Administrative Law Cases Compilation

DEFINITION CASE 1: LAUREL v. DESIERTO- KAMAE CRUZ FACTS: In June 1991, President Aquino issued AO 223, constituting a committee for the nationwide preparation for the national centennial celebration in 1998. Subsequently, President Ramos issued EO 128, reconstituting the said committee, which later on became the National Centennial Commission (NCC). Then VP Laurel was appointed as the chair. This commission was an ad-hoc body, the existence of which shall terminate upon the completion of all activities related to the celebration. Subsequently, a corporation named the Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created, Laurel being one of its incorporators and directors. Laurel was later on elected as Expocorp Chief Executive Officer. In August 1998, Senator Ana Coseteng delivered a privilege speech in the Senate denouncing alleged anomalies in the construction and operation of the Centennial Exposition Project at the Clark Special Economic Zone. Upon Senator Drilon’s motion, the privilege speech was referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation and several other Senate Committees for investigation. In February 1999, President Estrada issued AO 35, creating an ad hoc and independent citizen’s committee to investigate all the facts and circumstances surrounding the projects. Former senator Saguisag was appointed as the committee chair. In March 1999, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee recommended for prosecution. In November 1999, in its report, the Saguisag committeerecommended the Ombudsman to conduct further investigation for possible violations of Sec. 3 (a of RA 3019, Sec. 4 (a) in relation to Sec. 11 of RA 6713 and Art. 217 of the RPC. In April 2000, Laurel filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a motion to dismiss questioning the former’s jurisdiction. The Ombudsman denied the motion. Laurel moved for reconsideration but it was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari. In November 2000, a resolution was issued finding probable cause to indict Laurel and Pena for conspiring to violate Sec. 3 (a) of RA 3019, in relation to RA 1594. Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution with respect to Laurel but dismissed the charge against Pena. Laurel mainly assails the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman on the ground that he is not a public officer because: (1) Expocorp was a private corporation, not a GOCC; (2) The NCC was not a public office; (3) He, both as chairman of NCC and of Expocorp, was not a public officer as defined under RA 3019. ISSUE: WON Laurel, as the NCC chair, is a public officer. HELD: Yes. RATIO: Neither the Constitution nor RA 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), defines who public officers are. However, Mechem, a recognized authority in this subject, provides that “a public LAW, OFFICERS AND ELECTION ATTY. CASE officeADMINISTRATIVE is the right, authority andPUBLIC duty, created and conferred by law, LAW| by which, forLA a VIÑA| given period, DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 1 either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with

some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.” According to Mechem, the characteristics of a public office include the delegation of sovereign functions, its creation by law and not by contract, an oath, salary, continuance of the position, scope of duties, and the designation of the position as an office. Laurel argues that his office does not involve the delegation of sovereign functions. However, this court believes that NCC performs executive functions. The executive power is generally defined as the “power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.” The executive function, therefore, concerns the implementation of the policies as set forth by law. First, the NCC performs executive functions because it was precisely created to execute the policies and objectives needed to rationalize the relevance of historical links with other countries. This is in pursuant of Art. 14 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the provisions on education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports. Second, the President, upon whom the executive order is vested, created the NCC by executive order. Hence, the NCC is an implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers. Third, NCC also had a role in the country’s economic development, especially in Central Luzon, hence contributing to the fundamental state policy of promoting industrialization and full employment. The fact that the NCC is a mere ad-hoc body does not make it less of a public office because, as provided for by Chief Justice Marshall, if a duty be a continuing one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the government and not by contract, which an individual is appointed by government to perform, who enters on the duties pertaining to his station without any contract defining them, if those duties continue though the person be changed, it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office of the person who performs the duties from an officer. Under RA 3019 Sec. 2 (b), a “public officer” “includes elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified for exemption service receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government as defined in the preceding paragraph.” The use of the word “include” means this definition is not restrictive. Art. 203 of the RPC provides that a “public officer” is “any person who, by direct provision of law, popular election or appointment by competent authority, takes part in the performance of public functions in the government of the Philippines, or performs in said government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate official, of any rank or class.” Sec. 2 (1) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 states that an “officer” as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee” refers to a “person whose duties not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular person in the exercise of governmental power, “officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having authority to do that act or exercise of that function. Sec. 3 (b) of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) define a “public official” as including elective and appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the career or non-career service including military and police personnel, whether or not they receive compensation, regardless of amount. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE G01| BATCH 4| 2 CASEDIGESTS| 2: VETERANS FEDERATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYES- GC PILLENA

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CHARACTERISTICS CASE 3: SANTOS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR- GABRIEL ABLOLA FACTS: Segundo Santos was, for a number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the Department of Labor, His monthly pay was P259 per month, or P3108 per annum. On August 24, 1960, he was extended an appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliator II (Regional Office No. 3, Manila), with compensation per annum of P3493 vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned. This appointment, effective September 1, 1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962. In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of Labor Conciliator II. 1 Petitioner’s demand for the revocation of respondent Tiongco’s appointment and payment to him (Santos) of salary differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor. From the foregoing events stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20, 1962 three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was on August 23, 1962. 2 The petition prays, inter alia, that respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to uphold as legal and existing petitioner’s appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, for September 1, 1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid be paid petitioner. Respondents seasonably answered the petition. Before the case could be tried on the merits, that is, on February 14, 1963, Santos died. A motion to substitute the "Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased," represented by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was filed. This triggered a move on respondents’ part to seek dismissal of the case. The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without costs. Hence, this appeal on purely questions of law. ISSUE: May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of petitioner herein? HELD AND RATIO: Public office is a public trust. It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto. In this sense, it is not property which passes to his heirs. None of the heirs may replace him in that position. It is in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may not press Santos’ claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II. Actio personalis moritur cum persona. But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of Santos. That jurisdiction continues until the termination of the suit. It is true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials. But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on that money claim — it subsists, Resolution of this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to the position of Labor Conciliator II. We rule that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the present proceedings. Ruling on Merits: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| IICASE On August 24, 1960, Petitioner, a second grade eligible, was appointed Labor Conciliator at an DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 3 annual compensation of P3493 effective September 1, 1960. As far as salary is concerned, no

law, rule or regulation has been violated. Because, an annual pay of P3493 is well within the range provided for second grade civil service eligibles. Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner’s appointment as Labor Conciliator II. They say that such appointment is within the prohibition set forth in the memorandum circular of the Civil Service Commission dated February 16, 1961, thus: "Employees should not be assigned or promoted to positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of which exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility." Respondents likewise aver that it was because of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was recalled on September 7, 1961. The circular was not violated. And the withdrawal of petitioner’s appointment is not a proven fact. What the record clearly discloses is that the original appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken out of the Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962 and released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962. More important now is that the defense of recall has been abandoned by respondents. The case was ready for trial below. They did not go to trial. Instead, they thought it advantageous to them — upon petitioner’s death — to submit their case on their motion to dismiss based solely on legal grounds, namely, that the death of petitioner extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining claim for damages is ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death. The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos’ heirs. And, as we have earlier in this opinion stated, his Estate may prosecute that claim to its conclusion. It will not be in harmony with our sense of justice to return this case to the court below — at this stage — just to allow respondents to prove their defense of recall of petitioner’s appointment. Respondents had a choice: To go trial on the merits upon the issues raised in their answer; or, seek to overthrow petitioner’s case on legal issues. They did elect the latter. They cannot be permitted once again to return to the lower court for a trial on the merits. Suitors should not normally be allowed to gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results. It is unfair that this case should, on respondents’ choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court, and back to the lower court and perhaps only to be appealed once again to an appellate court. The ensuing delay, increased cost of litigation, and trouble and anxiety and harassment to be caused to the adverse party, the wastage of the courts’ time — these are reasons potent enough to support this view. At all events, petitioner’s right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both clear. Civil Service approval completed petitioner’s appointment, 6 clinched the case for him. The rest is a question of mathematical computation. Petitioner’s pay as Labor Conciliator I was at the rate of P259 per month of P3108 per annum. His increased compensation as Labor Conciliator II from September 1, 1960, to August 23, 1962, the date of his retirement is at the rate of P3493 per annum, specified in his promotional appointment, and reiterated in the 5th indorsement of the Commissioner of Civil Service to the Secretary of Labor dated May 22, 1962. He is entitled only to the pay set forth in his appointment, and no more — absent a legal adjustment thereof. There is no such adjustment here. Petitioner’s salary differentials during the period covered amounts to P761.68. And this should be paid to his Estate. Upon the view we take of this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 10, 1963, and direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier to pay the Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of P761.68 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE BATCH 4|DON 4 TUTAAN CASEDIGESTS| 4: ABEJAG01| v. TANADA-

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari, petitioner seeks the annulment of the orders issued by respondent Judge Tanada which decreed, among others, the revision of some 36 precincts contained in the counter-protest filed by respondent Radovan.

Petitioner Evelyn Abeja and private respondent Rosauro Radovan (deceased) were contenders for the office of municipal mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, in the May 11, 1992, national elections. Based on the official returns of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for the said municipality, private respondent was credited with 6,215 votes as against petitioner's 5,951 votes. After the proclamation of private respondent, petitioner filed an election contest, with the RTC of Lucena City. The protest covered twenty-two (22) precincts. On June 5, 1992, private respondent filed an Answer with a Counter-Protest of the results in thirty-six (36) precincts. During the pre-trial, private respondent's counsel filed a motion praying that the 36 counter-protested precincts be revised only if it is shown after completion of the revision of the 22 protested precincts that petitioner leads by a margin of at least one vote. The trial court declared discussion on the matter to be premature. The revision of the ballots covering 22 protested precincts was completed in September 1992. Thereafter, petitioner urged private respondent to commence the revision of the 36 counter-protested precincts by praying the necessary fees for the purpose. Private respondent refused. Petitioner moved that the counter-protest of private respondent be considered withdrawn. Private respondent opposed the motion and reiterated that the ballots of the 36 counter-protested precincts should only be revised and recounted if it is shown after the revision of the contested ballots of the 22 precincts that petitioner leads by at least one vote. Petitioner filed another motion, praying that the counter-protest be considered withdrawn from the time the final report of the Board of Revisors is submitted to the court for approval. The then presiding Judge, Hon. Ludovico Lopez, did not rule on the aforementioned motions but, according to petitioner, Judge Lopez declared during a hearing that once a ruling is made on the contested ballots of the 22 protested precincts, he will not allow further revision of ballots. Judge Lopez was reassigned to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City. Before transferring to his new post, Judge Lopez issued an order which contained his ruling in each of the contested ballots in the 22 contested precincts and the reasons therefor. The ruling did not contain a summation of the exact number of votes to be credited to each of the parties, or a declaration of the winner in the election protest for that matter.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Determine Votes, To Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office considering that based on her own computation of revised ballots ruled upon by Judge Lopez, she led private respondent by a margin of 281 votes. Private respondents filed a Motion to Correct the order issued by Judge Lopez as well as oppositions to the motion of petitioner. Respondents claim that petitioner's "Motion to Proclaim Winner" is premature since the 36 counter-protested precincts are yet to be revised. Respondent Judge Federico Tanada, who succeeded Judge Lopez, denied the "Motion to Determine Votes, to Proclaim Winner and to Allow Assumption of Office" filed by petitioner. Respondent judge ruled that petitioner's motion was indeed premature on the ground that until after the 36 counter-protested precincts have been revised, the court could not render a valid decision.

ISSUE: WON private respondents should be allowed to proceed with the revision of the 36 precincts subject of the counter-protest. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 5

HELD AND RATIO: No, the assailed orders of respondent judge as well as the results of the revision of the 11 ballot boxes subject of the counter-protest are set aside.

Petitioner argues that the sequence in the presentation of evidence may be altered for special reasons the applicable rules of procedure do not allow presentation of evidence after the court has already rendered a decision. Clearly, petitioner considers the order of Judge Lopez to be the "decision" on the case although the order did not contain a summation of the total votes credited to each of the parties or a declaration of the winner in the election protest. Petitioner objects to the stand taken by private respondent on the procedure to be followed for being "unprocedural" in the sense that a decision rendered on the election protest would be subject to another decision for the counter-protest. It is further argued that since the 36 counter-protested precincts were already under the jurisdiction of the trial court, the same should have been revised unconditionally and should not have been subjected to the whim and caprice of the private respondent.

The record shows that the revision of ballots in the 22 protested precincts was completed sometime in September 1992. Judge Lopez issued a ruling on the said revision almost a year later. Private respondent failed to commence the revision of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts, stubbornly maintaining the position that said precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision that petitioner leads private respondent by at least one vote. No law or rule authorizes such a procedure. Consequently, private respondent must be deemed to have waived or abandoned his counter-protest. The applicable Comelec rules provide for the presentation of evidence by the parties in succession in the order or sequence provided under Sec. 2, rule 17 (Comelec Rules) which must be submitted within a reasonable time, if not immediately after the revision of the precincts covered by the protest proper. By insisting that the counter-protested precincts should be revised only if it is shown after the revision of the protested precincts that his opponent leads by at least one vote, private respondent is adopting a selfserving rule without legal sanction calculated to unduly prolong the litigation. It is readily apparent from the provisions of the applicable Comelec Rules that the court shall render its decision after both parties shall have presented their respective evidence. Nowhere in the said provisions is it indicated that presentation of evidence by the protestee may continue after the court has ruled on the evidence of the protestant and determine the number of votes obtained by the latter. Otherwise, it would be possible for the protestee to prolong the protest and render it moot by expiration of the term of office contested.

Furthermore, private respondent is guilty of laches, which, in the case at bar, private respondent unreasonably failed to cause the revision of the counter-protested precincts despite being afforded ample time to do so and must be deemed to have abandoned it.

CASE 5: NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- RONWELL LIM FACTS: Violeta Garcia was a Bachelor of Laws graduate. On 1977, she was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII (later reclassified to Deputy Register of Deeds III) under permanent status. Sometime after, however, EO PUBLIC 649 was OFFICERS enacted. It AND authorized for theLAW| restructuring the LRC to ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, ELECTION ATTY. LAof VIÑA| CASE NALTDRA and regionalized the Offices of the Registers therein. The problem with this law, DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 6

however, is that it imposes a new requirement of BAR membership to qualify for a permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II or higher. For not being a member of the bar, therefore, Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II under temporary status. It was nonetheless renewed in 1985. On 1986, however, then Minister of Justice notified her of the termination of her services for allegedly receiving bribe money. Thus, Garcia appealed but the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on grounds that the termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. Thereafter, the CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be restored to her position. According to the CSC, under the vested right theory, the new requirement of the BAR membership will not apply to her but only to new applicants during or after the passage of EO 649. Since she had been holding said position even before the passage of EO 649, the same shall not apply to her. Thus, the NALTDRA filed the present petition to assail the validity of the said CSC Resolution. It contends that Sec 8 & 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in the LRC and transferred their functions to the appropriate new offices created by said EO. It also created offices, which requires the issuance of new appointments to qualified office holders. Verily, EO 649 applies to Garcia, and not being a member of the Bar, she cannot be reinstated to her former position as Deputy Register of Deeds II ISSUE: WON EO 649, Section 4, which require bar membership, should be applied to Violate Garcia. HELD: Yes. RATIO: EO 649 abolished all the positions in the now defunct LRC and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. The question of whether or not a law abolishes an office is one of legislative intent about which there can be no controversy whatsoever if there is an explicit declaration in the law itself, as in this case. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. On the contention that Garcia has a vested right on the position, the SC ruled that there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices, which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. None of the exceptions to this rule are obtaining in this case. To reiterate, the position that private respondent Garcia would like to occupy anew was abolished pursuant to EO 649, a valid reorganization measure. There is no vested property right to be re employed in a reorganized office. Not being a member of the Bar, the minimum requirement to qualify under the reorganization law for permanent appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II, she cannot be reinstated to her former position without violating the express mandate of the law.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY CASE 6: FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- FRANCIS TORRES FACTS: On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).”

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 7

Justices of this Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.”

The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.

To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint ]was filed with the Secretary General of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.

This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental importance, and that he “himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,” posits that his right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives. ISSUES: [1] WON the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and [2] WON Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules of the 12 th Congress are unconstitutional. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE HELD: DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 8

[1] Yes. The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI. [2] Yes. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional. RATIO: Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment. xxx (5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed on June 2, 2003 and the second impeachment complaint filed was on October 23, 2003, it violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period. On the other hand, under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term “initiate” a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. CASE 7: GUTIERREZ v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES- ANNESIR KADJIM

FACTS: Petitioner files "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)" dated February 25, 2011.

Petitioner’s arguments: 

The Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives



There never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other.

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

The initiation of an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, insisting on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco.



The word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation process from its end or conclusion.

ISSUE: WON the Feb. 2011 decision is inconsistent with the Francisco ruling.

HELD: No.

RATIO: Petitioner’s Motion concedes that the Francisco doctrine on the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.

In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House. 4 Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,5 which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant matters."6 Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provision’s congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND the ELECTION ATTY.petitioner LA VIÑA| herself CASE the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon initiationLAW| to what DIGESTS| 4| 10 process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation. concedes as theG01| start BATCH of the initiation

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote in the Court’s Decision that in such case of "an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into a single act."8 Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.

The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical limitation of impeachment complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to limit the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.

The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine. Moreover, referral of an impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the Constitution to the House.

