Agra Midterm Transcript 2016 EH408hhhh

AGRARIAN REFORM LAW AND OTHER SOCIAL LEGISLATION MIDTERM TRANSCRIPT 2016 Atty. Glenn Capanas Agra June 25 First Minutes If CARP is important in Agrarian reform, RA 3844 equally shares the same importance. 1.

2. 3.

This law is still applicable. Not all farmers are considered as owners of the land they tilled, some may have chosen to remain or to stay as farmers of the landowner under Sec. 6 of CARP. CARP was silent as to the leasehold provision then you should apply RA 3844 There is only one section that was expressly repealed by the CARP. (repeals on implication is not favored).

Sec. 35 of RA 3844 was repealed because in this law it says that shared tenancy was abolished and leasehold relation was instituted in place of shared tenancy. Leasehold will governed all the existing contracts between land owners, farmers, lessor, lessee. There is a portion of Sec. 35 of RA 3844 which states that notwithstanding the abolition of shared tenancy and leasehold to be considered as the relation between the lessor and the lessee, this law will not apply to certain Agri products such as durian, coffee and cacao. There were, in short, Agri products which were not covered under this law. It was expressly repealed because CARP covers all kinds of Agri products, no more reference to durian, coffee and cacao. Although there are other ways of distributing lands in CARP that even if CARP covers all kinds of Agri products, the government provided other ways for the farmers to acquire lands like for example through STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION. Just to show us that there are lands covered under this law (check the law). Except that the public area which are covered under this law are those devoted for settlement purposes whereas under CARP, regardless of whether it was for settlement purposes, all public lands which are agricultural in nature are supposed to be…(ming jump ug other topic si Atty. Haha). Beneficiaries When you read the law, you will found that there are 9 components: 1. Share tenancy is abolished and the law institutionalized leasehold relation 2. There is a declaration of rights for agricultural labor. The word labor is actually granting rights in favor of agricultural lessee like for example minimum wage, right to participate in certain activities, right to self-organization. 3. An authority for the acquisition and equitable distribution of Agri land. The authority referred to here is the Land Authority which the former name of Department of Agrarian Reform. 4. An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of the Agri land. The institution referred to is the Land Bank of the Philippines. LBP comes in, insofar as acquisition is concerned, when the Land Authority send a notice to the owner-“your land is covered by the agrarian reform”- they will conduct a meeting with the LBP so that LBP can show you how much is the valuation of the property the government intends to pay you. When the land owner accepts the offer, they will execute the sale then that’s it. If the landowner rejects the

offer of LBP before under this Code, the land owner can actually go to the judiciary which the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR). CAR under this code has the power to decide issues arising in this code and other related laws in relations including among others the task of fixing just compensation. The task of LBP is not only on the acquisition, it is also tasked regarding distribution. When the government wants to acquire the agri land, the government has to pay the landowner just compensation, the valuation of the land is supposed to be just. Once the government is now in possession of the Agri land, the government will now inform the Registry of Deeds, by process we have now deposited the valuation of the land pertaining to land owner A, deposited the money to LBP, so now we have certification form LBP that there is a deposit of money so cancel now the title of the landowner and issue a new title in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the title is now under the name of the republic of the Philippines, then the government will now distribute the land to the qualified farmer beneficiaries. But these lands to be given to the farmer beneficiaries are not for free, the farmer beneficiaries will have to have to pay 36 under CARP annual amortizations plus 6% interest based on the valuation of the LBP. So once the beneficiaries are identified, the title of the Republic will be transferred in favor of the different beneficiaries, others are individual and others are cooperative-in the back of the title, there is a list of the names. Because it is not for free, they will have to pay LBP. LBP is assured that Republic will not lose the property through the title bearing the annotation of the mortgage to be signed by the farmer beneficiary-mortgagee in favor of the LBP. If farmer defaulted, LBP can get it back, thus the farmer beneficiary cannot anymore be qualified for future beneficiary since he defaulted. 5, 6, 7, and 8. These are internal procedure for the effective implementation of the program. So if the land was to be surveyed if there is discrepancy or there is a need to classify or to register. 9. It mentions the CAR Even if this code will still apply but with respect to No. 3 there is a qualification. DAR now has two arms: (1) Implementationthat’s why we have Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) cases, Secretary down to MARO; (2) Quasi-Judicial Functions- DARAB to PARAB. Since DAR has two arms, this judicial system has been abolished. There is no more CAR now. The SOLE jurisdiction to determine the just compensation is given to RTC. It does not depend on the jurisdictional amount, there is no amount deposited because the law says that it is RTC which has jurisdiction for as long as the subject matter, the nature of the action is just compensation The power of CAR before also covers the determination of whether the parties are landlord-tenant or landlord-farmer, RTC has no jurisdiction over that as of now. It is the other arm of DAR that determines this, the DARAB. WHY SHARED TENANCY WAS ABOLISHED In labor law the employee has security of tenure, in Agra law, the agricultural lessee has security of tenure under RA 3844. Shared tenancy depends on the agreement between the landowner and the tenant. What is important in shared tenancy is sharing but previous laws have not focus on the tenurial status or the continuity of relation or the guarantee of the physical possession and enjoyment and management of the party. So right now, if farmer covered under RA 3844, the law says under Sec. 10, in case of sale or alienation of the legal

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possession, transferee shall will be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligation of the lessee. For example, if you have a landowner who wants to remove a farmer from the agri land and you have no leasehold relation, you have no law like this but probably there were few laws before that provide safety measures before a farmer or tenant can be ejected. However the law is silent before whether what will happen to the Agri-lessor will sell the property to another person. So if you want to eject the tenant you can ask the dummy to eject the tenant. This cannot be done now because there is an assurance of the status. This kind of relation is physical agreement, landowner and farmer agree, okay landowner ako ang yuta, farmer ikaw maoy service. They have a term in contract. Let’s say we have 10 years in the agreement. Do you think after 10 years, you can eject the tenant or farmer? NO, not anymore. Notwithstanding of the expiration of the term or period of the contract, the farmer is guaranteed of tenurial status. Sec. 9 of the law, in case of death or physical incapacity of the Agri-lessee the relation will continue. In Sec. 9 there are three persons who can succeed-that is where continuity of relation comes in- (1)Surviving spouse; (2) Eldest direct descendant by consanguinity and; (3) Direct descendant in the order of age priority.

June 29, 2016 You know how it is to redeem in a foreclosure in civil law: One year after the foreclosure. In Agra, under RA 3844, it is 180 days. In ordinary civil law foreclosure, 1 year after the registration of the property to the Register of Deeds. The Certificate of Sale will be registered at the Register of Deeds. That is where the reckoning point of the one year period. It is different in Agrarian Law, in Section 12 of the RA 3844, you have lessees right of redemption (Agricultural lessees), its redemption period is 180 days from notice in writing to be served by the vendees on all lessee affected and the DAR. Vendee in the auction is the one who will serve the notice. Who are to be notified: all lessees affected and the Department of Agrarian Reform. Po vs Dampal Petitioner who is the highest bidder in an auction conducted when the farmlands were foreclosed by the bank. Now, this one is very important: After the foreclosure with Po as the highest bidder, the previous owner (mortgagor) and the tenant filed a civil case against the bank for annulment of mortgage. Meanwhile the tenant filed a complaint for legal redemption made in DARAB. And that agency has the different interpretation on the complaint for legal redemption. The Adjudicator is allowed. It was a prescription and that the requirement of notice was complied when the tenant filed the civil case. Remember: Civil case was filed ahead for legal redemption. Now, with the DARAB central office reversed the lack of notice of sale of the tenant and the DAR. The basis is Section 12. Section 12 requires a notice in writing. That was not complied. However, since the tenant was partly a plaintiff in the civil case that was filed ahead of the complaint for legal redemption, then there must be substantial compliance of the law. But the SC did not agree with that argument. SC said that there was an express requirement of the law. Notice of writing is indispensable. Thus, the period to redeem has not begun to run. So the

legal redemption should be granted because it was denied because of prescription by the Regional Adjudicator because it was filed beyond the 180 days. Extinguishment: 1. Abandonment 2. Voluntary Surrender 3. Absence of first ____ in Section 9 (di ko kagets kay sir kani na part) Extinguishment - normally is voluntary, depends on the lessee Dispossession – dispossess is similar to eject; based on an offense committed by the lessee. Section 36 listed this grounds for dispossession under RA 3844: (1) The agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located, into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor, is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided, further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions. (2) The agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure; (3) The agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other than what had been previously agreed upon; (4) The agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine; (5) The land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or negligence of the agricultural lessee; (6) The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or

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(7) The lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twentyseven. We will have to focus on number 6 because this is subject on several cases. Sta. Ana vs. Carpo If truly there is no leasehold relation between parties, then the remedy is a civil law case. But if there is leasehold relations, agrarian court is the one who has jurisdiction. Go directly to the ruling of the SC:

So the principles (discussed) 1 Wilful and deliberate non-payment is needed 2. It must have lasted for at least two years of non-payment (another principle)

What was the basis as to why the Supreme Court held that the nonpayment must have lasted for at least two years? The Supreme Court cited a decree, PD 816. This law says. Continued that refusal or continued refusal to the lease rental by the agri lessee, shall upon hearing the judgment result in the cancellation of the CLT issued in the agri lessee’s name.

1) Burden of Proof: The lessor because of the principle of security of tenure of lessee 2) Failure to pay means “wilful and deliberate” Comment of Atty: The law does not say “wilful and deliberate” (just mentioned “non-payment of rental) but the SC qualified in this case. Facts: Evidence was an affidavit executed by the lessee stating the Leon, the lessor, refused to receive. If there is refusal, how can there be wilful and deliberate intent? Plus, there were two letters informing him of the _____ base rentals. If a mere affidavit is sufficient is Agra Law? (Compared to Civil Law System, an affidavit generally is not enough unless he testifies. But there is an exception: Ejectment and other cases that are summary in nature) What about agra? No. Judicial affidavit applies only to all court and other quasijudicial agencies under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. DARAB is not. So a mere affidavit will suffice. Depending of course of the contents of the affidavit. Natividad vs. Mariano Facts: Non-payment of rentals and Petition for Ejectment. Now, here is this Ernesto who allege that he purchased the property in an auction. He filed the ejectment case. After the purchase according to him, he verbally demanded for respondents to pay the rentals. And respondents refused to pay You have another principle here. (Take note Sta Ana) Only for the specifically enumerated causes of dispossession. You cannot add another cause under Section 36. Three points discussed by SC: 1) Was there demand? 2) Was there deliberate and wilful failure to payment of rentals? 3) Whether the lease rentals paid to Corazon and Laureano was valid? (They were former owners of the land) T/N: Ernesto was a purchaser of an auction. So according to the facts, the lessees were paying the rentals continuously to the previous owners. They do not know that Ernesto was the new owner of the land. Ernesto did not present proof that he demanded the lessees. Thus, there was no demand. --------

Presidential Decree 816 Section 1. That the continuing and deliberate refusal of the agricultural lessees to pay their leasehold rentals to the landowners/agricultural lessors cannot be countenanced and shall not remain unchecked or unpunished; Section 2. That any agricultural lessee of a rice or corn land under Presidential Decree No. 27 who deliberately refuses and/or continues to refuse to pay the rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years shall, upon hearing and final judgment, forfeit the Certificate of Land Transfer issued in his favor, if his farmholding is already covered by such Certificate of Land Transfer, and his farmholding; Section 3. That any agricultural lessee whose landholding is not yet covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer and who shall continue not to pay his lease rentals or amortization payments when they fall due for a period of two (2) years to the landowner/agricultural lessor shall, upon proper hearing and judgment, lose his right to be issued a Certificate of Land Transfer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and his farmholding; Section 4. That landholdings subject of forfeiture under the preceding Section shall be turned over to the Samahang Nayon with which the agricultural lessee is affiliated for assignment to a qualified member or members of the association whose landholding/s is/are of uneconomic size in accordance with the policies laid down by the Department of Agrarian Reform; Section 5. That any action for violation of the provisions of the preceding Sections 2 and 3 shall be cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations which is hereby vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide the same; Section 6. All provisions of existing laws, orders, decrees, and rules and regulations which are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. ---CLT (Certificate of Land Title) is the ticket of land transfer. It is the term used under PD 27. It is a document to be given to a tenant or a farmer preparatory to an issuance of an emancipation patent. It would seem that based on PD 816, the Supreme Court is making an analogy when they used this principle that lasted “for at least two years”. Meaning, if we had this under PD 816 and the period of nonpayment is two years will result to the cancellation of CLT then might as well as dubbed it as a minimum period for non-payment of rental for

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ground to disposes the lessee under section 36. Because I think you will all agree that this one, PD 816, has nothing to do with dispossession. It talks about cancellation of title but not dispossession. So I submit that the Supreme Court is adapting the law by analogy. Applying it to nonpayment of rental as ground to dispossess based on this. Now this bothers me, the Supreme Court clarified what is the meaning of deliberate to be absolute aside from defining the Sta. Ana case. “It must be non-payment of lease rentals to be absolute”. Kailangan wla gyuy bayad! To be considered deliberate or wilful. The example like, marked by the complete absence of any payment. Dli ba illogical? Because probably in the past months, the tenant was paying but now if I refuse to pay, I cannot be held to be considered as wilful and deliberate non-payment? That should not be the case. Because here. There were payments for 2 years. So if there were payments. This principle will apply. Now, you must take note that this are my observations dli nani sa Supreme Court. Now, my question is this: 1. 2.

Why did the Supreme Court applied PD 816? Considering PD 816 applies only to rice and corn. That’s why the word CLT is there in PD 816 Why did the y question the applicability of PD 816? Because there is nothing in the facts that will show you whether the land is rice or corn.

RA 3844 is silent on the non-payment of rental. Because non-payment of rental is a ground to dispossess. There was no period and you can’t find the words “wilful and deliberate”. Ako nalang mag-question, ako nalang say mu-answer para mahuman (Corny mani si Sir oi. HAHAHA) and this is my answer: 1.

Why did the Court applied PD 816? I made an assumption. The assumption being that the words “crop” appeared in the case. Crop here applies to rice. This CLT appeared also in the case. You can find CLT in PD 27 and this applies to rice and corn. Mao tingale ang reason sa supreme court it applied PD 816 in the Case of Natividad.

their supposed poor quality. This circumstance was taken by the Court together with the fact that said tenants even exerted efforts to make up for the rejected rentals through the payments made for the other year Roxas v. Cabatuando – SC held that the tenants therein did not wilfully and deliberately fail to pay their leasehold rentals since they had serious doubts as to the legality of their contract with respect to their non-sharing in the coconut produce, which thus prompted them to withhold their remittances in good faith. In contrast to Antonio and Roxas, the landowner in this case never rejected any rental payment duly tendered by respondents or their predecessors-in-interest. Neither was the legality of their agricultural leasehold contract with the landowner ever put into issue so as to intimate that they merely withheld their remittances in good faith. Thus, with the fortuitous event defense taken out of the equation, and considering the wilfulness and deliberateness were not found to have been established, the Court is impelled to agree with the DARAB that respondents herein wilfully and deliberately chose not to pay their leasehold rentals to the landowner when they fell due. Atty Comments: Sa Ato pa, if you do not fall between Roxas or Antonio then wla kay depensa, there is deliberate failure to pay. And I don’t think that is right. Why? Because who has the burden? It is the land owner. What was admitted was the non-payment of rental but in Sta. v. Carpo the SC said non-payment means “wilful and deliberate”. And who is suppose to prove that? The land owner! You don’t render a judgment based on logic or simple deduction based on Antonio or Roxas. But for me, it would have been better if the Supreme Court would have concluded that anyway that this is Rice land, so why not adopt PD 816? PD 816 said that non-payment should have lasted for at least 2 years diba? In this case the non-payment lasted for more than 20 years. Based on the case of Natividad, that is considered as wilful and deliberate. Ngano man? More than 2 years naman. Section 34 for RA 3844 - Liabilities of lessor if he ejects tenant without authorization

Nieves v. Duldulao Facts: You have an owner who filed a case to eject a tenant. The tenant invoke fortuitous event such as the flooding and typhoons as a defense for the non-payment of rentals. Issue: Is it a valid defense?

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Fine or Imprisonment Damages suffered Attorney’s fees Remuneration for last income

Lease Rental – Shall not be more than the equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest during the 3 agricultural years immediately preceding amount used for seeds and costs of harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling and processing. Atty Comments:

Held: No. Under Paragraph 6 of Sec. 36 provides “The agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rentals when it falls due: Provided, That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the nonpayment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished.” Antonio v. Manahan – SC held that the records show that the landowner actually rejected the rentals tendered by the tenants therein due to

Authorization here means, DARAB or PARAB. This also presupposes a real leasehold relation because the word used is “tenant”. Remember, this leasehold relation. Somebody is furnishing the land, somebody cultivates and the produce is shared. Naay magbayad ug lease rental sa land owner, the law fixed the lease rental. Ngano man? Luoy kaayo ang lessee if there is no cap. Basin i-take advantage sa land owner. You have to take note, Agri years is different from a calendar years. Agri years depends upon a commodity. There are certain commodity who have 2 or more Agri years in 1 calendar year. If I’m not mistaken there are 2 agri years in 1 calendar year.

