Agrarian Reform Case Digest

RAFAEL GELOS -versusCOURT OF APPEALS Promulgated: May 8, 1992 G.R. No. 86186 Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land (182 SCRA 15, 162 SCRA 747, 118 SCRA 484). It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP AND FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER RELATIONSHIP, DISTINGUISHED 1. in farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof; 2. the tenancy relationship, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land; 3. the agricultural worker works for the farm employer and for his labor he received a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit; and 4.

the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest.

The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: 1.

the parties are the landholder and tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.

In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant. (189 SCRA 194, 181 SCRA 247).

YOLANDA CABALLES -versusDEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, ET AL.

Promulgated: December 5, 1988 G.R. No. 78214 CONOMIC FAMILY SIZE FARM; Explained R.A. No. 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient use of labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter and education with possible allowance for payment of yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income. The private respondent only occupied a minuscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, bananas and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.

TENANCY The fact if sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. Tenancy, however, is not a purely factual relationships dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and, as in this case, their written agreements, provided there are complied with and not contrary to law, are even more important.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; All requisites must concur The fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof especially when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500 square meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Not shown by sharing of harvest Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationships. Certainly it is not unusual for landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This a typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received. This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specifically when the area tilled is only 60, or even 500, sq. meters and located in an urban area and in the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production. The requirements set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationship, to wit: 1.

the parties are the landholder and tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration; have not been met by the private respondent.

In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereof, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.

HILARIO -versusIAC 148 SCRA 573

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus: 1.

the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration. It is also understood that

5.

there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that

6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvests.

Fact that respondent was giving the landowners 20 cavans of palay every harvest not sufficient basis for formation of landlord tenant relationship where the landowners never intended to devote part of their metropolitan property to agriculture. The land in question was purchased at a foreclosure proceeding as "residential" and tax assessments show that it is "residential", not agricultural. A landholder-tenant relationship is preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession of the subject property. Tenancy cannot be created nor depend upon what the alleged tenant does on the land.

SOLIMAN v. PASUDECO, G.R. No. 169589, June 16, 2009 Dalmacio Sicat was the owner of a 10 hectare parcel of land. He offered to sell the subject property to PASUDECO to be used as a housing complex for PASUDECO's laborers and employees. The land was initially offered for sale at the price of P8.00 per square meter. This was later reduced to P5.00 per square meter. The Board of Directors of PASUDECO issued Board Resolution authorizing the purchase of the subject property at P4.00 per square meter. Thereafter, Dalmacio and his tenants jointly filed a Petition seeking approval of the voluntary surrender of the subject property with payment of disturbance compensation. The voluntary surrender was approved and the tenancy relation was extinguished on the date they entered into the agreement. A Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed between Dalmacio and PASUDECO. Thereafter, the documents needed for the conversion of the land to residential purposes were prepared. TCT in favor PASUDECO was then issued and registered. However, due to financial distress, PASUDECO did not complete the construction. For the meantime, though, it did not authorize any person to occupy the landholding. Petitioners alleged that in 1970, the manager of PASUDECO made one Ciriaco Almario his overseer/caretaker, tasked to collect lease rentals from petitioners. In turn, C. Almario remitted the rentals to the manager. In May 1990, C. Almario certified that petitioners were the actual tenant-tillers of the subject property. Moreover, petitioners deposited their alleged rentals with the LBP. The real controversy arose when PASUDECO decided to pursue the development of the property into a housing project for its employees in the latter part of April 1990. In May 1990, petitioners filed a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession before the PARAD to

restrain him from harassing and molesting petitioners in their respective landholdings. Petitioners together with armed men, entered the property and destroyed some of their crops. Traversing the complaint, the manager raised as one of his defenses the fact that PASUDECO was the owner of the subject property. 1.