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CASE 8: BINAMIRA v. GARRUCHO- RALPH VILLANUEVA

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CASE 9: TAPISPISAN v. COURT OF APPEALS- CHEYENNE YU

FACTS: Tapispisan is a public school teacher and has been occupying the position of Teacher 3 since September 1992. She has been teaching for the last 30 years and is currently assigned at the Villamor Air Base Elementary School in Pasay City. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 11

Atty. Sibug, one of the respondents, issued Division Memorandum No. 33 which designated (a): respondent Rumbaoa as OIC-Head Teacher of P. Villanueva Elementary School and (b) respondent Teves as OIC-Principal of Don Carlos Elementary School. Tapispisan felt aggrieved that she has been unduly by-passed and filed a protest with Atty. Sibug contesting the designation. But the protest was denied. Prompting Tapispisan to bring the matter to the Regional Directos of DECS-NCR, but was likewise denied. Tapispisan’s claim: 1. Designation of both Rumbaoa and Teves was made with favouritism and in gross violation of Civil Service and DECS rules and regulations on promotions. 2. She was more qualified for promotion than the other two. DECS-NCR decision: complaint/ protest dismissed. Appointment of both Rumbaoa and Teves are in order due to the Civil Service Commission’s attestation of their qualifications. Not contented, matter was brought before the Civil Service Commission, alleging that such designation is made in violation of the ban on appointments and promotions during the election period. CSC: dismissed; Only appointments/ promotions and not designation can be the subject of the protest. CA: also dismissed the petition; Rumbaoa and Teves are merely designated in acting capacity ISSUE: WON Rumbaoa and Teves are entitled to such designation/ qualified to such public offices. HELD: Yes. RATIO: There was no favouritism in their designation. They satisfactorily proved their merit and fitness to hold such positions in their respective designated positions. Their designations were made by the appropriate appointing authority and were duly attested by the Civil Service Commission, which under the Constitution is the central personnel agency of the government charged with the duty of determining questions of qualifications of merit and fitness of those appointed to the civil service. In the appointment or promotion of employees, the appointing authority considers not only their civil service eligibilities but also their performance, education, work experience, trainings and seminars attended, agency examinations and seniority. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may freely exercise according to his best judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. The final choice of the appointing authority should be respected and left undisturbed. Difference between APPOINTMENT and DESIGNATION 1. Appointment: selection by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. Enjoys a security of tenure unless replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office. EXECUTIVE in nature 2. Designation: the imposition by law of additional duties of an incumbent official. LEGISLATIVE in nature ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 12

Rumbaoa and Teves: designated in such capacities only, not appointed. Therefore it does not violate the ban on appointments and promotions during the election period. Petition denied. CASE 10: PIMENTEL v. ERMITA- REGINALD LAMPITOC FACTS: While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity and not anyone else.

On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292 itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year.

During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE: WON the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.

It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained toLAW, choose the undersecretary. SheELECTION has the option choose. An alter ego, ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND LAW|toATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 13

guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.

The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.

Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president “may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

NOTE: AD INTERIM APPOINTMENTS vs APPOINTMENTS IN AN ACTING CAPACITY

Ad Interim Appointments

Appointments Capacity

in

an

DESCRIPTION

It is permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the COA does not alter its permanent character. (Matibag v. Benipayo)

Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission of Appointments.

WHEN EFFECTIVE

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

Upon Acceptance by Appointee

WHEN MADE

When Congress is in Recess

Any time when there is vacancy

SUBMITTED TO THE COA

YES

NO

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE G01| BATCH 4| 14 CASEDIGESTS| 11: LUEGO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ

Acting

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as “temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee. Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, questions the order and the validity of the respondent’s appointment. ISSUE: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement. HELD: No. RATIO: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary. Section 9(h), Art V of the Civil Service Decree provides that the Commission shall have inter alia the power to “…approve all appointments, whether original or promotional, to positions in the civil service… ….and disapprove those where the appointees do not possess appropriate eligibility or required qualifications.” The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law. When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws. CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment because of its belief that another person was better qualified, which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city mayor. CASE 12: UMOSO v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- REBECCA FLORES FACTS: Umoso is a Senior Civil Engineer who was promoted to the position of Supervising Civil Engineer of DPWH. Caronan is a Senior Civil Engineer who protested the appointment in a letter addressed to the Regional Director of the DPWH. He complained that the candidates for promotion had not been fairly evaluated by DPWH’s Central Review Board. He claimed that he was entitled to preferential consideration being the employee next in rank in the Planning and Design Section The letter was referred to DPWH Committee, which upheld Caronan’s protest and held that Umoso would take Caronan’s position. (So Caronan now would be the Supervising Engineer and Umoso, the Senior Civil Engineer) The DPWH Secretary approved the recommendation of the DPWH Committee. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 15

Umoso now appealed to the MSPB Civil Service for which MSPB made a comparative study of Umoso and Caronan’s qualifications. Their decision was that since Caronan was chosen by the Secretary of DPWH, having 9 yeas of direct exposure and experience, his appointment must be upheld. Further saying that the Secretary has the administrative supervision and control over the entire department including the power to review appointments issued by the DPWH Regional Director. Thus, UMOSO appealed to the Civil Service Commission ISSUE: WON DPWH has the authority to set aside an appointment made by the Regional director of an appointee? YES. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The authority of the Regional Director to appoint is merely a delegated function. Thus it can be reviewed and set aside by the Department Secretary who is the SOURCE of the delegated power. To hold that the Secretary has no authority to review the appointment would create a false impression that the Secretary and Regional Direction are of the same rank. When the Secretary upheld Caronan’s appointment, the Secretary of DPWH is merely exercising his power and authority as Head of the Department. Caronan being the choice of the Secretary of DPWH clearly met the requirements for permanent appointment thus this should not be disturbed. This is in line with a number of SC decisions upholding the discretion of the appointing authority.

DISQUALIFICATION CASE 13: MONSANTO v. FACTORAN- JOYCE BAYLON FACTS: Salvacion Monsanto, an assistant treasurer of Calbayog City, and three other accused; was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum and a fine of P3,500. Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to the Court which affirmed the same. She filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was given absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted on December 21, 1984. By reason of the said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City treasurer that she be restored to her former position as assistant city treasurer since the same post was still vacant. Her letter- request was then referred to the Ministry of Finance for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government Code transferring the power of appointment treasures from the city governments to the said Ministry. The Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. However, she also claims that the full pardon bestowed upon her by the President has already wiped out the crime which, according to her, also implies that her government service has never interrupted and therefore, she is entitled to back pay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 16

The Ministry of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President and Factoran, Deputy Executive Secretary; which denied Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position. ISSUES: (1) WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment; and (2) Effects of a full and absolute pardon HELD: (1) No. (2) RATIO: (1) To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. (2) A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. CASE 14: GARCIA v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT- ARJUNA GUEVARA

FACTS: Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman. ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.

HELD: Yes. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 17

RATIO: The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.

If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.

In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.

Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.

Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.

CASE 15: CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY- JEAN GUECO FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that: Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor; Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of which the President is the Chairman. The petitioners alleged that the cited provision of EO 284contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall unlessOFFICERS otherwise AND provided in this LAW| Constitution, hold anyCASE other ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,not, PUBLIC ELECTION ATTY. LA VIÑA| officeDIGESTS| or employment during their tenure. G01| BATCH 4| 18

They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. The petitioners maintained that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be expressly provided in the Constitution. Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13,Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The provision relied upon by the respondents provides: Sec. 7. . . . . . Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. ISSUES: (1) Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB? (2) Does the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity? (3) Can the respondents be obliged to reimburse the perquisites they have received from the offices they have held pursuant to EO 284? HELD: (1) No. (2) No. (3) Yes. RATIO: (1) The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose stricter prohibition on the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is concerned. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this Constitution "must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW|ofATTY. LA VIÑA|and CASE (3), Article VII; and, theLAW, Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member the Judicial Bar DIGESTS| BATCH 4| 19 Council by virtueG01| of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.

(2) The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do no comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to, but must be required by the official's primary functions. If the functions required to be performed are merely incidental, remotely related, inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official, such additional functions would fall under the purview of "any other office" prohibited by the Constitution. (3) During their tenure in the questioned positions, respondents may be considered de facto officers and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other compensations attached to the office. Any per diem, allowances or other emoluments received by the respondents by virtue of actual services rendered in the questioned positions may therefore be retained by them. Overall, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987Cons CASE 16: CAASI v. COURT OF APPEALS- PATRICIA CAÑALITA FACTS: These are two consolidated cases both involving the disqualification, under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, of one Merito Miguel for the position of mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan to which he was elected in the local elections of Janauary 18, 1988. One case is a petition for review on certiorari of the COMELEC decision dismissing the three petitions of Cascante, Catabay, and Celeste, for the disqualification of Miguel. The other case is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder. Petitioners’ contention: That Merto Miguel is a green card holder, hence a permanent resident of the United States, not of Bolinao. Merito Miguel’s answer: Admits that he is a holder of a green card but denied that he is a permanent US resident. He argues the following: o The green card is only for convenience purposes o To visit his children in the US o For his periodic medical examination o He is permanent resident of Bolinao o He voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, as well as the Congressional elections ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 20

COMELEC (except Commissioner Badoy, Jr.): dismissed the petitions on the ground that the possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines ; that respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy pointed out that as a green card holder, Miguel must, under the Omnibus Election Code, prove that he has waived his status as a permanent immigrant to qualify for elections. This respondent failed to do. ISSUES: (1) WON a green card is a proof that the holder is a permanent US resident. (2) WON Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of US. HELD: (1) Yes. (2) No. RATIO: (1) On its face, the green card issued by the United States immigration to Miguel identifies the latter in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. He was issued a requisite green card or authority to reside in the United States permanently. Immigration is said to be a movement from one country to another with the intention to reside in the latter. An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As resident of the United States, Miguel owes allegiance to it. The law applicable here is Sec.68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (2) There is no evidence which shows that Miguel waived his status as permanent resident of the US before he ran for election. His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988. The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 21 Miguel thus is disqualified for the position of Mayor in Bolinao, Pangasinan.

SCOPE OF QUALIFICATIONS CASE 17: CUYEGKENG v. CRUZ- KELVIN HUNG FACTS: Petitioners are dorctors Jose Cuyegkeng, Pedro Mayuga, Benjamin Roa, Timoteo Alday, Dominador Jacinto, Alejandro Gaerlan and Rosita Rivera- Ramirez. The Council of the Philippine Medical Association, pursuant to section 13 of RA2382, otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959, approved and submitted to the President a revised list of physicians for appointment to the Board of Medical Examiners. The 12 recommendees were: 1. Dr. Cesar Filoteo 2. Dr. Jose Cuyegkeng 3. Dr. Edgardo Caparas 4. Dr. Antonio Guytingco 5. Dr. Pedro Mayuga 6. Dr. Benjamin Roa 7. Dr. Jose Cocjin 8. Dr. Timoteo Alday 9. Dr. Dominador Jacinto 10. Dr. Alejandro Gaerlan 11. Dr. Oscar Chacon 12. Dr. Rosita Rivera- Ramirez The Assistant Executive Secretary informed the council that the President has decided to appoint Dr. Cesar Filoteo (UP), De. Oscar Chacon(UP), Dr. Edgardo Caparas (UST). Dr. Jose Cocjin (UST), Dr. Antonio Guytingco (Government Physician) and Dr. Pedro Cruz (Government Phyisician). The Petitioners, citing Section 13 of RA 2382, alleged that Dr. Pedro Cruz cannot assume the position since he was not in the list of recommendees submitted by the council to the President. Respondent alleged that the list was merely recommendatory. ISSUE: WON the President can lawfully appoint Cruz to assume the position in the Board of Medical Examiners. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The Court is divided into three groups. First group believes that the provisions of the cited section are mandatory. However, section 14 which lays down the qualifications for eligibility does not specify that the candidate must be included in the list submitted by the Executive Council to the President. By imposing the restriction on the appointments, it curtails the the President’s power of appointment. Consequently, Section 13 of RA2382 is unconstiututional and appointment of respondent is lawful and valid. The second group believes that the provisions of section 13 are merely directory. The function of the council is purely recommendatory and those names appearing on the list are mere recommendees. Hence, Section 13 is constitutional and the respondent has valid title to his office. The third group believes that it is not important to inquire into the constitutionality of the provision as well as the nature of the cited provision as either mandatory or directory. As mentioned in the letter of the Asst. Executive Secretary to the Council, the President intended to appoint two government physicians. The list included two government physicians namely: Dr. Guytingco and Dr. Gaerlan both of whom were personal physicians of the President. The ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC AND ELECTION LAW| LA VIÑA| CASE President thought of appointing one OFFICERS to the board and retain one to ATTY. look after his health. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 22 (appointed Guytingco to the Board)

Respondent is an incumbent member of the board. According to Section 15 of RA2382, the term of office of the members of the board is one year. Every member may be reappointed for not more than one year. In the said section, it is not mentioned that the name of the person to be reappointed must appear on the list submitted by the council to the President. (STATCON) In case of conflict between two provisions of the same statute, the last in order of position is frequently held to prevail. B esides, the purpose of Section 13 is just to ensure that the person to be appointed to the position is among the best in the profession. Therefore, respondent has a valid and good title to his office. CASE 18: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DE LA CRUZ- FLOYD MAGO FACTS: Saturnino dela Cruz is an employee of DOTC, Air Transportation Office, he was a Check Pilot II. He was promoted to the position: Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of the Aviation Safety Division. His promotion was assailed by Calamba, saying he did not meet the four year managerial & supervisory qualification for the position because he was appointed as Acting Chief, just more than a year ago. ISSUE: WON de la Cruz can take the position. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The law requirement is four years of work in managerial position AND/OR supervisory position. It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that the use of the term “and/or” means that the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably. Mr. dela Cruz would indeed lack the required years of work experience to qualify for the contested position if the managerial standards in the first clause above were to be strictly followed. At the time of his permanent appointment on November 28, 1994 as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, respondent had a little over one year of managerial experience from his designation as Acting Chief of the Aviation Safety Division during the latter part of 1993. However, the work already rendered by respondent in the ATO at the time of his appointment was well within the supervisory standard in the second clause. Planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and supervising the enforcement of air safety laws, rules and regulations pertaining to licensing, rating and checking of all airmen and mechanics and regulation of the activities of flying schools were part of the work performed by respondent for more than 13 years prior to his appointment. CASE 19: YEE v. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS- ASTER CARRILLO FACTS: Antonia Yee is a civil service eligible serving as as a regular public school teacher having passed the required teacher’s examination. Antonia Yee has since been serving as a public school teacher in Buhang Elementary School, Buhang Hamtic, Antique. In 1957, she married a Chinese citizen, Ng Foo. In the same year, Yee received notice that she is being terminated from her job by reason of her marriage, and subsequent loss of citizenship. Yee then filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the Director of Public Schools to reinstate her. ISSUE: WON Yee should be reinstated. HELD: No. RATIO: She was validly removed from her position as a public school teacher because she lost ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, she PUBLIC OFFICERS LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE her Filipino citizenship when married Ng Foo.AND TheELECTION law provides that persons qualified to G01| BATCH 4| 23 serveDIGESTS| in classified public service must be Filipino citizens. A public school is qualified under public

service. Further, it is so provided that an applicant for the civil service examination must be a Filipino citizen; that requirement subsists even after such applicant had passed the exam.

DE FACTO AND DE JURE OFFICERS CASE 20: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. JOSON- DIANA DE LEON FACTS: July 1, 1995, Felicisimo O. Joson, Jr., then Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) appointed Priscilla Ong as Executive Assistant IV in his office under a contractual status. The appointment was made after the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) thru Director Miguel B. Doctor approved his request for the creation of a contractual position of Executive Assistant IV at the Office of the POEA Administrator, effective not earlier than July 1, 1995. Subsequently, respondent Joson wrote the CSC requesting exemption from the rule requiring appointees to confidential staff positions to meet the prescribed educational qualification. The educational requirement for the position of Executive Assistant is a “Bachelor’s degree relevant to the job” and Priscilla Ong was not a college degree holder. Acting upon this request, the petitioner CSC issued a resolution, approving the appointment of Ong under a Coterminous Temporary status In this case, it is clear that Ong does not meet the educational qualification for the position of Executive Assistant IV. However, considering that Ong has to her credit 65 units leading to a Bachelor’s degree and that the said position is coterminous with the appointing authority and belongs to his confidential/personal staff, the proposed appointment of Ong may be allowed under Coterminous Temporary status. ISSUE: Should Ong be considered a de jure or de facto public officer? HELD: De jure public officer. RATIO: The SC held that Ong is a de jure public offier. The inaction of certain officials led to the non-compliance with the CSC requirement that appointments should be included in the monthly report of personnel action (ROPA), which must be submitted in turn to the CSC. The Court held that legitimate justifications excused the delayed observance of or the non-compliance with the requirement. A de facto officer is: One who is in possession of the office and discharging its duties under color of authority. By color of authority is meant that derived from an election or appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a mere volunteer. The difference between the basis of the authority of a de jure officer and that of a de facto officer is that one rests on right, the other on reputation. It may be likened to the difference between character and reputation. One is the truth of a man, the other is what is thought of him.” It is the color of authority, not the color of title that distinguishes an officer de facto from a usurper. CASE 21: TUANDA v. SANDIGANBAYAN- NORIEL ALEJANDRO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 24

