major, John S. ( 1 975) "The Efficacy of Uselessness: A Chuang-Tzu Motif. " Philosophy East & West 25, July: 265-79. Merton, Thomas ( 1 965) The Way of Chuang Tzu. New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation. --

394

References and Further Reading Moller, Hans-Georg ( 1 999) "Zhuangzi's 'Dream of the Butterfly': A Daoist Interpretation." Philosophy East & West 49(4), October: 439-50. Oshima, Harold H. ( 1 983) "A Metaphorical Analysis of the Concept of Mind in the Chuang-tzu." In Victor H. Mair (ed. ), Experimental Essays on Chuang­ tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 63-84. Owens, Wayne D. ( 1 990) "Radical Concrete Particularity: Heidegger, Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 7(2): 235-55. Parkes, Graham ( 1 983) "The Wandering Dance: Chuang Tzu and Zarathustra. " Philosophy East & West 33: 235-50. Pas, Julian F. ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Chuang Tzu's Essays on 'Free Flight into Transcendence' and 'Responsive Rulership' (chs. 1 and 7) of the Chuang Tzu." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8, December: 479-96. Radice, Thomas (200 1 ) "Clarity and Survival in the Zhuangzi. " Asian Philo­ sophy 1 1 ( 1 ) : 33-40. Raphals, Lisa ( 1 994) "Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuangzi and Theaetetus. " Philosophy East & West 44(3): 501-26. Repr. in Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 26-49. Saso, Michael ( 1983) "The Chuang-tzu nei-p'ien: A Taoist Meditation." In Victor H. Mair (ed. ), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 140-57. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 6. Schwitzgebel, Eric ( 1 996) "Zhuangzi's Attitude Toward Language and His Skepticism." In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skep­ ticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 68-96. Shen, Vincent ( 1996) "Confucianism and Taoism in Response to Constructive Realism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23: 59-78. Soles, Deborah H. and Soles, David E. ( 1 998) " Fish Traps and Rabbit Snare: Zhuangzi on Judgment, Truth and Knowledge." Asian Philosophy 8(3), November: 149-64. Sun, Siao Fang ( 1 953) "Chuang Tzu's Theory of Truth. " Philosophy East & West 3, July: 137-46. Van Norden, Bryan W. ( 1 996) " Competing Interpretations of the Inner Chap­ ters of the 'Zhuangzi'." Philosophy East & West 46(2), April: 247-68. Waley, Arthur ( 1 982) Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (orig. pub. London: Allen & Unwin, 1 939). Wang, Youru (2000) "Philosophy of Change and the Deconstruction of Self in the 'Zhuangzi'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27(3): 345-60. Watson, Burton (trans.) ( 1964) Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Colum­ bia University Press (repr. in 1 996). (trans. ) ( 1 968) The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu. New York: Colum­ bia University Press. --

395

References and Further Reading Wu, John C. H. ( 1 963) "The Wisdom of Chuang Tzu: A New Appraisal." International Philosophical Quarterly 3: 5-36. Wu, Kuang-ming ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Trying Without Trying: Toward a Taoist Phenom­ enology of Truth. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 143-68. ( 1 990) The Butterfly as Companion: Meditations on the First Three Chap­ ters of the Chuang Tzu. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. ( 1 9 9 1 ) "Non-World Making in Chuang Tzu. " Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 1 8 , March: 37-50. Wu, Laurence C. ( 1 986) " Chuang Tzu and Wittgenstein on World-Making." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13, December: 383-9 1 . Xie, Wenyu (2000) "Approaching the Dao: From Lao Zi to Zhuang Zi. " Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 27(4) : 469- 8 8 . Yan, Beiming ( 1 9 8 1 ) The Reevaluation of Zhuangzi." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 63-89. Yearley, Lee ( 1 983) "The Perfected Person in the Radical Chuang-tzu." In Victor H. Mair (ed.), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 125-39. ( 1 996) "Zhuangzi's Understanding of Skillfulness and the Ultimate Spiritual State. " In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1 996, pp. 1 52- 82. Yeh, Michelle ( 1983) "The Deconstructive Way: A Comparative Study of Derrida and Chuang Tzu. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 95-126. Yukawa, Hideki ( 1 983) "Chuangtse the Happy Fish." In Victor H. Mair (ed. ), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu. Asian Studies at Hawaii, No. 29. Hono­ lulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 56-62.

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Chapter 8

Hanfeizi (Han Fei Tzu)

Ames, Roger T. ( 1 994) The Art of Rulership: A Study of Ancient Chinese Political Thought. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 12. Chang, Leo S. and Wang, Hsiao-po ( 1 986) The Philosophical Foundations of Han Fel's Political Theory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Legalism Versus Confucianism: A Philosophical Appraisal." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 271-302. ( 1 983) "Metaphysics of 'Tao' and Dialectics of 'Fa'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 251-84. Fung, Yu-lan ( 1 983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. I (trans. Derk Bodde). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 8, pp. 312-36. Goldin, Paul R. ( 1 983) "Han Fei's Doctrine of Self-Interest. " Asian Philosophy 1 1 (3): 1 5 1-9. Graham, Angus C. ( 1989) The Disputers of the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, IL: Open Court, Part III, ch. 3, pp. 267-92.

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396

References and Further Reading Hansen, Chad ( 1 992) A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, ch. 10, pp. 344-76. ( 1 996) "Fa: Laws or Standards." In Smart, Ninian (ed.) East- West En­ counters in Philosophy and Religion, Long Beach, CA: Long Beach Publishing. Ho, Pao-chung ( 1 988) "An Analysis and Critique of Han-Fei's Thought." National Taiwan University Philosophical Critique, No. 1 1 , January, pp. 247-60 (in Chinese). Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds.) (2003) Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., ch. 7 (excerpts). Lee, K. K. ( 1 975 ) "The Legalist School and Legal Positivism. " Journal Of Chinese Philosophy 3: 23-56. Liang, Enyuan ( 1 976) "The Legalist School Was the Product of Great Social Change in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy, Fall: 4-20. Liang, Ling-i. ( 1 976) "The Crystallization of Pre-Ch'in Legalist Thought." Chinese Studies in Philosophy 7, Summer: 35-56. Liao, W. K. (trans.) ( 1 939) The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu. London: Arthur Probsthain. Lin, Yih-jing ( 1 989) "A Study of the Pre-Chin Legalist Theory of Human Na­ ture." National Taiwan University Philosophical Critique 1 2, January: 14573 (in Chinese). Manicas, Peter T. ( 1 977) "Two Concepts of Justice. " Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 4: 99-1 2 l . Moody Jr., Peter R. ( 1979) "The Legalism of Han Fei Tzu and Its Affinities with Modern Political Thought. " International Philosophical Quarterly 19: 317-30. Schwartz, Benjamin ( 1 985) The World of Thought in Ancient China. Cam­ bridge, MA: Belknap Press, ch. 8, pp. 321-49. Ti, Ch'ing ( 1 978) "A Reading of Han Fei's 'Wu Tu' (Five Vermin) . " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 10, Fall: 1 9-33. Tong, Shuye ( 1 9 82/3 ) "A Study of Han Fei's Thought. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 14, Winter: 61-98. Vervoorn, Aat ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Taoism, Legalism and the Quest for Order in Warring States China." Journal Of Chinese Philosophy 8: 303-24. Waley, Arthur ( 1 982) Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (orig. pub. London: Allen & Unwin, 1939). Wang, Hsiao-po ( 1 977) "The Significance of the Concept of 'Fa' in Han Fei's Thought System" (trans. by L. S. Chang). Philosophy East & West 27( 1 ): 35-52. Watson, Burton ( 1 964) Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings. New York: Columbia University Press. Watson, Walter ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Principles for Dealing with Disorder. " Journal Of Chinese Philosophy 8: 349-70. Yang, K'uan ( 1 978) "Han Fei's Theory of the 'Rule of Law' Played A Progres­ sive Role." Chinese Studies in Philosophy 1 0, Fall: 4-1 8 .

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397

References and Further Reading

Part II

Chinese Buddhism Introduction

Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 958) "Transformation of Buddhism in China." Philoso­ phy East & West 7: 1 07-16. ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chatterjee, Satischandra and Datta, Dhirendramohan ( 1 968) An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 7th edn. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press. Ch'en, Kenneth K. S. ( 1 964) Buddhism in China: A Historical Survey. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cheng, Hsueh-li ( 1 980) "Motion and Rest in the Middle Treatise. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 7: 229-44. -- ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Chi-tsang's Treatment of Metaphysical Issues." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 371-89. Dalai Lama ( 1 997) The Four Noble Truths. London: Thorsons. -- (2000) The Meaning of Life: Buddhist Perspective on Cause and Effect (trans. Jeffrey Hopkins). Boston: Wisdom Publications. De Bary, William Theodore and Bloom, Irene (eds.) ( 1 999) Sources of Chinese Tradition, second edition. Volume I. From Earliest Times to 1 600. New York: Columbia University Press. Fang, Litian ( 1989) "A Tentative Discussion of the Characteristics of Chinese Buddhism. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 20, Summer: 3-7 1 . Fung, Yu-lan ( 1 9 8 3 ) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II. (trans. Derk Bodde). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 7, pp. 237-92. Gethin, Rupert ( 1 998) The Foundations of Buddhism. Oxford: Oxford Univer­ sity Press. Hurvitz, Leon ( 1 975) "The First systematizations of Buddhist Thought in China." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2: 361-88. Inada, Kenneth K. ( 1 979) "Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self." Phi­ losophy East & West 29(2), April: 141-58. -- ( 1 985) "Two Strains in Buddhist Causality." Journal of Chinese Philoso­ phy 12: 49-56. Kalupahana, David J. ( 1 975) Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii. -- ( 1 992) A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kieschnick, John (2003 )The Impact of Buddhism on Chinese Material Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Koller, John M. ( 1 972) "Dharma: An Expression of Universal Order. " Philo­ sophy East & West 22: 1 3 1-44. Lai, Whalen ( 1 977) "Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories: An Analysis of the Sinitic Mahayana Understanding of Pratiya-samutpada. " Philosophy East & West 27(3): 241-64.

398

References and Further Reading Liu, Ming-wood ( 1 985) "The Yogacara and Madhyamika Interpretations of the Buddha-Nature Concept in Chinese Buddhism. " Philosophy East & West 35, April: 171-93. ( 1 989) "The Early Development of the Buddha-Nature Doctrine in China." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 16: 1-36. Mitchell, Donald W. (1976) "The Paradox of Buddhism Wisdom." Philosophy East & West 26: 55-67. Potter, Karl H. ( 1 964) "The Naturalistic Principle of Karma." Philosophy East & West 14: 39-49. Radhakrishnan ( 1 962) Indian Philosophy, vol. 1. New York: Macmillan Com­ pany (orig. pub. 1923). Saso, Michael ( 1 977) " Buddhist and Taoist Notions of Transcendence: A Study of Philosophical Contrast." In Michael Saso and David W. Chappell (eds.), Buddhist and Taoist Studies I. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, pp. 3-22. Siderits, Mark (200 1 ) "Buddhism and Techno-Physicalism: Is the Eightfold Path A Program?" Philosophy East & West 5 1 (3 ) , July: 307-14. Streng, Frederick ( 1 975 ) "Reflections on the Attention Given to Mental Con­ struction in the Indian Buddhist Analysis of Causality." Philosophy East & West 25: 71-80. Ueda, Yoshifumi ( 1 964) "The World and the Individual in Mahayana Buddhist Philosophy. " Philosophy East & West 14: 1 57-66. Varma, V. P. ( 1 963) "The Origins and Sociology of the Early Buddhist Philo­ sophy of Moral Determinism." Philosophy East & West 1 3 ( 1 ) : 25-47. Wayman, Alex ( 1 974) "Two Traditions of India: Truth and Silence." Philosophy East & West 24: 389-403. Wright, Arthur F. ( 1 959) Buddhism in Chinese History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. -- ( 1 990) Studies in Chinese Buddhism, ed. Robert M. Somers. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Zeuschner, Robert B. ( 1 9 8 1 ) "The Understanding of Karma in Early Ch'an Buddhism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 399-425.

