Admin Law Case Digest 2

Securities and Exchange Commission vs. Chenery Corp., 332 US 194

Lumiqued vs. Exevea, 282 SCRA 125 (1997) POWER OF DELEGATION:

Mendoza vs. Dizon, 77 Phil 533 (1946) Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665 (1994)

Jaworski vs PAGCOR and SAGE GR 144463, 14 January 2004

Antipolo Realty Co. vs. NHA, 153 SCRA 399 (1987) Philippine International Trading Co. vs. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421 (1996) Christian General Assembly vs. Ignacio, 597 SCRA 266 (2009) Mitchell Coke and Coke Company vs. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 230 US 247 (1913) US vs. Dorr, 2 Phil 332 (1903) Cebu United Enterprises vs. Gallofin, 106 Phil 491 (1959) Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996) Viola vs. Alunan III, 277 SCRA 409 (1997) Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997) Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989) Tondo Medical Center Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 527 SCRA 746 (2007) Banda vs. Ermita, 618 SCRA 488 (2010) Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary, 677 SCRA 408 (2012) Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs. CA, 171 SCRA 348 (1989) Balanguan vs. CA, 562 SCRA 184 (2008) Dacudao vs. Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2003) Olaguer vs. RTC, 170 SCRA 478 (1989) Padua vs. Ranada, 390 SCRA 663 (2002) Joson vs. Executive Secretary, 290 SCRA 279 (1998) Eugenio vs. CSC, 242 SCRA 196 (1995) Blaquera vs. Alcala, 295 SCRA 411 (1998)

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Realty Exchange Venture Co. vs. Sendino, 233 SCRA 665 (1994) Lucina Sendino filed a complaint for Specific Performance against REVI before the office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of HLURB. REVI Cancelled the contract (entitled Reservation Agreement) for the reservation of Sendino of a 120 sqm house and lot in Paranaque. For the alleged non-compliance with the requirement of Sendino as provided in the Reservation Agreement. OAALA decided in favour of Sendino ordering to comply and continue with the sale. On Appeal of the decision was affirmed. This was further appealed to the Office of the President but the case was dismissed. MR was also denied. Issue: W/N the Office of the Pres committed a Serious Error in declaring that HLURB has quasi-judicial functions even though there’s not express grant by EO 90. Decision: NO. Section 1 of PD 1344, provides: ‘Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library ‘A.

Unsound

real

estate

business

Corporation v. National Housing Authority (153 SCRA 399 [1987]) where We restated that the National Housing Authority (now HLURB) shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the terms of PD No. 957 which defines the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers of said agency. HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. 15 We fail to see how the HSRC - which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers - had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. 16 The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E. O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.

practices;

‘B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and ‘C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.’ There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency’s special expertise. The constitutionality of such grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the National Housing Authority (now Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board) over cases involving the sale of lots in commercial subdivisions was upheld in Tropical Homes Inc. v. National Housing Authority (152 SCRA 540 [1987]) and again sustained in a later decision in Antipolo Realty APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Philippine International Trading Corp vs Hon Angeles (GR 108461 Oct 21 1996) Facts: - PITC issued an Admin Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 requiring all importation from China must be accompanied by a viable and confirmed “EXPORT PROGRAM" of Philippine Products to China carried out by the importer himself or through a tie-up. - Desiring to make importations from China, private respondents Remington and Firestone, both domestic corporations, applied for authority to import from China with PITC. They eventually granted authority after satisfying the requirements and after they executed respective undertakings to balance their importations from China. - Subsequently, for failing to comply with their undertakings to submit export credits equivalent to the value of their importations, further import applications were withheld by PITC from private respondents, such that the latter were both barred from importing goods from China - Remington, with Firestone as Intervenor, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PITC assailing the said Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 is an undue restriction of trade, and hence, unconstitutional. - The trial court ruled that PITC's authority to process and approve applications for imports and to issue rules and regulations has already been repealed by EO No. 133, issued on February 27, 1987 by President Aquino. - PITC filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to seek reversal of the Decision upholding the Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus of Remington Industrial Sales (Remington) and Firestone Ceramics (Firestone) , questioning the trial court's decision particularly on the

propriety of the lower court's declarations on the validity of Administrative Order No. 89-08-01. - Subsequently, when President Ramos went to Beijing, a new a new trade agreement was entered into between the Philippines and China, encouraging liberalization of trade between the two countries. Thereby the President directing the Department of Trade and Industry and the PITC to cease implementing Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01. - In view of the above fact, Remington then expressed its desire to have the present action to be declared moot and academic. PITC disagreed that the case has become moot and academic as a result of abrogation of the said Administrative Order because Remington still has outstanding obligation with PITC consisting of charges for the 0.5% Counter Export Development Service before the said abrogation

Issue1: W/N PITC is legally empowered to issue Administrative Orders. Issue2: W/N Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 valid? Decision:1 YES. PITC is legally empowered 1 to issue Administrative Orders, as a valid exercise of a power ancillary to legislation. Hence Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 8908-01 is constitutional Discussion: The PITC is attached to the DTI 2 (as established by EO 122) as an implementing arm of the said department.

1

The grant of quasi-legislative powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional. Thus, as a result of the growing complexity of the modern society it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasilegislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. 34 Evidently, in the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts. (Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority, G.R No. L-50444, August 31, 1987, 153 SCRA 399).