FACTS: Petitioners institute this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the resolution of Sandiganbayan and its orders denying petitioner’s motion for suspension of their arraignment. February 9, 1989 Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Negros Oriental by DILG Secretary Santos. They both took their oath of office on February 16 and 17, 1989. Then, petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. This was denied and enjoined Tuanda to recognize private sectoral representatives. Estrallanes and Binaohan then filed a petition for mandamus with RTC Negros Oriental for recognition as members of the Sangguniang Bayan. It was dismissed. The matter was then brought to RTC Dumaguete City accusing Tuanda and others of taking advantage of their official functions and unlawfully causing undue injury to Estrellanes and Binaohan. Petitioners filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for suspension of the Criminal Case on the ground that a prejudicial question exists. The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by DILG for violation of the provisions saying that the Sanggunian itself must make a determination first of the number of sectors in the city/municipality to warrant representation. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan has issued a resolution saying that the private respondents have rendered such services and the said appointments enjoy the presumption of regularity; for these reasons, the private respondents were entitled to the salaries attached to their office. Even if the RTC later declare the appointments null and void, they would still be given salaries because of the period they acted as representatives have made them de facto officers. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution in view of the RTC nullification of the appointments. But it was likewise denied along with the cancellation of their arraignment, instead Sandiganbayan required Tuanda and the others to submit a written show cause why they should not be cited for contempt of court for their failure to appear in court today for the arraignment. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition where petitioners attribute to respondent Sandiganbayan the following errors: A. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motions for the suspension of the proceedings in Criminal Case B. The Respondent Court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in refusing to suspend the proceedings that would entail a retrial and rehearing by it of the basic issue involved C. The Respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion and/or acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in effectively allowing petitioners to be prosecuted under two alternative theories that private respondents are de jure and/or de facto officers in violation of petitioners' right to due process. ISSUE: The legality of private respondents' designation as sectoral representatives. HELD: RATIO: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND related ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LAinVIÑA| CASE (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately to the issue raised the criminal DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 25 action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench, we find that the issue in the civil case, CAG.R. CV No. 36769, constitutes a valid prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners. All the elements of a prejudicial question are clearly and unmistakably present in this case. There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in the civil action (No. 36769) and the criminal case (No. 16936) are closely related. The filing of the criminal case was premised on petitioners' alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying private respondents' salaries and per diems as sectoral representatives, while the civil action was instituted precisely to resolve whether or not the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives were made in accordance with law. Private respondents insist that even if their designations are nullified, they are entitled to compensation for actual services rendered. We disagree. As found by the trial court and as borne out by the records, from the start, private respondents' designations as sectoral representatives have been challenged by petitioners. They began with a petition filed with the Office of the President copies of which were received by private respondents on 26 February 1989, barely eight (8) days after they took their oath of office. Hence, private respondents' claim that they have actually rendered services as sectoral representatives has not been established. Finally, we find unmeritorious respondent Sandiganbayan's thesis that even in the event that private respondents' designations are finally declared invalid, they may still be considered de facto public officers entitled to compensation for services actually rendered. The conditions and elements of de facto officership are the following: 1) There must be a de jure office; 2) There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and 3) There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith. Sandiganbayan Resolution was set aside. CASE 22: LUNA v. RODRIGUEZ- FRANCES BUBAN FACTS: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th day of June, 1916. At the said election, Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de los Angeles were candidates for the said office. The election was closed, the votes cast were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the provincial board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez, having received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province. Luna filed an election protest before the CFI of Taytay. In the municipality of Taytay, Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered that number of votes deducted from his total. Additional evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did not close the polls at 6 o’clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. From that conclusion both partiesto the contest appealed ISSUE: WON the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE HELD: Yes, the ballots were valid. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 26

RATIO: The law provides that “at all elections, the polls shall be open from seven o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the afternoon.” The polls should be open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted to vote if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be punished and not the innocent voter. CASE 23: US v. ABALOS- EDWARD MATIAS NOTE: PDF FORMAT CASE 24: GARCHITORENA v. CRESCINI- JOSHUA BAGOTSAY FACTS: An election for the office of the governor was held at the province of Ambos Camarines. Crescini was declared winner. Garchitorena filed a protest against the said election results. A trial was held and a decision was filed by the judge with the clerk on 27 April 1917. Garchitorena contends that at the time said decision was filed with the clerk, the judge who prepared and filed it was not a judge of the court, neither de jure nor de facto. The Judge - Auxillary judge of the CFI of the province. Took oath of office as Director of Bureau of Lands on 31 March 1917. Another judge was appointed as an auxillary judge in the CFI of the province who took the oath of office on 16 March 1917 and started performing his duties on 28 March 1917. ISSUES: (1) WON the decision is valid; and (2) WON the judge is a de facto judge. HELD: (1) No. (2) No. RATIO: (1) The decision is null and void. When the term of office of a judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, and his successor has qualified, a judgment rendered by him after that time is null and void. Subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business left unfinished by him before the expiration of his term are void. (2) The judge is neither a de jure nor a de facto judge. There cannot be a de facto judge when there is a de jure judge in the actual performance of the duties of the office. In order to be a de facto judge he must still be acting under some color of right. In this case, he cannot be actually acting under any color of right when he has ceased to be judge and has actually vacated the office by the acceptance of another office and by actually entering upon the acceptance of another office and by actually entering upon the duties of the other office. CASE 25: DIMAANDAL v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT- JENNIFER BALMEO NOTE: FILE CANNOT BE COPIED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| BATCH 27FACTO OFFICER EFFECTS OFG01| ACTS OF 4| DE

CASE 26: MONROY v. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Respondent Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas. He filed his candidacy as the Representative of the 1st District of Rizal in the forthcoming elections with COMELEC. 3 Days later, petitioner withdrew his candidacy which was approved by COMELEC. Subsequently, respondent Vice-Mayor Del Rosarioof Navotas took his oath as mayor on the theory thatpetitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question. CFI-Rizal ruled: a.) petitioner had ceased to be the Mayor of Navotas after filing his candidacy; b.) respondent became the mayor upon his having assumed office; c.) petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which respondent was entitled as Mayor from his assumption into office up to the time he can reassume said office; d.) petitioner must pay Php 1,000 as moral damages. CA affirmed in toto the decision of CFI except for award of moral damages which waseliminated. Issue: 1. W/N it is an electoral dispute before the COMELEC. 2. W/N the respondent should be reinstated as the mayor of Navotas. Held: 1. In this case there appears to be no decision, order or ruling of the Commission on any administrative question or controversy. There was no dispute before the Commission. 2. No. Ratio:  When petitioner withdrew the certificate announcing his candidacy for Congressman, as far as the Commission could be concerned, petitioner was no longer interested in running for that seat. The matter of his having forfeited his present position and the possible legal effect thereon by the withdrawal of his certificate was completely out of the picture. Hence, that purely legal question properly fell within the cognizance of the courts.  The withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy did not restore petitioner to his former position. Sec. 27 of the Rev. Election Code providing that — Any elective provincial, municipal or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy," makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is forfeited forever and nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official. In re: de facto officers Petitioner relied solely upon Rodriguez v. Tan where it was held that a senator who had been proclaimed and had assumed office but was later on ousted in an election protest, is a de facto officer during the time he held the office of senator, and can retain the emoluments received even as against the successful protestant. Rodriguez case is not applicable here. The case at bar does not involve a proclaimed elective official who will be ousted because of an election contest. This case involves the forfeiture of the petitioner’s office. It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under color of title.” but it is far more cogently acknowledged that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get involved in the official acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers. Here, it is possession of title, not of the office, that is decisive. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS periodADMINISTRATIVE of his wrongful retention of the public office. AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 28

CASE 27: CANTILLO v. ARRIETA- OLIVE CACHAPERO

FACTS: On October 6, 1962, the petitioner Jose Cantillo was appointed and served as Temporary Municipal Policeman of the municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon. Pursuant to said appointment petitioner took his oath of office as Temporary Municipal Policeman, and served as such. Said appointment was attested to by the Provincial Treasurer of Bukidnon, and the Commissioner of Civil Service.

On November 2, 1964, the petitioner was given another appointment as Municipal Policeman of the municipality of Maramag, Bukidnon, took his oath of office by virtue thereof, acted and qualified as such. The appointment of November 2, 1964 is "Provisional" in nature and such was attested to as provisional by the Provincial Treasurer of Bukidnon, and the Commissioner of Civil Service.

On January 20, 1967, petitioner was given another provisional appointment as Municipal Policeman of the municipality of Maramag, took his oath of office by virtue thereof, acted and qualified as such. That provisional appointment was attested to by the Provincial Treasurer of Bukidnon, and the Commissioner of Civil Service.

That at the time of petitioners' original appointment of October 6, 1962, petitioner was 41 years of age, and was and is still a second year high school.

On October 16, 1967, petitioner was suspended from the service as such patrolman of the Police Force of Maramag, Bukidnon, because of the filing of a criminal case against him for Infidelity in the Custody of the Prisoner.

The case against the petitioner was dismissed on the ground that the prosecution did not have sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner requested for reinstatement to the service and also claimed for payment of his back salary corresponding to the time of his reinstatement and payment of his back salary but such were turned down by respondent.

Petitioner commenced the mandamus case below, demanding that respondent municipality be compelled to pay his back salaries during his period of suspension from October 16, 1967 to June 30, 1968, basing his claim on Section 4 of Republic Act No. 557, which reads: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 29

SEC. 4. When a member of the provincial guards, city police or municipal police is accused in court of any felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal or city fiscal, as the case may be, the provincial governor, the city mayor or the municipal mayor shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final decision of the case by the court and, in case of acquittal the accused shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his suspension.

After appropriate proceedings the court a quo dismissed the petition on October 14, 1969. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: WON petitioner has the right to demand from respondent municipality the payment of his back salaries during his period of suspension.

HELD: No.

RATIO: The law in force when petitioner was extended is latest provisional appointment as municipal policeman on January 20, 1967 was Republic Act No. 4864, otherwise known as the Police Act of 1966. Section 9 thereof enumerates the general qualifications for appointment to a local police agency, specifically requiring, inter alia, that the appointee be not less than twentythree nor more than thirty-three years of age, and in the case of an appointment in a municipal police force, that the appointee must have at least completed high school. Considering that on October 6, 1962, when petitioner was first appointed as temporary municipal policeman, he was already 41 years old, he was at least 46, clearly 13 years over the maximum age qualification, when he was extended his latest provisional appointment as municipal policeman on January 20, 1967. His having studied only up to second year in high school, a couple of years short of the minimum educational requirement for position to which he had been appointed, merely accentuates further his lack of the qualifications required by law.

The infirmity of petitioner's appointment was not mere absence of civil service eligibility but of qualifications for the office. It affected therefore the very validity of such appointment, and precluded the reinstatement he claimed after he was suspended. During his tenure he was at best only a de facto officer and as such entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered. His provisional appointment did not render nugatory the requirements of Section 9 so as to give color of validity to petitioner's occupancy of the position. Thus, while Section 11 of the same Act authorized provisional appointments of policemen where no civil service eligibles are available therefor, it expressly required that "in case of a patrolman-appointee, he shall possess at least the general qualifications provided for in Section nine of this Act" in order that he could be appointed provisionally. "(T)he tolerance, acquiescence or mistake of the proper officials, resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the resulting in the non-observance of the pertinent rules on the matter, does not render the legal requirement (in this case the possession of the general qualifications for appointment to the local police agency), ineffective and unenforceable. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 30

CASE 28: CUI ET AL v. ORTIZ- JOSHUA SALTERAS FACTS: The present appeal originated from a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel respondent mayor to sign the payroll and approve the salaries accruing to petitioners, and to reinstate petitioners to their former positions. Petitioners were civil service eligibles appointed by the then Mayor of Ronda, Cebu, Fortunato Villalon, on December 1 and 12, 1955, petitioner Maribao as Chief of Police, and petitioners Cui, Yusores and Beynosa as patrolmen of the said municipality. On January 16, 1956, the newly elected mayor, above respondent, served notice to petitioners advising them of the termination of their service. In that very month, respondent appointed a new Chief of Police and three new policemen to take the place of petitioners. He also sent a telegram to the President of the Philippines withdrawing the appointments of petitioners. Petitioners after said date of January 16, 1956, continued in the service by reporting to the PC detachment at Damangug, Cebu. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the incumbent mayor, respondent, to approve the payment of petitioners’ salaries from January 16, 1956 to July 18, 1956, but kept silent as to the reinstatement, which the court evidently did not deem proper. Both petitioners and respondents appealed from the aforesaid decision, petitioners insisting in their reinstatement and accrued salaries until reinstatement; respondents assigning as error the payment of salaries from January 16 to July 18, 1956. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are entitled to the payment of their salaries and are entitled to reinstatement. HELD: Yes. RATIO: Section 14, Ex. Order No. 175 series of 1938 governs the appointments to the police force of the municipality. It says: "14. Hereafter, appointments to and promotion in the municipal, city and provincial police service shall be made in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations by the respective city or municipal mayor or governor, with the approval of the President of the Philippines pending designation of the Department Head who is to exercise supervision over local police force, except in cases of Chief of Police of Chartered cities which is governed by special provisions of law. The selection of appointees shall be made whenever possible from the list of eligibles in the corresponding city or municipality, if there are any, and in the negative case, from the general list of eligibles in the province. Pending approval of the appointment by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary for services actually rendered until the appointment is finally acted upon." Petitioners’ appointments on December 1 and 12, 1955 by the then mayor of the municipality were legal and in order, the appointing power still in possession of his right to appoint. For such appointments to be complete, the approval of the President of the Philippines is required. The law provides that pending approval of said appointment by the President, the appointee may assume office and receive salary for services actually rendered. Accordingly therefore, in that duration until the appointment is finally acted upon favorably or unfavorably, the appointees may be considered as "de facto" officers and entitled to salaries for services actually rendered. Petitioners’ appointments when respondent took office were not complete. Their recall and withdrawal having been based on lack of residence in the municipality concerned is proper. Respondent cannot be charged with discriminate removal of petitioners in view of their incomplete appointment to the office. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 31

It is of record that the office of the President disapproved petitioner Maribao’s appointment on July 18, 1956. It is in fact liberal construction for this Court (as for the lower court) to consider said date of July 18, 1956 as the final disapproval of appointments of the other petitioners. CASE 29: SAMPAYAN v. DAZA- JIMUEL MATIAS FACTS: Petitioners, residents of the second Congressional District of Northern Samar filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent Raul Daza, then incumbent congressman of the district, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a green card holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. Petitioners allege that Mr. Daza has not, by any act or declaration, renounced his status as permanent resident, thereby violating Section 68 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Congressman Daza filed his comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States; that although he was accorded a permanent residency status on October 8, 1980 as evidenced by a letter order of the District Director, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A., he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines. ISSUE: WON respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. HELD: RATIO: This case is already moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992 that they seek to unseat respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of its members. The appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Daza's certificate of candidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House Electoral Tribunal within 10 days after Daza's proclamation. As a de facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office because his acts are as valid as those of a de jure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services rendered.

THE CIVIL SERVICE CASE 30: MERAM v. EDRALIN- VITO SALES FACTS: Private Respondent, Filipina Edralin, a training officer of the BFD was proposed for the appointment for the position of Administrative Officer V in the BFD. Petitioner filed a protest against this proposal contending that herein respondent was not of the BFD personnel who was “next-in-line” however the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR) permanently appointed respondent to the said position. MNR opined that respondent was qualified for the said position and this appointment would be for the best interest of the service. LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION VIÑA| CASE MNR ADMINISTRATIVE dismissed the protest of the petitioner. Petitioner then appealedLAW| to theATTY. MeritsLA System Board. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 32 The Merits System Board appointed petitioner to the position. Respondent appealed to the Civil

Service Commission however the CSC dismissed the appeal. Respondent filed a letter-petition with the Office of the President alleging that the jurisdiction of promotional contests is lodged with the Ministry head and appealed with the Office of the President. Therefore, MSB and CSC had no jurisdiction to act aver petitioner’s appeal. Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs rendered a decision dismissing the protest of Petitioner Meram with the MSB and CSC. ISSUE: WON the Office of the President acted correctly in taking cognizance of the case and dismissing the decision of the MSB and the CSC. HELD: Yes. RATIO: By virtue of Sec 5(2) and Section 8 of PD 1409 the MSB and the CSC had jurisdiction over the formal protest of the petitioner to the exclusion of all other officials, boards and offices and that, the respondent Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs gravely abused his discretion when he disregarded and declared as nun and void the decisions of the MSB and the resolutions of the Commission which had already become final and executory, and in fact, had already been executed, enforced and implemented. The general purpose of the Civil Service Law (Republic Act No. 2260) is to "insure and promote the general mandate requiring appointments only according to merit and fitness, and to provide within the public service a progressive system of personal administration to insure the maintenance of an honest and efficient progressive and courteous civil service in the Philippines These laws intend to establish a merit system of fitness and efficiency as the basis of appointment; to secure more competent employees, and thereby promote better government. CASE 31: ABELLA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- KAMAE CRUZ FACTS: Francisco Abella, Jr. (Abella) was a lawyer, retired from the Exporting Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), now the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA). He held a civil service eligibility for the position of Department Manager of PEZA because in 1982, he completed the training program for Executive Leadership and Management under the Civil Service Academy. This was in pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 850 (Resolution), requiring such training for the position of Department Manager. He retired in 1996. In May 1994, the CSC issued Memorandum Circular No. 21 (Circular), providing a new criteria for the positions covered by the Career Executive Service. In 1998, Abella was hired by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) on a contractual basis. In January 1999, SMBA issued a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center. However, the CSC disapproved the appointment on the ground that Abella’s eligibility was not appropriate. Abella appealed the disapproval but it was denied. He then filed a petition for review seeking the reversal of the disapproval before the CA. Abella argued, among other things, that the Circular was unconstitutional because it rendered its earned civil service eligibility ineffective or inappropriate for the position of Department Manager III. ISSUE: WON the challenged Circular is constitutional. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 33 HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Art. 9-B, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides the mandate of the CSC, which is part making it “the central personnel agency of the Government, [that] shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote moral, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service.” It further requires that appointments in the civil service be made only through merit and fitness to be determined by competitive examination. Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce rules and regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular. Abella’s government service ended when he retired in 1996. Hence, his right to remain in a CES position also ceased. When he was reemployed, it was necessary for him to comply with the eligibility prescribed at the time for that position. Given that the questioned Circular was issued before his reemployment, he should comply with the standards provided for in the Circular. Abella had no CES eligibility, hence the CSC correctly denied his permanent appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointee’s possession of all the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. CASE 32: PERALTA v. COURT OF APPEALS- GC PILLENA FACTS: In1993, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) did not release any allotment or funds for Olegario as the Central Office of the PPA inadvertently reported to the DBM that the position held by Olegario was an unfilled position. Peralta, therefore, caused the payment of Olegario’s salary and other benefits. He, thereafter, requested for allotment but it was not released for some time. In 1995, Peralta issued an order directing Olegario and co-employee Enilo to go on leave with or without pay as the case may be, on the ground of insufficiency in the release of allotment. Olegario then sought the opinion of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Cotabato City, about the legality of the said order. CSC replied and informed Peralta that Olegario cannot be removed from the service without valid cause. Also, it declared that the order is illegal considering that going on leave is a matter of personal choice. It further held that the alleged insufficiency of cash allotment for salaries is not among the valid grounds provided by law for removing/separating employees from the service. Peralta was then advised to cease and desist from enforcing the void order. Peralta persisted in enforcing the void order. CSC then sent a letter reiterating its previous ruling and added that the enforcement of the order is tantamount to removal without just cause, without due process, and in violation of the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure. Peralta obstinately refused to obey and continued to bar both Olegario and Enilo from reporting for work. In 1996, the Ombudsman found Peralta guilty of grave abuse of authority and therefore must be penalised for suspension for one year without pay. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 34

Peralta contends that the letters he received from the Office of the CSC are mere opinions or technical advice which are not binding on him. He argues that Administrative Code of 1987 does not include the authority to render opinion and rulings on all personnel and other Civicl Service matters which shall be binding on all heads of departments, offices and agencies. Such power is granted only to the Commission itself. ISSUE: WON the opinion of the CSC is binding to Peralta, being a head of PPA. HELD: Yes. Therefore, Peralty is guilty of abuse of authority. RATIO: Peralta

Supreme Court

Act of issuing the order was demanded by the urgency of finding a solution. He claims that if he allowed Olegario to work without any cash allotments from DBM. he may be held personally liable.