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Chapter 9

The Consciousness-Only ( Wei-shi) School

Banerjee, Nikunja Vihari ( 1 974) The Spirit of Indian Philosophy. New Delhi, India: Arnold-Heinemann Publishers. Betty, Stafford L. ( 1 971 ) "The Buddhist-Humean Parallels: Postmodernism. " Philosophy East & West 2 1 , July: 237-53. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 23. Chatterjee, Satischandra and Datta, Dhirendramohan ( 1 968) An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, 7th edn. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press. Fung, Yu-lan (1983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II. (trans. Derk Bodde). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 8, pp. 299-338. ,

399

References and Further Reading Hamilton, Clarence H. (trans. ) ( 1 938) Vasubandhu, Wei shih er shih lun (The Treatise in Twenty Stanzas on Representation-only). Translated from the Chinese version of [XuanzangJ . New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society. Kalupahana, David J. ( 1 992) A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, chs. 19-20, pp. 1 84-205. Kern, Iso ( 1 9 8 8 ) "The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 19(3), October: 282-95. Lusthaus, Dan (2002) Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investiga­ tion of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch 'eng Wei-Shih lun. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Raju, P. T. ( 1 971) The Philosophical Traditions of India. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Wei, Tat (trans. ) ( 1973 ) Ch'eng Wei-shih lun Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness by Hsiian Tsang, Hong Kong: The Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee.

Chapter 1 0

The Hua-yan (Hua-yen) School

Berkson, Mark ( 1996) "Language: The Guest of Reality - Zhuangzi and Derrida on Language, Reality, and Skillfulness." In Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 97-126. Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 25. Chang, Garma C. C. ( 1 971 ) The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa Yen Buddhism. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State Univer­ sity Press. Cheng, Hsueh-fli ( 1 984) "Phenomenology in T'ien-tai and Hua-yen Buddhism." In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in A Dialogue between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 21 5-27. Cleary, Thomas (trans. ) ( 1 983) Entry into the Inconceivable: An Introduction to Hua-yen Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. ( 1 993) The Flower Ornament Scripture: A Translation of the Avatamsaka Sutra. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, Inc. Cook, Francis H. ( 1 972) "The Meaning of Vairocana in Hua-yen Buddhism." Philosophy East & West 22, October: 403-1 5. ( 1 977) Hua-yen Buddhism The Jewel Net of Indra. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. ( 1 979) "Causation in the Chinese Hua-yen Tradition." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 367-85. Fu, Charles Wei-hsiin ( 1 9 84) "Chinese Buddhism and An Existential Phenom­ enology." In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in A Dialogue Between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 229-5 1 .

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400

References and Further Reading Fung, Yu-lan (1 983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II (trans. Derk Bodde). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 8, pp. 339-59. Gimello, Robert M. ( 1 976) "Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahayana: A Chinese View. " Philosophy East & West 26, April: 1 1 7-36. ( 1 990) "Li T'ung-hsiian and the Practical Dimensions of Hua-yen. " In Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory (eds.), Studies in Ch'an and Hua­ Yen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 321-66. Gimello, Robert M. and Gregory, Peter N. (eds.) ( 1 990) Studies in Ch'an and Hua-Yen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Gregory, Peter N. ( 1 990) "The Teaching of Men and Gods: The Doctrinal and Social Basis of Lay Buddhist Practice in the Hua-yen Tradition." In Robert M. Gimello and Peter N. Gregory (eds.), Studies in Ch'an and Hua-Yen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 253-3 1 9. Inada, Kenneth K. ( 1 974) "Time and Temporality: A Buddhist Approach. " Philosophy East & West 24: 171-9. ( 1983) "The Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration Revisited." (A critique of Steve Odin's "A Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration: Process Theory and Hua-[yan] Buddhism.") Process Studies 13, Summer: 154-8. King, Winston L. ( 1 979) "Hua-yen Mutually Interpenetrative Identity and White­ headean Organic Relation. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 3 8 7-410. Lai, Whalen ( 1980) "The I Ching and the Formation of the Hua-yen Philosophy." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 7: 245-58 . ( 1 986) "The Defeat of Vijnaptimatrata in China: Fa-Tsang on Fa-hsing and Fa-hsiang. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 3 : 1-19. Odin, Steve ( 1 9 8 1 ) " Fantasy Variation and the Horizon of Openness: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Tantric Buddhism Enlightenment. " Inter­ national Philosophical Quarterly 2 1 , December: 41 9-36. ( 1 982) Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism: A Critical Study of Cumulative Penetration vs. Interpenetration. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Panikkar, Raimundo ( 1 974) "Toward a Typology of Time and Temporality in the Ancient Indian Tradition." Philosophy East & West 24: 161-4. Puligandla, R. ( 1 974) "Time and History in the Indian Tradition. " Philosophy East & West 24: 165-70. Wright, Dale ( 1 982) "The Significance of Paradoxical Language in Hua-yen Buddhism. " Philosophy East & West 32, July: 325-3 8 . -- ( 1 986) " Language and Truth in Hua-Yen Buddhism. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13: 21-47.

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Chapter 1 1

The Tian-tai (T'ien-t'ai) School

Chan, Wing-tsit ( 1 990) "The Lotus Sutra." In Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom (eds.), Approaches to the Asian Classics. New York: Columbia Uni­ versity Press, pp. 220-3 1 . -- (ed.) ( 1 973) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 24.

40 1

References and Further Reading Chappell, David W. (ed. ) ( 1 983) T'ien-T'ai Buddhism: An Outline of the Four­ fold Teachings. Recorded by Chegwan, trans. by the Buddhist Translation Seminar of Hawaii. Compiled by Masao Ichishima. Tokyo: Daiichi-Shob6. Honolulu: distributed by the University Press of Hawaii. Cheng, Chung-ying (200 1 ) " 'Unity of Three Truths' and the Three Forms of Creativity: Lotus Sutra and Process Philosophy. " Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 28(4), December: 449-59. Cheng, Hsueh-fli ( 1 984) "Phenomenology in T'ien-tai and Hua-yen Buddhism." In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in A Dialogue between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 215-27. Donner, Neal and Stevenson, Daniel B. ( 1 993) The Great Calming and Contem­ plation : A Study and Annotated Translation of the First Chapter of Chih-i's Mo-ho chih-kuan. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Fu, Charles Wei-hsiin ( 1 984) "Chinese Buddhism and An Existential Phenom­ enology. " In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), Phenomenology of Life in A Dialogue between Chinese and Occidental Philosophy. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 229-5 l . Fung, Yu-lan ( 1 983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. 2 (trans. Derk Bodde) . Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 9, pp. 360- 86. Hurvitz, Leon ( 1 962) Chih-i (538-597): An Introduction to the Life and Ideas of a Chinese Buddhist Monk. Brussels: L'Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises. Ikeda, Daisaku, et al. (2000) The Wisdom of the Lotus Sutra: A Discussion, vol. 1 . Santa Monica, CA: World Tribune Press. Ng, Yu-kwan (Wu, Ru-jun) ( 1 993) T'ien-t'ai Buddhism and Early Madhyamika. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Swanson, Paul L. ( 1 989) Foundations of T'ien-T'ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism. California: Asian Humani­ ties Press. Watson, Burton (trans.) ( 1 993) The Lotus Sutra. New York: Columbia Univer­ sity Press. (2002) The Essential Lotus: Selections from the Lotus Sutra. New York: Columbia University Press. Ziporyn, Brook (2000) "Setup, Punch Line, and the Mind-Body Problem: A Neo-Tiantai Approach." Philosophy East & West 50(4), October: 584-613. -- (200 1 ) "Inherent Entailment (Xingju) and Negative Prehensions: Givenness, The Agency of the Past, and the Presence of the Absent in White-head and the T'ien-t'ai Reading of the Lotus Sutra." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 28(4), December: 399-414. ,

--

Chapter 1 2

The Chan School (Zen Buddhism)

Abe, Masao ( 1 976) "Zen and Buddhism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3: 235-52.

402

References and Further Reading Blofeld, John [aka Chu Ch'an] (trans.) ( 1958) The Zen Teaching of Huang Po on the Transmission of Mind. New York: Glove Press. Bossert, Philip J. ( 1 976) "Paradox and Enlightenment in Zen Dialogue and Phenomenological Description. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3: 26980. Brear, A. D. ( 1 974) "The Nature and Status of Moral Behavior in Zen Buddhist Tradition." Philosophy East & West 24: 429-41 . Chan, Wing-tsit (ed.) ( 1 973 ) A Sourcebook in Chinese Philosophy, 4th edn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 26. Chang, Chen-chi ( 1 957) "The Nature of Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism. " Philosophy East & West 6: 333-55. Cheng, Chung-ying ( 1 973) "On Zen (Ch'an) Language and Zen Paradoxes. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1 : 77-99. ( 1 976) "Rejoinder to Michael Levin's 'Comments on the Paradoxicality of the Koans. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3: 291-7. Cheng, Hsueh-li ( 1 9 8 1 ) "The Roots of Zen Buddhism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 45 1-78. ( 1985) " Confucianism and Zen (Ch'an) Philosophy of Education." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 197-215. ( 1 986) "Negation, Affirmation and Zen Logic." International Philosophical Quarterly 26: 241-5 1 . -- ( 1 987) "Zen Morality within this World. " In Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed. ), Morality within the Life- and Social World. Dordrecht: Kluwer Publish­ ing, pp. 245-5 8 . -- ( 1996) Exploring Zen. New York: Lang Publishing. Cheshier, William L. ( 1 971 ) "The Term 'Mind' in Huang Po's Text Huang Po Ch 'uan Hsin Fa Yao." Inquiry 14: 1 02-12. Chun, Fang Yu ( 1 979) "Ta-hui Tsung-kao and 'Kung-an' Ch'an." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 21 1-35. Cleary, Thomas (trans.) ( 1998) The Sutra of Hui-neng: Grand Master of Zen. (With Hui-neng's Commentary on the Diamond Sutra.) Boston and London: Shambhala. Cua, Antonio S. ( 1 975) "Uses of Dialogues and Moral Understanding." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 2: 1 3 1-48. Davidson, Bruce ( 1 996) "Does Religious Faith Mean Uncritical Thought? Exploration of a False Dilemma. " Inquiry 1 6 ( 1 ) , Fall: 55-66. Dumoulin, Heinrich ( 1 994) Zen Buddhism: A History. New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan. Faure, Bernard ( 1 993) Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fromm, Erich ( 1 960) "Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism. " In D. T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm, and Richard De Martino (eds.), Zen Buddhism and Psycho­ analysis. New York: Harper & Brothers, pp. 77-14 1 . Fung, Yu-lan ( 1 983) A History of Chinese Philosophy, vo!' II (trans. Derk Bodde). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, ch. 9, pp. 386-406. --

--

--

403

References and Further Reading Garner, Dick ( 1 977) "Skepticism, Ordinary Language and Zen Buddhism." Philosophy East & West 27(2), April: 165- 8 1 . Garner, Richard ( 1 985) "The Deconstruction of the Mirror and other Heresies: Ch'an and Taoism as Abnormal Discourse. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 155-68. Gimello, Robert M. and Gregory, Peter N. (eds.) ( 1 990) Studies in Ch'an and Hua- Yen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Glass, Newman Robert ( 1 998) "A Logic of the Heart: Re-Reading Taoism and Zen Buddhism." International Philosophical Quarterly 38(4), December: 38392. Hershock, Peter D. ( 1 994) "Person as Narration: The Dissolution of Self ' and Other' in Ch'an Buddhism." Philosophy East and West 44(4), October: 685710. Holstein, Alexander (trans.) ( 1 993) Pointing at the Moon: 1 00 Zen Koans from Chinese Masters. Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company. Hu, Shih ( 1 953) "Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method." Philosophy East & West 3 ( 1 ) : 3-24. Hyers, M. Conrad ( 1 970) "The Ancient Zen Masters as Clown-figure and Comic Midwife." Philosophy East & West 20: 3-1 8 . Inada, Kenneth ( 1 988) "Zen and Taoism: Common and Uncommon Grounds of Discourse. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 15: 5 1-65. Izutsu, Toshihiko ( 1 977) Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism. Tehran, Iran: Imperial Iranian Academy of Philosophy. Jan, Yiin-hua ( 1 977) "Conflict and Harmony in Ch'an and Buddhism. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4: 287-302. ( 1 9 8 1 ) "The Mind As the Buddha-Nature: The Concept of the Absolute in Ch'an Buddhism." Philosophy East & West 3 1 (4): 467-77. Kapleau, Philip ( 1 980) The Three Pillars of Zen: Teaching, Practice, and Enlightenment. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press/Doubleday. Kasulis, Thomas P. ( 1979) "The Two Strands of Nothingness in Zen Buddhism." International Philosophical Quarterly 19: 61-72. Kim, Ha Poong (1980/1 ) "What Do Zen Masters Do with Words? " Philosophical Forum 12(2), Winter: 101-1 5. King-Farlow, John ( 1 983) "Review on 'On Zen Language and Zen Paradoxes': Anglo-Saxon Questions for Chung-ying Cheng. " Journal of Chinese Philo­ sophy 10: 285-98. Knaul, Livia ( 1 986) "Chuang-Tzu and the Chinese Ancestry of Ch'an Buddhism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 13: 41 1-28. Lai, Whalen ( 1 977) "The Meaning of 'Mind-Only' ('Wei-Hsin'): An Analysis of a Sinitic Mahayana Phenomenon." Philosophy East & West 27( 1 ) : 65-83. ( 1 979) "Ch'an Metaphors: Waves, Water, Mirror, Lamp." Philosophy East & West 29(3), July: 243-53. Lee, Jung Young ( 1 976) "Zen Enlightenment and the Intellectual Approach. " Journal of Dharma 1 : 21 1-26. Laycock, Steven W. ( 1 985) "Hui-neng and the Transcendental Standpoint." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 1 79-96. --

