Admin Law Digest

Powers and Functions in General 1. Makati Stock Exchange Inc. vs. SEC, 14 SCRA 620 (1965) 2. Radio Communications of the Phil. vs. Board of Communications, 80 SCRA 471 (1977) 3. Matienzo vs. Abellera, 162 SCRA 11 (1988) 4. Vda. de Herrera vs. Bernardo, 650 SCRA 87 (2011) Investigatory Powers 5. Ruperto vs. Torres, 100 Phil. 1098 (1957) 6. Carmelo vs. Ramos, 6 SCRA 836 (1962) 7. Evangelista vs. Jarencio, 69 SCRA 99 (1975) 8. Catura vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 37 SCRA 303 (1971)

288 (1956) 26. Ollada vs. Secretary of Finance, 109 Phil 1072 (1960) 27. Fortich vs. Corona, 298 SCRA 685 (1998) 28. Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. vs. CA, 291 SCRA 485 (1998)

Adjudicatory Powers 29. Philex Mining Co. vs. Zaldivia, 43 SCRA 479 (1972) 30. Antipolo Realty Co. vs NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987) 31. Guerzon vs. CA, 164 SCRA 182 (1988)

Rule-Making Powers 9. Victorias Milling Co. vs. Social Security Commission, 4 SCRA 627 (1962) 10. Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, 42 SCRA 660 (1976) 11. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese, 43 Phil 259(1922) 12. Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 276 (1916) 13. Sy Man vs. Fabros, 93 Phil. 1093 (1913) 14. Interprovincial Auto Bus Co. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290 (1956) 15. Phil. Lawyers' Assoc. vs. Agrava, 105 Phil 173 (1959) 16. Philippines Inter-Island Shipping Association of the Phil. vs. CA, 266 SCRA 489 (1997) 17. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Fortune Tobacco Co., 658 SCRA 289 (2011) 18. Lupangco vs. CA, 160 SCRA 848 (1988) 19. Olsen and Co. vs. Herstein and Rafferty, 35 Phil 520 (1915) 20. People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450 (1977) 21. US vs. Panlilio, 28 Phil 608 (1914) 22. US vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil 169 (1014) 23. People vs. Santos, 63 Phil 300 (1936) 24. People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil 640 (1954) 25. Hilado vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 100 Phil

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Makati Stock Exchange vs SEC

(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and

G.R No. L-23004 June 30, 1965  This is a review of the resolution of the Securities and Exchange Commission which would deny the Makati Stock Exchange, Inc., permission to operate a stock exchange unless it agreed not to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in the Manila Stock Exchange.  Objecting to the requirement, Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. contends that the Commission has no power to impose it and that; anyway, it is illegal, discriminatory and unjust. Issue: Whether the Commission may "in the public interest" prohibit (or make impossible) the establishment of another stock exchange (besides the Manila Stock Exchange), on the ground that the operation of two or more exchanges adversely affects the public interest.

(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the brokers in his employment. 13 And no extended elucidation is needed to conclude that for a licensing officer to deny license solely on the basis of what he believes is best for the economy of the country may amount to regimentation or, in this instance, the exercise of undelegated legislative powers and discretion. Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize the officer in charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that a sufficient number of licenses to serve the needs of the public have already been issued. (53 C.J.S. p. 636.)

Ruling: The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stock exchange may legally obtain a permit (sec. 17, Securities Act); it is not for the Commission to impose others. If the existence of two competing exchanges jeopardizes public interest — which is doubtful — let the Congress speak. 12 Undoubtedly, the opinion and recommendation of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprise and business opportunities. But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening: (a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law; Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

People vs Santos Facts:  The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, provides as follows: 28. Prohibited fishing areas. — No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 4003 and this order to catch, collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.

Issue: Whether Augusta Santos Section 28 Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture is valid. Ruling: Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and void and without effect.

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FORTICH VS. CORONA (G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998)

further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.

