Agamben The Signature of All Things
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The Signature of All Things On Metbod Giorgio
Translated
by Luca D'isanto
Agamben
with Kevin Attell
ONE
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Priface
for that
7
107 and 108 of the U.S.
for the public
by reviewers
permission
From the Publisher.
What Is a Paradigm? Originally
©
Printed
as Signatura
published
2008 Bollati
Boringhieri
in the United
Sui metodo
rerum:
II
editore.
States
of America.
Distributed
by The MlT Press,
Cambridge,
Massachusetts,
III
and London,
Theory
if
Philosophical
of Congress
Cataloging-in-Puhlication
Giorgio,
[Signatura
Agamben
; translated
p. Includes
'942-
rerum.
The Signature
English]
of all things:
on method
by Luca D'Isanto
/ Giorgio
with Kevin
Attcll.
em, bibliographical
references
and index.
ISBN 978-1-890951-98-6 I.
Methodology.
3· Foucault,
Michel,
2.
Paradigm
'926-'984.
113
Data
Index Agamben,
(Theory
of knowledge)
I. Title.
BD241.A3S '3 2009 19S-dc22 2009001976
if
33
ArchaeoloBY
England
Notes Library
Signatures
9
Names
123
81
Preface
Anyone familiar with research in the human sciences knows that, contrary
to common opinion, a reflection
lows practical application,
on method usually fol-
rather than preceding
then, of ultimate or penultimate
thoughts,
friends and colleagues, which can legitimately after extensive research. The three essays published three specific questions paradigm,
here contain
regarding
the theory of signatures,
be articulated
only
my observations
method:
the concept
on
of the
and the relation between his-
tory and archaeology. If these observations tions on the method
it. It is a matter,
to be discussed among
appear to be investiga-
of Michel Foucault, a scholar from whom I
have learned a great deal in recent years, this is because one of the methodological
principles
not discussed in the book-and
I owe to Walter Benjamin-is
that doctrine
exposed only in the form of interpretation. be able to determine
which
may legitimately
be
The astute reader will
what in the three essays can be attributed
to
Foucault, to the author, or to both. Contrary to. common opinion, method shares with logic its inability to separate itself completely from its context. There is no method that would be valid for every domain, just as there is no logic that can set aside its objects. According
to another methodological
cussed in this book-which philosophical
principle-
also not dis-
I often make use of, the genuine
element in every work, whether
it be a work of art,
THE
of science,
SIGNATURE
or of thought,
OF
ALL
THINGS
is its capacity for elaboration,
Ludwig Feuerbach defined as EntwicklungifCihigkeit. when one follows such a principle
which
becomes
as essential
the reverse risk of appropriating
What
between
as it is difficult
have therefore preferred to take the risk of attributing of others what began its elaboration
ONE
It is precisely
that the difference
what belongs to the author of a work and what is attributable the interpreter
CHAPTER
Is a Paradigm?
to
to grasp. I to the texts
with them, rather than run
thoughts
or research
paths that
do not belong to me. Moreover, every inquiry in the human sciences-including present
reflection
vigilance.
on method-
should entail an archaeological
In other words, it must retrace its own trajectory
to the point where something Only a thought
the back
remains obscure and unthematized.
that does not conceal its own unsaid-
but con-
it- may eventually lay claim to
santly takes it up and elaborates originality.
I
In the course of my research,
I have written
such as Homo sacer, the Muselmann, the concentration phenomena,
camp. While
I nonetheless
on certain
figures
the state of exception,
and
these are all actual historical
treated them as paradigms
was to constitute
and make intelligible
lematic context.
Because this approach has generated
understandings,
especially for those who thought,
whose role
a broader historical-proba few mis-
in more or less
good faith, that my intention
was to offer merely historiographi-
cal theses or reconstructions,
I must pause here and reflect on the
meaning
and function
of the use of paradigms
in philosophy
and
the human sciences. Foucault frequently
used the term "paradigm"
it precisely. Nonetheless,
even though he never defined
Archaeology
if Knowledge
and subsequent
tinguish the objects of his investigations cal disciplines,
he designated
"problematization,"
Francaise de Philosophie,
in The
works, in order to disfrom those of the his tori -
them with terms like "positivity,"
"discursive
more generally, "knowledge."
in his writings,
formation,"
'~apparatus,"
and,
In a May 1978 lecture at the Societe
he defines "knowledge"
thus: "The use
(savoir) ... refers to all procedures and all effects of knowledge (connaissance) which are acceptable at a given of the word knowledge
point in time and in a specific domain." necessary
H
In order to clarify the
relation of the concept of knowledge
I)
to that of power,
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
Foucault added these comments:
ALL
THINGS
WHAT
"For nothing can exist as an ele-
ment of knowledge if, on one hand, it does not conform to a set of rules and constraints
characteristic,
a homonym
IS
A
PARADIGM?
for that which, according
to Kuhn, marks the emer-
gence of scientific revolutions.
for example, of a given type
of scientific discourse in a given period, and if, on the other hand, it does not possess the effects of coercion or simply the incentives peculiar
to what is scientifically
validated
or simply rational
or
simply generally accepted." of "scientific
if Scientific
book, The Structure
Paul Rabinow, for example, thematized
the function
Kuhn recognized two different
As others have noted, these concepts are analogous to Thomas S. Kuhn's notion
2
paradigms,"
introduced
in his
Revolutions. Hubert Dreyfus and
argue that although
of paradigms,
Foucault never
"his current
work clearly
that he had used the concept of "paradigm"
senses." The first meaning
he proposes to replace with the term "disciplinary ignates
the common
possessions
scientific community, adhere.
members
The second meaning
selves. He is now proceeding
that serves as a common
as the historical
articulation
lytics in a manner description
of a paradigm,
of discourse
and approaching
that is heavily dependent
ana-
on the isolation and
of social paradigms and their practical applications."?
Yet Foucault,
who declared
rable and definitive"
if Things,
a description
that he had read Kuhn's "admi-
book only after he had completed
The Order
almost never refers to it, and even seems to distance
himself from Kuhn." In his 1978 introduction
to the American
The Normal and the Patholoqical,
edition of Georges Canguilhem's Foucault writes:
"This norm cannot be identified
retical structure
or an actual paradigm because today's scientific
truth is itself only an episode of it-let It is not by depending that one can return rediscovering
with a theo-
us say provisional
at most.
on a 'normal science' in T. S. Kuhn's sense to the past and validly trace its history: it is
the 'norm' process, the actual knowledge
of which
is only one moment of it.?' It is therefore
necessary
the analogy between
these two different
respond
to different
whether
the "paradigm"
problems,
methods
strategies,
of Foucault's
10
on whether does not cor-
and inquiries
archaeology
and
is not merely
models, and
more or less consciously within
Principia or Ptolemy's Almagest,
example and thus replaces explicit rules
and permits the formulation
of a specific and coherent
tradition
of inquiry. When Kuhn elaborated on Ludwik Fleck's concept of "thought style" (Denkstil) is not pertinent sought, through
and the distinction within a "thought the concept
science capable of determining community
are scientific
mean one governed On the contrary, paradigms
between collective"
of the paradigm,
makes possible the constitution
of a normal which problems
or not. Normal
what is and what
(Denkkollektiv), to examine science,
what
within a specific
science does not then
by a precise and coherent
can "determine
he
that is, a
system of rules.
if the rules are derived from paradigms,
then
normal science" even in the absence
of rules." This is the second meaning
of the concept
of para-
digm, which Kuhn considers "most novel:"? a paradigm
is simply
an example, first of all to reflect
des-
of a certain
refers to a single element
the set, such as Isaac Newton's
in
which
matrix,"
of the members
namely, the set of techniques,
values to which the group
follows a course that uses these insights, if not the words themthrough
of "paradigm,"
a single case that by its repeatability
acquires
capacity to model tacitly the behavior and research scientists. scientificity,
The empire
of the rule, understood
practices
the un iver-
by the specific and singular
I I
of
as the canon of
is thus replaced by that of the paradigm;
sal lozic of the law is replaced
the
IO!1i
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
of the example. And when an old paradigm paradigm
that is no longer compatible
what Kuhn calls a scientific revolution
WHAT
THINGS
is replaced by a new
with the previous
one,
occurs.
This statement
IS
is surprising,
A
PARADIGM?
to say the least, since Kuhn, who did
in the preface to The Structure tions his debt to two French epistemologists,
if Scientific
Revolu-
Alexandre
Koyre
and Emile Meyerson,
Canguilhem
in the
acknowledge
does not once mention
book. Since Foucault must have meant what he said, perhaps his
3
close relationship
Foucault
constantly
sought to abandon
power that were grounded as well as on universal of sovereignty).
on juridical
categories
traditional
and institutional
of
models
(of law, the state, the theory
He focused instead on the concrete
through which power penetrates
analyses
thereby governs their forms of life. Here the analogy with Kuhn's set aside the identification
corroboration.
and examination
Just as Kuhn
of the rules consti-
tuting a normal science in order to focus on the paradigms determine
scientists' behavior, Foucault questioned
primacy of the juridical
that
the traditional
models of the theory of power in order
to bring to the fore multiple disciplines through which the state integrates
and political techniques
the care of the life of individu-
als within its confines. And just as Kuhn separated normal science from the system of rules that define it, Foucault frequently
distin-
guished "normalization,"
power,
which characterizes
disciplinary
from the juridical system oflegal procedures. If the proximity of these two methods seems clear, then it is all the more enigmatic
why Foucault remained
to Kuhn's work and seems to have carefully
silent when it came avoided using the
very term "paradigm" in the The Archaeology if Knowledge. To be sure, the reasons for Foucault's silence may have been personal. In his reply to George Steiner, who had reproached mentioning
Kuhn by name, Foucault
him for not
explains that he had read
Kuhn's book only after he had completed The Order if Things and adds: "I therefore did not cite Kuhn, but the historian of science who molded
and inspired
his thought:
Georges
holding
personal
concerning
However,
grudges,
prompted
him to repay Kuhn
even if Foucault
this alone cannot
was not above
explain his silence
Kuhn.
mechanisms
the very bodies of subjects and
paradigms seems to find an important
to Canguilhem
for this discourtesy.
Canguilhem."B
4 A closer reading of Foucault's naming
the American
writings
epistemologist,
shows that even without he did on more than one
occasion grapple with Kuhn's notion of paradigm. Power," Foucault's Pasquale notion
Pasquino,
1976 interview
regime"
with Alessandro
when answering
of discontinuity,
"discursive
In "Truth and
he explicitly
a question opposed
Fontana and
concerning
the
his notion of the
to that of the paradigm:
Thus, it is not a change of content (refutation of old errors, recovery of old truths), nor is it a change of theoretical form (renewal of a paradigm, modification of systematic ensembles). lt is a question of what governs statements, and the way in which they govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions that are Scientifically acceptable and, hence, capable of being verified or falsified by scientific procedures. In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement. At this level, it's not so much a matter of knowing what external power imposes itself on science as of what effects of power circulate among scientific statements, what constitutes, as it were, their internal regime of power, and how and why at certain moments that regime undergoes a global modification."
1
\
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
WHAT
to The Order
A few lines later, when referring insists on the distance
between
political
and a paradigm
phenomenon)
THINGS
a discursive
regime
(a criterion
truth): "What was lacking here was this problem sive regime,'
if Thinas,
he
(a genuine of scientific
of the 'discur-
of the effects of power peculiar to the play of state-
ments. I confused
this too much with systematicity,
form, or something
like a paradigm.":"
Foucault did indeed recognize but this proximity
the proximity
then,
to Kuhn's paradigm;
was not the effect of an actual affinity but the
result of a certain confusion. the movement
theoretical
At some point,
What was decisive for Foucault was
of the paradigm
from epistemology
to politics,
call "epistemological
(even unsuccessfully)
norms of verification
or a verification)
over knowledge,
epistemological
the way in which the statements
another to constitute
From this perspective, explicitly
govern one
The change in terminology
it is clear that even though he does not
name them in The Archaeoloay
already wished to distinguish Kuhn's paradigms.
if Knowledae,
Foucault
the theme of his own research from
For Foucault,
discursive
formations
do not
the state of knowledge
at a given moment
up a list of what, from that moment,
in time: they do not draw
had been demonstrated
true and had assumed the status of definitively and a list of what,
on the other
out either proof or adequate accepted
as a common
the imagination.
enunciations,
To analyze
concepts,
further
seems to correspond
acquired
demonstration,
positivities practice
or theoretical
down,
Foucault
with-
or of what had been by the power of
is to show in accordance may form groups of objects,
choices."
describes
to Kuhn's paradigm
1'1
to be
knowledge,
hand, had been accepted
belief or a belief demanded
with which rules a discursive
A little
members
of a normal of a scientific
epistemological
When the
obeys a number
of formal
is not merely formal: in a manner
if Knowl-
from the criteria that permit the
science with respect
to subjects
(the
to the pure occurrence
and "figures,"
independently
("a group of statements
figure thus outlined").
of
of any ref-
is articulated,"
"the
And when, a propos of
the different types of history of science, Foucault defines his own concept of the episteme, ing something the episteme period,
it is once again not a matter of identify-
like a worldview postulates
is the "total
the discursive
or a structure
Kuhn's paradigm,
of thought
that
and norms on the subject. Rather, set of relations
practices
that unite,
at a given
that give rise to epistemologi-
cal figures, sciences, and possibly formalized
svstems.I'"
Unlike
the episteme does not define what is knowable
in a given period, but what is implicit in the fact that a given discourse or epistemological
figure exists at all: "In the enigma of
scientific discourse, what the analysis of the episteme questions is not its right to be a science, but the fact that it exists."!"
The Archaeoloay historiographical
something
we will say that the discur-
community)
"groups of statements"
imposes common
define
and
a critique,
with- the premises of The Archaeoloay
wholly consistent
erence to subjects
an ensemble.
and coherence,
(as a model,
if epistemoloqization.
figure thus outlined
edae, Foucault diverts attention
which determines
of a discursive claims to validate
criteria .... "'2
constitution
of power,"
function
crosses a threshold
of theoretical
regime
is articulated,
a dominant
sive formation
of epistemologiza-
in the operation
when it exercises
and discursive
as the "internal
or "thresholds
"When
regimes,
form" that was in question
PARADIGM?
a group of statements
its shift onto the plane of a politics of statements where it was not so much the "change
A
figures"
tion." Thus he writes: formation,
IS
if Knowledae
discontinuity.
has been read as a manifesto Whether
that
correct
or not (Foucault
but that he prefers to
certain
that in this book Foucault
contested
1
"
this characterization
it a number appears
of times),
most interested
of is it is in
THE
that which permits
SIGNATURE
the constitution
the positive existence contexts mological
OF
of "figures"
emerge in accordance
ALL
WHAT
THINGS
of contexts
and groups, in
and series. Only that these
with an entirely peculiar
model which coincides neither
episte-
with those commonly
accepted in historical research nor with Kuhnian paradigms, which we must therefore
undertake
and
of an "ensemble,"
IS
A
and the "panoptic
modality
such, it is a "figure of political technology detached
of power."
As
that may and must be
from any specific use"; it is not merely a "dream build-
ing," but "the diagram
of a mechanism
of power reduced
ideal forrn.?" In short, the panoptic on functions the strict sense: it is a singular
to identify.
PARADIGM?
to its
as a paradigm in
object that, standing
..all others of the same class, defines the intelligibility
equally for of the group
of which it is a part and which, at the same time, it constitutes.
5
Anyone who has read Discipline
Consider the notion of panopticism,
in
the panopticon,
situated as it is at the end of the section on disci-
is a par-
pline, performs
a decisive strategic function
the third part of Discipline ticular historical
which Foucault presents
and Punish. The panopticon
phenomenon,
an architectural
model published
by Jeremy Bentham in Dublin in 1791 under the title Patiopticon; or, The Inspection-House:
Cotitainino
the Idea
cj' a
New Principle
cj' Construction, Applicable to Any Sort cj' Establishment, cj' A~ Description Are to Be Kept Under Inspection.
Persons
in Which
for the understand-
modality of power, but also how it becomes
something
like the epistemological
disciplinary
universe of modernity,
figure that, in defining also marks the threshold
This is not an isolated case in Foucault's
work. On the con-
trary, one could say that in this sense paradigms
We know the principle on which it was based: at the periphery, an annular building; at the centre, a tower; this tower is pierced with wide windows that open onto the inner side of the ring; the peripheric building is divided into cells, each of which extends the whole width of the building; they have two windows, one on the inside, corresponding to the windows of the tower; the other, on the outside, allows the light to cross the cell from one end to the other. All that is needed, then, is to place a supervisor in a central tower and to shut up in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy. By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in the cells of the periphery. They are like so many cages, so many small theatres.
15
namely "panopticism,"
l
6
characteristic
gesture
model of
that is to say, the principle
of Foucault's
method.
ment, the confession, the investigation, cault treats as paradigms, intervention
phenomena
the care that Fou-
and this is what constitutes
into the field of historiography.
a broader problematic
define the most
The great confine-
the examination,
of the self: these are all singular historical
his specific
Paradigms
context that they both constitute
establish and make
intelligible. Daniel S. Milo has remarked
that Foucault demonstrates
relevance of contexts produced
by metaphorical
to those created only through
chronological
the
fields in contrast caesurae.
17
Follow-
ing the orientations
of such works as Marc Bloch's Royal Touch,
Ernst Kantorowicz's
King's Two Bodies, and Lucien Febvre's Prob-
lem
cj'
Unbeliif
in the Sixteenth
freed historiography
Yet for Foucault, the panoptic on is both a "generalizable
the over
which it passes into the societies of control.
Foucault
recalls its basic features:
functioning,"
ing of the disciplinary
and Punish knows not only how
contexts-for France-in
Century,
Foucault
is said to have
from the exclusive domain
example,
the eighteenth-century
order to return
metaphorical
I "
contexts
of metonymic or southern to primacy.
THE
This observation Foucault,
SIGNATURE
is correct
it is a question
OF
ALL
only if one keeps in mind that for not of metaphors
in the sense noted above. Paradigms metaphorical
transfer
WHAT
THINGS
but of paradigms
obey not the logic of the
of meaning but the analogical logic of the
he writes, respect
IS
"that the paradigm
A
PARADIGM?
does not function
as a part with
to the whole rhos meros pros holon], nor as a whole with
respect to the part rhos holon pros meros], but as a part with respect to the part rhos meros pros meros], ifboth
are under the same but
example. Here we are not dealing with a signifier that is extended
one is better known than the other.':" That is to say, while induc-
to designate
tion proceeds from the particular
heterogeneous
semantic structure; paradigm
phenomena
by virtue
of the same
more akin to allegory than to metaphor,
the
is a singular case that is isolated from its context only
insofar as, by exhibiting
its own singularity,
a new ensemble, whose homogeneity
it makes intelligible
it itself constitutes.
That is
from the universal
to the particular,
a third and paradoxical particular
The example constitutes
the universal and the particular,
the term functioning
of the latter. Aristotle's
use, not in order to be moved into another
context
contrary,
that use, which can
to present the canon-the
rule-of
but, on the
Sextus Pompeius
Festus informs us that the Romans distin-
guished exemplar from exemplum. The exemplar can be observed by the senses (oeulis eonspieitur) must imitate
is not merely sensible:
animo aestimatur);
all moral and intellectual.
The Foucauldian
these things: not only an exemplar the constitution
of a normal
(which
its meaning
is above
paradigm
is both of
and model, which imposes
science, but also and above all an
exemplum, which allows statements gathered
The exemplum,
a more complex evaluation
into a new intelligible
and discursive practices to be
ensemble and in a new problem-
particular
Aristotle's
irreducible
type exists before
of which was reconstructed
opposition
between
that the
which we are used to seeing as of knowing,
and presents
instead
two terms.
is not logic but analogy, the theory by Enzo Melandri in a book that has
by now become a classic. And the analoqoti it generates understanding
know-
thesis more radical-
to any of the dichotomy's
The domain of his discourse
nor general.
Not only
the status of "greater
the dichotomous
from procedures
a singularity
any further.
status of the paradigm becomes clear only
and the universal
inseparable
does not move
that belongs to the example.
if we understand-making it calls into question
together
and the status of knowledge rest-
is not examined
seem to hold that the common
The epistemological
particular
atic context.
of the paradigm
but he leaves undefined
ability" (anorimoteron)
and refers to that which one
(exemplar est quod simile faeiamus).
on the other hand, demands
ing within the particular particulars,
a peculiar
but seems to dwell on the plane
treatment
beyond these brief observations, does Aristotle
not be shown in any other way.
is defined by
which goes from the
that does not proceed by articulating
to say, to give an example is a complex act which supposes that as a paradigm is deactivated from its normal
the paradigm
type of movement,
to the particular.
form of knowledge
to the universal and deduction
is neither
Hence its special value,. and our task of
it.
6 The locus classicus of the epistemology
of the example is in Aristo-
tle's Prior Analyties. There, Aristotle
distinguishes
by way of paradigms
and deduction.
from induction
I
H
the procedure "It is clear,"
7 In La linea e i] circolo, Melandri the dichotomous
shows that analogy is opposed to
principle dominating
I I)
Western logic. Against the
THE
drastic alternative
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
WHAT
THINGS
"A or B," which excludes
imposes its tertium datur, its stubborn words, analogy intervenes universal; form/content;
A nor B." In other
a force field traversed
identities
evaporate.
But in what not as a
with the first two, the identity of which could
in turn be defined by a binary logic. Only from the point of view can analogy (or paradigm)
appear as tertium compa-
rationis. The analogical third is attested here above all through the disidentification
and neutralization
become indiscernible.
of the first two, which now
The third is this indiscernibility,
tries to grasp it by means of bivalent caesurae, runs up against an undecidable. separate
an example's
and if one
one necessarily
It is thus impossible
paradigmatic
character-its
to clearly
standing
for
all cases- from the fact that it is one case among others. As in a magnetic
field, we are dealing not with extensive
magnitudes
and scalable
but with vectorial intensities.
i.e., a necessity of the
assent of all to a judgment that is regarded as an example [Beispiel]
them into
sense and in what way is the third given here? Certainly
of dichotomy
it can only be called exemplary [exempJarisch],
of a universal rule that one cannot produce [angeben].
by polar tensions, where (as in an electro-
magnetic field) their substantial term homogeneous
that one absolutely (without a further aim) ought to act in a certain
and so on) not
to take them up into a higher synthesis but to transform
PARADIGM?
way. Rather, as a necessity that is thought in an aesthetic judgment,
of logic (particular/
lawfulness/exemplarity;
A
consequence of an objective law and signifies nothing other than
the third, analogy
"neither
in the dichotomies
IS
As with the aesthetic presupposes
judgment
the impossibility
or cannot be formulated, probative
19
for Kant, a paradigm
actually
of the rule; but if the rule is missing
from where will the example draw its
value? And how is it possible to supply the examples of
an unassignable
rule?
The aporia may be resolved only if we understand digm implies
the total abandonment
that a para-
of the particular-general
couple as the model of logical inference.
The rule (if it is still
possible to speak of rules here) is not a generality
preexisting
singular cases and applicable to them, nor is it something ing from the exhaustive is the exhibition
enumeration
the
result-
of specific cases. Instead, it
alone of the paradigmatic
case that constitutes
a
rule, which as such cannot be applied or stated.
9
8 Nowhere, perhaps, is the paradoxical relation between paradigms and generality ment, where judgment
as forcefully formulated Kant conceives
as in The Critique
of the necessity
cifjudg-
of the aesthetic
in the form of an example for which it is impossible to
state the rule:
Anyone familiar with the history that, at least in regard understand
of the monastic
to the first centuries,
the status of what the documents
most ancient testimonies,
orders knows
it is difficult
to
call regula. In the
regula simply means conversatioJratrum,
the monks' way of life in a given monastery.
It is often identified
with the founder's
as Jorma vitae- that
way of living envisaged
Now this necessity is of a special kind: not a theoretical objective
is, as an example
necessity, where it can be cognized a priori that everyone will feel
turn the sequel to the life of Jesus as narrated
in the Gospels.
this satisfaction in the object called beautiful by me, nor a practi-
With the gradual development
orders, and the
cal necessity, where by means of concepts of a pure will, serving
Roman Curia's growing
need to exercise control
as rules for freely acting beings, this satisfaction is a necessary
term regula increasingly
assumed the meaning
2
to be followed.
