Administrative Law Case Digests: Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies

Administrative Law Arellano University School of Law aiza ebina/2015

CHAVEZ vs NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 530 SCRA 235 Scope of Powers of Administrative Agencies Express and Implied Powers FACTS: Petitioner Francisco Chavez in his capacity as taxpayer seeks to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement between the NHA and R-II Builder’s, Inc (RBI) for being unconstitutional and invalid, and to enjoin respondents — particularly respondent NHA – from implementing and/or enforcing the said project and other agreements related thereto. On March 1, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Specifically, respondent NHA was ordered to “conduct feasibility studies and develop low-cost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/low-cost housing projects.” Pursuant to MO 161-A, NHA prepared the feasibility studies which resulted in the formulation of the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. SMDRP aimed to convert the Smokey Mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area across R-10, adjacent to the Smokey Mountain as the enabling component of the project. Once finalized, the plan was submitted to President Aquino for her approval. On January 17, 1992, President Aquino proclaimed MO 415, approving and directing the implementation of the SMDRP through a private sector joint venture. Said MO stipulated that the land area covered by the Smokey Mountain dumpsite is conveyed to the NHA as well as the area to be reclaimed across R-10. In the same MO 415, President Aquino created an Executive Committee to oversee the implementation of the plan and an inter-agency Technical Committee was created composed of the technical representatives of the EXECOM. Based on the evaluation of the pre-qualification documents, the EXECOM declared the New San Jose Builders, Inc. and RBI as top two contractors. Thereafter, TECHCOM submitted its recommendation to the EXECOM to approve the RBI proposal which garnered the highest score. On October 7, 1992, President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a JVA with RBI. Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. On September 1, 1994, pursuant to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3591 conveying in favor of NHA an area of 211,975 square meters covering the Smokey Mountain Dumpsite. The land reclamation was completed in August 1996. Sometime later in 1996, pursuant likewise to Proclamation No. 39, the DENR issued Special Patent No. 3598 conveying in favor of NHA an additional 390,000 square meter area. After some time, the JVA was terminated. RBI demanded the payment of just compensation for all accomplishments and costs incurred in developing the SMDRP plus a reasonable rate of return. In a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed by NHA and RBI, both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and other subsequent agreements, which stipulated, among others, that unpaid balance may be paid in cash, bonds or through the conveyance of properties or any combination thereof. On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed this Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus seeking to declare null and void the Joint Venture Agreement and the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project, and all other agreements in relation thereto, for being Unconstitutional and Invalid. The petitioner challenges the authority of NHA to reclaim lands. He claims that the power to reclaim lands of public domain is vested exclusively with the Public Estates Authority. He also contends that NHA and RBI were not given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands, as required and that there was no proclamation officially classifying the reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable. ISSUE: Whether or not the NHA has the authority to reclaim lands RULING: Yes. While the authority of NHA to reclaim lands is challenged by petitioner, we find that the NHA had more than enough authority to do so under existing laws. While PD 757, the charter of NHA, does not explicitly mention “reclamation” in any of the listed powers of the agency, we rule that the NHA has an implied power to reclaim land as this is vital or incidental to effectively, logically, and successfully implement an urban land reform and housing program enunciated in Sec. 9 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted, allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred