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Suppletory Application Reyes v. Reyes This confers that RA 3844 has suppletory application and you will find here the confirmation made by the Supreme Court that only Section 35 was repealed by CARL The Supreme Court emphasize that there are 2 modes that provided for in the establishment of an agricultural leasehold relation: (1) by operation of law in accordance with Section 4 of the said act or (2) by oral or written agreement either express or implied. Atty Comment: I submit there is a third mode. What is that? Katong there is a retained area and the farmer chooses to retain. It falls under leasehold but it does not fall under these two. Ngano man? Operation of law, those under staring 1963, shared tenancy convert into by operation of the law into leaseholds. What about oral or written agreement? The word is agreement. However even if the land owner doesn’t want to, he has no choice since the choice is given to the farmer whether to remain or not to remain. Pero ato-ato rana kay wla mana diri (LOL). Agra Transcript July 2, 2016 

What are covered under P.D. 27? -only those private agri land devoted to rice and corn -Lands under the public domain are not included

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Issues: A. Whether or not there is a valid abandonment made by Respondent Mabalot. B. Whether the act of Respondent Mabalot in conveying to petitioner the right to possess and cultivate the disputed parcel of land constitutes a valid abandonment thereby rendering the property available for transfer to other bona fide farmers. C. Whether the issuance of an emancipation patent and thereafter a transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner has validated and legitimized possession and ownership over the disputed property." Held:

P.D. 27 effectivity date: oct. 21, 1972 -lands acquired starting oct 21, 1972, if landowners are not yet paid just compensation, CARL took effect on june 10, 1988. Just compensation will now be based on CARL, not on PD 27.

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DAR regional office. DAR’s District Office found that respondent merely gave the subject land to petitioner as guarantee for the payment of a loan he had incurred from the latter; and recommending that the CLT remain in the name of respondent and that the money loan be returned to petitioner. Petitioner insisted that the subject land had been sold to him by respondent and requested the DAR to cancel the CLT in respondent’s name. Another investigation was conducted on the matter which led to the issuance of an Order issued by DAR Regional Director. In the said Order, the DAR found the act of respondent in surrendering the subject land in favor of petitioner as constituting abandonment thereof, and denied respondent’s prayer for redemption of the subject land. Respondent’s request for reinvestigation was denied in a Resolution. Thus, respondent appealed the case to the DAR Central Office which an order was issued reversing the assailed Order of DAR Regional Director and ordering the petitioner to return the subject land to respondent. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.

Differences of PD 27 and CARL o Under PD 27, what is included is only private agri land devoted to rice and corn. CARL includes all other agri land regardless of the commodity produced. o Under PD 27, there are limitations on the number of hectares a farmer may own. There’s a distinction between judicated and non judicated. Under CARL, there is no more distinction, and the number of areas also differs. Can lands acquired under PD 27 be transferred by DAR to another qualified beneficiary? Estolas vs. Mabalot , G.R. No. 133706, May 7, 2002

Facts: A Certificate of Land Transfer (hereinafter referred to as CLT) was issued in favor of respondent over a 5,000 square meter lot (hereinafter referred to as subject land). Needing money for medical treatment, respondent passed on the subject land to the petitioner. According to respondent, there was only a verbal mortgage; while according to petitioner, a sale had taken place. Respondent filed a Complaint against the petitioner before the Barangay Lupon in Pangasinan for the purpose of redeeming the subject land. When no amicable settlement was reached, the case was referred to the

Main Issue: Abandonment The subject property was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27. A CLT was issued in his favor. PD 27 specifically provides that when private agricultural land -- whether classified as landed estate or not – is primarily devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy, the tenant farmers thereof shall be deemed owners of a portion constituting a family-size farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated, and three (3) hectares if irrigated. Petitioner avers that respondent neither protested when the former had the subject land surveyed and planted with 40 mango trees, nor attempted to return the money he had borrowed from petitioner in 1976. Because the lot has been abandoned by respondent, the beneficiary, and because PD 27 does not prohibit the transfer of properties acquired under it, petitioner theorizes that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) may award the land to another qualified farmer-grantee. Non-transferability of Land Awarded Under PD 27 We do not agree. PD 27 specifically provides that title to land acquired pursuant to its mandate or to that of the Land Reform Program of the government shall not be transferable except to the grantee’s heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means. The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Upon the promulgation of PD 27, their emancipation gave them the rights to possess, cultivate and enjoy the landholding for themselves. These rights were granted by the government to them as the tillers and to no other. Thus, to insure their continuous possession and enjoyment of the property, they could not, under the law, effect any transfer except back to the government or, by hereditary succession, to their successors. Furthermore, this Court has always ruled that agrarian laws must be interpreted liberally in favor of the grantees in order to give full force and effect to the clear intent of such laws: "to achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers"; and to make them "more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society." Neither are we convinced that an award under PD 27 may be transferred to another in case the grantee abandons it. The law is explicit.

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No Abandonment

For abandonment to exist, the following requisites must be proven: (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. There must be an actual, not merely a projected, relinquishment; otherwise, the right or claim is not vacated or waived and, thus, susceptible of being appropriated by another. In the present case, no such "wilful failure" has been demonstrated. Quite the contrary, respondent has continued to claim dominion over the land. No Valid Reallocation Furthermore, even if respondent did indeed abandon his right to possess and cultivate the subject land, any transfer of the property may only be made in favor of the government. In Corpuz v. Grospe, the Court held that there was a valid transfer of the land after the farmer-grantee had signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolution surrendering his possession of the landholding. This voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon constituted a surrender or transfer to the government itself. In the present case, there was no valid transfer in favor of the government. It was petitioner himself who requested the DAR to cancel respondent’s CLT and to issue another one in his favor.21 Unlike in the above-cited case, respondent’s land was not turned over to the government or to any entity authorized by the government to reallocate the farm holdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Petitioner cannot, by himself, take over a farmer-beneficiary’s landholding, allegedly on the ground that it was abandoned. The proper procedure for reallocation must be followed to ensure that there was indeed abandonment, and that the subsequent beneficiary is a qualified farmer-tenant as provided by law.

land they till, they are still required to pay the cost of the land before the title is transferred to them and that pending the payment of just compensation, actual title to the tenanted land remains with the landowner. In Paris, the application of the process of agrarian reform was still incomplete thus, the Court held therein that with the passage of R.A. No. 6657 before its completion, the process should now be completed under R.A. No. 6657, with P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 applying only suppletorily. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample. The land therefore should be valued under RA 6657 following the guidelines set in DAR AO no. 5, series of 1998 and not under PD 27. Land Bank v. Heirs of Cruz: -The determination of just compensation should be based on RA 6657 for lands covered under PD 27. PD 27 applies only suppletory. IV. RA 6657 (as amended by RA Nos. 7881, 7905, 8532, and 9700) 

Is industrialization a component of Agrarian Reform?Yes. Sec.2 (RA 6657) “…sound rural development and industrialization” “…to promote industrialization” Industrial inputs necessary to agriculture(fertilizers, insecticides, hybrid seeds, irrigation systems, tractors)

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Can Private Corporation acquire ownership of alienable lands of public domain?

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED Estolas v. Mabalot: Land may only be transferred either by succession or to government (landbank-in case of non-payment of amortization, landbank can foreclose the property [even if 10 years pa]). DAR cannot transfer directly to a qualified beneficiary. 

PD 27 applies suppletory on just compensation (no express repeal by RA 6657)

Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175, September 29, 2008 Facts: Case is regarding the valuation to the land of the respondents of which the area was placed by the government under the coverage of the operation land transfer program under PD 27. The LBP, petitioners herein, valued the land in accordance with the guidelines set forth under PD 27 and EO No. 228 and pegged the value of the land amounting to P106,935.76 per hectare. Respondents rejected petitioner’s valuation and insist on claiming that the said land is worth between P150,00 to P200,000 per hectare. The Cagayan Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) however valued the land at P80,000 following the factors set under RA 6557 (CARL) and of which such value, as just compensation to the respondent, was approve by the lower court (RTC) setting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Issue: Whether or not PD 27 or RA 6557 is the applicable law in determining the value of the land which was taken under PD 27 or before RA 6557 was enacted. Held: The Court laid down in Paris v. Alfeche the applicability of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 in relation to R.A. No. 6657 in the matter of the payment of just compensation. There the Court explained that while under P.D. No. 27 tenant farmers are already deemed owners of the

Chavez v. PEA: No, only through lease not exceeding 25 yrs. Renewable not more than 25yrs. And not to exceed 1,000 hectares (CONST., Art. XII, Sec.3) 

Sec. 3 (b) “Agriculture” or “Agricultural Activity” - Means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by person whether natural or juridical.

Luz Farms v. Sec. – Sec.3 (b) unconstitutional (“Raising of livestock, poultry and swine” per SC) - “use of land is incidental and not the principal factor” RA 7881 (effective May 1995) - amended Sec.3 (b) and removed “the raising of livestock, poultry or fish” raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. (no land is tilled and no crop is harvested in livestock and poultry farming”, “livestock and poultry do not sprout from the land”, “there are neither tenants or landlords, only employees”) Industrial, not agricultural activity. Great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells,

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elevated water tanks, pump houses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances. DAR Admin. Order No. 03-95 (rules and regulations governing the exemption/exclusion of fishpond and prawn farms from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to RA 6657, as amended by RA 7881) Policies: a. In general, private agri lands owned by individuals or entities actually, directly, and exclusively used for prawn farms and fishponds as of march 12, 1995 shall be exempt from the coverage of CARP b. Lands devoted to prawn or fishponds which have already been distributed to ARB’s with the corresponding CLOA’s issued, being a consummated transaction, shall no longer be exempt from the coverage under the CARP c. Fishpond or prawn farms which are already been subjected to the CARL by voluntary offer to sell (VOS) or are under Commercial Farm Development (CFD) or for with notices of acquisition (NA) have already been issued to the landowner under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme, shall be exempt from CARP coverage only upon the consent of a simple and absolute majority of the actual regular workers or tenants within 1 year from March 12,1995 In case said workers object to the exemption, the subject fishpond or prawn farms shall be distributed collectively to the worker-beneficiaries or tenants who shall form a cooperative or association to manage the same. The land bank of the Philippines shall extend financial assistance to aid the said cooperatives through its countryside loan assistance program. In the event the 1 year period has elapsed and the required consent has not been obtained, the property becomes subject to CARL. d. e.

Xxxx Fishpond or prawn farms workers affected by exemption have the option to remain as workers or become beneficiaries in other agri lands. Workers who opt to choose to be a beneficiary may be awarded other lands covered by the CARP.

DAR Admin. Order No. 01, S. 2004 (RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE EXCLUSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS USED FOR CATTLE RAISING FROM THE COVERAGE OF CARP) Objective: To prevent circumvention of CARP and to protect the rights of ARBs due to unauthorized change/conversion or fraudulent declaration of areas used for cattle purposes. Coverage: All applications for exclusion from CARP of private agricultural lands actually, exclusively and directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988. Types of animal: cattle (of bovine family), bull, calf, cow. Policies: (1) Those ADE used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded (exclusion to be granted only upon proof and continuously utilized up to time of application); (2) Any change in use shall be subject to policies on land conversion (3) Only the grazing/pasture area and for infrastructure necessary for cattle raising shall be excluded; all other areas shall be covered. (4) Encourage growth of cattle industry (5) If filing of exclusion is in response to notice of CARP coverage, DAR shall deny due course if application is filed 60 days after date of receipt of notice. (6) Only exclusion applications fully supported by documents shall be accepted

Need to file an application with DAR, not automatic exempt from the coverage. So that DAR can verify. DAR v. Sutton: Masbate land -cattle-breeding capital of Phil (VOS - due to Luz Farms - withdraw VOS) - Constitutionality of AO No. 9, S. 1993 (prescribing a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising); - SC nullified AO; RA 7881 changed definition of “agricultural activity“ by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. Admin. Order No. 07, S. 2008 Policy guidelines: Lands ADE used for livestock purposes as of 15 June 1988 and continuously used shall be excluded; conversely, those not ADE are subject to CARP if one or more of the following conditions apply: (1) there is agricultural activity in the area (i.e., cultivation of soil, planting of crops, growing of trees including harvesting); (2) land is suitable for agriculture and occupied and tilled by farmers. In line with principle of regularity in the performance of official functions, all processes by DAR per AO No. 9 are valid. Sec. 3 (c) “Agricultural land” land devoted to agricultural activity & not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Republic vs Salvador Lopez Agri-business Facts Subject of this petition are four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 160.1161 hectares registered in the name of Salvador N. Lopez Agri-Business Corporation. On August 2, 1991, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards (sic) to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). On December 10, 1992, petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO), Davao Oriental, an Application for Exemption of the lots covered by TCT No. T-12637 and T-12639 from CARP coverage. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner's 105 heads of cattle, 5 carabaos,11 horses, 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine, prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). On December 13, 1992 and March 1, 1993, the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. On June 24, 1993, TCT No. T-12635 covering Lots 1454-A & 1296 was cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under RP T-16356. On February 7, 1994, petitioner through its President, Salvador N. Lopez, Jr., executed a letter-affidavit addressed to the respondent-Secretary requesting for the exclusion from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that they needed the additional area for its livestock business. On March 28, 1995, petitioner filed before the DAR Regional Director of Davao City an application for the exemption from CARP coverage of Lots 1454-A and 1296 stating that it has been operating grazing lands even prior to June 15, 1988 and that the said two (2) lots form an integral part of its grazing land.

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The DAR Regional Director, after inspecting the properties, issued an Order dated March 5, 1997 denying the application for exemption of Lots 1454-A and 1296 on the ground that it was not clearly shown that the same were actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock raising since in its application, petitioner itself admitted that it needs the lots for additional grazing area. The application for exemption, however of the other two (2) parcels of land was approved. Issue: Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL Held: In contrast, the Limot lands were found to be agricultural lands devoted to coconut trees and rubber and are thus not subject to exemption from CARP coverage. In the Report dated 06 April 1994, the team that conducted the inspection found that the entire Limot lands were devoted to coconuts (41.5706 hectares) and rubber (8.000 hectares) and recommended the denial of the application for exemption. 30 Verily, the Limot lands were actually, directly and exclusively used for agricultural activities, a fact that necessarily makes them subject to the CARP. These findings of the inspection team were given credence by the DAR Regional Director who denied the application, and were even subsequently affirmed by the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals. In the 07 February 1994 Letter-Affidavit addressed to the DAR Secretary, SNLABC requested the exemption of the Limot lands on the ground that the corporation needed the additional area for its livestock business. As pointed out by the DAR Regional Director, this Letter-Affidavit is a clear indication that the Limot lands were not directly, actually and exclusively used for livestock raising. SNLABC casually dismisses the clear import of their Letter-Affidavit as a "poor choice of words." Unfortunately, the semantics of the declarations of SNLABC in its application for exemption are corroborated by the other attendant factual circumstances and indicate its treatment of the subject properties as non-livestock. Verily, the MARO itself, in the Investigation Report cited by no less than SNLABC, found that the livestock were only moved to the Limot lands sporadically and were not permanently designated there. The DAR Secretary even described SNLABC's use of the area as a "seasonal extension of the applicant's 'grazing lands' during the summer." Therefore, the Limot lands cannot be claimed to have been actually, directly and exclusively used for SNLABC's livestock business, especially since these were only intermittently and secondarily used as grazing areas. The said lands are more suitable — and are in fact actually, directly and exclusively being used — for agricultural purposes. · Tax declaration classified as agricultural land (one way to prove) - it is not conclusive. Milestone Farms, Inc. vs. Office of the President Facts: Petitioner Milestone Farms, Inc. (petitioner) was incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission on January 8, 1960. 4 Among its pertinent secondary purposes are: (1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; to acquire lands by purchase or lease, which may be needed for this purpose; and to sell and otherwise dispose of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock and their produce when advisable and beneficial to the corporation; (2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; to purchase or acquire and sell, or otherwise dispose of the supplies, stocks, equipment, accessories, appurtenances, products, and byproducts of said business; and (3) to import cattle, pigs, and other

livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock as may be authorized by law. 5 On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian reform law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect, which included the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage. However, on December 4, 1990, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled in Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform 6 that agricultural lands devoted to livestock, poultry, and/or swine raising are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Thus, in May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. (T410434) M-15750, (T-486101) M-7307, (T-486102) M-7308, (T274129) M-15751, (T-486103) M-7309, (T-486104) M-7310, (T332694) M-15755, (T-486105) M-7311, (T-486106) M-7312, M-8791, (T-486107) M-7313, (T-486108) M-7314, M-8796, (T-486109) M7315, (T-486110) M-9508, and M-6013, and located in Pinugay, Baras, Rizal, from the coverage of the CARL, pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms. Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993 (DAR A.O. No. 9), setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage. Thus, on January 10, 1994, petitioner re-documented its application pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 9. 7 Acting on the said application, the DAR's Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) of Region IV conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner's property and arrived at the following findings: [T]he actual land utilization for livestock, swine and poultry is 258.8422 hectares; the area which served as infrastructure is 42.0000 hectares; ten (10) hectares are planted to corn and the remaining five (5) hectares are devoted to fish culture; that the livestock population are 371 heads of cow, 20 heads of horses, 5,678 heads of swine and 788 heads of cocks; that the area being applied for exclusion is far below the required or ideal area which is 563 hectares for the total livestock population; that the approximate area not directly used for livestock purposes with an area of 15 hectares, more or less, is likewise far below the allowable 10% variance; and, though not directly used for livestock purposes, the ten (10) hectares planted to sweet corn and the five (5) hectares devoted to fishpond could be considered supportive to livestock production. On January 21, 1997, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao (Secretary Garilao) issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP. 14 Secretary Garilao opined that, for private agricultural lands to be excluded from CARP, they must already be devoted to livestock, poultry, and swine raising as of June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. He found that the Certificates of Ownership of Large Cattle submitted by petitioner showed that only 86 heads of cattle were registered in the name of petitioner's president, Misael Vera, Jr., prior to June 15, 1988; 133 were subsequently bought in 1990, while 204 were registered from 1992 to 1995. Secretary Garilao gave more weight to the certificates rather than to the headcount because "the same explicitly provide for the number of cattle owned by petitioner as of June 15, 1988. Issue:

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Whether or not the lands are covered under CARL Held: With the procedural issue disposed of, we find that petitioner's arguments fail to persuade. Its invocation of Sutton is unavailing. In Sutton, we held: In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.