And the founder's
of the monastic
life is in
over them, the
of a written
text,
THE
preserved
SIGNATURE
in the monastery,
who, having embraced
OF
ALL
WHAT
THINGS
which had to be read by the person
the monastic
himself to the prescriptions
life, consented
and prohibitions
to subject
contained
therein.
for the paradigm":
a general norm but the living community
reconnected
tends at the limit to become paradigmaticitself asjorma
correctly
cerning
generates
We can therefore
say, joining
Aristotle's
observations
those of Kant, that a paradigm entails a movement and, without
with
that goes from
singularity
to singularity
transforms
every singular case into an exemplar of a general rule
ever leaving singularity,
mental,
[diespasmenoi;
"1acerate d"J In . anot her entity, ..
as the same, and having been
Goldschmidt
structure,
at once sensible and
which he calls the "element-form.'?'
even though it is a singular
shows that here In other words,
sensible phenomenon,
the paradigm
somehow contains the eidos, the very form that is to be defined. It is not a simple sensible element that is present in two different like a relation between the sensible and the
mental, the element and the form ("the paradigmatic itself a relationship").
22
Plato often uses as a paradigm
In 1947, Victor Goldschmidt,
phenomenon
diolectique
platonicienne.
of this brilliant apparently
historian
marginal
dialogues-throws
an author whom Foucault appears
and admired,
published
Le patadiqme
As is often the case with the writings. of philosophy,
problem-
the examination
the use of examples
new light on the entirety
especially the relation between Rodier had already observed the dialogues as paradigms
expression.
that sometimes
ideas function
as the paradigms
corresponding
in
of ideas. If
for knowledge-where
is placed into a nonsensible
thus re-cognized
a certain
ing it by means of an operation.
sensible likeness
"conjoining ing"
together,"
(paraballontas
and produced
... aianomena)
...
paratithemena
The paradigmatic
by "placing alongside,"
...
and "expos-
endeiknynai ... deicb-
relation does not merely
sensible objects or between
these objects and a
general rule; it occurs instead between
a singularity
becomes a paradigm)
(its intelligibility).
and its exposition
is
(paradeiqma-
and above all by "showing"
tliei ... deicbtbentai," occur between
it is a matter but of produc-
For this reason, the paradigm
never already given, but is generated tos ... aenesis; paradeiamata
a sensible
relation with itself, and
in the other, so in the paradigm
not of corroborating
- which
(which thus
sensible objects, in
the Statesman a sensible paradigm-weaving-instead
children
Georges
the idea of piety is that which is used as a para-
digm in order to understand
knowledge,
in Plato's
of Plato's thought,
for sensible objects, whereas at other
times sensible objects are presented
understanding
of an
ideas and the sensible, of which
the paradigm is revealed to be the technical
in the Euthypbro
dans la
element is
Just as in the case of recollection
10
to have known
IS
a true and unique opinion con-
on this definition,
places, but something
that can never be stated a priori.
when an entity,
each and both.'?"
there seems to be a paradoxical
vitae.
is generated
and recognized
together
Commenting
that is, to constitute
PARADIGM?
other and separated
t he Gree k term means ""torn, judged
(koinos bios, cenobio)
A
"A paradigm
which is found in something
However, at least until Saint Benedict, the rule does not indicate that results from an example and in which the life of each monk
IS
leads to the
1I
of ideas. To explain how an example may produce Plato introduces
are able to recognize
of the syllables
Consider
the relatively
simple case of a grammatical
words as a "paradigm
Grammar
is constituted
and may state its rules only through
here the example in different
example. the
THE
SIGNATURE
practice of paradigmatics,
paradigms
THINGS
WHAT
linguistic
examples. But
that defines grammatical
example produced?
that in Latin grammars
nouns. Through
ALL
by exhibiting
what is the use of language How is a grammatical
OF
its paradigmatic
practice?
Take the case of the
account for the declensions
of
(rosa, ros-ae, ros-ae,
exhibition
makes knowledge
IS
possible.
orders may be conceived (between
PARADIGM?
between
these two
in two ways: as a relation
"The relation
of likeness
copy and model)
each of these conceptions
A
or as a relation
of proportion.':"
there corresponds,
schmidt, a specific dialectical
procedure:
according
To
to Gold-
to the first, recollection
ros-am ... ), the normal use as well as the denotative character of
(defined by Plato in the Meno and in the Theatetus); to the second,
the term "rose" is suspended.
the paradigm,
which is discussed
the Statesman.
Continuing
constitution
The term thus makes possible the
and intelligibility
the first declension,"
of the group "feminine
of which it is both a member
digm. What is essential here is the suspension
noun of
and a para-
of reference
and
attempt
to understand
paradigm
above all in the Sophist and in
Goldschmidt's
analyses we must now
the specific meaning
and function
in dialectics., The whole thorny discussion
of the
of the dia-
normal use. If, in order to explain the rule that defines the class
lectical method in book 6 of the Republic becomes clear when it is
of performatives,
understood
the linguist utters the example "I swear," it is
clear that this syntagma is not to be understood
as the uttering
of
as an exposition
distinguishes
method." Plato
of the paradigmatic
two stages or moments
within
the emergence
a real oath. To be capable of acting as an example, the syntagma
science, which are represented
must be suspended
straight line. The first, which defines the procedures
from its normal function,
it is precisely by virtue
and nevertheless
of this nonfunctioning
that it can show how the syntagma
and suspension
works and can allow the
rule to be stated. If we now ask ourselves whether be applied to the example,
the rule can
the answer is not easy. In fact, the
its investigations
on hypotheses.
the evidence
to it. The example,
site of the exception: its exclusion,
the example
of its inclusion. mological
However,
meaning
(para-deiknymi)
then, is the symmetrical
whereas the exception is excluded
through
the exhibition
in this way, according
to the ety-
of the Greek term, it shows "beside
both its own intelligibility
oppo-
is included through
itself"
and that of the class it
constitutes.
as
is, as step-
ping stones to take off from, enabling it to reach the unhypothetical [anypotheton] this principle,
first principle
of everything.
without
making use of anything
all, but only of ideas themselves, and ending with ideas.":"
knowability
lating the relation between the intelligible
the contrary
but exposed
of the paradigm its specific
sensible at
moving on from ideas to ideas,
rather than as principles?
is not presupposed
In Plato, the paradigm has its place in dialectics, which, by articu-
Having touched
and keeping hold of what follows from it, it comes
down to a conclusion
hypotheses
and the sensible order,
for. The
"it does not consider hypotheses
[archai] but truly as hypotheses-that
first principles
"I lay
as known principles,
of which does not need to be accounted
What does it mean to treat hypotheses 12
(this is
the meaning of the Greek term hypothesis, from hypotithemi,
second belongs to dialectics:
belonging
of "geom-
It presupposes
it below as a base") givens that are treated
to the normal
because it exhibits its
segments on a
etry and calculus and those who practice these kinds of sciences," grounds
example is excluded from the rule not because it does not belong case but, on the contrary,
as two continuous
of
(presuppositions)
What is a hypothesis
that
as such? If we recall that the
is never presupposed,
operation
as
consists
and that on
in suspending
and
THE
deactivating intelligibility,
SIGNATURE
its empirical
OF
ALL
givenness
then treating
in order to exhibit only an
hypotheses
treating them as paradigms. Here the aporia that both Aristotle tors have observed-that
as hypotheses
means
and modern of ideas-is
being that is presupposed
coincides with it: it is the sensible considered is, in the medium of its intelligibility.
the perspective Daniel
IS
A
PARADIGM?
of the paradigmatic
Ernst Schleiermacher,
method.
Georg Anton
already observed that in the philological commenta-
in Plato the idea is the paradigm
sensible and the sensible the paradigm idea is not another
WHAT
THINGS
of the
resolved. The
by the sensible or as a paradigm-
that
This is why Plato is able to
state that even dialectics, like the arts, starts from hypotheses
(ex
a single phenomenon
presupposes
Before Friedrich Friedrich
sciences, knowledge
knowledge
vice versa, knowledge
of the whole presupposes this hermeneutic
ture, Martin difficulty
Heidegger
helped the human
and indeed guaranteed
of their knowledge.
that of single
circle in Beina and Time
as Dasein's anticipatory
on pre-understanding
of
of the whole and,
phenomena.
Grounding
Ast had
existential sciences
struc-
out of this
the "more original"
character
Since then, the motto "What is decisive is not
hypothesei5s iousa),27 but unlike them it takes hypotheses as hypoth-
to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right way" has
eses rather than principles.
become a magic formula that allows the inquirer
hypotheses
as paradigms.
To put it differently,
The non-hypothetical,
dialectics
uses
to which dialec-
tics has access, is above all opened by the paradigmatic sensible. It is in this sense that we should understand
use of the the follow-
ing passage, where the dialectical
method
is defined
as "doing
away with hypothesis":
is the only method
that pro-
"Dialectic
[tas hypotheseis anairousa] and reaching to the first principle itself.'?" Anairei5, like its corresponding Latin term tollere (and the German a!ifheben,
ceeds in this manner, doing away with hypotheses
vicious circle into a virtuous
was less reassuring
appeared. If the activity of the interpreter pated by a pre-understanding
(l'oraeben) by "fancies"
be presented
but instead "working
use and, at the same time, exposed as such. The non-hypothetical is what discloses itself at the point where hypotheses away," that is, raised and eliminated
are "taken
at the same time. The intelli-
the signature
their own existential
of a pre-understanding
a paradigmatic
is the paradigmatic
was in Ast and Schleiermacher: circularity,
I3 The hermeneutic
exposition
as in Heidegger,
between pre-understanding circle, which defines the procedures
of knowl-
edge in the human sciences, acquires its true meaning only from
? l1
intelligibility
that depends on
that the hermeneutic
circle. There is no duality
"single phenomenon"
the paradigmatic
in
structure.
gibility in which dialectics moves in its" descent toward the end" of the sensible.
must be able to recognize
The aporia is resolved if we understand circle is in actuality
conceptions,"
the circle then seems to become even
here between
intelligibility
or "popular
to
[it] out in terms of the things themselves.'?"
take," "to raise," and "to take away," "to eliminate."
phenomena
suggested
of never allowing the pre-understanding
This can only mean-and
from its normal
is always already antici-
that is elusive, what does it mean
more "vicious" - that the inquirer
noted, what operates as a paradigm is withdrawn
than it at first
"to come into [the circle] in the right way?" Heidegger that it was a matter
the
one."
However, such a guarantee
which Hegel placed at the heart of his dialectic), signifies both "to As previously
to transform
and "the whole"
the whole
of individual between
only results
does not precede
from
cases. And there is no
a "before"
and interpretation. the phenomenon;
spca k, "beside" it (para). According
as there
to Aristotle's
and an "after," In the paradigm, it stands, so to definition,
the
THE
paradigmatic
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
WHAT
THINGS
gesture moves not from the particular
and from the whole to the particular singular. The phenomenon,
but from the singular to the
exposed in the medium
ability, shows the whole of which it is the paradigm. to phenomena,
this is not a presupposition
"non-presupposed
principle,"
to the whole
is the origin
A
PARADIGM?
and history
of the iconographic
of a woman in movement."
theme
This would be a matter
of
of its know-
arranging,
With regard
cal order by following the probable genetic relation that, binding
(a "hypothesis"):
as a
it stands neither in the past nor in
the present but in their exemplary
question "figure
IS
as far as possible, the individual images in chronologi-
one to the other, would eventually archetype,
allow us to go back to the
to the" formula of pathos" from which they all origi-
nate. A slightly more careful reading of the plate shows that none
constellation.
of the images is the original, just as none of the images is simply a copy or repetition.
14 Between
Just as it is impossible
creation and performance, 1924- and 1929, Aby Warburg
was working on his "atlas
which was to be called Mnemosyne. As is well-known,
ofimages,"
it is a collection erogeneous
of plates or boards to which are attached
series of images (reproductions
manuscripts,
photographs
a het-
of works of art or
cut out of newspapers
or taken
by
laic" composition of the Homeric
Pathoiformeln hybrids of archetype and (ptimal'oltito) and repetition. Every is the original; every image constitutes the arche first-timeness
photograph
and is, in this sense, "archaic."
Warburg defined as Pathoiformel. Consider
plate 4-6, in which we
archaic nor contemporary;
the figure of a woman in move-
Chapel, Warburg nellbring,
fresco in the Tornabuoni
gives her the familiar nickname
"Miss Quick-Bring").
Fraulein Sch-
The plate is made up of twenty-
at the basis
of any oral composi-
tions, so are Warburg's phenomenon,
to a single theme that
ment (when she appears in Ghirlandaio's
between
in the "fonnu-
that Milman Parry had recognized poems and more generally
Warburg himself, and so on) often referring find the PathoifoTmel "Nymph,"
to distinguish
original and execution,
chrony and synchrony,
she is undecidable
in regards
unicity and multiplicity.
the nymph is the paradigm exemplars.
But the nymph herself is neither to dia-
This means that
of which individual
nymphs are the
Or to be more precise, in accordance
with the consti-
tutive ambiguity
of Plato's dialectic,
the nymph is the paradigm
seven images, each of which is somehow related to the theme that
of the single images, and the single images are the paradigms
gives its name to the whole. In addition to Ghirlandaio's
the nymph.
fresco,
one can identify a Roman ivory relief, a sibyl from the cathedral of Sessa Aurunca, Florentine
a few miniatures
manuscript,
from a sixteenth-century
a detail from one of Botticelli's
frescos,
Fra Filippo Lippi's tondo of the Madonna and the birth of John the Baptist, a photo of a peasant woman from Settignano by Warburg
taken
himself, and so on. How should we read this plate?
What is the relation that holds together
the individual images? In
In other words, the nymph is an Urphi:inomen, an "originary phenomenon"
in Goethe's sense of the term. This technical
which is essential to Goethe's
if
when understood lowing
by Elizabeth
it something
and hypotheses.'?'
R
where what is in
which proceeds
if Plants, becomes
eyen though it is intelligible only sense, thereby fol-
Rotten,
who traced
often juxtaposes
his method
by "single cases and general
rubrics,
In the essay "The Experiment
II
term,
on nature from the
in a decidedly paradigmatic
a suggestion
gin back to Plato. Goethe
repertory,
investigations
Theory Colors to The Metamorphosis never clearly defined by the author,
other words, where is the nymph? A mistaken way of reading the plate would be to see in like an iconographic
of
its orito that opinions
as Mediator
WHAT THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
Between Object and Subject," he proposes a model of "experience of a higher type," where the unification does not occur "in hypothetical
A
PARADIGM?
15
of individual phenomena
and systematic
where instead each phenomenon
IS
THINGS
manner,"
but
"stands in relation with count-
At this point, let us try to put in the form of theses some of the features that, according
to our analysis, define a paradigm:
less others, in the way we say of a freely floating luminous point, that it emits its rays in every direction.T" relation among phenomena
How such a singular
ought to be understood
is a form of knowledge but analogical.
2.
By neutralizing
ence, which consists of many others, is clearly of a higher type.
particular,
It represents
logical model.
the formula in which countless single examples find
their expression.":" fragment,
"Every existent,"
"is the analopon
he reiterates
of every existent;
in another
for this reason,
existence always appears to us as separated and connected same time. If one follows the analogy
too closely, everything
becomes identical; if we avoid it, everything As a paradigm,
the Urphdtiotuen
ogy lives in perfect equilibrium generality
and particularity.
phenomenon"
scatters to infinity."!'
is thus the place where analbeyond the opposition
between
Hence, Goethe writes of the "pure
that it can "never be isolated, since it shows itself
in a continuous Riflexionen,
at the
series of appearances.'?'
he sums up its nature
be equally valid for the paradigm:
And in the Maximen
with a definition "the originary
ideal insofar as it is the last knowable/real,
that could
phenomenon: with all cases.'?"
Even though it never crosses into the generality
of a hypothesis
or law, the Urphiinomen
is nevertheless
the single phenomenon
the last knowable element, its capacity to
constitute
itself as a paradigm.
knowable;
it is indeed in
For this reason, a famous Gothean
the dichotomy
between
it replaces a dichotomous
3. The paradigmatic
its belonging
logic with a bipolar ana-
from its singularity.
group is never presupposed
digms; rather, it is immanent 5. In the paradigm,
by the para-
in them.
there is no origin or archei every phenom-
enon is the origin, every image archaic. 6. The historicity
of the paradigm
lies neither
in diachrony
nor
in synchrony but in a crossing of the two. At this point, I think it is clear what it means to work by way of paradigms centration
for both me and Foucault. Homo sacer and the con-
camp, the Muselmann
more recently,
the Trinitarian
not hypotheses
through
On the contrary,
and the state of exception, oikonomia
which I intended
by tracing it back to something
and acclamations
insofar as they are paradigms,
of paradigms
series of phenomena
are
origin.
might have signaled,
whose aim was to make
whose kinship
had eluded or
gaze. To be sure, my investigations,
like those of Foucault, have an archaeological phenomena
and,
to explain modernity
like a cause or historical
as their very multiplicity
each time it was a matter could elude the historian's
(1
and, at the
to the group, so that it is
never possible to separate its exemplarity 4. The paradigmatic
intelligible
!
to
the general and the
case becomes such by suspending
same time, exposing
dictum states that one should never look beyond the phenomena: "they are theory."
inductive
und
insofar as it is known/
symbolic because it embraces all cases:/identical
that is neither
It moves from singularity
singularity.
nature
is stated beyond any doubt: "Such an experi-
A paradigm
nor deductive
is discussed
a few lines below in a passage where the paradigmatic of the procedure
1.
character,
and the
with which they deal unfold across time and therefore
\ I
THE
require an attention
SIGNATURE
to documents
follow the laws of historical they reach-and
OF
ALL
THINGS
and diachrony that cannot but
philology.
Nevertheless,
this perhaps holds for all historical
not an origin presupposed
Theory
inquiry-is
TWO
of Signatures
in time. Rather, locating itself at the
crossing of diachrony and synchrony, it makes the inquirer's ent intelligible
CHAPTER
the arche
pres-
as much as the past of his or her object. Archaeol-
ogy, then, is always a paradigmatology, ognize and articulate
paradigms
and the capacity to rec-
defines the rank of the inquirer
no less than does his or her ability to examine
the documents
of an archive. In the final analysis, the paradigm
determines
very possibility
of producing
archive-which
in itself is inert-the
the
in the midst of the chronological plans de clivaoe (as French
Book 9 of Paracelsus's
treatise De natura rerum (Of the Nature of
Things) is titled "De signatura
rerum naturalium"
epistemologists call them) that alone make it legible. If one asks whether the paradigmatic character lies in things
the Signature
themselves
fests and reveals their invisible qualities.
or in the mind of the inquirer,
my response
must be
that the question itself makes no sense. The intelligibility
in ques-
tion in the paradigm has an ontological the cognitive
relation between
There is, then, a paradigmatic ter definition
character.
Things).
1
(Concerning
The original core of the Para-
celsian episteme is the idea that all things bear a sign that manisign" (Nichts ist ohn ein Zeichen),
"Nothing
is without
a
he writes in Von den natuilicheti
It refers not to
Dingen, "since nature does not release anything in which it has not
subject and object but to being.
marked what is to be found within that thing."2 "There is noth-
ontology.
of it than the one contained
Stevens titled "Description
of Natural
Without
And I know of no betin a poem by Wallace
Place":
ing exterior
that is not an announcement
the Libei de podapricis,
of the interior,"
reads
and by means of signs man can know what
has been marked in each thing.3 And if, in this sense, "all things,
It is possible that to seem - it is to be,
herbs, seeds, stones, and roots reveal in their qualities, forms, and
As the sun is something seeming and it is.
figures [Gestalt] that which is in them," if "they all become known through
The sun is an example. What it seems It is and in such seeming all things are.
their signatum,"
everything
of any profundity knowledge,
then "siptiatuta is the science by which
that is hidden is found, and without
this art nothing
can be done." This science, however,
is a consequence
absolutely unmarked
like all
of sin, insofar as Adam, in Eden, was
(unbezeichnet),
had he not "fallen into nature,"
and would have remained
so
which leaves nothing unmarked.
Based on these presuppositions,
"De signatura
rerum natu-
ralium" is able to go right to the heart of the matter and inquire into the nature
and the number
of "signers."
Here signatura
is
no longer the name of a science but the very act and effect of
II
THE
marking:
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
THEORY
"In this book, our first business, as being about to phi-
losophise,
is with the signature
of things, as, for instance,
forth how they are signed, what signator signs are reckoned.?' According
to set
exists, and how many
to Paracelsus,
there are three
In other words, Paracelsus
OF
SIGNATURES
argues that the relation
expressed
the signature is not a causal relation. Rather, it is something complex, something
which has a retroactive
by
more
effect on the sianator
and which needs to be understood.
sianators: man, the Archeus, and the stars (Astra). The signs of the stars, which make prophecies and presages possible, manifest "the force and virtue" (iibernatiirliche Krcift und Tuaend) of
supernatural
things. The divinatory
sciences-for
example, geomancy,
maney, physiognomy,
hydromancy,
astronomy-examine
these signs. The monsters treated by divina-
tion, such as hermaphrodites ing but a sign imprinted Paracelsus
pyromancy,
necromancy,
chiro-
and androgynous
by the ascendant
and
beings, are noth-
celestial bodies. And
argues that not only the stars in the sky but also the
"stars of the human mind" -which with the Phantasy, Estimations, as in the firmament
above"6-can
happens with pregnant
or Imagination,
at all moments, rise and set just
leave their mark on the body, as
women whose Fantasey draws on the flesh signs" (Monstrosische Zeichen).7
of the fetus its "monstrous Similarly,
"perpetually
physiognomy
and chiromancy
teach one how to
decipher the secret of the "inner man" in the signs that the stars have imprinted hands. However,
on men's faces and limbs or on the lines of their the relation between
merely one of unilateral
subjection.
the stars and men is not
Paracelsus writes:
The wise man can dominate the stars, and is not subject to them. Nay, the stars are subject to the wise man, and are forced to obey him, not he the stars. The stars compel and coerce the animal man, so that where they lead he must follow, just as a thief does the gallows, a robber the wheel, a fisher the fishes, a fowler the birds, and a hunter the wild beasts. What other reason is there for this, save that man does not know or estimate himself or his own powers, or reflect that he is a lesser universe, and has the firmament with its powers hidden within himself?"
2
Before moving to the analysis of the signatures imprints
on natural things, Paracelsus refers to the existence of a
Signatory art (Kunst Sianata) that constitutes, adigm of every signature.
so to speak, the par-
This originary signature
is language, by
means of which "the first sianator," Adam, imposed on all things their "true and genuine names" (die tecate Nomen) in Hebrew." The signatory art teaches how to give true and genuine names to all things. All of these Adam the Protoplast truly and entirely understood. So it was that after the Creation he gave its own proper name to everything, to animals, trees, roots, stones, minerals, metals, waters, and the like, as well as to other fruits of the earth, of the water, of the air, and of the fire. Whatever names he imposed upon these were ratified and confirmed by God. Now these names were based upon a true and intimate foundation, not on mere opinion, and were derived from a predestinated knowledge, that is to say, the signatorial art. Adam is the first signator.'o Every name in Hebrew that left Adam's mouth had a correspondence in the specific nature and virtue of the named animal. "So when we say, 'This is a pig, a horse, a cow, a bear, a dog, a fox, a sheep, etc.,' the name of a pig indicates a foul a~d impure animal. A horse indicates a strong and patient animal; a cow, a voracious and insatiable one; a bear, a strong, victorious, mal; a fox, a crafty and cunning
and untamed
ani-
animal; a dog, one faithless in its
nature; a sheep, one that is placid and useful, hurting The relation between the signature
4·
that the Archeus
I
I,
no one.""
and the signed is generally
THE
understood
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
in terms of similarity, as in the case (to which we will
turn in a moment) of the similarity between the spots in the shape of an ocellus on the Euphrasia's corolla and the eyes that it has the power to heal. Since language is the archetype the signatory art par excellence, this similarity analogical
we are obligated to understand
not as something
and immaterial
physical,
model.
serves the archive of immaterial of signatures.
of the signature,
but according
Language,
similarities,
to an
then, which preis also the reliquary
have markings
OF
SIGNATURES
that look like snakes, is an antidote
of poisoning. Consider the specific structure case: the signature between,
relation,
that defines signatures
in the Euphrasia,
as it might seem, the hidden
the marking
to every type in this
is established
therapeutic
virtue
not and
in the shape of an eye on the corolla but directly
between the Euphrasia and the eyes. Paracelsus writes: "Why does the Euphrasia cure the eyes? Because it has in itself the anatomiam oculorum; it has in itself the shape and image of the eyes, and hence it becomes
entirely
eye."" The signature
puts the plant in rela-
tionship with the eye, displacing it into the eye, and only in this
3
way does it reveal its hidden virtue. The relation is not between a
The systematic medicine
core that determined
during the Renaissance
cerned signatures Signatures
are, as Henry death, "natural
more surprising
and the Baroque period con-
as ciphers of the therapeutic
Paracelsus'
reveals medicinal
the success of Paracelsian
virtues
More wrote
almost
hieroglyphics,"
which Paracelsus
after
virtue; and the disease-
to which one has to add the signato!" as
which God
a fifth term. Signatures,
which according
hidden in the vegetal world. All the rerum.
