ADR Case Digests 1

UNIVERSAL ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CORPORATION vs. HEIRS OF ANGEL TEVES G. R. No. 128574

September 18, 2002

Facts: Andres Abanto's heirs executed an “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Andres Abanto and Simultaneous Sale.”[2] In this document, Abanto's heirs adjudicated unto themselves the two lots and sold the (a) unregistered lot of 193,789 square meters to the United Planters Sugar Milling Company, Inc. (UPSUMCO), and (b) the registered lot covered by TCT No. H-37 to Angel M. Teves, for a total sum of P115,000.00. The sale was not registered. Out of respect for his uncle Ignacio Montenegro, who was UPSUMCO's founder and president, Teves verbally allowed UPSUMCO to use the lot covered by TCT No H-37 for pier and loading facilities, free of charge subject to the condition that UPSUMCO shall shoulder the payment of real property taxes and that its occupation shall be coterminus with its corporate existence. UPSUMCO then built a guesthouse and pier facilities on the property. Years later, UPSUMCO’s properties were acquired by the Philippine National Bank (PNB).

Later, PNB

transferred the same properties to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) which, in turn, sold the same to the Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO). URSUMCO then took possession of UPSUMCO’s properties, including Teves' lot covered by TCT No. H-37. Upon learning of URSUMCO's acquisition of his lot, Teves formally asked the corporation to turn over to him possession thereof or the corresponding rentals.

He stated in his demand letters that he merely allowed UPSUMCO

to use his property until its corporate dissolution; and that it was not mortgaged by UPSUMCO with the PNB and, therefore, not included among the foreclosed properties acquired by URSUMCO. URSUMCO refused to heed Teves' demand, claiming that it acquired the right to occupy the property from UPSUMCO which purchased it from Andres Abanto; and that it was merely placed in the name of Angel Teves, as shown by the “Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights and Possession” dated November 26, 1987.[7] Under this document, UPSUMCO transferred to URSUMCO its application for agricultural and foreshore lease.

The same

document partly states that the lands subject of the foreshore and agricultural lease applications are bounded on the north by the "titled property of Andres Abanto bought by the transferor (UPSUMCO) but placed in the name of Angel Teves". URSUMCO further claimed that it was UPSUMCO, not Teves, which has been paying the corresponding realty taxes. Issue: Whether or not petitioner herein has the legal capacity to question the validity of the sale Ruling: The Supreme Court held that An innocent purchaser is one who acquired the property for a valuable consideration, not knowing that the title of the vendor or grantor is null and void. He is also one who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. The concept underscores two important factors: (1) the property which is bought for consideration, and (2) the lack of knowledge or notice of adverse claim or interest prior to the sale. Both factors are not present insofar as petitioner URSUMCO is concerned. For one, petitioner acquired almost all of UPSUMCO’S properties for a consideration but failed to prove that the lot covered by TCT No. H - 37 was included therein. In fact, the lot was not among the properties acquired by petitioner from the APT whose holdings were limited only to those UPSUMCO properties foreclosed by the PNB. Also, the “Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights and Possession” shows that only the following properties and rights of UPSUMCO were transferred to petitioner URSUMCO: 1. The guest house and pier at Campuyo site in the Municipality of Manjuyod, Negros Oriental; 2. A parcel of land consisting of twenty five (25) hectares, more or less, leading to the Campuyo pier which is the subject matter of UPSUMCO's agricultural lease application pending with the Bureau of Lands and Land District Officer, Dumaguete City; and

3. Pending application for an industrial or foreshore lease of that portion of the adjacent government land approximately 270,000 square meters, later amended to be 16,000 square meters. The foregoing list does not specifically include the subject lot. Admittedly, the same “Deed of Transfer and Waiver of Rights and Possession” states that a “titled property of Andres Abanto bought by the transferor (UPSUMCO) but placed in the name of Angel Teves” is on the northern boundary of the above-mentioned lands subject of the foreshore and agricultural lease applications.[26] However, such description is insufficient to establish that the “titled property” is indeed owned by UPSUMCO.

VALENCIDES VERCIDE VS. JUDGE PRISCILLA HERNANDEZ A.M. NO. MTJ-00-1265 (2000) Facts: P filed a case for recovery of possession of a piece of land against D. The case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa since the parties do not reside in the same or adjacent barangays. Nevertheless, D raised as an affirmative defense the non-referral of the case to the Barangay and consequently, the judge dismissed the case Issue: Whether the parties are required to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa Held: No. PD 1508 is clear on this point. Where parties do not reside in the same city or municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

Atty. Veustiano Tavora vs. Rosario Veloso GR No. L-60367

September 30, 1982

Venustriano Tavora, a resident of Marikina owns an apartment in Quiapo, which he leased to Julieta Capati, a resident of Quiapo. On account of an alleged violation of the lease contract, Tavora filed an ejectment suit in manila. Capati filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure to bring the dispute first to the barangay for possible amicable settlement under PD 1508. Judge Veloso dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Issue: Whether or not the lupon has jurisdiction over the case? Ruling: No, Section 2 of PD 1508 specifies the condition under which the Lupon of a barangay “shall have authority” to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their dispute. The parties must be “actually residing in the same city or municipality.” At the same time Sec. 3 of PD 1508 – while reiterating that the disputants must be actually residing in the same barangay or in different barangays within the same city or municipality – unequivocably declares that the Lupon shall have “no authority” over disputes involving parties who actually resides in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except when such barangays adjoin each other.