--

404

References and Further Reading Levin, Michael E. ( 1 976) "Comments on the Paradoxicality of Zen Koans." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3: 28 1-90. Lusthaus, Dan ( 1 985) "Ch'an and Taoist Mirror: Reflections on Richard Garner's 'Deconstruction of the Mirror'." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 169-78. Milcinski, Maja ( 1 977) "Zen and the Art of Death." Philosophy East & West 27: 65-83. (Repr. in Journal of the History of Ideas 60(3), July 1 999: 38597.) Mitchell, Donald W. ( 1 980) " Faith in Zen Buddhism." International Philo­ sophical Quarterly 20: 1 83-98. Nakamura, Hajime ( 1 985) "The Non-logical Character of Zen." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 1 05-1 5. Nishida, Kitaro ( 1966) Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness. Hono­ lulu: East West Center Press. Nishitani, Keiji ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Ontology and Utterance." Philosophy East & West 3 1 : 29-44. Nordstrom, Louis ( 1 980) "Zen and Karman." Philosophy East & West 30( 1 ): 77-86. ( 1 9 8 1 ) "Mysticism without Transcendence: Reflections on Liberation and Emptiness." Philosophy East & West 3 1 : 89-95. Olson, Carl (2000) Zen and the Art of Postmodern Philosophy: Two Paths of Liberation from the Representational Mode of Thinking. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Perry, John ( 1 963) "Paradoxical Logic. " Philosophy East & West 13(2): 1 55-7. Ren, Jiyu ( 1 984) "A Brief Discussion of the Philosophical Thought of Chan Buddhism. " Chinese Studies in Philosophy 1 5 : 3-69. Riepe, Dale ( 1 966) "The Significance of the Attack upon Rationality by Zen Buddhism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26: 434-7. Rosemont, Jr., Henry ( 1970a) "The Meaning Is the Use: Koan and Mondo As Linguistic Tools of the Zen Masters." Philosophy East & West 20: 1 09-1 9. -- ( 1970b) "Is Zen Buddhism A Philosophy? " Philosophy East & West 20: 63-72. Scharfstein, Ben-Ami ( 1 976) "Salvation by Paradox: On Zen and Zen-like Thought. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3 : 209-34. Stauffer, Lee ( 1 989) "Is an Ethical Theory Possible Within Zen Buddhism? " Southwest Philosophical Studies, Spring: 80-4. Steffney, John ( 1 975) "Symbolism and Death and Jung and Zen Buddhism. " Philosophy East & West 25: 1 75-85. ( 1 977) "Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism." Philosophy East & West 27(3): 323-35. Strenski, Ivan ( 1 980) "Gradual Enlightenment, Sudden Enlightenment and Empiricism. " Philosophy East & West 30( 1 ): 3-20. Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro ( 1 949) Essays in Zen Buddhism. First Series. New York: Grove Weidenfeld. -- ( 1 95 1 ) "The Philosophy of Zen." Philosophy East & West 1 (2): 3-15. (ed.) ( 1 960) Manual of Zen Buddhism. New York: Grove Press. --

--

--

405

References and Further Reading ( 1964) The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind. New York: Grove Press. (trans. ) ( 1 966) The Lankavatara Sutra: A Mahayana Text. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. (orig. pub. 1 932). ( 1 972) An Introduction to Zen Buddhism. Christmas Humphreys (ed.) York Beach, Maine: Weiser Books. ( 1 996) Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki, ed. William Barrett. New York: Doubleday (orig. pub. 1 956). Tominaga, Thomas T. ( 1 983) "Ch'an, Taoism, and Wittgenstein. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 10: 127-45. Tucker, John ( 1 985) "An Anglo-Saxon Response to John King-Farlow's Ques­ tions on Zen Language and Zen Paradoxes. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 2 1 7-21 . Wang, Youru (2000) "The Pragmatics of 'Never Tell Too Plainly': Indirect Communication in Chan Buddhism. " Asian Philosophy 10 (1), March: 7-3 1 . Watson, Burton (trans.) ( 1 999) The Zen Teachings of Master Lin-Chi [Lin-chi Lu]. New York: Columbia University Press. Watts, Alan W. ( 1 957) The Way of Zen. New York: Vintage Books. Wright, Dale S. ( 1 993) "Emancipation from What? The Concept of Freedom in Classical Ch'an Buddhism." Asian Philosophy 3(2): 1 13-24. Yampolsky, Philip B. (trans. ) ( 1 967) The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch [from the Tun-huang manuscript]. New York: Columbia University Press. ( 1990) "The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch. " In Wm. Theodore de Bary & Irene Bloom (eds.) Approaches to the Asian Classics. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 241-50. Yi, Wu ( 1 985) "On Chinese Ch'an in Relation to Taoism." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 12: 1 3 1-54. Yii, Chiin-Fang ( 1 979) "Ta-hui Tsung-kao and Kung-an Ch'an." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 6: 21 1-35. Zeuschner, Robert B. ( 1 976) "The 'Hsien Tsung Chi' (An Early Ch'an (Zen) Buddhist Text)." Journal of Chinese Philosophy 3: 253-68. ( 1978) "The Understanding of Mind in the Northern Line of Ch'an (Zen)." Philosophy East & West 2 8 ( 1 ) , January: 69-79. ( 1 9 8 1 ) "The Understanding of Karma in Early Ch'an Buddhism. " Journal of Chinese Philosophy 8: 399-425.

--

--

--

--

--

--

406

Trans ation Conversion Ta

e

(In alphabetic order by the first appearing Romanized word) English

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Chinese

Analects Annals of Spring and Autumn Artificial (artifice; deliberate effort) Being appropriate to the time Benefit Book of Changes ( Book of Change) Book of Odes Book of History Book of Rites Buddha Buddha-dharma Buddha-nature Buddha-realm

Lun-yu Chun-qiu

Lun-yii Ch'un-ch'iu

ilifU� lffk

weI

weI

iff.}

shi-zhong

shih-chung

lfif r:p

Ii Yijing

Ii I Ching

;fIJ � *�

Shi-jing Shu-jing Li-ji fo fo-fa fo-xing fo-jie Cang Jie

Shih Ching Shu Ching Li Chi fo fo-fa fo-hsing fo-chieh Ts'ang Chieh

�'!j f(� :;i!: f(l{(

Cheng-guan Cheng Hao Cheng Yi xiang-zhuan

Ch'eng-kuan Ch'eng Hao Ch'eng I hsiang-chuan

•

Chan, Wing-tsit

Commentary on the images

•

R

R'

RCl

j�'

a l'a:.

fl� 1J1l fJIl1* fJIlt! fJIlW 1\ffJ ��tt mil!. �Jj! �n �1$

Translation Conversion Table English

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Commentary on the judgments Confucianism Confucius Consciousness-Only Contaminated Containment in nature Containment of 3,000 worlds in mind Containment of 3,000 worlds in nature Cook Ding Cosmic force (cosmic energy) (material force) (force) (vital force)

tuan-zhuan

t'uan-chuan

Ru-jia Kongzi Wei-shi ran xmg-Ju

Ju Chia K'ung Tzu Wei-shih Jan hsing-chii

•

•

•

xm JU san qlan

hsin chii san ch'ien

xmg J U san qlan

hsing chii san ch'ien

pao-ding ql

p'ao-ting ch'i

Dai Zhen Daodejing Daoism Dao-xin Da-zheng-zang fa fa-jie Shuo-gua

Tai Chen Tao-te Ching Taoism Tao-hsin Ta-cheng-zang fa fa-chieh Shuo Kua

�1t m� #,l[ m� m1� *lE. 1'* 1'*W l&i�

chan-pu Chung-yung Tu-shun Tung Chung-shu tl shu

� � r:t=ta tiJlli1 !i1�*f :It!!.

•

.

•

•

,

.

•

Dharma Dharma realm Discussion of tngrams Divination zhan-bu Doctrine of the mean Zhong-yong Du-shun Dung Zhongshu Earth di Empathy shu (sympathy) (sympathetic understanding) Emptiness kong Esoteric meaning Fahua Xuanyi of the Lotus Sutra Fa-zang Fang Dongmei •

•

408

Chinese

•

k'ung Fa-hua Hsiian-i Fa-tsang Fang Tung-mei

"*11 J l!.I'

Translation Conversion Table English

Filial piety Flower Ornament (Flowery Splendor) Scripture Four teachings Tripitaka teaching Common teaching Special teaching Perfect teaching Four dharma realms Four moral sprouts (four beginnings) Four transcendental wisdom Great mirror Universal equality Profound contemplation Perfect achievement

God Good Great Calming and Contemplation Great Learning Great Treatise Great Ultimate

Heart/mind Heaven

Hexagram Historical records

Chinese

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Feng Youlan Xlao Hua-yan Jing

Fung Yu-lan hsiao Hua-yen Ching

sl-)1ao zang-J1ao tong-Jlao bie-jiao yuan-Jlao si-fa-jie si-duan

ssu-chiao tsang-chiao t'ung-chiao pieh-chiao yiian-chiao ssu-fa-chieh ssu-tuan

da yuan jing zhi ping deng xing zhi

cheng suo zuo zhi

ta yiian ching chih p'ing teng hsing chih miao kuan ch'a chih ch'eng suo tso chih

Fu Xi Gen shang-di Gongsun Long shan Mohe Zhiguan

Fu-hsi Ken shang-ti Kung-sun Lung shan Mo-ho Chih-kuan

f*� � .1. Wi 0�� � .�.L!:.ft

Daxue xi-zi-zhuan Tai-ji Guan-ding Guo Xiang Han Yu xm tlan He Lin heng gua Shi-ji Hong-ren

Ta-hsiieh hsi-tz'u-chuan T'ai-chi Kuan-ting Kuo Hsiang Han Yii hsin t'ien Ho Lin heng kua Shih Chi Hung-jen

** . �1' :t:fi ti m: �� _:t9:

•

• •

•

. .

• •

• •

miao guan cha zhi

•

•

Im� lint �� l}IJ� Im � Im 1! W Im Yifil

7( �* '¥ i� !ttiC "5LRl, 409

Translation Conversion Table English

Humanity ( benevolence) (kindness) (humaneness) Hundred Schools Illumination Inactivity (non-action)

Judgment on the classification of doctrines

Koan

Law Legalism

Line

Lotus Sutra Loyalty (conscientiousness)

410

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Chinese

Hu Shi Huang Bo Huang Zongxi Hui-ke Hui-neng Hui Shi Hui-si Hui-wen ren

Hu Shih Huang Po Huang Tsung-hsi Hui-k'o Hui-neng Hui-shih Hui-ssu Hui-wen Jen

M� W� W7Kfl �r1J �fm ;!Jlffi 1!J�, �)c {-

bai-jia mmg wu-wel

pai-chia mmg wu-wel

1'r;* � ��

Ji-zang Jie Jin Yuelin pan Jlao

Chi-tsang Chieh Chin Yiieh-lin p'an chiao

�. � �ffii* *U�

Kan Kang Youwei gong-an Kuiji Kun Lao Dan fa Fa-jia Li Li Ao Li Er yao Li Si Liang Qichao Liang Shuming Lin Ji Liu Zongzhou Fahua Jing zhong

K'an K'ang Yu-wei kung-an K'uei-chi K'un Lao Tan fa Fa Chia Li Li Ao Li Erh yao Li Ssu Liang Ch'i-ch'ao Liang Sou-ming Lin Chi Liu Tsung-chou Fa-hua Ching chung

:JX �:ff � %� m� :t$ �JIll} 1* 1** � *� *Jf � *WT �,\ttJm �mm w.� Jtl* )W] 1*.�

Lu Xiangshan

Lu Hsiang-shan

��L1J

•

•

. .

.

.

.