by necessary or fair implication in the enabling act. When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by necessary implication. when the statute does not specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. The power to reclaim on the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415, RA 6957, and PD 3A. Land reclamation is an integral part of the development of resources for some of the housing requirements of the NHA. Private participation in housing projects may also take the form of land reclamation. RATIO: Express and implied powers. - The jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies are measured and limited by the Constitution or law creating them or granting their powers, to those conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication. --MASANGCAY vs COMELEC 6 SCRA 27 Scope of Powers of Administrative Agencies Inherent Powers FACTS: On 24 October 1957, Benjamin Masangcay — then provincial treasurer of Aklan designated to take charge of the receipt and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their distribution, among the different municipalities of the province— with several others, was charged before the Comelec with contempt for having opened 3 boxes containing official and sample ballots for the municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated on 2 September 1957, and its unnumbered resolution dated 5 March 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not in the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the Citizens’ Party, as required, which are punishable under Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. Masangcay et.al. complied with the summons issued by the Comelec to appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis of the charge. On 16 December 1957 the Commission rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as charged and sentencing each of them to suffer 3 months imprisonment and pay a fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of 2 months in case of insolvency, to be served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack of evidence. Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the Comelec as well as its members the power to punish acts of contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government. The Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from insofar as Masangcay is concerned, as well as the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, insofar as it concerns him; without pronouncement as to costs. ISSUE: Whether or not Comelec may punish Masangcay for contempt RULING: No. Under the law and the constitution, the Comelec has not only the duty to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the elections. The Commission, although it cannot be classified as a court of justice within the meaning of the Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express provision of law come under its jurisdiction. The Comelec lacks power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to Masangcay in the decision subject of review. When the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish for contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice. The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit

testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid. The resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different municipalities. The Commission, thus, has exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and void. RATIO: An administrative agency has no inherent powers, although implied powers may sometimes be spoken of as "inherent." Thus, in the absence of any provision to punich for contempt which has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of the courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid. --CITY OF BAGUIO vs NINO 487 SCRA 216 Scope of Powers of Administrative Agencies Quasi-Judicial Powers FACTS: The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City. Francisco Niño, who has been occupying the lot, contested the award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands. The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11, 1976. Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed. The decision of the Director of Lands having become final and executory, the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto." Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities. Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall, later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot introduced by Niño. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government, but on July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-InCharge Donato Bacquian, started demolishing the houses of Niño and his herein co-respondents. Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The RTC denied the petition. However the Court of Appeals granted the petition on appeal. Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper court. Petitioners contend that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution does not need a hearing and court order which Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. That an administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws." ISSUE: Whether or not a special court order is needed for the demotion of the respondents' structures RULING: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition - which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is.

Indeed, while the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts. The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands. Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession, this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest. In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents on, and turn over possession of, the lot to Narcisa. RATIO: Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such can exercise only those powers wgich are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise given judicial powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. They have, however, in their favor the presumption that they have regularly performed their official functions or duties, including those which are quasi-judicial in nature. --MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE, INC. vs SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 14 SCRA 620 Scope of Powers of Administrative Agencies Express and Implied Powers FACTS: The Securities and Exchange Commission, in its resolution, denied the Makati Stock Exchange permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange. Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. The Commission's order or resolution would make impossible, for all practical purposes, for the Makati Stock Exchange to operate, usch that its "permission" amounted to a "prohibition." ISSUE: Whether or not the SEC has the authority to promulgate the rule in question RULING: No. The Commission cites no provision of law expressly supporting its rule against double listing. It suggests that the power is 'necessary for the execution of the functions vested in it.' It argues that said rule was approved by the Department Head before the War and it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. The approval of the Department, by itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation. The test is not whether the Act forbids the Commission from imposing a prohibition but whether it empowers the Commission to prohibit. The Commission possesses no power to impose the condition of the rule which results in discrimination and violation of constitutional rights. It is fundamental that an administrative officer has such powers as expressly granted to him by statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. Accordingly, the license of the Makati Stock Exchange is approved without such condition against double listing. RATIO: It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. --COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs DOLEFIL AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES COOPERATIVE, INC. 382 SCRA 552 Nature of Powers Powers Subject to the Constitution, Applicable Law, or Administrative Regulation FACTS: Sometime in the later part of 1997, the CDA received from certain members of the Dolefil Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative, Inc., an agrarian reform cooperative that owns 8,860 hectares of land in Polomolok, South Cotabato, several complaints alleging mismanagement and/or misappropriation of funds of DARBCI by the then incumbent officers and members of the board of directors of the cooperative, some of whom are herein private respondents.