Four months before Peralta issued the order, DBM already released cash allotment for Olegario’s salary, and he had knowledge of it. Nonetheless, he still proceeded to implement the order. He could have informed the central office of the PPA of its mistake. That way, he can no longer be faulted, as it is already beyond his control. Peralta overstepped the bounds of his authority by executing his order.

Opinions and rulings of the CSC Regional Office are CSC’s authority covers matters on personal not binding upon him. administration in the government. The CSC Regional Office, in fact, wrote him twice and he was properly advised. Thus, his conduct is inexcusable; he’s acted in bad faith. He was not satisfied with the advice or instruction of The proper action is to seek the opinion of other the CSC. authorities such as the legal department of his office or file an appeal with the CSC questioning its ruling.

DOCTRINE: Section 36 of PD 807 and Section 46 of EO 292 provide that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. According to the aforementioned laws, the Regional Offices of the CSC are empowered to enforce Civil Service laws, rules, policies and standards on personnel management or personnel actions of national and local government agencies within their jurisdiction, and to enforce the same laws, rules, policies and standards with respect to the conduct of public officers and employees. From this power necessarily flows the authority to issue opinions and rulings regarding personnel management in both national and local government agencies. Moreover, these opinions and rulings perforce bind the aforementioned government agencies, otherwise, the authority given by law to these Regional Offices would become useless and said Regional Offices can be rendered ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| impotent by governmentLAW, agencies which can simply choose to ignore their opinions and CASE rulings G01| BATCH 35 are not binding. on theDIGESTS| convenient ground that 4| they

DISPOSITIVE: Petition is denied. Peralta is directed to pay the back salaries of Olegario.

ELIGIBILITY APPOINTMENTS CASE 33: ABROT v. COURT OF APPEALS- GABRIEL ABLOLA FACTS: Petitioners were former employees of respondent City of La Carlota, Negros Occidental, holding various positions and appointments. All of them were appointees of former City Mayor Jaime Mariño, who was defeated by respondent Luis Jalandoni in the 1967 local elections. After Mayor Jalandoni assumed office in January 1968, the eight petitioners were separated from the service on various grounds. Abrot was allegedly made to resign. Torrechilla, Geollegue, Castillo, Pagunsan, Dequiña and Seloterio were laid off for "lack of funds and for reasons of public interest." Hilaga’s position was abolished in the 1968-69 budget for reasons of economy. On July 20, 1968, the Municipal Board of respondent City enacted an ordinance abolishing 106 positions, including those of herein petitioners, except that of Abrot. Questioning their separation from the service, petitioners instituted seven separate actions for reinstatement, payment of back salaries, and damages against herein respondents before the Court of First Instance. The Trial Court dismissed all the complaints. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Court’s dismissal of the complaints of Abrot, Castillo, Seloterio and Hilaga but reversed the judgment as to Pagunsan, Geollegue, Dequiña and Torrechilla, who were granted back salaries. ISSUE: HELD: RATIO: The Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment with the modification that Pagunsan who did not present evidence in the Court a quo and did not appeal, was excluded from the High Court’s judgment. The Court held that: (a) the termination of Abrot as Municipal Board Secretary was justified because his term of office under the City Charter was co-terminus with that of the Mayor who appointed him, hence he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure; (b) the abolition of the position of Hilaga as City Development Officer for reasons of economy was made in good faith and therefore, valid; (c) while the appointments of Castillo and Seloterio as Rural Health Attendant and Road Foreman, respectively, were denominated as "provisional" (although Castillo’s appointment was also approved as temporary), they were in fact mere temporary appointments because they were not civil service eligibles, hence their termination, with or without cause, was justified; (d) the summary dismissal of Geollegue, Torrechilla and Dequiña as laborers was illegal and arbitrary since they were permanent employees — they were entitled to backwages from the date of their dismissal to June 30, 1968 when their positions were subsequently abolished, but they could not be reinstated since such abolition was done in good faith and, therefore, valid and legal. Assailed judgment affirmed with modification. CASE 34: MATURAN v. MAGLANA- DON TUTAAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 36

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as patrolman of San Francisco, Southern Leyte. On October 1, 1967 he was promoted to the rank of police sergeant. On October 8, 1968 and July 1, 1969 petitioner's salary was adjusted to P1,320.00 and P1,800.00 per annum, respectively. All the aforesaid appointments of petitioner were provisional. On July 1, 1970 his provisional appointment was renewed. Likewise on July 1, 1971 his provisional appointment was renewed with an increase in pay in the amount of P2,640.00 per annum. Respondent Mayor Santiago Maglana suspended the petitioner from office because of two pending criminal cases against him (falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in the narration of facts, and falsification of public document). Respondent Vice-Mayor Honorio Magoncia, who was then the Acting Mayor instructed petitioner together with Chief of Police Francisco Duterte and Patrolman Asisclo Irong, to tender their resignations pursuant to the Letter of Instruction No. 14 of the President of the Philippines. Petitioner submitted his letter of resignation on October 9, 1972. Petitioner's resignation was approved on January 19, 1973 and petitioner was accordingly informed thereof.

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the approval of his resignation for being null and void on the ground that Letter of Instruction No. 14 does not apply to him. In the meantime, Criminal Cases against him were dismissed.

In a letter dated January 12, 1974, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile then Acting Chairman of the National Police Commission informed petitioner that due to the dismissal of the aforesaid criminal cases, the latter's preventive suspension has been lifted and petitioner was directed to report for duty to his Chief of Police. Petitioner reported for duty but Chief of Police Francisco Duterte refused to accept the former in the police force. Respondent Mayor sent a letter to the Chairman of the National Police Commission requesting advice as to whether the resignation tendered by petitioner pursuant to letter of Instruction No. 14 is valid. In reply, the Deputy Executive Commissioner stated that since petitioner resigned from office on October 2, 1972, the lifting of his suspension as directed in the National Police Commission's is no longer feasible, the same having been rendered moot and academic; that said office had occasion to rule that resignations submitted by members of the police force in compliance with the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 14 are valid, said Instruction being broad in scope to include both local and national officials. Petitioner sought the intervention of the Governor of Southern Leyte to no avail hence petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with claim for back salaries, traveling expense and damages before the Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte.

In respondents' answer they set up the defense that petitioner has falsely entered in his duly sworn information sheet that he is a high school graduate of the University of Manila during the school year 1954-55, but in his Personal Data Sheet he feloniously alleged and/or entered therein that he is a graduate of the Pana-on Academy in the school year 1950-51 when in truth he was only a second year high school student; that petitioner, who has voluntarily resigned, needs a new appointment and has to meet the qualifications required by law among which, are, that he must be at least a high school graduate and not over 33 years of age; that petitioner falls short of these requirements; and that petitioner is notoriously undesirable, publicly known to be of bad moral character and oftentimes got drunk while on duty. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 37

Respondent court issued a decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The court a quo agreed with the opinion of the National Police Commission that resignations submitted by members of the police force in compliance with the provisions of Letter of Instruction No. 14 are valid. Since petitioner has been separated from the service, reinstatement is not the proper remedy. The court also said that the evidence of conflicting entries on petitioner's two information sheets have not been denied or rebutted, hence the preponderance of evidence is against the petitioner that he is not a high school graduate, as he could not have graduated in two high schools, one in the University of Manila during the school year 1954-55 and the other at the Pana-on Academy during the school year 1950-51. Lastly, the trial court ruled that since all petitioner's appointment were provisional, he can be removed at any time by the appointing power, Mayor Maglana.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner can be removed from the office at anytime by the respondent mayor?

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Petitioner contends that under Presidential Decree No. 12-A promulgated on October 4, 1972 the power to dismiss or remove a member of the police force has been transferred from the Mayor to the Police Commission. Hence, the acceptance of petitioner's resignation by respondent Mayor on January 19, 1973 is null and void because the latter is no longer clothed with authority to dismiss or remove a member of the police force on said date. Furthermore, petitioner stresses that Letter of Instruction No. 14 under whose provisions he was made to resign is not applicable to him as said Instruction covers only officials and employees with pending cases excluding policemen.

Presidential Decree No. 12 dated October 3, 1972 created the Adjudication and Investigation Boards in the Police Commission to review and dispose of all administrative cases of city and municipal forces referred to the Commission. On October 4, 1972 Presidential Decree 12-A was promulgated providing for the procedure to be followed in case an administrative charge is filed against any member of the local police agency or when a member of the police force is accused in court of any felony or violation of law. Nowhere in the provisions of said Presidential Decrees show that the power to dismiss or remove has been transferred from the Mayor to the Police Commission as contended by petitioner. It was only on August 8, 1974 when such power was removed from the Mayor pursuant to 'Presidential Decree No. 531 integrating the municipal police forces in the municipalities of the province of Southern Leyte. It is clear therefore that at the time petitioner's resignation was approved by respondent Mayor on January 19, 1973 the latter still had the power to dismiss or remove the former. The fact that petitioner subsequently obtained a testimonial eligibility is of no moment. At the time he received his appointment, petitioner had no eligibility. As such what is required is a new appointment, not merely reinstatement. But even then, he cannot compel the Mayor to reappoint him for the power to appoint is in essence discretionary and the appointing power enjoys sufficient discretion to select and appoint employees on the basis of their fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the position filled. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 38

CASE 35: ACHACOSO v. MACARAIG- RONWELL LIM FACTS: Petitioner, Tomas Achacoso, was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. In compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines, he filed a courtesy resignation, and this was accepted by the President “with deep regrets”. The Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge. He protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. Nonetheless, respondent Jose Sarmiento was appointed administrator of the POEA. Thus, Achacoso filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied hence, this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Arguments: Achacoso contends that he is a member of the Career Service of the Civil Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. His argument is that in view of the security of tenure enjoyed by the officials (provided in the Civil Service Decree), it was “beyond the prerogatives of the President” to require them to submit courtesy resignations. Such courtesy resignations, even if files, should be disregarded for having been submitted “under duress,” as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career officials at pleasure, even for a capricious reasons. On the other hand, respondents assert that the petitioner is not entitled to the guaranty because he is not a career official. They contend that as the petitioner was not a career executive service eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under the exception to the rule and so was subject to the provision that he “shall subsequently take the required Career Executive Service examination and that he shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies in such examination.” Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure in his position. ISSUE: WON petitioner is entitled to security of tenure, as provided in the Civil Service Decree? HELD: No. RATIO: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure to its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated. The person named in an acting capacity accepts the position under the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called upon to do so by the appointing authority. There is also a long line of cases affirming the rule that “One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.” CASE 36: PAGCOR v. ANGARA- FRANCIS TORRES FACTS: Respondents Beatriz T. La Victoria and Marita A. Angara were Slot Machine Roving Token Attendants (SMRTAs) of petitioner PAGCOR assigned at its casino in Davao City. The PAGCOR Board of Directors dismissed them from service, effective June 28, 1997, for loss of trust and confidence. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 39

It appears that La Victoria was dismissed for alleged short selling of tokens while Angara was dismissed for alleged token passing and condoning or actively assisting La Victoria in covering up her shortage. Respondents filed their appeal memorandum with the Civil Service Commission (CSC). CSC directed PAGCOR Chairman Alicia L. Reyes to submit her comment. Instead of filing a comment, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the appeal was filed out of time. CSC issued a Resolution, reversed the respondents’ dismissal and ordered their reinstatement. ISSUES: (1) WON the CSC erred in declaring private respondents dismissal is without cause and without due process even without awaiting the comment of the petitioner and the complete record of the case, where the merit of the case should have been fairly and impartially assessed. (2) WON the respondents hold confidential positions whose removal from the service can be justified through loss of trust and confidence. HELD: (1) No. (2) No. RATIOL (1) The CSC did not err in ruling that respondents were not dismissed for cause and after due process since the loss of trust and confidence is not one among the grounds for disciplinary action and there was no formal investigation conducted but a summary proceeding. (2) it is the nature of the position which determines whether a position is primarily confidential, policydetermining or highly technical. CASE 37: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. SALAS- ANNESIR KADJIM FACTS: On October 7, 1989, Rafael M. Salas was appointed by the PAGCOR Chairman as Internal Security Staff Member (ISS) and assigned to the Casino at the Manila Pavilion Hotel. ISS members do not directly report to the Office of the Chairman, and issubject to the control and supervision of an Area Supervisor who onlyimplements the directives of the Branch Chief Security Officer. The BOD of PAGCOR terminated him on Dec. 3, 1991 grounds: loss of confidence. Salas was allegedly engaged in proxy betting – in affidavits of 2 customers, claiming to have been used as gunners.CA reversed finding that Salas is not a confidential employee and cannot be dismissed on that ground, applying the “proximily rule” enunciated in Case 63: Grino V. CSC & Case 60: De los Santos V. Mallare 10. CA also held that PD 1869 Section 16 has been repealed by Section 2 (1),Article IX-B of the Constitution. ISSUES: (1) WON Salas is a confidential employee; and (2) WON the Pinero doctrine is still applicable. HELD: RATIO: Every appointment implies confidence, but more more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office, but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE In Pinero, et. al. V. Hechanova, et. al. OFFICERS “since the enactment of RA 2260: the 1959 Civil Service G01|ofBATCH 4| 40 which finally determines whether a position is: a.)primarily Act, itDIGESTS| is the nature the position

confidential, b.)policy determining or c.)highly technical. Senator Tanada: “in the 1 st instance, it is the appointing power that determines the nature of the position. In case of conflict, then it is the Court that determines whether the position is primarily confidential or not.”-Employees occupying various positions in the Port Patrol Division of the Bureau of Customs, which is part of the Customs police force, is not in itself sufficient indication that there positions are primarily confidential. 1. No. Salas’ position is the lowest in the chain of command. His job description is ordinary, routinary and quotidian in character. His pay is only P2,200 permonth.He does not enjoy that “primarily close intimacy” which characterizes a confidential employee. Where the position occupied is remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. Citing Case Tria V. Sto. Tomas, “the fact that sometimes, private respondent may handle ordinarily confidential matters or papers which are somewhat confidential in nature does not suffice to characterize his position as primarily confidential.” 2. Yes. PD 1869 can be no more than initial determinations that are not conclusive in cases of conflict.1986 Constitutional Commission Records The primary purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in providing for the declaration of a position as a.)primarily confidential, b.)policy determining o rc.)highly technical is to exempt these categories from competitive examinations as a means for determining merit and fitness. It must be stressed further that these positions are covered by the security of tenure, although they are considered non-competitive only in the sense thatappointees thereto do not have to undergo competitive examinations forpurposes of determining merit and fitness.CSC Resolution 91830 does not make PAGCOR employees confidential,merely reiterates exemption from civil service eligibility requirement .In reversing the decision of the CSC, the CA opined that the provisions of Section 16, PD 1869 may no longer be applied in the case at bar because the same is deemed to have been repealed in its entirety by Section 2 (1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Consti. This is not completely correct. On this point, we approve the more logical interpretation advanced by the CSC to the effect that “Section 16 of PD 1869insofar as it exempts PAGCOR positions from the provisions of the CivilService Law & Rules has been amended, modified or deemed repealed by the1987 Consti & EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987. However, the same cannot be said with respect to the last portion of Section16 which provides that “All employees of the casinos and related servicesshall be classified as “Confidential” appointees.” While such executivedeclaration emanated merely from the provisions of Implementing Rules of the Civil Service Act of 1959 Rule XX Section 2 The power to declare a position as: a.)primarily confidential, b.)policy determining or c.)highly technical,as defined therein has subsequently been codified and incorporated in EO 292: Administrative Code of 1987 Book V. Civil Service Commission Section 12. The Commission shall have the ff powers and functions: (9). Declare positions in the Civil Service as may properly be primarilyconfidential, highly technical or policy determining. This later enactment only serves to bolster the validity of the categorization made under Section 16 PD 1869.Be that as it may, such classification is not absolute and allencompassing. Prior to the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1959, there were 2 recognized instances when a position may be declared primarily confidential: 1:when the President, upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service, has declared the position to be primarily confidential;2:in the absence of such declaration, when by the nature of the functions of the office, there exists “close intimacy” between the appointing power which ensures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment of freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of the State. RA 2260: Civil Service Act (June 19, 1959) Section 5. LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION ATTY. LA be VIÑA| CASE “The ADMINISTRATIVE non-competitive or unclassified service LAW|shall composed DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 41law to be in the non-competitive orunclassified service or those of positions expressly declared4|by

which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential or highly technical in nature.” General Rules Implementing PD 807: Civil Service RulesSection 1. “appointments to the Civil Service, except as to those which are policy determining, primarilyconfidential, or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness to bedetermined as far as practicable by competitive examinations.” CASE 38: DE LOS SANTOS v. MALLARE- RALPH VILLANUEVA FACTS:Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interimappointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. The petitioner rests his case on Article XII of the Constitution, section 4 of which reads: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." It is admitted in respondents' answer that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified service." ISSUE: WON legality of the petitioner's removal from the same office which would be the effect of Mallare's appointment if the same be allowed to stand. HELD: No. The removal by Santos was rightfully made in accordance with the law. RATIO:Citing the case of Lacson vs Romero, it is contended that only officers and employees in the classified service should be brought within the purview of Article XII of the Constitution. Section 1 of this article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." The adoption of the "merit system" in government service has secured efficiency and social justice. It eliminates the political factor in the selection of civil employees which is the first essential to an efficient personnel system. It insures equality of opportunity to all deserving applicants desirous of a career in the public service. It advocates a new concept of the public office as a career open to all and not the exclusive patrimony of any party or faction to be doled out as a reward for party service. As has been seen, three specified classes of positions — policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. These positions involved the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound out with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category determinable at the will of the officer that makes them. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 42 PROMOTION

