Agra Case Digests Module 3 - RAC

 

1. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250 (July 9, 2002) Facts: When the late President Marcos enacted Presidenal Decree No. 1084, it created the Public Estates Authority (PEA) which is tasked "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and

"to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." But more importantly, Presidenal Decree No. 1085 was also enacted which mandates the transfer of the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and oshore of the Manila Bay,” or beer known as the Freedom Islands, to PEA. On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporaon, to develop the Freedom Islands to which the Board of Directors of PEA have conrmed and was subsequently approved by then President Ramos. On April 27, 1998, peoner Frank I. Chavez ("Peoner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, led the instant peon for mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injuncon and temporary restraining order. Peoner argues, inter alia, that it violates prohibion of sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporaons that is enshrined in Secon 3, Arcle XII of the 1987 Constuon. S tate Issue: Whether or not the Amended JVA which transfers to AMARI the Freedom Islands from the State an unconstuonal transacon. Held: Yes. Private corporaons are banned from acquiring lands of the public domain and are only allowed to lease those lands. Only qualied individuals could acquire alienable lands of the public

domain. The 1987 Constuon connues the State policy in the 1973 Constuon banning private corporaons from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The raonale behind this constuonal prohibion is that since individuals are allowed to acquire lands of the public domain with the limitaon of not more than 12 hectares, they could easily circumvent this limitaon by creang holding corporaons to acquire more than what is allowed. Furthermore, the provision in PD No. 1085 stang that porons of the reclaimed rec laimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the "contractor or his assignees" would not apply to private corporaons but but only to individuals because of the constuonal ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constuons.

20. Ong v. Imperial, G.R. No. 197127 (July 15, 2015) re gistered Facts: Peoners Noel L. Ong, Omar Anthony L. Ong, and Norman L. Ong (peoners) are registered owners of a parcel of land under Transfer Cercate of Title (TCT) No. T-17045 located in Barangay Dogongan, Daet, Camarines Norte (subject property). The Municipal Agrarian Reform Ocer (MARO) issued a Noce of Coverage to peoners pertaining to the subject property and that it is covered pursuant to the implementaon of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. This prompted the peoners to protest and object the said issuance because, as they t hey contended, the subject property was used as a grazing area for cale and carabao long before the passage of R.A. 6657, hence, exempted from the said law. To which the MARO replied in the negave as the subject property was not actually, directly and exclusively used for livestock.

 

Subsequently, the peoners led an applicaon of exempon with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) on the grounds that the subject property had already been reclassied rec lassied as residenal built-up area, not agricultural, before the eecvity of R.A. 6657 pursuant to a Town Plan and a Zoning Ordinance which was cered and was further claried by the Department of Zoning Authority as to its inclusion in the Town Plan. Nevertheless, the DAR rejected the said applicaon because according to them, the built-up area for residenal areas provided in the Town Plan has long been exhausted, hence, the subject property cannot t or has no room in the built-up area. Then, the peoners appealed the decision to the Oce of The President. In granng the appeal and reversing the decision of the DAR, the Oce of the President ruled that the ndings of Department of Zoning Authority should have been given more weight as they have the righul jurisdicon and experse on the maers of classicaon of lands. The respondents herein appealed in the Court of Appeals and ruled in their favour. Hence this peon. Issue: Whether or not the subject property is exempted from R.A. 6657. Held: No. The Supreme Court had already held that "to be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one

valid reclassicaon of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took eect." Moreover, it is worthy to note that "the power of the local government to convert or reclassify lands [from agricultural to non-agricultural lands prior to the passage of RA 6657] is not subject to the approval of the [DAR]."