Acting on the complaints docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 97-011, CDA Executive Director Candelario L. Verzosa, Jr. issued an order dated December 8, 1997 directing the private respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. On December 18, 1991, the private respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction, damages and attorney’s fees against the CDA and its officers primarily questioning the jurisdiction of the CDA to resolve the complaints against the private respondents, specifically with respect to the authority of the CDA to issue the “freeze order” and to create a management committee that would run the affairs of DARBCI. On February 24, 1998, CDA Chairman Jose C. Medina, Jr. issued an order in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011 placing the private respondents under preventive suspension, hence, paving the way for the newly-created management committee to assume office on March 10, 1998. On March 27, 1998, the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39, issued a temporary restraining order, initially for seventy-two (72) hours and subsequently extended to twenty (20) days, in an Order dated March 31, 1998. The temporary restraining order, in effect, directed the parties to restore status quo ante, thereby enabling the private respondents to reassume the management of DARBCI. The CDA questioned the propriety of the temporary restraining order issued by the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato on March 27, 1998 through a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. On April 21, 1998, the Court of Appeals, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC of Polomolok, South Cotabato, Branch 39, from enforcing the restraining order which the latter court issued on March 27, 1998, and ordered that the proceedings in SP Civil Case No. 25 be held in abeyance. The Court of Appeals thereafter declared the respondent Cooperative Development Authority orders in CDA-CO case No. 97-011 dated 08 December 1997, 15 December 1997, 26 January 1998, 24 February 1998, 03 March 1998, and the Resolution dated 26 May 1998, null and void and of no legal force and effect. Further, the respondents are ordered to perpetually cease and desist from taking any further proceedings in CDA-CO Case No. 97-011. The CDA filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution. Hence, the instant petition for review. Petitioner CDA claims that it is vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes in view of its powers, functions and responsibilities under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6939. The quasijudicial nature of its powers and functions was confirmed by the Department of Justice, through the then Acting Secretary of Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, in DOJ Opinion No. 10, Series of 1995, which was issued in response to a query of the then Chairman Edna E. Aberina of the CDA, to wit: Applying the foregoing, the express powers of the CDA to cancel certificates of registration of cooperatives for non-compliance with administrative requirements or in cases of voluntary dissolution under Section 3(g), and to mandate and conciliate disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, may be deemed quasi-judicial in nature. The reason is that – in the performance of its functions such as cancellation of certificate of registration, it is necessary to establish non-compliance or violation of administrative requirement. To do so, there arises an indispensable need to hold hearings, investigate or ascertain facts that possibly constitute noncompliance or violation and, based on the facts investigated or ascertained, it becomes incumbent upon the CDA to use its official discretion whether or not to cancel a cooperative’s certificate of registration, thus, clearly revealing the quasi-judicial nature of the said function. When the CDA acts as a conciliatory body pursuant to Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, it in effect performs the functions of an arbitrator. Arbitrators are by the nature of their functions act in quasi-judicial capacity xxx. The quasi-judicial nature of the foregoing functions is bolstered by the provisions of Sections 3(o) of R.A. No. 6939 which grants CDA on (sic) the exercise of other functions as may be necessary to implement the provisions of cooperative laws, the power to summarily punish for direct contempt any person guilty of misconduct in the presence thereof who seriously interrupts any hearing or inquiry with a fine or imprisonment prescribed therein, a power usually granted to make effective the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. The petitioner avers that when an administrative agency is conferred with quasi-judicial powers and functions, such as the CDA, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be covered within the jurisdiction of said administrative agency. The courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities undertaken upon their special technical knowledge and training.