Facts: The Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, dated January 7, 1993, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon AgroIndustrial Zones where the subject property is situated. Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. During the public consultation, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the project. Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries. The DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director “to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property.”Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the DAR Secretary’s decision. OP found that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision. However, on June 23, 1997, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DAR’s motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order

On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers’ protest by issuing the so-called “Win/Win” Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of fortyfour (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be distributed to qualified farmerbeneficiaries. The petitioners cried foul. They filed a case to the Supreme Court urging it to annul and set aside the “Win-Win” Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution. The petitioners further alleged that respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona “committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution. Issue: Whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by the “Win-Win” Resolution. Held: NO. The Supreme Court held that: 1.

The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides: SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations." 2.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must immediately be struck down.

Therefore, the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void Notes: Act No. 4003 "Fisheries Act" Approved December 5, 1932 . AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATING TO FISH AND OTHER AQUATIC RESOURCES OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

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US vs. Panlilio (G.R. No. L-9876 December 8, 1914)

Issue:

Facts:

Whether the accused may be convicted for violation of the quarantine order issued by the Director of Agriculture, assuming there was a violation.

Act No. 1760 provides that the following acts of any person, firm or corporation are unlawful:

Held: 1. to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any of the effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands; 2. to expose such animal either alive or dead on any public road or highway where it may come in contact with other domestic animals; and 3. to transport in any form without a certificate issued by authority of the Director of Agriculture whenever the Secretary of the Interior shall declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any island, province, municipality, township, or settlement and that there is danger of spreading such disease Pursuant to the said Act, the Director of Agriculture issued an order that all of his carabaos in the barrio of Masamat, municipality of Mexico, Pampanga Province, had been exposed to the disease commonly known as rinderpest, and that said carabaos were accordingly declared under quarantine, and were ordered kept in a corral designated by an agent of the Bureau of Agriculture and were to remain there until released by further order of the Director of Agriculture. However, it was alleged that Adriano Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized to do so, and while the quarantine against said carabaos was still in force, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were then quarantined and that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and agents took the said carabaos from the said corral and drove them from one place to another for the purpose of working them.

No. The court held that: Section 6 of the Act simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among them, paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for each offense." A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.”

Nowhere in the Act is the violation of the order of Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such order.

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K.S. YOUNG, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. JAMES J. RAFFERTY, Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L10951

FACTS: Section 6(j) of the Internal Revenue Act (Act No. 2239) authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to specify the manner in which the proper books of accounts shall be kept. Pursuant thereto, the Collector of Internal Revenue issued a circular letter requiring every merchant and manufacturer, to keep a record of his daily sales either in English or in the Spanish language, and providing that any violation or failure to comply with the provisions of the circular will subject the offender to prosecution under the provisions of Section 185 of Act No. 2339. ISSUE: Is the consular letter in question within the scope and purview of the authority delegated by Act No. 2339? HELD: No. (1) Keeping of books in any particular language not required by law. ~ The Collector is authorized to determine that persons subject to the percentage tax shall keep their sales record in a bound book of numbered pages, and that this record shall be spread upon the books, in the tabulated form specified in the circular. But the law does not provide nor require that the books be kept in any particular language. (2) keeping of books in any language allowed by law. ~ No one will deny that sales could be recorded in a bound volume as is specified using the tabulated form prescribed by the Collector in any modern language. In other words, all the information could be recorded in the designated book in the required form in Chinese or in local dialect or in some other languages as accurately as it could be recorded in English or Spanish.

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CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA vs. EMELITA BERNARDO, EVELYN BERNARDO as Guardian of Erlyn, Crislyn and Crisanto Bernardo (G.R. No. 170251) FACTS: Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo filed a complaint before the Commission for the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner for interference and trespassing over a portion of a parcel of land. Petitioner alleged that he inherited his property from his father who bought from a certain Domingo Villaran. The COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful claim over the subject property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling. Hence, petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question of ownership between the parties.

property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem. In the instant case, the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents' complaint. The present case does not fall under any of the cases enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561. The dispute between the parties is not critical and explosive in nature, nor does it involve a large number of parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be characterized as involving a critical situation that requires immediate action. ~ It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.