2

As the primary coordinative, promote, facilitative and regulatory arm of government for the country's trade, industry and investment activities, which shall act as a catalyst for intensified private sector activity in order to accelerate and sustain economic growth. In furtherance of this mandate, the DTI was empowered, among others, to plan, implement, and coordinate activities of the government related to trade industry and investments; to formulate and administer policies and guidelines for the investment priorities plan and the delivery of investment incentives; to formulate country and product export strategies which will guide the export promotion and development thrusts of the government. Corollary, the Secretary of Trade and Industry is given the power to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the department's objectives, policies, plans, programs and projects

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

The PITC, as an implementing arm of attached as an integral part of DTI as one of its line agencies, has the authority to issue the questioned Administrative Order.

Decision2: No. Although PITC has quasi-legislative power, this does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is valid exercise of such. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 3 of Civil Code. Discussion2: Thus, even before the trade balancing measures issued by the petitioner were lifted by President Fidel V. Ramos, the same were never legally effective, and private respondents, therefore, cannot be made subject to them, because Administrative Order 89-08-0l embodying the same was never published, as mandated by law, for its effectivity. DISPOSITIVE PORTION4

3

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided

a) From further charging the petitioners the Counter Export Development Service fee of 0.5% of the total value of the unliquidated or unfulfilled Undertakings of the private respondents;

4

ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED, to the effect that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the private respondents, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) Enjoining the petitioner:

b) From further implementing the provisions of Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 and its appurtenant rules; and, 2) Requiring petitioner to approve forthwith all the pending applications of, and all those that may hereafter be filed by, the petitioner and the Intervenor, free from and without complying with the requirements prescribed in the above-stated issuances.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Cebu United Enterprises vs First Assistant Solicitor - A Suit for Mandatory Injunction was instituted in the CFI of Cebu to compel Jose Gallorfin (Collector of Customs, Cebu) to release and deliver to plaintiff two shipments from the US. As ancillary relief, the plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was granted. Thereafter, the goods were released to the plaintiff. The importation of the aforesaid shipments was made under and by virtue of an Import Control Commission License No. 1225 issued by the defunct Import Control Commission. Under the terms of the license, the plaintiff could import, on a no-dollar remittance basis, overissue newspapers up to the amount or value of $118,000.00. The refusal of the defendant to deliver the imported items is premised on his contention that while the five bills of lading covering the two shipments of the overissue newspapers were all dated at Los Angeles, U.S.A. December 17, 1953, or one day before the expiration of the import license in question, the vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN, carrying on board the said merchandise, actually left the ports of embarkation, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, on January 12 and January 16, 1954 respectively. Hence, according to the defendant, the importation was made without a valid import license, because under the regulations issued by the Central Bank and the Monetary Board, "all shipments that left the port of origin after June 30, 1953, and are covered by ICC licenses, may be released by the Bureau of Customs without the need of a Central Bank release certificate; provided they left the port of origin within the period of validity of the licenses." No Central Bank certificate for the release of the goods having been shown or presented to the defendant, the latter refused to make the delivery. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. The question raised, however, being purely one of law, the appeal was certified to us pursuant to a resolution of said court dated July 19, 1957. Issue: W/N The appeal has no merit. The authority of the appellee to import was contained in the Import Control Commission License No. 17225, validated on June 18, 1953, and under Resolution 70 of the Commission (adopted March 27, 1952), the same had a six-month period of validity counted from the said

date of June 18, 1953. This license states, among other conditions, that "Commodities covered by this license must be shipped from the country of origin before the expiry date of the license, and are subject to sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 650." Although Republic Act No. 650, creating the Import Control Commission, expired on July 31, 1953, it is to be conceded that its duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life span of said governmental agency What is important to consider only is the legal connotation of the word "shipped" as the term was used in the license. Defendant maintains that it is when the vessel leaves the port of embarkation, while plaintiff holds that it is the dates of the bills of lading, which are usually issued after the cargo is placed on board the vessel. That the date of the shipment is the date when the goods for dispatch are loaded on board the vessel, and not necessarily when the ship puts to sea, is clearly implied from our ruling in the case of U.S. Tobacco Corporation v. Rufino Luna, Et Al., (87 Phil., 4), The issuance of the bill of lading, furthermore, presupposes or carries the presumption that the goods were delivered to the carrier for immediate shipment (13 C.J.S. sec. 123 (2), p. 235, and cases cited therein). It does not appear here that the bill of lading specified any designated day on which the vessels were to lift anchor, nor was it shown that plaintiff had any knowledge that the vessels M/S VENTURA and M/S BATAAN were not to depart soon after he placed his cargo on board and the corresponding bills of lading issued to him. From this latter time, the goods, in contemplation of law, are deemed already in transit Defendant's reliance upon Central Bank regulations that the shipment licensed must have "left the port of origin within the period of validity of the license" is not maintainable in the present case, because the regulations came into effect only on July 1, 1953 already after issuance of the appellee's license and cannot be read into the same Appeal of the Defendant was dismissed

