ADNOC-COPV4!01!2005 (Ver-1) - CoP on Framework of Occupational Safety Risk Management

ABU DHABI NATIONAL OIL COMPANY

HEALTH SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL OF CODES OF PRACTICE VOLUME 4 : SAFETY

CODE OF PRACTICE ON FRAMEWORK OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT ADNOC-COPV4-01

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RECORD OF REVISION Revision No.

Date

Section/Page

Reason

Copyright The copyright and all other rights of a like nature in this document are vested in Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. This document is issued as part of the Manual of HSE Codes of Practice (the “Manual”) and as guidance to ADNOC, ADNOC Group Companies and independent operators engaged in the Abu Dhabi oil & gas industries. Any of these parties may give copies of the entire Manual or selected parts thereof to their contractors implementing HSE standards in order to qualify for award of contracts or for the execution of awarded contracts. Such copies should carry a statement that they are reproduced by permission of ADNOC, and an explanatory note on the manner in which the Manual is to be used. Disclaimer No liability whatsoever in contract, tort or otherwise is accepted by ADNOC or any of its Group Companies, their respective shareholders, directors, officers and employees whether or not involved in the preparation of the Manual for any consequences whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from reliance on or from the use of the Manual or for any error or omission therein even if such error or omission is caused by a failure to exercise reasonable care.

All administrative queries should be directed to the Manual of HSE Codes of Practice Administrator in:

Environment Health & Safety Division, Exploration & Production Directorate, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, P.O. Box : 898, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Telephone : (9712) 6023782 Fax: (9712) 6668089 Internet site: www.adnoc.com E-mail: [email protected]

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CONTENTS Page I. PURPOSE ............................................................................................................... 4 II. DEFINITIONS.......................................................................................................... 4 III. EXISTING LAWS .................................................................................................... 7 1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 8 2. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................................. 9 2.1 Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Implementation of Risk Control Measures.......................................................................................... 9 2.2 Performance Monitoring And Records..................................................... 10 2.3 Audit 11 2.4 Review .......................................................................................................... 11 2.5 Additional Requirements And Guidelines................................................ 12 3. GUIDELINES ON TASK RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................... 13 4. PERMIT-TO-WORK SYSTEMS............................................................................ 16 4.1 Basics of a Permit-To-Work System ......................................................... 16 4.2 Roles and Responsibilities ........................................................................ 16 4.3 Shift Hand-over ........................................................................................... 19 4.4 Implementation Of Permit To Work Systems........................................... 19 5. EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT ............................................................................... 20 5.1 Right to Refuse Dangerous Work.............................................................. 21 6. INCIDENT REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP ....................................................... 22 6.1 Reporting Of Incidents ............................................................................... 22 6.2 Learning Lessons ....................................................................................... 22 6.3 ADNOC Group Experience......................................................................... 23 6.4 Incident Causation ...................................................................................... 23 6.5 Incident Investigation ................................................................................. 24 6.6 Human Failure ............................................................................................. 25 7. HAZARD AND UNSAFE ACT/CONDITION REPORTING .................................. 30 8. TRAINING AND COMPETENCY.......................................................................... 31 9. SIMOPS AND INTERFACE ARRANGEMENTS.................................................. 32 9.1 SIMOPS Procedures ................................................................................... 32 9.2 Interface Documentation............................................................................ 32 10. SAFETY CODES OF PRACTICE – STRUCTURE AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS ...................................................................................................................... 34 11. REFERENCES...................................................................................................... 37

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I.

PURPOSE ADNOC requirements and expectations for Group Company HSE Management Systems are specified in the ADNOC Health, Safety and Environmental Management System Guidelines [Ref. 1]. The purpose of this Code of Practice is to provide additional detail regarding ADNOC requirements for identification, assessment and control of occupational safety risks. ADNOC Group Companies must update their documented HSE Management Systems to include the requirements of this Code of Practice. Application of the principles contained in this Code of Practice will reduce occupational safety risks to people by ensuring that hazards are identified, risks are assessed and appropriate prevention and control measures implemented. Note that general guidance on Risk Management and risk acceptance criteria, including as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP), is contained in the ADNOC Group Risk Management Guidelines [Ref. 15].

II.

DEFINITIONS Accident See incident. Active Failure A failure of equipment or procedure that has immediate consequences with potential for harm to people, the environment or property. See also "Latent Failure". Contributing Factors Additional failures, which allow the situation established by the root cause to go unchecked, leading either to an incident or to an incident with more severe consequences than otherwise. These can be "active failures" but are more often "latent failures". Hazard The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to property, products or the environment; production losses or increased liabilities. Hazard Awareness A state where a person is alert to what he/she is doing and to what is going on around him/her. It involves the ability to recognise the potential for actions or conditions that might result in harm to people, damage to property or the environment.

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002. [15] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Risk Management’, March, 2000.

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HSE-Critical Term applied to any item of equipment, system, activity, task, documents, procedure, organisation, plan or other management tool that is important in preventing events with potential to cause serious harm to people, the environment or property, or which can reduce the impact of such events. [Note that the definition of serious harm includes the critical, severe and catastrophic categories shown in the risk potential matrix in ADNOC Risk Management Guidelines]. Incident An event or chain of events which has caused or could have caused fatality, injury, illness and/or damage (loss) to assets, the environment, company reputation or third parties. Job Safety Analysis The term for "Task Risk Assessment" used by the International Association Of Oil and Gas Producers [OGP, Guidelines On Permit To Work (PTW) Systems [Ref. 7]. Latent Failure A failure of equipment, procedures, organisation or other management system that does not immediately lead to an incident, but either makes an incident more likely or makes the potential consequences more severe. See also "Active Failure". Major Hazard Site Any process plant, storage facility, terminal, pipeline, offshore installation, drilling rig or any other facility handling or storing hazardous materials that has ‘Major Accident Potential’ at any time in the course of routine and/or nonroutine operations. Major hazard sites must prepare and maintain COMAH Reports in accordance with the ADNOC Code of Practice on Control of Major Accident Hazards [Ref. 6]. Near Miss An event or chain of events that could have resulted in fatality, injury, illness and / or damage (loss) to assets, the environment, company reputation or third parties. Occupational Hazard A hazard with the potential for causing ‘Occupational Accidents’ through slips, trips, falls, crushing, drowning, electrocution etc. Occupational Hazards are identified and either eliminated, controlled or mitigated by the use of best practice HSE Management Systems, procedures, methods and techniques. Operational Hazard An occupational hazard arising from specific operations carried out at Group Company sites. [6] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of practice on Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’, ADNOCCOPV5-01. [7] Guidelines On Permit To Work (PTW) Systems, OGP Report No 6.29/189, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, January 1993.