The private respondents on the other hand, contend that, contrary to the claim of the petitioner, the powers, functions and responsibilities of the CDA show that it was merely granted regulatory or supervisory powers over cooperatives in addition to its authority to mediate and conciliate between parties involving the settlement of cooperative disputes. ISSUE: Whether or not the CDA has the authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes RULING: No. It is a fundamental rule in statutory construction that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation – there is only room for application. It can be gleaned from the provisions of R.A. No. 6939 that the authority of the CDA is to discharge purely administrative functions which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws. Nowhere in the said law can it be found any express grant to the CDA of authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes. At most, Section 8 of the same law provides that “upon request of either or both parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes with a cooperative or between cooperatives” however, with a restriction “that if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, a certificate of nonresolution shall be issued by the commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts”. Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. The decision to withhold quasi-judicial powers from the CDA is in accordance with the policy of the government granting autonomy to cooperatives. It was noted that in the past 75 years cooperativism failed to flourish in the Philippines. Of the 23,000 cooperatives organized under P.D. No. 175, only 10 to 15 percent remained operational while the rest became dormant. The dismal failure of cooperativism in the Philippines was attributed mainly to the stifling attitude of the government toward cooperatives. While the government wished to help, it invariably wanted to control. Also, in its anxious efforts to push cooperativism, it smothered cooperatives with so much help that they failed to develop self-reliance. As one cooperative expert put it, “The strong embrace of government ends with a kiss of death for cooperatives.” But then, acknowledging the role of cooperatives as instruments of national development, the framers of the 1987 Constitution directed Congress under Article XII, Section 15 thereof to create a centralized agency that shall promote the viability and growth of cooperatives. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Congress approved on March 10, 1990 Republic Act No. 6939 which is the organic law creating the Cooperative Development Authority. Apparently cognizant of the errors in the past, Congress declared in an unequivocal language that the state shall “maintain the policy of non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.” After ascertaining the clear legislative intent underlying R.A. No. 6939, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. Consequently, we hold and rule that the CDA is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more particularly disputes as regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of cooperatives. The authority to conduct hearings or inquiries and the power to hold any person in contempt may be exercised by the CDA only in the performance of its administrative functions under R.A. No. 6939. RATIO: Powers subject to the Constitution, applicable law, or administrative regulation. - A government agency must respect the presumption of constitutionality and legality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in an appropriate case by a competent court, and ultimately by the Supreme Court. It is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which it does not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of the government. --FLORENDO vs ENRILE 239 SCRA 22 Discretionary and Ministerial Powers Ministerial Duty FACTS: In a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 17 March 1992, the complainant charged the respondent deputy sheriff of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities at Cabanatuan City with the failure to enforce a writ of demolition notwithstanding his collection and receipt of P5,200.00. She averred that she was the plaintiff in Civil Cases Nos. 9241 to 9249, all for ejectment, and that in a joint decision rendered on 22 June 1987 by Branch 2 of the MTCC the defendants were ordered to vacate the premises and to surrender the possession thereof to the complainant. The defendants appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which in a joint decision of 18 August 1989 affirmed it in toto. On 19 January 1990, the MTCC issued a writ of execution.