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996) G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996 - Petitioner Isabelo Crisostomo was President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC), having been appointed to that position by the President of the Philippines on July 17, 1974. - Two administrative cases were filed against petitioner for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials belonging to the college, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. The administrative cases, which were filed with the Office of the President, were subsequently referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation. - Petitioner was then preventively suspended from office - On April 1, 1978, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, CONVERTING THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGE OF COMMERCE INTO A POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, DEFINING ITS OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS, AND EXPANDING ITS CURRICULAR OFFERINGS. - After a couple of years, the Trial Court acquitted Crisostomo and cases before the ombudsman were also dismissed on the ground that they had become moot and academic and moved that he be reinstated but is barred by the PD 1341. - The People of the Philippines filed a Certiorari before the CA on the decided case which acquitted Crisostomo before the CA. CA reversed the Decision of the lower court. - PD 1341, Crisostomo argues that P.D. No. 1341, which converted the PCC into the PUP, did not abolish the PCC. He contends that if the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being "abolished" rather than "converted" and that if the PUP was intended to be a new institution, the law would have said it was being "created." Petitioner claims that the PUP is merely a continuation of the existence of the PCC, and, hence, he could be reinstated to his former position as president.

What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. As petitioner correctly points out, when the purpose is to abolish a department or an office or an organization and to replace it with another one, the lawmaking authority says so. The appellate court ruled, however, that the PUP and the PCC are not "one and the same institution" but "two different entities" and that since petitioner Crisostomo's term was coterminous with the legal existence of the PCC, petitioner's term expired upon the abolition of the PCC. - But the reinstatement of petitioner to the position of president of the PUP could not be ordered by the trial court because on June 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1437 had been promulgated fixing the term of office of presidents of state universities and colleges at six (6) years, renewable for another term of six (6) years, and authorizing the President of the Philippines to terminate the terms of incumbents who were not reappointed. - In accordance with § 7 of the law, therefore, petitioner became entitled only to retirement benefits or the payment of separation pay. Petitioner must have recognized this fact that is why in 1992 he asked then President Aquino to consider him for appointment to the same position after it had become vacant in consequence of the retirement of Dr. Prudente.

Issue: W/N PD 1341 abolished the PCC? Decision: NO. P.D. No. 1341 did not abolish, but only changed, the former Philippine College of Commerce into what is now the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Larin vs Executive Sec (G.R. No. 112745. October 16, 1997) Facts: - This is Petition for validity of the petitioner's removal from service as Asst. Commissioner of the BIR, questioning the creation of Memorandum Order no. 1645 Administrative Order No. 101 which found him guilty6 of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal from office. Likewise, petitioner seeks to assail the legality of Executive Order No. 132 7 - In his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. He claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies, particularly the Bureau of Internal revenue. He said that the reorganization sought to be effected by the Executive Department on the basis of E.O. No. 132 is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of Section 2 of R.A. 66568 Issue: Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to issue the questioned E.O. NO. 132?,

5

issued by the Office of the President, which provides for the creation of A Committee to Investigate the Administrative Complaint Against Aquilino T. Larin, Assistant Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue as well as the investigation made in pursuance thereto and 6

Petitioner is found guilty of the crimes of violation of Sec 268 (4) of NIRC and Sec 3 of RA 3019 in Criminal Cases Nos 14208-14209 (ppl vs Larin et. al) 7 Which mandates for the streamlining of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Under said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentralized or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The Excise Tax Service or the Specific Tax Service, of which petitioner was the Assistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said executive order. 8

Otherwise known as the Act Protecting the Security of Tenure of Civil Service Officers and Employees in the Implementation of Government Reorganization. 9

Decision: YES. Petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of removal of the President. - Under its Preamble, E.O. No. 132 lays down the legal basis of its issuance, namely: a) Section 48 and 62 of R.A. No. 7645, b) Section 63 of E.O. No. 127, and c) Section 20, Book III of E.O. No. 292. Section 48 & 62 of R.A. 7645 clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. - The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned. - While the President's power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.9 DISPOSITIVE PORTION10

dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 10

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated to his position as Assistant Commissioner without loss of seniority rights and shall be entitled to full backwages from the time of his separation from service until actual reinstatement unless, in the meanwhile, he would have reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five years in which case, he shall be deemed to have retired at such age and entitled thereafter to the corresponding retirement benefits. SO ORDERED.

Thus, in Dario vs. Mison, this court has had the occasion to clarify that: "As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Pichay vs Office of the Dep. Sec G.R. NO. 196425 - July 24, 2012 - This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, seeking to declare as unconstitutional Executive Order No. 1311 and to permanently prohibit respondents from administratively proceeding against petitioner on the strength of the assailed executive order. - On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued E.O. 1212. On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 1313 (E.O. 13), abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD). - On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. - Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman. - In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-judicial functions, the President has not only 11

entitled, "Abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and Transferring Its Investigative, Adjudicatory and Recommendatory Functions to the Office Of The Deputy Executive Secretary For Legal Affairs, Office of the President" 12 creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. 13 ABOLISHING THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION AND TRANSFERRING ITS INVESTIGATIVE, ADJUDICATORY AND

usurped the powers of congress to create a public office, appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached upon the powers of the Ombudsman. Petitioner avers that the unconstitutionality of E.O. 13 is also evident when weighed against the due process requirement and equal protection clause under the 1987 Constitution. Issue: W/N E.O. 13 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A PUBLIC OFFICE. Decision NO. The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 29214. Section 31 of E.O. 292), vests in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. Discussion: - The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." - The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. - The abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292. - Here, the Petitioner is a Presidential Appointee15. Petitioner is a presidential appointee occupying the RECOMMENDATORY FUNCTIONS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 14 otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 15

Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested.32 Having the power to remove and/or discipline presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into their conduct in office.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

high-level position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision. - Presumption of Constitutionality16 ===========

16

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39Petitioner has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably

a valid exercise of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Balanguan et. al vs CA (19th Division) GR 174350 , 2008 - Petition for Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of CA w/c annulled and set aside the Resolution of DOJ in HSBC vs Balanguan which dismissed the criminal complaint for Estafa filed against the Balanguan. - In this Petition, Balanguans urge the SC to reverse and set aside the decision of CA and accordingly, dismiss the complaint against them in view of the absence of probable cause - HSBC filed an estafa case against Balanguans which was dismissed by the Prosecutor in its Resolution, finding no probable cause. HSBC appealed to the Secretary of DOJ by means of a Petition for Review which was also dismissed. MR was also denied. - HSBC then went to CA by means of Petition for Certiorari thereby annulling and setting aside the resolutions of the DOJ. Balanguans filed an MR before the CA but was denied. ISSUE: W/N Decision: - The Prosecutor exceeded his authority and gravely abused his discretion. It must be remembered that a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

- It must be remembered that a preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency17 exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause - Though some cases describe the public prosecutor's power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasijudicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies18, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. - The alleged circumstances of the case at bar make up the elements of abuse of confidence, deceit or fraudulent means, and damage under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code on estafa and/or qualified estafa. They give rise to the presumption or reasonable belief that the offense of estafa has been committed; and, thus, the filing of an Information against petitioners Bernyl and Katherene is warranted. - Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced, SC dismissed the instant petition for being the wrong remedy under the Revised Rules of Court, as well as for petitioner Bernyl and Katherene's failure to sufficiently show that the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals were rendered in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Discussion: - The Court of Appeals found fault in the DOJ's failure to identify and discuss the issues raised by HSBC in its Petition for Review. And, in support thereof, HSBC maintains that it is incorrect to argue that "it was not necessary for the Secretary of Justice to have his resolution recite the facts and the law on which it was based," because courts and quasi-judicial bodies should faithfully comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution requiring that decisions rendered by them should state clearly and distinctly the facts of the case and the law on which the decision is based 17

A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court. A quasi-judicial agency performs adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their

18

A quasi-judicial body is an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making.

decisions have the same effect as judgments of a court.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995 FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:

“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.” Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution. ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set aside NO 1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16.. 2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.” The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: (3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency. NOTES:

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides: Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. — Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commissionmay effect changes in the organization as the need arises. Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The Commission shall have the following offices: (1) The Office of the Executive (2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members (3) The Office of Legal Affairs (4) The Office of Planning and Management (5) The Central Administrative Office. (6) The Office of Central Personnel Records (7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation (8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement (9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards (10) The Office of Human Resource Development (11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit. (12) The Office of Personnel Relations (13) The Office of Corporate Affairs (14) The Office of Retirement (15) The Regional and Field Offices.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Blaquera vs Alcala Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres. The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1, 000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him. When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive departments. The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources. The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive departments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the executive departments

Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution. Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Lumiqued vs Exevea FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform - Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. The following three complaints were filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR: -charged with malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. -private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00 -charged with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause The DOJ made appropriate action by forming a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. *Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22, 1992. On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52), 16 finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Petition for appeal addressed to Pres Ramos was filed by Lumiqued praying that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and

regulations." The OP denied the motion. Second motion was filed but on May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. On May 19, 1994, 20 however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, 21 Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

In view of Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order. ISSUES: 1. WON the administrative investigation conducted by the DOJ is valid. 2. WON the right to counsel by Lumiques was violated. HELD: 1. Yes. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system," conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform such other functions as may be provided by law," prosecutors may be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor. Moreover, the committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief 2. No. under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. In an administrative proceeding such as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued clearly show that he was

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

confident of his capacity and so opted to represent himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

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BANDA V. ERMITA G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010 FACTS: Sometime in 1987, The National Printing Office (NPO) was formed during the term of former President Aquino by virtue of Executive Order No. 285 which provided, among others, the creation of the NPO from the merger of the Government Printing Office and the relevant printing units of the Philippine Information Agency (PIA). In 2004, President Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. As such, the petitioners perceived that Executive Order No. 378 is a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO. Hence, they filed this petition. ISSUES: a) Whether or not President Arroyo has the power to issue Executive Order No. 378? b) Whether or not EO 378 is constitutional? HELD: a) YES. President Arroyo was granted by law to issue Executive Order No. 378.

of the Office of the President Proper and the agencies under it. The issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative power granted by the aforementioned Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for the continuing authority of the President to reorganize the Office of the President, “in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” This is a matter already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. The reorganization of such an office through executive or administrative order is also recognized in the Administrative Code of 1987. In the present instance, involving neither abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept. b) YES . EO 378 is constitutional. The basic evidentiary rule is that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proving it. The petitioners failed to allege, much less prove, sufficient facts to show that the limitation of the NPO’s budget to its own income would indeed lead to the abolition of the position, or removal from office, of any employee. Neither did they present any shred of proof of their assertion that the changes in the functions of the NPO were for political considerations that had nothing to do with improving the efficiency of, or encouraging operational economy in, the said agency. Furthermore, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order No. 378.