Atty Capanas believes that DAR is not competent to say land is not suitable for agriculture. It should be the department of agriculture DAR should respect the classification made by competent authorities If mineral or forest, it is the DENR (executive) If residential, commercial or industrial, it is the LGU’s (legislative act) by means of ordinance (went to a process, public hearing) or a Presidential Proclamation -when is classification done? Must be done prior to June 15, 1988 If you believe that your land should be exempt even if there is agricultural activity but it is already classified as resident prior to June 15, 1988, it is supposed to be exempt but there is a process If the classification is made by LGU’s, it needs an approval from the HLURB. Approval from the predecessor of HLURB, is valid. Natalia Realty v. DAR – 1979

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. Petitioner's admission that, since 2001, it leased another ranch for its own livestock is fatal to its cause. 64 While petitioner advances a defense that it leased this ranch because the occupants of the subject property harmed its cattle, like the CA, we find it surprising that not even a single police and/or barangay report was filed by petitioner to amplify its indignation over these alleged illegal acts. Moreover, we accord respect to the CA's keen observation that the assailed MARO reports and the Investigating Team's Report do not actually contradict one another, finding that the 43 cows, while owned by petitioner, were actually pastured outside the subject property. · Adjacent property is not covered. 



Definitions o “agriculture, agricultural enterprise” or agricultural activity” (sec 3 [b]) o Used among others, in:  “sec 4. Scope. The CARL of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No 131 and EO 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. When lands are no longer suitable for agriculture, they are supposed not to be covered by CARL. The law looks into the nature of the land.

Agra transcript july 9, 2016 Agricultural Land (Section 3[c]) Most important element! “Not classified as mineral, residential, forest, commercial, or industrial”

Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312 hectares of land located in the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban as town site areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite. The NATALIA properties are situated within the areas proclaimed as town site reservation. NATALIA properties later became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision which consisted of roughly 90.3307 hectares. NATALIA immediately registered its objection to the Notice of Coverage SC: “They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of the reservation”. Lands previously converted by government agencies, other than DAR, to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL were outside the coverage of reservations, but applied also to real estate converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of the CARL. NOTE: DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 and the case of Natalia Realty, Inc opine that with respect to the conversion of agricultural land covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of the DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15, 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance. However, the reclassification of lands to non-agricultural uses shall not operate to divest tenant-farmers of their rights over lands covered by PD 27, which have been vested prior to June 15, 1988. In order to implement the intent and purpose of the provisions of the aforecited laws, the DAR has issued guidelines through AO No. 4, Series of 2003. (Please refer to the attached files together with this reviewer… The important provisions there are only the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, APPROVING AUTHORITIES, EFFECT ON PRE-EXISTING CARP COVERAGE and PROTESTS).

-who makes the classification?

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DAR AO No. 4 (Rules on exemption) - “all lands already classified as commercial, industrial or residential before June 15,1988 no longer need conversion clearance” Requirements: Sworn application, copy of title, certification from HLURB (zoning or classification, citing zoning ordinance), among others. Public notice and Disturbance compensation (in case there are farmers there, to inform them) Roxas & Co., Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999 Facts: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner Roxas & Co., Inc and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under RA No. 6657. Petitioner is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner with TCTs andTax Declarations of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in Nasugbu, Batangas. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s landholdings are subject to coverage under the CARL, in view of the undisputed fact that petitioner’s landholdings have been converted to non-agricultural uses by Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 which declared the Municipality of Nasugbu as a tourist zone, and the zoning ordinance of the said Municipality re-classifying certain portions of the petitioner’s landholdings as non-agricultural or at the very least entitle the petitioner to apply for conversion as conceded by respondent DAR.

In 1989, Mateo filed with the DAR the petition for the award to them of subject disputed lots under CARP. On March 18, 1992, the respondent spouses Mateo, relying on their claim that the subject lots are agricultural land within the coverage of the CARP, brought before the respondent RTC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, to enjoin the NHA from bulldozing further and making constructions on the lots under controversy. RTC Judge Allarde issued the injunction against NHA. Held: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (included the disputed lots) was reserved, inter alia, under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the NHA, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity SC: As early as April 26, 1971, the Tala Estate (including the disputed lots) was reserved under Presidential Proclamation No. 843, for the housing program of the National Housing Authority, the same has been categorized as not being devoted to the agricultural activity contemplated by Section 3 (c) of R.A. No. 6657, and is, therefore, outside the coverage of the CARL. Verily, the assailed Orders of the respondent Court declaring the lots under controversy as "agricultural land" and restraining the petitioner from involving the same in its housing project thereon, are evidently bereft of any sustainable basis Advincula-Velasquez vs. CA,et al., G.R. No. 111387, June 8,2004

Held: Respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner’s landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner’s application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged for conversion is the DAR. The petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR’s failure to observe due process therein. In and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to the respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner’s application for conversion. Notice of coverage was wrongfully sent SC: . DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners' landholdings does not ipso facto give the Supreme Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The power to determine whether Hacienda Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are nonagricultural which exempts from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with the Supreme Court. Case was remanded to DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for conversion NHA vs. Allarde, G.R. No. 106593, November 16, 1999 Facts: Lots 836 and 839, registered in the of the Republic of the Philippines, and covered by the TCT No. 34624 and No. 34627, respectively, were acquired b the Republic on April 2, 1938 from Philippine Trust Company. They form part of the Tala Estate in Bagong Silang, Kalookan City, which, on April 26, 1971, was reserved by Proclamation No. 843 for, among others, the housing programs of the National housing Authority. According to private respondent Rufino Mateo, he had lived in the disputed lots since his birth in 1928. In 1959, he started farming and working on six hectare portion of said lots, after the death of his father who had cultivated a 13 hectare portion of the same lots.

The petitioners were the agricultural lessees of a Riceland located in Parañaque Metro Manila. In 1978, Sps. Nery and the Lorenzo sold the property to the Delta Motor’s Corporation (DMC). Petitioner Velasquez, in his capacity as leaseholder agricultural tenant, filed an action for the redemption of the said property before the Court of Agrarian Relation. The CAR dismiss the petition for lack on the part of the petitioner to redeem the property in its acquisition price in the amount of 2,319,210 pesos but directing the defendant to maintain the petitioner as agricultural lessee to the land in question. Petitioner Velasquez and the defendants appealed the decision of the CAR to the Intermediate Appellate Court who affirmed the decision of the CAR. Petitioner Velasquez filed a petition for review to the Supreme Court who issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the CAR’s decision pending the outcome of the petition. In 1981, the land in question was reclassified as residential zone under the ordinance issued by the city of Manila. Later, the land in question was mortgage by the DMC to the PNB as a security for its obligation who later foreclose it because of the failure of the DMC to pay its account. The PNB in 1986 executed a deed of sale of the said land in favor of the Remman Enterprise Inc. who decided to develop it in to a residential subdivision. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court issue a decision on the petition for review filed by the petitioner Velasquez affirming the decision of the IAC stating that the case had become moot and academic with regards the claim of the petitioner against the DMC considering that the property had been foreclose by the PNB declaring however that the petitioner may redeem the property from the PNB and its transferee. The record was remanded to the PARAD or the Provincial Agrarian Adjudication for the petitioner to exercise their right of redemption but since the case had become moot and academic, the PARAD denied the action of the petitioner to recover the property against the DMC since the land in question is now a residential land. The right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee was terminated and the property was now in the possession of the Remman Enterprise, Inc. The petitioner filed a

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motion before the DARAB or the Department of Agrarian Adjudication Board who reverses the decision of the PARAD stating that the land in question is an agricultural land and uphold the right of the petitioner as an agricultural lessee to recover the said land .The Remman Enterprise filed an appeal before the CA who reverses the decision of the DARAB because the land in question was already reclassified as residential land as early as 1981 converting it from agricultural land in to nonagricultural land. The petitioner filed a motion to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not the land was an agricultural land or a residential land. Held: According to the Supreme Court, agricultural land was defined under RA. 6657 as those lands devoted to agricultural activities and not classified as forest, minerals, residential and industrial land. The records show that as early as 1981, the landholding was reclassified as a low density zone under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, Series of 1981 before Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on June 15, 1998. It has been considered as early as that time for residential purposes thus not within the ambit of CAR. SC: Since the property was already reclassified as residential by the Metro Manila Commission and the HSRC before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657, there was no need for the private respondent to secure any post facto approval thereof from the DAR DAR vs. Berenguer Facts: The respondents were the registered owners of several residential and industrial lands with a total area of 58.0649 hectares located in Barangay Bibincahan, Sorsogon. In April 1998, the respondents received from the DAR notices of coverage of their said landholdings by the Government's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657(Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). They protested the notices of coverage, filing on October 5, 1998, in the office of DAR Regional Director Percival Dalugdug (Regional Director Dalugdug) in Legaspi City, their application for exclusion of their landholdings from CARP coverage, and praying for the lifting of the notices of coverage. In October and November 1998, the DAR Secretary, without acting on the respondents' application for exclusion, cancelled their titles and issued certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs), covering their landholdings, to the members of the Baribag Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (Baribag), not to the respondents' workers on the landholdings, although Baribag was not impleaded in the respondents' application for exclusion. In support of their claim that their landholdings were already classified as residential and industrial, the respondents submitted the following documents, namely: a. The certification dated May 18, 1999 issued by HLURB, stating, among others, that the Town Plan/Zoning Ordinance of Sorsogon, Sorsogon (classifying Barangay Bibincalan, * where the respondents' properties were located, as a residential and commercial area), was approved by HLURB (then Human Settlements Commission/Human Settlements Regulatory Commission); b. An excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of the Municipality of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showing that Barangay Bibincalan * was part of the CentralBusiness District; hence, the respondents' landholdings in Bibincalan * were classified as residential and industrial;

c. Resolution No. 5 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, series of 1981, expanding the area of the poblacion to include Barangay Bibincalan, * among others; d. The certification dated August 27, 1997 issued by the Office of the Zoning Administrator, Office of the Mayor, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, signed by Deputized Zoning Administrator Raul Jalmanzar, declaring that the respondents' landholdings were situated in Barangay Bibincalan * within the Poblacion area of the Municipality of Sorsogon; and e. Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, stating that a parcel of land was considered non-agricultural, and, therefore, beyond the coverage of the CARP, if it had been classified as residential, commercial, or industrial in the City or Municipality Land Use Plan or Zoning Ordinance approved by HLURB before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6657 on June 15, 1988. Issue: Whether or not the land is covered under RA 6657 Held: In ruling that the respondents' landholdings were not devoted to cattle raising, the DAR relied on DAR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9, series of 1993, which required that properties should be considered excluded from the coverage of the CARL only if it was established that as of June 15, 1988, the date of effectivity of the law, there existed the minimum ratio of one head of cattle to one hectare of land, and one head of cattle to 1.7815 hectares of infrastructure. According to the DAR, only 15 heads of cattle were found within the 58 hectares sought to be excluded based on the semestral survey conducted in Sorsogon by the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics in the period from 1988 to 1992, which was in contravention of DAO No. 9, series of 1993. The CA found, however, that heads of cattle were really being raised in thelandholdings of the respondents. This finding was not disputed by the DAR. In view of the finding of the CA, we cannot now hold differently, for we are bound by the finding of fact of the CA. Verily, the insufficiency of the number of heads of cattle found during the semestral survey did not automatically mean that the landholdings were not devoted to the raising of livestock. We concur with the CA that there could be several reasons to explain why the number of cattle was below the ratio prescribed under DAO No. 9 at the time of the survey, including pestilence, cattle rustling, or sale of the cattle. Resolution No. 5, passed on March 12, 1981 by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon, showed that the limits of the poblacion area of the municipality included Barangay Bibincahan, where the respondents' landholdings were situated. There is no dispute that as early as 1981, the respondents' landholdings have been part of the poblacion of Sorsogon, Sorsogon. Consistent with Hilario and Natalia, holding that the respondents' landholdings were non-agricultural, and, consequently, outside the coverage of the CARL, was fully warranted. In fact, the excerpt from the Comprehensive Development Plan of Sorsogon, Sorsogon showed that Barangay Bibincahan was within the Central Business District of the municipality. Alangilan v. Office of President SC: It is beyond cavil that the Alangilan landholding was classified as agricultural, reserved for residential in 1982, and was reclassified as residential-1 in 1994. However, contrary to petitioner's assertion, the term reserved for residential does not change the nature of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural. As aptly explained by the DAR Secretary, the term reserved for residential simply reflects the intended

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land use. It does not denote that the property has already been reclassified as residential, because the phrase reserved for residential is not a land classification category. Indubitably, at the time of the effectivity of the CARL in 1988, the subject landholding was still agricultural. This was bolstered by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had to pass an Ordinance in 1994, reclassifying the landholding as residential-1. If, indeed, the landholding had already been earmarked for residential use in 1982, as petitioner claims, then there would have been no necessity for the passage of the 1994 Ordinance. Heirs of Deleste vs Leviste Facts: The spouses Gregorio Nanaman (Gregorio) and Hilaria Tabuclin (Hilaria) were the owners of a parcel of agricultural land located in Tambo, Iligan City, consisting of 34.7 hectares (subject property). In 1975, the City of Iligan passed City Ordinance No. 1313, known as the "Zoning Regulation of Iligan City," reclassifying the subject property as commercial/residential. Petitioners claim that the land is outside the coverage because of ordinance while DAR contended that there is no evidence that the ordinance was approved by HLURB Issue: Coverage of subject property under CARP Held: Sc: Accompanying the certification dated Oct. 8, 1999 issued by Gil R. Balondo, Deputy Zoning Administrator of the city planning and development office, iligan city, and the letter dated Oct 8, 1999 issued by Ayunan B. Rajah, regional officer of the HLURB, is the certificate of approval issued by Imela Marcos, then minister of human settlements and chairperson of the HSRC, showing that the local zoning ordinance was, indeed approved on Sept 21, 1978. This leads to no other conclusion than that city ordinance no. 1313 enacted by the city of Iligan was approved by the HSRC, predecessor of HLURB. Rom vs Roxas & co. Facts: On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas, having an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares and constituting portions of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land 5 which is defined under Section 3 (c) thereof as "land devoted to agricultural activity . . . and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land." Respondent claimed that prior to the effectivity of the CARL on June 15, 1988, the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC [now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)]) under HSRC Resolution No. 123, Series of 1983. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR. In its Order 11 of November 6, 2002, the DAR granted the application in this wise: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Application for Exemption Clearance from CARP coverage filed by Roxas & Company, Inc., involving twenty-seven (27) parcels of land, specifically described in

pages 1 and 2 of this Order,[12] being portions of TCT No. T-44664, with an aggregate area of 21.1236 hectares located [in] Barangay Aga, Nasugbu, Batangas is hereby GRANTED, subject to the following conditions: 1. The farmer-occupants within subject parcels of land shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas of tillage until a final determination has been made on the amount of disturbance compensation due and entitlement of such farmer-occupants thereto by the PARAD of Batangas. 2. No development shall be undertaken within the subject parcels of land until the appropriate disturbance compensation has been paid to the farmer occupants who are determined by the PARAD to be entitled thereto. Proof of payment of disturbance compensation shall be submitted to this Office within ten (10) days from such payment; and 3. The cancellation of the CLOA issued to the farmer beneficiaries shall be subject of a separate proceeding before the PARAD of Batangas. ISSUE: Whether the land is covered under CARL. Held: Having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A 9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor. The Court recognized the power of a local government unit to classify and convert land from agricultural to non-agricultural prior to the effectivity of the CARL and thus upheld the validity of said zoning ordinance. Davao New Town vs Sps. Saliga -land involved are in Davao City -private respondent filed a complaint for injunction, cancellation of title and damages against petitioner before PARAD -private respondents alleged that they are their parents are tenants and that the transfer of lands to petitioner is fraudulent -petitioner answered that it is buyer in good faith and that the lands are classified as “urban/urabnizing zone” per “1979-2000 Comprehensive land use plan for Davao City” that was duly adopted by the city council of Davao City and approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission, now HLURB SC: The May 2, 1996 HLURB certification (issued in relation to another case that involved in a different parcel of land) is not without value. The clear-cut declaration of the HLURB in the certification, which the DARAB and the CA should have considered and which we find sufficiently convincing, show that Catalunan Pequeno (where the property lies) is classified as within the urbanizing district centers of Davao City. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the May 2, 1996 HLURB certification satisfied the purpose of this requirement, which is to establish by sufficient evidence the property’s reclassification as nonagri land prior to June 15, 1988. GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC.vs RUBEN ALCAIDE Facts: Petitioner Gonzalo Puyat and Sons, Inc. is the registered owner of 14 parcels of land. On April 14, 1998, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage over the subject landholding informing petitioner that the subject properties were being considered for distribution under the government's agrarian reform program. 4 Thereafter, on November 15, 1998, the corresponding Notice of