CASE 39: ESPAÑOL v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION- CHEYENNE YU FACTS: The position of Regional Manager of the National Irrigation Administration, Regional Office No. 2, Cauayan, Isabela, became vacant. Petitioner Perfecto Español was Chief of the Engineering Division, and private respondent Orlando L. Bulseco was Chief Design Engineer. In the organizational chart of the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), the position of Chief Design Engineer is below the Chief of the Engineering Division, and the latter is considered nextin-rank to the position of Regional Manager. Bulseco was the one appointed to the vacant position pursuant to Resolution No. 5302-86 passed by the Board of Directors of NIA prompting petitioner Español to file a protest with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) which subsequently referred the protest to the NIA Administrator for appropriate action. However, the protest was dismissed on the ground that "in the evaluation conducted, Mr. Bulseco has advantage over Mr. Español on the factors of performance and potential.” Espanol alleges that he is the employee next-in-rank to the position of Regional Manager and, as such, he has promotional priority over Bulseco. Espanol appealed, MPSB then ordered that he be appointed as Regional Manager ruling that the individual qualifications of the contestants exceed the qualification requirements, especially those of respondent Bulseco. This prompted Bulseco to appeal to the Civil Service Commission which then reversed the ruling of the MPSB and held Bulseco’s appointment. ISSUE: Who is entitled to the promotion? Espanol or Bulseco? HELD: Bulseco. Bulseco was previously designated and performed his duties and functions to rank of equal and next-in-rank positions as to that of Espanol’s as certified by the Civil Service Commission. RATIO: Even if the vacancy here had been filled by promotion rather than by lateral transfer, the concept of "next-in-rank" does not import any mandatory or peremptory requirement that the person next in rank must be appointed to the vacancy. What Section 19(3) of P.D. No. 807, the Civil Service Law, provides is that if a vacancy is filled by a promotion, the person holding the position next in rank thereto "shall be considered for promotion”. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in whom it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee shall possess the qualifications required by law. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the department head or appointing authority and not in the Civil Service Commission Section 19, paragraph 6, Article VIII of Presidential Decree No. 807 defines a qualified next-inrank as an employee appointed on a permanent basis to a position previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy proposed to be filled and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously determined by the appointing authority and approved by the respondent commission. LAW, PUBLICREGINALD OFFICERS LAMPITOC AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE CASEADMINISTRATIVE 40: ISON v. PANGRAMUYENDIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 43

FACTS: In sum, petitioner would want the Court to hold that since at the time of the appointment in dispute, he was Chief Deputy Assessor exercising, according to his allegation, immediate administrative control and supervision over respondent Maliwanag, who was Senior Deputy Assessor, and inasmuch as he has superior educational and appropriate civil service eligibilities to those of said respondent, the appointment aforementioned extended to the latter by respondent City Mayor is illegal and contrary to law being violative of the rule of next-in-rank. Petitioner maintains that upon the promotion of the Assistant City Assessor to the position of City Assessor, he, petitioner, instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto. Maliwanag's appointment was recommended by the City Assessor and his reasons therefor, stated in said official's indorsement to the Mayor recommending dismissal of petitioner's protest thereto and quoted in the record, are substantial and well taken, as, in fact, they have been reviewed by respondent Commissioner and found to be sustainable, as he did sustain them. The appointment in controversy was made on November 23, 1973 and respondent Maliwanag assumed office on the strength thereof, albeit she claims she has not been paid her salary. On the other hand, the petition herein was filed only on March 13, 1975, clearly more than one year after the pretended right of petitioner to hold the office in question arose. This single circumstance has closed the door for any judicial remedy in his favor. ISSUE: WON the petitioner instead of respondent Maliwanag should have been appointed thereto. HELD: No. RATIO: Petitioner contends in regard to this point that Section 16 of Rule 66 invoked by private respondent refers to actions of quo warranto and since his petition is also for certiorari and mandamus, said rule is inapplicable. Such contention is not correct. As earlier noted in this decision, the allegations supporting petitioner's cause or causes of action boil down to no more than the removal of respondent Maliwanag from the position to which she has been appointed in order to be replaced by him, with a new appointment in his favor. Necessarily, the ouster of Maliwanag by quo warranto has to be based on a nullification o her appointment, which petitioner seeks, albeit unnecessarily, by certiorari. His ultimate remedy, therefore, is quo warranto. Besides, even if it could be also viewed as mandamus, it is already settled that his latter remedy prescribes also after one year. (Cornejo vs. Sec. of Justice, L-32818, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 663.) And it is of no avail to petitioner that during the intervening period of more than one year, he was seeking relief from the corresponding administrative outhorities. The resort to such administrative remedy does not abate the period for the judicial action. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436; Galano vs. Roxas, G.R. L-31241, Sept. 12, 1975, 67 SCRA 8.) SEPARATE OPINION: AQUINO, J., dissenting. Petitioner Abraham C. Sison, as the incumbent chief deputy assessor, is the qualified and competent next-in-rank employee who should be promoted to the contested position of assistant city assessor of Olongapo City, as contemplated in section 23 of the Civil Service Law. He is qualified for that position because he is a provincial Assessor eligible and he holds a bachelor's degree in commerce. Those qualifications are required for the position of assistant city assessor. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW|to ATTY. VIÑA| CASE Respondent Eureka F. Maliwanag, who was appointed by the mayor that LA position, is not DIGESTS| G01| 44 qualified because sheBATCH is not a4|provincial assessor eligible and she is not a holder of a bachelor's

degree. Her appointment to the contested position is in violation of section 23. Hence, the Commissioner of Civil Service revoked that appointment in his decision of May 3, 1974. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the Commissioner approved that appointment in his decision of June 24, 1974. It is incontestable that Sison is senior to Mrs. Maliwanag. He was appointed senior deputy assessor of Olongapo City effective September 25, 1967. Then, he was promoted to the position of chief deputy assessor of that city on September 1, 1969. On that date, Mrs. Maliwanag was appointed to the position of senior deputy assessor, the position vacated by Sison (pp. 62-63, Rollo). Thus, Sison (not Mrs. Maliwanag) was next in line for the position of assistant city assessor when that position became vacant on November 23, 1973. There is no reason why Mrs. Maliwanag should jump over Sison. The mayor should have apprised Sison as to why he was being bypassed and why Mrs. Maliwanag was being appointed to that position. That legal requirement was not observed. Although Sison's petition in this Court is for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, he has no cause of action for quo warranto because Mrs. Maliwanag holds an appointment to the contested position of assistant city assessor. She cannot be regarded as a usurper of that position. Sison's petition should be treated as one for certiorari and mandamus only. Those special civil actions are adequate for assailing the decisions of the Commissioner of Civil Service. The quo warranto aspect of Sisons's petition should be disregarded. Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not fix any period for the filing of a petition for certiorari and mandamus. The one-year period within which the petition for quo warranto should be filled does not apply to Sison. His petition was delayed because, as he explained, he is a poor man who cannot afford to embark on an expensive and protracted litigation. CASE 41: EUGENIO v. TORRIJOS- VIKTOR GUTIERREZ FACTS: Respondent Torrijos was appointed to the position of Assistant Chief of the Scientific Library and Documentation Division of the National Science Development Board. The legality of the appointment was contested by petitioner who claimed that she had preferential right to the disputed position. Her protest was denied by the NSDB Chairman. Her appeal to the Civil Service Commission did not prosper as it was found that she is not an employee next in rank; that the contested position as well as the division where it belongs are newly created offices as a result of the implementation of the Integrated Reorganization Plan; that the appointee is qualified and eligible; and that there is absence of a showing that her selection has been the result of grave abuse or discretion of fraud. The Commission’s decision dismissing the appeal was elevated to the Presidential Assistant, Office of the President, but the decision and resolution appealed from was affirmed in toto. ISSUE: WON the appointing authority (NATIONAL SCIENCE DEVELOPMENT BOARD) can choose Torrijos for the said position HELD: RATIO: On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents as the appointing authority has discretion in the choice of who is entitled to promotion considering as the basic factor, the needs of the public service, especially where no question may be raised as to who is the employer next in rank. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE Petition dismissed. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 45

CASE 42: PT&T v. COURT OF APPEALS- REBECCA FLORES DOCTRINE: An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to ‘lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees’ consent. There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse.

FACTS: PT&T, engaged in the business of providing telegraph and communication employed various employees, herein private respondents. After conducting a series of studies regarding profitability of its retail operations, PT&T came up with a Relocation Restructuring Program designed to a. Sustain its retail operations b. Decongest surplus workforce, to promote efficiency and productivity c. Avid retrenchment of employees occupying redundant productivity Herein private respondents receive letters from PT&T giving them the option to choose the branch to which they could be transferred. PT&T offered benefits/allowances to those employees who would agree to be transferred under its new program. Likewise, the employees would agree top be transferred would be considered promoted. Private respondents rejected petitioner’s offer. PT&T asked an explanation for such refusal and to justify why disciplinary action should not be taken against them. Private respondents explained that it would case difficulties because they would be assigned to distant places, which would require separations from their respective families. That some of them would need to ride a boat overnight in going to their new assignment Dissatisfied with this explanation, PT&T considered the refusal as an insubordination and willful disobedience to a lawful order thus they were dismissed from work. Private respondents claim that their refusal to transfer could not possibly give rise to a valid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience, as their transfer was prejudicial and inconvenient; thus unreasonable. Private respondents and their new assignments: 1. Jesus Paracale, from General Santos Branch to Butuan City Branch; 2. Romeo Tee, from Zamboanga Branch to Jolo Branch; 3. Benjamin Lakandula, from Iligan City to Butuan City; 4. Avelino Acha, from Legaspi City Branch t Odiongan Branch; 5. Ignacio Dela Cerna, from Pagadian City Branch to Butuan Branch; 6. Guillermo Demigillo, from Midsayap to Lebak Cotabato Branch PT&T contends that the transfers were made in the lawful exercise of its management prerogative and were done in good faith. Respondents however claims that since their respective transfers resulted in their promotion, they had the right to refuse or decline the positions being offered to them. Thus, the refusal to accept ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 46

the transfer could not have amounted to insubordination or willful disobedience to the “lawful orders of the employer. NLRC declared PT&T guilty of illegal dismissal and ordering to reinstate individual complainantsappellants to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to pay them full backwages from the date of their dismissal up to the date of their actual reinstatement. ISSUE: WON the refusals of private respondents constitute willful disobedience and insubordination which will justify their dismissal? HELD: No. RATIO: … [P]romotion, as we defined in Millares v, Subido, is “the advancement from one position to another with an increase in duties and responsibilities as authorized by law, and usually accompanied by an increase in salary.” Apparently, the indispensable element for there to be a promotion is that there must be an “advancement from one position to another” or an upward vertical movement of the employee’s rank or position. Any increase in salary should only be considered incidental but never determinative of whether or not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. This can be likened to the upgrading of salaries of government employees without conferring upon the, the concomitant elevation to the higher positions…. The admissions of the petitioner are conclusive on it. An employee cannot be promoted, even if merely as a result of a transfer, without his consent. A transfer that results in promotion or demotion, advancement or reduction or a transfer that aims to ‘lure the employee away from his permanent position cannot be done without the employees’ consent.] There is no law that compels an employee to accept a promotion for the reason that a promotion is in the nature of a gift or reward, which a person has a right to refuse. Hence, the exercise by the private respondents of their right cannot be considered in law as insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer. As such, there was no valid cause for the private respondents’ dismissal. As the questioned dismissal is not based on any of the just or valid grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the NLRC correctly ordered the private respondents’ reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and the payment of backwages from the time of their dismissal up to their actual reinstateme DISPOSITIVE: Private respondents won.

OTHER PERSONNEL ACTIONS CASE 43: MANGLAPUS v. MATIAS- JOYCE BAYLON FACTS: Abaya received an Assignment Order transferring him to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing as Minister-Counsellor and Consul General. On March 18, 1988, he requested deferment of his transfer to his new assignment in Beijing, to “give him ample time to wind up official and pending family matters.” On April 15, 1988, the Office of Personnel and Management Services (OPMS) recommended to the Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs:  The appointment (in place of Abaya) of Ariel Abadilla to the Embassy at Beijing, Abaya’s suitability having been questioned by Ambassador Rodolfo Severino.  Abaya’s recall to the Home Office in line with the Department’s program of recalling ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE “overstaying” DIGESTS| G01| officers BATCH and 4| 47employees assigned abroad.

Chairman Ramon Diaz of the PCGG requested that Abaya be allowed to testify before a grand jury then investigating the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth in the U.S. OPMS addressed a memo to Secretary of DFA Raul Manglapus (petitioner) reiterating its recommendation to recall Abaya from New York had been extended on request of the PCGG. Abaya sent a telex message to the home office requesting reconsideration of the recall order and a deferment of its effectivity, for the reason that in the case of 8 members of the UN Mission, their recalls were allegedly made effective “some 16 to 23 months from receipt of recall orders,” this being “in consonance with Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89” providing that “recall orders are served one year in advance to cushion those concerned against harsh tradition.” Abaya sent a telex communication to Secretary Manglapus duly noting the latter's instructions to report at Manila on June 1, 1989, and stating that: (1) the period of his initial tour of duty at the UN Mission at New York was not 13 years but 11 years and some 7 months, and he served in the home office for 14 months before being reassigned to New York in June, 1984; (2) that these assignments involved no violation of rules but had been "lawfully made by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs in the exercise of his legal prerogative to redeploy DFA staff in (the) interest of (the) service — a prerogative of any secretary of foreign affairs, past or incumbent . . .;" (3) that said prerogative was not being disputed, the issue being his right to "one-year advance notice of recall orders," a right unconditionally conferred by FS Circular 11-89; and (4) that his request for one-year notice should thus be granted. Secretary Manglapus directed that if Abaya was unable to return to the home office, “he should file leave application with salaries computed at home office rate and payable in pesos.” Abaya went to court. He filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against Sec. Manglapus with the RTC of Manila. Secretary Manglapus moved to dismiss the action OTG that (1) Abaya’s recall is an exercise of Sec’s prerogative and discretion which may not be interfered with by the Court; and (2) petitioner “has not exhausted his administrative remedies.” The RTC denied the motion and granted the application for preliminary injunction. It ruled that Manglapus had no authority to disregard Foreign Service Circular No. 11-89; he had not shown “with convincing evidence that the ‘exigencies of the service’ require the immediate and peremptory recall” of Abaya; Abaya’s case was substantially identical to those of eight other members of the Philippine mission who had been accorded advance notice of their recall of more than a year. ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Foreign officers has the authority under the law to recall and reassign officers as the interests of the service may in his discretion require? Corollary to this, W/N Abaya may be reassigned to another post HELD: Yes. RATIO: Where an officer has served in a foreign post for at least four years, as in Abaya's case, it would appear that the Secretary's power of assignment and transfer rests entirely in his discretion, guided chiefly by his perception of what is necessary for the good of the service. There is no need in that event that some "emergency or extraordinary circumstances" exist, this being required only where the officer has served less than four years in a foreign post. Abaya's reassignment to Beijing in January, 1988, and his recall to the Home Office reiterated in December, 1988, were thus well within the authority granted to the Foreign Affairs Secretary by law (RA No. 708). Those acts were based on reasoned conclusions of the OPMS and the head of the Beijing Embassy — including the fact that Abaya is really an "overstaying" officer in the UN Mission, having served in that post for much more than the maximum term of four (4) years ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, OFFICERS ELECTION ATTY.could LA VIÑA| CASE prescribed by Section 6 of the PUBLIC Foreign Service Law,AND as amended — LAW| and hence, not in truth DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 48

be said to be in any sense capricious or whimsical, no matter how debatable Abaya might think the validity of those conclusions is. No grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of authority, may rightfully be ascribed to the respondent Secretary. It is the RTC which the facts disclose to have gravely abused its discretion in having so utterly misread the facts and the applicable law and overruling the Secretary’s plainly valid and legally authorized actions. CASE 44: GLORIA v. GUZMAN- ARJUNA GUEVARA FACTS: Private respondents were employees of the Philippine Air Force College of Aeronautics (PAFCA) by virtue of temporary appointments because at the time of their appointment, they lacked appropriate civil service eligibilities or otherwise failed to meet the necessary qualification standards for their respective positions. One of them was Rosario Cerillo who was appointed as Board Secretary II of PAFCA. However she was relieved from the position by reason of loss of confidence. Subsequently, she was designated as "Coordinator for Extension Services". Said appointments expired when the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA (Philippine State College of Aeronautics) Aggrieved, private respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Reinstatement before the RTC of Pasay. Petitioners filed an answer upon the ground that mandamus will not lie to compel reinstatement because their appointment prayed for is discretionary on the part of the appointing power (Board of Trustees). Respondent Judge de Guzman rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement of Cerillo as coordinator for extension services. Thus, Sec. Gloria filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to the SC. ISSUE: WON private respondent Rosario V. Cerillo is entitled to reinstatement to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services"? HELD: RATIO: The judgment of respondent Judge de Guzman which orders the reinstatement of Ms. Rosario V. Cerillo to the position of "Coordinator for Extension Services" is patently improper because it finds no support as to facts and the law. The fact is that private respondent's assignment to the said position was a mere designation. Not being a permanent appointment, the designation to the position cannot be the subject of a case for reinstatement. The fact that private respondent Cerillo passed the requisite Civil Service Examination after the termination of her temporary appointment is no reason to compel petitioners to reappoint her. Acquisition of civil service eligibility is not the sole factor for reappointment. Still to be considered by the appointing authority are: performance, degree of education, work experience, training, seniority, and, more importantly, as in this case, whether or not the applicant enjoys the confidence and trust of the appointing power, considering that the position of Board Secretary II, by its nature, is primarily confidential. Reappointment to such position is an act which is discretionary on the part of the appointing power hence it cannot be the subject of an application for a writ of mandamus. Reinstatement is technically issuance of a new appointment which is essentially discretionary, to be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. Such exercise of the discretionary power of appointment cannot be controlled, not even by the Court as long as it is exercised properly by the appointing authority. Thus the order of the lower court for the reinstatement of the private respondent amounts to an undue interference by the court in the exercise of a discretionary power vested in the PSCA Board of Trustees. To the question as to the legality of the termination of the services of the petitioners, the only answer is there was no termination to speak of. Termination presupposes an overt act committed by a superior officer. There was none whatsoever in the case at bar. At most, PSCA Chairman of the Board of Trustees Col. Julian gave notice to the petitioners of the expiration of their respective contracts. Petitioners’ ADMINISTRATIVE LAW,simply PUBLIC OFFICERS AND LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE appointment or employment expired either by itsELECTION very own terms, or because it may not DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 49

exceed one year, but most importantly because the PAFCA was dissolved and replaced by the PSCA. CASE 45: BORRES v. CANONOY- JEAN GUECO FACTS: Petitioner Eulogio Borres was then the acting mayor of Cebu City, while private respondent Silverio Parages was a detective in the Cebu Police Department holding such position in a permanent capacity being a civil service eligible. Acting on verbal complaints that Parages had been molesting Chinese businessman in Cebu and the fact that his performance was not satisfactory, Borres issued a memorandum ordering the detail of respondent to his office. After the said detail order was endorsed by the Chief of Police, Parages was served with a copy thereof, but he refused to receive it and to comply with said order. He informed Borres that he was declining the detail because the order was illegal and continued to report to his unit. Parages filed a petition for prohibition and injunction in the court a quo against petitioner. The court, however, did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for, but preferred to hear the evidence before taking any action.