The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office “to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.” To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies. The Administrative Code provides that the Office of the President consists APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Jaworski vs PAGCOR and SAGE GR 144463, 14 January 2004 PAGCOR’s19 Board of Directors an instrument called "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and Internet Gaming", which granted SAGE20 the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors, provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. Senator R. Jaworski, as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement and Sports, filed a petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE be nullified for the following reasons: 1. He maintains that PAGCOR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it authorized SAGE to operate gambling on the internet. He contends that PAGCOR is not authorized to operate gambling on the internet for the reason that PD 1869 could not have possibly contemplated internet gambling since at the time of its enactment, the internet was inexistent and gambling activities were confined exclusively to real-space. 2. Further, he argues that the internet, being an international network of computers, necessarily transcends the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, and the grant to SAGE of authority to operate internet gambling contravenes the limitation in PAGCOR’s franchise, under Section 14 of P.D. No. 1869 which provides that PAGCOR shall conduct gambling activities or games of chance on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. 3. Internet gambling does not fall under any of the categories of the authorized gambling activities enumerated under Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 which grants PAGCOR the "right, privilege and authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports gaming pools, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines."1 He contends that internet gambling could not have been included within the 19

A GOCC existing under Presidential Decree No. 1869 issued on July 11, 1983 by then President Ferdinand Marcos created to xxx To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports, gaming pools (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: x x x (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, the evils, malpractices and corruptions that

commonly accepted definition of "gambling casinos", "clubs" or "other recreation or amusement places" as these terms refer to a physical structure in real-space where people who intend to bet or gamble go and play games of chance authorized by law

Issue: WHETHER RESPONDENT PAGCOR ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION, OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT AUTHORIZED RESPONDENT SAGE TO OPERATE INTERNET GAMBLING ON THE BASIS OF ITS RIGHT "TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN GAMBLING CASINOS, CLUBS AND OTHER AMUSEMENT PLACES" UNDER SECTION 10 OF P.D. 1869; Decision: PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE A legislative franchise is a special privilege granted by the state to corporations. It is a privilege of public concern which cannot be exercised at will and pleasure, but should be reserved for public control and administration, either by the government directly, or by public agents, under such conditions and regulations as the government may impose on them in the interest of the public. It is Congress that prescribes the conditions on which the grant of the franchise may be made. Thus the manner of granting the franchise, to whom it may be granted, the mode of conducting the business, the charter and the quality of the service to be rendered and the duty of the grantee to the public in exercising the franchise are almost always defined in clear and unequivocal language. While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s and/or management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non potest21, inasmuch as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so. Citing Lim v. Pacquing, the Court clarified that "since are normally prevalent in the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement.xxx 20 Abbrevation for Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation. A Corporation. 21 In constitutional and administrative law, the principle delegata potestas non potest delegari (Latin) states that "no delegated powers can be further delegated". Alternatively, it can be stated delegatus non potest delegare, "one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power".

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila." By the same token, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet gambling. The "Grant of Authority and Agreement to Operate Sports Betting and Internet Gaming" executed by PAGCOR in favor of SAGE is declared NULL and VOID.

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G.R. Nos. 86540-41 November 6, 1989 MANTRUSTE SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, MAKATI AGROTRADING, INC., and LA FILIPINA UY GONGCO. CORP., respondents. Facts: - in 1986 (at the time when Freedom Constitution was in force) Mantruste System, Inc. (MSI) entered into an "interim lease agreement" with the Development Bank of the Philippines (owner of the Bayview Plaza Hotel) wherein the former would operate the hotel for "a minimum of three months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. - On December 8, 1986 the President issued Proclamation No. 50 entitled "Launching a Program for the Expeditious Disposition or Privatization of Certain Government Corporations and/or the (acquired) Assets thereof, and creating a Committee on Privatization and the Asset Privatization Trust." - The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets Identified for privatization and were consequently transferred from DBP to APT for disposition. - To effect the disposition of the property, the DBP notified MSI that it was terminating the "interim lease agreement." in Sept 1987 (after more than a year) - MSI, in its reply to the said termination, said that it is of the opinion that since its lease on the hotel properties has been for more than one year now, its lease status has taken the character of a long term one. As such MSI as the lessee has acquired certain rights and of firm contention that it has acquired a priority right to the purchase of Bayview Hotel properties over and above other interested parties and does not need to participate in a property bidding that was on going at that time.

22

- APT responded firmly that they disagree with MSI’s claims and recommended to join the bidding instead should they intend to acquire the property. - Eventually, Mantruste being firm to their stand, did not join the bidding. As a result, the bid was awarded to another company. - MSI filed a Civil Complaint to prevent such transfer of Bayview and from them being ejected. RTC rendered a decision in favor of MSI. - APT appealed to CA. CA nullified RTC's decision on the ground that RTC's decision is violative of Section 3122 of Proclamation No. 50-A and rejected RTC’s opinion in the case that the above provision of Proclamation No. 50-A is unconstitutional because it ceased to be operative in view of the 1987 Constitution Issue: - W/N Proclamation No. 50, that was promulgated 1986, has ceased to be operative in view of the 1987 Constitution - W/N Sec 31 of Proclamation No. 50 impinges upon the judicial power as defined in Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution Decision: NO. Proclamation No. 50-A continued to be operative after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, by virtue of Section 323, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) providing that: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 50-A does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government" (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts belongs to the legislature, except that it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5,

which provides: 23

No court or administrative agency shall issue any restraining order or injunction against the Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it . . . Nor shall such order or injunction be issued against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him.