Their
is taken by deer and age or the number
or the knots in the umbilical how many children
the figure in the plant,
a century
through
cow horns, whose shape reveals the animal's which indicate
Instead, it entails
often calls signatum; the part of the human body; the therapeutic
is their absence in De signatura
of calves it has delivered,
at least four terms;
(signans and signatum).
power of plants.
place, as examples of the Archeus's signature,
newborns,
signifier and a signified
cords of
the mother
can
should appear as signifiers, of the signified,
to the theory of signs
always already slide into the position
so that signum and signatum
seem to enter into a zone of undecidability.
in a passage from the Paraotatium,
Paracelsus
the identity between
establishes
"What then is ferrum? Nothing
other thanferrum.
Mars ....
He who knows Mars knows ferrum
and this signature
shows that it can "restore
a man's virility and
which has a marking in the shape of an
ferrum
Nothing
where
a metal-iron-
a planet (Mars), which should be its signator. Paracelsus
of examples. The satyrion is "formed passion.?" The Eupbtasia,
This sliding move-
ment can be observed
still have. Paracelsus's medical works, however, offer a wide array like the male privy parts,"
exchange roles and
and writes,
other than Mars. What is Mars?
This means that both areferrum
and
and he who knows
knows what Mars is.?"
eye, thus reveals its capacity to heal the diseases of the eye." If the plant called Specula pennarum
cures women's breasts, this is
because its shape recalls that of breasts. Pomegranate
seeds and
4
pine nuts, having the shape of teeth, alleviate their pain. In other
We have left for last the discussion
cases, the similarity
lege in the De signatura
is metaphorical:
the thistle,
fraught
with
thorns, will alleviate sharp and acute pains; Syderica, whose leaves
that holds the place of privi-
rerum, namely, that of signatures
signator is the human being. The example Paracelsus
I"
whose
provides of
THE
such signatures
SIGNATURE
OF
sionally resurrected
in the history
of
even though for centuries it remained a
sort of dead end in the Paracelsian
Paracelsus,
THEORY
THINGS
is perhaps the most surprising
the concept of signatures,
understand
ALL
episteme,
before being provi-
in the thought of Foucault and Melandri.
natural and supernatural
signatures
one needs to understand
To
correctly, writes
above all else those signa-
the confirmation
of the letter which gives it authority among men
The letters
of the alphabet
on their jackets or coats: "What is this but a sign by which any-
ointments
body who meets him may understand
numbers
or a bailiff (Scherg ader Biittel) recognizable. insignia on their garments
a private soldier
outside with only
on labels that in pharmacies ... spirits,
"liquors,
or alchemists'
syrups,
oils, phlegmata,
on rooms and dwellings,
laboratories
oils, powders,
crocuses,
alkalis;"
seeds, or the
which mark the year in which
they were built."
Just as couriers wear
that identify them as messengers-and
also show where they come from, who sent them, and how they should be treated-
made by man as
one word, in that way signify their contents.V" Or the letters
is the "small yellow patch" (ein Gelbs Flecklin) that the Jews wear that he is a Jew?"16 A similar
are also signatures
ignated, just as books which, though lettered
allow one to recognize
here is not ironic-makes
a seal is dead, useless, empty."!"
signatar: "By a few letters, names, or words, many things are des-
inscribed
comparison
SIGNATURES
and in trials. A receipt without
tures whose signatar is the human being. The first example of this
sign-the
OF
so does the soldier on the battlefield
colored signs or bands making him recognizable
wear
by friends and
5 Let us try to develop and analyze the unique structure signatures.
Consider
the signature
(or monogram)
of human
the artisan or
enemies ("Hence it is known that one is on the side of Caesar, or
artist uses to mark his own work. What happens when we observe
of the kings; that one is an Italian, another a Gaul, etc."). 17
a painting
Still more interesting paradigm
of signatures
is another is further
set of examples
complicated.
where the
This group has to
in a museum
fecit is written
in a cartouche
do not pay attention
artisan marks his own works "so that everyone may understand
operation
it." Here the signature
mological connection is clear in languages, "signature"
shows its likely ety-
with the act of signing a document,
(in canon law signaturae were the rescripts
by the pope by virtue of a signature
on a document).
in Latin signare also means "to coin," and another cussed by Paracelsus
which
like French and English, that use the word
pertains
example dis-
to signs that indicate
of coins: "It should be remembered
granted However, the value
that every coin carries its
proof and sign by which it may be known how much that coin is worth."!" Like the seal impressed
on a letter, these serve not to
identify the sender but to signify its "force" (Krcift): "The seal is
I R
on the lower edge? We are now so
used to looking for and receiving this type of information
do with the "marks and signs" (Markt uncI Zeichen) with which the who has produced
and we realize that the phrase Titiatius
to the operation
that is anything
that we
implicit in the signature,
an
but trivial.
Let us assume that the painting represents
the Annunciation,
which may itself be seen both as sign and as image, harking back to a religious are familiar
tradition (though
or iconographic we needn't
theme with which we
be). What does the signature
Titian usfecit add to the sign "Annunciation" our eyes? It tells us nothing
about its theological
way in which the iconographic ing about the properties The signature
that we have before meaning
or the
theme has been treated,
noth-
of the thing in its objective materiality.
merely puts the painting
in relation
to the name
of a man, whom we know to be a famous painter
who lived in
Venice in the sixteenth
century
(but it could also be a name that
\ I)
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS THEORY
we know nothing
or almost nothing
about). If this information
were missing, the painting would remain completely in its materiality signature
is so important
in our culture
be the case, and the painting the reading
of the cartouche
at the painting
in question.
radically
of the bailiff or of the courier
by the
(in others, this may not
could live in total anonymity) modifies
Furthermore,
that
how we look
if the artwork
SIGNATURES
this sense, the yellow patch on a Jew's coat and the colored mark
unchanged
and quality. Yet the relation introduced
OF
is one
referring
are not merely neutral
to the signified "J ew," "bailiff," or "courier." By shifting
this relation into the pragmatic
and political sphere, they express
instead how one must comport couriers
signifiers
oneself before Jews, bailiffs, or
(as well as the behavior
Similarly, a signature
that is expected
from them).
in the shape of an eye on a Euphrasia petal
which falls within the era of authorial copyright, the signature has
is not a sign that signifies "eye." Rather, in the eye-shaped
legal effects.
(which in itself is a sign that refers back to the eye), the signature
Now consider
the example of a signature
which determines substantial
stamped on a coin
its value. In this case, too, the signature has no
shows that the plant is an effective remedy
against illnesses
of
the eye.
relation with the small circular metal object that we
hold in our hands. It adds no real properties again, the signature
to it at all. Yet once
decisively changes our relation to the object
as well as its function
in society. Just as the signature,
altering in any way the materiality in the complex network
without
of relations of "authority,"
6 From the moment
of Titian's painting inscribes it
forms a piece of metal into a coin, producing
here it trans-
refers
motifs-above
it as money.
signatures,
And what about the letters of the alphabet which, according
of its title, Jakob Bohrne's De signatura rerum
to Paracelsus,
taking
up a number
books? Here it is probably not a matter
occult virtue of things by establishing
expressions
of the "signatory
as
art" that allowed Adam to assign
simply as what manifests a relation between
ent domains. Instead, it is the decisive operator
Instead, it must refer to a use of a lan-
that which makes the world, mute and without
guage that is constituted
not by sentences but by paradigms,
intelligible.
statements,
that A, Z, E, R, T is, in a typing handbook,
the statement
alphabetical
ini-
titles, similar to those Foucault must have
had in mind when, to define his enunciative
he wrote
relation
is what-insisting
between
a
on this relation
of the
in a new network
of pragmatic
40
an historical
Conjecture,
the
differ-
of all knowledge, reason in itself,
is spoken, written,
[Signatur]
of the signature for it proceeds
or
only from
from the Mouth of. another,
wherein
is dumb; but if the Spirit opens to
express
a
him the Signature,
and a sigDatum; rather,
it
and further
it
revealed itself (out of the Essence through the Principle) in the Sound with the Voice.?" For Bohrne, the process of revelation,
In
whose parad igm is language,
without
displaces and moves it into another
taught of God, without the Knowledge
the Spirit without Knowledge
does not merely
»e=»
Bohrne writes: "All whatever
is dumb and void of Understanding;
order adopted by French keyboards.
In all these cases, a signature
The theory of
here, and shows the inad-
names to the creatures. tials, and conventional
and
equacy of the concept of the sign to address the issue. A signature, first of all, is no longer understood
of words understood
of his themes
all, the theme of Adam's language. however, is taken further
to Paracelsus, by being arranged into words allow us to designate
semiotic
spot
domain,
coinciding
with it-
thus positioning
and hermeneutic
relations.
then he understands
he understands
the Speech of another;
how the spirit has manifested
entails from the beginning
I
I
and
a more
THE
SIGNATURE
complex development
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
of the semiotic model. The sign (which he
itself is inert and mute, and must, in order to
however its Operation
effect knowledge,
be animated
character
and qualified in a signature
fundamental
technical
terms
of his thought).
in what the
either in Good or Evil; and with this sign
[Bezeichnung] he enters into another Man's Form [Gestaltnis], and awakens also in the other such a form in the Signature; both Forms mutually
assimulate
together
[miteinander
so that
inquali-
ren] in one Form, and then there is one Comprehension, Will, one Spirit, and also one Understanding.":" is the following that remains signature
one
passage, where Bohrne compares
signs to a lute
stands in the Essence, and is as a Lute that lies still,
and is indeed
a dumb
Thing
that is neither
heard
or under-
stood; but if it be played upon, then its form is understood Thus likewise
the sign [Bezeichnung]
dumb Essence .... artificially
according
nothing
....
that can strike
his instrument.I'" Despite
clearly does not coincide sign intelligible. moment
hesitations,
the signature
was prepared
but produces
knowledge
and marked at the only in a subse-
quent moment when it reveals itself in the signature,
where "the
itself in the Sound of the Word, for that is the
Mind's natural Knowledge
of itself.'?' Using a term that refers to
a tradition
that is both theological
"character"
this active moment
into "revelation"
here
with the sign, but is what makes the
The instrument
of creation,
inward manifests
ogy. For him, "the Word of God is the Ground of aJl Substances, and the Beginning of all Properties,
(Olfenbarung).
Qualities,
or Conditions.
The
[das Sprechen], and remains in God; but or Expression [Aussprechen], viz. the Exit of the
Word is God's speaking the Outspeaking
Word wherein the abyssal Will introduces through
the Outspeaking,
itself into Separability,
[is] Nature and Property.?"
The aporias in the theory of the signature Trinity:
just as God was able to conceive
repeat those of the
and give shape to all
things by means of the Word alone, as both the model and the effective
instrument
of creation,
the mute signs of creation,
the signature
in which it dwells,
is what makes efficacious
and
expressive.
7 Before disappearing teenth century,
the terminological
(Natur-
lies most
to the Essence of all Essences,
but the wise Master
language"
in its Form is a
In the human Mind, the Signature
composed,
and Man wants
of Nature
of this "natural
sprache) of signatures is not Paracelsus's signatory art but Christel-
Even clearer
silent as long as the player does not play it: "The
externallv.?"
For Bohme, the paradigm
one of the
Bohrne goes on
to argue: "So that in the Word may be understood Spirit has conceived,
(and
SIGNATURES
[Fiaur] of the inward spriritual World; whatever is internally, and is [in der Wirkuna ist], so likewise it has its
calls Bezeichnung)
to describe this process, he uses the word inqualiren,
OF
and magical, Bohme defines as when signification
crosses over
He writes: "The whole outward
visible World with all its Being is a sign [Bezeichnuna],
or Figure
from Western
science at the end of the eigh-
the theory of signatures
exerted
a decisive influ-
ence on science and magic in the age of the Renaissance
and the
Baroque, even to the degree of influencing
aspects
of the work of Johannes theory of signatures
non-marginal
Kepler and G. W. Leibniz. However, the
did not have its locus in medical science and
magic alone. Its most significant
development
came in the theo-
logical realm, especially in the theory of the sacraments. The medieval hermeneutic the sacraments
within
tradition
the domain
traced the inscription
of signs back to Augustine,
insofar as his was the first effort to construct raments
as a "sacred semiology."
both the cursory
definition
of
the doctrine
of sac-
Although we find in Augustine
of the sacrament
~
.:
\
as a sacrum sianum
THE
SIGNATURE
("A sacrifice as commonly sacrament
OF
ALL
THINGS
understood,
THEORY
therefore,
is the visible
of an invisible sacrifice: that is, it is a sacred symbol.")
OF
SIGNATURES
the most decisive problem of the theory of the sign sacrament: the question
concerning
the efficacy of the sign. In Hugh of St. Vic-
and the elusively stated idea of an indelible character imprinted
by
tor's Sacraments
if the
the sacrament
of
its resemblance
to the Signified-grounds
on the person who receives it, the construction
a proper theory of the sacrament later with Berengarius 28
Summa theologiae. In
as sign began only six centuries
of Tours and culminated
in Saint Thomas's
the passage just mentioned
from The Ciry
God, the term sacramentum
refers not to the sacraments
if
in a tech-
nical sense but more generally to "every work done in order that we may draw near to God in holy fellowship," the sacrifice of immolation
to
celebrated by the Hebrews, according
to the biblical story." Before Augustine, the sacraments,
in opposition
the spiritual
in Ambrose's treatise on
term spiritale signacuJum
Christian Faith, such efficacy-
the excess of the sacrament "What is the difference
between
sign and sacrament? [ex institutione);
also by means of similarity
In the sacrament,
by means of similarity, The anonymous
of the Summa
rament to the sign:
for medieval theology
succession rament
described
of three doctrines: sacrament
of the sac-
and philosophy,
[The sacrament] is not only the sign of a sacred thing; it is also
he
of the Scholastic theory
sign to be, it is enough that it signify that of which it offers the sign,
as the convergence
without conferring it. The sacrament, however, not only signifies
the doctrine
or
but confers that of which it is sign or signification.
of the mystery sac-
In addition,
of the
there is a difference insofar as the sign exists only for signification,
(still present in Hugh of St. Victor as well as
even if it lacks similarity, as, for example, the circle, which in the
(which has its paradigm
medicine
the irreducibility
stresses
efficacy. This is the difference between sign and sacrament: for the
The process that led to the formation is usually
sententiarum
elaborates his theory of signs,
the sacraments.
of the sacraments
but also
represents
and confers by means of sanctification.Y"
author
once again and without reservations
never mentions
Further-
instead, there is not only signification
at this stage as an exorcism or initiation which is so important
[ex similitudine).
efficacy, such that it signifies by means of institutions,
ignated a moment within the process of baptism, which appears that in the texts where Augustine
The sign
the sacrament
more, the sign may signify the thing, but not confer it [coiferre).
only des-
rite. And it is Significant
the difference and even
with respect to the sign. He writes:
signifies by means of an institution represents
together with
in Isidore), the doctrine
in Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles),
and the doctrine
sacrament
(which supplied the definitive
Scholastic
doctrine
of the sacraments).
canonical
of the sign
taverns signifies wine (circulus vinum) whereas the sacrament not
form to the
only signifies by means of institution but also represents by means of similarity. 31
A more subtle analysis
shows that the three elements continue to be present throughout all stages of the theory's
development,
testifying
to a composite
origin that has not yet been elucidated by historical investigations and that the theory of the sign sacrament
is unable to get to the
bottom of. The inadequacy
8 In the treatise on the sacraments from the Summa theologiae which is usually seen as the moment where Aquinas fully adheres to the
of the semiotic model for explaining
the sac-
rament emerges when one tries to engage what is in every sense
4·
paradigm of the sign sacrament,
the inability of the theory of the
sign to fully account for the sacrament's
I "
efficacy emerges with
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
respect to the effects of the sacrament,
THEORY
THINGS
namely, grace and charac-
OF
SIGNATURES
depends on the good or evil dispositions
that is produced
ex opere
operantis),
is forced to distinguish
operatum,
the sign here is always the place of an operation
actualizes
its efficacy.
a "principal
cause," which pro-
duces its effects in virtue of its form (like fire warming tue of its warmth),
and an "instrumental
up in vir-
reality
(ex opere
ter. To explain how a sign may also be the cause of grace, Thomas between
but is an objective
of the minister
that
In other words, the sacrament functions not as a sign that, once
cause," which acts not in
virtue of its form but only through a movement impressed on it by
instituted,
always signifies its meaning
but as a signature
whose
an acting principle (the hatchet being the cause of the bed only by
effect depends on a signator, or in any case on a principle-occult
means of the artisan's action). Whereas the principal cause cannot
virtue in Paracelsus, instrumental
be the sign of its effect, the instrumental
time animates it and makes it effective.
cause, writes Thomas,
virtue in Thomas-
which each
"can be called the sign of a hidden effect in virtue of the fact that it is not only a cause but in some sense an effect too, inasmuch as it receives its initial impetus from the principal is why the sacraments
agent. And this
of the New Law are causes and signs at the
9 The proximity
of the sign to the sphere of signatures
same time. Hence too it is that, as the usual formula puts it, they
ev ident in the specific sacramental
1fect what they.figuratively
"character"
express [~fficiunt quod .figurant)."32 How-
ever, this means that as the effect of a principal namely Christ's, the sacrament
understood
does not act simply ex institutione needs an active principle
as instrumental
cause
like a sign; rather, each time it
in order to animate it. This is why it is
necessary for the minister, who represents agent, to have the intention
agent's action,
Christ as the principal
(if not presently,
of carrying out the sacramental
at least customarily)
contrast
in baptism,
polemics
developed
against the Donatists,
baptism (and ordination) important
act. Thomas adds:
question
can be imparted especially
The Donatists
if the sacrament
or schismatic.
because he wanted
can be aimed at physical Cleanliness or physical health, or be done in play, and there are many other reasons of this kind why this action should be performed. And because of this it is necessary to isolate and define the one purpose for which the action of washing is performed in baptism, and this is done through the intention of the minister. This intention in turn is expressed in the words pro-
jects receiving or administering municated
since according to the patristic tradition, participating
had been administered this raised an
to affirm the validity of of the situation of the sub-
that imprints
spiritual grace,
they were excluded from
in the Holy Spirit. Against this thesis,
affirms the possibility
of a baptisma sine spiritu-
Augustine
that is, a baptism
on the soul a character or nota, without
Even if such intention
I, ()
in the short treatise denied the validity of
the sacraments of heretics could not communicate
the identity of both the Christian
which
of his
it but also outside the grace com-
its corresponding
subjective,
only once).
by the sacrament through the Spirit. For the Donatists,
nounced in the sacraments, as when the minister says, "I baptise you in the name of the Father etc.,,33 is not something
(which, in
in the context
For Augustine,
the sacrament not only independently Thus the act of washing with water, which takes place in baptism,
and ordination
a theory of character
Contra epistolam Parmeniani. by or to a heretic
effect that takes the name of
confirmation,
to the other sacraments,
Augustine
is even more
conferring
grace. The reasons for such a radical thesis are
probably ecclesial, and to be found in Augustine's
desire to ensure
person and the priest beyond
THE
any personal
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
merit or unworthiness.
such a "character"
THEORY
THINGS
In any case, the status of
OF
10
is so paradoxical that Augustine has to multiply
the paradigms that make it intelligible.
The Scholastics,
He first cites the example
who centuries
of someone who has stamped a gold or silver coin with a signum
"sacramental
regale, though illicitly, without
origin. They thus attempted
caught, he will certainly and is incorporated conpeteuuv."
SIGNATURES
the sovereign's
be punished,
authorization:
if
but the coin remains valid
into the public treasury
(thesallris
in the Roman army, has been marked on his
body by the character militiae and out of cowardice battle. If he appeals to the emperor's it is not necessary
clemency
has fled from
"that the sacramenta
christiana
could not have overlooked to give content
that it communicates
its aporetic
to the Augustinian to the soul a habitus
latter is the position of Thomas, even if it does not communicate upon the soul "a certain
are less
lasting than this bodily mark [corporalis nota ]7"35 On the basis of
grace, nevertheless
does bestow
spiritual power ordered to those things
This, however, too, has recourse in antiquity
does not resolve all the difficulties. to Augustine's
military paradigm,
Thomas,
writing
"it was usual for soldiers on enlistment
service to be marked with some form of physical 'character'
draws by means of a doubtful argument
recognition
Spirit, then heretics
the inevitable conclusion
spirit": "If baptism cannot be without the have the Spirit-
but to destruction
not to
in
of the fact that they were deputed for some function
in the physical sphere. In the same way, therefore, sacraments
that
for military
this example and aware of the aporias implicit in this notion, he of a "baptism without
The
who argues that the character,
which pertain to divine worship.'?"
and is forgiven,
to mark him again with a new character. "Is it
possible," asks Augustine,
by affirming
the theory of the
(this is the thesis of Alexander of Hales) or a power (potenza).
regalibus
The second example has to do with a soldier who,
as was customary
signature
character,"
later developed
men are deputed
for some function
when in the
in the spiritual
salvation, just as was the case with Saul. ... [But if] the covetous
sphere pertaining
have not the Spirit of God, and yet have baptism, it is possible for
believers they are marked off by some form of spiritual character.?"
baptism to exist without the Spirit of God."36 The idea of an indelible "sacramental character"
by the sensible sign of the sacrament:
from the need to explain how the sacrament
Character, he argues, is an indelible sign imprinted arises, then,
survives in condi-
tions that should have made it void or inefficacious.
If the com-
munication
will express
of the Spirit is impossible,
the excess of the sacrament supplement
the character
over its effect,
of efficacy without
any content
to the worship of God, it naturally follows that as
something
like a
other than the pure
upon the soul has the force of a sign [habet rationem the character
of baptism
be erased. Consider
produces not only the effect of
sign that is spiritual
the paradoxical
nature
in nature and cannot
of this special
signature
is a zero degree
(qllaedam si8natio)
that defines character." A sign produced
which expresses the event of a sign without meaning
sign, the character
exceeds the relational nature that is proper to
priestly character. To put it differently: signature,
signi] ... for
is that he has been washed by water
the sensible sign of the sacrament
the qualities that defined him, if he has committed
or
imprinted
which is apparent to the senses.":" That is, in the case of baptism,
fact of being marked. If the Christian person or priest has lost all ful act or even denied his faith, he still retains his Christian
on the soul
the way in which an individual is known to have been sealed with
grace but also another
some disgrace-
"The character
and grounds-
in this event-
character
a pure identity without content.
the sign:
III)
"8
by a
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
THEORY
OF
SIGNATURES
With regard to the relation implied by the term "sign," there has
participation
to be some basis for this. Now the immediate basis for the relation-
is usually seen as the first philosophical
ship involved in this kind of sign, namely character, cannot be the
theurgy: Iamblichus's
essence of the soul. Otherwise
it would belong connaturally
to
every soul. Hence we have to postulate some property in the soul which constitutes the basis for a relation of this kind, and this is the essence of character. Hence we shall not have to assign it to the genus of relation, as some have asserted." Character,
of the sacrament,
every relation.
character
In the efficacious
of signatures
theory, which makes it akin to the derives from it, even
to it, a character
In both cases, the meaning
magical
that is inseparable or signature that by
of character
is purely pragmatic.
with a character
[charactere ... insigni-
tur] ordaining it for use in commerce,
and soldiers are sealed with
a character inasmuch as they are deputed to military service" (both examples also appear in Paracelsus), so are the faithful marked by recipiendum
in order to be able to perform
vel tradendum
properly arouse the divine will are the actual divine symbols [theia
in the theurgic rites depends on us, or suppose that their genuine
by which it is
insisting on a sign makes it efficacious and capable of action.
the character
relate, itself recognises the proper images [oikeias eikonas] of itself,
has the
us with something
Just as a coin is "imprinted
work, and the ineffable power of the gods, to whom these symbols
For this reason, "character
to suppose for both a common
from the sign yet irreducible
aliis ea quae pertinent
acts of worship (ad ad cultum Dei).43
performance
[alethes ... er8on] is assured by the true condition of
our acts of thinking, or that they are made false by our deception.Y Marsilio
Ficino was so convinced
these texts and the Christian tradition mysteriis into Latin, together and the Corpus hermeticum, sacraments.
the idea that the efficacy of sacred
,; o
of the condition
and type of
of the efficacy of the
"De virtute
theta synthemata,
signs," as "sacramenta
the expression
the
sacramento"divine
divina." And at the end of the passage, he
adds a few lines that unequivocally ment: "When
De
he slightly altered the passage in ques-
Thus not only does he place before the paragraph
refer to the Christian
in the course of sacrifice
that is, signs and sacraments
the priest uses material
there
sacra-
are symbols and
[signacl!la et sacramenta],
things in virtue
decorum;
of whose ordination
but it is God who imprints
he
on the
its efficacious force.?"
