Allison, G (1969) Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Reference: Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689-718 Case study: October 1962 - 13 days when almost 300 million humans would have died Analysts think the governmental and military problems in terms of largely implicit conceptual models 1. In terms of the Rational Policy Model (Model I) To use this model, the outputs are categorized as acts and choices, not outputs Unified national governments  They do what is best for the nation  Model I must be balanced with ideas of  Monoliths are black boxes Large acts are consequence of conflicting smaller actions at various levels of bureaucracy How it applies to the Cuban crisis The soviets were deciding to increase their missiles at the same time they were  befriending America  The analyst assume that the actor is the government and the decisions are rationally calculated Analytic paradigm  I Policy as national choice II Organizing concepts National actor - The nation  The problem - Strategic problem  Static selection - The solution choose by the nation  Action as a rational choice  Goals and objectives  Options  Consequences  Choice  Choice - Highest rank  III Dominant inference pattern Nation has ends and optimal means  IV General propositions Value- maximizing behavior  Relevant values and objectives  Perceived alternative courses of action  Estimates of various sets of consequences  Prepared by Ariadna73

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Net valuation of each set of consequences  Increase of cost or reduction of probability of attaining consequences reduces the  likelihood of that alternative being chosen  A decrease in cost or an increase in probability of attaining desired consequences, increases the likelihood of that action being chosen  V Specific propositions Deterrence  Stable balance reduces the possibility of an attack  Stable balance increases probability of limited war  Soviet Force Posture  Assuming that they were going to strike first  The US Blockade of Cuba: A first Cut  Six major categories of action were considered Do nothing  Diplomatic pressures  Secret approach to Castro  Invasion  Surgical air strike ("Pearl Harbor in reverse") Blockade  More attractive  Middle course  The only real option  The blockade was the only real option! It was middle course between inaction and attack  Placed on Khrushcev the burden of the next step (the ball in his court) A naval confrontation in the Caribbean was the ideal possible war for USA US could explore alternatives to the use of its nuclear superiority (hence not destroying  the planet where the USA happens to have its permanent address (!)) Variants Framework always the same: place the action within a value-maximizing framework  The analyst proceeds predominantly with this paradigm, but acknowledge that there  is a margin for error 

2. Organizational process model (Model II) To use this model, identify the relevant organizations and display its patterns of behavior When we apply this model to the Cuban crisis, the result is a very different  explanation than in Model I  The government is not only one person that knows everything. It is a conglomerate  of sub-organizations, alliances, etc. Each sub-organizations has it own goals and all intentions amount to tendencies

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

On the other hand, the behavior of the complete organization is more complex than the behavior of its sub-sets (he calls them solids) How it applies to the Cuban crisis Analytic paradigm  I Basic unit of analysis: Policy as organizational output The actual occurrences are organizational outputs. Example: The actions of men who  are soldiers in platoons  Effective options to confront a problem: Routines for employing present physical  capabilities  Outputs structure the situation (raise the problem, provide information, make the initial  moves) II Organizing concepts A. Organizational actors: A constellation of loosely allied organizations  B. Factored problems and fractionated power  Power must accompany responsibility, but the organizations should not have a lot of  power  However, there is quasi-independence  C. Parochial priorities, perceptions and issues. Tendency to parochialism has  enhancing factors:  Selective information available to the organization  Recruitment of personnel into the organization  Tenure of individuals  small group pressures  distribution of rewards  D. Action as organizational output  1. Goals: Constraints defining acceptable performance  Seldom formal Central among the constraints is the organization health Constraints = mix of expectations and demands of other organizations  Conflict among goals is always latent 

2. Sequential attention to goals  In order of relevance for the interested i nterested organization or sub-unit

3. Standard Operating Procedures  Used to perform the "lower" tasks so the organization can then perform its "higher" function Helps doing certain vital things, but sometimes make the organization look sluggish or inappropriate

4. Programs and Repertoires  Large coordination is a must Each predicted behavior requires a program (in both senses: computer and drama) People will "dance" according to the program The number of programs is always limited (not possible to be prepared for everything)