'*'

J�'

Translation Conversion Table English

Pinyin

Mandate of Heaven Master Gao Master Han Fei Master Lao Master Lie Master Mo Master Xun Master Zhuang Mencius Mohism Nature Nature (naturalness) Nirvana Non-being (nothingness) One thought contains three thousand worlds Platform Sutra Political clout (power) Principle Propriety (rites; rituals; social etiquettes) Pure Pure Land

Realm of the noninterference between Principle and things Realm of noninterference of all things Realm of Principle Realm of things Rectification of names

Wade/Giles

Chinese

tlan-mmg Gaozi Hanfeizi Laozi Liezi Mozi Xunzi Zhuangzi Mengzi Mo-jia Mou Zongsan xm zl-ran

tJan-mmg Kao Tzu Han Fei Tzu Lao Tzu Lieh Tzu Mo Tzu Hsiin Tzu Chuang Tzu Meng Tzu Mo Chia Mou Tsung-san hsin tzu-Jan

7(iP 1S-'f � :JF 'f � 'f JU 'f �'f 1tJ'f m:'f � 'f ��

me-pan wu

nieh-p'an wu

.

.

•

•

•

.

.

•

yl men san qlan

i nian san ch'ien

Liu-zu Tan-jing shi

Liu-tsu ran-ching shih

Ii Ii

Ii Ii

Jmg Jing-tu Qian Qin Qua-ci

ching Ching-t'u Ch'ien Ch'in kua-tz'u

zheng-ming

cheng-ming

•

•

• •

•

;;0, 6- ­ .q=-- 4' -=::..

i¥ tJ ± � � !b� J!j[��it¥!W

411

Translation Conversion Table English

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Righteousness (uprightness) Sage

yl

I

sheng Seng-zhao Shang Shang-yang Shao Yong Shen-hui Shen-xiu Shun Si-ma Qian cheng liu-xiang-yuan-rong

sheng Seng-chao Shang Shang-yang Shao Yung Shen-hui Shen-hsiu Shun Ssu-ma Ch'ien ch'eng liu-hsiang-yiian-jung

� 1�£ fflj fflj� W1� :fIl!it ;fIjl � � RJ J� � � /,;f� 1II 1i

Chun-qiu shu mlao-you ru ru-shi-xiang

Ch'un-Ch'iu shu mlao-yu

tffk j;ftj j(J}1f �Q �Qjjk;f�

•

Shang Dynasty

Sincerity Six aspects in harmony Spring and autumn Statecraft Subtle existence Suchness (Thusness) Such-like characteristics Superior people ( Gentlemen) Sutra of the Lotus Blossom of the Subtle Dharma

Ten Wings Things (events)

•

•

.

JU •

ju-shih-hsiang

Junzl

chiin tzu

Miaofa Lianhua Jing

Miao-fa Lian-hua Ching

Tan Sitong Tang Junyi Shi-yi shi Tian-tai san-di jia-di

T'an Ssu-t'ung T'ang Chiin-i Shih-i shih T'ien-t'ai san-tl )la-tJ

•

•

Threefold Truth Provisional eXistence Emptiness kong-di Middle-path zhong-di Threefold truth san-di-yuan-rong m umty Time shi Transforming zhuan shi cheng zhi conscIOusness mto wisdom True emptiness zhen-kong True Thusness zhen-ru

•

• •

•

•

•

412

k'ung-ti chung-ti san-ti-yiian-jung

•

•

•

Chinese

shih chuan shih ch'eng chih chen-k'ung chen-ju

li1 HUPJ IPJ m�� -t. � :JC #; '='il* ffiil*

Translation Conversion Table English

Pinyin

Wade/Giles

Chinese

Universal love Virtue

)lan-al de Wang Bi Wang Chong Wang Guowei Wang Fuzhi Wang Yangming Zhan-guo Dao zhi zhi Fahua Wenju

chien-ai te Wang Pi Wang Ch'ung Wang Kuo-wei Wang Fu-chih Wang Yang-ming Chan-kuo Tao chih chih Fa-hua Wen-chii

:f. 5/fj :f. JE :f. ll ft.li :f. XL :f. iIJ! ll] �II ill

Xia Xiong Shili Xu Fuguan Xuan-zang Yan Hui yang Yang Xiong Yang Zhu Yao ym Yu yuan Chan Zhan-ran Zhang Dongsun Zhang Junmai Zhang Zai Zhi-yi Zhi-yan Zhou Dunyi Zhou Zhen zhen Zhu Xi

Hsia Hsiung Shih-Ii Hsii Fu-kuan Hsiian-tsang Yen Hui yang Yang Hsiung Yang Chu Yao ym Yii yuan Ch'an Chan-jan Chang Tung-sun Chang, (Carsun) Chang Tsai Chih-i Chih-yen Chou Tun-I Chou Chen chen Chu Hsi

Warring States Way (the) Will Wisdom Words and phrases of the Lotus Sutra

. .

.

•

••

Zen

Zhou Dynasty

•

± ,�,

I ff� t-jJ ��. �� M @I iIJ! �1$ m* � � � JG

W �*fi; ��Plb �� � mi � fjl )!J�i9j )!J 11 .& *�

413

ex

Note: Page references in italics indicate tables and diagrams; those in bold type indicate main references to major topics. Abe, Masao 2 1 0 acedia and akrasia 338 n.40 actuality, and names 5 1 , 1 96-7, 201, 320, 324-5 afterlife and Tian-tai School 280 and Xunzi 9 1 and Zhuangzi 1 76 Ahern, Dennis M. 1 1 5, 145, 346-7 n.14 Alexander, G. G. 345 n.5 Allinson, Robert 53, 156 Altar Sutra see Platform Sutra alterity, in Buddhism 237 altruism in Confucius 58 in Mozi 1 10, 1 1 1 , 1 1 5, 127 Ames, Roger 200, 336 n.4, 350 n.85 Analects see Confucius anarchism, and Laozi 149 Annals of Spring and Autumn ( Chun-qiu) 10 anti-rationalism, in Zhuangzi 156-7 arahatlarhat 218, 230, 2 8 1 Aristotle 154 Asanga 220 asceticism and bodhisattvas 272 and Mozi 128 •

•

asuras 280, 369 n.12 atman 236, 237-9 atom in Indian materialism 233-4 in pluralist view 234-5 attachments, and Buddhism 2 1 1-12, 2 1 7, 230, 272-3, 3 1 1 , 3 1 6 attributes, artificial/natural 94-5 Austin, J. L. 326 authoritarianism, pragmatic 1 1 9-24 being and non-being 2 1-2 in Buddhism 2 1 7-1 8 in Chan School 3 1 8 in Laozi 134-5, 140, 141, 150 in Tian-tai School 291 benefit in Hanfeizi 1 83-5, 1 89, 1 95-6 in Mozi 20, 1 1 5-19, 124-7, 129 and religion 1 25-7 in Yijing 36 benevolence in Confucius 56, 58 in Hanfeizi 1 90 in Mozi 1 1 0 see also compassion Berkeley, George, and idealism 364 n.41

Index Berkson, Mark 155, 158, 168, 3 5 1 no25 Bodde, Derk 7, 16, 2 1 9, 332 no3, 333 n o l a, 358 no15, 360 no27 Bodhi tree 307 Bodhidharma (patriarch of Chan Buddhism) 304, 373 no l l , 3 75 no50 bodhisattva 21 8-1 9, 230-1, 270-2, 281, 293 Book of Changes see Yijing Book of History (Shu-jing) 1 0-1 1, 125 Book of Odes (Shi-jing) 10-1 1, 68, 125 Book of Rites (Li-ji) 1 0, 333 nn.3a,6 Brahmanism, and Vedanta School 235-6, 237 Buddha meanings 268-9, 287-8, 3 1 9 as Tathagata 3 1 0, 3 1 3 see also Buddha-nature; Buddhahood; Gautama, Siddhartha Buddha-nature 2 1 9 in Chan School 305, 3 12, 3 14-15, 3 1 9-23, 329, 330 in Tian-tai School 270, 278-9, 293, 298-9, 301, 302 Buddhahood 2 1 8-19 in Chan School 3 1 5, 319-22, 329-30 in Consciousness-Only School 232 in Hua-yan School 268-70 in Tian-tai School 281, 287-9, 293, 297-301, 302 Buddhism, Chinese and Daoism 209-10 eightfold noble path 213 evolution 209-10 and Five Aggregates 213, 239-40 schools 210, 2 1 7-19; see also Chan (Zen); Consciousness-Only; Hua-yan; Tian-tai and the soul 2 1 6 and this-worldliness 2 1 9 see also Four Noble Truths

Buddhism, Indian basic tenets 2 10-19 impact 209-10 Carus, Paul 345 noS Ciirviikas 233-4 categorical imperative 54 causality 2 14-17 in Consciousness-Only School 223-5, 227, 237 in Hua-yan School 261, 273 in Tian-tai School 286 in Xunzi 8 8-9, 91 in Yijing 42-5 Chan, Wing-tsit xii, 92, 94, 1 04, 108, 233, 248, 253, 274, 278, 308, 335 nA, 344 no57, 347 no23, 359 no6, 363 nno l ,6,60 Chan (Zen) School 2 1 0, 304-30 as Chinese school 304, 305 and education 325-9 and enlightenment 268, 295, 305, 306-7, 3 14-16, 3 1 9-22 and ethics 322 and language and knowledge 268, 296, 306, 323-5 and mind and nature 3 1 9-23 and Mind-Only theory 309-1 1 , 316 Northern and Southern Schools 304-16, 323; beholding the mind/seeing one's nature 3 1 1-12, 322; gradual/immediate enlightenment 306, 307-8, 3 1 3 -16; and Mind-Only thesis 309-1 1; and self-realization 3 14-16 origins 304 and pure mind 306, 307-8, 309, 3 1 1-12, 3 13-14, 3 1 6, 3 1 7, 320 and reality 308-1 1, 3 1 7-18, 323-5, 329 and Tian-tai School 301, 302, 3 1 6, 318 and Two Minds theory 309, 3 1 1 , 3 1 9-20 415

Index Chang, Garma C. C. 363 n.3, 364 n.15, 365 n.34 change and periodicity 33 and polar reversal 33, 37 in Yijing 27- 8 , 29-34, 42, 43-4 Chappell, David 277, 278, 371 n.50 Chatterjee, Satischandra and Datta, Dhirendramohan 361 n.36 Chegwan, Fourfold Teachings 278 Cheng, Chung-ying 325, 352 n.44 Cheng-guan (patriarch of Hua-yan) 249 and noninterference of things 248, 260 and noumenon and phenomena 263-4 Chinese philosophy description 1-12 primary concerns 8-10 and religion 1-4, 9, 20, 91-2, 329 Ching, Julia 1 1 0 Chuand Tzu see Zhuangzi Cleary, Thomas 249, 258-9, 269, 363 nn.1,6, 367 n.79, 375 n.34 cogmtlOn in Chan School 309 in Laozi 137 in Xunzi 90 in Zhi-yi 301 see also knowledge Commentary on the Images ( Yijing) 28, 39-42 Commentary on the Judgment ( Yijing) 28, 32, 36-7, 40-1 Commentary on the Words of the Text ( Yijing) 29, 44 Commentary on Yi 47 Common Teaching 293, 296 compassIOn in Buddhism 2 1 7, 231, 271-2, 2 8 1 in Mencius 73-6, 80, 8 1 see also benevolence conceptual relativism 1 54-5, 1 57-66 in Hua-yan School 264, 265-7 in Laozi 141 •

•

•

416

Confucianism 45 and ethics 19-20, 23, 24-5, 34-5, 37 and the good 48, 62 and Legalism 1 8 7-94 and Mozi 108, 109, 1 12, 122, 128 music 1 8-1 9, 21, 122 and religion xii and rites 1 8 , 20-1, 59-60, 1 05, 122 and Spring-Autumn period 1 6 and Warring States period 1 7 and Yijing 26, 28-9 see also Confucius; Doctrine of the Mean; family; Great Learning; Mencius; Xunzi; Yijing Confucius Analects 29, 43, 47-63, 333 n.3a and Dao 6, 57, 59, 136 and education 190, 332 n. 14 and empathy 53-6 ethics 47-60, 63, 1 02, 168-9 and fate 43 and five classics 1 0-12 and loyalty 48-53 and Mencius 65, 83, 84 and politics 16-19, 24, 47-8, 49-56, 60-2, 63, 68, 82, 88, 187 and society 16-18, 48-56, 109, 169 as teacher 47, 1 9 1 as Ultimate Sage 58 and Yijing 4, 26, 28 and Zhuangzi 168-9, 1 8 0 conscIOusness as creation of one mind 257-8 discriminative 225-6, 228, 232, 244 eight forms 214, 221, 225-8, 229, 23 1 and external reality 222-3, 230, 233-6, 240-2, 243, 250-5 in Hua-yan School 252-4, 255-8 intellective 225, 227-8, 230, 23 1-2 •