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Permit-To-Work System The system that allows central control and ongoing monitoring of higher risk activities on a site and, in particular, to ensure that activities are authorised, carried out by qualified personnel using appropriate safety precautions and that activities with potentially hazardous interactions do not take place at the same time. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) Personal Protective Equipment. Any device or appliance designed to be worn or held by an individual for protection against one or more health and safety hazards. PTW Permit-To-Work Risk Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired event and the potential adverse consequences which this event may have upon: − People – injury or harm to physical or psychological health − Assets (or Revenue) – damage to property (assets) or loss of production − Environment – water, air, soil, animals, plants and social − Reputation – employees and third parties. This includes the liabilities arising from injuries and property damage to third parties including the cross liabilities that may arise between the interdependent ADNOC Group Companies. Risk = Frequency x Consequences. Root Cause The initiating event that begins the chain of events that leads to an incident usually an active failure Task Risk Assessment A process of formal identification, recording and assessment of the risks involved in any particular operation so that appropriate controls can be introduced. TRA Task Risk Assessment Unsafe Act Something a person does that can cause an accident or injury. Unsafe Condition A situation, which, if it continues, can lead to an accident or injury. Workplace A location owned by an ADNOC Group Company or a location where plant is operated by, or on behalf of, an ADNOC Group Company.

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III.

EXISTING LAWS United Arab Emirates Federal Law Number 8 of 1980 requires employers to provide adequate preventative equipment to protect workers against the dangers of employment accidents and occupational diseases that may occur during the work, and also against fire hazards and other hazards that may result from the use of machines or other equipment (Article 91).

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1.

INTRODUCTION This Code of Practice draws on international standards such as British Standards Institute, Occupational Health and HSE Management Systems Specification OHSAS 18001 [Ref. 2] and on experience in other countries such as the United Kingdom including: •

Health and Safety Executive, Management Of Health And Safety At Work [Ref. 3].

•

Health And Safety Executive, A Guide To The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations [Ref. 4].

•

Health And Safety Executive, A Guide To The Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration) Regulations [Ref. 5].

It represents current worldwide best practice for the management of occupational safety, as applied to Abu Dhabi.

[2] Occupational Health and HSE management Systems - Specification, OHSAS 18001: 1999, British Standards Institute, April 1999. [3] Management Of Health And Safety At Work, Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, Second Edition, 2000, ISBN 0 7176 2488 9. [4] A Guide To The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, United Kingdom Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, Second Edition 1998, ISBN 0 7176 1165 5. [5] A Guide To The Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration Regulations), Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, 1995, ISBN 0 7176 0938 3.

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2.

GENERAL REQUIREMENTS

2.1

Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and Implementation of Risk Control Measures. ADNOC Group Companies must establish and maintain procedures for: •

The systematic identification of safety hazards,

•

the assessment of safety risks, and

•

the implementation of necessary safety risk control measures.

Specifically for HSE-Critical operations and installations, the basic requirements for the above three steps are detailed in Element 4 of the ADNOC HSEMS Guidelines [Ref. 1]. These must be applied to all relevant occupational activities, including: •

Routine and non-routine activities.

•

Activities of all personnel having access to the workplace including contractors and visitors.

•

Facilities at the workplace, whether provided by the Group Company or by others.

Group Companies must document all of the above information and keep it up to date. In addition to these basic requirements, the expectations as detailed in Element 4 of the ADNOC HSEMS [Ref 1] require the Group Companies to develop and implement similar methodology for all other occupational activities, i.e. those which have a less HSE-critical nature. Group Company methodology for hazard identification and risk assessment for occupational safety must: •

Be proactive in its scope, nature and timing i.e. as opposed to applying this only once incidents have occurred.

•

Provide for the classification of risk including identification of risks that are to be eliminated or controlled.

•

Be consistent with operating experience and the capabilities of risk control measures employed.

•

Provide input into the determination of facility requirements, such as, for example, identification of training needs and/or development of administrative, engineering or operational controls.

•

Involve those who will be carrying out the activities.

•

Consult with those who may be affected by any changes that impact health and safety at their workplace.

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002.

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•

Provide a Remedial Action Plan to ensure both effective and timely implementation of risk control measures.

Ultimate responsibility for ensuring that hazards are identified, risks are assessed and that necessary risk control measures are applied rests with the Group Company management. Personnel performing hazard identification, risk assessment and application of risk control measures must be competent to do so. Sufficient resources must be provided to implement these requirements. Group Company management must ensure that management systems for occupational safety are established, implemented and maintained in accordance with ADNOC Group HSE Management System Guidelines. This will include ensuring:

2.2

•

That the roles, responsibilities and accountabilities for occupational safety at each site and workplace are clearly defined.

•

That competency and training requirements have been identified and are being implemented and methods are in place for measuring and assuring competence.

•

That hazard identification, hazard registers and risk assessment procedures are in place and that necessary risk control measures are applied.

•

That hazard and incident reporting and investigation procedures are in place and being used.

•

That all personnel (employees and contractors) undertaking activities at the workplace are aware of: − The hazards and safe operating limits of the systems and equipment they may be required to use and the tasks they are required to carry out (see also the ADNOC Code of Practice on Identification and Integrity Assurance of HSE Critical Equipment and Systems [Ref. 8]). − The potential consequences of departure from specified operating procedures or exceeding operational limits. − The necessary controls to prevent or reduce risks associated with identified hazards.

Performance Monitoring And Records ADNOC Group Company HSE Management Systems must provide for the ongoing monitoring of arrangements for identification of hazards, assessment of risks and implementation of suitable control measures, in line with Element 6 of the ADNOC HSEMS [Ref. 1]. In particular the HSE Management System must ensure that:

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002. [8] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of Practice on Identification and Integrity Assurance of HSE Critical Equipment and Systems’, ADNOC-COPV6-01.

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•

Arrangements for identification of hazards, assessment of risks and implementation of control measures are implemented correctly, including the necessary training of personnel.

•

Non-compliance is identified and corrective action taken.

•

Performance is measured.

•

Suitable records are kept.

•

Incidents are reported and investigated , root causes are identified, and, where appropriate, remedial actions implemented.

Where appropriate, the HSE Management System must include the requirement for verification of the above by local supervision/inspection. 2.3

Audit ADNOC Group Company HSE Management Systems must include the requirement for regular independent audit of the HSEMS, which includes the arrangements for identification of hazards, assessment of risks and implementation of suitable control measures (see Element 7 of the ADNOC HSEMS [Ref. 1]). These audit must include all matters covered in this Code of Practice including: •

Use of formal techniques such as Task Risk Assessment.

•

The Permit-to-Work System.

•

Employee involvement in the hazard identification, risk assessment and control measure implementation process.

•

Incident and Near Miss reporting and investigation.

•

Hazard and unsafe act/condition identification and reporting.

•

Training and competency of personnel with respect to hazard identification, risk assessment and control measure implementation.

•

Health and safety interface arrangements.