HELD: No. Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute.1 Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to

Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void.2 A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation.3 All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.4 Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings.

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CATURA vs CIR G.R. No. L-27392 January 30, 1971

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court acted beyond its power, when it ordered delivery and deposit of Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances

FACTS: Celestino Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization filed a complaint against Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, the President and Treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a legitimate labor organization duly registered. That during their tenure, they were responsible for unauthorized disbursement of union funds with complainants on various occasions and that when demanded from them a full and detailed report of all financial transaction of the records of the financial activities of the union open to inspection by the members, they refused.

HELD:

The executive board of the said labor organization called for a general membership meeting so that Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador could be confronted about the status of the union funds. Pablo Catura, as President cancelled the meeting. The same was reiterated but there was no response. The members then referred the matter to the Department of Labor which issued subpoenas for the presentation of book accounts but without success. After setting forth that complainants had exhausted all remedies provided in the union's constitution and by-laws, which were all unavailing, the complaint sought, after due hearing and judgement, to declare present petitioners, as respondents, guilty of unfair labor practice under the above provision of the Industrial Peace Act, for them to cease and desist from further committing such unfair labor practice complained of, and to render a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union as well as to make the book of accounts and other records of these financial activities open to inspection by the members.2 Thereafter, respondent Celestino Tabaniag and the other members sought an injunction to prevent Pablo Catura from taking his oath of office after being re-elected in view of his alleged persistence in the abuse of his authority in the disbursement of union funds as well as his refusal to make a full and detailed report of all financial transactions of the union. Instead of granting the injunction sought, the order issued by Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador limited itself to requiring and directing "personally the respondents Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, president and treasurer, respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees' Association, to deliver and deposit to this Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor union. There was a motion for reconsideration on January 2, 1967 by now petitioners Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador on the ground that they were not heard before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of respondent Court. With Associate Judge Ansberto P. Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the Court en banc on February 28, 1967. Hence the present petition filed.

No, the Court did not act beyond its power when it called for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation by requiring the petitioners to deliver and deposit with the Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition before it on January 3, 1967. The complaint against petitioners as President and Treasurer of the union, specifically recited an unauthorized disbursement of union funds as well as the failure to make a full and detailed report of financial transactions of the union and to make the book of accounts and other records of its financial activities open to inspection by the member. The matter was deemed serious enough by the prosecutor of respondent Court to call for the exercise of the statutory power of investigation to substantiate the alleged violation so as to assure that the rights and conditions of membership in a labor organization as specifically set forth in Section 17 be respected. It cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged

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G.R. Nos. 167274-75

July 21, 2008

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

general rule of requiring adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by implication.

vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts: Fortune Tobacco Corporation, herein respondent, is a manufacturer/producer of several cigarette brands. On the other hand, herein Petitioner, Commissioner of Internal Revenue is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Fortune Tobacco was granted a tax refund or tax credit representing specific taxes erroneously collected from its tobacco products. The tax refund is being re-claimed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in this petition.

The Government is not exempt from the application of solutio indebiti. Indeed, the taxpayer expects fair dealing from the Government, and the latter has the duty to refund without any unreasonable delay what it has erroneously collected. If the State expects its taxpayers to observe fairness and honesty in paying their taxes, it must hold itself against the same standard in refunding excess (or erroneous) payments of such taxes. It should not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of taxpayers. And so, given its essence, a claim for tax refund necessitates only preponderance of evidence for its approbation like in any other ordinary civil case.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund as alleged overpaid excise tax for the month of January 2000?

Held: Yes. Fortune Tobacco is entitled to a refund. Fortune Tobaccos claim for refund is premised on its erroneous payment of the tax, or better still the government’s exaction in the absence of a law. Tax refunds (or tax credits), on the other hand, are not founded principally on legislative grace but on the legal principle which underlies all quasi-contracts abhorring a person’s unjust enrichment at the expense of another. The dynamic of erroneous payment of tax fits to a tee the prototypic quasi-contract, solutio indebiti, which covers not only mistake in fact but also mistake in law. In the case at bar, the rule in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. A tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for that purpose. Accordingly, the Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.