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Valuation and Acquisition 5 was issued informing petitioner that a 37.7353-hectare portion of its property is subject to immediate acquisition and distribution to qualified agrarian reform beneficiaries and that the government is offering P7,071,988.80 as compensation for the said property. Petitioner then filed a Petition 6 before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), wherein it argued that the properties were bought from their previous owners in good faith; that the same remains uncultivated, unoccupied, and untenanted up to the present; and, that the subject landholdings were classified as industrial, thus, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Petitioner prayed, among other things, that the Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition be lifted and that the properties be declared exempt from the coverage of CARP. Respondents 8 on their part countered, among other things, that the classification of the land as industrial did not exempt it from the coverage of the CARP considering that it was made only in 1997; the HLURB 9 certification that the Municipality of Biñan, Laguna does not have any approved plan/zoning ordinance to date; that they are not among those farmer-beneficiaries who executed the waivers or voluntary surrender; and, that the subject landholdings were planted with palay. On June 8, 2001, then DAR Secretary Hernani A. Braganza, issued an Order 11 in favor of the respondent declaring that the subject properties are agricultural land. Issue: Whether or not the land is exempted. Held: As aptly found by the Office of the President, the importance of conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated, since it is one of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. In other words, before the MARO sends a Notice of Coverage to the landowner concerned, he must first conduct a preliminary ocular inspection to determine whether or not the property may be covered under CARP. The foregoing undertaking is reiterated in the latest DAR AO No. 01, s. of 2003, entitled "2003 Rules Governing Issuance of Notice of Coverage and Acquisition of Agricultural Lands under RA 6657." Section 1 [1.1] thereof provides that: "1.1Commencement by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) — after determining that a landholding is coverable under the CARP and upon accomplishment of the Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, the MARO shall prepare the NOC (CARP Form No. 5-1)." (NOC stands for Notice of Coverage) Found on the records of this case is a ready-made form Preliminary Ocular Inspection Report (undated) signed by the concerned MARO. Interestingly, however, the check box allotted for the all-important items "Land Condition/Suitability to Agriculture" and "Land Use" was not filled up. There is no separate report on the record detailing the result of the ocular inspection conducted. These circumstances cast serious doubts on whether the MARO actually conducted an on-site ocular inspection of the subject land. Without an ocular inspection, there is no factual basis for the MARO to declare that the subject land is devoted to or suitable for agricultural purposes, more so, issue Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition. The importance of conducting an ocular inspection cannot be understated. In the event that a piece of land sought to be placed from CARP coverage is later found unsuitable for agricultural purposes, the landowner concerned is entitled to, and the DAR is duty bound to issue, a certificate of exemption pursuant to DAR Memorandum Circular No. 34, s. of 1997, entitled "Issuance of Certificate of Exemption for Lands Subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)

and Compulsory Acquisition (CA) Found Unsuitable for Agricultural Purposes." More importantly, the need to conduct ocular inspection to determine initially whether or not the property may be covered under the CARP is one of the steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The CARP was not intended to take away property without due process of law (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 245. [1996]). The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property. In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 321 SCRA 106 [1999], the Supreme Court nullified the CARP acquisition proceedings because of the DAR's failure to comply with administrative due process of sending Notice of Coverage and Notice of Acquisition of the landowner concerned. Considering the claim of appellant that the subject land is not agricultural because it is unoccupied and uncultivated, and no agricultural activity is being undertaken thereon, there is a need for the DAR to ascertain whether or not the same may be placed under CARP coverage. 47** Thus, the question of whether or not petitioner's properties could be covered by the CARP has not yet been resolved. Until such determination, it follows that petitioner's landholdings cannot be the proper subject of acquisition and eventual distribution to qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, these involve factual controversies, which are clearly beyond the ambit of this Court. Verily, the review of factual matters is not the province of this Court. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and is not the proper forum for the ventilation and substantiation of factual issues.

Agrarian dispute (section 3[d]) any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements (leasehold, tenancy, stewardship) over lands devoted to agriculture any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under CARL and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership. “tenancy relationship” -used, among others, in: Sec 47. Functions of BARC – in addition to those provided under EO 229, the BARC shall have the following functions” a. Mediate and conciliate between parties involved in an agrarian dispute including matters related to tenurial and financial arrangements Sec 53. Certification of BARC – the DAR shall not take cognizance of any agrarian dispute of controversy unless a certification from the BARC that the dispute has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation without any success of settlement is presented. ESSENTIAL REQUISITIES: PSC-PPS 1) Parties (landowner & tenants) 2) Subject matter is agricultural land 3) Consent of parties 4) Purpose is agricultural production 5) Personal cultivation by tenant 6) Sharing of harvest between parties (receipt coming from the landowner) All requisites must concur, absence of one does not make one a tenant. July 13, 2016 Agricultural Law

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RA 9700 Section 50 – A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. – No court or prosecutor’s office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of RA 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify within 15 days from the referral whether an agrarian dispute exists: Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the prosecutor’s office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court, and in cases referred by the RTC, the appeal shall be to the CA. Atty Comment: I believe you would remember, that if there is an allegation or a case is filed with a tenant farmer before the court or a city prosecutor’s office. The court or prosecutor has to refer the matter to DAR. And DAR referring to PARO. The PARO has to certify within 15 days and return the case to the judge or prosecutor for the filing of the case. So there is an admin order, implementing the Circular amendment. There are section 2 which mentions the Cases covered. DA No. 03-11 Section 2. Cases Covered – these guidelines shall apply to the procedure on the referral of cases which are agrarian in nature to the DAR by the Prosecutor’s Office, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court, (MCTC, MTC, MeTC, and RTC respectively), whether it be criminal or civil in nature, except those involving issues of just compensation or the prosecution of criminal offenses as provided for by Section 57 of RA No. 6657, as amended by RA 9700. Atty Comments: First level courts because of forcible entry or unlawful detainer are cases proper for determination. RTC referring to accion publiciana, when the assessed value of the property exceeds 20,000 DOJ Circular No. 40 “When a complaint for a felony or criminal offense is filed before the Office or Provincial Prosecutor, the investigating prosecutor shall refer the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who has jurisdiction over the place of the incident when: a.

b.

There is an allegation by any of the parties that the case is agrarian in nature or an agrarian dispute and one of the parties is a tenant, lessee, farmer-beneficiary, farmer, or farmworker; or The case pertains to the implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of RA 6657 as amended.

without a warrant. The one who will refer is the case to PARO is the inquest prosecutor. OCA Circular No. 62-2010 “directs all courts and judges concerned to “refer” all cases before it alleged to involve an agrarian dispute to DAR” Atty Comments: This came from the office of the court administrator. It referred that all judges and courts to refer the case before it alleged to involve an agrarian dispute to the DAR. So now, you have a complete administrative aspect insofar as the Section 50 is concerned.

Section 5. Issues to Be Determined – Upon referred the PARO may only give a ruling as to two issues: 1.

2.

No other issue may be adjudicated or determined by the PARO

Atty Comment: There are only 2 issues that PARO can give a ruling. And the word “only” is very apparent in there. The reason why there are only 2 reasons that can be resolve by the PARO is because the PARO can certify with dispatch. Remember, the PARO is given a 15 days to certify whether the case is an agrarian case. Because the moment the period is not stated in the law or the PARO is given a limited discretion, it is highly possible that land owners would like to harass the legitimate farmers or tenants. Then file any motion or whatsoever before PARO to be able to prolong the procedure. So it is very specific that the PARO can only resolve 2 issues and all other issues the PARO cannot! Section 8. Prima Facie Presumption of an Evidence of Agrarian Dispute or that the Case is Agrarian in Nature – The presence of any of the following facts or circumstances shall automatically give rise to a prima facie presumption that an agrarian dispute exist or that the case is agrarian in nature: a.

b.

Atty Comments: This is a circular mandating the prosecutors in relation to the Section 50-A. This circular talks about a criminal complaint that is being processed in a regular procedure. Meaning the accused or respondent has not been arrested that it has to go through a preliminary investigation. So you will find there the word “investigating prosecutor” who will also refer the case to PARO. Now, DOJ circular (parehas ra ug number sa iyang powerpoint. DOJ Circular 40) is about inquest. Inquest as we normally know is when an accused is arrested

Whether or not the cause of action of the pending case with the referring Court or Office of the Public Prosecutor is agrarian in nature, the jurisdiction of which is lodged exclusively with the DAR; or Whether or not a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR is a prejudicial question to the issue pending with the referring Court or Office of the Public Prosecutor..

c.

d.

A previous determination by the DAR that an agrarian dispute exists or that the case is agrarian in nature or the existence of a pending action with the DAR, whether an Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) case or a case before the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), which involves the same landholding; A previous determination by the National Labor Relation Commission or its Labor Arbiters that the farmworker is/was an employee of the complainant; A notice of coverage (NOC) was issued or a petition for coverage under any agrarian reform program was filed on the subject landholding; or Other analogous circumstances.

If there is a prima facie presumption that an agrarian dispute exist or that the case is agrarian in nature, the burden of proving the contrary shall be on the party alleging the same.

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Atty Comments:

SC:

These are the situations in which it would give rise to a prima facie presumption that it is an agrarian dispute.

The case involving agri land does not automatically make such case agrarian. Because there are requisites to be followed for it to be an agrarian dispute.

Section 9. Facts Tending to Prove that a Case is Agrarian. – In addition to the instances mentioned in Section 7 hereof, the Chief of the Legal Division, or the DAR Lawyer or legal officer assigned, in determining whether the case is agrarian in nature, shall be guided by the following facts and circumstances: 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

Existence of tenancy relationship The land subject of the case is agricultural Cause of action involves ejectment or removal of a farmer, farmworker, or tenant; The crime alleged arose out of or is in connection with an agrarian dispute, Provided that the prosecution of criminal offenses penalized by RA 6657 as amended shall be within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts; The Land subject of the case is covered by the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), Emancipation Patent (EP), or other title issued under the agrarian reform program, and that the case involves the right of possession, use, and ownership thereof; or The civil case filed before the court of origin concerns the ejectment of farmers/tenants/farmworkers, enforcement or rescission of contracts arising from, connected with, or pertaining to an Agribusiness Ventures Agreement (AWA), and the like.

The existence of one or more of the foregoing circumstances may be sufficient to justify a conclusion that the case is agrarian in nature. The Chief of the Legal Division, or the DAR lawyer or legal officer assigned shall accordingly conclude that the case is agrarian in nature cognizable by the DAR, and thus recommend that the case is not proper for trial. The admin order has already stated the examples of these crimes that arose out or in connection with agrarian. Section 12. The Recommendation of the PARO is final. – The recommendation of the PARO is final and non-appealable. Any Party who may disagree with the recommendation of the PARO has judicial recourse by submitting his/her/its position to the referring Court or Office of the Public Prosecutor in accordance with the latter’s rules.

Supplico v. CA (requisites present)

Facts: Suplico is a lessee of a land. Respondent was allowed by suplico to till the land and the shares are divided between him and Suplico. A year later, Suplico threatened respondent with ejectment. Respondent filed an action for damages in CAR. SC: No reason to disturb the findings. Atty: Comment: The SC found that the requisites are present however it did not discuss the requisites one by one. What was discussed instead was the actual possession of the land, personal cultivation and sharing of the harvest. Consent was not mentioned in the case. I believe if there was consent then it could have another been decided otherwise because consent is so powerful. Do you agree?

Bejesa v. CA (tenancy not established) Facts: Candelaria leased a land to Malabanan. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to till the land. Bejasas did not give any consideration for the use of the land in the form of rent or shared harvest. The Bejasas filed a complaint against Candelaria for confirmation of leasehold and home lot with damages

SC: There was no tenancy relationship between the parties. There was no proof of share of harvest.

Atty Comments: For example, the PARO would now return or submit his certification to the Public Prosecutor investigating. The prosecutor will now resolve the case, weighing the evidence including the certification of the PARO. If the prosecutor dismisses the case and approved by the reviewing fiscal and city prosecutor then the recourse is through an MR (Motion for Reconsideration) appeal to the Regional Prosecutor in which the jurisdiction of the case lies or appeal to the Secretary of Justice. If the case is with the MTCC and dismisses the case then the appeal is with the RTC. If the case is with RTC then appeal is with CA.

Atty Comment: What was the proof submitted by Bejasa? Self-serving statements. Whose statements? Bejasas. The court needed a receipt or any other similar evidence. Insofar as the word receipt is concerned, the court is consistent however with the phrase “and other similar evidences” the court is not. Naay uban case, nga other evidence. Nawala ang word nga “similar”. Naa poy uban nga “concrete eveidence” or “other concrete evidence”. Though the court did not discuss what this receipt is, it has to be a receipt coming from the land owner. Because it would be self-serving if the receipt would be coming from the tenant.

Isidro v. CA (requisites not present) Facts:

Monsanto v. Zerna (tenancy relationship established)

Private respondent filed an unlawful detainer with the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case because the land is agricultural and so agrarian.

Facts:

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Sps. Zerna was charged with qualified theft for taking coconuts owned by Monsanto.

SC:

Pasong Bayabas v. CA (tenancy not established)

Facts:

The court dismissed the case however ordered Sps. To return the amount of 1,100 on the ground of non-consent to harvest of the coconut. Tenancy relationship may be established verbally or writing, expressly or impliedly.

Atty Comment:

It’s about a development of a land. Prior to the development, the land was converted from agricultural to residential as approved by DAR. Petitioners claim that there was surreptitious conversion of the land so they filed a case before the RTC.

SC:

Ngano gipa-uli man ang kwarta? Because the amount was the proceed of the harvest. The RTC was reminded by the Supreme Court that it did not have jurisdiction because the case was agrarian and should have been decided by the DARAB.

Valencia v. CA (tenancy not established)

Facts: Same facts with Suplico and Bejasa. Velancia as the owner and Fr. Flores the lessee but there is a prohibition against subleasing or encumbering the land without Valencia’s written consent.

No tenancy. There is even no allegation in the complain that petitioners-members are tenants plus there were waiver of rights which constitutes abandonment. No concrete evidence of cultivation and no proof presented except for their self-serving statements.

Atty Comments: Under what law gani ang emancipation patent? PD 27, Marcos time. At the time of Marcos, the name of the title is emancipation patent. Under CARL the name of the title is CLOA. Although before, before you are issued emancipation patent, you are issued CLT (certificate of land transfer) preparatory to the issuance of emancipation patent.

SC:

Nicorp Management and Dev’t Corp v. De Leon (tenancy not shown)

An allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question does not make the case an agrarian dispute. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. Facts: Atty Comment: Can you reconciled, the principle of a tenancy relation cannot be presumed and implied contract of tenancy? Duna bay conflict nila? When you allege that there is an implied contract of tenancy, you still have to prove the six requisites. So, I think that this principle that a tenancy relation cannot be presumed can still be applied to an implied contract of tenancy.

No substantial evidence to support the CA conclusion that respondent is bona fide tenant of the property. The only evidence presented was a letter in which the word “kasama” is used to refer to the respondent.

Issue: where “kasama” is tenant

SC: Almuete v. Andres (Ownership)

The word “kasama” could be taken in varying context and not necessarily in relation to an agricultural leasehold agreement.

Facts:

Sps. Fajardo v. Flores (tenancy established)

Almuete is in possession of the land. However, Amdres was awarded homestead patent due to investigation report that Almuete was unknown and waived his rights. Almuete filed for recovery of possession and reconveyance before the trial court. SC: The Supreme Court, held that this is not an agrarian dispute. There is no juridical tie of the landowner and tenant as alleged between petitioners and respondents thus the RTC was competent to try the case.

Facts: Sps. Fajardo are legitimate tenants. There was an agreement of a termination of their relationship but Fajardo is given a share of the land of Flores so they executed an agreement. However the problem arises when the agreement did not specify the land on which the tenants are to be given. Flores taught the land in which the house of Fajardo is situated is not the portion to be given by Fajardo so he wants

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the house removed. Fajardo argues that the land in which his house stood was the land given to him.

SC: If the dispute originates from the relationship even if there is an agreement then the dispute is agrarian. The severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian dispute.

Adriano v. Tanco (tenancy not established)

Fact: Bugarin is the owner. He complained in the barangay because the share he receives from the tenant are just small compared from what he expects. So he wanted to be the one who will personally farm the land.

SC: There is tenancy relation because it was even admitted by the owner himself. Atty Comment: Unsay gigamit sa SC, the admission of the landowner when he complained in the brgy. The admission confirms that indeed rentals are being paid.

Facts: Same facts.

Six Requisites: 1. 2.

Issue: whether there is a proof of sharing

3. SC:

4.

There is no proof of sharing. Mere occupation does not automatically convert a tiller into an agricultural tenant. He who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.

5. 6.

Respondent is the landowner and Petitioner is the tenant The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a farm land They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production After the harvest, petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash Personal cultivation of the land by the tenant Ladano v. Neri (tenancy not established)

Atty Comments: In the previous cases, the Supreme Court is looking for an independent evidence. What evidence? To prove sharing of the harvest. This evidence is already required to prove consent. Sharing of the harvest is an independent evidence such as receipts.

Atty Comment (wla siya nisutli sa facts): In this case there was no allegation of relationship. Is the allegation important? Yes. Because the allegation determines the jurisdiction of the case. What will you prove if you have alleged.

Estate of Pastor Samson v. Susano Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. DBP (tenancy not established) Facts: There were affidavits made by the neighbors to serve as an evidence.

Issue: Are they self-serving?

Facts: Petioners are heirs of Florentino who claimed to be a tenant of the land. DBP was the mortgagee of the subject land that was mortgaged by previous owners and sold to private respondents. The proceedings started at RARAD with Florentino (later substituted by his heirs after he died) claiming a right to redeem for being a tenant. RARAD and DARAB ruled for the heirs while CA reversed as tenancy relationship was not established.