TENANCY — ESTABLISHMENT Citing Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 140164, September 6, 2002, 388 SCRA 471, 481-482: Under R.A. 3844, two modes are provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act; or (2) by oral or written agreement, either express or implied. By operation of law simply means the abolition of the agricultural share tenancy system and the conversion of share tenancy relations into leasehold relations. The other method is the agricultural leasehold contract, which may either be oral or in writing.

2.

IMPLIED TENANCY Petitioners' assertion that they were allowed to cultivate the subject property without opposition, does not mean that PASUDECO impliedly recognized the existence of a leasehold relation. Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant,because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

3.

ELEMENT OF TENANCY — CONSENT Citing Masaquel v. Orial, G.R. No. 148044, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 51, 63 and Bautista v. Araneta, G.R. No. 135829, February 22, 2000, 326 SCRA 234, citing Lastimoza v. Blanco, 110 Phil. 835, 838 [1961]). Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the property, and not through the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the property subject of the tenancy. To rule otherwise would allow collusion among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder. cCaSHA

4.

ACTUAL AND CONTINUED POSSESSION — NOT DETERMINATIVE OF TENANCY Citing Nicorp Management and Development Corporation v. Leonida de Leon, G.R. No. 176942 and G.R. No. 177125, August 28, 2008: Occupancy and continued possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant, because the principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.

5.

QUANTUM OF PROOF TO PROVE SHARING — SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE Citing Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29, 2003, 401 SCRA 666, 690-691:

Substantial evidence necessary to establish the fact of sharing cannot be satisfied by a mere scintilla of evidence; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate to prove the element of sharing. Thus, to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other credible evidence must be presented, because self-serving statements are inadequate. 6. CERTIFICATION ATTESTING TO TENANT STATUS — NOT BINDING UPON JUDICIARY Citing Salmorin v. Zaldivar, G.R. No. 169691, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 564, 571-572: The certifications attesting to petitioners' alleged status as de jure tenants are insufficient. In a given locality, the certification issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or an authorized representative, like the MARO or the BARC, concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary.

SPS. TITUS L. ENDAYA, ET AL. -versusCOURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO FIDELI Promulgated: October 23, 1992 G.R. No. 88113 AGRICULTURAL TENANCY; Requires consent It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the consent of the true and lawful owner is absent. But this doctrine contemplates a situation where an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against her will or permission to work on the farm land.

This doctrine has been reiterated in Endaya vs. Court of Appeals where this court further held that the agricultural lessee's rights are enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's successor-in-interest. Whatever was the true nature of his designation, Benigno, was the LEGAL POSSESSOR of the property and the law expressly grants him, as legal possessor, authority and capacity to institute an agricultural leasehold lessee on the property he legally possessed.

VICTOR G. VALENCIA -versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

Promulgated: April 29, 2003 G.R. No. 122363 Facts: 









Victor Valencia is a government retiree who owns two parcels of land situated at Barangay Linothangan, Canlaon City, Negros Oriental. One with an area of 23.7279 hectares and covered by TCT No. H-T-137 and another covering 6.4397 hectares under Homestead Application No. HA-231601. Valencia entered into a ten-year civil law lease agreement with a certain Glicerio Henson. And later, into a five-year civil law lease agreement with Fr. Andres Flores. The agreement was subject to a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering and against installing a leasehold tenant without Valencia's consent. Henson instituted Cresenciano Frias and Marciano Frias while Fr. Andres Flores designated fourteen others together with the Friases to cultivate the land. Of the farmworkers, twelve became recipients of CLTs. Upon the expiration of the lease agreements, Valencia demanded that the respondents vacate the premises but to no avail. Valencia wanted to gain possession of his landholdings and had in fact designated Bernie Bautista to be his overseer. Valencia filed a letter of protest but it was too late, the property was placed under the Operation Land Transfer Program of the government and the CLTs were issued to the respondents. Valencia again protested but to no avail. However, in February 1988, petitioner Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a profit sharing agreement. No other respondent entered into any kind of agreement with the petitioner, Henson or Fr. Flores. Twelve years after the filing of the protest, an administrative investigation was finally conducted. The report revealed that from 1975 to 1983, it was only Bautista who received the shares in the produce. Respondents only stopped paying when Bautista refused to issue a receipt for such. Valencia did not receive a single cavan for the said years. to aggravate matters, some of the respondents have even subleased their properties despite the pending protest of Valencia. While all this was transpiring, Valencia and Catalino Mantac entered into a leasehold contract over a 0.0425 hectare of the 23.7279 hectares covered by TCT-H-T-137. Valencia's protest was dismissed. The respondents were maintained in the landholding, prompting Valencia to appeal to the Office of the President. However, the Order was affirmed with the modification that the Homestead be excluded from the coverage of P.D. No. 27. Valencia appealed to the CA but it was dismissed for having been filed out of time. His Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence, Valencia filed a Petition for Review or Certiorari under Rule 46 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: 