Facts: This is an appeal raised by Que Po Lay based on the claim that Circular #20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed by the appellant. Under C.A. 638 and Act 2930 both require that such circular be published in the Oficial Gazette, but Solicitor General contends that the two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette for guidance of the different branches of the government.

Issue: Whether or not such circular should be published?

Held: Yes. The question of non publication is fundamental and decisive if as a matter of fact circular #20 had not been published as required by law before its violation then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated consequently appellant committed no violation on the circular nor committed any offense. Under the provisions of the old and new civil code both requires publication on the Official Gazette to be binding, although such circular of the central bank is not a statute or law but it has a penal sanction for its violation thus having the force and effect of the law which should be published before becoming effective.

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Phil. Lawyer’s Association vs AGRAVA FACTS: 





Respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contests that one who passed the bar examinations and licensed by the Supreme Court are duly qualified to practice before the Philippine Patent Office. Respondent answered that the prosecution of patent cases does not involve entirely and purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical knowledge and training. Respondent also stated Sec. 78 of the Patent Law of the Philippines which stated that the “Director, subject to the approval of the Sec. of Justice, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.”

WON the Director of Patents is allowed to hold an examination even if they are already member of the Bar?

HELD: 







ISSUE: 



application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the Patent Office. In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation and

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MANUEL VS GENERAL AUDITING OFFICE FACTS:  



 Benito Manuel who was Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan applied for retirement. He sought for the commutation of his vacation and sick leave wherein he filed a memorandum to the General Auditing Office stating that he is entitled to unused vacation and sick leave earned for a period of 10 years and 7 months. The General Auditing Office ruled that the application of the petitioner could not be allowed in audit.

ISSUE: 

WON petitioner is entitled to the commutation of his vacation and sick leaves.



administrative order supplant the plain and explicit statutory command. A rule is binding on the courts as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory power granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the claim of petitioner to a commutation of his vacation and sick leave not exceeding ten (10) months must be upheld, inasmuch as the facts show that the total amount sought to be paid to him was precisely in accordance with the controlled legal provisions. The ruling now on review must be versed and petitioner's plea granted.

HELD: 





It is expressly provided under Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code that vacation and sick leave shall be cumulative, any part thereof not taken within the calendar year earned being carried over the succeeding years with the employee voluntarily retiring or being separated from the service without fault on his part, being entitled to the commutation of all such accumulated vacation or sick leave to his credit provided that it shall in no case exceed ten (10) months. There cannot be the least doubt therefore that the petitioner, who was a municipal mayor and as such an elective official for sixteen (16) years, having to his credit four (4) successive terms as Mayor of Lingayen, Pangasinan could not be denied his plea for the commutation for vacation and sick leave. If, however, to be considered as having pertinence and relevance, it cannot as an

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Evangelista vs Jarencio, 68 SCRA 99 (1975)

directing, for determining general policy, for recommending legislation, and for the purpose no more specific than illuminating obscure ares to find out what if anything should be done. An adminstrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but alos in proceeding whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

Importance of administrative investigations Facts: •

The President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO).

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The President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena dues tecum, administer oaths, testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.

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Petitioner Evangelista as Undersecretary of the Agecy issued to respondent Manalasta the Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him to appear as witness a th office of PARGO to declare and testify on a pending investigations.

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administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies.

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Subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is a.) within the authority of the agency ,b.) the demand is not too definite , c.) the information is reasonably relevant.

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There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn statements implicating certain officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Manalastas, of which he is claimed to be in possession is reasonably relevant to the investigations.

Instead of obeying the subpoena respondent filed with CFI of Manila a petition for prohibition, certiorari on the case and assailed its legality

Issue: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys th authority to issue subpoena in its conduct of factfinding investigations? Held: Yes. •

The life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact. the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative function, not only for rule-making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Radio Communications of the Philippines vs BOC

necessary implication conferred upon it by statues.