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Article VIII of the Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom Constitution, issued Proclamation No. 50-A prohibiting the courts from issuing restraining orders and writs of injunction against the APT and the purchasers of any assets sold by it, to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge, by this instrumentality of the executive branch of the Government, of its task of carrying out "the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain government corporations and/or the assets thereof' (Proc. No. 50), absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution). - Under the system of separation of powers set up in the Constitution, the power of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of the Government is limited only to the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion (by them) amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). - There can be no justification for judicial interference in the business of an administrative agency, except when it violates a citizen's constitutional rights, or commits a grave abuse of discretion, or acts in excess of, or without jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

PELAEZ VS AUDITOR GENERAL (1965) FACTS: Pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC) of 1917, authorizing the President of the Philippines to create new municipalities among others, then President (Macapagal) issued Executive Orders creating 33 municipalities. Thereafter, then a special civil action was instituted by Emmanuel Pelaez as then the Vice President and taxpayer against the Auditor General to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in the implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities. ISSUE: Whether the Executive Orders were valid and thus constituted due delegation of power HELD: No. R.A. 2370 (1960) has impliedly repealed Sec. 68 of RAC when it expressed: Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress. Thus, the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature; the creation of municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently legislative in character.

(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but, also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our Republican system. Further, the 1935 Constitution (Art VII, Sec 11) has granted the President control over all executive departments and with regard to local governments, only supervision. He was then denied the power to control local governments by the very Constitution itself. If the President was allowed to create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him by the Constitution.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate — and APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY (CGA) SPS IGNACIO (2009)

VS

FACTS: Owners of subject property in Pulilan , Bulacan, Spouses Ignacio, and CGA entered into a Contract to Sell for the said subdivision lot with stipulations on downpayment, installment terms and period. CGA paid the downpayment and religiously paid its monthly installments until it was discovered that subject property had flaws and defects in its title; that said lot was a property under litigation. CGA filed an action before the RTC against Ignacio for fraudulent concealment of property under litigation. Ignacio moved to have the action dismissed contending that the HLURB has jurisdiction over their claims.

contracts, One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

ISSUE: Whether HLURB has jurisdiction over the complaint

HELD: Yes. HLURB had its beginning when pursuant to PD No. 957 NHA was created intended to closely supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses in order to curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. By virtue of succeeding executive orders, NHAs jurisdiction expanded until its functions were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) until it was eventually renamed HLURB. HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ENRIQUE GARCIA VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (1992) 211 SCRA 219 FACTS: In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438 which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In 1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution which provides: “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments”

than the Executive Department. It does not follow, however, that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines. Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President to issue the said EOs.

He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.

HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the Legislative rather APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS 527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324 - on delegation of powers J. Chico-Nazario Facts: In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five general areas of reform: To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals; Secure funding for priority public health programs; Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance; Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies; Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP) On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 102, entitled “ Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government units. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102, “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,” Petitioners alleged that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the HSRA's policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide guidelines for legislation. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of the political department.

Issue: WON EO 102 is void on the ground that it was issued in excess of the president's authority. Held: No. EO 102 is valid. Executive Order No. 102 is well within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President did not usurp any legislative prerogative in issuing Executive Order No. 102. It is an exercise of the President's constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. The HSRA cannot be nullified based solely on petitioners' bare allegations that it violates the general principles expressed in the non selfexecuting provisions they cite herein. There are two reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad constitutional principles: basic considerations of due process and the limitations of judicial power. Petitioners also claim that Executive Order No. 102 is void on the ground that it was issued by the President in excess of his authority. They maintain that the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is an exercise of legislative functions, which the President usurped when he issued Executive Order No. 102. This line of argument is without basis.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

In Domingo v. Zamora, this Court explained the rationale behind the President's continuing authority under the Administrative Code to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. The law grants the President the power to reorganize the Office of the President in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his or her office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." To remain effective and efficient, it must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner the Chief Executive deems fit to carry out presidential directives and policies. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED. This Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 26 November 2004, declaring both the HSRA and Executive Order No. 102 as valid. No costs.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

La Bugal-B’Laan v. Ramos G.R. No. 127882. December 1, 2004. J. Panganiban Facts: The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995, executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP). On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO 96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP, mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987 Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service contracts,[9] which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation. The Decision quoted several legal scholars and authors who had criticized service contracts for, inter alia, vesting in the foreign contractor exclusive management and control of the enterprise, including operation of the field in the event petroleum was discovered; control of production, expansion and development; nearly unfettered control over the disposition and sale of the products discovered/extracted; effective ownership of the natural resource at the point of extraction; and beneficial ownership of our economic resources. According to the Decision, the 1987 Constitution (Section 2 of Article XII) effectively banned such service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC (Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.