In view of Parages’ refusal to comply with the detail order, Borres charged him with insubordination and neglect of duty in the Police Commission through the City Board of Investigators. At the same time, he ordered the suspension of Parages. 6.Parages thus amended his petition for prohibition and injunction, with the additional prayer that his suspension be declared illegal.

Trial court declared the detail order illegal and therefore null and void, for being contrary to Section 90 of RA No. 3857, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Cebu and to the constitutional protection of security of tenure. Consequently, it held the order of suspension likewise illegal, and ordered the immediate reinstatement of private respondent to the service and the payment of his back salaries. * Section 90. Power and Duties of the Chief of Police. — There shall be a Chief of Police with a salary of seven thousand eight hundred pesos per annum who shall have charge of the police department and everything pertaining thereto including the organization, administration, discipline, and disposition of, and the transfer of, members from and to the city police and detective bureau; ... and shall promptly and faithfully execute an orders of the Mayor, including assignments and transfer of personnel. ISSUE: WON it is within the power of the Mayor to order the detail of private respondent under the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu and the latter's suspension for refusing to comply with the order. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The power of petitioner, as Mayor of Cebu City, to detail respondent cannot be denied. Such power to detail must necessarily be deemed included in his power of control and supervision over differentLAW, departments, among which is ELECTION the Police Department, as VIÑA| expressly so ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND LAW| ATTY. LA CASE provided in Sections and 324|of50the Revised Charter of Cebu. DIGESTS| G01|19 BATCH

*Section 19. Nature of Office; Qualifications, compensations. — The Mayor shall be the Chief executive of the city and as such shall have immediate control over the executive functions of the different departments and agencies of the city, subject to the general supervision of the President as may be provided for by law ... .

Section 32. City Departments.— There shall be the following city departments over which the Mayor shall have direct supervision and con trol any existing law to the contrary notwithstanding (6) Police Department If by the grant of the power of control and supervision, the Mayor can nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties, it is evident that he can order the detail of private respondent to correct or prevent him from committing any abuse in the performance of his duties; otherwise, said Sections 19 and 32 of the city charter would just be stale and meaningless provisions.

The power to detail may also be gleaned from the fact that Section 20 of the same charter provides that the Mayor has the power to see to it that executive officers and employees are properly discharging their respective duties. It should be recalled that the Mayor issued the questioned detail order after he has received reports that Parages' efficiency is far from satisfactory and had been molesting Chinese businessmen. Hence, in this desire to gain information of actual facts and closely look at his activities, he ordered the detail of private respondent to his office. There is no effective way by which the Mayor can see to it that private respondent properly discharged his duties.

*Section 20. General Powers and Duties of the Mayor. —The Mayor shall have the following general powers and duties: e. To see that executive officers and employees of the city are properly discharging their respective duties. The Mayor may, in the interest of the service, transfer officers and employees not appointed by the President of the Philippines from one section, division, service, or department to another section, division, service, or department without changing the compensation they receive.

CASE 46: FLOREZA v. ONGPIN- PATRICIA CAÑALITA FACTS: Petitioner Reynoso B. Floreza joined the government service in May, 1955 as a clerk (action attorney) in the Administrative Division of the Department of Finance. In December, 1959-he transferred to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) where he was appointed Senior Revenue Examiner. While based in Davao City as Regional Director of Revenue, he was informed by then Acting BIR ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. VIÑA| CASE Commissioner Ruben B.LAW, Ancheta of the latter's intention to designate him toLA the position of DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 51 Revenue Service Chief (Legal). Floreza accepted the designation.

April 4, 1986 – Pursuant to reorganization program, BIR Commissioner, Bienvenido Tan, Jr. issued a memorandum asking the all Service Chiefs and assistants to tender their resignation. Floreza refused to do this. Commissioner Tan then issued Travel Assignment Order assigning Floreza to the Office of the Commissioner as Consultant due to "the exigencies of the service." The same order directed Jaime M. Maza to report to the Legal Office as its acting chief. The President issued EO 127 reorganizing the Ministry of Finance. Three days later, Feb. 2, 1987, the new Constitution was ratified. Section 3 of the transitory provisions provides that all existing executive orders and issuances not inconsistent with the constitution "shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. Thereafter, the committee constituted to effect the reorganization of the Bureau submitted a staffing pattern and structure to the Commissioner and the Secretary of Finance. Feeling that he had been placed in a "freezer" 11 and having been confidentially advised that he would be removed from the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) as he was not among those recommended for reappointment, Floreza filed in the Court of Appeals on June 4, 1987 a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. He alleged that this violated his right to security of tenure. CA: Dismissed the petition. CA ruled that Executive Order No. 127 was issued pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the Freedom Constitution mandating that "(a)ll elective and appointive officials and employees under the 1973 Constitution shall continue in office until otherwise provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such appointment is made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.; that Floreza's non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief (Legal) did not violate his constitutional right to security of tenure for it merely confirmed his earlier separation from the post.; Section 59 of Executive Order No. 127 which took effect on January 30, 1987 or within the one-year period prescribed by the Freedom Constitution, personnel of the Ministry of Finance, including Floreza, were considered removed on said date. Hence, the present petition. March 7, 1988 - President Aquino issued appointment for Jaime M. Maza and Rizalina Magalona to the positions of Assistant Commissioners for Legal Service and Planning and Research Service, respectively. It is not shown why Commissioner Tan had to secure Presidential appointments for these two items since persons appointed to these positions are not and have never been presidential appointees at least, not under the law. Floreza appealed on March 12, 1988 to both the Department of Finance and the Civil Service Commission his non-reappointment as Revenue Service Chief and the appointment of Maza and Magalona to said position. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION DECISION: Directed the BIR to appoint Floreza "to a position in the new staffing pattern equivalent or comparable to the rank of Revenue Service Chief, There is however no showing that the post of Assistant Commissioner is equivalent to the post of Revenue Service Chief Assuming however that such is the case, there is no showing either that Floreza is more qualified than either Maza or Magalona to move up to the contested Assistant Commissioner post. Floreza then filed the other petition herein. He prays that said decision be modified by "restoring" him to the position of Revenue Service Chief (Legal) 'retitled Assistant Commissioner (Legal)." ISSUES: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 52

(1) WON Floreza’s assignment as Consultant in the Office of the Commissioner through a travel assignment order, is considered a “transfer” under Sec.24(c) of PD 807, hence his position as Legal Revenue Service Chief was considered discontinued; and (2) WON Floreza was invalidly terminated. HELD: (1) No. (2) RATIO: Floreza’s assignment as Consultant is considered a “Detail” under Sec. 24(f) of PD 807. Under such provision, Detail. A detail is the movement on an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited period in the case of employees occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the Commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the Commission. Under Sec. 24(c), Transfer. A transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level, or salary without break in service involving the issuance of an appointment. Therefore, Floreza continued holding the position of Revenue Service Chief until Commissioner Tan went to the President for the appointments of Jaime M. Masa as Assistant Commissioner for the Legal Service and Rizalina S. Magalona as Assistant Commissioner for the Planning and Research Service on March 7, 1988. Since both the Planning and Policy (or Research) Service and the Legal Service were given new Chiefs, Floreza was in effect terminated in his employment even as he was offered a demotion in rank to replace it. As to the second issue, Yes, Floreza was invalidly terminated. The Court ruled that government reorganization may continue under the 1987 Constitution. However, no employee shall be terminated without just cause and due notice. In this case, the Court held that Floreza was deprived of his right to security of tenure by his nonreappointment to the position of Revenue Service Chief or its new title under the reorganized Bureau of Internal Revenue. When Floreza was not reappointed as Revenue Service Chief or as Assistant Commissioner either in the Legal Service or in the Planning and Research Service, and other persons were appointed to the positions, he was, in effect, dismissed from the service in violation not only of his right to security of tenure but to due process as well. There was no vacancy in the office to which Jaime M. Maza was appointed and, therefore, the latter’s promotion was invalid.

DISCIPLINE CASE 47: RTC MAKATI MOVEMENT AGAINST GRAFT AND CORRUPTION v. DUMLAOKELVIN HUNG ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 53

FACTS: Atty. Inocencio Dumalao, then Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134, was charged by the petitioner for allegedly engaging in usurious activities, immorality and violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. First, Atty. Dumalao has been collecting commissioner’s fee from party litigants and lawyers in exchange for favourable action on their cases. Second, He is neglectful of his duty. He was often absent during court hearings. Third, He withheld the salary checks of all RTC Makati employees and compelled them to borrow money from him at usurious rates. He charged them 10% per month. Failure on the part of the employees to pay would lead to his filing of criminal charges against the employees. ISSUE: WON Atty. Dumlao must be dismissed from office given the findings of guilt against him by the lower court. HELD: Yes. RATIO: Dismissal of respondent is based on grave misconduct and dishonesty prejudicial to the interest of the service and acts unbecoming of a court officer. Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline. The administration of justice is a sacred task. The conduct of all officers charged with the dispensation of justice must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. First, it is expressly provided in the Manual for Clerks of Court that “No branch clerk of court shall demand and/or receive commissioner’s fees for reception of evidence ex-parte.” Defense of unfamiliarity with the manual is not considered by the Court. Ignorance of the existence of the Manual clearly demonstrates how grossly remiss he has been in the performance of his duty. Second, Atty. Dumalao, although he cannot be charged civilly and criminally because of the suspension of the Usury law, can be held administratively liable under the Civil Service law where lending money at usurious rates of interests is specifically listed as grounds for disciplinary actions. The court is not a lending institution, by engaging in the lending activities, respondent has caused dishonour to the courts of justice. Lastly, respondent’s failure to prepare proper or correct monthly reports of cases was found by the court to be a serious breach of duty. His reliance on the reports prepared by the Clerks-incharge was insufficient and is a lazy and sloppy manner of performing his duty. DISMISSED FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS, IF ANY, AND WITH PREJUDICE TO HIS REINSTATEMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, INCLUDING GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS. CASE 48: AQUINO v. FERNANDEZ- FLOYD MAGO FACTS: Judge Manuel R. Aquino of the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator his “Report/Findings” dated November 16, 1998 recommending that an appropriate disciplinary action be imposed upon Jocelyn Fernandez who holds the position of Stenographer I in his sala. It appears that respondent committed several transgressions, among which are: 1) Her failure to comply with the instruction to type the drafted order in Criminal Case No. 41978 entitled, “People of the Philippines vs. Jose Runas” on November 4, 1998; 2) For absenting herself from office for the period November 4,5,6, 1998 without prior leave of absence as required by law; And for these transgressions the investigating judge recommended her suspension for ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLICwith OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE 1 month without LAW, pay together a stern warning. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 54

ISSUE: WON the recommendation of the investigating judge was appropriate. HELD: No. RATIO: Although the first transgression is considered a less grave offense under Sec. 23 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 for which a penalty of suspension for one month and one day to six months shall be imposed for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense, The Court considered her admission and plea for compassion with a promise not to commit the same acts in the future, thus deemed a lighter penalty than suspension for one month and one day on respondent would suffice in this case. As for the second offense, sections 50-51 of the Rule XVI of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations state that it is not mandatory to submit an application for vacation leave of absence and in the case that these were not approved by the department or agency head, the employee will not receive his salary to the corresponding date of absences and but does not ipso facto render an employee administratively liable. These set of facts were found by the Court as insufficient to discipline the respondent. WHEREFORE, we find respondent Jocelyn C. Fernandez, Stenographer I, Municipal Trial Court, Caba, La Union GUILTY of simple neglect of duty. She is FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future shall be dealt with more severely. CASE 49: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COURT OF APPEALS- ASTER CARRILLO FACTS: Guevarra and Cezar were the Officer-in-Charge/President and the Vice President for Administration, respectively of the PUP. Cueva, then PUP Chief Legal Counsel, filed an administrative case against Guevarra and Cezar for gross dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official documents among other charges. In Guevarra’s application, he denied the existence of his pending criminal and administrative cases..Ï‚rνll In his Application, he answered Question No. 11 in this wise: 11. Do you have any criminal or administrative records? NO. If so, state briefly the nature thereof NO.rν ll This was despite the undisputed fact that, at that time, both Guevarra and Cezar admittedly had 17 pending cases before the Sandiganbayan.νll Cezar, knowing fully well that both he and Guevarra had existing cases before the Sandiganbayan, endorsed and recommended the approval of the application.Ï‚rÎ ½ll They explained that they believed "criminal or administrative records" to mean final conviction in a criminal or administrative case.‚rνll Thus, because their cases had not yet been decided by the Sandiganbayan, they asserted that Guevarra responded in good faith. Meanwhile, the CSC formally charged Guevarra with Dishonesty and Cezar with Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Aggrieved, Guevarra and Cezar filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA essentially questioning the jurisdiction of the CSC. The CA granted the petition, nullifying and setting aside the questioned resolutions of the CSC for having been rendered without jurisdiction. The CA noted that the CSC erred in recognizing the complaint filed by Cueva, reasoning out that ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERSremedies AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE the latter should have exhausted all administrative by first bringing his grievances to the DIGESTS| G01|Board BATCH 4| 55 attention of the PUP of Regents.

Hence, these petitions. ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission has original concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases falling under the jurisdiction of heads of agencies. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The CSC has jurisdiction over casesfiled directly with it, regardless ofwho initiated the complaint. The CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has the power to appoint and discipline its officials and employees and to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal.‚rνll By virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1341, PUP became a chartered state university, thereby making it a government-owned or controlled corporation with an original charter whose employees are part of the Civil Service and are subject to the CSC’s original jurisdiction.rνll

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION CASE 50: DE GUZMAN v. APOLONIO- DIANA DE LEON Doctine: Section 19, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowers the proper disciplining authority to issue upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, an order of preventive suspension to any subordinate officer or employee pending investigation if the charge involves, among others, grave misconduct. It should be noted that a preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. FACTS: Police Capt. Romeo de Guzman, Chief of CIDG Isabela, prays that Maripi Apolonio be placed under preventive suspension. Court stenographer Maripi Apolonio was charged of violating RA 3019 or The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. She was caught in an entrapment operation receiving P120,000.00, an act which the complainant, her sister-in-law, aver as extortion. Apolonio denies the charges asserting that the money is to be used for her nephew’s surety bond. Her nephew, Jomel, seeks the possibility of posting bail in relation to the drug charges against him. Apolonio claims that her sister-in-law is just unaware that the money will be used for Jomel’s bail. However, the Court noted that Apolonio made personal inquiries to the PNP and the Office of the City Prosecutor regarding her nephew’s cases. She also personally made arrangements for securing a surety bond at the city prosecutor’s office. She did all of these during official time. The Office of the Court Administrator in its report stated that Apolonio’s actuations compromised the integrity of the judiciary in the eyes of the public. Hence, the OCA recommended that Apolonio be placed under preventive suspension pending the final outcome of the resolution of the criminal case against her or until further orders from the Court. It also recommended that the instant administrative proceedings be held in abeyance to await the outcome of said criminal case. ISSUE: WON Apolonio may be placed under preventive suspension HELD: Yes. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 56

RATIO: Section 19, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, empowers the proper disciplining authority to issue upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, an order of preventive suspension to any subordinate officer or employee pending investigation if the charge involves, among others, grave misconduct. The provision reads: SEC. 19. Preventive Suspension.- Upon petition of the complainant or motu proprio, the proper disciplining authority may issue an order of preventive suspension upon service of the Formal Charge, or immediately thereafter to any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending investigation, if the charge involves: a. dishonesty; b. oppression; c. grave misconduct; d. neglect in the performance of duty; or e. if there are reasons to believe that the respondent isguilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from the service. An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary evidence on file with his Office. In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the proper disciplining authority or head of office, may reassign respondent to other unit of the agency during the formal hearings. The Court agreed to the findings of the OCA and said that the Supreme Court is given by the Constitution the exclusive power over the discipline of lower court judges and court personnel. As the charge embodied in the Complaint constitutes either dishonesty or grave misconduct, the Supreme Court as the proper disciplining authority may motu proprio¸ or at the complainant’s behest as in the case at bar, issue an order placing respondent under preventive suspension. Under the circumstances, the Court believes that an order of preventive suspension is warranted. It is worth reiterating that preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. Finally, the Court confirms the need to hold the instant administrative proceedings in abeyance pending the outcome of the criminal case filed against Apolonio. The disposition of the criminal case will provide basis for determining the administrative liability of respondent. CASE 51: VILLALUZ v. ZALDIVAR- NORIEL ALEJANDRO FACTS: Ruben Villaluz was appointed as the Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office in 1958. In 1960, Congressman Joaquin Roces alleged that Villaluz was an ineffective leader and had caused losses to the government. He indorsed the removal of Villaluz. Consequently, Executive Secretary Calixto Zaldivar suspended Villaluz and ordered a committee to investigate the matter. After investigation, it was recommended that Villaluz be removed. The president then issued an Administrative Order removing Villaluz from his post. Villaluz averred that the president has no jurisdiction to remove him. ISSUE: WON Villaluz is under the jurisdiction of the President to be removed considering that he is an appointee of the president. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE HELD: Yes. DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 57

RATIO: The president has jurisdiction and not the Civil Service. The President of the Philippines has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Sec 5 of Republic Act No. 2260; being a presidential appointee, Villaluz belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and as such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing by the President of the Philippines under the principle that “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint” . The Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against said official, because his authority to pass upon questions of suspension, separation or removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which classification the administrator does not belong. There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that “the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department”. CASE 52: QUIMBO v. GERVACIO- FRANCES BUBAN FACTS: Petitioner Prudencio C. Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, was administratively charged for harassment and oppression by Elmo V. Padaon, a general foreman. During the pendency of the case, he was placed under preventive suspension without pay. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found Quimbo guilty of oppression and recommended that he be suspended from office for a period of 8 months without pay. This was approved by the Ombudsman. The CA found Quimbo guilty of simple misconduct only and penalized him with suspension from office for a period of 2 months without pay. Quimbo filed a Motion for Modification/Reconsideration calling attention to the fact that he had been on preventive suspension from March 18, 1998 to June 1, 1998 and praying that the order under reconsideration be modified to take into account the period of his PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION of 2 MONTHS and 17 DAYS WITHOUT PAY as part of the final penalty imposed. The Ombudsman clarified that preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an investigation; and that if after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated upon is found guilty warranting the imposition of penalty, then he shall accordingly be penalized. Such was affirmed by the CA. ISSUE: WON the preventive suspension pending the investigation is a penalty. HELD: RATIO: Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERSBook AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA|ofCASE Rule ADMINISTRATIVE XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing V of the Administrative Code 1987 DIGESTS| G01| 4| 58other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. As stated in Sec. 24, (Executive Order No.BATCH 292) and

preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure. Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides that the period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty. Clearly, service of the preventive suspension cannot be credited as service of penalty. To rule otherwise is to disregard above-quoted Sections 24 and 25 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and render nugatory the substantial distinction between, and purposes of imposing preventive suspension and suspension as penalty.