Both the theological
signs and practices was independent
that when he translated
title (which is missing in the original)
synthemata,
between
with other Greek magical treatises
rum," he also translates
sacrament I I
of the relation
tion to make it accord with the doctrine
realizes the external
A century before Augustine,
the symbols
themselves, by themselves, perform their appropriate
son: that you not believe that all authority over activity [ener8eias]
in itself it has the force of a principle.':"
origin), is that it presents
[synthemata]
synthemata] .... I have labored this point at some length for this rea-
(and which probably
though it is legitimate
For even when we are not engaged in intellection,
sign
The paradox of sacramental theory
He writes:
excess
force of a sign in relation to the sensible sacrament but considered
of magic and
is what marks the irreducible
of efficacy over signification. imprinted,
De mysteriis.
foundation
not through being aroused by our thought. ... The things which
then, is a sign that exceeds the sign, and a relation
that exceeds and grounds
of the subjects involved had emerged in a work that
and the medical doctrine
doctrine
of the sacramental
of signatures
origin to this kind of magical-theurgic
I; I
in all likelihood tradition.
character owe their
Among the texts
THEORY THE
translated
=e«
OF
ALL
to Proclus, in which the basic concepts we have
so far are clearly present.
the familiar idea regarding
OF
SIGNATURES
THINGS
by Ficino, there is a short treatise titled De sacr!ficio et
attributed
examined
SIGNATURE
Here we find, once again,
the visible signatures
of things ("the
that the juridical fundamental
problem
element
posed by such a practice
of doctrine,
nature of the sacrament.
putting
Since sacramental
touched
in question
a
the very
efficacy immediately
depends on the signum and the character rather than on the aims
stone called 'the eye of the sky' or 'eye of the sun' contains a figure
and the conditions
resembling
the baptism of images calls into question the essence of the sacra-
the pupil of the eye from which emanates a ray") as
of the subjects, the person who administers
well as the idea of efficacious likeness as the foundation of magical
ment and therefore
influences:
crime of sorcery. In other words, the close proximity
("The ancients, having recognized
these things ... by
means of likeness transfer divine virtues onto the inferior world;
sacramental
in fact, likeness is the sufficient cause that allows individual things
theologian
commits a crime of heresy, and not a simple
and magical efficacy makes the intervention
of the
and the canonist necessary.
This is clear in the longer and more elaborate
to be bound to one another")."
between
by the Franciscan
Enrico del Carretto,
answer given
bishop of Lucca. Against
those who argued that it could not be a matter of afactum 12
cale, since magical purpose
was accidental
with respect
heretito faith
and magic is evident enough
in the sacrament,
he argued that baptism was a consecration
in the practice of the baptism of images and charms as reported
added something
to the consecrated
The proximity in a
1320
between
consultation
sacraments
of Pope John XXII. The ritual baptism of
magical images, which serves to increase their efficacy, must have been a widespread
enough practice
in those years to worry the
or sign. The baptism of images performed therefore
did not merely introduce
to the sacrament
that
thing by way of either form for magical purposes
an external
aim with respect
but was "a form of consecration
pontiff to the point of inducing him to submit the following question to ten theologians
is affected by the act or is believed to be affected by such conse-
and canon law experts:
to witchcraft,
through
[quedam con-
secTOtiol and deputation
which the thing
cration.?" In other words, Enrico believes in the reality of the Do those who baptize with water, in accordance with church ritu-
spell performed
als, images, or any other object devoid of reason for the purpose
operation
through
the baptism
were performed
of images. If the magical
on an unconsecrated
image, even if
of witchcraft commit the crime of heresy and should therefore be
the performer
considered heretics, or should they be judged only as having com-
image for this reason (ad hoc pungit Jmaginem,
mitted sorcery? And how should they be punished in either case?
malificiatum),
And what is to be done with respect to those who have received such
ever, if the image has been baptized in accordan~e
believed
in the demon's
power and pierced
the
ut dJabolus pungat
there would be sorcery rather than heresy." Howwith the ritual
images even tough they knew that they had been baptized? And what
(modo divino), "the consecration
to do with respect to those who did not know that the images had
cal image" where the devil effectively insinuates
been baptized, but, knowing the power of these sorts of images, had
parallelism
received them for this purpose?"
of the sacrament
The pope, himself
means of a sign. Indeed, the devil is present in the image not as
a scholar of canon law, had understood
between
of the image produces a diaboli-
the efficacy of the baptized
consists
precisely
I,' '\
his power. so The image and that
in the fact that both act by
THE
a "principle
SIGNATURE
of movement"
OF
ALL
(sicut motor in mobili) but as "some-
thing marked in the sign" (ut signatum in the sacrament, institutes,"
in signo). Just as it occurs
in the magical image the devil "efficaciously
through the priest, "a sign relation with respect to the
spell." And, as in the sacrament,
whatever
may be, "the simple fact of consecration therefore
THEORY
THINGS
the performer's
contains the belief, and
makes it a case of heresy IJactum
cal and sacramental
operations
for term, and the classification
belief
correspond
Saturni,
according
OF
SIGNATURES
to Picatiix, is that of "a man who has a black
face and camel feet, who sits at the desk holding in his right hand a pole and in his left hand an arrow or javelin.?" What is the meaning recorded
of these enigmatic
in the manuscripts'
illustrations?
draw in the sky, nor do they describe any properties
to each other term
cal signs to which they refer. Their function
of the crime as a type of heresy
when we place them in the technical of charms or talismans reproductions
of anything:
context
and medical tradition
site of signatures.
examined
Indeed, the magical
so far has its roots in astrology.
of the production
a point in order to influence
terrestrial
role, the form or figure of the planet is defined or signator, or even "root"
maius, which so fascinated Aby War-
burg when he saw them sumptuously
reproduced
in the frescos at
Schifanoia that he did not rest until he had traced their genealogy. "In this decan," we read in the Introductorium
maius in regard to
selves operations
Both the figure in the ymago de can find their meaning both signatures
his midriff
ized (iste linee Significant
a voluminous
white
cord; he is wrathful,
garment,
tied around
stands erect, guards, and observes.':"
with a In the
through
Knowledge
in the median strip of the month of March in the hall of Palazzo
sense that producing
Schifanoia, Warburg
and reproducing
ultimately saw a kind of "secret companion"
both the decansand
like a cipher of his destiny. In Picatiix,
the planets have a "figure"
(jonna)
kind. Thus, while the first decan of Aries is described "man with red eyes and a large beard, wrapped cloth, making
impressive
gestures
~ 4
of this
there as a
in a white linen
while he walks,"
the Jorma
and the form of the planet or
in this efficacious which the influence
operation:
of celestial signatures
in mundo ut in
et hoc modo operantur). 56
is the magician's science, in the
an ymago means sympathetically
in a signature
formula) the signature
they are
of the stars is real-
radios quos stelle proiciunt
centro; et ex hoc est opus et virtus ymaginum,
gloomy figure of this vir niger, as depicted by Francesco del Cossa
of his life and something
as a significator that gathers and
radices erunt opus celi pro iffectibus ymaginum).55
of mind; he wears
and greatness
(radix), of the yma80
In this
put in the service of the efficacy of images (iste
of powerful
courage,
into
directs the virtues of the stars. In this sense, the roots are them-
the first decan of Aries, "a black man arises with red eyes, a man stature,
which
bodies (ymago nihil aliud
est quam vis corporum celestium in cotpotibus irifluencium).54
Consider the images and figures of the decans in the Arabic treaAbu Ma'shar's /ntroductorium
the
signs nor
through
and concentrated
tise that was translated
into Latin under the title Picatrix or in
Whatever
r=e= are neither
they are operations
the forces of celestial bodies are gathered is a privileged
of the zodia-
becomes clear only
that Picatrix calls ymagines.
. matter of which they are made, the
13
the constel-
lations, they in no way refer to the figures that the stars seem to
hereticale]."51 Magi-
records this proximity.
Astrology
figures so precisely Unlike
imagining
(which can also be a gesture
or a
of the planet in question.
This is all the more true for the so-called "signs" of the zodiac as well as for the constellations
themselves.
It is not properly
a
matter of signs (what would they be signs of?) but a matter of signatures
expressing
a relation of efficacious likeness between
the
THE
constellation
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
and those who are born under its sign, or more gen-
erally, between the macrocosm
and the microcosm.
And not only
OF
SIGNATURES
produce his charms, so Mnemosyne is the atlas of signatures the artist-or
the scholar-must
is it not a matter of signs, but it is not even a matter of anything
or she wishes to understand
that has ever been written
is at issue in the tradition
of the historical
For this reason, Warburg,
with para-scientific
the profound
down. Rather, in the sky, according to
image proposed
by Hugo von Hofmannsthal,
men
that
learn to know and handle if he
and perform the risky operation memory
that
of the West.
terminology
that
learned perhaps for the first time "to read what was never writ-
is, in truth,
ten." However, this means that the signature
the Pathoiformeln as "disconnected dynamograms" (abgeschniirte Dynamogramme) that reacquire their efficacy every time they
is the place where
the gesture of reading and that of writing invert their relation and enter into a zone of undecidability. ing, and writing
Here reading becomes writ-
is wholly resolved into reading:
"The image is
called image because the forces of the spirits are conjoined here:
[cogitacio1 is included in the thing
the operation of the imagination
encounter
closer to that of magic than of science, can refer to
the artist (or the scholar). Despite the terminological
uncertainties
that are undoubtedly
the "nameless
science"
instruments,
These observations
may supply the key to understanding
burg devoted the last years of his life- as well as to grasping more appropriately
of Pathoiformel. The images (in fact,
the concept
photographs,
which were specially developed
photo lab of the Warburg
and printed in the
Haus) making up each of the seventy-
nine plates of the atlas should not be seen (as with ordinary books) as photographic
reproductions
which we would ultimately
be referring.
of works or objects On the contrary,
have value in themselves, since they themselves
an archaeology
art to they
are ymaaines in
In The Order
if
when he situates episteme.
the theory
man and the universe. correspondences
and planets
'i
11
that will enable him to
the exegesis and
a world that is supported and sympathies,
stands in need of signatures,
Signs," and knowledge
of the decans
However,
the thick weave of resemblances
the historian:
its pages the catalog of the Jormae and
century
not only of texts but also of the relation between
are not found in works of art or in the mind of the artist or of in the atlas. Just as the Introductorium maius or Picatrix offers to
in the Renaissance
plays a decisive role, domi-
nating until the end of the sixteenth interpretation
out signatures.
they coincide with the images precisely recorded
of signatures
In the latter, resemblance
us how to recognize
signatures
of signatures.
Things, Michel Foucault cites Paracelsus's treatise
Picatrix's sense, in which the signature of the objects they appear has been affixed. In other words, the Pathoiformeln
perusing
and
to found is something
15
to reproduce
the magician
signs nor symbols but signatures; he was unable
what is
Bildetotlas Mnemosyne- to which War-
at issue in the enigmatic
and the Bilde: Warburg
an Atifhebung of magic by means of its own
like an overcoming,
I4
by the psychology
of the time, from Friedrich Theodor Vischer to Richard Wolfgang Semon, the Pathoiformeln, the "engrams" seeks to grasp are neither
that contains the virtue of the planet.'?"
influenced
them.
"There
of resemblances
ing and deciphering
signatures.
incessant doubling resemblances:
that signatures
58
~arks
that teach
are no resemblances
The world of similarity
by
analogies and with-
can only be a world of is based on identify-
Foucault realizes the curious, introduce
into the system of
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
But what are these signs? How, amid all the aspects and so many interlacing
forms,
faced at any given moment pause because
it indicates
form constitutes
does one recognize
with a character
that should give one
a secret and essential
does. It signifies
bles what it is indicating
resemblance?
for its distinct
would then be indistinguishable it is another resemblance,
this signature
an adjacent
existence
as a signature
the first, and which is revealed
is no more than an intermediate
a signature;
but
form of the same
As a result, the totality of these marks, sliding over the
exact duplication
forms a second circle which would be an
of the first, point by point, were it not for that tiny
degree of displacement
which causes the sign of sympathy
in an analogy, that of an analogy in emulation, which in turn requires
the mark of sympathy
The signature
same nature;
it is merely that they obey a different
tion; the pattern
and what it denotes
in
for its
are of exactly
the
and communicate
Everything
the world
celsus to Crollius,
is a motif in his definition needs to be elaborated signatures.
At a certain
_ the set of knowledges and what is notof knowledges
from Para-
Foucault does not define the concept
nature, which for him resolves into resemblance; of the Renaissance
of sig-
however, there
episterne that only
to identify the proper site and function point Foucault distinguishes that allow us to recognize
from hermeneutics,
to "make the signs speak." The sixteenth
8
of
semiology
what is a sign
which consists of the set
that allow us to discover
the meaning century,
coin-
between them there remains a gap,
would
be manifest
and immediately
hermeneutics
of resemblance
cided without
the slightest parallax.
form the graphics
knowable
and the semiology
if the
of signatures
coin-
But because the similitudes
of the world are one "cog" out of alignment
those that form its discourse,
knowledge
and the infinite
involves find here the space that is proper to weave their way across this distance, course from resemblance
that with
labour it
to them: it is their task
pursuing
to what resembles
an endless zigzag
it."'
Although the site and nature of signatures in the passage just quoted, signatures gap and disconnection signatures
59
just like the authors he examines,
from one end to the do not perfectly
is produced:
between
provided
of signs,
he suggests,
remain problematic
find their own locus in the
semiology
and hermeneutics.
an early definition
of the concept
of
in this context in a 1970 article on The Order ?!Thinas.
Starting from the noncoincidence Nevertheless,
other than
is visible only in the
and hermeneutics
cide by means of resemblance;
the way in which
is nothing
And that resemblance
of signs that crosses
Enzo Melandri
law of distribu-
from which they are cut is the same.
and semiology in the form of simili-
to reside
that of emulation
recognition.
network
where knowledge
one of another
receives
they are linked together
other.l"? Yet semiology
But what it indi-
similitude,
Every resemblance
great circle of similitudes,
convenience,
What
value as a
from the face of which it is the sign;
type which enables us to recognize in its turn by a third.
....
hermeneutics
SIGNATURES
tude .... The nature of things, their coexistence, their resemblance.
exactly in so far as it resem-
(that is, a similitude)
cates is not the homology;
resemblance.
that one is
a sign and endows it with its particular
sign?-Resemblance
"superimposed
of the world
OF
in Foucault,
of semiology and hermeneutics
he went on to define the signature
the transition
as what enables
from the one to the other: "A sianature is a sort of
sign within the sign; it is the index that in the context of a given serniology univocally A signature
makes reference
to a give!} interpretation.
adheres to the sign in the sense that it indicates,
by
means of the sign's making, the code with which it has to be deci-
phered.l'" If for the Renaissance to the resemblance in modern
between
episteme
a signature
the sign and its designated
science it is no longer a character
sign but of its relation
thus refers thing,
of the individual
with other signs. In any case, "the type
I,' \)
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
of episteme depends on the type of signature,"
language
and this is "that
character of the sign, or of the system of signs, that announces
by
SIGNATURES
solely as a system of signs is insufficient
and does not
allow one to explain the passage from sign to speech. The semiology of language,
means of its making its own relation to the deSignated thing."63
OF
the interpretation
signs, was thus "paradoxically
of language
as a system of
blocked by the very instrument
that allowed for its creation: the sign."65 As Saussure had intuited 16
in notes published after his death, iflanguage
One of the final conclusions idea that the transition
of Emile Benveniste's
between
is not to be taken for granted, unbridgeable
gap. Consider
langue." There Benveniste significance"
semiology
that between
work was the
the two there is an
the 1969 essay "Semiologie identifies
within
(une double signifiance) that corresponds
crete and juxtaposed
de la
language "a double to two dis-
planes: on the one hand, the plane of semi-
otics; and on the other, that of semantics.
into discourse:
"Various concepts
what operation,
what interplay
between
form discourse? The sequence
however
it might be by the ideas it evokes, will never
enriched
pronouncing
tion raised by the sign relates to its existence, and this question is decided with a yes or no .... It exists when it is recognized as a Signifier by all the members of the linguistic community .... With the semantic, we enter into a specific mode of significance that is generated by discourse. The problems posed here are a function of language as a producer of messages. The message is not reduced to a succession of unities to be identified separately; it is not the sum of signs that produces sense. On the contrary, it is the sense, globally conceived, that is realized and divided in particular "signs," namely, words .... The semantic order is identical with the world of enunciation and the universe of discourse. It is possible to show that we
them, what conditions,
do these concepts
The semiotic denotes the mode of significance that belongs to the linguistic sign and constitutes it as a unity .... The only ques-
are present in
language (that is, clothed in linguistic form) such as beif, lake, sky, red, sad,five, to split, to see. At what moment, and by virtue of
make any human being understand
He writes:
as a
system of signs, then nothing allows us to explain how these signs are transformed
and hermeneutics
is presupposed
that another human being, by
it, wishes to convey something
Thus Benveniste
specific to him.'?"
can conclude with the forceful affirmation:
"The world of the sign is, in truth, sentence
of these words,
there is no transition,
closed. From the sign to the
neither
by syntagmation
nor by
them.?" In Foucault's
any other
means.
Melandri's
terms, this amounts to saying that there is no passage
from semiology
A gap separates
in the "gap" that separates
speak unless signatures theory oflinguistic of signatures.
and that we must situate sig-
to hermeneutics
natures precisely
and
them. Signs do not
make them speak. But this means that the
signification
must be completed
The theory of enunciation
in this same period can be considered
with a theory
that Benveniste develops as an attempt
a bridge over that gap, to render thinkable
to construct
the passage between
the semiotic and the semantic.
are dealing with two distinct orders of concepts and two conceptual universes by pointing to the different criteria of validity that are required for the one and for the other. The semiotic (the sign) must be recognized; the semantic (discourse) must be understood.T" According
to Benveniste,
Saussure's
i)
o
attempt
to conceive
17 In the same year that Benveniste published the essay "Semiologie
of
de la langue,"
Foucault published
1'1
The Archaeology
if Knowledge.
THE
SIGNATURE
Even though Benveniste's
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
name does not appear in the book, and
The statement
OF
SIGNATURES
cannot be identified as a sign or structure
Foucault might not have known his most recent articles, a secret
ring to a series of logical, grammatical,
thread unifies the manifesto
Instead,
Benveniste's
of Foucauldian
theses. The incomparable
epistemology
and
novelty of The Archaeol-
it operates
in signs, phrases,
of their simple existence,
allows us to decide whether
calls "statements."
the sentence is correct,
tinguish
Now, statements
(the semantic),
them as much from the sentence
tion (the statement, sitional
structure
residual
element
of "irrelevant
thereby reducing the statement
takes care to dis-
as from the proposi-
he writes, is "what is left when the propohas been extracted
sible to situate the statement
neither
are not merely reducible
since Foucault
and defined,"
raw material?").
Nor is it pos-
entirely within the semiotic sphere,
it to signs: "It is useless therefore
among unitary
a syntagma,
form of succession
a kind of
to look for
groups of signs. The statement
nor a rule of construction, and permutation;
is
nor a canonic
it is that which enables
such groups of signs to exist, and enables these rules or forms to Hence the difficulty
Foucault faces in his effort to define the
function,"
as well as the stubbornness
always insists on the heterogeneous
character
with which he
of statements
with
exists therefore
neither in the same way as a language
(Jan8ue) (although it is made of signs that are definable in their individuality
only within
a natural
or artificial
in the same way as the objects it is always endowed situated statement
presented
with a certain
in accordance
linguistic to perception
materiality,
with spatio-temporal
but neither
(although
coordinates)
therefore
(I
....
The
the proposito the same
is it the same kind of unit as a material
with its limits and independence."
nor
and can always be
is not the same kind of unit as the sentence,
tion, or the speech act; it cannot be referred criteria;
system),
object,
belongs
a structure
... it is a function
of exis-
analysis or intuition,
whether
or not they
to what rule they follow one another
or are
of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is car-
a unit, but a function possible
if
an aim is realized:
to signs and on the basis of which one
ried out by their formulation
unities,
(oral or written)
... [I]t is not in itself
that cuts across a domain
and which reveals them,
of structures
with concrete
and
contents,
in time and space."
To be sure, Foucault realized that it was not possible to define as one level among others of linguistic
that the archaeology
analysis and
he sought after did not at all delimit in lan-
guage a sphere comparable
to that of a disciplinary
The whole book, with its hesitations tions and resumptions,
respect to signs and to the objects they signify: The statement
is not therefore
"make sense," .according juxtaposed,
the act of language is efficacious,
or whether
may then decide, through
the statement
become manifest.?" "enunciative
The statement
tence that properly
relations. at the level
as a bearer of efficacy, which each time
0ay if Knowledce is to explicitly take as its object what Foucault to discourse
or syntactical and sentences
refer-
and repetitions,
knowledge. its interrup-
and finally its explicit admission that it did
not aim at the constitution
of a science in the proper sense, bears
witness to such difficulty.
To the extent that it is always already
invested in sentences not coincide
and propositions,
with the signifiers
to the extent that it does
or with signifieds,
and that it
refers to "the very fact that they ate given, and the way in which they are given," the enunciative them and must be recognized ignation
of something
is almost invisible in
beyond or on this side of their des-
or their being deSignated by something."
In other words, it is necessary direction
function
to "question
language,
to which it refers, but in the dimension
To grasp this, it is less a matter
It
of capturing
i
not in the
that gives it."73 the whole set of
THE
SIGNATURE
logical or grammatical lish the competence
OF
ALL
rules that order communication
or estab-
that is, "a body of anony-
rules, always determined
in the time and space
purely existential
that have defined a given period, and for a given social, econorr;ic, geographical,
object endowed
The Order
in The Archaeology
if Things
situated on the threshold where signatures yet discourse
if Knowledge
belonged to signatures. between
that the
take the place that in Statements,
then, are
semiology and hermeneutics
take place. Neither
semiotic nor semantic,
and no longer mere sign, statements,
character
but "a function
Foucault
of statements. of existence,"
with real properties.
not
like signa-
ment is the signature existence
the
Insofar as it is not a the statement
is not an the
takes place. The state-
that marks language in the pure fact of its
(darsi).
An attempt
to link the doctrine
of signatures
was made by the English philosopher seventeenth
century.
It concerned
Edward
tures, do not institute semiotic relations or create new meanings; instead, they mark and "characterize"
pertain
to ontology
Herbert
the interpretation
predicates that Scholastics called "transcendents" trascendentalia)
signs at the level of their
often emphasizes
It is a pure existence,
sheer fact that a certain being-Ianguage-
enunciative function."74 The whole argument acquires clarity if we hypothesize statements
SIGNATURES
if Knowledge,
In The Archaeology "structure"
or linguistic area, the conditions of operation of the
OF
18
of the speaking subject than it is of pausing
to reflect on the" discursive practices," mous, historical
THEORY
THINGS
in the of those
(trascendentia
insofar as, being the most general predicates,
to every being through
the very fact of existing.
or they
These
existence, thus actualizing and displacing their efficacy. These are
are: res, verum, bonum, oliquid, unum. Every being, owing to the
the signatures that signs receive from the sheer fact of existing and
sheer fact of existing, is one, true, and good. For this reason, the
being used-namely,
Scholastics
the indelible character that, in marking them
as signifying something,
orients and determines
tion and efficacy in a certain context. like the figures of the constellations
their interpreta-
Like signatures
on coins,
and the decans in the sky of
astrology, like the eye-shaped spots on the corolla of the Eaphrasia or the character
that baptism imprints on the soul of the baptized,
they have always already pragmatically
decided the destiny and life
of signs that neither semiology nor hermeneutics The theory abstract unmarked
of signatures
is able to exhaust.