Petitioners argued that no amendatory laws have been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995 conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that, at present, it does not); that public respondents will continue to implement and enforce the statute until this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law continues to be the source of legal authority in accepting, processing and approving numerous applications for mining rights. Issue: WON the court can decide on the controversy on the ground that it is a justiciable question. Held: Yes, it is a justiciable question.

All the protagonists are in agreement that the Court has jurisdiction to decide this controversy, even assuming it to be moot. Petitioners stress the following points. First, while a case becomes moot and academic when “there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits,”[18] what is at issue in the instant case is not only the validity of the WMCP FTAA, but also the constitutionality of RA 7942 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Second, the acts of private respondent cannot operate to cure the law of its alleged unconstitutionality or to divest this Court of its jurisdiction to decide. Third, the Constitution imposes upon the Supreme Court the duty to declare invalid any law that offends the Constitution. Petitioners also argue that no amendatory laws have been passed to make the Mining Act of 1995 conform to constitutional strictures (assuming that, at present, it does not); that public respondents will continue to implement and enforce the statute until this Court rules otherwise; and that the said law continues to be the source of legal authority in accepting, processing and approving numerous applications for mining rights. Indeed, it appears that as of June 30, 2002, some 43 FTAA applications had been filed with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), with an aggregate area of 2,064,908.65 hectares -- spread over Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao[19] -- applied for. It may be a bit far-fetched to assert, as petitioners do, that each and every FTAA that was entered into under

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the provisions of the Mining Act “invites potential litigation” for as long as the constitutional issues are not resolved with finality. Nevertheless, we must concede that there exists the distinct possibility that one or more of the future FTAAs will be the subject of yet another suit grounded on constitutional issues. But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is even now scaring away foreign investments. Attesting to this climate of anxiety is the fact that the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines saw the urgent need to intervene in the case and to present its position during the Oral Argument; and that Secretary General Romulo Neri of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) requested this Court to allow him to speak, during that Oral Argument, on the economic consequences of the Decision of January 27, 2004.[20] We are convinced. We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a multiplicity of suits. Paraphrasing Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[21] it is evident that strong reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality issue be resolved now.[22] In further support of the immediate resolution of the constitutionality issue, public respondents cite Acop v. Guingona,[23] to the effect that the courts will decide a question -- otherwise moot and academic - if it is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” [24] Public respondents ask the Court to avoid a situation in which the constitutionality issue may again arise with respect to another FTAA, the resolution of which may not be achieved until after it has become too late for our mining industry to grow out of its infancy. They also recall Salonga v. Cruz Paño,[25] in which this Court declared that “(t)he Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. x x x. ”

The mootness of the case in relation to the WMCP FTAA led the undersigned ponente to state in his dissent to the Decision that there was no more justiciable controversy and the plea to nullify the Mining Law has become a virtual petition for declaratory relief.[26] The entry of the Chamber of Mines of the Philippines, Inc., however, has put into focus the seriousness of the allegations of unconstitutionality of RA 7942 and DAO 96-40 which converts the case to one for prohibition[27] in the enforcement of the said law and regulations. Indeed, this CMP entry brings to fore that the real issue in this case is whether paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution is contravened by RA 7942 and DAO 96-40, not whether it was violated by specific acts implementing RA 7942 and DAO 96-40. “[W]hen an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. ”[28] This ruling can be traced from Tañada v. Angara,[29] in which the Court said: “In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. xxx xxx x xx “As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.”[30] Additionally, the entry of CMP into this case has also effectively forestalled any possible objections arising from the standing or legal interest of the original parties.

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For all the foregoing reasons, we believe that the Court should proceed to a resolution of the constitutional issues in this case. AFTER ALL IS SAID AND DONE, it is clear that there is unanimous agreement in the Court upon the key principle that the State must exercise full control and supervision over the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources.

referred to in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution; and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 executed by the government and Western Mining Corporation Philippines Inc. (WMCP), except Sections 7.8 and 7.9 of the subject FTAA which are hereby INVALIDATED for being contrary to public policy and for being grossly disadvantageous to the government.

This Court cannot but be mindful that any decision rendered in this case will ultimately impact not only the cultural communities which lodged the instant Petition, and not only the larger community of the Filipino people now struggling to survive amidst a fiscal/budgetary deficit, ever increasing prices of fuel, food, and essential commodities and services, the shrinking value of the local currency, and a government hamstrung in its delivery of basic services by a severe lack of resources, but also countless future generations of Filipinos. For this latter group of Filipinos yet to be born, their eventual access to education, health care and basic services, their overall level of well-being, the very shape of their lives are even now being determined and affected partly by the policies and directions being adopted and implemented by government today. And in part by the this Resolution rendered by this Court today. Verily, the mineral wealth and natural resources of this country are meant to benefit not merely a select group of people living in the areas locally affected by mining activities, but the entire Filipino nation, present and future, to whom the mineral wealth really belong. This Court has therefore weighed carefully the rights and interests of all concerned, and decided for the greater good of the greatest number. JUSTICE FOR ALL, not just for some; JUSTICE FOR THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE, not just for the here and now. WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents’ and the intervenors’ Motions for Reconsideration; to REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Court’s January 27, 2004 Decision; to DISMISS the Petition; and to issue this new judgment declaring CONSTITUTIONAL (1) Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Law), (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations contained in DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 9640 -- insofar as they relate to financial and technical assistance agreements APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Conference of Maritime Agencies v. POEA G.R. No. 114714 FACTS: Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its copetitioners, all licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge to annul Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05. Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.