Facts: •

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Two complaints were filed by complainants Deigo Morales and Pacifica Innocencia against RCPI for its failure to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the deaths of close relatives which accordings to them caused personal injury and inconvenience and prays for damages. After hearing, the respondents BOC in both cases held that the services renedered by petitioners was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon petitioners in each case a disciplinary fine of P200.

Issue:

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One of these powers provided by law is the power to issue certificate of public convenience and which does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related thereto or performance therewith in the matter suitable to promote public interest.

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It is clear that petitioner has not been charge of any violations or failure to comply with the terms and conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision, regulation of respondent Board.

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The proper forum for complainants to ventilate their grievances for the proper recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the Courts and not in the respondent BOC.

Whether respondent Board has no jurisdiction to entertain and take congizance of complaints for injury caused by breach of contractual obligatios arising from negligence? and quasi-delict which should be ventilated in proper courts? Held: No. BOC has no jurisdiction. •

The court stated that:

"There can be no jurisdiction then for the BOC imposing fines in there two petitions. The law cannot be any clearer. The only power if possessed over radio companies as noted was to fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress of validity." •

The functions of BOC are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Ollada vs Sec of Finance 109 Phil. 1072 The Secretary of Finance expressly authorized the non-retroactivity of regulation which amended a previous one. FACTS Under Sec.334 (now Sec.232) of the National Internal Revenue Code, all corporations, companies, partnerships or persons required by law to pay internal revenue taxes whose gross quarterly sales, earnings, etc. do not exceed P5000 are required to keep & use a simplified set of Bookkeeping Records duly authorized by the Sec. of Finance. Pursuant to such authority, the Sec. of Finance promulgated Revenue Regulations No. V13 authorizing the use by the taxpayers whose gross quarterly sales do not exceed P5000 a simplified set of bookkeeping records. The Secretary amended Revenue Regulations No. V-13 by promulgating Revenue Regulations No. V43, which requires that simplified set of bookkeeping records should be especially designed for each class/kind of trade and prepared by a CPA. The new regulation was not intended to have a retroactive effect and, therefore, could not adversely affect those who had already acquired an accrued right under the old regulation. A CPA prepared & devised his own simplified sets of bookkeeping records under the new regulation. He then instituted proceedings praying that respondent financial officials be enjoined from further accepting, authorizing, and tolerating the public’s use of simplified sets of bookkeeping records not prepared in accordance with the new regulation.

respect from the Courts. No one is better qualified to interpret the intent behind the revenue regulations than the authority that issued them. Granting that the subsequent permission to use old bookkeeping forms was incompatible with the new regulation, such incompatibility would not render the permission illegal and void since the Secretary may, at any time, amend or revoke any of the regulations he issued so long as it is in consonance with the statute. The Secretary may change or repeal any of the regulations he issued as he may see fit.

ISSUE Whether the Secretary of Finance acted within his authority in not giving retroactive effect to Revenue Regulations No. V-43. HELD Yes. The Secretary if Finance’s Resolution that Revenue Regulations No. V-43 was not intended to have retroactive effect was fully within his powers and authority and becomes part of the regulation itself. The Resolution is not clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and is, thus, entitled to recognition & Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

IN RE CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARMANDO RAMOS, JESUS L. CARMELO, in his capacity as Chairman of the Probe Committee, Office of the Mayor of Manila, petitioner-appellant, vs. ARMANDO RAMOS, respondent-appellee. FACTS: The Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office (of the Mayor)." He named Mr. Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee. In a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, admitted having misappropriated sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes and that he is used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office. With the information, the committee issued subpoenas to Ramos, in connection with an administrative case against Crisanta Estanislao but Ramos, refused to appear. Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings," petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. And to compel Ramos to confirm this statement in the administrative case against certain employees in the Office of the City Treasurer would be to compel him to give testimony that could be used against him in a criminal case for estafa of which the owner of Casa de Alba was the offended party. From that decision, petitioner appealed to this Court. Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for Powers incidental to taking of testimony of administrative authorities.