(or of statements)
rectifies
the
and fallacious idea that there are, as it were, pure and signs, that the signans neutrally signifies the signatum,
said that the meaning
with pure existence
of these predicates
(reciptocatur
coincides
cum ente), and they defined its
nature with the syntagma passiones entis; that is, the attributes
a
being "suffers" or receives from the very fact of being. Herbert's predicates
great achievement
(or at least one of them) as signatures.
ing, in De veritate scendental
(1633), the nature
While analyz-
and meaning
bonum, he defines it as the signature
a thing through signatura
was to read these transcendent of the tran-
that pertains
to
the very fact of being: "Bonitas ... in re est ejus
interior
[The goodness
of the thing lies in its internal
signature]."75 Bonum is a "passion of the being," which necessarily
univocally and once and for all. Instead, the sign signifies because
marks the thing and displays itself as much in its sensible appear-
it carries
a signature
ance (the "pleasant," the "beautiful")
pretation
and distributes
practices,
and precepts
sense, archaeology
that necessarily
predetermines
its use and efficacy according that it is our task to recognize.
is the science of signatures.
(1 ~
its interto rules, In this
(intellection
as perception
Let us attempt
as in intellectual
of the ultima bonitatis
to broaden
Herbert's
intuition,
signatura). which throws
new lioht on an essential chapter of first philosophy,
(.
I,
knowledge
namely, the
THE
doctrine
SIGNATURE
OF
of the transcendentals.
ALL
THINGS
THEORY
In itself, being is the most empty
and generic notion, which seems not to tolerate any determina-
relation between
OF
SIGNATURES
En-Sof (God as simple and infinite
Being) and
the Sephiroth (the ten "words" or attributes in which God is mani-
tions other than the "neither ... nor" of negative theology. Yet, if
fested). How can multiple attributes and determinations
we instead posit that being, through
ted if God is simple, one, and infinite? If the Sephiroth are in God,
the very fact of existing,
of
be admit-
giving itself in an entity, receives or suffers marks or signatures
God's unity and simplicity are lost; if they are outside of God, they
that orient its comprehension
cannot be divine at all. "You will never escape from this alterna-
tain hermeneutics,
toward, a given sphere and a cer-
then ontology is possible as the" discourse"
of being, that is, of "the passions of being." "Quodlibet unum,
verum,
bonum":
every being presents
unity (which directs it toward mathematics
ens est
the signature
of
or the theory of singu-
tive," states the philosopher in the dialogue The Philosopher and the Kabbalist, written by Padua's great Kabbalist Moshe Hayyim Luzzatto: "Either the Sephiroth can one think something
are in God or they are not
How
divine derived from the divine?
'God'
larity), of truth (which orients it toward the theory of knowledge),
signifies
and of the good (which makes it communicable
sary .... So we must conceive God as one, having absolute unique-
and desirable).
Here we touch on the special relevance for ontology of the theory of signatures. the objective
It is not only that in the syntagma passiones etitis
or subjective
being and its passions dissemination statements
meaning
coincide.
of the genitive is not clear;
Existence
is a transcendental
in passions, that is, in signatures.
Signatures
(like
with respect to language) are then that which marks
things at the level of their pure existence. is the archi-signator
that imprints
On haplos, "pure being,"
its transcendental
existent entities. The Kantian principle
marks on
according to which exis-
the one who is unique
ness. How can one think God in terms of multiplicity,
is necesgeneration,
and origin of the lights from one another? ... We know that the holy one, blessed be He, is absolutely simple and no accident can be attributed
to Him.H76 The same problem
appears in Christian
theology (as well as in Islamic and Jewish theology) in relation to the question concerning according
God's attributes.
It is well-known
that,
to Harry A. Wolfson and Leo Strauss, the history
of
Western philosophy and theology from Plato to Spinoza coincides with the history of the doctrine
tence is not a real predicate, reveals here its true meaning: being is
And, as philosophers
not "the concept of something
ing, this doctrine
that could be added to the concept
and whose existence
regarding
and theologians
is intrinsically
the divine attributes.
alike do not tire of repeat-
aporetic.
God is the absolutely
of a thing," because in truth being is not a concept but a signa-
simple being, in whom not only are essence and existence indistin-
ture. Hence, ontology
guishable, but not even essence and attributes,
is not a determinate
knowledge
but the
archaeology
of every knowledge,
that pertain
to beings by virtue of the very fact of existing, thus
predisposing
which explores the signatures
them to the interpretation
of specific knowledges.
cies, can be distinguished.
Nevertheless,
perfect being, He must somehow attributes
possess all perfections and all
insofar as they express perfections.
divided between
or genus and spe-
if God is the absolutely Thus the field is
those who argue that in actuality
the attributes
exist in God and those who maintain with equal firmness that the
19
attributes
exist only in the minds of human beings.
The theory of signatures allows us also to throw light on one of the
Signatures
problems that have engaged scholars of the Kabbala, namely, the
the Sephiroth
h
(l
interrupt
this false alternative.
for the Kabbalists)
(\
The attributes
(as
are neither the essence of God
'/
THE
nor something natures
SIGNATURE
OF
THEORY
THINGS
foreign to the essence of God: they are the sig-
that, by barely brushing
simplicity
ALL
against
the absoluteness
of the being that is solely its own existing,
toward revelation
and
dispose it
the Sleeping
Gemaldegalerie
of Dresden
original by Titian.") nation
as a "copy by Sassoferrato
The novelty of "Morelli's of Burckhardt
of some scholars
focusing attention, 20
SIGNATURES
Venus, which until then had been exhibited
earned the admiration
and know ability.
OF
disappears
the advent of the Enlightenment.
from Western
The two lines dedicated
term in the Encyclopedie amount to a mocking port ridicule
des plantes
systeme extravagant
science with
as art historians
entre leur figure
to the
obituary:
"Rap-
et leurs effets. Ce
under different
second half of the nineteenth
century.
names starting
in the
In an essay that does not
and Freud and the indig-
details like ear lobes, the shape of fingers and
execution
of secondary
details, the more individual
Following
in the footsteps
of Enrico Castelnuovo,
the Italian historian
Carlo Ginzburg
compares
of this reemergence,
Mesopotamian
divination
of identification
defines as "evidential"
Ginzburg's
to Freud,
to art history.
that Ginzburg reconstructs
essay spans from
from forensic
an epistemological
(indiziario)
cases, situations,
to recall
paradigm
that he
in order to distinguish
it from
"highly quali-
in which the object is the study of individual and documents,
precisely because tbey are indi-
Exemplary is the case of Giovanni Morelli, who between
revolutionize
or better
an actual "signature":
ers the perpetrator
the techniques
of attribution
in painting.
to Morelli, among other things, the restitution
,) R
to Giorgione
of
and the Historical
Holmes's
Metbod,
almost maniacal
he
resembles the detective who discov-
attention
the mud, the ashes of a cigarette
on
to most people.'?" And
to the imprint
of a shoe in
on the pavement,
or indeed the
curve of an ear lobe (in the story "The Adventure
of the Card-
board Box") undoubtedly
calls to mind that of Pseudolermolieff
details in the masters'
(the
(We owe
more
of a crime (or the artist behind a painting)
Wind has observed
or iffecit) a series of articles that would
Ginzburg
to the one invented
the basis of evidence that is imperceptible
attention
Morelli
method
In Clues, Mytbs,
1874
and 1876 published under the Russian pseudonym Lermolieff eff., that is to say, iffinxit
evidential
It is well known
margin."77
name was an anagram,
Sherlock Holmes.
for the marginal
vidual, and for this reason get results that have an unsuppressible speculative
Morelli's
an art his-
of attribution,
or less in the same years by Arthur Conan Doyle for his detective writes: "The art connoisseur
techniques
It should be sufficient
the model of Galilean science, and that concerns tative disciplines,
car-
which occurs in the most dispa-
and techniques.
and uncon-
without his being aware of it.'?"
in depth here since it is so well-known,
rate knowledges
Morelli exam-
toes, and "even, horribi]« dictu ... such an unpleasant subject as fingernails. »78 Precisely where stylistic control loosens up in the
have to be described tography
of
had until that point, on more characteristics,
torian who had worked on the question
has traced a precise
which
scious traits of the artist can abruptly emerge, traits that "escaped
n'a que trop H~gne." Even more significant
is its gradual reemergence
ined insignificant
of a lost
method,"
of art, lies in the fact that instead
visible stylistic and iconographic
The concept of signature
in the
that Morelli's
paintings.
writings
h~d drawn
Freud's
years before he began to develop psychoanalysis.
the personality less intense,
that Morelli's
principle
according
Edgar
to which
of the author must be found where the effort is recalls
that of modern
which it is our small unconscious of our character.
gestures
In the essay "The
(j I)
psychology,
according
to
that betray the secret
Moses of Michelangelo,"
THE
SIGNATURE
Freud himself states without
OF
THINGS
reservations
is "closely related to the technique accustomed
ALL
features,
that Morelli's method
of psycho-analysis.
to divine secret and concealed
or unnoticed
THEORY
It, too, is
things from despised
from the rubbish-heap,
as it were, of our
observations."?'
OF
SIGNATURES
21
An actual philosophy fragments
Walter
of the signature
Benjamin
is contained
dedicated
jamin calls the "mimetic
(das Mimetische)
element"
mes, Freud, Alphonse Bertillon, and Francis Galton are grounded
rial similarity"
undoubtedly
comes to light in a particular
The specifically
human faculty of perceiving
tive of the theory
way if we view it from the perspec-
of signatures.
The details Morelli gathers
the ways in which ear lobes or fingernails Holmes investigates
of
are drawn, the traces
phylogeny he seeks to reconstruct he documents,
precisely
signatures
are all signatures
Bohme, the sphere of the mimetic
dimension
in the strict sense,
that we have examined
so far. As with Paracelsus
astrology and the correspondence
between
rocosm
identification
all in language
(in his correspondence
the fragments
in question
or characterization des Estampes
of a certain individual or event. at Paris's Bibliotheque
holds a series of photographs
that reproduce
Nationale
the objects
and
by the police in the garden of the accused while the crimes of Henri Landru
(1919). It consists of a
(which Benjamin
language").
and
faculty consists not only in
allow us to put a series of details into efficacious relation with the The Cabinet
whose
and whose decline in our time
ashes, the denials
the semiotic
similarities,
coincides with the ability to recognize
in the mud or in cigarette
that, by exceeding
or "immate-
refers to the sphere of signatures.
or lapses on which Freud focuses his attention,
investigating
faculty.
Even though the term itself does not appear in them, what Ben-
The nature of the clues on which the methods of Morelli, Hol-
clues gathered
in the two
to the mimetic
examines
microcosm
and mac-
at some length),
but above
with Gershom
are presented
From this perspective,
Scholem,
as a "new theory
language-
of
as well as writ-
ing- appears as a sort of "archive of nonsensuous
similarities,
nonsensuous
and articulate
correspondences.l'"
which ground
of
series of small, sealed displays, similar to the frames of a painting,
"the ties not only between what is said and what is meant but also
where pins, buttons,
between
metal clips, bone fragments,
ing dust, and other minutiae order. What is the meaning irresistibly
remind
of these small collections,
traces, the fragments
the cases leave no doubts: like clues or
case of a signature that puts an insignificant in effective relation
The
the exemplary
or nondescript
object
to an event (in this case, a crime, in Freud's
event) or to subjects (the victim, the murderer,
of a painting).
The "good God" who, according
Warburg's famous motto-which
to
Ginzburg uses as an epigraph to
his essay- hides in the detail, is a signataJ.
()
what is written
and what is meant, and equally between
the spoken and the written.?" The definition jamin in regard to the magical and mimetic perfectly
coincides
with the definition
above: "The mimetic
element
developed by Benelement of language
of the signature
in language
offered
can, like a flame,
manifest itself only through a kind of bearer [Treiger]. This bearer
of objects or bodies stand in a particular
relation to the crime. That is, the clue represents
the author
which
us of the oneiric objects of surrealism?
captions that accompany
case, a traumatic
vials contain-
of this kind are classified in perfect
is the semiotic or sentences ity appears. him-is
element.
Thus, the nexus of meaning
is the bearer through For its production
of words
which, lik~ a flash, similar-
by man-like
in many cases, and particularly
its perception
the most important,
by tied
to its flashing up. It flits past [Sie huscht varbei]."84 As we have seen in regard to the relationship tures and signs, immaterial
similarity
I
I
functions
between
signa-
in Benjamin
as
THE
an irreducible
SIGNATURE
complement
ALL
THINGS
to the semiotic
without which the transition Just as with Warburg's
OF
to discourse
astrological
THEORY
element of language cannot be understood.
signatures,
it is precisely the
knowledge of the mythical and magical elements of language that enables the overcoming
"The true image of the past flits by [huscht vorbei]. The past can recognizability,
definitions
clearer when restored
a medium into which the
ory of historical
and comprehension
research,
production
have
of its
and is never seen again."88
These famous
seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the most comearlier powers of mimetic
similarity:
be seized only as an image that flashes up at the moment
plete archive of nonsenuous
passed without residue, to the point where they have liquidated those of magic."8s
SIGNATURES
on the mimetic faculty used in regard to nonsensuous
of magic: "In this way, language may be similarity:
OF
of the dialectical
to their proper context,
signatures.
image become namely, the the-
It is well-known
that Benjamin's
following the examples of the surrealists
gardes, privileges
and the avant-
objects that because they appear to be second-
ary or even waste (Benjamin exhibit more forcefully
speaks of the "rags" of history),
a sort of signature
or index that refers
them to the present (the arcades, which already in the 1930S had
22
become
obsolescent
For Benjamin, especially from the time he begins to work on the
The historical
Paris arcades, history
accompanied
is the proper
sphere of signatures.
they appear under the names of "indices"
("secret,"
"historical,"
"temporal ") or of "images" (Bilder), often characterized lectical."
Here as "dia-
"The past," reads the second thesis "On the Concept
of History," "carries with it a secret index by which it is referred to redernption.?"
As fragment
N3,1 of
The Arcades Project makes
clear:
and almost
oneiric,
are their prototype).
object is never given neutrally; by an index or signature
and temporally
determines
and conditions
torian does not randomly or arbitrarily
rather, it is always
that constitutes
it as image
its legibility. The his-
choose the documents
out
of the inert and endless mass of the archive but follows the subtle and obscure
thread
of signatures
that demand
to be read here
and now. And the status of the scholar depends, precisely on the ability to read these ephemeral
for Benjamin,
signatures.
For the historical index of the images not only says that they belong to a particular time; it says, above all, that they attain to legibility only at a particular time .... Every present day is determined by the images that are synchronic with it: each "now" [jetzt] is the now of a particular recognizability .... It is not that what is past casts its light on what is present, or what is present its light on what is past; rather, image is that wherein what has been comes together in a flash with the now to form a constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a standstill." The fifth thesis reaffirms, once again, the flashing and precarious character
of the image in the same terms that the fragment
23
Fashion is a privileged
site of signatures.
exhibit their genuinely
historical
that fashion continuously itself by means temporal
It is where signatures
character.
seeks to recognize
of a never-ending
network
For the currentness always constitutes cif references
and
citations which define it as a "no longer" or an "again."
That is to say, fashion introduces nuity, which divides it according ness, its being or no-longer-being subtle, is nevertheless
into time a peculiar to its currency
disconti-
or outdated-
in fashion. This caesura, albeit
clear insofar as those who must perceive
I I
THE
it necessarily manner
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
THEORY
either perceive it or miss it, and precisely
in this
attest to their being in or out of fashion; however, if we
try to objectify it or fix it in chronological
time, it proves to be
ungraspable. of fashion tears the years (the 1920S, the 1960s,
the 1980s) out oflinear
chronology,
allowing them to have a spe-
cial relation with the designer's gesture, them appear in the incalculable present is in itself ungraspable, (not chronological!) entails a certain
of the proceedings.
Pierre Noailles has clarified the meaning of this last term. It is derived, according
to the traditional
etymology,
from vim dicere:
"to say or to show force." But what kind of "force"
is
involved here? Among the scholars, observes Noailles, the greatest confusion prevails on this point:
who cites them to make
"now" of the present.
Yet this
since it lives only in kairological
relation to the signatures
reason, being in fashion is a paradoxical
SIGNATURES
himself ready to suffer the consequences
literally,
The signature
OF
of the past. For this
condition that necessarily
ease or an imperceptible
lag, in which up-to-
They incessantly oscillate between the two possible meanings of the word: force or violence, that is, force that is materially put in action. In actuality, they do not choose, but rather each time propose either one or the other meaning. The vindicationes of the sacramentum are presented at one time as manifestations
of force, and at another
dateness includes within itself a small part of its outside, a tinge
as acts of symbolic or simulated violence. The confusion is even
of the demode. Like a historian,
the man of fashion is able to read
greater in regard to the vindex. In fact, it is not clear whether the
of the time only if he instead of entirely placing
force or violence expressed is his own, which he puts at the service
the signatures
himself in the past or coinciding in their "constellation,"
wholly with the present, lingers
of the law, or the violence of the adversary whom he denounces as contrary to [ustice ."
that is, in the very place of signatures.
Against such confusion,
Noailles
shows that the vis in ques-
tion cannot be a force or a material violence but must instead be
24
only the force of ritual, namely, a "force that compels, but does Indicium
(clue) and index derive from the Latin verb dico, which
not need to apply itself materially
in an act of violence,
albeit
originally
means "to show" (to show by means of the word and,
a simulated
therefore,
to say). Linguists and philologists
Aulus Gellius in which the "vis civilis ... quae verbo diceretur"
the essential
bond that joins the lexical
sphere of law. "To show by words" the juridical
formula,
the uttering
tion necessary to produce a certain the term dix-which form's sake")-means authority
have long observed family of dico to the
is the proper
operation
of
one.""
sition to the "vis quae manu fieret, cum vi bellica et cruenta." If we further
effect. Thus, for Benveniste,
hypothesis
"the fact of showing
verbally
and with
what must be.'?" Index is "the one who shows or indi-
cites a passage from
(civil force ... which is said by means of words) is placed in oppo-
of which realizes the condi-
survives only in the phrase diets causa ("for
On this point, Noailles
develop Noailles's
thesis, it is possible to offer the
that "the force said by means of the word" in question
in the action of the vindex is the force of the efficacious formula, as the originary
force of the law. That is to say, the sphere of law
is that of an efficacious
word, a "saying"
cates by means of the word," just as iudex is "the one who says the
(proclamation,
declaration),
law." To the same group belongs the term vindex, which denotes
in conformity
the one who in a trial takes the place of the accused and declares
cious word). If this is true, then law is the sphere of signatures
7 '1
solemn
that is always indicete
ius dicere (saying what is
with the law), and vim dicere (saying the effica-
THE
par excellence,
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THEORY
THINGS
where the efficacy of the word is in excess of its
was Blumenberg's
OF
SIGNATURES
thesis contra Lowith) was in question.
meaning (or realizes it). At the same time, the whole oflanguage
secularization
here shows its originary
cepts in order to make them refer to their theological
belonging
Before (or better, together
language is the place of signatures, be able to function.
to the sphere of signatures.
wit,h) being the place of signification, without which no sign would
And speech acts, in which language seems to
was a strategic operator
Rather,
that marked political conorigins. To
put it differently:
secularization
acts within
the conceptual
sys-
tem of modernity
as a signature,
which refers it back to theology.
Just as, according
to canon law, the priest reduced
to a secular
border on magic, are only the most visible relics of this archaic
status had to bear a sign of the order to which he had belonged, so
signatory nature of language.
the "secularized" as a signature.
concept shows its past in the theological Secularization,
then, is a signature
sphere
that marks or
exceeds a sign or concept in order to refer it to a specific interpre-
25
tation or to a specific sphere without,
All research
in the human sciences-
context-necessarily
has to do with signatures.
it is all the more important correctly,
particularly
in a historical
So for the scholar
to learn to recognize and handle them
since in the final analysis they determine
of any scholar's investigation. philosophical
the success
Gilles Deleuze once wrote
that a
inquiry entails at least two elements: the identifica-
to constitute
a new concept
stake in the (ultimately
however, leaving it in order
or new meaning.
What is really at
political) debate that has engaged scholars
from Max Weber's time to the present can be understood we grasp the signatory character
of secularization.
What is decisive each time is the way we understand ence worked by the Signature. dominated
for approaching
as the human
sciences entail a more or less conscious
of signatures.
Indeed,
it. It is necessary
without
to add that concepts
entail.
which they remain inert and unproductive.
the debate in twentieth-century
It may even happen that what at first appears to be a concept is
basis of one important poses something
like the absolutizing
to say, a doctrine
of the constitutive
signatures
the transcendentals
are not concepts but
In the human sciences, too, we may at times deal with concepts are signatures.
part of twentieth-century
as well practice
to state that the thought presup-
of the signature,
that is
primacy of signatures
over
signification.
and "passions" of the concept of "being."
that in actuality
that have
philosophy
it would not be wrong
later revealed to be a signature (or vice versa). Thus, we have seen that in first philosophy
the refer-
Many of the doctrines
tion of the problem and the choice of concepts that are adequate signatures,
only if
One such concept is seculariza-
Consider
the concept of privative opposition
betzkoy, which has exerted a determinant
in Nikolai Tru-
influence on the human
tion, about which in the mid-196os in Germany there was a sharp
sciences of the twentieth
debate that involved figures like Hans Blumenberg,
term is not opposed to the marked term as an absence is to a pres-
and Carl Schmitt.
The discussion
none of the participants was not a concept, theological discontinuity
was vitiated
between
by the fact that
seemed to realize that "secularization"
in which the "structural
and political
Karl Lowith,
conceptuality Christian
theology
II
identity"
(Schmitt's
between
thesis) or the
and modernity
(this
century. It implies that the non-marked
ence, but rather that non-presence zero degree of presence
is somehow
(that presence
equivalent
to a
is lacking in its absence).
In the same sense, according to Roman Jakobson, the zero sign or phoneme, though not having any differential
character,
functions
precisely to oppose itself to the simple absence of the phoneme.
THE
The philosophical
SIGNATURE
OF
foundation
ALL
THINGS
THEORY
of these concepts
lies in Aristo-
(steresis), of which Hegel's concept of
tle's theory of "privation"
Atifhebun8 is the consistent
development.
Aristotle, privation is distinguished
Indeed,
according
to
from simple "absence" (apou-
sia) insofar as it still entails a referral to the form of which it is a privation, which is somehow attested through its own lack." At the end of the 1950S, Claude Levi-Strauss concepts in his theory of the constitutive over the signified.
According
to Levi-Strauss,
originally in excess over the signifieds this gap translates matter of non-signs
In other words, it is a
of a supplementary
symbolic
con-
clear when read as a doctrine
priority of the signature
of
over the sign. The zero
that, in the absence of a signi-
to operate as the exigency of an in finite significa-
tion that cannot be exhausted Once again, everything understand
is
or signs having "zero symbolic value, that is,
the necessity
degree is not a sign but a signature fied, continues
signification
that are able to fill it, and
devoid of meaning.
tent."?' This theory becomes the constitutive
these
into the existence of free or floating signifiers
that are in themselves a sign marking
elaborated
excess of the signifier
by any Signified. depends
we
in the last thirty years of the twen-
tieth century was intimately tied to an interpretative suspends signatures words, deconstruction pure writing
infinite
the sense of the notions
In other
about signatures
which thus guarantees
deferral-of
signification.
of "arch i-trace"
and "originary
ment" as well as the insistence nonconceptual
event of meaning.
is a way of thinking
beyond every concept,
inexhaustibility-the
practice that
and makes them idle, in such a way that there
is never any access to the realized
as the
This is supple-
with which Derrida affirms the
character of these "undecidables":
of concepts but of archi-signatures
or "signatures
which are always already posited as supplement
H
SIGNATURES
every concept and every presence.