SC: No. they are not self-serving. However they cannot be admissible because they lack details on their personal knowledge as to how the crop-sharing agreement was implemented.

SC: Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie and relationship cannot be presumed. To prove consent, there has to be an independent and concrete evidence.

Galope v. Bugarin (tenancy established)

July 16 2016

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Davao New Town v. Sps Saliga (tenancy not established) 

  

Private respondents filed before PARAD a complaint for injunction and collation of titles of petitioners alleging that they and their parents are tenants Petitioners answered that it is a purchaser in good faith and that there was no tenancy PARAD and DARAB held that tenancy exist CA affirmed

Atty Comments:

It is not law students that commits errors like this, even lawyers commit errors like this. If you say like Agricultural lessee, that is not a factual circumstance but a conclusion of law. If you are a MARO, you cannot certify that a person is an agricultural lessee or tenant. Why? Because MARO is not a judicial entity neither a Quasi-Judicial entity. You cannot say that there was a fraudulent transfer of land, you must collaborate it with other evidences. If you have a picture of a hut in land does not prove anything but that there is a hut in the land. It does not prove there is personal cultivation, unless ug mag-selfie cguro or naay picture nga nagcultivate. Do you know the significance of notarization of a document? In the admissibility of the document, you do not need to let the witness who executed the document to verify. It would be admitted immediately by the Court.

The land was already reclassified to residential thus the element of subject matter that it is agricultural is lacking. Quintos v. DARAB (tenancy not established) Jopson v. Mendez Jr. (tenancy not established) Facts:

Facts: 





Petitioner alleged that he is a bone fide tenant-farmer of the parcel of land subject of the sale between respondent DBP and respondent Mendez His father Melchor Jopson was the original tenant of subject landholding appointed as such by the spouses Laura and Jose in 1947 (Sps are the original owners which conveyed to DBP by way of dacion en pago)



SC: There was no concrete proof submitted and the land is no longer agricultural because there was a zoning ordinance that the land is already a commercial zone. The requisites are lacking thus the tenancy was not established.

SC:  

Reyes v. Heirs of Pablo Floro (tenancy not established)  Facts: There is a tenant (Reyes) who has two pieces of evidence. One is a certification from Carmen Bautista, the previous owner of the land. Second is that there is a MARO certification that Reyes is an agricultural lessee or tenant.



SC: MARO certification (certified as agricultural lessee) is merely a preliminary and does not bind the courts as conclusive evidence that Reyes is a lessee who cultivates the land for purposes of agricultural production. Petitioner failed to submit any proof that he personally cultivated the land. He only had a picture of a hut erected on the land. Thus is not enough to prove that a leasehold relationship exists. The certification from Bautista has little evidentiary value, without any corroborative evidence. The certification was not notarized and Bautista was not even presented as a witness.

Atty Comments:

KAMIFCI filed an action for the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the subject property against Quintos before PARAD asserting its rights under an agricultural leasehold tenancy agreement it purportedly entered into the Lacuesta (APT OIC). In his answer, Quintos denied the personality of KAMIFCI as a registered cooperative as well as the existence of any tenancy agreement covering the subject property. PARAD, DARAB and CA ruled in favour private respondent, holding the existence of tenancy relationship.

Tenancy is a legal relationship established by the existence of particular facts as required by law The burden of proof rests on the one claiming to be a tenant to prove his affirmative allegation by substantial evidence. His failure to show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim would put the opposite party under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. The rule applies to civil and administrative cases. The right to hire tenant is basically a personal right of a landowner, except as may be provided by law. Hence the consent of the landowner should be secured prior to the installation of tenants. In the present case, the PARAD, the DARAB and the CA all held that a tenancy relationship exist between GCFI and the KAMIFCI members who were allegedly installed as tenants by APT, the “legal possessor” of the mango orchard at the time. Records are, however, bereft of any showing that APT was authorized by the property’s landowner, GCFI, to install tenants thereon.

Atty Comments: N/A Automat Realty v. Sps. Cruz

Facts: Automat is a corporation. Ofelia voluntarily offered her services to Lim who is representing Automat. She became a caretaker. Her reason being to prevent informal settlers. Later on, she and her family was the one who occupied the land and they were paying rents.

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The problem with Automat is that they received the rents from Ofelia. Mr. Lim agreed with a condition that Ofelia would vacate the premises once Automat will be using the property. When the time came that the Automat will use the property, Sps. Dela Cruz refused to vacate and demanded that they will be paid for compensation and they claimed that they were “agricultural tenants who enojoyed security of tenure under the law”.

When did CARL took effect? *deep silence. Kalimot namo?! Ako kaha ni pangutana sa exam noh? Ako ni ask kay kalimtanon kaayo mo. CARL took effect on June 15 1988 up to June 15 1998 that is pursuant to Sec 5. In Section 63. The government set asides an amount to be used for the implementation of the law in a period of 10 years. 1998 came and there is an amended by law (RA 8542). What was the section that was amended? Section 63. what was not amended was section 5. And for your information, Section 5 was never amended.

SC: 



 

This court has held that a MARO certification (that Sps Dela Cruz are the actual tillers of the land”) concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship between the contending parties, is considered merely preliminary or provisional, hence, such certification does not bind the judiciary. The amended cetification does not bind the court. Several elements must be present before the courts can conclude that a tenancy relationship exist. MARO certification are limited to factual determination such as the presence of actual tillers. It cannot make legal conclusion on the existence of a tenancy agreement. Land is non-agricultural because of classification (zoning ordinance with approval from HLRUB) SC found presence of consent (Automat never denied giving consent to installing respondent spouses as caretakers of the land. Automat never denied receipt of the rentals.

RA 8532: “amended Sec. 63 as follows: “The amount needed to implement this Act until 2008 shall be funded from Agrarian Reform Fund.” Interpreted up to December 31, 2008 Joint Resolution No. 19 of the Senate and House extending implementation upon to June 30, 2009.

After the lapsed of June 30, 2009. There was no amendment for the extension of the law. Congress are confused on to who to favour whether it is the landowner or the farmers. So what Congress did, extended June 30, 2009. Can the mere resolution amend the land? Was it valid that Congress amended Sec. 63 and not Sec. 5? My Question are answered not by DAR by by a case. The case of DAR v. Woodland.

DAR v. Woodland Atty Comments: Facts:

N/A

Coverage (Sec. 4)

NOC (Notice of Coverage) dated December 11 2003 and NOA (Notice of Acquisition) dated October 5 2004 were issued over the portion of respondent’s land

RA 9700, Sec. 3

Issue: Can petitioner still issue NOC and NOA after June 15, 1998?

Section. 4. Scope. – The Comprehensive Agrarian Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the of the public domain suitable for agriculture: Provided, That landholdings of landowners with a total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to qualified beneficiaries

SC: 



Schedule of implementation (Sec. 5) Sec. 5 “ The distribution xxx shall be implemented immediately and completed within 10 years from effectivity hereof”. Sec.63 “The initial amount needed to implement this Act for the period of ten years upon approval hereof shall be funded from the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Section 20 and Section 21 of EO No. 299. xxx”

Atty Comment: Section 5 talks about the implementation while 63 talks about the funding.



“For us to sustain Woodland’s theory that the DAR can no longer issue those notices after June 15, 1998 despite the enactment of RA 8532 would thwart the CARP’s purpose.” Clearly, Section 63 refers to the implementation of the CARL in its entirety, not just the funding source. Indeed, RA 8542 specifically amended Section 63 of RA 6657 but it does not follow that only Section 63 had been affected by the amendment. The fact that Section 63 falls under the chapter on “Financing” only emphasizes its general applicability. Hence, the phrase “until the year 2008” used in RA 8532 unmistakably extends the DAR’s authority to issue NOCs for purpose of acquiring and distributing private agricultural lands Finally RA 9700 extended the acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands until June 30 2014. The title alone of RA 9700 – An Act Strengthening the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), Extending the Acquisition and Distribution of All Agricultural Lands, Instituting Necessary Reforms, Amending for the Purpose Certain Provisions of Republic Act. 6657, Otherwise Known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998, As amended, and Appropriating Funds Therefor – reveals that the CARP was

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indeed extended from 1998 to 2008 via RA 8532. Had there been no prior extension from 1998 to 2008, how else could CARP have been extended by RA 9700 until June 30 2014? There could have been an extension only if the program sought to be extended had not expired.

Extensions CARP June 15, 1988 – effective for 10 years until 1998 RA 8532 – extended CARP until 2008 (valid until Dec 31 2008) Resolution by Senate – Up to June 30, 2009 RA 9700 – until June 30 2014.

RA 9700 Approved August 7, 2009 Section 34. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect on July 1, 2009 and it shall be published in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Section 21: “Section 63. Funding Source. – The amount needed to further implement the CARP as provided in this Act, until June 30, 2014, upon expiration of funding under RA 8532 and other pertinent laws, shall be funded from Agrarian Reform Fund and other funding sources in the amount of at least One hundred fifty billion pesos (150,000,000,000,000)

Atty Comments: It was given a retroactive effect. And the Congress was consistent in amending the Section 63 instead of Section 5

What happens after June 30, 2014? 







DAR’s management reiterated that it will be business as usual for the agrarian reform agency come July 1, 2014. The agency’s official clarified that DAR can still distribute land even after June 30, 2014 Section 30 permits DAR to complete the acquisition and distribution of landholding for which there are pending cases or proceedings. And since a Notice of Coverage initiates land distribution proceedings for lands subject to compulsory acquisition, then all landholdings with NOCs can still be distributed after “June 2014” – DAR Undersecretary for Legal Affairs Anthony Parungao Parungao added that the Department of Justice, through DOJ Opinion No. 59 and 60 Series of 2013 concurs with this position. Furthermore, Special Provision No. 2 of the 2014 General Appropriation Act (GAA) explicitly states that “all lands which have been issued notices of coverage and with pending cases and/or proceedings as of June 30, 2014 shall continue to be processed until issuance of the duly registered certificate of land ownership award to the individual agrarian reform beneficiaries in accordance with Section 30 of RA 9700 and Item IV (A.I) of DAR A.O No. 2 Series of 2009, as amended.

July 20, 2016 Refreshing your memory:

Since the start, up to June 30, 2014, there is no gap as to the implementation of CARP. Of course, Congress was also consistent in amending Section 63. Section 5 already expired in 1998, so cannot be amended anymore. If NOC and NOA were issued prior to June 30, 2014, DAR can continue its acquisition and distribution. What about if there were no NOC and NOA issued after June 30, 2014, DAR cannot issue those notices in the absence of law. As of now, no law extending CARP. Neither is a new law setting again a new schedule of implantation of CARP. If there will be another extension, I really think, that there will be a retroactive effect.

SECTION 6. HOMESTEAD GRANTEES SECTION 6.Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention. Qualifications under Sec. 6 (Take note):

Section 63 of CARL was amended by RA 8532 extending the implementation of CARL from 1998 up to 2008. And then in the case DAR v Woodland, notices were sent during 2003 and 2004, Woodland questioned these notices contending that it should be Section 5 that should have been amended not Section 63.

1. original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs 2. who still own the homestead 3. as long as they continue to cultivate

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Purpose of Homestead:

Paris is the owner of 23 hectares. Dinhi nabunggo si Paris, she admitted that the land was fully tenanted. It implies that Paris is not actually and continuously cultivating the land because other people is cultivating the land.

To give home and cultivation. You have original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs, they still own the homestead at the time of the approval of the law and they will retain these areas as long as they continue to cultivate the said homestead. Based on Section 6, none of the granted land will be covered by CARP if it is continuously cultivated by the original grantee or the compulsory heirs.

Actually, what happened here was the lands of Paris, they were already titles issued to the tenant farmers and Paris wants these to be cancelled. Paris claimed that she is entitled to retention and that as original homestead grantee, she is entitled to retain the lands to the exclusion of tenants. RULING: Contention of petition is without basis.

ALMERO V PACQUING According to the dissent Justice Leonen, Section 6 was unconstitutional considering that there is no phrase “continuous cultivation” found in the Consitution. Just to give you an overview, these are the requirements regarding to homestead patents. The original grantee shall retain the same areas (whether 12 or 24 hectares granted). Observation: The law used the word “retain”. Section 6 also with respect to the retention of the land owner, it also used retain. With respect to the land in favour of farmer beneficiaries, “award” is used. With respect to the child, “award” also was used. What reason that the constitution does not qualify continuous cultivation? ATTY’S OPINION: If there is a requirement of continuous cultivation, DAR does not have jurisdiction. It is CENRO’s jurisdiction. Why? Because CENRO is the one who gave the land, it is CENRO that should examine and verify the grant or the reward. CONTINUOUS CULTIVATION (JURISPRUDENCE) ALITA v CA Private respondents allege that their predecessors-in-interest have acquired a land through homestead patent. And they are desirous of personally cultivating the land. While petitioner tenants refused to vacate. ATTY: Why am I underlining desirous? This is in connection with Paris v Alfeche. But I believe that this case of Alita has nothing to do with the condition as long as they continue to cultivate. But why underline? This phrase was cited in Paris v Alfeche. Private respondents desired to cultivate so they want tenants to vacate. Petitioner argues PD27. In my opinion, issue is not whether the desire to cultivate is sufficient element of the continuous cultivation of the land. SC did not say that this is the issue. (OPINION RA NI) ISSUE: Is a homestead patent covered by PD27? RULING:

PD applies to all tenanted private agriculture lands primarily devoted to rice and corn. Nowhere does it appear that lots obtained by homestead patents are exempted from its operation. Under RA 6657, rights of homestead grantee are provided but with condition: only for “as long as they continue to cultivate them”. That parcels of land are covered by homestead will not automatically exempt them from operation of land reform. It is the fact of continued cultivation by original grantees or direct compulsory heirs that shall exempt their lands. As compared to Alita? Paris cited the case of Alita vs CA. According to the SC, as compared to Alita, owner was desirous to cultivate thus, the court upheld the right of homestead owners. Observations: It is alright to compared Paris and Alfeche. But not based on “desire to cultivate.” Because there was no issue on the desire to cultivate in the case of Alita. Naa lang sa facts! The only issue on the Alita case was whether homestead patent is covered in PD27. Dinhi nabunggo ang Supreme Court with due respect. (OPINION RA NI) In the case of Almero v Pacquing, ang gigamit na argumaent sa Office of the President is about the “desire to cultivate” in Paris v Alfeche. Supreme Court said that it was not there ruling in Paris. Our ruling was there has to be a condition and it has to be complied with. So in the case of Alemero, the Supreme Court was strict, there was a condition and the condition was to be complied with. In you practive later on, if there are cases cited by the other party. Please discuss whether those cases apply to your case or not. Of course, you do not want those cases to apply, you have to finds ways to win. You need to point out whether the issues are the same and the principles of law used. So comparing Aleta, petitioner did not cultivate and they have no also expressed their desire. The heirs are also not entitled to 3 hectares because Paris has 23 hectares. He is saying “covered by homestead, therefore I have to retain all of these.” SC said you do not have the right because you are not cultivating and you have not expressed your desire, but since you are a land owner, you are entitle to 5 hectares. How about the children? Nagcultivate ba? Wala, kay fully tenanted man. Nagmanage ba ang mga anak? Wala kay fully tenanted man. Thus, Paris will retain 5 out of 23 hectares only.

Private respondents argue that they are tenants under PD 27. However, the SC ruled that PD 27 cannot be invoked as against Homestead Patent. The latter is a superior right than PD 27.

DAR Memorandum Circular 05-14 In relation to homestead, DAR came up with a Memo Circular

PARIS V ALFECHE

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*If the grantee will voluntary offered the land for sale to the government. Does it need requirements? No! Voluntary man.

kung dili makasubaya unya gibutang gyud nga tagaan or awardan ang child.

*How about mandatory? Requirements are needed. For verification by DAR kun tinuod ba gyud ang mga conditions:

***Atty. told his experience on this.

-

If the land owner is alive, affidavit by the landowner is needed. If not, Brgy Chairperson certification If deceased ang daghan na landowners, joint affidavit by farmers or certification

JULY 23, 2016 So just to summarize, you have section 6 two retention: 1. Landowners’ retention 2. Homestead Grantees retention

Take note: Original grantee ang land owner. Only the original grantee and the compulsory heirs benefit this homestead patent provision. Not third person who bought the land from original grantees.

It was also mentioned reward to each child of the landowner subject to qualifications.

ALMERO v PACQUING

SECTION 6. RETENTION RIGHTS of Land Owners

The subject of the issue here before SC is the interpretation of the Office of the President. According to it, the ruling of the SC in Paris v Alfeche, Linda’s mere expression of her desire to continue or start anew with the cultivation of the land would suffice the condition of continuous cultivation This means that Linda was not in actual cultivation. SC said that the condition must be complied. It did not mention the desire to cultivate. There was no express pronouncement of the court what was really the intention of comparing the case of Alita and Paris on the desire to cultivate. The continuous cultivation condition should be within the province or jurisdiction of CENRO of DENR, not CARL of DAR.

Now, kadtong mga minyu na, take note that in Section 6, it talks about landowners right to retain, di pwede musobra sa 5. If you are married, you are covered under this rule. So if under the ka Family Code, and your property regime is Absolute, both spouses -- total not to exceed 5 hectare because two become one. Tip from Atty: change the classification of the agricultural land to residential land. This is safer.