Audits must be carried out by competent persons that are independent of the operation being audited. 2.4

Review As often as necessary, ADNOC Group companies must review their HSE Management System, which includes the arrangements for hazard identification, risk assessment and control measure implementation (see ADNOC HSEMS [Ref. 1] Element 8). The review must take into account experience since the last review including the findings of audits and the availability of new technical knowledge.

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002.

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The maximum interval between such reviews must be stated in the company HSE Management System. Earlier review may also be required in event of: •

Significant changes to design or operation on a relevant site, especially if this changes the nature or extent of the hazards present.

•

New technical knowledge regarding safety matters.

The criteria adopted for the triggering of an early review must be specified. 2.5

Additional Requirements And Guidelines Further requirements and guidelines for methods used to identify hazards, to assess risks and to apply control measures are detailed in the remainder of this document. •

Task Risk Assessment (Section 3) is a formal tool useful for the identification of hazards, assessment of risks and specification of necessary risk control measures for a wide range of activities.

•

Permit-To-Work Systems (Section 4) are systems to control work activities of a higher risk nature, in defined areas to ensure that activities are authorised, carried out by qualified personnel using appropriate safety precautions and that activities with potentially hazardous interactions do not take place at the same time.

•

Employee Involvement (Section 5) is essential to ensure that identification of hazards, assessment of risks and implementation of risk control measures is both thorough and realistic.

•

Incident Reporting and Investigation (Section 6) provides important input to the hazard identification, risks assessment and prevention / risk control measure implementation processes.

•

Hazard and Unsafe Act/Condition Reporting (Section 7) provides information regarding hazard identification and the status of prevention and control measures.

•

Training and Competency (Section 8) is required for all personnel with respect to their health and safety functions including identification of hazards, assessment of risks, and implementation of prevention and control measures and for working with prevention and control measures. Specific training and competency assurance relating to their role is required for all personnel carrying out HSE critical tasks.

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3.

GUIDELINES ON TASK RISK ASSESSMENT Task Risk Assessment (TRA) is a technique for identifying hazards, assessing risks and determining prevention and control measures for occupational and operational activities. Detailed guidelines for application of TRA have been provided by, amongst others, the Oil and Gas Producers Association [Ref. 7] and CONCAWE [Ref. 9]. An outline is presented here, as guidance for use of this and similar techniques. TRA is an approach, which has some similarities with HAZOP [Ref. 10]. Both tools provide a qualitative method for assessing risk with the objective of reducing the likelihood of having accidents at work. TRA is undertaken in a structured, systematic manner to: •

Identify hazards.

•

Identify possible initiating causes that might lead to release of a hazard.

•

Assess the potential consequences of the release of the hazard.

•

Assess the existing control, mitigation and recovery methods.

•

Determine whether additional control, mitigation and recovery preparedness methods are necessary to reduce the risk associated with the hazards to at least ALARP level.

However, HAZOP focuses on the operation of plant, while TRA focuses on a sequence of tasks to be carried out by competent personnel. HAZOP is usually carried out in an office. TRA is often carried out at the work-site, so that those carrying out the assessment have first hand experience of the environment where the tasks will be undertaken, including the potential impact from or to other ongoing works in the vicinity. Figure 1 is a flow chart of a typical TRA process. In outline, the procedure takes the task to be accomplished and divides it into sub-tasks of manageable size. Each sub-task is then reviewed against a task-specific checklist or a list of guidewords. Team members use the checklist / guideword list to identify hazards that may be present during performance of each sub-task due to equipment failure, human error, environmental conditions, external factors, process upset, or other source. The potential effects of the hazard are then assessed against the available protective and preventative systems and a judgment made as to whether it is safe to proceed or, whether further protective or preventative measures are required. On occasion it may be necessary to delay the work while a more detailed or rigorous assessment is made, to change the proposed work procedure, or to provide or further evaluate specialist protective systems. In all cases, the principle of making the work as safe as reasonably practicable applies. [7] Guidelines On Permit To Work (PTW) Systems, OGP Report No 6.29/189, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, January 1993. [9] Task Risk Assessment, CONCAWE Report (3/97), CONCAWE 1997 [10] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Guideline on Risk Assessment And Quantitative Risk Assessment’, ADNOCCOPV5-03.

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Define Work To Be Done

Breakdown Work Into Simple Tasks

1. Identify hazards relevant To Task 2. Determine causes of potential incidents 3. Determine consequences of potential incidents 4. Assess control measures and risks

Is Risk Tolerable?

No

Introduce Controls

Yes Next Task

FIGURE 1:

TASK RISK ASSESSMENT FLOW CHART

The supervisor responsible for the work would normally lead the Task Risk Assessment team, which must be made up of people who will be involved in the work. In some cases the Task Risk Assessment team must also include those with relevant specialist knowledge. Where the task is of a higher risk nature, the TRA must be reviewed and authorised by a higher authority, e.g. the Department Head or Division Manager. All persons involved in TRA must be competent for their role and must receive prior training in TRA at an appropriate level. They must have a practical and theoretical knowledge of the hazards involved, possible effects and preventative measures, together with an awareness of the work and workplace conditions. It is important that such persons are able to make sound judgments and can recognise the extent and limitations of their own experience.

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Where TRA is used it must be carried out according to a formal documented procedure. The formal procedure must cover: •

Use of an appropriate checklist or guidewords for the task to be reviewed.

•

The format for recording the findings and especially any additional precautions that may be required.

•

Communication of the results of the TRA to those affected by it, especially if they were not part of the assessment team.

•

Interface with the Permit-to-Work System.

The results of the TRA must, where appropriate, be included in procedures, operating manuals and emergency plans. They must also be communicated during ‘tool-box’ talks. TRA is an ideal focus for any tasks that require refresher training and ‘tool-box’ talks before commencing such as: •

Tasks that are relatively complex.

•

Tasks that are carried out infrequently or non routine activities.

•

Where there are personnel changes.

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4.

PERMIT-TO-WORK SYSTEMS

4.1

Basics of a Permit-To-Work System A Permit-to-Work (PTW) system is a means of monitoring and controlling higher risk activities on a site to ensure that those activities have been authorised, are carried out by competent personnel and that appropriate health, safety and environmental precautions are in place. Personnel must not carry out such work without a Work Permit , which has been authorised by an appointed competent person. The work must only be carried out in accordance with the Work Permit. PTW systems must be implemented whenever it is intended to carry out work that may adversely affect the safety of personnel, the environment, or property. They are normally considered to be more appropriate to non-routine activities that may require Task Risk Assessment prior to work commencing (see Section 3). There are many activities closely associated with plant operations where a PTW system is required. For example, process isolation, mechanical and electrical isolation, hot work, hot tapping and entry into confined spaces must be subject to PTW procedures. A PTW system must also be used when two or more individuals or groups of people from different trades/crafts, contractors or operators need to coordinate their activities if their respective works are to be completed safely. Similarly, a PTW system must be used where work or responsibilities are transferred from one group to another. ADNOC recommends that Group Companies harmonise PTW systems across all sites for which they are responsible in order to reduce risks arising from misunderstanding when personnel move between sites. In any event, Group Companies must ensure that all personnel carrying out work that requires a Work Permit are trained and competent in the application of local PTW procedures.