A signature,
separated
origin and from the origin in the position of supplement,
at the exceeds
in a ceaseless dif.ferance and erases its own trace
every meaning
in a pure auto-signification. must be absolutely
"Therefore
the sign of this excess
excessive as concerns
all possible presence-
absence ... and yet, in some manner it must still signify .... trace is produced as its own erasure.I'" A signature's
The
auto-signifi-
cation never grasps itself, nor does it let its own insignificance rather, it is displaced and deferred is then a signature
suspended
in its own gesture.
and referred
be;
The trace
toward itself, a ketiosis
that never knows its own pleroma. The strategy
of Foucault's
archaeology
It, too, starts with the signature However,
is entirely
different.
and its excess over signification.
just as there is never a pure sign without
signature,
neither is it possible ever to separate and move the signature originary position (even as supplement). that in The Archaeolo8Y mass that is inscribed
if Knowled8e
to an
The archive of signatures gathers
into every signifying
the non-semantic discourse
and sur-
rounds and limits the acts of speech as an obscure and insignifi-
on the way in which
this primacy of Signatures over the sign. The ephem-
eral success of deconstruction
OF
cant margin,
also defines the whole set of rules that determine
the conditions
of the existence
make sense and are juxtaposed one another
and operation
in space and time. Foucauldian
seeks the origin
or its absence.
ignoring
of its history. own proper
to produce a geneal-
or inaccessible
every beginning,
On the contrary, dispersal,
lingering
the details and accidents
or the episodes and accidents it means keeping events in their on the smallest
deviations
it is a matter not
the aberrations
at degree zero,"
ing. In a word, it means seeking in every event the signature
with respect
characterizes
to
never
or of morals does not mean to seek its origin,
as irrelevant
that accompany
archaeology
As the 1971 essay "Nietzsche,
Genealogy, History" never tires of repeating, ogy of knowledge
of signs, bow tbey
to one another, how they succeed
that accompany them and determine and specifies it and in every signature
I)
and
their meanthat
the event and
THE
SIGNATURE
the sign that carry and condition
OF
ALL
THINGS
it. To put it in Foucault's words:
"to show that to speak is to do something-something
CHAPTER
other than
Philosophical
to express what one thinks.'?' It goes without saying that deconstruction not exhaust the catalog of signatorial example, to imagine in pure signatures
a practice
THREE
and archaeology
strategies.
that without
or simply inquiring
Archaeology
do
It is possible, for
infinitely
dwelling
into their vital relations
with signs and events of discourse reaches back beyond the split between
signature
and sign and between
the semiotic
and the
semantic in order to lead signatures to their historical fulfillment. Whether
a philosophical
inquiry is possible that reaches beyond
signatures
toward the Non-marked
coincides
with the paradisiacal
that, according to Paracelsus,
state and final perfection
they say, another story, for others to write.
is, as
I
The idea of a "philosophical
archaeology"
time in Kant. In his "jottings"
appears for the first
for the essay "What Real Progress
Has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff," Kant explores the possibility of philosophy."
A philosophical
history of philosophy,
"is itself possible, not historically i.e.,
0
of a "philosophizing
or empirically,
history
he writes,
but rationally,
priori. For although it establishes facts of reason, it does not
borrow them from historical
narrative,
but draws them from the
nature of human reason, as philosophical archaeology [015philosophische Archao108ie].'' The paradox implicit in such an archaeology is that, since it cannot merely be a history of what philosophers have "been able to reason out concerning
the origin, the goal, and
[MeJnun8en]
the end of things in the world," that is, of "opinions
that have chanced to arise here or there," it runs the risk of lacking a beginning not happened."!
and putting forth a "history
Kant's notes return cannot write a history for which nothing raw materials."?
of the thing that has
more than once to this paradox: of the thing that has not happened,
has ever been provided He adds: "All historical
cal. ... Thus a historical
presentation
as preparation
knowledge
of philosophy
philosophizing
has been done hitherto,
philosophizing
is a gradual
development
"One and and
is empiri-
recounts
how
and in what order. But of human reason,
and
this cannot have set forth, or even have begun, upon the empirical
II n
8
1
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
path, and that by mere concepts."! Finally: "A history of philoso-
it investigates
phy is of such a special kind, that nothing
1971 essay "Nietzsche,
what has happened, have happened,
without
knowing
can be told therein
beforehand
of
what should
is immediately
and also what can happen.?"
Let us pause on the rather peculiar that Kant calls "philosophical as a "history,"
origin,
is at the basis of Foucault's
Genealogy,
History."
clear: it is a matter
model Foucault reconstructs
The essay's strategy
of playing genealogy,
from Nietzsche,
whose
against any search
of this science
for an origin. From this perspective,
it may even be useful to seek
This science appears
an alliance with history: "Genealogy
does not oppose itself to his-
character
archaeology."
and factical
ARCHAEOLOGY
and as such it cannot but question its own origin;
tory ... on the contrary,
it rejects the metahistorical
however, since it is a, so to speak, a priori history, whose object
of ideal significations
coincides with the very end of humanity,
to the search for 'origins.'''8
that is, the development
and indefinite
teleologies.
deployment
It opposes itself
Thus, among the terms employed
and exercise of reason, the arehe it seeks can never be identified
by Nietzsche,
Foucault distinguishes
with a chronological
for "origin,"
the bete nail' from which we must stay away, and
datum; it can never be "archaic."
more, since philosophy is concerned
Further-
not only with what has been
that has not yet been given, just as
its history is "the history of the thing that has not happened." For this reason, sophical thinker
the two terms that "are more exact than Urspruna in recording object of genealogy": Herkurift, which he translates as "descent, "dan E ntste }"lUna, emergence, t he moment 0 f ansmg. .. "9 If Nietzsche refutes the pursuit of the origin it is because Urspruna the true
but also with what ought to or could have been, it ends up being in a certain sense something
Kant argues in the Loaie that "every philo-
names "the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, their carefully protected
builds his own work, so to speak, on the ruins
identities;
[arif den Triimmern] of another," and that "one cannot learn philos-
the existence
ophy, because it is not yet aiven."s Archaeology,
of accident and succession.
of ruins, a "ruinology" transcendental
given as an empirically
then, is a science
whose object, though not constituting
principle
a
in the proper sense, can never truly be present whole. The archei are what could
or ought to have been given and perhaps one day might be; for the moment,
though, they exist only in the condition
objects or ruins. Like philosophers, An "archetype,"
adds Kant, "remains
of partial
who do not exist in reality,
they are given on ly as Urbildei, archetypes
images.6
or original
such only if it can never be
reached. It must serve only as a guideline
[Riehtsehnur]."7
of immobile
was already there,'
genealogist
dishomogeneity,
historical
a constitutive
Ii
practice
contains
gap between
and it necessitates
this idea. It is not that the
does not look for something
is never the "inviolable
an
the arene
the removal
disclose an original identity."!"
goes to war against
like a beginning.
ever, what he or she finds "at the historical
beginning
How-
of things"
identity of their origin." Thus "a geneal-
ogy of values, morality,
cultivate
world
to 'that which
the 'very same' of an image of a primordial
asceticism,
and kno",;ledge
confuse itself with a quest for their 'origins,'
2
essential
This search is directed
of every mask to ultimately Genealogy
and
because this search assumes
forms that precede the external
truth fully adequate to its nature,
as inaccessible
The idea that every authentic
Ursprunp, which he reserves
will never
will never neglect
all the episodes of history. On the contrary,
the details and accidents
that accompany
it will
every begin-
ning .... The genealogist needs history to dispel the chimeras of the origin."!! The French term conjurer- translated here as dispel-
encompasses
two opposite meanings:
Ii \
"to evoke" and "to
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
-*LL
PHILOSOPHICAL
THINGS
expel." Or perhaps these two meanings are not opposites, for dis-
when starting
pelling something-a
and history
specter, a demon, a danger-first
requires
ARCHAEOLOGY
from the essential difference
that one can explain
between
why prehistory
conjuring it. The fact is that the alliance between the genealogist
special consideration.
and the historian
relevant and more decisive than any history, even outside of the
expulsion."
finds its meaning
precisely in this "evocation-
Years later, in a 1977 interview,
the same gesture will
Prehistory
history of the Church.
is in fact-and
prehistory
enjoys such a
The history
of the moment
of arising or
J is of incomparable
value for the
define the relation between genealogy and the subject: one has to
emergence
account for the constitution
history of every living being and, more generally, of life."!'
of the subject within the weavings of
history to get rid of it once and for all: "It is necessary to get rid of the subject itself by getting rid of the constituting
subject, that is,
to arrrive at an analysis that would account for the constitution the subject in the historical
of
plot. This is what I would call gene-
alogy: to account for the constitution
of knowledge,
discourses,
involved in genealogy
up and eliminating
consists
in conjuring
the origin and the subject. But what comes
to take their place? It is indeed always a matter of following threads
back to something
discourses, stitution"
like the moment
the
when knowledge,
and spheres of objects are constituted.
Yet this "con-
takes place, so to speak, in the non-place of the origin.
Where then are" descent" (Herkurift) or "emergence"
For Overbeck, necessarily
splits itself into prehistory
and Geschichte), therefore history
this means that every historical
require
which are connected different
and history (UrBeschichte but not homogeneous,
methodologies
does not merely coincide
phenomenon
and precautions.
chronologically
and Pre-
with what is
most ancient:
spheres of objects, etc. without having to refer to a subject.l"? The operation
[EntstehunBsBeschichte
absolutely-more
and "the moment of arising"
(EntstelJUnB) located, if they are not and can never
be in the position of the origin?
The fundamental
character of prehistory is that it is the history
of the moment of arising [Entstehun8s8eschichte),
and not, as its
name might lead one to believe, that it is the most ancient [uralt). Indeed, it may even be the most recent, and the fact of being recent or ancient in no way constitutes a quality that belongs to it in an original way. Such a quality is as difficult to perceive in it as any relation to time that belongs to history in general. Instead, the relation to time that belongs to history is attributed to the subjectivity of the observer. Like history in general, prehistory is not tied to any specific site in time."
3
At first glance, the heterogeneous
The idea that all historical
inquiry
of a fringe or of a heterogeneous the position of a chronological
involves the identification stratum
that is not placed in
character
of prehistory
has
insofar as "history begins only where the
monuments
become intelligible
other,
testimonies
are available. Behind and on this side of it, there lies
the theo-
prehistory."
Nevertheless,
origin but is qualitatively
derives not from Nietzsche but from Franz Overbeck,
an objective foundation
and where trustworthy
written
the following passage clarifies beyond
logian who was perhaps the most faithful and lucid of Nietzsche's
all doubt that at issue is not an objective given, but rather a con-
friends.
stitutive heterogeneity
Overbeck
calls "prehistory"
sion with which every historical history-must
necessarily
engage.
Il t1
(UrBeschichte)
inquiry-
this dimen-
and not just Church
Thus he writes:
"It is only
inherent
each time must confront "prehistory,
in historical inquiry itself, which
a past of a, so to speak, special type:
too, has to do with the past, but with the past in a
K
I,
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
special sense," with respect to which "the veil that is suspended over every tradition
end the book lives by itself, and no longer its author in it. This is the
Litetatut, Overbeck
time of literary history, whose fundamental motif is the reflection
a cbiistlicbe Uiltterauu and an uichristliche Literatur;
distinguishes
and in a posthumous
on the author of books that are now the only things left alive ....
work he makes clear that "the past of an
Utlitetatut is not a simple past, but a qualified
At this stage, the book ... acts separately from its author, though
past or a past to
a process is thereby introduced that in the end will exhaust every efficacy. IS
[Mehr-als- VerBanBenheit] or
the second power-more-than-past
•
unity, though it dissolves in the course of its effectivity, until in the
darkens to the point of impenetrability."!'
In his essay, Uber die ArifanBe der patristiscben
ARCHAEOLOGY
superpast [UberverBanBenheit]: there is nothing or almost nothing of the past in it."16 History
and prehistory,
originally
unified,
irrevocably
sepa-
rate from each other at a certain point:
4Anyone who practices
historical
inquiry
must sooner
In the history of every organism, there comes the moment when the
engage the constitutive
limits dividing it from the world can no longer be shifted. In that
This can be done in the form of either the critique
instant, preh istor y or the history of the moment of arising [Entste-
or the critique
hunBsBeschichte]
Criticism
separates itself from history. Hence the similarity
heterogeneity
of sources,
concerns
or later
inherent in his or her work.
both of which demand
not just the ancient character
of tradition special care.
of the past but
between this moment and death and the ease with which every his-
above all the mode in which the past has been constructed
tory-understood
tradition. Overbeck, having long worked on the patristic sources, is perfectly aware of this:
in the common sense of the term-appears
history of decline [VeifollsBeschichte].
as a
It loosens once again the bond
among dements that prehistory has produced .... Therefore, if one has to distinguish, within the things that have a life and historical efficacy, between their prehistorical
and historical epochs; it is
prehistory that lays out the foundation of their historical efficacy.'? It is not only that prehistory
and history are distinct,
accompanied by a tradition, this does not mean ... that what is called tradition is always the same thing .... The writer of history must approach its exposition by means of a tireless preliminary work: this
albeit con-
is the critique of tradition. To the extent that historiography presupposes this critique and that criticism's claims to autonomy are justi-
that in history we are used
tion is established and it is right to ask if the tradjtion of prehistory
fied, then the necessity of retracing every period back to its tradi-
with this distinction. to considering
There is no history without tradition - but if every history is thus
is bound up
nected. The very historical efficacy of a phenomenon In fact, in prehistory,
into a
the elements
as separate
coincide
immediately
and manifest
themselves
only in their living unity. Take the case of a book. In
prehistory,
argues Overbeck,
it
should not be described before the tradition of every other period." The critique
of tradition
with a meta-historical
as well) deals not
but with the very structure
acts as a closed unity of itself and the author .... At this time, to take
historical
a book seriously means knowing of its author nothing else beyond
the pages of section 6 of BeinB and Time which Heidegger
the book. The historical efficacy of the book is grounded on such a
cates to the" destruction
H (,
inquiry.
(and of sources
beginning
of
It is along these lines that one should reread of tradition"
H
dedi-
and where it is possible to
THE
SIGNATURE
perceive echoes of Overbeck's
opposition
ALL
PHILOSOPHICAL
TH1NGS
thought.
The famous distinction
(Historie) and "historicality"
between "history" elaborated
OF
there is not metaphysical, between
(Geschichtlichkeit)
nor does it simply imply an
object and subject. The distinction
becomes
prehistory-requires as the moment
ARCHAEOLOGY
a further operation.
of the manuscript
tradition,
even though clearly it is not possible
to gain access to the source
without
intelligible as soon as it is referred to its context, namely, the dis-
analysis of that tradition.
tinction between tradition and source criticism. Heidegger writes:
it is possible to access the manuscript
what it "transmits" is made so inaccessible, proximally and for the most part, that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what has come down to us and delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial "sources" from which the categories and concepts handed down to us have been in part genuinely drawn. Indeed it makes us forget that they have had such an origin, and makes us suppose that the necessity of going back to these sources is something which we need not even understand." The "destruction tradition
of tradition"
must confront
in order to enable "the return
current
philological
tradition-is
of tradition
and the canon? Clearly the problem here
is not merely philological, cal precautions
because even the necessary
for such inquiry
are complicated
this freezing of
in a new way, beyond tradition, in question
the very historical
putting to gain
Provisionally,
tion bars access to the sources, which is especially true in regard
investigation
to the original
with the moment
of a phenomenon's
To be sure, there are also
then, is the epistemological
of inquiry itself.
in any historical
we may call "archaeology"
other ways in which access to the sources is barred or controlled. In modern culture,
tion without deconstructing
one of these occurs when knowledge transforming
the manuscript
tradition.
If philology
healthy critique of such tradition,
defines the very
namely, the study of
performs
a necessary
and
it cannot ipso facto give back to
conditions
objective and subjective never the emergence
graph, the access to the source character
HH
of a text-that
is, its
It cannot confront techniques,
tradi-
and prac-
access to sources, and in the final analysis determines
constitute
but to the auto-
arising and must therefore
the paradigms,
the very status of the knowing
the critical text that it produces its character as a source; it cannot is possible to go back not so far as the archetype
but
tices through which tradition regulates the forms of transmission,
on a threshold
it as a moment of arising. And in those cases where it
that practice which
has to do not with origins
engage anew the sources and tradition.
thereby
when dealing
to the sources without
the mechanism by which tradi-
criticism,
philologi-
subject who is supposed
sources. Overbeck calls "canonization"
textual
to when engaging in
with Urgeschichte and Entstehung. It is not possible to gain access
to the past" (Riickgong
access to the sources into a special tradition,
of that
the exception).
access to them. What is in question,
and regulates
having
to the Urge-
tradition
entails the capacity to renew knowledge
But what does the scholar seek to return a critique
is not true:
without
of arising (anyone familiar with
paradigm
literature."
tradition
whereas going back from the manuscript
schichte-which
a firsthand
practice knows that this, in fact, is the rule,
zur Vergongenheit), which coincides with renewed access to the
Christian
undertaking
The inverse, furthermore,
access to the source as moment When tradition thus becomes master, it does so in such a way that
The source, understood
of arising, does not coincide with the documents
the emergence
subject. The moment
of arising is
at the same time and is indeed situated
of undecidability
between
of the fact without
object and subject. It is at the same time being
of the knowing subject itself: the operation
origin is at the same time an operation
HI
on the subject.
on the
THE
SiGNATURE
OF
ALL
PHILOSOPHICAL
THINGS
6
5 An important
precaution
poses a unitary
must be taken whenever
(or in any case, more originary)
before a historical
one presup-
prehistoric
stage
split with which we are familiar. For example,
consider the division between the religious and the profane juridical spheres, each of whose distinctive well-defined,
characteristics
appear to be
at least to a certain extent. If a more archaic stage is
reached in one of these spheres, we are often led to hypothesize that there was a previous stage beyond it in which the sacred and the profane spheres were not yet distinct. whose work concerns "pre-law"
(pre-droit)
were indiscernible.
the most ancient
Hence Louis Gernet, Greek law, has called
an originary phase in which law and religion And Paolo Prodi, in his inquiry on the politi-
cal history of the oath, similarly evokes a "primordial
instinct"
in
which the process of separation between religion and politics had not yet begunY
In such cases, one must take care not merely to
project upon the presupposed
"primordial
instinct"
the charac-
In the 1973 introduction Georges
Dumezil
to the third volume of My the et epopee,
sought to define his own research
which he resolutely described as "historical," the structuralism
prevalent
I am not a structuralist;
I do not have the opportunity
vieille bistoire et de 10 Jran8e d 'ultra-histoire
the comparison of some of these primary data, going back to the secondary data that constitute their common prototypes." As Dumezil readily acknowledges, the comparative sometimes
grammar
theory'
of the most ancient traditions
is not necessarily Pre-law
the sum of the characteristics (conceding
division
defining its frag-
that such a hypothesis
could make
that at a certain
this method is derived from
of Indo-European
called 'Dumezil's
that cannot be reduced to the
what stands prior to the historical
one can reasonably
in spheres that are known to be genetically akin and then, through
think, following
has specific properties
1 that
attempt to reach; this is limited to the observation of primary data
bering
sum of its elements,
to be or not
historian of the oldest history and fringe of ultra-history [de 10 plus
of the split. Just as a chemical
compound
in a polemic against
to be one. My effort is that not of a philosopher but of a historian, a
teristics defining the religious and political spheres known to us, the outcome
methods,
at the time.
which are precisely
ments.
ARCHAEOLOGY
languages:
point Indo-Europeans
in the linguists'
"What is
consists entirely in remem-
footsteps,
existed
and to
that the comparison
of peoples who are at least in part
their heirs must allow us to catch a glimpse of the basic outlines of their ideology."24 The consistency
of the "fringe of ultra-history"
that the histo-
sense) cannot simply be a more archaic law, just as what stands
rian attempts to reach here is therefore intimately tied to the exis-
before religion as we historically
tence of the Indo-European
tive religion.
know it is n~t just a more primi-
Rather, one should avoid the very terms "religion"
and "law," and try instead every care in defining,
to imagine
practicing
a kind of archaeological
that suspends, at least provisionally, that we commonly prehistory
an x that we must take
the attribution
epoche
of predicates
ascribe to religion and law. In this sense, too,
is not homogeneous
with history and the moment
arising is not identical with what comes to be through it.
'I
C)
of
language and of the people who spoke
it. It exists in the same sense and in the same measure in which an Indo-European
form exists (for example,
that are usually preceded tinguished
'~deiwos or t.'med, forms
by an asterisk so that they can be dis-
from the words belonging to the historical languages).
However, rigorously speaking, each of these forms is nothing but an algorithm
that expresses a system of correspondences
between
existing forms in the historical languages, and, in Antoine Meillet's
'/
I
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
words, what we call Indo-European correspondences
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
is nothing but "a system of
... that presupposes a language x spoken by people
x at place x and at time x," where x merely stands for "unknown.":" Unless one wants to legitimze inquiry
extrapolate
of a historical
its original
documents
one can never
from the Indo-European
language
events supposed
to have taken place historically. made a significant
advance
the end of the nineteenth ognized
century,
mythology
when, around
that the ideology of the three functions
riors, shepherds, economy)
or, in modern
"did not necessarily
into an actual
tripartite
terminology, translate,
division
Indian model [of the three castes of an ideology, something a way of analyzing
of
1950, he rec-
(priests,
religion,
war-
war, and
in the life of a society,
of this society, based on the
1,"
but rather represented
more
like "an ideal and, at the same time,
and interpreting
the forces that determined
the course of the world and the life of men."26 that archae-
ology seeks to reach cannot be localized within chronology, remote past, nor can it be localized historical aternporal structure
beyond this within
system of a hominid).
words,
a present
historical
languages,
their development
a meta-
(for example, as Dumezil said iron-
ically, in the neuronal it represents
in a .
Like Indo-European
and operative
which conditions
tendency
within
and makes intelligible
in time. It is an arche, but, as for Foucault and
Nietzsche, it is an arcM that is not pushed diachronically past, but assures the synchronic
comprehensibility
into the
and coherence
of the system.
epistemological its objective
il
decisive-first
appearance
This dimension
having reference
that of its conditions
its positivity
of possibility.'?"
is "the envisaged
to its rational
value or
and thereby manifests
a history which is not that of its growing
perfection,
Foucault
but rather
specifies
that it
is not so much a history of ideas or of sciences as it is an inquiry that, by going back upstream tions, knowledge, knowledge
in the history of discursive
and practices
and theory
order knowledge
forma-
seeks to discover "on what basis
became
possible;
was constituted;
within
what space of
on the basis of what historical
a priori, and in the element of what positivity, ideas could appear, experience
be reflected
in philosophies,
rationalities be formed, only, perhaps, to dissolve and vanish soon afterwards."28 Let us pause on the oxymoron
"historical
the 1971 essay, it aims to underscore meta-historical determines
knowledge.
in The Archaeology cal practice,
As in of a
gift that founds and
As Foucault made clear three years later
if Knowledge,
the episteme
is itself a histori-
"a total set of relations that unite, at a given period,
the discursive
practices
ures, sciences,
and possibly formalized
Nietzsche
a priori."
that it is not a matter
origin, a kind of originary
that give rise to epistemological
the possibility
at a specific
terms,
fact" of its existing fact of its "moment
its prehistory).
'-1 I
fig-
The a priori
is its own history level of its
at a particular
way; or, to use the terminology
essay, the brute
in Overbeck's
systems,":"
of knowledge
level. This is the ontological
the "brute
time and in a certain
tions. It had made its discreet-though
and para-
a priori," where knowl-
of possibility.
forms, grounds
in
of that word," is
field, the episteme in which knowledge,
apart from all criteria
simple existence, is linked to Michel Foucault's investiga-
archaeology,
meaning
a sort of "historical
edge finds its condition
grasped
The term "archaeology"
There
as an inquiry into an at once transcendental
that conditions
7
Things.
to history in the "traditional
sciences be established,
The "oldest history," the" fringe of ultra-history,"
if
to The Order
digmatic dimension,
This is why Dumezi i's method
on the comparative
contrast presented
the monstrum
that produces
in the preface
ARCHAEOLOGY
from the
of arising"
(or,
Yet how can an a priori
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
be given and exist historically?