Can petitioner's civil law lessee, Fr. Flores, install tenants on the subject premises without express authority to do so under Article 1649 of the Civil Code, more so when the lessee is expressly prohibited from doing so, as in the instant case?

Held: 



A contract of civil law lease can prohibit a civil law lessee from employing a tenant on the land subject matter of the lease agreement. An extensive and correct discussion of the statutory interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, is provided by the minority view in Bernas vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 85041, 05 August 1993, 225 SCRA 119). When Section 6 provides that the agricultural leasehold relations shall be limited to the person who furnishes the landholding, either as owner, civil law lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor, and the person who personally cultivates the same, it assumes that there is already an existing agricultural leasehold relation, i.e., tenant or agricultural lessee already works the land. The epigraph of Sec. 6 merely states who are "Parties to Agricultural Leasehold Relations", which assumes that there is already a leasehold tenant on the land; not until then. xxx



xxx

xxx

From the foregoing discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a civil law lessee cannot automatically institute tenants on the property under Section 6 of R.A. No. 3844. The correct view that must necessarily be adopted is that the civil law lessee, although a legal possessor, may not install tenants on the property unless expressly authorized by the lessor. And if a prohibition exists or is stipulated in the contract of lease, the occupants of the property are merely civil law sublessees whose rights terminate upon the expiration of the civil law lease agreement.

LEASE AGREEMENT; Prohibition Sec. 6 of R. A. No. 3844, as amended, does not automatically authorize a civil law lessee to employ a tenant without the consent of the landowner. The lessee must be so specifically authorized. For the right to hire a tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. But certainly nowhere in Sec. 6 does it say that a civil law lessee of a landholding is automatically authorized to install a tenant thereon. A different interpretation would create a perverse and absurd situation where a person who wants to be a tenant, and taking advantage of this perceived ambiguity in the law, asks a third person to become a civil law lessee of the landowner. Incredibly, this tenant would technically have a better right over the property than the landowner himself. This tenant would then gain security of tenure, and eventually become owner of the land by operation of law. This is most unfair to the hapless and unsuspecting landowner who entered into a civil law lease agreement in good faith only to realize later on that he can no longer regain possession of his property due to the installation of a tenant by the civil law lessee.

RETENTION; Homestead Grantees With respect to the retention limits of land ownership by Valencia and his "direct descendants," the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law allows landowners whose lands have been covered by Pres. Decree No. 27 to keep the area originally retained by them provided the original homestead grantees who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of Rep. Act No. 6657 shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate the homestead. [50] The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner, as a general rule. [51] However, the factual determination of whether Valencia and his "direct descendants" have complied with Sec. 6 of Rep. Act No. 6657 should be addressed by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Ascertaining if petitioner and his "direct descendants" are within the seven (7)-hectare retention limit provided by Pres. Decree No. 27 requires the technical expertise of the administrative agency concerned.