Look at the first part of section 6, there are two parts of the retention limits. One is the right to retain the agricultural land. Meanign the excess will be acquired by the government. Number two is ownership ceiling, it means that if at present you already own 5 hectares of agricultural land, you cannot anymore acquire additional agri land because ou will exceed your ownership ceiling. Basis: “no person may own or retain” of section 6 o o

“Own” means the ownership ceiling “Retain” means the retention limit.

Another! It says “person”. It did not qualify natural or juridical. Therefore, apil both natural ang juridical. According to section 6 also, the compulsory heirs may be awarded 3 hectares with qualifications: 1. Actually tilling or directly managing the farm 2. Age of 15 ATTY: In practice, naa dinhi ang gray area. Gray area in a sense, either dili kacomply if imong subayon ang balaud or nay possible corruption

SECTION 6.Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm: Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the areas originally retained by them thereunder: Provided, further, That original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous, shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the area for retention.

The term award is also being used there. There are similarities between the award to a child and the award to the farmer beneficiaries. The number of hectares to be awarded is the same. The name of the title is also the same – CLOA. And also prohibition is the same – 10 year prohibited period. The difference between the two is that child does not pay the govt while farmer beneficiary pays. “Direct Management”

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o

Shall refer to the cultivation of the land thru personal supervision under the system of labor administration. It shall be interpreted along the lines of farm management as an actual major activity being performed by the landowner’s child from which he/she derives his/her primary source of income. (2006 AO No. 06, s. 2006)

To emphasize that the right of the land owner of retention is given importance.

So you have the procedure: the MARO, the PARO, the Director. An in case of appeal, go to Secretary of DAR. DAR Admin Order 05-06 Policies:

DAEZ v CA

1. It is the policy of the DAR to acquire and distribute all lands covered under RA 5567 including thos subject of illegal transfers/ sales.

SC said that if it turned that the retained area of the landowner, title has been issued in favour of the farmer beneficiary, EP or CLOA – the court is saying that it can be cancelled.

2. The DAR shall as a matter of policy, cover all lands, in excess of the five hectare retention limit or land ownership ceiling.

Question is if truly there are really farmers in the retained area, and these farmers has titles, even if there title is cancelled, the leasehold relationship will continue. Titles may be cancelled but leasehold will still continue. DAR Admin Order No. 2, Series of 2003 o o o o o

who may apply the retention period of exercise right of retention where to file instance where owner is considered to have waived his right of retention Operating procedure: MARO – PARO – Reg Director – Sec (Appeal)

There are provisions on who may apply, period to exercise the right of retention. For example, if the landowner availed the voluntary offer to sell, it should be manifested at the time of the offer. What about if DAR issue a NOA? (no voluntary offer) The period of exercise is 60 days from receipt of the notice of coverage That means if he did not exercise this right within the period, it is considered as one of the instances that the owner has waived his right of retention. Meaning? It does not mean that he will not be able to retain 5 hectares. I means that he will not be able to choose the land to retain. Other examples: o o o VOS does not present to DAR to exercise the right of retention, considered waiver o Failure to manifest within 60 days o Landowner executes a waiver o If the landowner execute another document and effect that he is not exercising his right of retention – considered waiver.

3. Where the transfer/ sale involves a total aggregate of more than five hectares, the transfer is legal and proper. However, a DAR clearance is needed. ATTY: in case in you practice, if land involve in sale is agricultural land, it is always best to pay. 4. if the sale involve more than 5 hectare retention, the transfer is violative. In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five hectares sold without DAR clearance and corresponding titles issues by the Register of Deeds in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be trated as the transferor/s’ retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the 5 hectare landholding ceiling pursuant to section6, 70 ad 73. The excess will be covered that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of June 15, 1988. DAR AO No 06-06 Coverage: all children of landowners who ae qualified to be awarded with portion of agri land of their parent-land owners covered under the CARP. Atty: The child is given preference in the distribution; provided he or she meets qualifications provided further, only untenanted portions may be subject for transfer. From ppt: o

In all cases, the aggregate award to a qualified child shall not exceed the limit of 3 hectares.

o

A qualified child who owns less than 5 hectares of agri land is still entitled to an award of his parents’ landholding provided that his or her total area, including the area to be awarded under Carp shall not exceed the five hectare ownership ceiling.

o

CLOA duly registered with ROD concerned shall be issued to qualified child of landowners. 

DAR v Carriedo In this case, SC said that sale of the property is not one of the instances that the landowner waived his right of retention. In the case of DAR v Carriedo, there was a sale and the issue was whether the sale made by Carriedo is a waiver of his right of rentention. SC said no, because sale is not mentioned as an instance in the DAR Admin Order. The list is exclusive.

o

o

It’s the same name of the title to farmer beneficiaries

A qualified child cannot enter into Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme agreement with his/her parent-landower unless he/she is tenant in his own right prior to June 15, 1988. The land awarded to a qualified child shall be utilized for agricultural production and shall be subject to the usual restrictions and conditions governing CLOAs as provided in RA 6657 and pertinent implementing guidelines.

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o

o

The landowner shall nominate his/her qualified child/rewardee within 30 days from receipt of NOC or upon the filing of Voluntary Offier to Sell. Failure to do so within the said period shall constitute a waiver of the landowner’s privilege to nominate children who may qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP. Children who were not nominated by their parentlandowner and children of landowners who did not avail the retention rights shall be precluded from filing an application to be awarded a portion of the agricultural land owned by their parent-landowner.

Qualifications: 1. 2. 3.

Filipino Citizen At least 15yo Actual tillers or one directly managing the farm as of June 15, 1988 up to the time of the conduct of field investigation of the landholding under CARP. DAR AO No 02-09

------ this one should be your new bible (ana si sir) o

“Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition and Distribution of Agricultural Lands under RA No 6657, as amended by RA No. 9700”

- Farmer Beneficiary Identification, screening and selection - Land Distribution

“SEC. 6-A. Exception to Retention Limits. - Provincial, city and municipal government, units acquiring private agricultural lands by expropriation or other modes of acquisition to be used for actual, direct and exclusive public purposes, such as roads and bridges, public markets, school sites, resettlement sites, local government facilities, public parks and barangay plazas or squares, consistent with the approved local comprehensive land use plan, shall not be subject to the five (5)-hectare retention limit under this Section xxx.” (RA 9700, Sec. 4) ATTY: That means if you have an agricultural land, the landowner will choose an area which the LGU will use for public purposes, the landowner cannot use his right of retention to prevent the LGU from exercising its right to expropriate. REASON: Public purposes such as road, bridges, public market, school sites, resettlement sites, local government facilities, public parks and barangay plazas or squares - So what the landowner can do is choose another area. That is if it is consistent with the comprehensive land use of the LGU. Do not be misled, the title still speaks about retention limits. You will have to take note again, the opening phrase “no person may own or retain.”

Governing Principles: o

o

RA 9700 provides for, among others, the continuing acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands covered under CARP for a period of five years under various phases and the simultaneous provision of support services and the delivery of Agrarian justice to ARBs. After June 30, 2009, the modes of acquisition shall be limited to Voluntary Offer to Sell and Compulsory Acquisition and that VLT shall be allowed only for landholdings submitted for VLT as of June 30, 2009.

If NOC, were issued prior to June 30 2009, DAR can still continue the process of acquisition and distribution. Mode of acquisition can only be limited to voluntary offer and CA and that VLT shall be allowed only for landholdings submitted for VLT as of June 30, 2009. Coverage: Acquisition and Distributionof all agri lands yet to be acquired and or to be distributed under CARP. Policies: Notice of Coverage The acquisition and distribution of agricultural lands under CARP shall be completed by June 30, 2014. However, the process of acquisition and distribution for landholdings which were issued with NOCs on or before June 30, 2014 shall continue even after June 30, 2014 until said lands will be awarded to qualified beneficiaries. Other notable provisions: -modes of service of NOC - Landowner’s retention - Land Acquisition - Land Valuation and Land Compensation

SECTION 10 (EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS) Sec. 10. Exemptions and Exclusions from coverage of CARL (a) Lands ADE used for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestation, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves (exempt); - You will note, jurisdiction here lies with DENR - Example: agricultural lands all the way to balamban (watershed area), exempted from CARP because it is for a different purpose (b) private lands ADE used for prawn farms and fishponds (exempt) - You have RA 7881, that exempts it from the coverage during the time of Ramos (c) lands ADE used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations, seeds and seedlings research, church sites and convents, mosque sites, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and farms and all lands with 18% slope and over (exempt) - Very interesting (daw), Why? (a) and (b), you have the qualifying words ADE, which is used under letter (b) and which is also used under letter (c) BUT, there is an additional phrase: found to be necessary. And this was tested in the case of Central Mindanao. WHY? (go to Central Mindanao Case) - experimental farm stations, seeds and seedlings research why exempted? For agricultural production - church sites and convents, mosque sites freedom of religion

Lands which have been classified or proclaimed , and actually, directly, exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds and water shed and mangroves shall be exempted from the coverage of CARP until Congress, taking into account ecological developmental and equity

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considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of public domain. What about reforestation? Also excluded from the coverage of CARP, provided that the areas or portions thereof occupied by qualified forest occupants shall be included in the Integrated Social Forestry program of the DENR. And then, if your land has a slop of 18% and over – EXEMPTED. But if already developed for agricultural pruposes as of June 15, 1988 shall be allocated to qualified occupants.

Did not use the phrase “found to be necessary”, but impliedly it was referring to it. Because even if that portion of land was not used, if it was found to be necessary for future expansion, it is to be exempted from coverage. I like what SC said here: who will determine/decide when and what lands are found to be necessary? SC: it is the school and the only exception is if it is manifest that CMU has no real need for the land. (wala ko kagets ano diri tbh) DAR v DECS

And then another guideline: In all cases, the DAR shall conduct a continuing review and verification of exempted lands to ascertain which of the areas declared exempt or which portions thereof are no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and found necessary for said purpose. If the purpose for the grant of exemption no longer exists, the area or portion involved shall be covered under CARP pursuant to the guidelines on land acquisition and distribution. Why? Let’s say you have 5 hectares of agriland, and it turned out that after exemption, 2 hectare are not actually, directly and exclusively used, it will be acquired by the govt to beneficiaries.

Process to be followed

File petition with MARO to be reviewed by PARO and to be approve by regn’l director if the number of hectare is below 5. If 5 and above it goes to Bureau of Agrarian legal affairs to be reviewed by Usec. For Legal Affair - Secretary CENTRAL MINDANAO v. DARAB Atty: I would like to stress that according to this case there was a Presidential Proclamation reserving this for school purposes. 3k hectares of agricultural land is involve. The subject lands are exempted because they are actually, directly & exclusively used and found necessary for school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes and for establishing seed and seeding research The construction of DARAB in Section 10 restricting the land area of CMU to its present needs overlooked the significant factor it growth of a university in years to come. By the nature of CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture & industry, the need for vast tract of agriculture land for future programs of expansion is obvious. While portion of CMU land was leased by Phil. Packing Corp.(now Del Monte), the agreement was prior to CARL & was directly connected to the purpose & objectives of CMU as educational institution. As to determination of when and what lands are found to be necessary for use of CMU, school is in best position to resolve & answer the question. DARAB & CA have no right to substitute unless it is manifest that CMU has no real need for land. SC:

1921, subject lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondents DECS and titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS. DECS leased the lands to AAC for 10 Agri crop years, commencing from 1984-1985 to 1993-1994. The lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 years. 1993: Alpar and several others claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands filed a petition for Compulsory Agra Reform Program coverage with the MARO. After investigation, MARO sent a Notice of Coverage to DECS, stating that the lands are now covered by CARP.

Admin Order No. 13-90 -

Facts:

In this case, the land was previously privately owned until it was donated to DECS. Ruling: The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to DECS. From that time until they were leased to ACC, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane. Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act before and after the enactment of RA 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Indubitable, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. Compare with CMU case: In the CMU case, the land was ade used and found to be necessary for school site and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the Del Monte under a Mgt and Devt Agreement, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by Del Monte as part of the CMU research program with direct participation of faculty and students. Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational purposes. On the other hand, the lands in the case of DECS were not actually, and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation (ACC), not for educational purposes. The income from the lease was for repairs and renovations not educational purpose. This one is one of the factors that SC considered which is different with CMU v DARAB Atlas Fertilizer v Secretary (Aquaculture)

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Atlas is engaged in the aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and prawn farms; challenger RA 6657 which coverage lands devoted to the aqua culture industry, particularly fishponds and prawn farms.

Watershed is not to be included under subpar 1 of Section 10 plus the slop is more than 18 percent. Roxas v DAMBA

Ruling:

Presidential Proclamation 1520:

Section 10 and RA No 7881 expressly state that fishponds and prawn farms are excluded from the coverage of CARL. Sanchez v Marin (fishpond) Issue: Whether the subject fishpond is exempted from CARP of the govt by virtue of amendments introduced by RA 7881 to RA6657 Ruling: Section 2 of RA 7881 amended Section 10 of RA 6657 by expressly exempting/excluding private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms, fishponds from the coverage of the CARL. Republic v CA (slope) o o o

Tax declaration classified subject land as agricultural. So there was a clash on the evidences. DAR issued Notice of Coverage and owner applied for exemption Application was denied and on appeal the CA created a commission to conduct ocular inspection and survey the land. Later, based on the report submitted, the CA reversed the Order of DAR and exempted the lands from CARL.

Now, Republic contends the tax declaration classified it as agri alnd and which cannot be altered by mere ocular inspection.

DECLARING THE MUNICIPALITIES OF MARAGONDON AND TERNATE IN CAVITE PROVINCE AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF NASUGBU IN BATANGAS PROVINCE AS A TOURIST ZONE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. WHEREAS, certain areas in the sector comprising the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate in Cavite Province and Nasugbu in Batangas have potential tourism value after being developed into resort complexes for the foreign and domestic market; and WHEREAS, it is necessary to conduct the necessary studies and to segregate specific geographic areas for concentrated efforts of both the government and private sectors in developing their tourism potential;

SC said that the Presidential did not automatically convert the land into non-agri land because the Proclamation itself mentioned the word “potential” so it was not yet sure if it has really a tourism value. Moreover, there was also a need for necessary studies. Milestone v Office of the President Do you remember the case? Kadtong naa syay cattle maexempt siya during sa inspection anf iyang cattle naa sa adjacent property. There was an argument here of Milestone: When the land is declared exempt kinahanglan kuno ang DAR di na mahinlabot if the land is declared as exempt. It is entirely and forever be beyond DAR’s jurisdiction.

Ruling: There is no law or jurisprudence that land classification in tax declaration is conclusive; tax dec is clearly not sole basis of classification of land. “Based on their report by the commsission, it was found that the land use map submitted by private respondents was an appropriate document consistent with the existing land use. It was confirmed that the lands are not wholly agricultural as they consist of mountainous are with an average of 28% slope; The CARL has further provided that all lands 18% and over except those already developed shall be exempt from the coverage of CARL.

The court said that this is dangerous suggestive of selfregulation. Precisely, it is DAR Secretary who is vested with scuh jurisdiction and authority to exempt and/or exclude a property from CARP coverage based on the factual circumstances of each case and in accordance with law and applicable jurisprudence. DAR Memo Circular 02-15 RA 9458 declared the following towns of Northern Samar, namely: 1) Biri 2) Capul 3) San Antonio 4) San Vicente

Sta. Rosa v CA *(non-agricultural and slope) Facts: Parcels of land registered in the name of petitioner and later declared as watershed area by DENR were placed by DAR under compulsory acquisition after service of the requisite notice of coverage and letter of invitation and NOA. Petitioners claim that the land is not agri and has a slop of more than 18%. SC:

SC:

As national tourism zones and, from the time of the effectivity of the said Act, exempt from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. ATTY: According to these memo circular, these lands are exempt from the coverage of CARP. Do you know where these places are?  (Sec. 11) : COMMERCIAL FARMS

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Commercial farms – private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and rubber plantations. They are subject to compulsory acquisition and distribution after 10 years from effectivity.

Luz Farms vs. Dar Sec. 11 which includes “private agricultural land devoted to commercial livestock, poultry & swine raising” in definition of “commercial farms” is invalid.

**There are actually different treatments under CARL. GENERAL RULE: You have private agricultural land which is acquired by the government irrespective of the commodity produced. There is also commercial farming and corporate land owners. **Hacienda Luisita falls under corporate land ownership. Banana Plantation in Davao and Pineapples in Bukidnon is under commercial farming. Atty. C’s opinion: There is a different treatment of the law based on this types or kinds of land because the law would not immediately acquire them upon the effectivity of the law, June 15, 1988. They are given a deferment of 10 years. After the lapse of 10 years then the government is compelled to acquire them. There are specific commodities, products and crops in this section, to wit: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

saltbeds, fruit farms (i.e. pineapple and banana) orchards vegetable cut-flower farms cacao coffee rubber plantations

Adm. Order #01 (2004): rules & regulations governing exclusion of agricultural land used for cattle raising from CARP. Citing Luz Farms case private agricultural land or portions thereof actually, exclusively &directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded. Exclusion shall be granted only upon proof of AED prior to 15 June 1988 & continuously utilized for such purpose up to application. Any act to change or convert; w/ intent to avoid CARP, shall be invalid. Only the grazing area & portions of property required for infrastructure necessary for cattle raising shall be considered for exclusion Alternative methods available to commercial farms other than distribution of lands. DAR A.O #9, S of 1998 – allows commercial farms certain options, subject to approval of DAR & workers: (aside from voluntary & compulsory coverage). Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA). CLOAs are issued in name of cooperative of workers

- joint venture - growership agreement - lease – back - direct payment

TN: In any of these methods, ownership of the land is still transferred to the farmer beneficiaries but it is not distributed. The land remains intact but the former landowner can participate in this method.