ISSUE: Whether the power to investigate of the committee includes the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses? HELD: There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, is that the Mayor cannot delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner. One who invokes this provision of the law (Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code) must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or

evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. Such provisions are applicable to the City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government. Petitioner contends that the Mayor of Manila has the implied power to investigate city officials and employees appointed by him to the end that the power expressly vested in him to suspend and remove such officials of employees may be justly and fairly exercised. We agree with this proposition. But We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena. Citing 50 Am. Jur. 449, petitioner contends that "the power of the investigation committee to issue compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses undoubtedly exists since only complimentary to the power of the mayor to investigate, suspend and remove city officers and employees, supra, is the recognized rule that where the statute grants a right, it also confers by implication every particular power necessary for the exercise thereof." There is no merit in the argument. In the first place, the authority cited speaks of statutory, grant of power to a body. Here, We have seen that whatever power may be claimed by petitioner's committee may only be traced to the power of the Mayor to investigate as implied from his power to suspend or remove certain city employees. There is no statutory grant of power to investigate to petitioner's committee. 50 Am. Jur. Sec. 428, p. 450 itself admits an exception to the rule invoked by the petitioner. Thus, it is stated that "where the liberty and property of persons are sought to be brought within the operation of a power claimed to be impliedly granted by an act because necessary to its due execution, the case must be clearly seen to be within those intended to be reached." Here, no less than the liberty of Armando Ramos is involved in the claim of the committee to the right to cite witnesses. The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt) 1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies We hold, therefore, that petitioner's committee has no power to cite witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

WALTER E. OLSEN & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. VICENTE ALDANESE, as Insular Collector of Customs of the Philippine Islands, and W. TRINIDAD, as Collector of Internal Revenue, respondents. FACTS: Act No. 2613 entitled "an act to improve the methods of production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein." Empowers the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules respecting the classification, marking and parking of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation to the United States, and, among other things, provide: No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from the Philippine Islands to the United States until it shall have been inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative and found to be standard for export ... The Collector of Internal Revenue then promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," in which clause B of section 6 provides: To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper and with long filler, etc.

The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco, and as the petitioner himself stated on making such application that the cigars sought to be exported must have been manufactured from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya, said cigars were neither inspected nor examined by the Collector of Internal Revenue and were rejected because they were not long-filler and were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.

Hence, petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. ISSUE: Whether clause B of section 6 of Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," is valid? HELD: No. The court held clause B of section 6 of the Act to be null and void. By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to assume that he performed his official duty as he understood it. After such refusal and upon such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars. Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been refused. The motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ will issue, as prayed for in the petition, without costs. So ordered.

Note: Guys..nothing in the full text yung hinahanap ni Atty. Guerrero na “may dating” na decision ng court. Mas inexplain pa ng court yung naging actions ng CIR based sa clause B of section 6 of ng A.O. No. 35 na void nman. I’ll quote na lang De Leon p. 111 of Admin Law Book: “The purpose and intent of the Legislature was that a proper standard of the quality of tobacco should be fixed and defined, and that all of those who produce tobacco at the same standard should have equal rights and opportunities. It was never intended that a standard should be fixed which would limit the manufacture of cigars for export to certain provinces of the Islands, or that the tobacco produced in one province should be measured by another and different standard than the tobacco produced in any other province. That would amount to discrimination and class legislation, which even the Legislature, would not have the power to enact.”

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Philippines Interisland Shipping Association of the Phlippines vs CA 266 SCRA 489 Facts:

determination of the parties, the PPA jettisoned this policy and changed it to laissez-faire, something which only the legislature, or whoever is vested with law-making authority could do.