20. Rom v. Roxas & Company, Inc., G.R. No. 169331 (September 5, 2011) Facts: Respondent herein are the landowners of the subject properes which sought for an exempon from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, pursuant to DAR Administrave order No. 6, Series of 1994. Respondents claim that the subject properes was reclassied as part of the

residenal cluster area pursuant to a zoning ordinance prior to the eecvity of R.A. 6657. The DAR rejected the applicaon for exempon because it was not accompanied by proof of disturbance compensaon that are to be paid to the farmer-beneciaries occupying the land. This was later remedied by respondent upon xing of the compensaon by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicaon Board. The DAR then granted the exempon. The peoners then led a review in the Court of Appeals alleging that the respondent should have been estopped from ling for exempon because it had already voluntarily oered to sell the subject properes to the DAR and that the farmer-beneciaries were not given the disturbance compensaon pursuant to Secon III(B), paragraph 8 of DAR Admin. Order 6-1994. Issue: Whether or not the subject properes be covered by R.A. 6657 through estoppel and/or failure to comply with the exempon requirements. Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary oer to sell because the subject properes cannot be the subject of a voluntary oer to sell because it is clearly

beyond the CARP's coverage. Furthermore, the respondents failure to submit proof of disturbance compensaon or by peoner’s waiver of such would not render the exempon exe mpon as invalid because the records show that the respondent oered to pay but no agreement was reached, hence the xing of

 

compensaon by the PARAD. The eorts of respondents and along with the documents submied by them in complying with the requirements of the department order appears to have been bee n substanally complied, hence, valid.

12. Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associaons, Inc. v. Secretary of DAR G.R. No. 183409 (June 18, 2010) Facts: Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associaons, Inc. (CREBA for brevity) seeks for the stoppage of the implementaon of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07, and DAR Memorandum

No. 88, 2 for having been issued by the Secretary Secre tary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of discreon amounng to lack or excess of jurisdicon as some provisions of the aforesaid administrave issuances are illegal and unconstuonal. The Secretary of DAR issued rules and procedures which would govern the conversion c onversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural lands. The issued rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, and all untled agricultural lands and agricultural lots reclassied by LGUs into non-agricultural uses aer 15 June 1988. The said issuance was later amended to include (1) those to be converted to residenal, commercial, industrial, instuonal and other nonagricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural acvity such as livestock, poultry, and shpond — the eect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized; and (4) those reclassied to residenal, commercial, industrial, or other nonagricultural uses on or aer the eecvity of Republic Act No. 6657. In Feb. 28, 2002, the Secretary of DAR issued DAR AO 01-02, the challenged rule herein, to amend the aforesaid rules and procedures and repeal all issuances inconsistent therewith. This rule now covers all applicaons for conversion of agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use. This new rule dened agricultural lands as "lands not reclassied as residenal, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" which in eect, means that lands reclassied from agricultural to residenal, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses aer 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of conversion, redistribuon, or otherwise. Subsequently, DAR AO 05-07, which is also one of the challenged rule herein, was issued to amend certain provisions pertaining to land conversion in me of exigencies. As a result of these rules, memorandum no. 88 was issued to suspend all connuing or in-progress conversion of prime agricultural land for real estate development. Peoners herein contend that it slowed down the development of housing projects that resulted to unemployment, illegal squang problems which prejudiced them and more so of the whole naon. Issue: Whether or not the reclassied non-agricultural lands is within the jurisdicon of the DAR

Secretary. Held: Yes, the denion of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers to the

category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-agricultural uses and is not

 

in any way conned to agricultural lands in the context of land redistribuon as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657. In so doing, the DAR Secretary Secre tary merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in Secon 4 (K) and Secon 5(1) 5 (1) of Execuve Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulaons for agrarian reform implementaon and that includes the authority to dene agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has previously held that agricultural lands, though reclassied, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdicon over which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands, which are already reclassied before the eecvity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion because it was the t he cut-o period for automac reclassicaons or rezoning of agricultural lands that does not require any clearance from DAR.