DECISION CASE 53: CANIETE v. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION- EDWARD MATIAS CASE 54: APUYAN v. STA. ISABEL- JOSHUA BAGOTSAY FACTS: Complaint for Gross Misconduct, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Official and Graft and Corruption. Apuyan is one of the plaintiffs in a civil case. In that civil case, a writ of attachment was issued by the RTC against the monies and properties of defendants. Apuyan fetched Sheriff Sta Isabel and other policemen for the execution of the writ of attachment against the defendant. Sta Isabel told Apuyan that the Sheriff’s rate is 5% of the total amount attached, but he was willing to settle for a 0.5% share. The total amount subject to attachment was P10,000,000.00, or a share of P50,000.00. After levying the properties, Apuyan handed Sta Isabel an envelope containing P2,000. When the latter saw the money, he threw the envelope and cursed him, saying that the amount of P2,000.00 is a big insult to his person. He grabbed Apuyan’s collar, uttering, “O, ano ang gusto mong mangyari ngayon?” Sta Isabel’s officemates intervened to avoid further harm and embarrassment to complainant Apuyan. For his defense, Sta Isabel denied that he threw the envelope and grabbed Apuyan’s collar. Accordiing to him, Apuyan was angered when he refused to accept the offer of P2,000.00 goodwill money. The Office of the Court Administrator found Sta Isabel guilty of the charges and recommended the suspension of Sta Isabel. Case was submitted to the Supreme Court for resolution. ISSUE: WON Sta. Isabel is guilty. HELD: Yes. RATIO: Section 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to estimate his expenses in the execution of the decision. The prevailing party will then deposit the said amount to the Clerk of Court who will disburse the amount to the sheriff, subject to liquidation. Any unspent amount will have to be returned to the prevailing party. In this case, no estimate of sheriff’s expenses was submitted to the court by Sta Isabel. In fact, the money which he had demanded and had received from Apuyan was not among those ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC prescribed and authorized by the Rules OFFICERS of Court. AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 59

The SC has ruled that any amount received by the sheriff in excess of the lawful fees allowed by the Rules of Court is an unlawful exaction and renders him liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty. However, this is the first time that Sta Isabel has ever been charged administratively. Thus, instead of imposing the penalty of dismissal which is the imposable penalty for commission of the first offense of grave misconduct and dishonesty, Sta Isabel, as appropriately recommended by the OCA, should be suspended for a period of one year without pay with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely. CASE 55: MALANYAON v. LISING- JENNIFER BALMEO FACTS:MayorPntlwschgedvifRA3019(-GratnuCopcPesi).Hwdfrmobuthingscey,adwl p.iThcsmedutoaPinrghpymfeMtsoa'lduinrp toSec13fRA09whpivdrs-ualcboefnytijdgmhsalerovitybnfudwl,sheacqbnodtirmhesalbnftocwidvreughspna.MylowmbreftuSgniBal,Cmsr. He edfil an oacnti to declar aileg the sdibuerntm made by eGotal as Mpunical eTasur ot het wdoi of Mayor Pontal a opnrti of the asryl of the atel Mayor as such Mayor of such ucnmyipalt ndugri het opedri of shi supenio from Augst 16, 197 up ot Novembr 28, 197. wHoevr, eJudg Lisng sdmie the action on het ground tha het ncariml case nasigt Mayo r Pontal due to shi death oaeunmdt to uacitql. ISUE:

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APEL CASE56:PRDvVIL.OMSN-AJHP AFCTS: This is a consolidated case of G.R. 88177 and 89530 wherein the former case, Paredes assails the resolution sustaining the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) directing the revocation of her appointment as HS Project Coordinator in the HLURB and declaring the said position vacant while, the latter case, Paredes assails another resolution affirming the decision of the MSPB dismissing all charges against Atty. Amor except habitual tardiness for which Atty. Amor was reprimanded and warned. In GR 88177, Paredes entered in government services as a public school teacher in 1950 and later transferred to the General Auditing Office as Auditing Clerk at the Phil/ Tobacco Administration. Subsequently, she joined the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) as Project Officer (PO) II and was promoted to PO III and afterwards, as the HS Project Supervisor (PS). Respondent Atty. Amor, HS PO IV, assailed the promotion of Paredes; the case was docketed in the HSRC. HSRC Commission and CEO Mendiola dismissed Amor’s protest because: (1) as it was filed beyond the prescribed period provided in Sec 10 Rule IV of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations; (2) Amor is not among the top next-in-rank candidates; and even though Paredes is only a holder of a 2 year Elementary Teachers Certificate her educational deficiency can be substituted with her 31 years of service in the government. Amor appealed to the Office of the President but it was forwarded to the MSPB. The appeal was favored to Amor. MSPB’s ground was opined that (1) the position requires a lawyer, architect, engineer or a holder of a masteral degree for appointment thereto; (2) Paredes’ length in service cannot be used; (3) even if the 2 year educational requirement can be substituted, Paredes is only a holder of a 2 year elementary teacher certificate not meeting the standards as provided in the HSRC Qualification Standards; (4) in the exercise of appointing authority should be guided by the Civil Service Law and Rules. Paredes files her motion for reconsideration alleging that there is no Qualification ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. VIÑA| CASE Standards; that the CSCLAW, Resolution No.OFFICERS 84-215 approved only the HSRC’s MeritLA Promotion Plan DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 60 (MPP) and the System of Ranking Positions (SRP) ; that the Qualification standards is separate

ac?quitl

from the MPP and SRP; that the promotional appointments of petitioner are legal. However, it was denied by the MSPB. On appeal, the CSC ruled that although the HLURB Qualification Standards has not been approved it can be used as basis for recruitment and promotion. nI GR 89530, Peredes filed a complaint against Amor for falsification of documents, dishonesty, violation of the Civil Service Law and reasonable office Rules and Regulations, habitual tardiness, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Amor denies all allegations against her and alleges that she’s being harassed. Finding prima facie evidence against Amor, Legal Officer Aquino of HSRC recommended to resolve the issue at the CSC pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, implementing PD No. 1409, then Commissioner Mendiola requested in his letter dated June 25, 1986 that the said administrative case be taken cognizance of by the MSBP. MSPB favoured Amor of all charges. Not satisfied with MSPB, Paredes appealed to CSC however it was dismissed on the grounds that she is not the party affected by the decision. ISSUES: (1) WON the public respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the revocation of petitioner Paredes' appointment as HS Project Coordinator and in declaring the said position vacant. (2) WON petitioner Paredes has the legal personality to appeal the decision of the MSPB absolving private respondent Amor of all charges except for habitual tardiness for which the latter was reprimanded. HELD: (1) No. (2) No. RATIO: In declaring the Position of HS Project Coordinator vacant; the public respondent has therefore not abused its discretion as the Qualification Standards of the HSRC which should be the basis and guide for appointment has not been approved by the Civil Service Commission. Section 20 of Article III on Personnel Policies and Standards under Presidential Decree No. 807 dated October 6, 1975, expressly mandates them to do so. Also, it prescribes for the minimum qualification requirement in terms of education, Civil Service eligibility, training, experience, physical fitness and other qualities for appointment to a particular position as determined by the appointing authority. A Qualification Standard is to be established or formulated by the Department or agency concerned but must be approved by the Civil Service Commission. Approval is required by law because the Civil Service Commission is the central personnel agency of the government entrusted with the enforcement of laws relative to the selection, promotion and discipline of civil servants. Once approved, the Qualification Standards shall be used as guides in appointment and in the adjudication of contested appointments. For an act of a court or tribunal to be considered as committed in grave abuse of discretion the same must be performed in a capricious and whimsical manner as tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law (Carson et al. v. Judge Pantamosos, Jr., G.R. No. 75934, December 13, 1989; Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ATTY. G.R. ADMINISTRATIVE 72424, February 13, 1989; People v. Manuel, 11ELECTION SCRA 618)LAW| Failure onLA theVIÑA| part CASE of the DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 61

petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition (Del Rosario v. Subido, 31 SCRA 382). Paredes the complainant is not the party adversely affected by the decision so that she has no legal personality to interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission. In an administrative case, the complainant is a mere witness (Gonzalo v. D. Roda, 64 SCRA 120) Section 37 & 39 allows appeal to the Civil Service Commission in an administrative case is extended to the party adversely affected by the decision, that is, the person or the respondent employee who has been meted out the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. The decision of the disciplining authority is even final and not appealable to the Civil Service Commission in cases where the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. Appeal in cases allowed by law must be filed within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Here, The penalty was only a reprimand so that even private respondent Amor, the party adversely affected by the decision, cannot even interpose an appeal to the Civil Service Commission Appeal in judicial proceedings is a statutory right that must be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law (Ozaeta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 83281, December 4, 1989; Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 51 SCRA 439). This doctrine is also applicable in quasi-judicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal the order or decision. CASE57:HURTvGONZ.L-IVACPE

FACTS: An administrative complaint was filed with the Office of the Regional Director of the then Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), NCR, by Dr. Carolina C. Dizon, the principal of the Bacood Elementary School in Sta. Mesa, against Angelito M. Huertas, a school teacher in the same school, for grave misconduct, disrespect of authority and violation of the provision of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.

The school conducted a regular election of the officers of the faculty club. Huertas was re-elected president, besting for the second time around his co-teacher, Mrs. Catalina Lorenzo. This notwithstanding, a group of teachers circulated a manifesto denouncing Huertas. As a countermove, Huertas launched his own signature campaign to show his clear mandate.

Huertas received information that Dizon was preventing the teachers from signing in his favor. He rushed to the office of Dizon and angrily confronted the latter. After the heated exchange of words, Huertas decided to leave, but before doing so, warned Dizon that if she doesn’t stop, he will sue her. Dizon preempted Huertas and filed an administrative complaint against him.

An Investigating Committee (Grievance Committee) constituted theLApurpose. The ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND was ELECTION LAW| for ATTY. VIÑA| CASE Investigating Committee conducted a preliminary hearing. The formal investigation was set on DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 62

September 10, 1996, during which Huertas appeared without the assistance of counsel. The parties agreed to submit the case for resolution without any formal investigation on the basis of the affidavits on record.

In time, the Grievance Committee submitted its investigation report, finding Huertas guilty of gross discourtesy in the course of official duties. In a Resolution dated October 16, 1996, Regional Director Nilo Rosas modified the findings and recommendation of the Grievance Committee. He found Huertas guilty of gross disrespect and imposed on him the penalty of one (1) month suspension from service without pay.

Huertas moved for a reconsideration of the resolution on the alleged ground of lack of due process, both substantive and procedural. He claimed that he was not represented by counsel during the investigation and that the Grievance Committee failed to conduct a formal investigation of the case. Director Rosas denied the motion, prompting Huertas to appeal the resolution to the DECS Secretary via a petition for review.

Then DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria issued a Resolution reversing the resolutions of the Regional Director and dismissing the administrative complaint for want of a formal hearing. The Secretary ruled that Huertas was deprived of his right to due process when the Grievance Committee dispensed with a formal investigation and based its report-recommendation merely on the affidavits of the parties and those of the witnesses of the complainant.

Dissatisfied, Dizon herself filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution. Then Acting Secretary Erlinda C. Pefianco reconsidered the ruling of her predecessor and reinstated the resolution of the Regional Director.

Huertas filed a petition for review which was treated as a motion for reconsideration by then DECS Secretary Andrew Gonzalez, FSC. Secretary Gonzalez reconsidered and set-aside Secretary Pefianco’s Resolution and reinstated Secretary Gloria’s Resolution. In reinstating Secretary Gloria’s Resolution, Secretary Gonzalez tersely and succinctly ratiocinated: It is evident that then Secretary Pefianco acted on the motion for Reconsideration of the [complaint] contrary to the rule that only the respondent can file a motion for reconsideration (CSC Resolution No. 94-0512, Sec. 7).

The CA ruled that Dizon herself had the right to appeal or move for a reconsideration of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria as held by the Court in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy. It rejected the argument of the OSG that a decision in administrative cases penalized by one month suspension or less shall LAW, be final under Section 47(2), Chapter 7, Subtitle Title I,LA Book V of E.O. ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW|A,ATTY. VIÑA| CASE No. 292. According the CA,4|the DIGESTS| G01|toBATCH 63 petitioner’s case does not fall within the ambit of E.O. No. 292

because “the root of the penalty is an illegally constituted investigating committee. As the old adage tells us ‘it is a fruit of a poisonous tree.’”

Petitioner avers that respondent Dizon was barred from filing a motion for the reconsideration of the Resolution of Secretary Gloria. This resolution reversed that of Regional Director Rosas and ordered the dismissal of the said complaint, on the ground that the petitioner was deprived of his right to due process when the committee dispensed with a formal investigation and because its report was based merely on the affidavits on record. The petitioner cites Section 39(a) of Presidential Decree No. 805, which provides that appeals where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision. He also cites Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission, where the Court ruled that only the government employee against whom the administrative case is filed is entitled to appeal from a decision adverse to him, and the ruling of this Court in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission that the civil service law does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges. The petitioner insists that when Secretary Gloria ordered the dismissal of the complaint against him for lack of due process, he was exonerated of the charge.

ISSUE: WON private respondent Carolina Dizon has the locus standi to file a motion for reconsideration.

HELD:

RATIO: We do not agree with the petitioner. The Court overturned its ruling in Mendez v. Civil Service Commission and in Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, which latter holding, in turn, was reiterated in Philippine National Bank v. Garcia, Jr. Thus:

In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Reynato S. Puno explained that the Civil Service Law did not categorically sanction the old doctrine barring appeals by parties other than the respondent employee. What the law declared as “final” were only those decisions of heads of agencies involving suspensions of not more than thirty days or fines not exceeding thirty days’ salary. These decisions, he said, involved minor and petty offenses, and to allow multiple appeals in those instances would overburden the quasi-judicial machinery of our administrative systems.

Neither can the old doctrine barring appeal be justified by the provision limiting the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. According to that provision, the CSC was limited to the review of decisions involving: (1) suspension for more than thirty (30) days; (2) fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary; (3) demotion in rank or salary; and (4) transfer, removal or dismissal from office. Nothing in the provision, however, indicates a legislative intent to bar appeals from decisions exonerating a government official or an employee from an administrative ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LAcharge. VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 64

Indeed, the battles against corruption, malfeasance and misfeasance will be seriously undermined if we bar appeals of exoneration. After all, administrative cases do not partake of the nature of criminal actions, in which acquittals are final and unappealable based on the constitutional proscription of double jeopardy.

Furthermore, our new Constitution expressly expanded the range and scope of judicial review. Thus, to prevent appeals of administrative decisions except those initiated by employees will effectively and pervertedly erode this constitutional grant.

It must be stressed that the petitioner was not exonerated of the charge against him in the November 20, 1997 Resolution of Secretary Gloria; the DECS Secretary merely nullified the proceedings before the committee as well as its report/recommendation. Hence, respondent Dizon was moving for the reconsideration of the November 20, 1997 Resolution of the Secretary, and was not, in effect, appealing from any resolution exonerating the petitioner.