On Feb 3, 1986, President Ferdinand Marcos (hereinafter PM) issued Executive Order 10885 which increased the rates of the exisiting pilotage fees previously fixed by the Philippine Ports Authority6 (PPA hereinafter). PPA refused to enforce the said EO and, instead, issued Memorandum Order No 43-867 (MO hereinafter). PPA and Intervenors maintained that EO 1088 was merely an administrative issuance and could be superseded by the MO by PPA. Moreover, to consider EO 1088 as a statute would deprive PPA of its power to fix pilotage rates as mandated under its charter. Issue: W/N EO is constitutional Decision: NO. EO is in the nature of a law. PPA’s orders were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated in the exercise of delegated power. As such, the orders can be amended or revised by law, as the president did by issuing the said EO. PM was authorizd under the 1973 Constitution to exercise legislative power. With the same power conferred to him, he created PPA 8 and as PM can delegate the rate fixing power to PPA, he could also exercise the same in specific instances without withdrawing the delegated power to PPA. EO 1088’s legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise veseels in all Philippine Ports. SC conclude that EO 1088 is a valid statute and PPA is duty bound to comply with its provisions. PPA may increase the rates but it may not drecease them below those mandated by EO 1088. PPA cannot refuse to implement EO 1088 or alter it as it did in issuing MC 4386. Therefore, the policy was one of governmental regulation of the pilotage business. By leaving the matter to the

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Providing for uniform and modified rates for pilotage services rendered to foreign and coastwise vessels in all private and public ports.

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Fixing pilotage fees at rates lower than those provided in EO 1088. 8 By Issuing PD 857.

6 Government entity specially charged with the financing, management and operations of public ports throughout the archipelago. – www.ppa.com.ph

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies

Interprovincial Auto Bus Co (IAB) vs CIR Facts: IAB9 was assessed, on the 194,406 stubs of the receipts which did not state the value of the goods transported, by the Tax Agent with an assessed amount of Php 7,776.24. The assessed amount was computed by assuming that the value of the goods covered by each of the reciprts amounted to more than Php 5.00, and assessed a Documentary Stamp Tax on each of the 194,406 stubs. Plaintiff demanded the refund of the amount, and upon refusal, plaintiff filed the action anchoring on the validity of the Regulation No. 2610 by the Department of Finance, promulgated under the Authority11 of Admin Code.

the various counties who have to do with the assessment of property for taxation will knowingly violate the duties imposed upon them by law.” “As a logical outgrowth of the presumption in favor of the validity of assessments, when such assessments are assailed, the burden of proof is upon the complaining party. It is incumbent upon the property owner clearly to show that the assessment was erroneous, in order to relieve himself from it.”

Issue: Is the Regulation No. 26 unconstitutional when it created a presumption of liability to tax if the receipt fails to state such value?

Held: NO. The regulation falls within the scope of the administrative power of the Secretary of Finance, as authorized in the Revised Administrative Code, because it is essential to the strict enforcement and proper execution of the law which it seeks to implement. Said regulations have the force and effect of law. The regulation impliedly required the statement of the value of the goods in the receipts so that the collection of the tax can be enforced. IAB failed to do and now claims the unreasonableness of the provision as a basis for his exemption. “All presumptions are in favor of the correctness of tax assessments. The good faith of tax assessors and the validity of their actions are presumed. They will be presumed to have taken into consideration all the f acts to which their attention was called. No presumption can be indulged that all of the public officials of the state in

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A common carrier engaged in transporting passengers and freight receipts.

transportation of merchandise or goods for the collection of fees therefor are considered as bills of lading, and the orginal thereof issued or used should bear the documentary stamp as provided by paragraphs (q) and (r) of section 1449 of the Administrative Code.”

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“SEC. 121. Basis of the tax and affixture of stamps.—Bills of lading are exempt from the documentary stamp tax imposed by paragraphs (q) and (r) of section 1449 of the Administrative Code when the value of the goods shipped is P5 or less. Unless the bill of lading states that the goods are worth P5 or less, it must be held that the tax is due, and internal revenue officers will see to it that the tax is paid in all cases where the bill of lading does not state that the shipment is worth P5 or less.” “SEC. 127. ‘Chits,’ memorandum slips, and other papers not in the usual commercial form of bills of lading, when used by common carriers in the

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The Department Head shall have power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit to do so, all rules, regulations, orders, circulars, memorandums, and other instructions, not contrary to law, necessary to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law. * * *."

Admin Law | Case Bank Week 3 | Powers and Functions of Admin Agencies