4.2

Roles and Responsibilities Principle roles and responsibilities under a PTW system are: Group Companies' Senior Management must ensure that: •

a PTW system is introduced where required according to this Code of Practice and where required by their own HSE Management System.

•

Training programmes and competence standards relating to the PTW system are established and maintained.

•

Systems are established and maintained for monitoring, auditing and review of PTW system.

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The Site Manager (or person with overall responsibility for safety at a particular site) must ensure that: •

All personnel, including contractors, who operate and use the PTW system have received adequate training and are competent to do so.

•

The planning and administration including issue and return of Work Permits, is properly coordinated.

•

A secure method of isolation for all energy sources including electrical and process/mechanical isolations is implemented.

•

Adequate time is allowed during shift changes to ensure effective transfer of information on Work Permit status on the facility.

•

The system is regularly monitored to ensure that the PTW system is implemented effectively.

Contractor's management must ensure that: •

Their employees are informed of and understand the broad principles of the PTW system for the locations where their employees have to work.

•

Their employees have been given the appropriate training and understand the operation of the PTW system and their specific roles and responsibilities within it.

•

They monitor the training of their employees.

The person who issues a Work Permit must ensure that: •

The nature of the work is well defined (on the Work Permit) and fully understood.

•

All the hazards associated with the job are identified on the Work Permit.

•

All the necessary precautions are stipulated on the Work permit and implemented, including isolations, before work begins.

•

All people who may be affected by the work are informed before the work begins, when the work is suspended and when the work is complete.

•

Work Permits (and related certificates e.g. isolations) for tasks that may interact are cross-referenced.

•

That effective arrangements are made for the work site to be examined before work begins, on completion of work and as appropriate when work is suspended.

•

Sufficient time is spent on shift handover to discuss all ongoing or suspended Work Permits with the oncoming permit issuer.

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The supervisor (or other person in charge of the work covered by the Work Permit, e.g. the Job Performer) must ensure that: •

The work party have received training in the PTW system in use in that particular location.

•

The work party have received adequate instruction in the PTW system.

•

The job is fully discussed with the person issuing the Work Permit.

•

The Work Permit is posted obviously at the work site.

•

The work party is briefed on the details of the Work Permit including any potential hazards and on all the precautions taken or to be taken.

•

The precautions as mentioned on the Work Permit are maintained throughout the activity.

•

The work party understand that if circumstances change work must be brought to a safe stop and advice sought.

•

The work party remains within the limitations set on the Work Permit, which can include physical boundaries; type of work and time of validity.

•

On completion or suspension of the work: − the site is left in a safe, clean and tidy condition, − the Work Permit Issuer is informed,.and − the Work Permit is signed-off properly.

Individuals working within the Permit-to-Work System must ensure that: •

They have received instruction and have a good understanding of the local PTW system.

•

They do not start any work requiring a Work Permit until it has been properly authorised and issued.

•

They receive a briefing (e.g. Tool Box Talk) from the supervisor on the tasks to be undertaken and the particular hazards involved and precautions to be taken.

•

They follow the instructions specified on the Work Permit.

•

When they stop work, the site and any equipment they have been using is left in a safe, clean and tidy condition.

•

If in doubt or if circumstances change, they must bring work to a safe stop and consult immediately with their supervisor.

The core of the PTW system is the Work Permit document, which will carry information such as the work to be undertaken, the trade/craft/party to execute the work, the work location, the potential hazards, precautions to be taken, limits to validity and authorising signatures, verification of work by competent authority, etc. Every effort must be made to keep the Work permit document

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simple and user friendly. Universal pictograms and multi-language formats may be used where appropriate. 4.3

Shift Hand-over Shift hand-over can be one of the most vulnerable times for a Permit-To-Work system. The failure to pass on the correct information has been shown to be the cause of many accidents. ADNOC Group Companies' Permit-To-Work systems must emphasise the importance of planning the shift change such that there is sufficient overlap to allow proper review and discussion of the status of all extant permits/ certificates. The systems for recording and displaying permit status such as: permit log book, permit files, display boards and computer screens and print outs, as well as the Permit-To-Work form itself, must be designed to facilitate clear communication at shift hand-over. The shift hand-over arrangements must be audited regularly to ensure its continued effectiveness

4.4

Implementation Of Permit To Work Systems The International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) Guidelines on Permit-To-Work Systems [Ref. 7] provide further best practice information including recommendations on: •

Information to be included on a PTW form.

•

Training and competence requirements.

•

Documentation.

•

Communication.

•

Verification and monitoring of the PTW system.

•

Preparation, including isolations, precautions, and gas testing.

•

Display of Work Permits.

•

Revalidation.

•

Suspension.

•

Action in an emergency.

•

Monitoring Work Permits.

•

Completion procedures.

•

Work Permit inspections/audits.

•

Review of the PTW system.

[7] Guidelines On Permit To Work (PTW) Systems, OGP Report No 6.29/189, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, January 1993.

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5.

EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT Employee involvement is an essential feature of the identification of hazards, assessment of risk and implementation of risk control measures process. The contribution of employees to improvement of safety by Task Risk Assessment and the Permit-To-Work System are noted above in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In particular, employees who work closely with hazardous materials and processes are in a unique position to contribute to the identification, assessment and control implementation process. They may be able to: •

Identify the strong points of the existing safety regime.

•

Identify the weak points of the safety regime.

•

Identify opportunities for safety improvement.

•

Identify threats to safety that need addressing.

These four bullet points are the basis of SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis (see, for example, the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive Publication, Involving Employees In Health And Safety [Ref. 11]). Employees must be involved in the application of such techniques, not only in the important area of hazard identification, risk assessment and control application, but in all parts of the HSE Management System that affect them or their work. Employees will be able to actively contribute in a number of specific areas such as: •

Identifying potential for acute or chronic exposure to toxic or allergenic materials.

•

Writing / review / update of procedures.

•

Accessibility, availability, use and performance of PPE, survival equipment and incident response equipment.

•

Location, type and clarity of warnings such as signs, lights and sirens.

•

Location, type and use of fire alarm initiators and emergency shutdown initiators.

•

Incident investigation, reporting and follow up;

•

Near miss investigation, reporting and follow up.

ADNOC Group Companies must ensure that the implementation of their HSE Management System includes for relevant employee involvement in these and similar activities and must provide mechanisms for two-way communication between management and employees that facilitates the raising and dealing with safety issues. [11] Involving Employees In Health And Safety, Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, 2001, ISBN 0 7176 2053 0.