TN: Rice, corn sugarcane and coconut are not covered.

1.

Joint Venture

**If your type of land is planted in any of the enumerated above, the government will give you alternatives.



Kinsa ang mag.joint venture? Ang beneficiary and former landowner

ALTERNATIVE



Beneficiaries will contribute the use of the land, the investor furnishing the capital and technology. It assumes that the beneficiaries are the owners of the land. The investor may be the person of the previous landowner. Under DAR regulation, the land owner is always given the priority. Even if you might observed certain hectares of land still planted with the same crops then you check who owns the parcel of land, is it still the land owner or the farmer beneficiary.

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TN: There has to be approval from DAR

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

This private agricultural lands (COMMERCIAL FARMS) will have to remain intact. o If these lands will be distributed to farmer beneficiaries it is based on individual basis. Lands like this are to be awarded in favor of a cooperative Don’t believe that if you have lands devoted to commercial farming then there is no transfer of ownership from the land owner to the farmer. Because there means that there can be a transfer of ownership as well as title of the land in favor farmers cooperative.

2.



Lease-back 

“Have to remain intact” Because if you have 100-hectares of banana plantation and it is acquired by the government and to be distributed to individual farmer beneficiaries, the government cannot imposed on the individual farmer beneficiaries that they can continue to plant bananas on the lands awarded. It is because the farmer beneficiary will be at liberty to choose what kind of commodity will be planted there.



3.

farmer

An owner of the land will now rent his own land from the farmer beneficiary Lease may not exceed 10 years. There is a least rental. It needs approval of DAR

Growership arrangements 

You have workers who will continue to farm the land and then the produce/ harvest based on the

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

agreement of the previous owner that he will be the one to buy it. To be approved by DAR

4.

Direct payment scheme



If they can agree that the property will have to be transferred to the farmer beneficiary and the farmer beneficiaries will be paying the landowner for the land. To be approved by DAR According to DAR, it requires that CLOA be issued collectively or under co-ownership under the direct payment scheme

 

TN: Former landowner shall be given priority with respect to these methods. Contracts are reviewed by DAR Support Services to be submitted to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM) and to be endorsed to PARC. PARC is the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by the President of the Philippines.

TN: NO MORE VLT UNDER RA 9700. So now we are only limited to two ways: VOS and Compulsory Acquisition Under Sec 12, DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease rentals within the retained areas and areas not yet acquired. And this is shown in Admin Order No. 02-06. **Even in RA 3844, we know that there is security of tenure, continuity of relations, there may be farmers who may wish to execute a contract of lease so that the executed contract of lease can be annotated at the back of the title of the land to have full protection for the farmer beneficiary. If there is a contract of lease between the farmers and the landowner, it can be registered in the Register of Deeds and it is free of charge. DAR Adm. Order No. 02-06 RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout the country into agricultural leasehold relationship

**There are cases when a land owner does not want to avail of these methods. Like for example the Sumilao Farmers in which they used to fight the San Miguel Corp. when San Miguel challenged the acquisition. Thus these are not the only options or methods under CARP.

1.

OTHER METHODS UNDER CARP

4.



Stock distribution option o o

o

referring to hacienda Luisita For how many years, the SDO was perfectly managed; it was a good method until when the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council headed by GMA revoked the SDO on the ground that among others, it failed to alleviate the conditions of the farmer beneficiaries. And which revocation was upheld by the SC. Right now, the lands are being distributed to farmer beneficiaries consistent with the ruling of the Court.

Chapter III (IMPROVEMENT OF TENURIAL & LABOR RELATION) WHAT ARE THE WAYS IN DISTRIBUTING LANDS TO QUALIFIED FARMERS? 1. 2. 3.

Compulsory acquisition (Sec.16) Voluntary offer to sell/voluntary land transfer (Sec.20) Non-land transfer schemes –stock distribution option(SDO); production & profit sharing (PPS)- Sec. 13/32; leasehold operation(Sec.12) a. No actual transfer of the land of the landowner in favor of the farmer. i. Stock distribution option. ii. Production and Profit Sharing **There can be an agreement that the farmer beneficiary can be given a profit on the production iii. Leasehold Operation

Voluntary offer to sell (VOS) vs. Voluntary land transfer (VLT) VOS you have a transfer of the land from landowner to the government and government to farm beneficiaries while in VLT, there is no intervention of the government, so landowner to farm beneficiaries.

2. 3.

Abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural landholdings without exceptions The conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated by law. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into agricultural lessees as of June 15, 1988 whether or not a leasehold agreement has been executed Leaseholder’s security of tenure shall be respected and guaranteed.

Cancellation of Leasehold Contract **DARAB has jurisdiction on the cancellation of the leasehold contract. It is because DARAB has power to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in the contract. So if there are stipulations in the contract, when one party commits violation the other party can ask for adjudication for it. Cancellation of Leasehold Contract vs. Cancellation of CLOA The cancellation to cancel CLOA is given by the Secretary of DAR. It is the Secretary of DAR who issues the title and the restrictions and conditions stated in the title is part of the Agrarian Law Implementation or ALI cases. The cancellation of leasehold contract, the adjudicating arm of DAR will be the one to adjudicate whereas in CLOA, where the parties are the government and the farmers is done by the Sec. of DAR. CLOA is not a contract, it is a privilege which is subject to restrictions and conditions. CHAPTER IV – REGISTRATION Sec. 14 & 15 require the registration of landowners & beneficiaries w/ DAR specifically the MARO because it is about implementation. Registration is an implementation of CARP. Purpose of which is to establish databank & identify actual famerbeneficiaries. Insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, registration will determine if you have a standing to intervene in a case. Enunciated in the case of Fortich vs. Corona Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., G.R. 131457, August 19, 1999 This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.

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In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million. NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders." On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.

considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations. Fortich vs. Corona: intervenors claimed that they are farm workers & so intervened in case. SC: There is no ruling yet from DAR whether intervenors are beneficiaries, so they have no standing yet to intervene in the case. 1. DAR safeguards the list of ARB & provide IDs as proof of being bonafide beneficiaries 2. DARAB has jurisdiction to disqualify an ARB.

Concha vs. Rubio: Not a dispute between Land owner and tenant. It is a fight among tenants. They were name as beneficiaries by MARO. Concha was named as the beneficiaries by MARO. Rubio et al. would also want to be named as beneficiaries but the MARO rejected it. So Rubio and the others file a complaint for tenancy as beneficiaries and they want to Concha et al. to be disqualified. ISSUE: 

ISSUE: Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win" Resolution. RULING: We rule in the negative. The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides: Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever practicable. When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained



Who among them should be considered qualified to become beneficiaries over a portion of land? Who determines who is qualified?

RULING: It is DAR specifically MARO who determined who is qualifies as beneficiaries. The identification and selection involve administrative implementation so it lies with the Secretary of DAR and not with DARAB. The findings of MARO showed that the respondent were not considered qualified because according to the MARO they:  refused to sign the form  already given disturbance compensation Respondents claimed that they already returned the money to the landowners but MARO found that they used the money in building their houses in the lot given to them in other lots. MARO also found out that they executed the document “sinumpaang salaysay” that they already abandoned the landholding in question. MARO decide to eject them. As a matter of principle, the finding of the MARO is to be accorded respect unless there is a showing of abuse of authority. CHAPTER V – LAND ACQUISITION  



Landlessness is acknowledged as the core problem in the rural areas and the root cause of peasant unrest. In order to hasten the implementation of the program, the Department of Agrarian Reform has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition. To the same end, the law provides for the steps in acquiring private lands through administrative instead of judicial proceedings. This procedure is allowed provided the requirements of due process as to notice and hearing is complied with. Compulsory acquisition may be defined as the mandatory acquisition of agricultural lands including facilities and improvements necessary for agricultural production, as may be appropriate, for distribution to qualified beneficiaries upon payment of just compensation.

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The Notice of Coverage (NOC) commences the compulsory acquisition of private agricultural lands coverable under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Along the various phases of the CARP proceedings, the process stalls because of Land Owner (LO) resistance, most of whom invoke the ground of lack of notice or non-observance of due process in attacking the proceedings.

In this Subsection, you cannot find the NOC or the Notice of Coverage what you will see is the Notice to acquire. The Notice of Coverage is covered in this phrase but it was not included in the section. SC claims that the identification of the land presupposes a Notice of Coverage issued by DAR and Pursuant to DAR order, Notice of Coverage is a mandatory requirement.

SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:

But it was not clear in the law about how identification is determined. This was filled up by DAR through an Admin Order. Subsection A, talks about “notice to acquire”: In the case of CONFED vs. DAR, SC talks about two notices

(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

1. Notice of coverage: More or less Preliminary: WHY?  Because while it notifies that the property shall be placed under CARP, the landowner is entitled to retention.  Notifies the landowner about the public hearing about the results of field investigation, land evaluation and other pertinent matters  The landowner will be informed that the field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted. After that comes the notice of acquisition.

(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. (c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title. (d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to summit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. (f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation

2. Notice of acquisition:  The area subject of compulsory acquisition has to be stated. WHY? It is based already on the field investigation  Plus the amount of just compensation offered by DAR



TN: Sec. 16 outlines the procedure for acquisition of private land. There are aspects of procedure that is mandatory. (a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.

How is the notice to be done? Personal delivery, registered mail and posting Note in the case of CONFED: Notice shall contain the offer of DAR  OFFER: offer of the government to the landowner as to how much the government will pay the landowner corresponding to the land to be acquired.  Discuss this in relation to par. (e): It is the deposit that is the key to the immediate possession and issuance of a title (b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. 

Within 30 days from the date of the receipt the owner shall inform DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.

TN: Do not be misled by the word administrator here because, in so far as the owner who answers to the offer, the administrator has no authority to receive the notice. Roxas Co. vs. Ca Roxas, the person who received the notice of coverage was and administrator. SC held that it was not a valid service of the notice. (c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title. 

If the landowner accepts the owner, he shall execute a deed of transfer and correspondingly the landowner shall be paid just compensation

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(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to summit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision. TN: Even if DAR conducts Summary Administrative proceeding for determination of just compensation. SC explained in CONFED vs. DAR that determination by DAR is merely preliminary because in sub-paragraph (F), it is the RT who has jurisdiction on determination of just compensation. (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. 

In normal dealings (voluntary dealings), if you have a sale of land, the seller will execute the Deed of Sale and give the original copy (owner’s duplicate copy) to the buyer, so that the buyer can go to RD, and be issued a new title in favor of the purchaser. But here it is different because there is no deed to be executed by the landowner because this is compulsory. There is also no surrender of the owner’s copy of the title. There are two copies of a title: (1) with the Registry of Deeds and; (2) the owner’s copy of the title. 1.

2. 3.

4.

Under par. (e), Registry of Deeds can cancel the title of the LO on the basis of the deposit, certification from land bank which will be annotated to the title and RD will issue a new title in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The title is cancelled even without the surrender of the owner’s copy RD’s copy of the LO’s title is cancelled even if the owner’s copy is subsisting i. Probable in case LO rejects offer or does not reply, he is still in possession of the title ii. Advise: do not simply rely on the owner’s copy, you get a certified true copy from the RD. RD can cancel and issue under CARL even if there is no payment of taxes and transfer fees (provided in Sec 66 and 67 below)

Sec. 66 (Exemptions from taxes &fees of land transfer) Sec. 67 (Free Registration of patents, titles & documents required for implementation of CARP) Sec. (e): Once DAR request and LBP makes deposit of initial valuation, DAR can request RD to cancel title & transfer it to Republic of Phil. So even if landowners protests valuation, distribution of land will proceed.

CLOAs are issued upon land acquisition: so cancellation of title of landowner can simultaneously go w/ issuance of CLOA. LBP vs. Heirs of Trinidad What is the amount deposited? Does sub-paragraph E follows after subparagraph D? NO, because E may also follow after subparagraph B. It means that if the owner does not file a reply within 30 days or if he rejects it, two things will happen: (1) it can be conducted through summary administrative proceedings and; (2) deposit. By mere deposit and having in possession a certification that there was deposit made in the bank in the name of the landowner, DAR can request the Registry of Deeds to cancel the title of the landowner and issue a new title under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Under the amendments of RA9700, the Registry of Deeds has no discretion because it is a ministerial function. ROD can only transfer the name of the title once the DAR issues a certification on the deposit. TN: Sub-paragraph A, B, C, and E is related to administrative implementation so it is under MARO. D is not under MARO, it is under PARAD or RARAD depending on the amount involved- not more than 5M, PARAD; if more than 5M RARAD. Summary Administrative Proceeding is not under the administrative implementation because it is quasi-judicial. There is a need for an adjudicatory arm because in determining the just compensation, disputes may arise and it must be settled. (f)

Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation

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The decision referred to is based on the Summary Administrative Proceeding. If it reaches DARAB, any party (referring not only to the landowner, LBP can also file a case in RTC) can go to RTC.

“FINAL” Determination of the DAR is merely preliminary; the final say is with the RTC. “PAYMENT”  In cash (if hectares involved are small hectares receives more cash while those who have bigger hectares receives less cash so that they can pursue on agricultural undertaking.)  LBP bonds (expires in 10 years but it can be use to buy property) Compulsory Acquisition is also an eminent domain. Expropriation in Consti Law: two limitations:  Public use  Payment of just compensation SC: In this case (CONFED VS. DAR), there is no more need to prove public use because this has been settled in the Constitution when it called for Agrarian Reform. So there is only one limitation remaining: just compensation. JUST COMPENSATION

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1.What are the factors which the court must rely upon to be able to determine just compensation? (Sec. 17) 2. When shall we reckon the payment of the determination of just compensation? Time of ACTUAL taking  But it is different in this case, while the SC has mentioned about date of taking, but it has been interpreted at the time of the issuance of the title which may different.  Actual scenario: actual taking may precede issuance or vice versa TN: This is the section that provides the Special Agrarian Courts (SAC) original and exclusive jurisdiction. SAC refer to RTC. Agrarian Cases like any other case has rules and procedure which is Rule 67 which is about expropriation. Sec. 58 and rule 67 talks about appointment of commissioners. When the case is filed in the RTC: in the law itself, it says MAY appoint, under rule 67, court SHALL appoint Commissioners for the determination of just compensation. Who normally opposes commissioners? BIR, city assessor, provincial assessor, treasure and if parties cannot agree on the third member, the court appoints the clerk of court (they are more or less knowledgeable on the aspect of just compensation). It does not preclude other person to be appointed as commissioners. The purpose is to receive evidence as far as just compensation is concerned and based on the evidence submit recommendation to RTC. Recommendation of the commissioners is not binding upon the them. LBP vs .Heirs of Trinidad “Deposit” under sub-paragraph (E), question is what is the amount to be deposited? Is it the amount of the offer the DAR in subparagraph A which is supposed to be contained in the notice of acquisition? Or is it the amount based on par. (d) after the conduct of summary proceedings? CA claimed that the amount to be deposited under subparagraph E is the sum awarded under sub-paragraph D because while sub-par. A talks about the offer sub-par. E talks about deposit. You can only find the word deposit in sub-par. E and it follows sub-par. E and because it follows sub-par. D so the word deposit must be referring to the sum awarded by DARAB after the conduct of Summary Administrative Proceeding. SC did not agree. SC ruled that E should be related to subpar (a), (b), and (c) considering that the taking of possession by the state is the next step after DAR, and LBP supplied with the notice requirements. In effect the SC is saying: it is the offer of the LBP that will determine that that is the correct amount to be deposited not the amount after the determination of just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. SC claimed that to construe subpar (A) would hamper the land redistribution process because the government has to wait for the termination of the Summary Administrative proceeding.

Land Bank v. CA Private respondent challenged the admin order issued by DAR permitting the opening of trust account by LBP, in lieu of depositing in cash or in LBP bonds. SC:   

WHY? Because the trust account is under the control of the trustee. The beneficiary-landowner cannot properly use or control the funds when the funds is supposed to be given due for land owner. not sanctioned by law Service of the NOC General rule — The NOC shall be addressed to and received by the Landonwer. EXCEPTIONS: 

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TN: par (a) precedes over par. (d) on the determination of the correct amount to be deposited. Compensation in cash or in LBP bonds (Section 16)  

Payment of cash and bonds otherwise the government will go bankrupt if all in cash. Bonds: to give the government time to appropriate in the future when the bonds will mature VOS (Voluntary offer to sell): under the law, if you make VOS, landowner is entitled to 5% payment in cash, additional than that provided by law.

Sec. 16 (e) is explicit that deposit be in “cash” or in “LBP bonds”; Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form like a trust account; There was no basis for issuance of order.

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Service upon co-owners — In case of co-ownership, the NOC shall be served upon each and every co-owner, unless one is specifically authorized to receive for the other co-owners. AHEDaI Service upon minors or incompetents — When the LO is a minor, insane or otherwise incompetent, service shall be made upon him personally and to his legal guardian if he has one, or if none, upon his guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the DLR. In the case of a minor, service may also be made on his father and/or mother. Service upon entity without juridical personality — When the LOs who are persons associated in an entity without juridical personality are sued under the name by which they are generally or commonly known, service may be effected upon all the LOs by serving upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the Office or place of business maintained in such name. Such service shall not bind individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon due notice, been severed before the proceeding was brought. Service upon domestic private juridical entity — When the LO is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, in-house counsel or administrator. Branch manager is not included Service upon LO whose identity or whereabouts is unknown — In any proceeding where the LO is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the DLR may order. Extraterritorial service — When the LO does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, or when the LO ordinarily resides within the Philippines but is temporarily out of the country, service may be made by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for such time as the DLR may order.