Index and other minds 242-5 and plurality of phenomenal worlds 255-7, 261 and the self 236-40 storehouse (Alaya) 222, 223, 224, 225-3 1 , 242, 244, 255, 280, 288, 3 1 0 transformation 222-3, 225-33, 244, 254, 3 1 0 see also mind Consciousness-Only ( Wei-shi) School 210, 220-46 basic doctrine 222-33 and cause of consciousness 214, 224 defense of 340-5 and dependent co-arising 223-5, 242 origins 220-1 and other minds problem 242-5 and reality 222-3, 233-6, 240-2, 243, 255, 280 and the self 236-40 transformation of consciousness 222-3, 225-33 and wisdom 229-33 contemplation and Realm of Principle 264 in Zhi-yi 301 Cook, Francis H. 253, 270, 366 n.59 correspondence theory of truth 141, 165, 290-2, 295 cosmogenesis, in Laozi 136, 138, 150 cosmology 4, 5- 8, 87 and interconnectedness of things 258-60 and morality 34-5, 40, 42, 1 02 and Yijing 8, 26-9, 30, 40, 5 8 creation 2, 6, 22 and Dao 1 36, 139-40, 199 Creel, Herrlee G. 1 1 5, 123, 132-3, 345 n.5, 346 n.13, 350 n.7 Cua, Antonio S. 48, 59, 97-8, 1 05, 342 n.55

cultivation, moral in Buddhism 23 1, 272, 301 in Confucius 17, 56, 57-8, 60, 62-3, 84 in Mencius 65, 72-3, 76-9, 80-3 in Xunzi 86, 93, 104-6, 146 culture in Laozi 146, 150 in Xunzi 146 Da-xue ( Great Learning) 1 7, 333 n.3a Danto, Arthur 346 n.13 Dao (Way) 8-9, 8 7 and change 135 in Confucius 6, 57, 59, 62, 63, 136 as constant/eternal 135, 139, 199 definition 5-6, 36, 1 32-4 as empty and inexhaustible 1 35, 139 as female principle 138-9 as generative principle 5, 21, 136, 139-40, 199 and goodness 36-7, 143 and Hanfeizi 1 99-200 and harmony and equilibrium 38 as imperceptible 136-7, 1 39, 142 as ineffable 133, 1 34, 137, 142 and Laozi 5-6, 21, 1 3 1-42, 166, 200 and Ii 199-200 and morality 6, 8-10, 141, 142-4, 168-9 as nameless 137-8, 141, 166 and Nature 138, 139, 150 as Non-being 21-2, 1 34-5, 140, 141, 150 as pre-existent 135-6, 1 39, 142, 199 as transcendent and immanent 139-40 transmission 10-1 1 as undifferentiated 1 36 and virtue 142-3 and Zhuangzi 22, 23, 1 53-4, 155, 157-8, 163-6, 167-71, 1 73, 1 79, 268, 3 1 5

417

Index Dao-xin (patriarch of Chan Buddhism) 304 Daoism and Chan School 3 16, 330 and human nature 22-3, 25 and Indian Buddhism 209-10 and individual deliverance 21 and knowledge 268 and Legalism 200-2 and politics 22 and religion xii and truth 22 and Yijing 26, 138 see also Laozi Dawson, Raymond 60, 335 nA de see virtue death in Xunzi 9 1 in Zhuangzi 1 73-9 defilements 229-32, 262, 299, 307, 309, 3 1 1-12, 3 1 3 democracy and Hanfeizi 198, 203 and Mozi 121-2 deontology and Confucianism 52-5, 63, 193 and Laozi 142-3 and Mohism 1 1 5 -19 dependent co-arising 2 14, 216, 2 1 7, 293 in Consciousness-Only School 223-5, 242 in Tian-tai School 284, 285 desire in Buddhism 21 1-13, 231, 272, 317 in Confucius 56 in Daoism 23, 145 in Laozi 23, 145, 147-8, 347 n.16 in Mencius 71-2, 74-5, 76-7, 79, 93 in Xunzi 93-4, 96-8, 103-4 destiny see fatalism detachment in Chan School 320 in Daoism 23

418

determinism in Hua-yan School 273 and karma 2 1 6 and Mencius 68-9 in Mozi 125-7 in Yijing 26, 42-5 dharma Buddha-realm 288-9 Chan School 309-10 Consciousness-Only School 221, 223, 224-5, 233-6 four realms 249, 260, 282 Hua-yan School 249, 254, 260, 261 and materialism 233-4 "no dharma" thesis 213-14, 233 -6, 240-5, 272, 3 1 0 reality 216, 2 1 7-18, 224 six realms 279-80, 282, 302 ten realms 279- 82, 281 , 284, 287, 288, 300, 302, 365 n.39 two realms 249, 261-5, 279 see also existence; reality Dharma (Truth) 213 dhyana see meditation dialogues (mondo), Chan 325-7 Diamond Sutra 306, 307, 308-9, 3 10, 3 1 1-12, 3 1 7-1 8 , 327 discrimination and bodhisattvas 272 and Chan School 3 10, 3 1 1 , 3 1 3, 3 1 8 , 320, 325 and "True Thusness" 265, 266-8 divination 3-4, 28 and Yijing 29-30, 3 1-2, 42, 43, 91 Doctrine of the Mean (Zhong-yang) 19, 38, 333 n.3a Donner, Neal and Stevenson, Daniel B. 278, 370 nA4 Du-shun (patriarch of Hua-yan) 248, 249, 259, 263, 267, 271 dualism in Brahmanism 236 yin and yang 7, 27 Dumoulin, Heinrich 376 n.68

Index Earth (di) in ancient folk religion 2 and Confucian ethics 34-5, 36 in Xunzi 1 04-5 in Yijing 40, 58 education in Chan School 325-9 and five classics 10-11, 104 moral 92-3, 203, 340-1 n.23 and politics 47, 122, 190, 203 effort (wei) 94-6, 98-101, 1 03, 146 egoism, psychological 1 15, 1 84, 273, 355 n.5 emotIOns in Buddhism 213, 246 in Xunzi 93-4, 96-7, 1 05-6 in Zhuangzi 170 empathy (shu) in Confucius 48, 53-6, 62, 1 12 in Mencius 8 1 Emptiness (kong, Sunyata) 21 0-1 1, 2 1 7-18 in Consciousness-Only School 224-5 in Hua-yan School 250-3, 264, 266, 271-2 in Theravada Buddhism 290, 293 in Tian-tai School 251, 282, 284, 285-6, 289, 290-1 energy, cosmIC, see ql enlightenment 210, 212, 2 1 7-19 in Chan School 268, 295, 305, 306-8, 3 1 0, 3 13 -16, 3 1 9-22 in Consciousness-Only School 224, 242 gradual/immediate 306, 307-8, 31 3 -16 in Hua-yan School 248, 255 in Tian-tai School 293, 294, 296, 299-301 epistemology and Buddhism 2 1 1 and Chan School 3 1 1 , 323-5 and ethics 8-9 and Hua-yan School 265 - 8 in Zhuangzi 155-8 •

.

.

and other minds 242-5 in Xunzi 89-90 equilibrium (zhong), and harmony 1 9 , 33, 37-9 ethics and categorical imperative 54 and Chan School 322 Christian 53-5, 102 Confucian 19-20, 23, 24-5, 34-5, 37, 48-60, 102, 1 6 8 consequentialist 1 1 1 and contextual prescriptivism 39-42, 43 and Dao 6, 8-10, 141, 142-4 deontological 52-5, 63, 1 1 5-19, 142-3, 193 Divine Command theory 1 1 6-19 and epistemology 9 in Hanfeizi 1 8 7-94 and Hua-yan School 268-74 and Laozi 141, 142-6, 148 and Mencius 9, 63, 69, 71-2, 73-83, 1 02 Mohist 1 1 0-19, 128-9 and moral failure 76-80 and moral ideal 56-60, 62, 1 1 1-12, 167-73 and moral realism 39, 80 naturalistic 76, 87-92, 1 02 and politics 17, 49-50, 146, 1 8 7-94, 203 and primary virtues 35-6 situational 41, 48 utilitarian 1 1 5-19, 122, 124, 127 and Xunzi 92-1 06, 146, 1 84 in Yijing 28, 34-9 and Zhuangzi 144, 1 50, 1 53, 167-73 evil in folk religion 2 in Hua-yan School 273 in Laozi 147 in Mencius 72, 78, 80 in Tian-tai School 298, 299-300, 302 in Xunzi 93-4, 95-1 0 1 , 1 04, 302, 339-40 n.3

419

Index eXistence provisional 286, 290-1 subtle 285-6 threefold nature 224-5 see also dharma experience, and knowledge 267-8, 324 extension, moral (tuei) 80-1, 83 •

fa see Legalism Fa-zang (patriarch of Hua-yan) 249, 252-4, 257, 365 n.49 and bodhisattvas 270 and interconnectedness of things 258 -60 and nirvana 271 and Realm of Principle 261-4 six aspects in harmony theory 260-1 family and Confucianism 1 6, 1 7, 24-5, 48, 49, 8 1 and filial piety 49, 52-3, 1 12, 1 1 3 -14 and hierarchy 48, 49 and love with distinctions 16, 20, 8 1 , 1 12-13 and Mohism 20, 1 12-13 of ruler 195, 1 98 in Yijing 40 Fang, Litian 358 n.1 fatalism and Chinese Buddhism 2 1 6 and Confucianism 109 in folk religion 87-8 and Mozi 125-7 in Yijing 42-5 and Zhuangzi 153-4, 1 72-3, 1 8 0 Feng Shui 29, 88-9 feudalism and Confucianism 83 and Mohism 1 22 filial piety, in Confucius 52-3, 1 12 Fingarette, Herbert 59 Five Hegemonies 15 folk religion, early 1-3, 9, 20, 87-8, 91

420

Four Books 333 n.3a Four Noble Truths 212-13, 299 free will, and determinism 42-5, 273 Fu, Charles Wei-hsun 145, 344 n.3, 345 n.9, 366 n.64 Fu Xi (legendary ruler) 27 funerals in Confucianism 123-4 in Mozi 109, 122, 123-4 in Xunzi 105 Fung, Yu-lan x, 138, 1 85, 1 8 8 , 1 95, 209, 253, 278, 346 n.12, 360 n.27, 363 n.6 Gaozi, and human nature 70-2, 75 Garner, Richard 373 n.10 Gautama, Siddhartha 2 1 0-18, 238, 240, 268-9, 297 ghosts in Mozi 20, 1 25-7 in Xunzi 91 Gimello, Robert M. 266, 274 god, concept 87, 126 Golden Rule 53-5, 1 12 Goldin, Paul Rakita 88, 340 n.6 gong-an 325 Good, in Yijing 34, 35, 36-7, 42 Goodman, Russell 157 goodness, human in Buddhism 2 1 9, 302, 3 1 9 in Confucius 56-7, 62 in Hanfeizi 1 9 1 , 1 92-3 in Laozi 9, 143, 145-6, 150 in Mencius 65, 67-8, 71-2, 73 -6, 77-80, 94-5, 3 1 9 in Xunzi 86, 92-102 in Yijing 9, 38 governance absolute 1 93-4 authoritarian 1 1 9-24, 1 94, 202 humane 82-3 and Laozi 146-50 see also law; punishment Graham, A. C. 8-9, 50, 67-8, 83, 93, 98, 1 1 0, 120-1, 126, 144,