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ADNOC Group Companies must ensure that necessary resources are available and applied to obtain optimum employee involvement, particularly in the areas of: •

Training.

•

Attaining competency and experience.

•

Time available to carry out HSE duties within normal working time.

In particular, no employee must feel that they will be "victimised" or "blamed" for identifying lapses in safety or pointing out opportunities for improvement. Group Company safety culture must provide an environment where employees will identify lapses of safety and point out opportunities for improvement as a matter of course, because of management's strong commitment to safety. Where relevant, contractors must be involved in the identification of hazards, assessment of risk and application of controls process. This must be taken account of in the implementation of each ADNOC Group Company HSE Management System. Obtaining satisfactory employee involvement will take time and effort from management and this must be reflected in the Group Company HSE Management System. Guidance on securing employee involvement and maximising the benefits that can accrue can be found in such publications as the UK Health and Safety Executive publications "Involving Employees In Health And Safety" [Ref. 11] and "Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour" [Ref. 12]. 5.1

Right to Refuse Dangerous Work An essential principle of employee involvement is the right and duty of every employee to intercede or question a job or task based on their view that the work is not carried out safely. This principle applies to: •

Work carried out by the employee or the work group/team team to which the employee belongs;

•

Work carried out by others employees with which the employee has no work group/team relationship.

This principle is stated explicitly in the ADNOC Corporate HSE Policy as follows: ‘Every ADNOC Group Company shall empower all its employees to refrain from actions that are considered a threat to HSE.’

[11] Involving Employees In Health And Safety, Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, 2001, ISBN 0 7176 2053 0. [12] Reducing Error And Influencing Behaviour, HSG 48, Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, 1999, ISBN 0 7176 2452 8.

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6.

INCIDENT REPORTING AND FOLLOW-UP

6.1

Reporting Of Incidents In order to attain continuous improvement in safety performance it is necessary to put into practice lessons learnt from incidents. The ADNOC HSEMS gives requirements and expectations for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up in its sub-element 6.4 [Ref. 1]. This covers both incidents that are reportable to ADNOC according to the criteria in the document ‘Code of Practice on Reporting of Serious HSE Incidents (to ADNOC)’ [Ref. 13] and incidents that are not reportable to ADNOC. ADNOC requirements and expectations include:

6.2

•

System for the reporting of incidents to ADNOC [Ref. 13].

•

Provision for investigation and follow-up actions, including training and ensuring awareness of reporting procedures.

•

Implementation of corrective or preventative actions to remove or reduce risk from further similar incidents.

•

Communication of lessons learnt from the incident.

Learning Lessons Group Companies must ensure that their systems for incident investigation, follow-up and reporting facilitate use of meaningful incident data in identifying hazards, assessing risks and implementing control measures. In particular: •

Incident investigations and consequent reports must clearly identify the root cause where this is known and all contributing factors that can be ascertained.

•

Relevant personnel (and contractors) must be made aware of the importance of reporting "Near Misses" as well as actual incidents so that lessons can be learnt before an incident occurs.

•

Relevant information from incident and near miss investigation must be disseminated to those who would benefit from this information, including those involved in relevant Task Risk Assessment (section 3) and Permit-to-Work Systems (section 4). This information must also be disseminated to contractors, where relevant.

•

Dissemination of information must be in a form so that the lessons to be learnt can be clearly applied and that preventative actions from root causes can be fed back to HSEMS [Ref. 1] for improvements.

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002. [13] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of Practice on Reporting of Serious HSE Incidents (to ADNOC)’, ADNOC-COPV1-08.

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•

6.3

Ensure incident details including root causes, contributing factors and recommended means of preventing or mitigating future occurrences are recorded in a suitable database. Such a database must be readily accessible by those who would benefit from its contents, and should incorporate a suitable tracking system to ensure that the recommendations (from investigations) are implemented.

ADNOC Group Experience ADNOC Group Companies should share incident and near-miss information with other ADNOC Group Companies so that all can benefit from the experience. Group Companies must share incident data where the lessons learnt from the incident imply a high potential for harm to persons or the environment or to assets or reputation. Data shared should include a description of the circumstances of the incident and its consequences and a summary of the conclusions of the investigation especially root causes, contributing factors and possible preventative or control measures. Coordination of information sharing should be through ADNOC EH&S Division, as detailed in the ADNOC Codes of Practice ‘HSE Administration Systems’ [Ref. 16]. The methodology to communicate such information to ADNOC is detailed in the document ‘Code of Practice on Reporting of Serious HSE Incidents (to ADNOC)’ [Ref. 13]. Similarly ADNOC Group Companies that are affiliated with multi-national organisations are encouraged to share relevant incident data gathered from its affiliate with other Group Companies.

6.4

Incident Causation As a prelude to Incident Investigation, it is useful to consider Incident Causation for which there exist a number of techniques. One such technique is the Hazard 'Bow-tie' Model, which describes the basic Hazard - Top Event - Consequence sequence, as shown in Figure 2 below. The model highlights the point that it is the hazard that can have undesirable consequences and must be managed. This involves understanding both causation, i.e. how the hazard may be released, as well as consequence, i.e. what could possibly result if the hazard is in fact released. The Hazard ‘Bow-Tie’ Model is explained in further detail in Appendix 3 of Codes of Practice ‘Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’ [Ref. 6]

[6] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of practice on Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’, ADNOCCOPV5-01, May 2004. [16] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: HSE Administration Systems’, ADNOC-COPV1-01. [13] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of Practice on Reporting of Serious HSE Incidents (to ADNOC)’, ADNOC-COPV1-08.

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Escalation factor

Control of escalation factor

Control of escalation factor

Threat 1

Consequence 1 Barriers to prevent threat

H A Z A R D

Escalation factor

Threat 2

Recovery preparedness measures Top event

Threat 3

Consequence 1

Consequence 1

Figure 2 - Hazard Analysis - The ‘Bow-Tie’ The model states that for a hazard at a location there are a number of causes (threats) that will release the hazard (top event) and that if a hazard is released that there are a number of possible outcomes (consequences). To manage the hazard fully requires that all threats are suitably and sufficiently controlled (barriers) and that suitable and sufficient measures are in place for all consequences possible and foreseeable (recovery preparedness measures). 6.5

Incident Investigation With reference to Figure 2, during an incident investigation it must be ascertained how the hazard was released and the threats that were not suitably and sufficiently controlled. It must also be ascertained whether recovery preparedness measures failed. Section 6.2 includes the requirement that incident investigations and consequence reports must clearly identify the root cause and all contributing factors that can be ascertained. In incident investigation the following terms are used: •

Root cause means the initiating event that begins the chain of events that leads to an incident.

•

An active failure is a failure of equipment or procedure that has immediate consequences with potential for harm to people.