52. Monico Ligtas v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 200751 (August 17, 2015) Facts: Peoner herein was charged with the under Art. 308 of the RPC. The informaon alleged that he entered the abaca plantaon and harvested 1,000 kilos of abaca bers without w ithout the consent of the

owner and with intent to gain. The peoner pleaded not guilty. According to ve (5) prosecuon witnesses, they went to the abaca plantaon with the plantaon’s administrator and several other men upon the orders of the owner. There, they saw the peoner with 3 unidened men already harvesng the abaca bers. Acng upon seeing them, the peoner threatened them if they keep on harvesng. On July 3, 2000, the owner, in the name of Anecita Pacate, confronted the peoner before the Police Staon where the laer admied on harvesng the said abaca bers but claimed c laimed that he was the owner of the plantaon. According to the peoner, he had been a tenant of Pacate since 1993 and that Pacate’s late-husband had installed him as tenant of the poron of the land that is involved in the criminal case. In his defense, Peoner was only defending his land in prevenng Pacate’s workmen in harvesng the abaca in which he righully owns. Peoner led a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicaon Board (DARAB) which later on decided in his favour in ruling that he was a bona de tenant of the land. The RTC convicted him of the crime of the and ruled that Ligtas' defense of tenancy was not supported by concrete and substanal evidence nor was his claim of harvest sharing between him and Anecita Pacate duly corroborated by any witness. The Court of Appeals armed the decision and held that ndings or cercaons issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform or its authorized representaves concerning the presence or absence of a tenancy relaonship between the contending pares are merely preliminary or provisional and not binding upon the courts. Issue: Whether or not the DARAB decision on the existence of tenancy relaonship is conclusive and binding upon the courts. Held: Yes. The ndings of the DARAB were supported by substanal evidence. Requiring peoner to prove tenancy relaonship through evidence other than the DARAB Decision and the tesmonies of the

witnesses is absurd and goes beyond the required quantum of evidence, which is substanal evidence.

 

Notwithstanding the fact that decisions in administrave cases are not binding on criminal c riminal proceedings, in this case, the decision of the DARAB should be given respect because of the tenancy relaonship is a factor in determining whether all the elements of the were proven by the prosecuon. Findings of fact of administrave agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers are entled to respect if supported by substanal evidence.

53. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Igmidio Robles, et al. G.R. No. 190482 (December 9, 2015) Facts: The subject parcels of land is owned by Eduardo Reyes which he later sold to the respondents herein. The DAR then led a peon to annul the deeds of absolute sale on account of the lack of prior clearance from the DAR pursuant to DAR AO No. 01-89 and in violaon of Secon 6, par. 4, of R.A. 6657.

The heirs of Eduardo then led a moon to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdicon over the nature of the subject maer of the case. The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator denied the moon for lack of merit. The CA reversed and set aside the decision in ruling that the DARAB acted beyond its jurisdicon because there is no tenurial arrangement/relaonship which is necessary in order for a case to be classied as an agrarian dispute within the jurisdicon of the DARAB or its adjudicators. The DAR led a moon for reconsideraon that was later on denied by CA. Issue: Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdicon over the annulment of deeds of absolute sale and the subsequent cancellaon of tles involving agricultural lands. Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that there are two jurisdicon of DAR which are the essenally execuve that pertains to the enforcement and administraon of the laws, carrying them into praccal

operaon that enforces their due observance and the other is the quasi-judicial which involves the determinaon of rights and obligaons of the pares. Although no tenancy or agrarian relaonship between the pares is alleged in the peon in order to be considered an agrarian dispute within the DARAB's jurisdicon, the Court notes that the issue in this case is based on the absence of a clearance c learance for the sale and registraon of the subject agricultural lands in favor of respondents, as required by DAR’s rules and procedures governing land transacons. The general rule is that DARAB's jurisdicon is limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy relaonship between the pares exists but Secon 50 of R.A. No. 6657 and Secon 17 of E.O. No. 229 both plainly state that the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdicon to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform maers. R.A. 6657 dened “agrarian disputes” but it did not dene “agrarian reform maers.” In light of the foregoing, this Court cannot restrict the DARAB's quasi-judicial jurisdicon only to those involving agrarian disputes where tenancy relaonship exists between the pares, for it should also include other "agrarian reform maers" which do not fall under the exclusive jurisdicon of the Oce of  the Secretary of DAR, the Department of Agriculture and the DENR, as well as the Special A Agrarian grarian Courts.