The writ was assigned to the respondent for implementation. In view of the refusal of the defendants to vacate the premises, the complainant asked for the issuance of a writ of demolition, which the court granted pursuant to its order of 21 March 1990. On 27 June 1990, it denied the defendant's motion for extension of time to execute the writ of demolition. For the service and implementation of the writ of demolition, the respondent asked and received from the complainant and her lawyer the total sum of P5,200.00 purportedly as sheriff's fee. The respondent issued no official receipt for this amount. The respondent did not execute the writ of demolition despite the receipt of P5,200.00. The complainant's lawyer then wrote a letter to the respondent on 8 November 1990 demanding that the latter implement the writ of demolition or return the aforesaid sum within ten days from receipt of the letter, otherwise the matter would be brought up to this Court. Since nothing was done by the respondent, the complainant filed this complaint. She asked that the respondent be dismissed from the service. In his comment (denominated as an answer) dated 16 June 1992, the respondent did not deny the charge that he collected P5,200.00 as sheriff's fee; however, he specifically denied the allegation that he did not implement the writ of execution and the writ of demolition. He claimed that he "returned to the defendants for several times to advice [sic] them to vacate the said place," but since they did not, he advised the complainant's counsel to file a motion for the issuance of a writ of demolition. When he received the writ of demolition, he served it on the defendants on 25 July 1990; the latter requested an extension of thirty days. He then prepared a return of service dated 25 July 1990. Then, after the expiration of the extended period, he again approached the defendants on 4 September 1990 to make them vacate the premises. However, he was threatened by them that if he would enforce the writ of demolition something would happen, i.e., "magkamatayan muna." He then prepared the return of service on the said date. The writ was thus unsatisfied. It appears, however, that these returns dated 25 July 1990 and 4 September 1990 were filed with the MTCC only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively. He further claimed that on 8 July 1991, Judge Romeo Mauricio of the MTCC referred to Mr. Arsenio S. Vicencio, Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the MTCC, the respondent's return of service of 4 September 1990 for comment. In his compliance of 15 July 1991, Mr. Vicencio informed Judge Mauricio that the threat on the respondent's life was "real, and it will be very risky for him to implement" it, and requested that a new deputy sheriff be assigned to enforce the writ. Pursuant to this request, Judge Mauricio sent a formal request to the Presiding Judge of Branch I of the MTCC of Cabanatuan City asking that deputy sheriff Teodoro Pineda be assigned to implement the writ of demolition. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent sheriff implement the writ of execution and the writ of demolition RULING: No. The records further disclose that the respondent's returns of service dated 25 July 1990 and 24 September 1990 were filed by him only on 29 May 1991 and 6 June 1991, respectively, with the MTCC, which issued the writ of demolition. Either the respondent correctly dated the returns, in which case there was a deliberate and unreasonable delay in their filing with the court, or he antedated them to make it appear that he prepared it well within the period provided for by the Rules of Court. Section 11 of Rule 39 thereof provides that a writ of execution should be returned at any time not less than ten days nor more than sixty days after its receipt by the sheriff who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. As the court personnel primarily responsible for the speedy and efficient service of all court processes and writs originating from his court, it was the respondent's duty to immediately implement the writ of demolition. The Manual for Clerks of Court provides: Duty of sheriff as to execution of process. — When a writ is placed in the hands of the sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of instructions, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it in accordance with its mandate. . . . He has no discretion whether to execute it or not. Section E (4) of the Manual also provides: All sheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall submit a report to the Judge concerned on the action taken on all writs and processes assigned to them within ten (10) days from receipt of said process or writ. Said report shall form part of the records of the case. The duty imposed upon the sheriff to execute the writ is ministerial, not directory. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of the legal authority, without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The respondent's explanation that he was not able to implement the writ of demolition because he was threatened with death by the defendants is unacceptable. If that were true, he should have either reported it to the MTCC and requested the assistance of other sheriffs or law enforcement authorities, or filed the

appropriate criminal complaint against the defendants who had threatened him. Instead of doing so, he filed his returns only after several months had lapsed. For such nonfeasance and misfeasance, the respondent is guilty of serious dereliction or neglect of duty, gross inefficiency or incompetence, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Time and again, this Court has stressed that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with the dispensation of justice from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. They must at all times not only observe propriety and decorum, they must also be above suspicion. RATIO: A ministerial duty is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitetd or proved to exist, and imposed by law. A ministerial act has been defined as one performed in response to a duty which has been positively iposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon theofficer's judgment or discretion. That a necessity may exist for the ascertainment of the facts or conditions, upon the existence of which the performance of an act becomes a clear and specific duty, does not operate to convert a ministerial act into one discretionary or judicial in nature. Although an agency has the power to determine whether an application complies with statutory requisites, if it appears beyond doubt that the application does so comply, there is no discretion to reject the application. ---