ALL
PHILOSOPHICAL
THINGS
And how is it possible
to gain
almost nothing
ARCHAEOLOGY
of the past"). In his essay on deja vu, Henri Berg-
son put forth the thesis that memory does not follow perception,
access to it? In all probability,
the idea of a "historical
a priori" originates
more from Marcel Mauss than from Kant's philosophical
archae-
if
but rather is contemporaneous the attention
with it, and can thus, as soon as
of consciousness
relaxes, produce a "false recogni-
ology. In his General Theory Magic (19°2-19°3), Mauss argues that mana is "the very condition of magical experimentation" and
tion" that he defines with the only apparently
"exists, a priori, before all other experience.
the past in its form and of the present in its matter."!' Moreover,
is not a magical representation
Properly speaking, it
in the same way as those represen-
tations of sympathy, demons, and magical properties. magical representations
and is a condition
It produces
of them. It functions
as
a kind of category, making magical ideas possible in the same way as we have categories a significant
which make human ideas possible." With
elaboration,
Mauss defines this historical
dental as "an unconscious suggesting
in this way that the epistemological
for such knowledge of conscious nevertheless ing historical historical
category of understanding,"
cannot
historical
it is
is itself inscribed
within a determinate
In other words, it realizes the paradox
condition
that can only constitute
that is inscribed itself a posteriori
history in which inquiry-in
within
a history
with respect
and
to this
or its moment
of arising,
did not question
the specific temporal
past in question here is, like Overbeck's "fringe of ultra-history,"
structure
that
a priori. Yet the
prehistory and Dumezil's
a special kind of past that neither pre-
cedes the present chronologically
as origin nor is simply exterior
to it (in this sense, in Overbeck's
words, it contains "nothing
q'l
phenomenon
and a history,
a history
of the sources
as they coincide for an instant in the moment Benjamin
in Overbeck's
footsteps,
(VOT- und Nacbpe-
that the entire
in a "historical
is the restitution
that in the
object are contained
and its "post-history"
into the present
Origen, apokatastasis
similar in mind
he wrote
of the historical
and a insofar
of arising.
must have had something
structure
split in
in it a before and an
that are in actuality contemporaneous,
brought
seems to be implied by the notion of a historical
of archaeology
after, a prehistory
both its "prehistory"
Foucault
every historical
sehiehte), or when he suggested
8
the archae-
historical tradition Walter
in
so to speak, toward the
from the viewpoint
with the fault line separating
monadological
discover it.
in question
seeks to reach is not only
such an a priori retreats,
It is as if, considered
accordance
be
with the real and the present. It is and remains
ologist pursuing present.
of possibility
in them as well. With a singular gesture,
when, following
Foucault's case, archaeology-must
to the actual and the image of memory
a priori that archaeology
implicitly with that
Such a memory, he writes, "is of
In the same sense, the condition the historical
contemporaneous
kuowledge.l? But as with Foucault,
experience,
corresponds
expres-
to the virtual, then the virtual will, for Bergson, necessarily contemporaneous with the real.
immanent
model required
homogeneous
if perception
transcen-
clear that for Mauss the a priori, though condition-
constellation.
of an a priori
be entirely
sion "a memory of the present."
paradoxical
past must be
apocatastasis.?"
(For
of the origin that will take
place at the end of time; by characterizing
an eschatological
real-
ity as "historical," Benjamin makes use of an image quite similar to Foucault's "historical a priori.")
or
'I !.
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
the psychoanalytic
9
Freudianism
Enzo Melandri
deserves
sophical relevance
credit for grasping
of Foucault's
early on the philo-
archaeology
and for seeking to
principle,
ARCHAEOLOGY
interpretation
is to have unmasked
Melandri notes that while usu-
analysis is to reduce apparent
of a culture are explicated
ally a revival of the old: substitute
expli-
cative power is attributed
(this is the model of the "origin"),
Foucault "archaeological
inquiry instead sets out to overturn
procedure
or better to make the explication
immanent
in its description.l'P
metalanguage
with the
of the phenomenon
This entails a sharp refutation
and instead assumes a "paradigmatic
lost archaic
object,
of
derivatives
conception
genius
of
under its rationaliza-
Here the function
of the
novelty by showing that it is actu-
but various names to designate features of the new."36 Melandri's
matrix, both
of the pleasure
its sublimations.
ally the basic codes and matrices
recourse to a code of a higher order to which a mysterious
"The
the archaic form of the human,
tions, its idealizations,
develop and clarify its structure.
by a
of culture: the strategy
satisfaction,
restoration
of the
from early fantasies-these
are
the restoration
of archaeology
as for Foucault, the point of departure
of the old in the
is entirely different. Just lies in Nietzsche-
ticular, the concept of a "critical history"
in par-
from the second essay
concrete and transcendental,
that has the function of giving form,
in Untimely Meditations, that is to say, a history that criticizes
and
rule, and norm to a content"
(this is the model of the "historical
destroys the past to make life possible.F Melandri
this
a priori").34 Melandri locating
seeks to analyze this immanent
it vis-a-vis the Freudian
opposition
matrix by
between
the con-
renders
concept more general by connecting it, through an extraordinary tour de force, to Freud's concept of regression:
scious and the unconscious. Paul Ricoeur subject"
had already spoken of an "archaeology
in regard
in Freud's thought.
to the primacy Freudian
process of consciousness
of the
of the past and the archaic
analysis shows that the secondary
is always delayed with respect to the pri-
mary process of desire and the unconscious.
The wish fulfillment
pursued by the dream is necessarily regressive insofar as it is modeled on the "indestructible
desire" of an infantile
place it takes. For this reason, which dreams
are the witness
is unable to completely
writes Ricoeur:
the indestructible."35
of
repression
is the
of a psychism condemned
to
and to being ever prey to the infantile,
Ricoeur argues that next to this archaeology
in the strict sense of the word, there is in Freud's metapsychological writings
a "generalized
archaeology"
I) II
history]
genealogy
must retrace
established
between
as well, which concerns
and Foucault,
understood
that has been
and the unconscious.
and
in tracking
in reaching
reveal its real meaning.
to the unconscious
of
Ricoeur
"archaeologi-
back to where the phenom-
splits into the conscious
Only if one succeeds
"repressed."
call this procedure
genealogy
Crit-
aimed at the recovery
as the historical
as just mentioned,
cal." It consists
While
the conscious
thus has the role of a therapy
the unconscious,
dynamic
The division
the actual
(historia rerum 8estarum)
historiography
has always existed between ical history
direction
(res 8estae) is quite similar to the one that, for Freud,
actual history
syndrome
in the opposite
of events that it examines.
enon in question
effect this replacement
form of repression;
ordinary rule or working condition making a late appearance
"Regression,
and the model, shows that man
and definitively
except in the inadequate
scene, whose
[Critical
and the unconscious.
that point does the pathological So it is a matter of a re8ression: not
as such, but to what made it unconscious-
in the
sense of repression."
the link between
already established
archaeology
and regression
was
in Ricoeur, Melandri radically inverts its sign
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
in this dense passage. The pessimistic is incapable of overcoming
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
vision of regression,
which 10
the original infantile scene, cedes its
place to an almost soteriological
vision of an archaeology
capable
The image of a procession
of going back, regressively,
to the source of the split between
is, of course,
conscious
But how are we to understand
familiar
and unconscious.
singular "archaeological the unconscious
regression,"
advances
conscious and uncon-
and history (and, more generally, between
all the binary oppositions
defining the logic of our culture),
It is not merely a question of bringing
which comes back in the form of a symptom,
In the ninth
thesis,
the future
a reculons.
Melandri's
is the inverse and complementary
the angel
of progress, "Dionysian"
image of Benjamin's
angel. If the latter advances toward the future with a gaze fixed
was
on the past, Melandri's
the repressed,
to consciousness,
citation.
who must have been
whose wings are caught in the storm toward
regression
in time that turns its back on the goal
found as well in Benjamin,
with Valery's
of history,
or the forgotten in the past so much as to go back
scious, historiography produced?
this
which does not seek to reach
to the point where the dichotomy between
ARCHAEOLOGY
ing at the future.
as
neither
angel regresses
Both proceed
into the past while look-
toward something
that they can
see nor know. The invisible goal of these two images of
the vulgate of the analytic model would have it. N or is it a matter
the historical process is the present. It appears at the point where
of writing the history of the excluded and defeated, which would
their gazes encounter
be completely
past and a past reached in the future for an instant coincide.
homogeneous
with the history of the victors,
as
the common and tedious paradigm of the history of the subaltern classes would have it. Melandri to be understood
precisely
opposite of rationalization.
makes clear that archaeology
as a regression
What is
and as such it is the
governed
ization. Rationalization and regression are inverse operations, just like the differential and the integral. ... To take up a very wellknown expression of Nietzsche's, which has nevertheless not yet been understood (and if what we are saying is true, then it is also never be possible to understand it
entirely), we may say at this point that archaeology requires a "Dio-
a
reculons .... To understand the past, we should equally traverse it 39
the split between
historiography
conscious
the
before the split is
such a "before"
indeed
in the split, presupposing
prior to it that at a certain
itself. In this case, this is expressed
in
It should by now be obvi-
by the split itself. To imagine condition
reaches
and unconscious,
the moment
involves, following the logic inherent an original
regression
in the
and history that defines the condition
ous that our way of representing
more, the regressive operation is the exact reciprocal of rational-
a reculons.
when archaeological
which we find ourselves is produced?
For archaeology, the concept of regression is essential. Further-
nysian" regression. As Valery observes, nous entrans dans ]'avenir
where
between
He writes:
true that it will unfortunately
point
happens
each other, when a future reached
by the tendency
point divided to represent
the before or the beyond of the dichotomy
as a state of happiness,
a kind of golden age devoid of repressions
and perfectly conscious
of and master of itself. Or, as in Freud and Ricoeur, as the in finite repetition
of the infantile scene, the indestructible
of the phantasm
of desire. On the contrary,
split, in the disappearance sentation,
of the categories
manifestation
before or beyond the governing
its repre-
there is nothing but the sudden, dazzling disclosure
the moment of arising, the revelation
of
of the present as something
that we were not able to live or think.
'I
Ii
'1'1
~
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
ARCHAEOLOGY
event is preserved and at the same time repressed the etymology that unites tradere and tradire).
I I
The idea that the present stitutive
inaccessibility
trauma and repression. experience cerning either
- a train
sexuality), because
some reason
might be given in the form of a con-
is bound up with Freud's conception According
to this conception,
crash, an infantile
scene (generally
a drive - is repressed
of its traumatic unacceptable
of
an actual con-
character
or because
for consciousness.
it is for
It thus enters
never taken place. Yet during this stage neurotic to the return
child has experienced reached
symptoms
begin to appear in the subject, bearing of the repressed.
Thus Freud writes:
a
and not understood
witness a
by the time he has
At any time in later years, however,
events] may break
In her book Unclaimed Experience, Cathy Caruth suggests that latency is somehow constitutive
into his life with obsessive
except [those
impulsiveness,
The historical power of the trauma is not just that the experience is For history to be a history of trauma means that it is referential precisely to the extent that it is not fully perceived as it occurs; or to put it somewhat differently, that a history can be grasped only in the very inaccessibility of its occur rence.V Let us try to elaborate unexplained,
by a preference
that so
with reference
these ideas, which the author leaves to archaeology. They imply above all
as in Bergson, but also forgetfulness,
often cannot be rationally
defended.?" Only analysis is able to
contemporaneous
with perception
go beyond
and compulsive
ceive something,
we simultaneously
repressed
actions, back to the
events. of the law by Moses was followed
by a long period in which the Mosaic religion entered a stage of
its traumatic perienced
character
and forget it. Every
or its excessive proximity
in every experience
Heidegger's
ism with which we are familiar. Freud institutes
destines itself to a tradition
parallelism between as 'unconscious"
remember
the "special state of memory that ... we class
and historical tradition.
Thus he writes: "In this
Indeed, it is,
at the limit, what remains non-lived in every life, that which, for
latency, only to appear later in the form of the Judaic monothein light of this a
are
and the present. While we per-
present thus contains a part of non-lived experience.
In Moses and Monotheism, Freud applies this scheme to the history of the Jews. The imposition
and
repeated after its forgetting, but that it is first experienced at all. ...
that not only memory,
the symptoms
and that
precisely
consist not in the forgetting of a reality that can hence never be
direct his actions, force him to like or dislike people, and often of his love-object
experience
and experienced
The experience of trauma, the fact of latency, would thus seem to
decide
the choice
of historical
the traumatic event is preserved only through its forgetting:
fully known, but in an inherent latency within the experience itself.
or
"What
the age of two he may never again remember,
in his dreams ....
to
into the unconscious
stage of latency during which it seems as if it had, so to speak, oneiric content
(according
remains unex-
(or, if you wish, in the terms of
history of being, it is what in the form of forgetting and to a history). This means that it is
above all the unexperienced,
rather than just the experienced,
gives shape and consistency
to the fabric of psychic personality
that
feature we expect to find an analogy with the state of mind that
and historical
and ensures their continuity
and consis-
we ascribe to tradition
tency. And it does so in the form of the phantasms,
desires, and
when it is active in the mental emotional
life of a people.':" In other words, with respect tradition
functions
to its traditum,
as a period of latency in which the traumatic
1011
tradition
obsessive drives that ceaselessly push at the threshold of consciousness (whether
individual or collective).
, II I
To paraphrase
a saying of
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
PHILOSOPHICAL
THINGS
Nietzsche's, one might say that whoever (an individual or a people) has not experienced
something
always has the same experience.
ARCHAEOLOGY
seek, as in Freud, to restore a previous stage, but to decompose, displace, content
and ultimately
bypass it in order to go back not to its
but to the modalities,
circumstances,
which the split, by means of repression, 12
Thus it is the exact reciprocal
The analogy between archaeological
regression
and psychoanaly-
sis now seems clearer. In both cases, it is a question access to a past that has not been lived through, that technically has remained
cannot be defined present.
of gaining
and therefore
as "past," but that somehow
In the Freudian
scheme, such a non-past
bears witness to its having been by means of neurotic which are used in analysis as an Ariadne's
thread to go back to
that has been covered over and repressed possible by the patient work that rather origin, focuses on the moment
by tradition
is made
than searching
for the
of arising. Yet how is it possible
to gain access, once again, to a non-lived
experience,
to return
to an event that somehow for the subject has not yet truly been given? Archaeological
regression,
of the dividing line between
going back to the hither
and non-lived
experience
and forgetting,
both communicate
from each other. It is not, however, a matter of realizing,
it as origin.
face of the eternal return:
it does
transforming contrary,
the "so it was" into "so I willed it to be." On the
it wills to let it go, to free itself from it, in order to gain
access beyond or on this side of the past to what has never been, to what was never willed. Only at this point is the unlived past revealed for what it was: contemporary
with the present. It thus becomes accessible for the
first time, exhibiting itself as a "source." For this reason, contemporaneity,
co-presence
the experience
to one's own present, insofar as it entails
of an un lived and the memory
rare and difficult; for this reason, archaeology, side of memory and forgetting, to the present.
constitutes
of a forgetting,
is
going back to this
the only path of access
side
the conscious and the unconscious,
also reaches the fault line where memory
constituted
in
not will to repeat the past in order to consent to what has been,
symptoms,
the originary event. In genealogical inquiry, the access to the past
and moments
lived
with and separate
13 The text where Foucault perhaps most precisely foresaw - the strategies
as in the dream, the
essay he published,
and gestures
described - or
of archaeology
is the first
the long 1954 preface to Le Reve et l'existetice
by Ludwig Binswanger.
Even though the term itself is obviously
simistic vision of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, of infinitely repeat-
absent, "the movement
of freedom"
ing an original trauma. Nor, as in a successful analytical therapy,
the dream
of bringing
archaeology.
"indestructible
repressed
back to consciousness in the unconscious.
of conjuring inquiry,
desire" of an infantile
up its phantasm,
scene, nor, as in the pes-
all the content that had been
On the contrary, through
meticulous
in order to work on it, deconstruct
the point where it gradually In other words, archaeological
it is a matter genealogical
it, and detail it to
erodes, losing its originary regression
I II
status.
is elusive: it does not
and imagination
that Foucault
shares the meanings
From the beginning,
dream as vicarious fulfillment
attributes
to
and aims of
he refutes Freud's thesis of the
of an original wish. If the dream is
dream, rather than satisfied desire, this is because it "also fulfills counter-desires is the burning
that are opposed to desire itself. The oneiric fire satisfaction
of sexual desire, though
what makes
it possible for desire to take shape in the subtle substance
I
I)
\
of fire
THE
is everything extinguish language
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
PHILOSOPHICAL
THINGS
that denies such desire and incessantly
it." Hence, the insufficiency of the dream is reduced
seeks to
of Freudian analysis: the
solely to its "semantic
tion," leaving aside its "morphological
and syntactical
that is to say, the fact that it articulates is entirely omitted,
"psychoanalysis
dimenhas never
succeeded in making images speak.''" The movement restoration
scene or trauma
because it goes well
beyond them in order to reach back to the "first movements freedom,"
until it coincides
of
with the "trajectory
of existence
itself." For the subject, to follow such a trajectory
in the dream
means to put itself radically in question,
the transition
"existence
the phantasm movement
above all taking the risk
so in the dream "there
from anthropology
itself ... in the fundamental represents
of regression,
to ontology,"
direction
foundation.Y"
goal orienting
the dream and the imagination
Indeed, a phantasm
where
of the imaginary
And while for Freud
the indestructible
ally call into question every crystallization image or phantasm.
of the dream can never exhaust itself in the
of an original
occurs
of arising and pure being-there,
indicates its own ontological
structure,"
itself in images. For this
reason, insofar as the analysis of the properly imaginary sion of expression
func-
moment
ARCHAEOLOGY
continu-
of their impetus in an is generated
"when the
subject finds the free movement
of its existence annihilated
presence
that surrounds
of a quasi-perception
it."? On the contrary,
and 'poetic
in the
and immobilizes
"the value of a poetic imagination
sured by the power of destruction "all imagination,
the
is mea-
internal
to the image."48 Thus
in order to be authentic,
must learn to dream;
art' has meaning
only insofar as it teaches itself to
break the spell of images in order to open to the imagination
of its own" derealization." To imagine Pierre after one year of absence does not mean announcing him in the mode of unreality .... It means first of all that I derealize myself, absenting myself from this world where for me it is not possible to encounter Pierre. This does not mean that I "escape to another world," or that J walk along the possible margins of the real world. I ascend to the streets of the world of my presence;
free path toward the dream, which offers, as absolute 'indestructible
kernel of night'."
and phantasms
toward which the movement
directed
This dimension
is not the obsessive repetition
scene, but the initial moment constitution
truth,
the its
beyond images
of the imagination
is
of a trauma or of a primal
of existence
when "the originary
of the world is accomplished.l'""
and then the lines of th is necessity from which Pierre is excluded become blurred, and my presence, as presence to this world, is erased.:"
Far from restoring
14 Let us elaborate
a previous
archaic stage, a phantasm,
a family history, the dream begins by destroying
or
and shattering
philosophical
the specific
archaeology.
a past but a moment
temporal
be obtained
over and neutralized
jective and objective
point where the split occurred
by returning
back to the point wh-ere it was covered
by tradition
world on the daybreak of its first explosion, when it still coincided
unconscious,
with its own existence."45 Just as archaeology
ing, the arche of archaeology
is defined precisely by grasping phenomena
I II
II
in the 1969 book at the level of their
in a
What is at stake in it is not properly
tion. If it goes back in time, it is in order to leap over the subto it toward "the
implicit
of arising; however, access to such can only
every real world while dragging itself as well into such destrucuniverses corresponding
structure
historiography
(in Melandri's
between
and history).
terms,
to the
the conscious
and the
The moment
of aris-
is what will take place, what will
become accessible and present, only when archaeological
I (I I,
inquiry
THE
has completed
SIGNATURE
its operation.
OF
ALL
THINGS
It therefore
PHILOSOPHICAL
has the form of a past in
the future, that is, afuture anterior. Here it is not merely a matter, appeal for the alternative
the tight-knit
as has been suggested,
developments
of "an
Archaeology
that forbids us to conceive of his-
atheological,"
into unrealized.
because memory
the unrealized 51 If memory
somehow
into realized and
thus constitutes
the
moves backward
as the imagination represent
through the course of history, just
moves back through individual biography. Both
a regressive force that, unlike traumatic
not retreat toward an indestructible point .where history
less confirms
accessible for the first time, in accordance
it (and yet somehow archaeology
is what incessantly
guards its presence).
Instead, the point of
is to gain access to the present
beyond memory and forgetting
removes
for the first time,
or, rather, at the threshold
of their
indifference.
(whether
of the future anterior. In this way, the relation becomes transparent.
individual
between
It corresponds
or collective)
past is projected
into the future.
to Le Rive
In the introduction
theology, too) at once distinguishes
archaeology
or praxis in God: the work of redemption
the dream is not so much that it resuscitates
the former correspond
to this doctrine, the prophets,
and that of creation. To
who serve as mediators
order to affirm the work of salvation; to the latter correspond angels, who mediate the work of creation.
or she] does not yet know, which is nevertheless
precedes
in rank that of creation,
prophets
over the angels. (In Christian
den of [his or her] present .... The dream anticipates of freedom. compelled
It constitutes repetition
a harbinger
of the traumatic
the moment
united in God, are assigned to two distinct
Trinity: the Father and the Son, the all-powerful
we must specify that the future at issue in archaeology intertwined
with a past; it is a future anterior.
becomes
It is the past that
will have been when the archaeologist's gesture (or the power of has cleared away the ghosts of the unconscious and
the imaginary)
I II
Ii
Redeemer,
persons within
the
Creator and the
aspect
of this conception
is that redemption
creation in rank, that the event that seems to follow is
in truth anterior. rather
of the
in whom God emptied himself of his force.)
The decisive precedes
the
theology, the two works,
past."52
of freedom that frees itself,"
in
The work of salvation
hence the superiority
of history, before being the
Leaving aside the accent placed here, perhaps too ingenuously, on the future as the "first moment
and cre-
there are two kinds of work
which the patient will finally reveal to the analyst the secret [he the heaviest bur-
and Jewish
and joins redemption
angels. According
the moment in
and history
(am!') and "creation" (khalq), prophets and
ation, the "imperative"
tension of the dream toward the future: "The essential point of the future. It foretells and announces
becomes
to the relation that in Islamic
et l'existence, Foucault observes (contrary to Freud) the intimate the past as that it
does
with the temporality
theology (and, though in a different way, in Christian
Precisely for this reason, the space opening up here toward the
announces
neurosis,
origin but rather toward the
force that gives possibility back to what has been (and nevertheit as past), forgetting
con-
sciousness truly become possible.
brance we have an experience
the realized
which block access to history.
that had been condemned
15
modifies the past, transforming
fabric of tradition
Only in the form of this "will have been" can historical
in the first trial" nor of conjecturing possible alternatives to the actual state of things.50 Benjamin once wrote that "in rememtory as fundamentally
ARCHAEOLOGY
It is not a remedy for the fall of creatures,
that which makes creation
gives it its meaning.
comprehensible,
For this reason,
I () "
but
that which
in Islam, the light of the
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
Prophet is the first of all beings (just as in the Jewish tradition
the
been put forth by Hermann
ARCHAEOLOGY
Usener at the end of the nineteenth
name of the Messiah was created before the creation of the world,
century in his work Gotternamen
and in Christianity
tigation,
the Son, though
Father, is consubstantial
he was generated
by the
and coeval with Him). It is instructive
(1896). At the outset of his inves-
he asked himself how the creation of divine names had
been possible, and observed
that in order to attempt
to find an
that in Islam and Judaism the work of salvation, while preceding
answer to such a question - one that is absolutely fundamental
in rank the work of creation, is entrusted
the history ofreligions
to a creature.
This con-
- we have no other "evidence"
(Urkunde)
firms the paradox, which should by now be familiar to us, that the
than that originating
two works are not simply separate but rather persist in a single
even before him, though with much less rigor, comparative
place, where the work of salvation acts as a kind of a priori that is
mar had inspired the investigations
immanent
Muller to Adalbert
in the work of creation and makes it possible.
To go backward
through
the course of history, as the archae-
attempted
from an analysis of language.
However,
53
gram-
of scholars ranging from Max
Kuhn and Emile Burnouf,
to provide a foundation
for
all of whom had
for comparative
mythology and
ologist does, amounts to going back through the work of creation
the science of religions in the last thirty years of the nineteenth
in order to give it back to the salvation from which it originates.
century.
Similarly, Benjamin made redemption
reconstruct
a fully historical
category,
one opposed in every sense to the apologia of bad historians. not only is archaeology but the gesture
institutions"
a priori of historiography,
of purely linguistic
data, was reaching
constitutes
cation of Benveniste's
the paradigm
project
author's-or
toward a formalized
that determines
his or her rank,
but the way in which he or she has been able to bring it back to the work of redemption,
to mark it with the signature of salvation
and to render it intelligible.
Only for those who will have known
in its effort
started
themselves
Indo-European
the analysis
its apex (with the publiLanguage
to decline in conjunction
a la Chomsky,
model
through
and Society),
with linguistics'
turn
horizon made such an endeavor inadmissible. This is not the place to ask about the function in how the arclle that is in question in archaeology stood.
If it is indeed
true that inquiry
advance when it abandoned,
16
the
whose epistemological and future of
the human sciences today. Instead, we are interested
how to save it, will creation be possible.
to
not only the "divine names" but the general outline
of every true human action. For it is not merely the work of an of anyone's-life
grammar,
of "Indo-European
the immanent
of the archaeologist
And
But just when comparative
once again
is to be under-
had made a Significant
in the fields of linguistics
and the
history of cultures, the anchorage in a language that was supposed Before entering sciences
a stage of decline,
saw, during
decisive acceleration,
the history
of the human
the first half of the twentieth with linguistics
and comparative
century,
to be real and in the people who spoke it ("the academic Indoa
grammar
assuming the roles of "pilot science" in the field. The idea that it might be possible, through a purely linguistic to more archaic stages (or ultra-historical take up Dumez ils expression)
of the history
I II
H
analysis, to return
stages, to once again of humanity
had
European language spoken, so one thought, 'at the moment of the dispersiori'"!"), important
and if scholars had understood
to reconstruct
explain comparatively
an unverifiable
the known languages,
not possible within that perspective links to the ontological
that it was not as
prototype
as it was to
nonetheless
to completely
support implicit in the hypothesis.