TENANCY RELATIONSHIP In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals this Court ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. [43] The fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy. [44] Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to prove the element of sharing. [45] Bejasa v. Court of Appeals similarly ruled that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. [46] In the present case, it is not disputed that the relationship between Valencia and Henson, and subsequently, Valencia and Fr. Flores, partook of a civil law lease. Henson and later Fr. Flores were not instituted as agricultural lessees but as civil law lessees. As a finding of fact, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform held that a written civil law lease contract between Valencia and Fr. Flores was on file which contained in clear and precise terms the stipulation prohibiting the subleasing or encumbering of his parcels of land without the written consent of Valencia. [47] The Secretary even went as far as stating for the record that such stipulation barring the subletting of the property was violated by Fr. Flores when he subleased the subject parcels of land to private respondents. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Requisites The following essential requisites must concur in order to establish a tenancy relationship: [36] (a) the parties being landowner and tenant; (b) the subject matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent by the landowner; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is personal cultivation by the tenant; and, (f) there is sharing of harvests between the parties. An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. [37] Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The

elements of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. [38] A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove this allegation. Hence, a perusal of the records and documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents. The principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent. Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.

TANPINGCO VS IAC SYLLABUS Remedial Law; Action; An action must be brought against the real party-in-interest or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be reversed therein. — Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real-party-interest, or against a party which may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein (Salonga v. Warner Barnes and Co., Ltd. Supra citing Salmon and Pacific Commercial Co., v. Tan Cuenco, 36 Phil. 556 [1917]). The real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or be injured by the judgment, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit (Rebollido v. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 800 [1989] citing Samahan ng mga Nangungupahan sa Azcarraga Textile Market, Inc., et al., v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 598 [1988]). If the suit is not brought against the real-party-interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652). Same; Same; Same; Petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party defendant. — We agree with the contentions of the private respondent. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 [1991], a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownerhip, results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652). Civil Law; Ownership; The owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. — Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the

owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law. As an incident of ownership therefore, there is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652). Same; Tenancy Law; The law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. — As elucidated in the case of Bernardo v. Court of Appeals (168 SCRA 439 [1988]), security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their landholdings is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy relationship. However, the donation itself is valid (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652). Same; Same; Same; Court rules that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended. — Considering that the tenant in the case at bar is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in exchange for his right to cultivate the landholding in question, the real issue is who should pay the compensation. We rule that the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports as the new owner cannot oust the petitioner from the subject riceland and build a public high school thereon until after there is payment of the disturbance compensation in accordance with Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652). Same; Same; Same; Same; Court is of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. — In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private respondent is not the real party-in-interest. And having arrived at this conclusion, we do not deem it necessary to pass upon the other errors assigned by the petitioner for as stated in Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 485 [1990]), a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a position to for it (ESPIRIDION TANPINGCO VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT ET AL., 207 SCRA 652).

POLICARPIO NISNISAN AND ERLINDA NISNISAN -versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. Promulgated: August 12, 1998 G.R. No. 126425 GRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing Agricultural Leasehold Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844. TENANCY RELATIONSHIP; Essential requisites Essential requisites set by law for the existence of a tenancy relationships, thus: 1.

the parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2.

the subject is agricultural land;

3.

the purpose is agricultural production; and

4.

there is consideration. It is also understood that

5.

there is consent to the tenant to work on the land, that

6. there is personal cultivation by him and that the consideration consists of sharing the harvests. AGRICULTURAL LEASEHOLD; Voluntary Surrender as a Mode of Extinguishing Agricultural Leasehold Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3844, voluntary surrender, as a mode of extinguishing agricultural leasehold tenancy relations, must be convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. The tenants' intention to surrender the landholding cannot be presumed, much less determined by mere implication. Based on the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that petitioners-spouses are agricultural lessees and are therefore entitled to security of tenure as mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3844.