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ROXAS CO. vs. CA

There are two notices that is mandatory: Notice of Coverag and Notice of Acquisition. QUERY: how does DAR know the name of the landowner? ANS: DAR will get a Certified True Copy of the Title from Registry of Deeds or true copy of the Tax Declaration from the assessor in case of untitled land. If there is no certified true copy. Present any of these four documents, to wit: 1. Photocopy of Title 2. Tax Declaration 3. Certification from Registry of Deed that OCT/TCT is missing but there is a technical description and the last known registered owner is indicated. 4. Public Documents If based on these documents, there are several landowners then send NOC’s to all of them. For just compensation, let DAR settle it for as long as service of the NOC is complied. DAR also preferred that NOC’s should be published in the national newspaper of general circulation. Heirs of Deleste vs LBP HELD:

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DAR notified the heirs of Gregorio meaning that Deleste was not notified.

SC: it was incumbent upon DAR to notify Deleste, he was the landowner, sale was registered and tax declaration was already in the name of Deleste. Petitioner’s right to due process was indeed violated, DAR failed to notify them. There can be no valid transfer of title should the CLT’s are void, cancellation of TCTs and OCTs are clearly warranted. ROXAS CO. VS. CA The landowner is a domestic corporation; the NOC was served to an administrator. After the service of the NOC, the government acquired the landholding and after that, causes the cancellation of the land title of the land owner and issued a new title in favor of the Republic. Then CLOAs were given to the farmers. SC ruled that the service of the NOC to the administrator is invalid because he is not authorized to receive such (Admin. Order 711). If the service is invalid, is it a ground to nullify the CLOA. SC said NO, let DAR validate the proceedings. SC has no power to cancel the CLOA; it is DAR ho has the power. It would seem that the proceedings would be ratified.

On the violation of petitioners' right to due process of law Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated. We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the essential requirements of administrative due process of law. It was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2, 1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held: Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal with the same property. It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the property has been entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no reason for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the subject property. Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the name of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession." Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform program. Failure to notify owners violating section 16.  Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, childless. But the husband had a son name Virgilio by another woman but was raised by the couple. Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad by still another woman. Gregorio died. Hilaria and Virgilio sold the land to Jose Deleste. Sale was notarized, registered, declaration was cancelled and tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.

Fortich Case CLOA was illegal because there was a violation of the process and should it be cancelled? Fortich is the governor. This case is originally a case an application for conversion. Quisumbing Corporation applied for the conversion of the 144 hectare-land from Agri to Agro industrial. Application was supported by the government and Fortich filed the case. DAR did not listen. The application was denied and the denial of the application was passed to the Office of the President. OP reversed the decision of the DAR. OP decided to approve the application for conversion of the 144 hectares. DAR filed a MR but it was denied because of the lapse of time in filing. The decision of the OP becomes final ad executor. Under the Ramos Administration, new executive secretary who is Corona, there were strikes by the farmer in QC so the OP came up with a “win-win” resolution. “Win-Win” resolution says that 100 hectares should be given to the farmers and the 44 is for conversion. Fortich then filed a case and he won in SC because OP’s decision which granted the application of conversion is already final and executory. So the “Win-Win” resolution was issued in abuse of discretion thus it is invalid. CLOA’s given are invalidated. Meaning of Just Compensation -

That is how it is defined. (sir points to the slide huhuhu) LBP v Dumlao

Facts:

Respondents are owners of agri lands covered under PD 27; determination of just compensation remained pending with DAR, so they filed complaint with RTC for determination SC: If just compensation was not settled prior to the passafe of RA 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said law, although property was acquired under PD 27. The determination made by the trial court, which relied solely on the formula prescribed by PD 27 and EO No 228, is grossly erroneous. The amount does not come close to a full and fair equivalent of the property.

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It cannot be overemphasied that the just compensation to be given to the owner be assumed and must be determined with certainty.

any deed of sale. It should be the recorded deed of sale. It is one that is bared with stamp by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

FORMULA: 3) Actual use and income and nature LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x .03) + (MV x 0.1) It can be proven also by zoning, inspection or testimony of the appraiser

where: LV = Land Value CNI = Capitalized Net Income CS = Comparable Sales MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

4. Sworn valuation by owner 5. Tax Declaration 6. Assessment made by Government assessors.

ATTY:

The last three can found in the tax declaration itself. So the assessed value made by the landowner. It is the part where some landowners will not state the true value of the property because they do not want to pay higher real property taxes.

The principle in just compensation is the court will receive evidence in relation to the factors, the court is supposed to come up with a decision base on the factors. So the court cannot simply choose any value without basing it from the factors.

Opinion of Atty: Here the RTC simply chose the lower of the two value and the court said that cannot be done. Formula must be followed. The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable. The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. (Sir: I will not ask this because there is a conflicting issue  - wala na nako giapil ang explanation ni sir sa conflict the date upon full payment or date of taking) Why? EP constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a TCT in the name of the grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding, subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner. However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the trial court should determine the date os issuance of these EP in order to ascertain the date of taking and proceed to compute the just compensation due to respondents. ATTY: -

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If just compensation was not settled prior to CARP but the property was acquired under PD 27, the governing law is CARP To summarize: o SC said that it CARP will govern because PD 27 applies suppletorily only. o CARL is the latter enactment also In this case there were Two Values specified by the commissioner. What the court did was simply to choose the lower of the two values. Actually in matters regarding just compensation, what is important is: we know what are the factors in Section 17 and which according to RA 9700, these factors are now translated into a formula. In another case, SC said that it is inequitable to base it on PD 27, but the SC did not elaborate why.

Why CARL should be the governing law in computing just compensation? 1)

PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration; RA 6657: several factors for consideration in determining just compensation.

2)

RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation has not been determined at the time of passage of RA 6657 applies because PD 27 and EO 228 have onlt suppletory effect.

In fact in the amendment in the RA 9700, the crop harvest was included as an additional factors. Amendment of Section 17 (RA9700): -

Spouse Lee vs LBP In this case, there was admission by the party that the valuation was not based on the factors. So the valuation was not valid because it was not based on the factors. So normally the court will remand the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence LBP vs Heirs of Cruz Decision of PARAD point to no evidence. So naay valuation, but it was not mentioned in the decision what was the evidence relied upon in coming up with the valuation. So it was invalid. If valuation is not based on any evidence, it is without basis, so determination be remanded. It was remanded to the trial court LBP v Jocson and Sons -

SECTION 17 (FACTORS) 1) Cost of Acquisition 2) Current Value of like properties

Two additional factors were added o The value of the standing crop o 70% of the zonal valuation of the BIR

About the date of taking as compared to Dumlao case. “Seizure of the land holding did not take place on the date of effectivity of PD 27. LBP would normally argue that the date of taking should be reckoned October 21, 1972.

SC said NO! It is on the payment of just compensation. Proof of this could be a deed of sale but please take note that if you are a landowner, you cannot simply present

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ATTY: But it is difficult considering that the decision can still be appealed. And the payment can still not happen because there was an appeal. **Remember the decision is subject of an appeal. LBP vs Livioco The land is agricultural but the landowner tried to prove that the land is now residential. He submitted different evidence like certification form the MPD and others. But none of the plans was approved. Based on these evidence SC ruled that they cannot accept those evidences because the land was classified as agricultural but you did not present a conversion clearance approval coming from DAR. The land owner should have presented this. The best way to value the property is to classify it as agricultural and if there are improvements then you include those improvements as part of the factors to be able to be included in actual valuation. Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential property (which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most, refer to the potential use of the property. While the potential use of an expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated property, it should never control the determination of just compensation (which appears to be what the lower courts have erroneously done). The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential uses. If at all, the potential use of the property or its "adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor, not the ultimate in determining just compensation." The proper approach should have been to value respondent's property as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the improvements in the Municipality of Mabalacat. This is because the farmer beneficiaries are made to pay for lands valued as residential.

There is RTC STC where the determination of the just compensation was the issue. There are two branches here: Branch 35 and Branch 36. In these two braches there was a determination of Just compensation. RTC STC got the valuation of the two branches and use it as the basis in the case involving agrarian reform. It did not consider the market value of the land, the formula because it simply rely on the valuation of the two branches. SC distinguished the difference of the expropriation of the agra and the NAPOCOR. SC says that these are two different entities, their objective is different. It is not wrong to rely on the valuation of another court FOR AS LONG AS the RTC-STC CAN JUSTIFY SUCH VALUATION BASED ON THE REQUISITES and not mere reliance without explaining and considering the factors. QUERY: Whether prior reports to DARAB is necessary before determination of just compensation can be filed. ANSWER: NO. There are two grounds and under sec. 57 RTC-SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction. There are cases where owner file petitions in PARAD, if there is adverse decision it will not elevate to DARAB, you can go directly to RTC and there is no such thing as appeal from DARAB to RTC because they are the same level. LBP vs. Nable The court mention about the farming experience and method of conversion test but did not discuss it. This test would actually prove the nature and the actual use of the income of the landowner. Even we don’t find this test in Sec. 17, DARAB was not mean that it was omitted. You can conclude that the farmers have this way of computing how many sacks of crops can we harvest. August 3, 2016 22-33 minutes LBP v. Nable

LBP vs Honeycomb HELD: We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the applicable DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Lim, 24 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, 25 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido. 26 In Barrido, we were explicit in stating that: While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial function vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules. Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law, the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just compensation. RTC based it valuation when it took judicial notice that a portion of the land is commercial land, just a few kilometers away from a commercial district. It is not right of the RTC to base it in their observation by taking judicial notice. SC ruled that you CANNOT RELY BASED ON YOUR OBSERVATION, you should follow the factors. CA which affirmed the RTC’s decision acted in grave error when they were not able to come up with their own basis for the valuation of the subject land.

SC: 

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Court finds nothing objectionable or irregular in the use by the RTC of the assailed the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion tests. Such test are not inconsistent or incompatible with the factors listed in Section 17 of the RA 6657 Although Section 17 of the RA 6657 has not explicitly mentioned the farming experience and the thumb method of conversion as methods in the determination of just compensation, LBO cannot deny that such methods were direcly relevant to the factors listed in Section 17, particularly those on the nature, actual use and income of the landholding.

Atty Comment: The farmers there has their own way of computing the compensation like “How many sacks to be produced out of the entire hectare?” that is farming experience. That was declared by the court as relevant.

Valuation and payment (Section 18)

LBP vs. Yatco

LBP v. PARAB

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Issue: If there is still a case pending on appeal, can the landowner withdraw any amount deposited to the government with the bank? SC: The court answered in affirmative. If you deny the landowners opportunity to withdraw the amount already deposited then that is an oppressive exercise of eminent domain.

This is a case in which the SC justified why it is CARL in the determination of just compensation. For land acquired, PD 27. However the just compensation was not settled. It ruled however that it is inequitable. But why? The Supreme court did not elaborate. The meaning of just compensation.

Content and Manner (Section 18) 

Atty Comment: While the case is pending in RTC, the landowner can withdraw the amount. Is it possible that there is a double compensation? Well, that is the responsibility of landbank. If the amount is withdrawn then Landbank should attest in court that the landowner has already withdrawn the amount. So that the withdrawn amount can already be deducted to the award to be given to the landowner.

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Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stocks, tax credits or LBP bond Is this a violation of usual way of payment in cash? o No, because “revolutionary kind”.

Parties (Sec. 18) Who are the parties in a case of just compensation?

LBP v. CA

Heirs of Lorenzo v. LBP

It is DAR, Landowner and LBP. The law does not mention the participation of farmer-beneficiary

Facts: The petitioners challenged the personality of LBP. They argues that Landbank cannot file a case of just compensation without DAR.

Atty Comment: You would not here “consent of farmer-beneficiary is not required in establishing proper compensation.”

Issue: What is the personality of Landbank in a case of determination of just compensation.

Payment if Interest

Apo Fruits v. CA SC: Section 18. clearly states there has to be consensus between the landowner, DAR and LBP. LBP is not a nominal party in the determination of just compensation thus LBP can act independently of DAR.

Atty Comments: You would note that there are several cases in which the party to a case is Landbank and only Landbank, without DAR.

Facts: RTC rendered a judgement ordering LBO/DAR to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the above-fixed amount from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After the decision becomes final and executory, the rate of 12% per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is satisfied. CA nullified the RTC order.

SC: The interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay in its payment, which facts must be sufficiently established.

DAR v. Heirs of Domingo

SC: Just compensation should be full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.

Atty Comment:

Aug 3. Last 11 min. “Si sir nag teach daw transpo” -in so far as agra is concerned, the government is supposed to pay money to the land owner, that is forbearance of money

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-once there is already a final decision, the obligation becomes a forbearance of money -the reckoning point of interest as a form of damages is from the time of demand until finality of the decision (decision will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period, no party appealed to the decision) -once the decision has become final and executory, there is again an interest on a forbearance of money which is to be computed from finality until payment. -rate is the same-12% Apo Fruits corp. vs CA Facts: On October 12, 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the lands subject of this case pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications to Land Bank for initial valuation. LandBank fixed the just compensation at P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected, however, prompting Land Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit accounts in the names of the petitioners, and to credit in said accounts the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC) and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). Both petitioners withdrew the amounts in cash from the accounts, but afterwards, on February 14, 1997, they filed separate complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB).

The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the Court of Appeals does not mean that it deliberately delayed the payment of just compensation to KPCI. It may disagree with DAR and the landowner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to court for judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the Agrarian Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such cases that are unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to appeal in this case, LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for interest. It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation is imposed only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition of interest on the award of just compensation is not justified and should therefore be deleted. It must be emphasized that "pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of AFC and HPI within fourteen months after the filing by the latter of the Complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC". It is likewise true that AFC and HPI already collected P149.6 and P262 million, respectively, representing just compensation for the subject properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in the payment of just compensation which should warrant the award of 12% interest per annum in AFC and HPI's favor. LBP vs Rivera Facts:

When DARAB did not act on their complaints for determination of just compensation after more than three years, the petitioners filed complaints for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagum City, Branch 2, acting as a special agrarian court (SAC), docketed as Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000. Summonses were served on May 23, 2000 to Land Bank and DAR, which respectively filed their answers on July 26, 2000 and August 18, 2000. The RTC conducted a pre-trial, and appointed persons it considered competent, qualified and disinterested as commissioners to determine the proper valuation of the properties.

The respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land embraced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-082, and later transferred in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T95690 that was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972. Only 18.8704 hectares of the total area of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the coverage. After the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) directed payment, LBP approved the payment of P265, 494.20, exclusive of the advance payments made in the form of lease rental amounting to P75,415.88 but inclusive of 6% increment of P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.

The RTC rendered its decision:

On 1 December 1994, the respondents instituted Civil Case No. 94-03 for determination and payment of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners' fees herein taxed as part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 1/2) percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of taking until full payment; ISSUE: Whether or not the interest was validly imposed. HELD: a notice of appeal; and that Land Bank filed in March 2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not give due course to its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby entailed could not be attributed to Land Bank, however, considering that assailing an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy afforded by law to every losing party, who cannot thus be considered to act in bad faith or in an unreasonable manner as to make such party guilty of unjustified delay. As stated in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation:

LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 7 were governed and valued in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 8 as implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1987 and other statutes and administrative issuances; that the administrative valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only financing arm; that the funds that LBP would use to pay compensation were public funds to be disbursed only in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that the supporting documents were not yet received by LBP; and that the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive Order No. 228 was already settled. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we affirmed the award of 12% interest on just compensation due to the landowner. The court decreed: The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final

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compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred. The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the value of the currency over time.

-look at the pronouncement of the SC, there is 12% interest on just compensation but the reckoning point. “From the finality of this decision until its satisfaction”. The question now is, “what is the meaning of finality of decision?” what happened to Oct. 7, 2004? -g.change sa SC and reckoning point Case of Gallego Interest from the taking to full payment SC found that there was delay. 1. Deprivation of income. Landbank took 4 decades and 3 generations of the Gallegos before they received the just compensation. 2. Gross in valuation. Landbank valued the compensation 97% lower than the RTC

Voluntary Offer for Sale (Section 19) SEC. 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. - Landowners other than banks and other financial institutions who voluntarily offer their lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash payment. Voluntary Transfer (Section 20 and 21) SEC. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. - Landowners of agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines: (a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first year of the implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners and qualified beneficiaries covering any voluntary land transfer which remain unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such land shall instead be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to this Act. (b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the transferee than those of the government's standing offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such offers have been made and are fully known to both parties. (c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for noncompliance by either party and shall be duly recorded and its implementation monitored by the DAR. SEC. 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries Under Voluntary Land Transfer.- Direct payment in cash or in kind may be made by the farmer beneficiary to the landowner under terms to be mutually agreed upon by both parties, which shall be binding upon them, upon registration with and approval by the DAR. Said approval shall be considered given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration. In the event they cannot agree on the price of the land, the procedure for compulsory acquisition as provided in Section 16 shall apply. The LBP shall extend financing to the beneficiaries for purposes of acquiring the land. Other style: RTC decision in Rivera -“OCT 6, 2004” –date when the decision was rendered -You know why I put that date there? Because based on the dispositive portion, the interest was reckoned, Oct 7, 2004. Are you not surprised? Sir cannot imagine the decision. -The oct 7, 2004 went to the CA and was affirmed. It went to SC affirmed the decision of the CA with modifications. G.modify sa SC ang just compensation, diri 500, diri 1.2M, but the reckoning is the same (i.e., Oct. 7)

University of San Carlos EH408 (2016)