5. Uncertainty Avoidance (Negotiated environment) Budgetary splits Alliances, "club relations", Rules of the "Precarious status quo" between enemies 

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Standard scenarios

6. Problem directed search  Focus on avoiding discomfort First search the neighborhood of the symptom, then the neighborhood of the current alternative

7. Organizational Learning and Change (Occur more likely in situations like:) Periods of Budgetary feast (shopping sprees) or famine (within a year everything changes) Dramatic performance failures (major disasters)

E. Central coordination and control  There are advocates for both extremes  Total centralization is not possible  The relation depend on structural variables such as:  The nature of the job The measures and information available to leaders The system of rewards and punishments for members The procedures by resources and humans get committed

F. Decisions of Government Leaders  III Dominant inference pattern The actions of today must be very much similar to actions made in the past  The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t is t-1 the prediction of t+1 is t (from breakfast, you can tell what lunch is going to be!) Power of this model: uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires  IV General propositions A. Organizational action (Determined by routines, not leader's directions) 1. SOP Routines for dealing with standard situations  Good for average performance

2. A Program  Complex action chosen from a short list li st in the repertoire

3. Repertoires are developed by parochial organizations, then they are frequently ill-  suited  B. Limited flexibility and incremental change  1. Budgets change incrementally  2. Once undertaken, an investment is not dropped easily  C. Administrative Feasibility (Considerable gap between what leaders choose and  what organizations implement) 1. Organizations are blunt instruments. Precision and coordination are not likely to  succeed  2. Projects that demand doing things differently, are not likely to succeed  3. Leaders can expect each organization will do its "part" in terms of what it knows to  do  4. Leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information  5. If an assignment is contrary to the goals of the organization, that assignment will  encounter resistance 

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

V. Specific Propositions 1. Deterrence  If the attack occurs, it will result from organizational activity  Alert status determine probabilities for accidental firing  Repertoires fix the range of effective choice open to enemies  Training in nuclear weapons is crucial  2. Soviet Force Posture  Determined by organizational factors (goals and processes) Review of the training and practice activities of the Soviet Union  The US Blockade of Cuba: A second Cut  Organizational intelligence October 22 1962 7 am: President Kennedy said to the Russians that they must halt  and eliminate their clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to the world peace  This decision was reached after a week of critical deliberation  The missiles were discovered in October 14 (it is crucial because if it were later, more aggressive actions would have taken place) They were discovered not earlier or later as a consequence of established routines  and procedures. On Set 19 there have been a meeting to consider consi der several factors and reports about missiles There was a 10 day delay between the suspicions and the flight to take the pictures and see if there were any missiles (due to two facts) Many jobs won't fall into precise jurisdictions  Vigorous organizations are imperialistic  The CIA and the air forces engaged in discussions about how to make the flights, and delayed the actual flight

Organizational options (Quickly narrowed to two options) Air strike (impossible) Blockade (thus, the choice) The choice of the blockade turned on two points  Morality and tradition (US won't perpetrate a "Pearl Harbor" in reverse (A problem of  morality) A "Surgical" air strike was impossible (A problem of capability)

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Organizational implementation Types of blockade  Offensive weapons only  Strategic goods  The details were left to the navy  But then they decided to intercept the ships much closer to Cuba so the Soviets  would have time to think. The navy didn't like that  The navy was emotional, but had to say "yes, sir" to the orders

Not clear what happened, but the ships entered Cuba and seemed not to have been  intercepted !  Suspicious started over the Navy doings

One day (oct 18) one ship stopped in the middle of the ocean, the government was  happy, but the Navy wasn't  The government leaders were happy: "the blockage is working!" The navy was suspicious: "They are picking up submarine escort

Finally, the Navy leader shouted to the government leader "go back to your desk, the  Navy will take care of the blockade!" 