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•

Latent failure is the failure of equipment, procedures, organization or other management system that does not immediately lead to an incident, but either makes the incident more likely or makes the potential consequences more severe.

•

Contributing factors are additional failures, which allow the situation established by the root cause to go unchecked, leading either to an incident or to an incident with more severe consequences than otherwise. These can be active or latent failures. Contributing factors can include failures of the management system, including organisation and planning.

Where human failure (error) is a contributor to an incident, and experience shows this is usually the case, the investigators must attempt to identify: •

Why the error occurred.

•

What the contributing factors might be.

Contributing factors include any circumstance that made the error more likely, including work stress, poor communications, lack of correct equipment or procedures, lack of training, lack of skills or lack of knowledge. Section 6.6 expands on the types of human failure that can contribute to incidents. Consideration must then be given to ways and means of reducing the likelihood of similar errors in the future e.g. by means of a system of feedback to the HSEMS for future improvements. This may involve making changes to equipment, or to procedures, or other management systems, as appropriate, within the bounds of what is reasonably practicable. To state that the personnel must "take more care" in future will not normally result in an improvement in safety. Amongst others, important considerations in conducting incident investigations are:

6.6

•

Correct team composition.

•

The need for external input (e.g. expert or otherwise) in some cases

•

What incidents need investigation

•

The need for investigation of high potential near misses.

Human Failure This sub-section provides an outline of how human failure can cause and contribute to incidents, and provides some guidance as to how human failure can be reduced. ADNOC Group Companies must take these principles into account when designing systems (including management systems) and when carrying out incident investigations and dealing with subsequent follow-up and recommendations. For a more detailed treatise on the role of human error in incidents consult a specialist reference sources must be consulted, such as Health and Safety Executive Publication HSG 48 "Reducing Error and Influencing Behaviour" [Ref. 12].

[12] Reducing Error And Influencing Behaviour, HSG 48, Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, 1999, ISBN 0 7176 2452 8.

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There are three categories of factors that can increase the risk of human failure: 1.

Job factors.

2.

Individual factors.

3.

Organisation and management factors.

Examples of failures in each category are listed below. Refer to ADNOC Codes of Practice ‘Directions for Preparing the Annual HSE Letter’ [Ref. 17], which provides the detailed listing and breakdown of General Failure Types that are to be used in incident reporting/investigation. These include the above human failure types. Job Factors: •

Poor design of equipment and instruments.

•

Constant disturbances and interruptions.

•

Missing or unclear instructions.

•

Poorly maintained equipment.

•

High workload.

•

Noisy and unpleasant working conditions

Individual Factors: •

Low skill and competence levels.

•

Tired staff.

•

Bored or disheartened staff.

•

Individual medical problems.

•

Misjudgement.

•

Carelessness.

•

Overconfidence.

•

Lack of motivation.

Organisation and Management Factors: •

Poor work planning leading to high work pressure.

•

Lack of safety systems and barriers.

•

Inadequate response to previous incidents.

•

Management based on one-way communications.

•

Deficient co-ordination and responsibilities.

•

Poor management of health and safety.

•

Poor health and safety culture.

[17] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Directions for Preparing the Annual HSE Letter’, ADNOC-COPV1-07

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Human failure can also be divided into errors and violations. An error is an action or decision that was not intended, but which resulted in a deviation from an acceptable standard, and which led to an undesirable outcome. A violation is a deliberate deviation from a rule or procedure. Errors can be further sub-divided into "skill based errors" involving "lapses of memory" and "slips of action" and "mistakes", which can be further sub-divided into "rule-based mistakes" and "knowledge based mistakes". Violations can be sub-divided into "routine violations", "situational violations" and "exceptional violations". Figure 3 shows the sub-division of human failures according to these types. A brief description of each type is given below:

Slips of action Skill based errors Lapses of memory Errors Rule -based mistakes Mistakes Knowledgebased mistakes

Human Failures

Routine

Violations

Situational

Exceptional

FIGURE 3:

TYPES OF HUMAN FAILURE

Skill-based errors are those errors that can be made even by an experienced, well-trained and well-motivated person. They are often the result of distractions or overconfidence.

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Slips of action are failures in carrying out the actions of a task. Examples are: picking the wrong component from a mixed box, operating the wrong switch or transposing digits when copying out numbers. Slips can often be avoided by redesigning the task or altering the equipment used. Lapses Of Memory occur when a person forgets to carry out an action or loses their place in a task. An example is driving away a road tanker while still connected to a loading bay. The risk of lapses of memory can be reduced by minimising distractions and interruptions while performing HSE-Critical tasks and providing effective reminders, especially for tasks that take a long time to complete. Mistakes are when a person does the wrong thing believing it to be right. Rule-based mistakes occur when behaviour is based on remembered rules and familiar procedures. An example is an operator overfilling a tank after a modification to increase the rate of filling. Shift handovers are a particularly vulnerable time for communication failures that lead to rule-based mistakes. Rule-based mistakes can often be avoided by effective communication and by effective change-control. Knowledge-based mistakes occur when people are presented with unfamiliar circumstances and must make goals, develop plans and procedures by extrapolating from the knowledge available to them. Many errors that occur during emergency response fall into this category. Improving the knowledge base, especially regarding potential hazards, can often reduce the risk of knowledge-based mistakes. Specifically for emergency response, this may be achieved via table-top or other emergency response exercises which deal with potential situations (as opposed to real historic events). Routine violations occur where breaking a rule or procedure has become the normal way of working within a particular group. This can be due to: •

The desire to cut corners to save time and energy.

•

The perception that the rules are too restrictive.

•

The belief that the rules no longer apply.

•

Lack or rule enforcement.

•

New workers starting a job where routine violation has become the norm and so not realising that this is not the correct way of working.

Examples of routine violations are routine operation of plant or equipment with shutdown overrides in force or guards missing and working without PPE. The presence of routine violations has a debilitating effect on the safety motivation of personnel as well as being a serious source of potential incidents. It is essential that both incident investigation and day-to-day management review is able to identify areas where routine violations occur and that effective steps are taken immediately to redress the situation.

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Situational violations occur when rule breaking arises from pressures of the job, including, time pressure, insufficient staff for the workload, the right equipment not being available, or even extreme weather. Examples of situational violations are: provision of safety harnesses for working at height, but no provision for attaching the harnesses; missing or degraded safety equipment; and provision of poorly designed, slow or faulty software. Situational violations can often be avoided by applying the principles of employee involvement and ensuring good communications between employees and management regarding job pressures. Exceptional violations occur when a rule is deliberately broken to try and fix an existing safety issue. They can only occur when something else has already gone wrong and so are relatively rare. The risk of exceptional violations can be reduced by reducing the time pressure on staff to act quickly in novel situations and by use of risk assessments prior to carrying out nonroutine tasks (see Section 3). ADNOC recommends that the possibility of these different types of human failure is considered during incident investigations. Communication between Group Companies regarding incidents must use the above terminology with respect to human failure.