Index 156-7, 1 77, 336 nA, 344-5 n.3, 346 nn.1 1,13, 350 nA, 353 n.78 Great Learning (Da-xue) 17, 333 n.3a Great Treatise (in Yijing) 5, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41-2 Guan-ding (student of Zhi-yi) 277, 280, 369 n.6 habituation in Confucius 56-7 in Xunzi 94, 1 04 Hamilton, Clarence H. 359 nnA,6, 361 n.35 Hanfeizi 183 Hanfeizi (Han Fei Tzu) 23-4, 1 10, 149, 1 82-204 and Dao 199-200 and ethics 1 8 7-94 and human nature 1 83-7, 1 91-3, 355-6 n.26 and law, statecraft and power 194-8, 200-2 and metaphysics 198-202 and politics 1 82-3, 1 8 7-98, 200-4 Hansen, Chad 5 1 , 86, 13 1-2, 144, 152, 154-5, 167, 334 n.16, 339 n.2, 349 nA9, 352 n.38 harmony and Confucian ethics 19, 55-6 cosmic 2-3, 9, 32, 33, 37 and equilibrium 19, 33, 37-9 and goodness 94 in Laozi 146 in Mozi 120 and music 19 and six aspects theory 260-1 heart see mind Heaven (tian) in ancient folk religion 2, 87-8 and Confucianism 34-5, 87-8, 126 in Mencius 87-8 in Mozi 20, 1 1 6-19, 121, 125-7 in Xunzi 8 7-92, 93, 104-5, 1 06 in Yijing 34, 36, 40, 58 in Zhuangzi 1 67-8

heng (penetration of qi) 36 hexagrams in Yijing 3 -4, 26, 28-9 and change 30-2 Feng 34 Kun 29, 35, 40, 44, 45 and morality 34-6, 39-40 and primary virtues 35-6 Qian 29, 35, 38, 40, 45 Return 37 Song 39 the Family 40 and time 41 Xiao Guo 42 Xu 39 hierarchy, moral in Confucianism 19, 48-9, 49, 55, 119 in Mencius 66 hierarchy, social in Confucius 48-9, 49 in Mozi 1 1 9 -20, 126 in Yijing 40, 42 Hinayana ("Small Vehicle" ) School (Buddhist) see Theravada School holism 6 causal 214 and Chan School 330 and Hua-yan School 258-61, 274 Hon, Tze-ki 44 Hong-ren (patriarch of Chan Buddhism) 304-5, 306, 324, 373 n. 1 1 Hsu, Sung-peng 345 n.10 Hsiin Tzu see Xunzi Hua-yan School 199, 210, 248-75, 362 n.53 and Buddhahood 268-9, 293 as Chinese 248 and classification of teachings 2 1 8 and emptiness 250-3, 264, 266, 271 and ethics 268 -74 and existence 249 and external reality 250-5, 261-5, 274-5 and four realms of dharma 249 421

Index Hua-yan School (cont'd) impact 274 and interconnectedness of things 258-60 and language skepticism 265- 8, 296 and Ii (principle) 248, 26 1-4, 274-5 metaphysics 250-65 and noninterference of things 248, 260 and the One Mind 257-8, 260, 274-5, 3 1 1 , 3 1 6 origins 248-9 as pan-Buddhism 270 and plurality of phenomenal worlds 255-7, 261 and self 272-3 six aspects in harmony theory 260-1 Ten Mysterious Gates 249 and "True Thusness" 261-5, 266, 287 Hua-yan Sutra 248, 249-53, 255-7, 261-5, 266, 269-73, 374 no24 Hua-yen School see Hua-yan School Huang, Alfred 36 Huang Bo (Huang Po) 306, 3 1 5, 3 19, 323, 326-8, 374 no20, 376 no81 Hui-ke (patriarch of Chan Buddhism) 304, 373 no l l Hui-neng (leader of Southern Chan School) 304-5, 306 and Buddha-nature 3 1 9, 321 and enlightenment 3 14-16 and knowledge and language 324, 326 and meditation 3 1 3 -14 and mind and nature 320, 376 no81 and Mind-Only thesis 3 1 0-1 1 and pure mind 307-8 and reality 3 1 7-18 and seeing one's nature 31 1-12 as teacher 327

422

Hui-si (teacher of Zhi-yi), Method of Cessation and Contemplation 278, 287, 301 Hui-wen 369 no6 human nature 9, 273 badness of 9, 68, 86, 92-102 in Chan School 3 12, 3 14-15, 3 1 9-23 in Confucius 56-8 containment in nature 300 in Daoism 2 1 , 22 in Hanfeizi 1 83-7, 1 91-3, 355-6 no26 and human mind 68-73, 76-80, 84 in Laozi 145-6 in Legalism 24 in Mencius 65, 66-80, 92-3, 94-101, 302 in Mohism 20, 24, 1 1 2 and morality 34-5 in Tian-tai School 298-300 in Xunzi 9, 68, 86, 92-1 02, 104, 1 06, 1 84, 302 in Yijing 9, 34-9 see also Buddha-nature; goodness humanism, and Chinese philosophy 9, 22, 246, 270 humanity (ren) in Confucianism 19, 48, 56, 57-8, 59-60, 62, 1 1 1 governance with 82-3, 19 1-2, 355-6 no26 in Hanfeizi 1 91-2, 204, 355-6 no26 in Laozi 147 in Mencius 71, 72, 73-6, 78, 8 1 , 82-3 in Mozi 1 1 1 Hurvitz, Leon 283, 286, 300 Hutton, Eric L. 337 no l l I Ching see Yijing idealism objective, and Consciousness-Only Buddhism 223, 232-3, 255, 283, 367 no92

Index subjective, and Hua-yan School 250, 252-6 illumination (ming), in Zhuangzi 165-6 impartiality in Chan School 322 in Daoism 23, 202 and Mencius 8 1 and Mozi 1 09, 1 1 0 and Zhuangzi 167, 170, 173 inactivity (wu-wei) 1 70, 200, 202 in Laozi 22, 144-6, 150, 154 individual in Daoism 2 1 in Hanfeizi 203 in Hua-yan School 274 in Xunzi 86 in Yang Zhu 1 1 5 in Yijing 41-2 intellectuals, in Hanfeizi 193, 201 interconnectedness of things 258-60 Ivanhoe, Philip J. 53 -4, 69, 74, 155, 157, 1 67, 335 n.4, 337 n.12, 338-9 n.43, 347-8 nn. 1 6,23,34 Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Van Norden, Bryan W. xii, 94, Jainism school 238 Japan, and Zen School 304 JunZl as government official 344 n.43 see also superior person just war, in Mencius 82-3, 150 .

.

Kaltenmark, Max 3 and Laozi 138, 144, 345 n.l0, 346 n.13, 348 n.44 Kalupahana, David J. 2 1 7, 358 n. l0, 360 n.9 karma, and cause and effect 215-16 Kasulis, T. P. 145, 345-6 n.l0 Kern, Iso 228 Kim, Ha-poong 326 Kjellburg, Paul 167 Kline, T. C. III 1 02, 104, 342 n.57

Kline, T. C. III and Ivanhoe, Philip J. 86, 339 n.l knowledge in Chan School 268, 296, 306, 3 1 1 , 322, 323-5 in Hanfeizi 201, 203 in Hua-yan School 265-8, 272 intuitive 324 and language 268, 296, 306, 323-5 in Laozi 137, 147-8, 349 n.49 of other minds 242-5, 323-4 of own mind 323-4, 327, 329 pursuit 8-9 supreme 272 in Tian-tai School 289 in Xunzi 89-90 in Zhuangzi 150, 154-8, 161-6 Koan 325, 327, 328 Kongzi see Confucius Kuiji 22 1, 238 -9, 361 nn.35,40 Kun ( Yijing hexagram) 29, 35, 40, 44, 45 Lai, Whalen 274, 307, 3 1 6, 330, 366 n.70 language in Chan School 268, 296, 306, 323-9 and Confucius 51 deconstruction 154 and education 325-9 in Hua-yan School 265 - 8, 296 in Laozi 6, 22, 1 32-42 perlocutionary 326-7 in Xinzi 90-1 in Zhuangzi 22, 155, 157 Lankavatara Sutra 307, 308-1 0, 3 1 1 , 3 12-13, 375-6 n.57 Lao Dan 1 3 1 Lao si-guan 343 n.18 Lao Tzu see Laozi Laozi (Lao Tzu) 13 1-50 and Buddhism 210 and Dao 5-6, 21, 132-42, 166, 169, 200

423

Index Laozi (Lao Tzu) (cont'd) Daodejing 6, 13 1-2, 133, 142, 14 3 and ethics 141, 142-6, 148 and gratification of senses 23 and human goodness 9, 143, 145-6, 150 and inactivity 22, 144-6, 1 50, 154 and language 6, 22, 132-42 and Legalism 149, 198-202 and politics 22, 145, 146-50, 200 reversal 33, 37 and society 2 1 , 23 as teacher 1 1 and virtue 1 39, 142-4, 149 Lau, D . C. 66, 94, 95, 1 3 1 , 138, 146, 335 nnA,8, 337 n.12, 341 n.24, 346 nn. 1 1,14, 347 n.16 law in Confucius 61-2, 193 in Laozi 149 and Legalism 24, 68, 1 84-6, 1 8 8-90, 192-3, 194-5, 198, 201 , 203 and Mencius 6 8 as public 194 and Xunzi 86, 1 00-1, 104 Laycock, Steven W. 308 learning see knowledge Lee, Jung H. 157, 352 n.37 Lee, K. K. 1 83, 1 8 8, 1 93, 201 Legalism 23-4, 25 and Communist China 1 83 and Confucianism 1 8 7-94 and Daoism 200-2 and Laozi 149, 198-202 and Mohism 24, 1 1 0, 121, 128 and realism 354-5 n.l see also Hanfeizi Legge, James 36, 347 n.23 Legge, Russell D. 177 LePore, Ernest and Loewer, Barry 348 nA7, 349 nA8 Ii (as benefit) 36, 1 1 5-19, 124-7, 128 424

Ii (as principle) 5-6 in Hanfeizi 199-200 in Hua-yan School 248, 26 1-4, 274-5 Ii (as propriety) 1 8 8 in Confucius 1 8 , 48, 52, 59-60, 61-2 in Laozi 147 in Mencius 72, 75-6, 78 in Mozi 123 in Xunzi 96, 98-9, 101, 1 02-6 see also benefit; music; rites Li Er 1 3 1 Li Si 1 82, 194 Li-ji (Book of Rites) 10, 333 nn.3a,6 Lin Ji (Lin-Chi) 306, 3 1 5, 321-3, 328 Lin, Yih-jing 355 n.5 Liu, Xiaogan 348 n.37 Lotus Sutra and Buddhahood 297-8 and Chan School 376 n.68 and Perfect Teaching 295 and truth 294, 295-6 and Tian-tai School 277, 278, 279, 28 1-2, 287-8, 371 n.53 love in Confucius 8 1 with distinctions 16, 20, 8 1 , 108, 109, 1 1 0, 1 12 extension 83, 1 1 3 in Mohism 20, 22, 24, 1 08-9, 1 1 0-15, 1 1 6, 1 1 8 selfish 1 14-15 Loy, David 351 n.25, 354 n.80 loyalty (zhong) 20, 48-53 and politics 49-50, 62 see also piety, filial Lum, Alice 128 Lusthaus, Dan 232-3, 237, 329, 359 nn.3,4,6, 360-1 n.27, 361 n.31 Machiavelli, Niccoli'> 62, 83, 1 89 Madhyamaka School (Buddhist) 2 1 7-18, 278, 293

Index Mahayana ( " Great Vehicle" ) School (Buddhist) and bodhisattvas 2 8 1 and Buddhahood 232 and Common Teaching 293 and enlightenment 2 1 8-19, 231, 296 and Middle Way 284, 285-6, 290-1, 293, 295-6, 360 n.16 and mind 309, 316 and selflessness 273, 368 n . l 05 and Special Teaching 293 and truth 296 Major, John S. 1 72, 353 n.77 materialism, Indian 233-4, 237 matter, and qi 6 mean see equilibrium meditation and Chan School 304, 305, 3 1 1, 312-14 sitting 313-14, 316 The Mencius (Mengzi) 65, 70-1, 82, 333 n.3a Mencius (Mengzi) 65-84 and agriculture 17, 82 analogical reasoning 66, 69-71 , 78-9, 83, 338 n,43 and Confucius 65, 83, 84 and education 332 n.14 and ethics 9, 63, 69, 71-2, 73-83, 102 and five classics 1 1 and human nature 65, 66-80, 84, 92-3, 302, 3 1 9, 330 and Mozi 109 political philosophy 66-7, 8 1 , 82-3, 84, 88, 1 8 7 and Xunzi 86, 92-3, 94-102 meritocracy, in Mozi 121-2 Middle Way 284, 285 -6, 290-1, 293, 295-6, 360 n.16 mind (xin) in Chan School 309-14, 3 1 6, 319-23, 327, 330 conditioned 319-20 in Mencius 68-73, 76-80, 84