I Ii Ij
it was
cut off all the Thus,
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
PHILOSOPHICAL
when in 1969 Benveniste published his masterpiece, means clear how the epistemological tency of something understood.
it was by no
locus and historical
like an "Indo- European institution"
And it is quite probable
consiswas to be
that Benveniste
would not
comparative
grammar
an originary historical
ARCHAEOLOGY
grounded
in it) is
event and for generative grammar
(and for the disciplines
(and for
the cognitive disciplines associated with it) is the neuronal system and genetic code of Homo sapiens. The current
predominance
have been able to suggest a solution in this regard, even if he had
the human sciences of models originating
not been struck by a type of total and incurable aphasia.
ences bears witness to this shift of epistemological
From the perspective
of the philosophical
posed here, the question be completely regresses
regarding
The arche toward
revised.
is not to be understood
in a chronology
ontological
words expressing
a system of connections
accessible languages,
history,
pro-
the human sciences will be capable of reaching their decisive epis-
must
temological
which archaeology
threshold
only after they have rethought,
bottom up, the very idea of an ontological anchoring, envisaged being as a field of essentially historical
instead,
like the Indo- European between
historically
or the child of psychoanalysis
exerting
an
active force within the psychic life of the adult, or the big bang, which is supposed to have given rise to the universe continues
to send toward
us its fossil radiation.
big bang, which astrophysicists in terms of million anthropogenesis
Yet unlike
anthropogenesis,
the
of years), the arche is not a given or a sub-
and history, between
between
but which
claim to be able to date (albeit
stance, but a field of bipolar historical currents stretched becoming,
an archi-past
between
the moment of arising and
and the present.
And as 'With
which is supposed to have taken place but which
cannot be hypostatized is able to guarantee
in a chronological
the intelligibility
event - the arche alone
of historical
phenomena,
"saving" them archaeologically
in a future anterior in the under-
standing not of an unverifiable talizable history.
origin but of its finite and unto-
At this point, it is also possible to understand
what is at stake in
the paradigm shift in the human sciences from comparative mar (an essentially (ultimately, the problem
historical
discipline)
a biological discipline). of the ultimate
I I II
to generative
gram-
grammar
In both cases, there remains
ontological
Yet
anchoring
(even with as large a frame as prehistory); force within
paradigm.
archaeology
in any way as a given locatable
it is an operative
in
from the cognitive sci-
anchoring,
which for
I I I
from the and thereby
tensions.
Notes
CHAPTER Michel
1.
erine
ONE:
Porter
Dreyfus
and Hermeneutics.
if
Truth, trans. Lysa I-Iochroth
Semiotexte,
and Cath-
2007), pp. 60-6l.
and Paul Rabinow,
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism
With an Afterword by and Interview with Michel Foucault (Chi-
cago: University 3· Michel
IS A PARADIGM?
The Politics
Foucault,
(Los Angeles:
Hubert
2.
WHAT
of Chicago
Press,
'983), p. 199.
The Order oj' Things (New York: Vintage
Foucault,
Books,
1973),
pp. 239-40. 4· Michel Georges
Foucault,
Canguilhem,
Books, 1991),
s· Thomas sity of Chicago
P:
to The Norma} and the Pathological,
introduction trans.
Caroline
R. Fawcett
(1978; New
by
York: Zone
16.
The Structure ifScient!fic
S. Kuhn, Press,
Revolutions (Chicago:
Univer-
'970), P: 182.
6. lbid., p. 46.
7· lbid., p. 187. 8. Michel (Paris:
Foucault,
GaJlimard,
9· Michel
Dits et ecrits, ed. Daniel
Defer
and Fra ncois
Ewald
1994), vol. 2, P: 240.
Foucault,
"Truth
1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion,
and Power," in Power: Essential Works of Foucault trans. Robert
Hurley
(New York: New Press,
2000), vol. 3, P: 114. 10.
lbid., Pl': 114-15.
11. Michel Smith
Foucault,
The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans.
(New York: Pantheon
Books,
1972), P: 181.
12. lbid., pp. ,86-87.
1 1
3
A. M. Sheridan
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
NOTES
13. lbid., p. 191.
CHAPTER
14. lbid., p. 192. 15. Michel Foucault, Sheridan
Discipline and Punish: the Birth
(New York: Vintage
rf the Prison, trans.
Alan
Books, 1995), P: 200.
1991),
P·236.
OF SIGNATURES
the Signature 1,
of Natural
ed. Arthur
Edward
Things," Waite
in The Her-
(London:
James
1894).
Von den noturlicben
2. Paracelsus,
17. Daniel S. Milo, Trahir le temps: Histoire (Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
THEORY
"Concerning
metic and Alchemical Writin8s: Vol. Elliott,
16. lbid., pp. 205, 220, 221.
Johannes
in Biicher und Schriften,
Ditiqen,
(1859; Hildesheim-New
Huser
York: Georg
ed.
Olms, 1972), vol. 3.7,
p. 131.
Prior Analytics 69aI3-15.
18. Aristotle, 19· Immanuel (Cambridge,
Kant,
Critique
UK: Cambridge
rf the
University
rf [udqment,
Press, 2000),
trans.
Paul Guyer
p. 121.
4· Paracelsus,
Von den naturlichen
5. Paracelsus,
"Concerning
Vrin, 1985), p. 53.
iu«, p.
10.
Le paradi8me dans la dialectique platonicietuie,
24. Goldschmidt,
p. 84.
25. Plato, ReplIblic 6.509d-511e.
Ibid.
11. lbid., p. 189.
Princeton
Selected Writin8s, trans. Norbert
University
13. Paracelsus,
28. Ibid., 7.533c6.
14. lbid., vol. 2.4, p. 316.
Bein8 and Time, trans. John Macquarrie
Heidegger,
(New York: Harper
and Row, 2008),
and Edward
p. 195.
(Princeton,
NJ:
Biiclier und Schriften, vol. 1.2, p. 234.
15. lbid., vol. 1.2, p. 110. 16. Paracelsus,
30. Ibid.
Guterman
Press, 1988), pp. 122-23.
27. lbid., 6·51Ob9.
"Concerning
the Signature
of Natural
Things,"
p. 172.
17. Ibid.
31. Johann
Wolfgang
in Gedenkauspabe
32. Johann
Natunvissenschciftliche
von Goethe,
Schr!ften, vol. 2,
der Werke, Briefe, und Gesprdclie, cd , Ernst Beutler
1949-52),
(Zurich:
vol. 17, p. 691.
Wolfgang
von Goethe,
Naturwissenschoitliche
Schriften, vol. 1, in
ibid., vol. 16, pp. 851-52. 33· lbid.,
p. 171.
174.
12. Paracelsus,
26. lbid., 6.511b2-CI.
Artemis,
Things,"
9. ibid., p. 188.
23. Plato, The Statesman 278b-c.
Robinson
of Natural
7. Ibid. 8.
lbid., P: 77.
29. Martin
Diiiqen, in ibid., vol. 3·7, P: 133.
the Signature
6. lbid., p. 173.
Le paradi8me dans la dialeciioue platonicienne (Paris:
21. Victor Goldschmidt,
Liber de podaqricis, in ibid., vol. 2·4, P: 259.
3. Paracelsus,
Power
20. Plato, The Statesman 2]8c.
22.
TWO:
1. Paracelsus,
P:
34. Goethe,
852·
ibid. Ibid.
21.
Ibid.
(Whitefish,
Schr!fteIl, vol. 2, in ibid., P: 706.
Noturwissensclioltlicbe
Wolfgang
19. 20.
22. Jakob Bohme,
35. lbid., vol. 1, P: 871. 36. Johann
18. Ibid.
Works q}jacob Behmen: The Teutonic Philosopher:
MT: Kessinger,
23· Bohrne,
2003), p. 9.'
Works rfjacob Behmen, P: 9.
24. lbid., p. 10 von Goethe,
2, P: 693.
Maximen und Reflexionen,
in ibid., vol.
25. Ibid. 26. lbid.,
I I
P: 59.
1 1
Vol. 4
THE
SIGNATURE
OF
ALL
THINGS
NOTES
5l. Ibid.
27. lbid., p. 239·
The City rifGod against the Pagans, ed. and trans. R. W. Dyson
28. Augustine, (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge
P:
29· lbid.,
Press, 2007), P: 397.
University
30. Hugh of St. Victor, De sacrametitis cbrisuonae
32. Thomas
Blackfriars,
Summa sententiarum,
Aquinas,
Iidei, PL, 176,
P:
35a.
(London:
PL, 176, p. 117b.
Summa theolopiae, trans.
David
Bourke
(London:
Institute,
57. lbid.,
Contra epistolam Parmeniani, PL, 43, p. 7
P:
in A Select Library
D. Hartranft,
rif the Nicene and Post-Nicetie Fathers rif Literature
60. lbid., p. 29.
ibid., P: 30.
62. Enzo
Summa theologiae, P: 83·
Melandri,
"Michel
umane,' Lingua e stile 2.1 (1967),
38. Ibid.
63. lbid., p. 148.
39· Ibid., p. 79·
64. Emile
40. Ibid.
Foucault:
P:
L'epistemologia
delle
scienze
147.
Problemes de linguistique generale (Paris: Gallimard,
Benveniste,
1974), vol. 2, p. 64.
65. Ibid., pp. 65-66.
Ibid., P: 83·
42. lbid., pp. 83-85.
44. lamblichus, P. Hershbell
CT: Yale University
De mJsteriis, trans. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and (Atlanta:
Society
of Biblical Literature,
45. Iamblichus de mysteriis AegJptiorum,
2003), p. 115·
Cbaldoeorum, AssJriorum; Proclus ...
Press,
1979), pp. 3-4.
Problemes de linguistique 8eneraIe, p. 65.
67. Benveniste,
The Archaeolo8J rif Knowledge, trans.
68. Foucault,
de sacr!ficio et magia ... MarsiJjo Ficinoj1orentino interprete (Venice: Aldi, 1516), P: 7.
(New York: Pantheon
Books,
1970),
P:
Le pape et les sorciers: Une consultation de Jean XXII sur
la magie en 1320 (manuscript
B.A.V. Borghese
348) (Rome:
Ecole Francaise
de
A. M. Sheridan
Smith
84.
69. lbid., p. 88. 70. lbid., p. 86.
46. lbid., p. 35. 47. Alain Boureau,
Words upon Words, trans. Olivia Emmet (New Haven,
66. Jean Starobinski,
43. Ibid., P: 87·
71.
•
lbid., pp. 86-87.
72. lbid., p. 111.
nlbid.
p. ix.
48. lbid., p. '5.
74. lbid., p. 117·
4.9. lbid., p.
75. Edward
)0.
The Order rifThings (New York: Vintage Books, 1966),
59. lbid., pp. 28-29.
61.
1887), p. 475.
37. Aquinas,
Rome, 2004),
1986), pp. 33 and 51.
p.26. On Baptism, Against the Donatists, 5.24, trans. J. R. King, rev.
the Christian Church, Vol. 4, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo, NY: Christian
Jackson
of London,
Ill.
58. Michel Foucault,
"
36. Augustine,
4l.
University
56. lbid., P: 8.
35. Ibid.
Company,
Warburg
David Britt (Los
The Latin Version rif the CaJat al-hakim
ed., Picatrix:
Pingree,
trans.
1999), P: 569.
Institute,
55· lbid., pp. 8-9·
33· lbid., p. 127.
Chester
Research
54· lbid., p. 51.
1975), vol. 56, p. 55.
34. Augustine,
Getty
53· David
399·
3l. Anonymous,
The Renewal rif Pagan Antiquity,
52. Aby Warburg, Angeles:
2;1'
Ibid., p. 18.
Arrowsmith,
I I
j,
Herbert,
De veritate, trans. Meyrick
1937), p. 191.
I I
H. Carre
(Bristol:
J. W.
THE
76. Moshe
Hayyim
SIGNATURE
77. Carlo Ginzburg,
ALL
NOTES
THINGS
Le phitosophe et le caba!iste: Exposition
Luzzatto,
debat, ed. Joelle Hansel (Lagrasse:
Anne C. Tedeschi
OF
Verdier,
d'un
1991), pp. 86-87.
Johns Hopkins
University
Press,
1989), P: 106.
(Cambridge, 2.
UK: Cambridge
3· lbid.,
4. Ibid., P: 419.
rf the
Freud,
Moses
Hogarth
82. Walter
Press,
rf Sigmund
P:
Edi-
Freud, trans. James Strachey
1953), vol. 13, P: 222.
Benjamin,
"On the Mimetic
in Selected WritinBs: Vol-
(Cambridge,
MA: Belknap
Press,
Kant, Logic, trans.
(New York: Dover, 1974), 6. Immanuel
8. Michel
Foucault,
10.
85. Ibid.
11.
the Concept
of History,"
in Selected
(Cambridge,
MA: Belknap
86. Walter
Benjamin,
"On
WritinBs: Press,
87. Walter
The Arcades Project, trans. Howard
Benjamin,
(Cambridge,
88. Benjamin,
MA: Belknap
"On the Concept
(Coral
Gables, FL: University
90. Pierre Lettres, 91.
1948),
Noailles,
P:
jlIS:
LanBuage and Society, trans. Elizabeth Press, 1973), P: 336.
of Miami
93. Claude
Etudes de droit romain (Paris:
Les Belles
94. Jacques
Derrida,
versity of Chicago 95· Foucault,
Press,
to the Work
Mauss, trans.
1987), P: 64.
MarBins rfPhilosophy,
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
1972), p. 65.
Archoeolosy
rf Marcel
I I
H
p. 20.,.
in Aesthetics,
Method,
1998), P: 370.
(New York: New Press,
and Prancois
Ewald
Kirchenlexicon
Materialen:
Werke unci Nachlass (Stuttgart:
und Kuluir, ed.
Cbristenuun
1996), P: 53.
Metzler,
lbid., p. 53·
18.Ibid., p. 54. lbid., p. 52. Heidegger,
21. Overbeck,
costiuiziona]e
Perennial,
Kirchenlexicon,
22. Paolo Prodi, Uni-
Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie
(New York: Harper
and Edward
1962), p. 4-3.
p. 56.
J1 sacramento del potere: J1 giuramento
dell'Occidente
23· Georges
rf Knowledse,
Hurley
History,"
16. lbid., p. 55.
Robinson
Introduction
Schriften,
1994), vol. 3, P: 147.
von Reibnitz,
20. Martin
Metaphysics 1004a.16.
Routledge,
Genealogy,
Foucau It, Dits et ecrits, ed. Dan iel Defer
Gallimard,
Barbara
19·
Levi-Straus,
P: 7.
lbid., p. 371.
12. Michel (Paris:
17·
57.
Baker (London:
in Gesammeite
1973), vol. 29,
IS. Ibid., P: 5J.
390-91.
lbid., P: 59.
92. Aristotle,
Felicity
Fas et
Pl':
Schwarz
14· lbid., p. 57.
Press, 1982), pp. 462-63.
of History,"
Indo-European
89. Emile Benveniste,
Eiland and Kevin
and Wolfgang
Ibtd., pp. 372, 373.
13. Franz Overbeck,
2003), p. 390.
S. Hartman
Enzyklopadie,
De Gruyter,
"Nietzche,
84. Ibid.
Volume 4, 1938-1940, trans. Edmund [ephcott
Robert
29.
and Epistemolooy, trans. Robert
722.
Press, 2002), pp. 417 and 419.
7. Ibid.
9· lbid., pp. 373, 376.
Palmer
P:
Philosophische
Kant, (Berlin:
83. Ibid.
McLaughlin
University
Gary Hatfield
417.
Akadeinie-Auscabe
Faculty,"
ume 2, 1927-1934, trans. Rodney Livingstone 1999),
in The Standard
of Michelangelo,"
Complete Psyclioloqical Works
(London:
p.
5. Immanuel "The
ARCHAEOLOGY
Philosophy cifter 1781, trans.
lbid., p. 419.
79. Ibid. 80. lbid., pp. 97-98.
PHILOSOPHICAL
Theoretical
Kant,
78. Ibid., P: 101.
81. Sigmund
tion
THREE:
1. Immanuel
Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method, trans. John and
(Baltimore:
CHAPTER
(Bologna:
il Mulino,
1992), P: 24.
Durnezi l, My the et epopee (Paris: Gallimard,
24. Ibid.
I I
politico nella storia
1968), vol. 3, p. 14.
THE
25· Antoine Champion,
p.
OF
ALL
THINGS
NOTES
Lin81/istic historique et lin8uistic 8enerale (1921; Paris:
Meillet,
(975),
SIGNATURE
324.
47. Ibid., p. 116.
26. lbid., vol. 1, p. 15.
48. Ibid.
if Things
The Order
27· Michel Foucault,
(1994; New York: Vintage,
1970),
p. xxii. 28.
46. lbid., P: 109.
49. Ibid., pp. 118, 1'7. 50. Paolo
Ibid., pp. xxi-xxii.
29· Michel
metropoli,"
30. Marcel Mauss, A General Theory and Kegan Paul, (972), P:
31. Henri
grave Macmillan, 32. Walter McLaughlin
umane,"
if Magic,
trans. Robert
Brain (London:
H. Wilson
Carr
(New
York: Pal-
(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard
Melandri,
"Michel
52. Foucault,
University
Foucault:
di parole:
Dits et ecrits, vol. Usener,
Press,1982),
Klostermann,
My the et epopee, vol.
2000), I,
scienze
Litiqua e stile 2.1 (1967), p. 78.
34· lbid., p. 96. 35· Paul Ricoeur,
Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation,
Denis Savage (New Haven, CT: Yale University
trans.
Press, (970), p. 445.
36. lbid., P: 446. 37· Friedrich (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge
38. Enzo Melandri, (Macerata:
Untimely Meditations,
Nietzsche,
Quodlibet,
trans.
R.
J.
Hollingdale
Press, 1997), P: 67.
University
La linea e il circolo: Studio logicofilosrifico sull'aoaloqta 2004),
pp. 65-66.
39· lbid., P: 67. 40. Sigmund York: Vintage
Moses and Monotheism, trans. Katherine
Freud,
Jones
(New
Books, (937), p. 162.
41. lbid., p. 163. 42. Cathy (Baltimore:
Caruth,
Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History
Johns Hopkins
43· Foucault,
University
Press,
Dits et ecrits, vol. 1, pp. 69-70
44· lbid., p.
Ill.
45. lbtd., p.
100.
(I
(996),
delIa
Costa & Nolan,
Venuch einer Lehre von del' reliqiosen
P: 459. delle
Ilardi (Genoa:
Iinguistica
P: 99.
I,
Gotternanien:
Eiland and Kevin
L'espistemologia
Per uri'analisi
The Arcades Project, P: 471.
Begr!fFbildullg (Frankfurt: 54. Dumezil,
The Arcades Project, trans. Howard
dedalo
in La citta senza luoqhi, ed. Massimo
53. Hermann
trans.
"Un
1990). p. 74· 51. Benjamin,
2007), p. 133.
Benjamin,
33· Enzo
A. M. Sheridan
118.
Mind-Ener8Y,
Bergson,
trans.
Books, (972), p. 191.
Smith (New York: Pantheon
Routledge
if Knowledpe,
The Archaeology
Foucault,
Virno,
pp. 17-18.
and 73.
121
p. 9.
p. 5.
Index
ABU
MA1SHAR,
Augustine,
50.
Saint,
Alexander
of Names
ENRICO
40-41,
of Hales,
44-45,
DEL CARRETTO,
45.
J1EDVRE,
LUCIEN,
Ambrose,
4.1.
Festus,
Aristotle,
17-18, 20, 24, 26, 72.
Feuerbach,
Ast, Georg
Anton
Aulus Gellius,
Friedrich,
25.
Sextus
Ficino,
70.
SAINT,
Benjamin,
20.
Walter,
88, 91, 97,
Jeremy,
16.
Benveniste,
Emile,
Berengarius
01"Tours,
Bergson,
I lend,
Bertillon, Binswanger,
Marc,
Bohmc, Burnouf,
Sigmund,
GALTON,
95.
28, 38-40,
Cernet,
66.
FRANCIS,
Goethe,
GEORGES,
10,12.
HEGEL,
Derrida, Doyle,
64.
63.
Dreyfus,
Herbert,
Durnezil,
70.
Georges,
21, 23.
Martin, Edward,
FRIEDRICH,
Hugh
25-26,
Hugo
of St. Victor,
64.
IAMBLlCHUS,
10. 84-85,
Isidore
von, 52. 41.
87, 100.
123
47.
of Seville,
81, 93.
60-61.
72.
Conan,
Hubert,
27-28.
Victor,
GEORG WILHELM
Heidegger,
54.
GILLES,
Jacques,
26.
24,72.
Enrico,
Arthur
Bigordi,
63-65.
Wolfgang,
Goldschmidt,
9,.
65.
Domenico Carlo,
Hofmannsthal, DELEUZE,
92-93,
Louis, 83.
Giorgione,
100.
Croll ius, Oswald,
89-90,
93.
Ginzburg,
Cathy,
So.
63-65,
95, 97, 98.
Jacob,
Castelnuovo,
95, 98.
Ghirlandaio,
Emile,
13.
7, 13,9-17,21,29,
del Cossa,
16.
CANGUILHEM,
Caruth,
Michel,
Hans, 71.
Jakob,
Burckhardt,
Freud,
65.
Ludwig,
Blumenberg,
69, 101.
41.
87-88,
Alphonse,
II.
Alessandro,
Francesco
55-57,
47-4.8.
Ludwik,
85-90,
Bentham,
17.
7.
35,38,53-55,57-58,60,73,76-77,
100.
Bloch,
Ludwig,
Foucault,
7, 65-68,
16.
Pompeius,
Marsilio,
Fleck, Fontana,
BENEDICT,
49.
47.
41.
THE
JOHN
XXII,
Jakobson,
SIGNATURE
48.
POPE,
Roman,
OF
ALL
THINGS
64.
SASSOFERRATO,
72.
Saussure,
Ferdinand
Schleiermacher, KANT,
19-20,75-76,87.
IMMANUEL,
Ernst, 16.
Kantorowicz, Kepler,
Johannes,
Koyre,
Alexandre,
Kuhn,
Adalbert,
Kuhn,
Thomas
LANDRU)
Leibniz,
40. 12.
Luzzatto,
Moshe
Meyerson,
87.
12. 30.
USEN
41-42.
AQUINAS,
37, 64.
ER,
VALERY,
Nikolai,
71.
l.-JERMANN,
i
oo ,
91.
PAUL,
Friedrich
Theodor,
Weber, 63.
ORIGEN,
88.
II.
69-70.
Franz,
78-82,
66,74· Parry, Milman,
27.
Pasquale,
21-24,
13.
27, 62.
Prod us, 48. Paolo, 83.
Ptolemy,
II.
RAlllNQW,
86-88.
31-38,40,43,47,53-54,
PARACELSUS,
Pasquino,
Wind, Wolfson
ISAAC)
Pierre,
PAUL,
AllY,
26-27,
65-66.
100.
Noailles,
Overbeck,
WARBURC,
34.
Max,
10.
RicOClII', Paul, 89-90,
II ,
Leo, 62.
Vischer,
12.
Giovanni,
NEWTON,
n 0[[('
62.
S., 16.
Henry,
Morellli,
Rodier,
Strauss,
Titian,
85.
Emile,
Milo, Daniel
Prodi,
Wallace,
53.
Enzo, 18,35, 55, 57, 88-91, 97.
Melandri,
Plato,
George,
Stevens,
Trubetzkoy,
MARCEL,
Muller,
72.
Hayyim,
Antoine,
More,
Steiner,
53.
62.
von, 40,
26.
Karl, 71.
Ernst,
66.
Wolfgang,
Baruch,
THOMAS
Claude,
Lippi, Filippo,
MAUSS,
65.
Willhelm
Lowith,
Meillet,
Richard
Spinoza,
S., 10-IS.
Gottfried
Gershom,
Semon,
100.
Daniel
Carl, 71.
Scholem,
HENRI-DESIRE}
75· Levi-Strauss,
25· Schmitt,
de, 56.
Friedrich
Goorg('s, 21. Jilizabcth, 17.
92.
Max, 71. Edgar, Harry
64. A., 62.
50, 52-53,
911~~1,llmll~~I,I~llllll
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