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7.

HAZARD AND UNSAFE ACT/CONDITION REPORTING ADNOC Group Companies must have in place a system that encourages its employees, management and, where relevant, contractors to be proactive in: •

Hazard awareness.

•

Preventing unsafe acts by themselves or colleagues.

•

Identifying unsafe conditions, which are situations that may lead to an incident if not redressed.

•

Taking responsibility in dealing with unsafe conditions and knowing how to do so safely.

Hazard awareness is a state where a person is alert to what they are doing and to what is going on around them. It involves the ability to recognise the potential for actions or conditions that might result in accident or injury. An unsafe act is something a person does that can cause accident or injury. An unsafe condition is a situation, which, if it continues, can lead to an accident or injury. Unsafe conditions are usually the result of unsafe acts. Dealing with unsafe conditions covers all actions taken by those identifying the unsafe condition including: •

Stopping the job if there is immediate risk that continuing would result in harm.

•

Steps taken to eliminate the unsafe condition where, after due consideration of the risks, it is safe to do so.

•

Communication of the nature of the unsafe condition to interested parties to avoid accident and injury.

•

Reporting of the unsafe condition to line management for action.

•

Any reporting of the unsafe condition for records purposes (e.g. during audits).

All personnel must be given initial training in hazard, unsafe act and unsafe condition reporting supplemented by refresher courses at suitable intervals in the system used. Training requirements for initial and refresher courses must be built into the implementation of the Group Company HSE Management System. ADNOC makes no specific recommendation for the hazard and unsafe condition reporting system to be used by Group Companies. Many companies will be using their own proprietary system. However, the chosen system must be consistent with the requirements set out here. The level of provision of resources to the hazard and unsafe condition recognition and reporting system, time spent on the system and management commitment to the system, must reflect the company commitment to safety contained in the Group Company HSE Policy.

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8.

TRAINING AND COMPETENCY ADNOC Group Companies must ensure that all personnel who carry out, or may carry out, HSE-critical tasks must be adequately trained and competent to do so. Minimum competency levels for HSE-critical tasks must be defined. Records of qualifications, training and competency must be kept and made available for ADNOC or appointed third party audit when requested. Qualifications attained from external bodies must be authenticated. Also refer to the expectations as detailed in Sub-element 3.4 – ‘Competence Assurance’ of the ADNOC HSEMS [Ref 1]. Competency and training requirements must be specified for two HSE-Critical task areas, i.e.: 1. general requirements for day-to-day safety, e.g office safety, road safety, lifting, eye and hearing protection, etc. 2. requirements specific to the safe performance of their job, e.g. use of specialist tools, using BA sets, scaffolding standards, chemical handling, etc.. Training and competency requirements should include include as a minimum: •

Hazard awareness and unsafe condition reporting (Section 7).

•

Familiarity with procedures and orderliness standards for the job.

•

Safe operating limits for equipment, systems and tools.

•

Task Risk Assessment (Section 3).

•

The Permit-to-Work System (Section 4).

•

Selection, condition monitoring and use of personal protective equipment and safety equipment.

•

Selection, condition monitoring and use of tools.

•

Emergency procedures and response [Ref. 14].

•

Competency in spoken and written English

Procedures are the proven step-by-step way to do a job safely. Orderliness is having a safe place for materials and the arrangement of materials so as not to cause an unsafe condition.

[1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002. [14] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice ‘Code of Practice on Crisis And Emergency Management’, ADNOC-COPV5-02, May 2004

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9.

SIMOPS AND INTERFACE ARRANGEMENTS Where ADNOC Group companies carry out activities in close proximity to activities that are the responsibility of another organisation (or organisations) such that there is potential for interactions leading to an increased hazard or risk, then the ADNOC Group Company must take steps to ensure that appropriate health, safety and environment interface arrangements are in place. The other organisation may be: •

other ADNOC Group Company or companies that operate on or in close proximity of the same site,

•

different departments/divisions of the same Group Company that operate with different business responsibilities but on, or in close proximity of, the same site. Typical examples of such Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS) are producing on an offshore platform at the same time as drilling a well, or carrying out construction works on, or adjacent to, plant while it is still in production.

In either case, all affected organisations must cooperate to avoid duplication of work and to ensure that the health, safety and environmental interface arrangements achieve the intended result. The principles noted here and the requirement for health, safety and environmental interface arrangements apply to either of the above. The focus must be on the activity combinations that occur on a non-routine basis. It is expected that each ADNOC Group Company HSE Management System will cover activity combinations that occur routinely, such as simultaneous production and routine maintenance, and that there will be no need for additional interface arrangements in such cases. 9.1

SIMOPS Procedures Group Companies in which SIMOPS occur, must have a formal SIMOPS procedure to provide structure to the development of documented Health, Safety and Environmental interface arrangements for non-routine activities. The SIMOPS procedures should address the full range of activities including approach, set-up, handover of control, work activities, return of control and departure from site. The procedure must include the requirement for formal risk assessment specific to each SIMOPS process to be carried out, as well as approval and documentation of each step of the process.

9.2

Interface Documentation In following the SIMOPS procedure, the resultant interface arrangements must include all necessary information to link the HSE Management Systems of Group Companies, departments or divisions that are involved, especially:

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•

Overall command and control responsibilities including competency.

•

Other coordinated competency.

•

Communications between organisations at various levels.

•

Interfacing and interaction of Permit-to-Work Systems.

•

Coordinated emergency response arrangements including the carrying out of drills and exercises.

•

Arrangements for incident reporting, investigation and follow-up.

•

Arrangements for hazard and unsafe condition reporting.

•

Readily understandable statement of prohibited combinations of simultaneous operations and additional necessary precautions for other possible simultaneous operations.

•

Identification of additional hazards introduced by potential interactions.

•

Assessment of risks arising from those hazards.

•

Changes to existing hazards and risks introduced by potential interactions.

•

Communication to interested parties of potential hazardous interactions and the steps to be taken to avoid or control them.

HSE

management

responsibilities

including

If the site covered by the interface arrangements is a major hazard site, as defined by the ADNOC Code of Practice on ‘Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’ [Ref. 6], the interface arrangements must be reviewed and authorised by an independent competent person, prior to the operations commencing. The level of detail in the documentation submitted for authorisation must be such as to facilitate the review. Additional back up documentation, such as risk analyses or simultaneous operations reviews, must be supplied to the independent competent person if he so requests. Where the independent competent person believes that the health, safety and environmental interface arrangements are deficient, he must inform the relevant organisations. Discussions must then be held between the independent competent person and the involved organizations, to resolve the issue. No work with the potential for hazardous interactions on a COMAH site must proceed unless the involved organisations have a Health, Safety and Environmental Management System interface document authorised by an independent competent person.