3. Bureaucratic politics model (Model III) To use this model, the analyst displays the perceptions, motivations, position, power and maneuvers of the principal players Each leader pulls to his own end  Contrast with Model I: Several actors instead of an unitary actor  Power is shared  How it applies to the Cuban crisis Analytic paradigm  I Basic unit of analysis: Policy as a political outcome Happenings are results from compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among  government officials  National behavior can be conceived as outcomes of wittgensteinian games  II Organizational concepts A. Players in Positions (men in jobs) Positions define what players may and must do  Players are also people  B. Parochial Priorities Perceptions and Issues  C. Interests, Stakes and Power (The three elements of power) Bargaining advantages  Skill  Will  D. The problem and the problems  Each solution to a smaller problem affects the bigger problem  E. Action channels 

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

F. Actions as politics  The context of shared power determines the mechanisms of choice  Players end up using strategies to "make the government do whet is right"  G. Streams of outcomes  Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated  All the little streams of outcomes feed up the bigger outcome  III Dominant inference pattern The action of the nation is the outcome of the bargainings between sub-organizations  IV. General propositions 1. Action and intention  Cannot presuppose intention  Sometimes the result (action) is the sum of different courses and no-one's intention  2. Where you stand depends on where you sit  It is easy to predict the responses if you know the positions of the actors  3. Chiefs and indians  Different chiefs must build a coalition of the relevant powers  There are fights against indians (departments) Issue looking down: Options = How to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition coali tion The issue looking upwards is confidence: how to give the boss confidence

V. Specific propositions 1. Deterrence  Which players can decide an attack?  Though model I, an attack is not realistic because it would be a suicide and  governments don't commit suicide  Questions considered  Could any member of the government solve sol ve his problem by attack What stream of outcomes might lead to an attack? How might miscalculation and confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as an outcome?

The US Blockade of Cuba: A third Cut  The politics of discovery Discovery of the missiles and when it happened can be explained by a series of  bargaining games  Cuba was Kennedy's Achiles's heel  He was campaigning, and wanted to solve the Cuba problem soon  The politics of issues Khrushchev had caught the US "with the pants down"  Kennedy was angry with Khrushchev "He can't do that to me!"  Doing nothing or taking a diplomatic approach would not solve Kennedy's problem  There was a lot of advising and they wanted to show the president how the russian  guy was provoking him  The politics of choice Initially, the President wanted the surgical air strike  Fortuitous coincidences prevented the air strike 

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Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis

McNamara's vision of holocaust  Robert Kennedy didn't want his brother to become a "Tojo" (another Pearl Harbor  maker) McNamara had time to convince Robert of the blockade because the President  traveled on campaign activities. A coalition was made and they advised the  President  This coalition gave the President a moment to pause and consider why other guys  wanted the attack  Inaccurate information was given to the President: they told him that a surgical air  strike was not possible and that was false  Further investigation: Why no-one probed this estimate during the first week? Why the so-called "experts" so conveniently made a mistake in appreciation? With a strong coalition and the President in it, the blockade was the way to go

Conclusion Four intended implications of the argument Formulation of alternative frames of reference and how it affects the analysis, should make the analyst more self-conscientious The argument implies a position on the problem of "the state of the art" Foreign and military policy problems should subject of reexamination. They are typically treated in Model I, but as we saw, Models II and III reveal (and demand!) large amounts of information Model I would have concluded that Soviets were going to attack  Model II would have considered other aspects and reduced the probabilities  returned by Model I  Model III would suggest the political subtext and return a better understanding of  what happened  The present formulation of paradigms is simply an initial step. There are many questions open Model I: Does a statement of reasons why a rational actor would choose an action  constitute an explanation of the occurrence of that action?  Model II: The explanation of T in terms of T-1 is weak in a contiguous and  changeable world  Model III is fascinating, but really complex 

The three models are not exclusive alternatives. alternatives. They can be used at the analyst convenience :-) Model I concentrates in Market factors Nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits  Models II and III focus on internal mechanisms But require considerable amounts of information  Exercise for the reader: Apply these three models to the US decision of surrender in Vietnam

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