MARTINEZ ETAL. v. MARTINEZ (2005)

FACTS:

1.

Spouses Daniel Martinez, Sr. and Natividad Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land as well as the house constructed therein. On 06 March 1993, Daniel Sr. executed a Last Will and Testament dividing the said land to his three sons Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr., Manolo assigned as the administrator of estates.

2.

In October 1996, Natividad died and in 1997, Daniel Sr. passed away.

3.

On 16 September 1998, Rodolfo found a deed of sale signed by his father where the latter appears to have sold one lot of the subject land to Manolo and his wife Lucila.

4.

Rodolfo filed a complaint for annulment of deed of sale against his brother and sister-in-law Lucila. On motion of the defendants, the RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisidction since there was allegation in the complaint that the last will of Daniel Sr. had been admitted to probate. Rodolfo appealed the order to the CA.

5.

On 04 October 1999, Rodolfo filed with the RTC for the probate of the last will.

6.

In the meantime, Manolo and his wife Lucila wrote to Rodolfo requesting him to vacate the property but he ignored; hence the said spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent in the MTC.

7.

on 11 October 1999, Rodolfo alleged that the complaint failed to state a condition precendent, namely, the earnest efforts for an amicable settlement. Respondent filed an Amended Complaint inserting that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made. Respondent opposed; Spouses insisted; and on 21 February 2000, the trial court (MTC) rendered judgement in favor of the spouses, declaring that the latter had substantially complied with Article 151 of the Family Code.

8.

Rodolfo appealed the RTC decision. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. Respondent then filed a petition for review to the Court of Appeals.

9.

On 27 November 2003, the CA rendered judgment granting the petitioner and ruled that spouses Martinez had failed to comply with Article 151 of the Family Code. Hence, the present case. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in finding that there was non-compliance with the requirment provided for under Article 151 of the Family Code?

RULING:

1.

Yes, the CA arred in its decision that petitioners has not complied with the requirement provided for in Article 151 of the FC considering that one of the petitioners, Lucila Martines, had no familial relations with the respondent, being a mere sister-in-law. She was a stranger to the respondent, hence, there was no need for the petitioners to comply with Article 151 of the FC. Article 151 of the Family Code:

“No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.” 2.

Article 151 of the FC must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. Hence, a sisteror brother- in-law is not included in the enumeration of “members of the same family”.

3.

It is necessary that every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed. Thus, a party’s failure to comply with Article 151 of the FC before filing a complaint against a family member would render such complaint premature.

G R NO. 146195, November 18, 2004 AVELINA ZAMORA, EMERITA ZAMORA NICOL, SONNY NICOL, TERESA ZAMORA-UMALI, CLARENCE UMALI, ROBERTO ZAMORA, ROLANDO ZAMORA, MARY ANN ZAMORA, MICHELLE ZAMORA AND RODRIGO ZAMORA, Petitioners. Versus HEIRS OF CARMEN IZQUIERDO represented by their attorney-in-fact, Anita F. PUNZALAN, respondents. FACTS: This case is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA. There was a complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of failure to refer the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation is allowed under Section 19 0f the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. The case was referred to the Lupon Chairman for conciliation. Petitioner’s motion to discuss even if allowed is bereft of merit.

Issue: Whether the issue or the motion to dismiss since controversy was not referred to the barangay for conciliation. Whether or not motion to dismiss the complaint or to quash the complaint or information except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Failure to comply with the preceding section of the complaint to the Lupon for conciliation.

Held:

Judgment is rendered a favor of the plaintiff and against the dependent. Petitioners’ motion to dismiss is bereft of merit and is Denied. Assailed judgment is affirmed.

Magno vs. Velasco-Jacoba [A.C. No. 6296 November 22, 2005]

Facts: Atty. Evelyn J. Magno, President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. During the conciliation/confrontation proceeding, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba appeared on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos. Atty. Magno objected to Atty. Jacoba’s appeareance in the conciliation but the latter interpose that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzo’s counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact.

Thus, this petition for willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba violated the Local Government Code and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Section 415 of the LGC of 1991, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of

goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. Worse still, the participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

Doubtless, respondent’s conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant’s protestation against her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings. Hence, Atty. Jacoba was ordered to fine P5,000 and warned that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.