Mind-Only thesis 257-8, 260, 274-5, 309-1 1, 3 1 6 original 3 1 9-20, 324, 327 other minds problem 242-5 Pure 301, 302, 306, 307-8, 309, 3 1 1-12, 3 1 3-14, 3 1 6, 3 1 7, 320 in Tian-tai School 282-5, 288-9, 298-301 as ultimate reality 308-11 watchful 307 in Xunzi 90, 93 in Zhuangzi 1 77, 3 1 6 see also consciousness Mo Tzu see Mozi (Mo Tzu) moderation, in Mozi 122 Mohism 25, 65 dialectics 1 1 0 and elimination of desire 23 Grand Masters 108 and human nature 20, 24, 1 12 and society 20-1 and universal love 20, 23, 1 08-9, 1 10-15, 1 1 6, 1 1 8 see also Legalism; Mozi mondo (dialogues) 325-7 monism, and dharmas 235-6 Moody, Peter R. 202, 357 n.38 morality and Nature 28, 34, 36, 39 origins 1 02, 1 06 and yin and yang 35, 36, 40, 43, 45 see also ethics Mou, Bo 345 n . l 0, 346-7 n.14 mourning 1 8, 20-1, 1 05, 1 09, 123 and filial piety 52 The Mozi 109-10 Mozi (Mo Tzu) 108-29 and Confucianism 108-9, 1 12, 122, 128 and ethics 1 1 0-19, 128-9 and love with distinctions 20, 8 1 , 108, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 12 and Mencius 1 09 and music 2 1 , 1 09, 122-3 and politics 108, 1 1 9 -24

425

Index Mozi (Mo Tzu) (cont'd) and religion 20, 124-7 and rites 20-1, 109, 122-4 and social reform 20, 24, 1 08-9, 1 12-1 5, 128-9 as teacher 108 and universal love 20, 23, 24, 1 08-9, 1 1 0-15, 1 1 6, 1 1 8 and Upward Conformity 120-1 musIC in Confucianism 1 8-19, 21, 122 in Mozi 2 1 , 1 09, 122-3 in Xunzi 1 04 mysticism, in Zhuangzi 157 •

Nagarjuna, and Zhi-yi 278, 285 names and actuality 5 1, 196-7, 201, 320, 324-5 rectification 5 1 and styles 137-8, 144, 347-8 n.34 naturalism, in Xunzi 8 7-92, 1 02, 1 06 Nature in ancient folk religion 2-4, 9, 87 and Dao 138, 139, 150 in Laozi 138, 146 and morality 28, 34, 36, 39 in pre-Buddhist philosophy 9 in Xunzi 8 8 in Yijing 28, 34 in Zhuangzi 153 see also human nature Neo-Confucianism x, 8 and Dao 5 and Hanfeizi 183, 199 and Hua-yan School 269, 274 and Laozi 150 and Mencius 86 and Tian-tai School 302 and Xunzi 1 06 and Yijing 29, 36 Ng, Yu-kwan 277, 278-9, 298-9 nihilism, epistemic 291, 351 n.18 Nirgrantha School 238

426

nirvana 210, 212, 213, 2 1 8 and Buddhahood 297 in Chan School 307, 3 1 0, 313-14, 3 1 6, 3 1 7-1 8 , 329 and Common Teaching 293 in Consciousness-Only School 229, 230, 232, 246 in Hua-yan School 252, 264, 270-1 and Perfect Teaching 293, 295 and Special Teaching 293 in Tian-tai School 279-82, 280, 284, 286, 289, 293, 294, 297-9, 302, 3 1 8 and Tripitaka Teaching 292-3 Nirvana Sutra 3 1 7 Nivison, David S. 50, 1 03, 338 nn.26,33,40, 33 8-9 n.43 noumenon and phenomena in Hua-yan School 250-5, 261-5, 264, 265, 270 see also reality One Mind and Chan School 309, 327 in Hua-yan School 257-8, 260, 274-5 ontology in Chan School 317-18 in Hanfeizi 199-200 in Laozi 134-6, 139-40 of other minds 242-5 in Xunzi 8 7 see also existence; reality order, cosmic 5-9, 40-1 order, social and Confucianism 1 6-17, 50-1 and Hanfeizi 1 84-7, 1 88, 1 94, 203 and Laozi 145 and Mohism 20, 1 1 7-1 8 and Xunzi 96, 1 03 in Yijing 40-1 parents see family; piety, filial particularity, and universal love 20, 113 Pasupata School 239

Index perceptIOn in Chan School 3 1 1 , 320 and consciousness 228 in Consciousness-Only School 230, 236 in Hua-yan School 250-4, 264, 266-8 as illusory 213, 230, 236, 250-4, 266 in Tian-tai School 284 perfectibility in Confucius 56 in Mencius 65 perfuming of consciousness 222, 223, 224, 227, 229, 231, 242 and causation 214-16, 273-4 and external reality 242, 255 personhood, ideal in Buddhism 218, 231 in Confucianism 19-20, 62 in Mozi 1 1 1-12 in Zhuangzi 1 70-3, 1 74, 177 perspectivism, in Zhuangzi 1 54-66, 167-8, 1 79 petty (inferior) person (xiaoren) 19, 57, 79, 99, 175 phenomena see noumenon and phenomena; reality philosophy, and religion xii, 1-4, 9, 20, 124-7 physiognomy 91 piety, filial in Confucius 49, 52-3, 1 12 and Mozi 1 12-13 Pinyin Romanization system x, 407-13 Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch 304-6, 312, 324, 374 n. 14, 376 nn.6 8,80 Plato, Republic 50, 60-1, 1 1 3, 149 pleasure, as transient 2 1 1 pluralism, and dharmas 234-5, 238 politics and Confucius 16-19, 24, 47-8, 49-56, 60-2, 63, 68, 82, 8 8 and Dao 9 •

and Daoism 22 and ethically ideal state 168-70 and ethics 17, 49-50, 1 46, 1 8 7-94, 203 and Hanfeizi 1 82-3, 1 8 7-98, 200-4 and Laozi 22, 145, 146-50, 200 and Legalism 24, 68 and loyalty 49-5 1 and Mencius 66-7, 8 1 , 82-3, 84, 88, 1 8 7 and Mozi 108, 1 1 9-24 in Spring-Autumn and Warring States periods 16 and Yijing 40 and Zhuangzi 1 54, 168-70, 201-2 Poussin, Louis de La Vallee 359 nA power, political (shi), in Hanfeizi 194, 1 95- 8, 202 pragmatism and Chan School 329 and Legalism 24, 25 and Mohism 20-1, 122, 124-8, 129 and truth 125, 127, 294-6 and Zhuangzi 179 preferences, relativity 158-66 prescriptivism, moral 39-42, 43 present-awareness 323 principle see Ii propriety see Ii punishment in Confucius 61-2 and Legalism 24, 68, 1 84-7, 1 8 9-93, 1 94, 1 96-7, 201, 203 in Mencius 68 in Mozi 20, 126 in Xunzi 86, 100-1, 1 04 Pure Land Buddhism 3 1 7, 358 n.3 Putnam, Hilary 142, 1 54, 348 nA7, 352 n.3 1 •

qi (energy) 6-7 in Mencius 77 in Yijing 30, 32, 36, 37-8 and yin and yang 8, 30 in Zhuangzi 1 76-7

427

Index Qian ( Yijing hexagram) 29, 35, 38, 40, 45 Qin (state) and book burning 201 and reunification of China 15, 1 82 Radhakrishnan 358 n.7 Raju, P. T. 362 nA2 Raphals, Lisa 156 rationality in Hanfeizi 1 8 9 in Mozi 12 1-2 in Zhuangzi 156-7 realism 25, 90-1 and Buddhism 210, 216, 2 1 7 and Chan School 309-10, 3 1 8 , 329 and Hua-yan School 253, 255, 267 and Legalism 354-5 n.1 metaphysical 141-2, 348 nA6 moral 39, 80 pluralist 234-5 scientific 348 nA6 and Tian-tai School 283, 286, 329 and Zhuangzi 156, 1 57- 8, 166 reality as Buddha 269-70, 273, 284, 288-9, 3 1 9 in Chan School 308-1 1, 3 1 7-1 8, 323-5, 329 characteristics 241 in Consciousness-Only School 222-3, 230, 232, 233-6, 240-2, 243, 255, 280 in Hua-yan School 250-5, 261-5, 274-5 and language 265-8, 326 in Laozi 133 and materialism 234 and mind 282-5, 301, 309-1 1 and monism 235-6 as nirvana 297-8 and pluralism 234-5, 261 and ten dharma realms 279-82, 281 , 284, 287, 365 n.39

428

in Tian-tai School 25 1, 279-8 9, 290-1, 297-8, 368-9 n.5 in Zhuangzi 1 54-8, 165, 1 79 reasoning, analogical 66, 69-71, 78-9, 83, 338 nA3 rectification of names 5 1 reincarnation, in Buddhism 2 1 2, 224, 230 relativism asymmetrical 156 ethical 143, 167 perspectival 1 54-5, 1 57-66, 1 67- 8, 1 79 radical 1 54, 166 soft/hard 167 and truth 292-3, 295-6 religion and Buddhism 210, 270, 288, 329 in Mozi 20, 124-7 and philosophy xii, 1-4, 9, 20, 124-7 in Xunzi 91-2 Remusat, Jean Pierre Abel 345 n.5 ren see humanity reversibility, and Golden Rule 53-4 revolution, in Mencius 83 righteousness (yi) in Confucius 48, 59, 1 1 5 in Hanfeizi 1 91-2 in Laozi 147 in Mencius 71-2, 74-8 in Mozi 1 17 in Xunzi 94, 96, 98-9, 101 ntes and Confucianism 1 8 , 20-1, 59-60, 1 05, 122 and Mozi 20-1, 109, 122-4 and Xunzi 91-2, 94-5, 1 02-6, 184 Rorty, Richard 154 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 73 ru see reality Ru-ism see Confucianism rule-utilitarianism 1 1 7-19 ruler and Confucianism 16-17, 35, 47, 50, 60-2, 63, 88, 202

Index and Daoism 22, 1 32 and Hanfeizi 1 82-3, 185-6, 1 8 7-98, 200-2, 203 and Laozi 132, 145, 146-50, 200-2 and Legalism 24, 25 and Mencius 65, 66-7, 80, 81, 82-3, 84, 8 8-9 and Mozi 1 1 9-24 and rites 1 03 in Xunzi 86, 1 00-1, 103 in Yijing 34, 40 in Zhuangzi 154 (sheng) Confucius 1 9, 56, 58, 63, 82 Laozi 143, 145, 146-7, 149 king 17, 60-2, 82, 101, 1 09, 125, 1 8 7-9 in Xunzi 92, 93, 99-1 01, 1 02-4, 1 06 in Zhuangzi 156 salvation, in Buddhism 212, 2 1 7-1 8, 231, 298-9 Samkhyas School 238 School of Being (Buddhist) 2 1 7, 225, 286, 3 1 8 School of Emptiness (Buddhist) 2 1 7, 225, 286, 3 1 8 School of Mind 302, 376 School of Nature 302, 376 n.80 Schwartz, Benjamin 6, 5 1 , 56-7, 100, 1 1 1 , 1 14, 122, 143, 145, 194, 343 n.19, 344 n.3, 345 nA, 346 nn. 12,13, Schwitzgabel, Eric 354 n.95 self in Brahmanism 236 substantiality 236-40 self-denial, in Mencius 79-80 self-interest 273 in Hanfeizi 24, 1 83-5, 1 89, 192-3 in Mozi 20, 1 12-15, 122 self-realization, in Chan School 3 14-16 selflessness, Buddhist 210, 21 1-12, 2 1 3, 216-17

sage in in sage

in Consciousness-Only School 221, 224, 230, 236-40 in Hua-yan School 272-3 Seng-can (patriarch of Chan Buddhism) 304 senses in Buddhism 2 1 8 in Chan School 3 1 1 in Consciousness-Only School 228, 234 in Hua-yan School 252, 264, 266-8, 272 in Laozi 23, 136-7, 147-8 in Mencius 76-7, 79 in Xunzi 89-9 1, 93-4, 96 Seven Supremacies 15 Sextus Empiricus 1 54 Shakyamuni ( Gautama Buddha) 210-18, 238, 240, 268-9, 297 shan see goodness Shang Yang 194 Shang-di (Supreme Being) 1 Shen-hui 305 Shen-xiu (leader of Northern Chan School) 304-5, 306, 307-8, 309, 3 1 1-12, 3 1 3-14, 373 n.11 sheng see sage Sheng-yan 300 shi (political power), in Hanfeizi 194, 1 95-8 shi (things, events), in Hua-yan School 248 shi (time) see time shu see empathy Shun, Kwong-loi 338-9 nA3 Shun (sage king) 17, 58, 6 1 , 109, 187 skepticism in Hanfeizi 193 language 6, 22, 154, 1 55, 157-8, 265-8, 296 radical 1 54-5 soft 155 therapeutic 155-6 in Tian-tai School 289 in Zhuangzi 154-6, 157, 161, 166