CASE 58: CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. GENTALLAN- JOSH SALTERAS

CASE 59: NATIONAL APPELLATE BOARD OF NAPOLEON v. MAMAUAG- JIMUEL MATIAS

FACTS: Nancy Gaspar and Proclyn Pacay left the residence of Judge Angeles in Quezon City. Gaspar and Pacay were both minors and were later classified as moderate or mild mental retardates by the DSWD. Agnes Lucero found Gaspar and Pacay wandering around the vicinity of the Philippine Rabbit bus terminal in Cubao. Gaspar and Pacay narrated to Lucero stories of maltreatment and non-payment of salary by Judge Angeles. Lucero brought Gaspar and Pacay to the Central Police District Command (CPDC). At the police station, desk officer SPO1 Billedo recorded the girls’ complaint in the police blotter. On Billedo’s instruction, SPO1Cariño brought Gaspar and Pacay to the East Avenue Medical Center for the requisite medical examination. The two girls were returned to the police station where Cariño interviewed them. Cariño’s Initial Investigation Report was reviewed and signed by SPO2 Almario and approved by P/Insp. Mamauag. SPO1 Felipe and SPO4 Garcia escorted Gaspar and Pacay to the DSWD. P/Insp. Ganias signed the Letter of Turnover to the DSWD. The incident drew the attention of the media and spawned several cases. One was a criminal case for child abuse under Republic Act No. 7610 against Judge Angeles. Another was an administrative complaint for Grave Misconduct filed by Judge Angeles against Ganias, Mamauag, Almario, Cariño, Felipe and Garcia. Judge Angeles later impleaded Billedo as additional respondent. Judge Angeles filed an administrative complaint, The Inspectorate and Legal Affairs Division of the CPDC investigated the administrative complaint. After its investigation, the ILAD ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC AND CPDC ELECTION LAW|Director ATTY. LAapproved VIÑA| CASE recommended the dismissal of theOFFICERS charges. The District the DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 65

recommendation and dismissed the complaint. Not satisfied with the outcome, Judge Angeles moved for re-investigation of the case before PNP Chief Sarmiento. In a Decision dated 7 June 1996, PNP Chief Sarmiento ruled as follows: WHEREFORE, this Headquarters finds: Respondents P/CINSP. Ganias, SPO1 Billedo, and SPO1 Cariño guilty of Serious Neglect of Duty and orders their dismissal from the police service; P/INSP Mamauag and SPO2 Almario guilty of Less Serious Neglect of Duty and orders that both of them be suspended from the police service for Ninety days with forfeiture of pay; and SPO4 Erlinda Garcia and SPO1 Vivian Felipe exonerated of the charge for insufficiency of evidence. PNP Chief Sarmiento nmodified his previous ruling and ordered the dismissal from the service of Mamauag, Almario, Garcia and Felipe. Mamauag, et al. forthwith filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PNP Chief Sarmiento, PNP Inspector General Sales and Judge Angeles before the RTC of Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioners to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to show that respondents abused their discretion. Mamauag, et al. then appealed the PNP Chief’s Resolution before the NAB. The NAB dismissed the appeal for late filing and lack of merit. Mamauag, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but the NAB denied it. Thus, Mamauag, et al. sought relief from the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: WON the private complainant in an administrative case has the legal personality to move for reconsideration, or appeal an adverse decision of the disciplining authority. HELD: No. RATIO: RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975 authorize “either party” to appeal in the instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP member-respondent when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The other party is the government when the disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but the government believes that dismissal from the service is the proper penalty. However, the government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the service. The government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the respondent. A private complainant like Judge Angeles is not one of “either party” who can appeal under Sections 43 and 45 of RA 6975. The private complainant is a mere witness of the government which is the real party in interest. Private complainant Judge Angeles is not a party under Sections 43 and 45 who can appeal the decision of the disciplining authority. Judge Angeles has no legal personality to appeal the dismissal of the charges against Mamauag, et al. by the CPDC District Director. The motion for re-investigation filed by Judge Angeles with the PNP Chief is in substance an appeal from the decision of the CPDC District Director. The PNP Chief had no jurisdiction to entertain Judge Angeles’ appeal in the guise of a motion for reinvestigation. Since the PNP Chief had no jurisdiction, all actions taken by the PNP Chief ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICERS ELECTION LAW|Director ATTY. LAdismissing VIÑA| CASE pursuant to the appeal isLAW, void.PUBLIC Thus, the DecisionAND of the CPDC District the DIGESTS| BATCH charges against G01| Mamauag, et 4| al.66 stands and is now final and executory.

RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION

CASE 60: SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v. COURT OF APPEALS- VITO SALES

NOTE: PDF FORMAT

CASE 61: TRADE UNIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES AND ALLIED SERVICES v. NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION- KAMAE CRUZ FACTS: National Housing Corporation (NHC) is a corporation organized in accordance with EO 399 (Uniform Charter of Government Corporations). It is fully owned by the government. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, the SSS, the DBP, the NIDC and the People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation. Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter in the NHC. In July 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with the Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It is claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. In November 1977, Med-Arbiter Eusebio Jimenez (Jimenez) dismissed the petition because the NHC, being a GOCC, its employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. TUPAS then appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Director Carmelo Noriel (Noriel) reversed the order. However, in November 1978, Officer-in-Charge Virgilio Sy (Sy) set aside Noriel’s upo NHC’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, TUPAS seeks the reversal of Sy’s resolution and prays that a certification election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC. ISSUE: WON employees/workers of a GOCC may form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 67

This guarantee is reiterated in Art. 13 (3) of the Constitution, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law ...."

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Art. 9-B, Sec. 2 (5) of the Constitution which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." This is because the government is in a sense an employer in every sense of the word, except that the terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is the biggest employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship existing between the government and the people who work in and for it.

Also, Art. 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by EO 111 provides that employees of the government corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

AUTHORITY OF THE PUBLIC OFFICER

CASE 62: GRAPILON v. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF CARIGARA- GC PILLENA

FACTS: In the 1955 general elections in Leyte, Jose Aguilar and Herculano Grapilon were elected mayor and vice-mayor respectively. Both were qualified for and assumed office in accordance with law. Mayor Aguilar, however, left for Manila on official business without assigning anyone as acting municipal mayor. Appellee dressed a notice that he will assume office as acting municipal mayor for the entire period Aguilar’s away, to the municipal secretary, chief of police and provincial governor of Leyte. The provincial governor wrote petitioner an official letter saying that Aguilar cannot leave the office to him or to any acting mayor when such absence is for official purpose. Appellee filed a petition for mandamus praying that he may be allowed to act as municipal mayor. RTC: Vice Mayor is entitled to assume and discharge the office of Municipal Mayor in accordance with Sec. 2195 of the Rev. Adm. Code if there are no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, petitioner may resort. Appellees now urge the court to reverse the decision of the lower court. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 68

ISSUE: WON Vice Mayor Grapilon is entitled to step into the shoes of Mayor Aguilar when the latter is out for an official business. HELD: No. RATIO: Appellee (Vice Mayor)

Appellants (Municipal Council Supreme Court of Carigara, Leyte, et. al.)

It is enough for the mayor to be away (not physically present) from Carigara for him to be entitled to step into his shoes.

The absence, suspension or other temporary disability of the mayor mentioned in the legal provision relied upon by appellee refer to disability which temporarily prevents the municipal mayor from performing the duties of his office. Mayor Aguilar is indeed able to perform his duties. To allow the vice-mayor to to act as mayor under such state of facts would lead to the irregular situation of two mayors for the same municipality acting at the same time.

Appellants’ contention seems to be logical. Although physically absent from Carigara, he was in the exercise of the powers and prerogatives of his office and was naturally entitled to continue drawing his salary. The phrase 'other temporary disability' found in section 2195 of the Code. follows the words 'absence' and 'suspension' and is used as modifier of the two preceding words, under the principle of statutory construction known as ejusdem generis. Under American jurisprudence, 'absence' is construed to mean not merely physical absence, but absence which prevents the mayor from the active performance of his duties.

DOCTRINE: A Vice Mayor does not have the authority to be recognized as acting Municipal Mayor unless the latter is absent on an occasion demanding the immediate exercise of the powers of his office, or is prevented from the active performance of his duties. DISPOSITIVE: Decision is reversed insofar as it grants the writ of mandamus. Decision is affirmed insofar as it dismisses the counterclaim of appellants.

CASE 63: LEGAZPI v. MINISTER OF FINANCE- GABRIEL ABLOLA ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 69

FACTS: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes”unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6, which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed after the lifting of the ML.

ISSUE: WON Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan Pambansa.

HELD:

RATIO: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the Constitution which provides that – ‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.’

The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”

SALARY AND PREREQUISITES

CASE 64: SEVILLA v. GOCON- DON TUTAAN

FACTS: Sevilla and Limbo was charged of falsification of official document, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Gocon, Guidance Counselor III, was designated as Chairman of the Values Education Department in 1989. Limbo was a former Head Teacher III in the Practical Arts Department of the Quezon National High School in Lucena City. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC AND ELECTION ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE Respondent Sevilla requested for theOFFICERS reclassification of eight (8)LAW| items of Secondary Head DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 70 Teacher III to Secondary Head Teacher VI. Apparently, said request contains super

impositions/erasures, specifically item 7 “wherein the Practical Arts Department was replaced to Values Department with Limbo as the ALLEGED Secondary Head Teacher (Head Teacher III)” when in truth he was the Head Teacher of the Practical Arts Department which was later merged with the Home Economics Department. Sevilla, in his capacity as Principal IV, requested the Office of the Regional Director, DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocon’s position of Guidance Counselor III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. DECS denied the request. Gocon discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI for Values Education when he asked about said appointment, Sevilla explained to Gocon that Limbo was temporarily designated as Head Teacher for Values Education so that all Head Teacher items would be reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV. Gocon filed a complaint and requested the intercession of the then DECS Secretary regarding the matter. DECS claimed among others, as follows: ‘I strongly deny the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to ‘temporarily designate Mr. Limbo’s appointment item as Values item…” I do not know personally Mr. Sevilla, hence, I have no reason to make such suggestion to him knowing that such act is a clear falsification of public documents. And I do not remember having met him.’ Limbo acknowledged that he was the one who made alterations in the request for reclassification. He stressed, however, that he initialed all the corrections he made to show that he was in good faith in doing so and that he acted upon the suggestion of Monina Belen, as staff of Leovigildo Arellano at the DECS Management Division.

In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally charged by the Civil Service Commission Regional Office No. IV of falsification of official documents, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ISSUE: WON the acts or omissions of petitioner Sevilla amounted to dishonesty

HELD: No, the omission of petitioner Sevilla was not equilvalent to dishonesty BUT he is administratively liable for that omission. BASIS: The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officials and Employees

RATIO: Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination, registration, appointment or promotion. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.

It was Limbo who had made the alterations in the letter of petitioner, who never represented him to anyone as the head teacher of the Values Education Department. The records show that the item of Limbo was reclassified from Head Teacher III (Practical Arts) to Head Teacher VI (Values Education), without petitioner misrepresenting the former as the one performing the functions of head teacher of the Values Education Department. Although Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values Education), after his previous item had been reclassified as such, he continued performing the functions of head teacher of the Practical Arts Department. Hence, LAW, PUBLIC ELECTION LAW|Arts ATTY. LA VIÑA| there ADMINISTRATIVE was no misrepresentation of himOFFICERS as the headAND teacher of Practical (Boys). The CASE above DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 71 circumstances, however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability. The meat of the anguished

Complaint of respondent was the concealment from her and the entire school of Limbo’s appointment as Head Teacher VI for Values Education. Ordinarily, no one would assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position without receiving, or at least expecting to receive in the future, the corresponding compensation therefor. Good faith demanded that petitioner should have revealed Limbo’s appointment to respondent. It was improper for him to expect her to continue performing the functions of a values education head teacher, when someone else had already been appointed to that position and was receiving the corresponding salary. Thus, he is administratively liable for his omission which, however, did not amount to dishonesty, as he had made no false statement. On his part, no deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud can be read from the circumstances of this case.

As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethic. “The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713), enunciates inter alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that ‘(p)ublic officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.’

By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His failure to inform respondent of Limbo’s appointment and to promptly remedy the resulting prejudice against her may be characterized as conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, since such conduct affected not only her but also all the other faculty members of QNHS.

AS TO THE SALARIES:

The conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is penalized under Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws by suspension. The suspension is for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. HOWEVER, petitioner has already reached the compulsory age of retirement during the pendency of this case. He is no longer in the government service. Thus, it would be more appropriate to impose on him a fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months, instead of a suspension. This penalty is allowed under Section 19 of the same Rules.

CASE 65: REYES v. ANOSA- RONWELL LIM

CASE 66: BAYBAY WATER DISTRICT v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT- FRANCIS TORRES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 72

FACTS: In 1996, the Resident Auditor of the BWD conducted an audit of its 1994 accounts. In the course of the audit, the auditor disallowed payments of per diems in excess of those authorized by the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) and P. D. No. 198, RATA (representation and transportation allowance) and rice allowances granted to the members of the board of directors of the BWD, as well as duplication of claims for cash gifts as part of the Christmas bonus of the general manager and traveling allowance of the officers of the BWD. The members of the board and the officers, who had approved the release of these benefits, were served with notices of disallowance.

On May 30, 1997, petitioners asked for reconsideration, but the Resident Auditor denied their request on the ground that the disallowance had become final and executory. Instead, she advised them to make their appeal to the Commission on Audit. The BWD at first appealed to the COA Regional Office No. VIII at Tacloban City, which affirmed the findings of the Resident Auditor of Baybay, Leyte, and then to the Commission on Audit. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioners argue that As far as the directors of the BWD are concerned, P. D. No. 198, §13, as amended by P. D. No. 768 and P. D. No. 1479, reads: Compensation. — Each director shall receive a per diem, to be determined by the board, for each meeting of the board actually attended by him, but no director shall receive per diems in any given month in excess of the equivalent of the total per diems of four meetings in any given month. No director shall receive other compensation for services to the district.

Any per diem in excess of P50 shall be subject to approval of the Administration.

Petitioners argue that the term “compensation” in the above provision does not include the allowances and per diems which had been disallowed in this case. They cite P. D. No. 1146, Sec 2(i), as amended by R.A. No. 8291, which provides that “compensation” means “the basic pay or salary by an employee, pursuant to his employment/appointment, excluding per diems, bonuses, overtime pay, allowances and any other emoluments received in addition to the basic pay which are not integrated into the basic pay under existing laws.”

Petitioners contend that even before this Court declared in Davao City Water District v. Civil Service Commission that water districts are government-owned and controlled corporations subject to the jurisdiction of the COA, water districts had already been granting additional benefits to members of the board of directors, with the approval of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and to their officers and employees and that they continued doing so after the promulgation of the decision in that case. Petitioners contend they have thus acquired a vested right to these benefits of which they cannot now be deprived without violating their property rights and the rule on non-diminution of benefits. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 73

Petitioners finally cite the grant of similar benefits to the directors of the National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) to support their claim that board of directors are entitled to receive allowances and other benefits in addition to per diems.

ISSUE: WON the members of the Board of Directors of BWD are entitled to the compensation and perquisites that they receive and want to continue to receive.

HELD: No, P.D. 198 is clear with regard to the compensation to be received by the Board members RATIO: 1. The contention is untenable. The statutory provision invoked refers to the basis for the computation of employer and employee contributions to the GSIS as well as the benefits to which such employees are entitled. In the same manner, under Sec 32 of the National Internal Revenue Code, “compensation” includes fees, salaries, wages, commissions, and similar items for purposes of recognizing taxable income. The definitions of the term “compensation” in these statutes are for limited purposes only and cannot be deemed to comprehend such other purposes not specifically included in the provisions thereof. 2. This contention too has no merit. The erroneous application and enforcement of the law by public officers does not estop the Government from making a subsequent correction of such errors. More specifically, where there is an express provision of law prohibiting the grant of certain benefits, the law must be enforced even if it prejudices certain parties due to an error committed by public officials in granting the benefit. As already stated, P.D. No. 198 expressly prohibits the grant of compensation other than the payment of per diems, as determined by the LWUA pursuant to P. D. No. 198, to directors of water districts. Practice, without more, no matter how long continued, cannot give rise to any vested right if it is contrary to law.

3. Unlike P.D. No. 198, Sec 13, the Charter of NAPOCOR expressly granted members of its board of directors the right to receive allowances in addition to their per diems, subject only to the approval of the Secretary of Energy. Petitioners cannot thus claim similar treatment as the board of directors of NAPOCOR. The BWD board of directors’ right to compensation, it bears emphasis, is limited to per diems.

CASE 67: NITAFAN v. COMMISSION ON INTERNAL REVENUE- ANNESIR KADJIM

FACTS: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on December 4, 1987. Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, ADMINISTRATIVE PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| in ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE respectively, of the RTC, LAW, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations Manila. They seek to DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 74 prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer

of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. They contend that this constitutes diminution of salary contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the salary of the members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law and that “during their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased.” With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition. ISSUE: WON the salaries of judges are subject to tax. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia vs. David do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income has been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subject to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees. on Act of 1935. What is provided for by the constitution is that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well as other members of the judiciary.

CASE 68: SAN LUIS v. COURT OF APPEALS- RALPH VILLANUEVA

CASE 69: CASTRO v. GLORIA- CHEYENNE YU

FACTS: Castro was found guilty and be dismissed from service by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) for disgraceful and immoral conduct for having an illicit affair with Porfirio Gutang’s wife, a co-teacher of Castro in Guibuangan Central School, Barili, Cebu. DECS Central Office sought the recommendation of the School Division of Cebu which said that the decision must be resolved favorably, but was opposed by the DECS Regional Office. Castro sought review of the decision of the DECS; 3 indorsements of the decision of DECS Secretary heeded to no result. This then caused Castro to file before the RTC seeking the decision of Secretary Gloria. He prays for the reduction of his penalty from dismissal to 1 year suspension; to reinstate him to his position; to pay back his salaries. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies ruling that petitioner should have appealed to the Civil Service Commission before coming to court. 5.Castro argues that, "when the question to be settled is purely a question of law, he may go directly to the proper court so that he can have proper redress." ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 75 ISSUES:

(1) Is the dismissal from service the correct penalty for Castro? (2) Is Castro entitled to his salaries? HELD: (1) No. (2) No. RATIO: 1. The proper penalty for the 1st offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is only suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.( Section 23 of the Administrative Code of 1987 and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws). 2. No. A public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn. Since Castro did not work during the period for which he is now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of such salaries. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges. However, if the employee is not completely exonerated of the charges such as when the penalty of dismissal is reduced to mere suspension, he would not be entitled to the payment of his back salaries

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ELECTION LAW| ATTY. LA VIÑA| CASE DIGESTS| G01| BATCH 4| 76