[6] ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of practice on Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’, ADNOCCOPV5-01 .

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10.

SAFETY CODES OF PRACTICE – STRUCTURE AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS The ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice is divided into six volumes: Volume 1

HSE Administration

Volume 2

Environmental Protection

Volume 3

Occupational Health

Volume 4

Safety

Volume 5

Risk Assessment and Control Of Major Accident Hazards

Volume 6

Verification Of Technical Integrity

Each of the three safety related volumes (Volumes 4, 5 and 6) is headed by a Code of Practice, which provides an outline of the framework that ADNOC expects Group Companies to follow by building their requirements within their own HSE Management Systems and implementations thereof. All three framework Codes of Practice build on the requirements and expectations in the ADNOC HSEMS Manual [Ref. 1] Volume 4 contains the Code of Practice: Management Framework Of Occupational Safety Risk (this document). Volume 4 also contains a series of codes and guidelines designed to provide a standard approach among ADNOC Group Companies to a variety of safety topics. These include: •

Code of Practice: Work Equipment - Risk Assessment and Control.

•

Code of Practice: Fire Risk Assessment.

•

Code of Practice: Personal Protective Equipment.

•

Code of Practice: Non-Routine Operations.

•

Code of Practice: Essential Features Of Road Transport Risk Assessment And Control.

•

Code of Practice: Essential Features Of Marine Transport/Operations Risk Assessment And Control.

•

Code of Practice: Essential Features Of Air Transport Operations Risk Assessment And Control.

•

Code of Practice: Essential Features Of Diving Operations Risk Assessment And Control.

Volume 5 contains the Codes of Practice: Control Of Major Accident Hazards. It also contains codes of practice and guidelines covering topics associated with the identification, assessment, elimination, prevention and control of major hazards: [1] ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002.

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•

Code of Practice: Crisis And Emergency Management.

•

Guideline: Risk Assessment And Quantified Risk Assessment.

•

Best Practice Note: Outline HSE Design Safety Philosophy For Major Hazard Plant And Equipment.

•

Guideline: Incident Command System

Volume 6 contains the document: Code of Practice on Identification and Integrity Assurance Of HSE-Critical Equipment And Systems (as applicable to design, operations and modification). The Asset Integrity and Reliability Management System documentation is under preparation by the joint technical team of Group Company professionals, and will be provided as a draft Code of Practice in mid-2005. Upon completion/finalising, the document will be proposed for acceptance as the corporate Asset Integrity and Reliability Management System by the end of 2005. Figure 4 shows the relationship of the three framework Codes of Practice and the ADNOC HSEMS. ADNOC Group Companies must review the codes and standards they currently use and align them with the ADNOC Codes of Practice and guidelines as appropriate. The Code of Practice in Volume 4, Management framework of Occupational Safety Risk (this document) expands on the requirements to identify hazards and assess risks in the ADNOC HSEMS. Where the hazards are potentially large scale, either because of the quantities of hazardous materials stored or because of processing conditions, then the Code of Practice in Volume 5, Control of Major Accident Hazards, also applies. The Code of Practice in Volume 6, Identification and Integrity Assurance of HSE Critical Equipment and Systems, provides a regime for integrity assurance and independent verification for those items of equipment, that are deemed HSE-critical because of their role in preventing, controlling or mitigating the effects of major accidents. Such HSE-critical equipment may have been identified by application of the Code of Practice on Control Of Major Accident Hazards, or by another route.

HSE MANAGEMENT CODES OF PRACTICE Volume 4: SAFETY COP ON FRAMEWORK OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

Version 1 January, 2005 Page 36

Document No: ADNOC-COPV4-01

Volume 4: Safety Element 4

Codes of Practice Framework of Occupational and Operational Safety Risk Management Work Equipment Risk Assessment and Cont rol Fire Risk Assessment Personal Protective Equipment Non Routine Operations Essential Features of Road Transport Operations, Risk Assessment and Control Essential Features of Marine Transport Operations, Risk Assessment and Control Essential Features of Air Transport Operations, Risk Assessment and Cont rol Essential Features of Diving Operations, Risk Assessment and Control Guidelines To be provided in future

ADNOC HSEMS

Volume 5: Risk Assessment & Control Of Major Accident Hazards Code Of Practice Control of Major Accident Hazards

Element 4

Crisis and Emergency Management Incident Command System Guidelines Risk Assessment & Quantified Risk Assessment Best Practice Notes Outline HSE Design Philosophy For Major Hazard Plant and Equipment

Volume 6: Verification Of Technical Integrity Element 5

Code Of Practice Identification and Integrity Assurance Of HSE Critical Equipment & Systems

FIGURE 4:

ADNOC MANUAL OF CODES OF PRACTICE – SAFETY SECTIONS STRUCTURE AND LINKS

HSE MANAGEMENT CODES OF PRACTICE Volume 4: SAFETY COP ON FRAMEWORK OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT

Version 1 January, 2005 Page 37

Document No: ADNOC-COPV4-01

11.

REFERENCES

1.

ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Management Systems’, January 2002.

2.

Occupational Health and HSE Management Systems - Specification, OHSAS 18001: 1999, British Standards Institute, April 1999.

3.

Management Of Health And Safety At Work, Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, Second Edition, 2000, ISBN 0 7176 2488 9.

4.

A Guide To The Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 1992, United Kingdom Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, Second Edition 1998, ISBN 0 7176 1165 5.

5.

A Guide To The Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and Administration Regulations), Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, 1995, ISBN 0 7176 0938 3.

6.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of Practice on Control Of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)’, ADNOC-COPV5-01.

7.

Guidelines On Permit To Work (PTW) Systems, OGP Report No 6.29/189, International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, January 1993.

8.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Code of Practice on Identification and Integrity Assurance of HSE Critical Equipment and Systems’, ADNOCCOPV6-01.

9.

Task Risk Assessment, CONCAWE Report (3/97), CONCAWE 1997

10.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice: ‘Guideline on Risk Assessment And Quantitative Risk Assessment’, ADNOC-COPV5-03.

11.

Involving Employees In Health And Safety, Health And Safety Executive, HSE Books, 2001, ISBN 0 7176 2053 0.

12.

Reducing Error And Influencing Behaviour, HSG 48, Health and Safety Executive, HSE Books, 1999, ISBN 0 7176 2452 8.

13.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice ‘Code of Practice on Reporting of Serious HSE Incidents (to ADNOC)’, ADNOC-COPV1-08.

14.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice ‘Code of Practice on Crisis And Emergency Management’, ADNOC-COPV5-02.

15.

ADNOC Group Guideline ‘HSE Risk Management’, March 2000.

16.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice ‘HSE Administration Systems’, ADNOCCOPV1-01.

17.

ADNOC Manual of Codes of Practice ‘Directions for preparing the Annual HSE Letter’, ADNOC-COPV1-07.