ANICETO M. QUIÑO -versusCOURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. Promulgated: June 26, 1998 G.R. No. 118599 RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Full Amount of the Redemption Price It is not difficult to discern why the full amount of the redemption price should be consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without the attendant evidence that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law in fixing a definite term to avoid prolonged and anti-economic uncertainty as to ownership of the thing sold. Consignation of the entire price would remove all controversies as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time. Against such rationale, petitioner's submission is rendered insignificant. The amount so consigned by him falls short of the requirement of the law and leaves the court with no choice but to rule against him. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Consignation of the Redemption Price An offer to redeem to be properly effected can either be through a formal tender with consignation or by filing a complaint in court coupled with consignation of the redemption price within the prescribed period. It must be stressed however that in making a repurchase it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem merely manifests his desire to repurchase; this statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment which constitutes the legal use or exercise of the right to repurchase. And the tender of payment must be for the full amount of the repurchase price, otherwise the offer to redeem will be held ineffectual. As to what constitutes reasonable price and consideration, the valuation placed by the Leonardo spouses and respondent Bitoon themselves as price of the land must be taken to be such reasonable price and consideration. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; Purpose of Written Notice The purpose of the written notice required by law is to remove all uncertainties as to the sale, its terms and its validity, and to quite any doubts that the alienation is not definitive. The law does not prescribe any particular form of notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying he redemptioner. So long as the redemptioner is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the period for redemption will start running. The letter received by petitioner, being bare, was not such written notice. It failed to make certain the terms, particulars and validity of the sale. Rather, only a copy of the deed of sale, in an authentic form, will satisfy the requirement of the law and serve the purpose thereof. Thus, it is proper to reckon the period of redemption

from receipt of the authentic document on 02 March 1987. the amended complaint filed on 27 July 1987 is well within the redemption period of one hundred eighty (180) days.

Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997 278 SCRA 820 The policy of social justice, we reiterate, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as we said in Galay et al., v. Court of Appeals, et al. "is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege." It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Where the law is unambiguous and clear, it must be applied according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. A mere member of a tenant's immediate farm household is not entitled to a home lot.

RAYMUNDO T. MAGDALUYO -versusATTY. ENRIQUE L. NACE Promulgated: February 2, 2000 Adm. Case No. 3808

LEGAL ETHICS; Remission of duty as a lawyer Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB), thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciated of facts. Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet respondents dares raised the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer would know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the fact of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land.

Facts: 





Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Respondent was one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo, Rizal. Allegedly, when complainant offered to relocate the squatters, the latter refused and instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants therein. Three months later, the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. This time, claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land. They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title. Because of the conflicting causes of action, both cases were dismissed. Complainant filed a case against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter.

Held: 

After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the findings of the former are as follows: ". . . while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved, it is their total inconsistency, nay, total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the respondent's sincerity. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can, in good faith, allege to be a lawful tenant one moment, and be an owner the next. Respondent herein, as a lawyer, was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had been existing between the parties before the PARAB, thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts. Lastly, respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land."



The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by evidence on record.





Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was indeed, less than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all probability, he knew not to be his. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the court will not tolerate.

BAYANI BAUTISTA -versusPATRICIA ARANETA Promulgated: February 22, 2000 G.R. No. 135829 CERTIFICATIONS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES We cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence. The requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvest. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship and the absence of one or more requisites do not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant as distinguished from a de jure tenant. This is so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws.

Facts: 

In essence, the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. In April 1991, a group of armed security guards, allegedly, were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta, successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject







landholding. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments against his person, for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case, for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land. Defendant to summarize, denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged to Consuelo A. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. The land also does not fall under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. During an ocular inspection, defendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises. However, the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB. Hence, this Appeal. Petitioner contends that in 1978, he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. And that he regularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. Petitioner, likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding Held:  





The Appeal lacks merit. "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, they only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. The certifications do not disclose how and why he became a tenant." In sum, respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. Blanco, we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the 'owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. 5 [b], Rep. Act No. 1199), and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. . . . To rule otherwise, would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder." Lastly, we can not sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. As discussed above, DARAB mainly relied on the certifications

issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. In Oarde vs. Court of Appeals, we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.