429

Index social control 1 8, 103-4, 1 8 5-93, 1 94, 202-3 society and Confucianism 16-18, 48-56, 1 09, 169 and the family 1 6-17, 20, 1 12 in Hanfeizi 1 84-93, 202, 203 human 8-9, 1 2 in Laozi 2 1 , 23, 146-8 in Mencius 68, 80 in Mohism 20-1, 108-9, 1 12-15, 128-9 in Spring-Autumn and Warring States periods 1 6 in Yijing 40 in Zhuangzi 168-70 Soles, David 341 n.24 Soles, David and Deborah 351 n. 1 8 soul, in Buddhism 212, 2 1 6, 237 space, in Hua-yan School 262, 270 Special Teaching 293, 296 speech acts, perlocutionary 326-7 spirits, in Mozi 20, 125-7 Spring-Autumn period 15-16 state see politics statecraft, in Hanfeizi 1 94, 195-8, 200, 202 Stoicism, and Zhuangzi 178-9 Strenski, Ivan 375 nA8 substance Mind as 284, 368-9 n.5 noumenon as 262-5, 264, 265 and pluralism 234-5, 238 ultimate 229 suchness, Ten Suchnesses 287 suffering and bodhisattvas 271 in Buddhism 21 1-13 in Consciousness-Only School 230, 246 in Daoism 23 in Hua-yan School 271-3 in Tian-tai School 284, 299 sun, in Yijing 34 Sun, Siao-Fang 157-8, 1 65, 279 Sunyata see Emptiness •

430

superior person (junzi) 1 9 in Confucius 49-50, 56, 57-8, 59, 60 in Hanfeizi 190 in Mencius 78 in Mozi 120-1 in Xunzi 99, 106 in Yijing 39-42 superstition, and Xunzi 8 7-9, 91, 1 06 Supreme Being (Shang-di) 1 Buddha as 269 in Mozi 1 26 Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro 304, 305, 312, 3 14, 320, 324, 328-9, 374 n. 1 7 Swanson, Paul L. 278, 370-1 n.44 tai-ji (totality of qi) 32 Tathagata (Perfect One) 3 1 0, 3 1 3 Tathata (True Thusness) and Chan School 309, 3 1 3, 3 1 7 in Consciousness-Only School 232-3 in Hua-yan School 261-5, 266, 287 teachers and enlightenment 321 as transmitters of Dao 1 0-12, 104, 166 Ten Wings (supplementary texts to Yijing) 27, 28-9, 333 n.2b Theatetus 154 Theravada School (Buddhist) and Buddha-nature 302 and Common Teaching 293, 296 and emptiness 290 and enlightenment 2 1 8-19 and ethics 273 and nirvana 260 n.24, 2 8 1 and Tripitaka Teaching 292-3 Thompson, Kirill O. 149 Thucydides 1 0 1 tian see Heaven Tian-tai School 2 1 0, 277-302, 362 n.53

Index and Buddha-nature 269, 270, 278-9, 2 8 1 , 287-9, 301, 302 and Chan School 301, 302, 3 1 6, 318 as Chinese 248, 277, 302 classic texts 277-8 and classification of teachings 2 1 8 , 292, 295 and emptiness 25 1 , 282, 284, 285-6, 289, 290-1 and external reality 251, 279- 89, 297-8, 368-9 n.5 and mind and the world 282-5, 288-9, 298-301 and semantic truth 2 89-97 and subtle existence 285 -6, 302 and Ten Suchnesses 287 and Threefold Truth 278 -9, 285-7, 289, 290-2, 297 time (shi) cyclical view 227, 229 and morality 41, 43 in Yi;ing 32, 33 timeline, comparative xiii-xvii Tong, Lik Kuen 37 tortoise-shell divination 3, 29 totalitarianism, and Hanfeizi 202-3 transformation of things, in Zhuangzi 177-8 transmigration 212, 224, 230, 232, 241, 279 Treatise on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana 309 trigrams, in Yi;ing 3 -4, 27-8, 34, 39 Tripitaka Teaching 292-3, 295-6 True Thusness 232-3, 261-5, 266, 280, 287, 288, 3 1 3, 3 1 8 Truth (metaphysical) in Buddhism 2 1 1 in Consciousness-Only School 225 in Hua-yan School 249, 263, 265-8, 293 ineffability 266 in Laozi 141 Threefold 278-9, 285-7, 289, 290-2, 297

in Tian-tai School 279- 89 Two Truths theory 285 in Zhuangzi 22, 154-8, 1 59, 161-6 truth (semantic) 157-8, 265-8 in Chan School 325 correspondence theory 141, 1 65, 290-2, 295 as hierarchical 295-6 as ineffable 296-7 pragmatic theory 125, 127, 294-6 as relative to understanding and intelligence 292-3, 295-6 in Tian-tai School 2 89-97 tyranny and Confucianism 1 9 and Legalism 202-3 umverse as Buddha 269-70, 284, 288 and change 32-3 in Consciousness-Only Buddhism 228-9, 234 in folk religion 2-4 and harmony 2-3, 9, 32-3, 38, 146 in Laozi 136, 138, 150 and morality 34-5, 37-9, 42 see also cosmology Upward Conformity, in Mozi 120-1 utilitarianism and Legalism 193 and Mohism 1 1 5-19, 122, 124, 125-7 •

Vairocana, Buddha as 269-70 Vaisesika School 234, 238 Van Norden, Bryan W. 5, 79, 338-9 n.43 Vasubandhu 228, 235, 236, 360 n.9 Thirty Stanzas of Consciousness­ Only 220-1, 232, 240-2 Twenty Stanzas of Consciousness­ Only 220, 221, 225, 233, 240-2, 245, 361 n.34, 363 n.61 Vedas 235

431

Index Vendanta School 235-6 virtue (de) extension 80-1 in Hanfeizi 1 90, 192 in Laozi 139, 142-4, 147, 149 in Mencius 69, 71-6, 80-1 negative 144 of rulers 16-17, 60-2, 63, 149 in Xunzi 96, 104 in Yijing 35-6 see also loyalty Vorenkamp, Dirck 1 1 7, 126 Wade-Giles Romanization system x, 407-13 Waley, Arthur 354-5 n.1 , 357 n.38 Wang, Hsiao-po 194 Wang, Qingjie 138, 1 44 Wang Yangming 268, 330 war in Confucianism 1 7-1 8 in Laozi 149-50 in Mencius 82-3, 150 in Mozi 108, 124 in Xunzi 150 Warring States period 1 5-17, 20, 128, 1 50, 182 Watson, Burton 94, 126, 1 66, 183, 277, 288, 296, 344 n.49, 357 n.44 Watts, Alan 372 n.1 wealth in Confucius 57 in Mencius 78 in Mozi 122, 123 wei see effort; inactivity Wei, Tat 359 n.6 Wen of Zhou, King 28 Wilhelm, Richard 27, 3 1, 32, 33, 34, 41, 345 n.5 Wilhelm, Richard and Baynes, Cary F. 35-6 will (zhi) in Mencius 76-7, 79 see also free will Wing, R. L. 33

432

wisdom in ancient folk religion 3-4 in Chan School 3 1 0, 3 14-15, 320-3 in Consciousness-Only Buddhism 221, 229-33, 280 Four Transcendental Wisdoms 230-2 in Hanfeizi 200-1 in Laozi 147 in Mencius 72, 75-6, 78 in Tian-tai School 293 Wong, David B. 66, 74, 1 12-13, 167, 338-9 n.43 Wright, Arthur F. 209 Wu, John C. H. 353 n.67 Wu, Kuang-ming 350 n.6 Wu Cheng-en 359 n.2 wu-wet see maCtlVlty .

.

.

,

Xia dynasty 342 n.2 xiao see piety, filial xtaoren see petty person Xie, Wenyu 354 n.93 xin see mind Xuan-zang (Hsiian Tsang) 220-1, 360 n.9 Cheng Wei-Shi Lun (Treatise) 221, 223, 225-9, 230, 238-9; 240-5, 360 n.17, 361 n.34, 362 n.45 The Xunzi 86, 104 Xunzi (Hsiin Tzu) 86-106 and culture 145-6 and ethics 92-106, 145-6, 184 and Hanfeizi 1 82, 183 and Heaven 8 7-92 and human nature 9, 68, 86, 92-102, 1 04, 1 06, 1 84, 302 and Mencius 86, 92-3, 94-102 and religion 9 1-2 •

Yampolsky, Philip 305, 373 n.7 Yan Hui (student of Confucius) 5 8 Yang, Huei-nan 373 n.3 Yang Zhu 65, 1 14

Index Yao (sage king) 1 7, 58, 6 1 , 88, 99, 1 09, 187 Yearley, Lee 1 52, 1 6 8 Yen Hui (student of Confucius) 1 73 yi (change) 29-34 yi (righteousness) in Confucius 48, 59, 1 15 in Hanfeizi 19 1-2 and Laozi 147 in Mencius 71-2, 74-8 in Mozi 1 1 7 in Xunzi 94, 96, 98-9, 101, 1 02 Yijing (Book of Changes) 26-45 and change and non-change 27-8, 29-34, 42, 43-4 Commentary on the Images 28, 39-42 Commentary on the Judgment 28, 32, 36-7, 40-1 Commentary on the Words of the Text 29, 44 and Confucius 26, 28-9 and cosmology 8, 26-9, 30, 40, 58 and Dao 5, 138 date 26 and divination 3-4, 28, 29, 31-2, 42, 43, 9 1 and ethics 28, 34-9 and the Good 34, 35, 36-7, 42 Great Treatise 5, 29, 30, 35, 36, 41-2 hexagrams 3-4, 26, 28-9, 30-2, 34-6 , 39-40 and human goodness 9, 38 influence 26, 45 philosophy of action 42-5 primary virtues 35-6 role in education 1 0 Ten Wings 27, 28-9, 333 n.2b trigrams 3-4, 27-8, 34, 39 yin and yang 7- 8, 9 and change 30-1, 33, 43 and harmony 32, 37-8 in Laozi 347 n.25 and morality 35, 36, 40, 43, 45 in Yijing 4, 26, 27, 30-1

Yogacara School 239-40 Yu (sage king) 99, 109 yuan (origin of life) 36 Zan-ran (student of Zhi-yi) 371 n.67 Zen Buddhism see Chan (Zen) School Zengzi (Confucius' student) 48, 49 Zeuschner, Robert B. 215, 309, 3 1 1 zhen (correctness) 36 zhi see will Zhi-yan (patriarch of Hua-yan) 248, 249, 252 Zhi-yi (Chih-i) 277-8 and Buddha-nature 278-9, 288, 298-9, 301 and classification of teaching 292, 295 The Esoteric Meaning of the Lotus Sutra 277, 278 and Fourfold Teaching 292-3 The Great Calming and Contemplation 277- 8, 291 and hierarchy of truth 295-6 and human nature 298-300 and mind and the world 282-5 and nirvana 294, 299 and no-truth 296-7 and reality 279, 280-2, 285-6, 288-9, 290-1 and semantic truth 289-91 and subtle existence 285-6, 302 and ten dharma realms 2 80-2, 300 and Threefold Truth 278-9, 285-7, 289, 290-2, 297 The Words and Phrases of the Lotus Sutra 277-8 zhong see equilibrium; loyalty Zhong-yang (Doctrine of the Mean) 1 9, 3 8 , 333 n.3a Zhou Dynasty 3,15, 28 Zhu, Bokun 346 n. l l Zhu Xi 333 n.3a The Zhuangzi 1 52-3, 165 Inner Chapters 152-4, 353 n.78 Miscellaneous Chapters 152-3, 1 66, 1 69, 1 76

433

Index The Zhuangzi (cant'd) Outer Chapters 152-3, 1 59-60, 1 72, 1 74 Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) 1 52-80, 210 and Chan School 3 1 5, 3 1 6 and Confucius 1 6 8-9, 1 8 0 and Daa 22, 23, 153-4, 155, 157-8, 1 63-6, 1 67-71 , 1 73, 1 79, 268, 3 1 5

434

and ethics 144, 1 50, 153, 167-73 and human goodness 9 and language 22, 1 54, 155, 1 5 7-8 and life and death 1 73-9 and politics 1 54, 168-70, 201-2 and transformation of things 1 77-8 and truth, reality and knowledge 154-8 Zigong (Confucius' student) 335 n.25