The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation." With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers ISSUE: Whether or Not the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative power? HELD: YES! The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government but is especially important in the case of the legislative power because of the many instances when delegation is permitted. The occasions are rare when executive or judicial powers have to be delegated by the authorities to which they legally pertain. In the case of legislative power, however, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its nondelegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) FACTS: President Carter terminated a treaty with Taiwan, and a few Congressional members felt that this deprived them of their Constitutional with respect to a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has taken no official action. However, no Congressional action was ever taken. The Senate considered a resolution that would require the President to get Senate approval before any mutual defense treaty could be terminated, but there was no final vote on the resolution.

ISSUE: Whether the issue as the President can terminate a treaty without Congressional approval is a nonjusticiable political question.

HELD: Yes, because it involves the authority of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President. The question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the Amendment. The controversy is a non-justiciable political dispute that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government and might be answered in different ways for different amendments which must surely be controlled by political standards, rather than standards easily characterized as "judicially manageable". In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty, and the fact that different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties, the instant case, in my view, also "must surely be controlled by political standards." APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Olaguer vs RTC, G.R. No. 81385. February 21, 1989

FACTS:

HELD:

When the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) provided certain financing accommodations to Philippine Journalists, Inc. (PJI), Publisher, the voting rights over 67% of the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of stock of the company held by the stockholders were assigned to the bank. The bank appointed some stockholders as proxies to exercise its right to vote. But when PJI defaulted, the bank cancelled the said proxies and designated as its proxies petitioner Eduardo Olaguer, Jose Mari Velez and Manuel de Leon. DBP scheduled a special stockholders meeting for the purpose of electing new set of directors. However, complaints were filed against them due to some alleged illegal acts committed by them. Among which is that Olaguer continued to exercise and retain full management and control of PJI despite of his termination of his appointment as member of the board of directors of DBP by Pres. Aquino. It was alleged that Olaguer, et. al have been acting as corporate officers and/or members of the board without their having been elected by the majority vote of stockholders and without their owning in their own right even a single qualifying share. It was also alleged in the complaint, that petitioner Reyes had been sending out notices to private respondents about an alleged stockholders meeting to be held on December 21, 1987 at the PJI building, and that in the letter written by the DBP chief legal counsel, it is stated that petitioner Olaguer and his associates who claim to be members of the board and corporate officers of PJI do not represent DBP and that they are not authorized to act in its behalf.

No. Olaguer, being a fiscal agent of the PCGG and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the PJI, was acting for and in behalf of the PCGG. Under Section 2 of Executive Order No. 14, the Sandiganbayan has exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding "the funds, moneys, assets and properties illegally acquired by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinate, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees," civil or criminal, including incidents arising from such cases. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan is subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court. In the exercise of its functions, the PCGG is a co-equal body with the regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. The regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the PCGG. The Commission should not be embroiled in and swamped by legal suits before inferior courts all over the land. Otherwise, the Commission will be forced to spend valuable time defending all its actuations in such courts. This will defeat the very purpose behind the creation of the Commission.

A complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila however, Olaguer contested that he has just been designated the fiscal and team leader of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) assigned to the PJI and that all his actions are sanctioned and reported to PCGG.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding Olaguer's appointment as fiscal agent of the PCGG. APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. L-45127

May 5, 1989

Petitioner: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of Leyte Respondent: HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO, SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA (TOPIC: TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION) Ponente: REGALADO, J.: FACTS: The Private respondents were charged of violation of Republic Act 4670. During the arraignment the Private respondents pleaded guilty and moved to quash the charge on the ground that the facts of the charge do not constitute offense, Sec 32 of the said law is null and void for being unconstitutional. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides: Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied). The private respondents contend that in the penalties imposed by the said law, it is apparent that it has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment, although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the court. The determination of what Congress intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power, and that the absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.

ISSUE: Whether the absence of designated limits in fixing the length of service of a term of imprisonment (as in Sec 32 of RA 4670) constitutes an exercise of undue delegation of powers? HELD: Yes. The court held that It is not for the courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or assumption, of legislative power. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield. On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional. It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term of imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application of the socalled rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00 would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prisonv term; it is to be

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considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26 of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment. Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to the other

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

Dacudao vs Gonzales, 688 SCRA 109 (2013) Facts: •

The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates in the Legacy Group of companies, after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture.

•

Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary Gonzales issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action.

•

However, in separate order which in Memorandun dated March 2009, it was said that cases already filed against Celso Delos Santos et. al of the Legacy Group of companies in Cagayan De Oro City need to be sent anymore to the secretariat of DOJ Manila.

•

Because of such orders, the complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ of Manila.

•

Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the D.O. and Memorandum which accordingly violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy disposition of the cases.

group. The function involved is purely executive and adminstrative. Furthermore, Preliminary Investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. The DOJ as a primary prosecution arm of the government, does not exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.

Issue: Whether or not the Secretary of DOJ commited grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Department Order 182 and Memorandum?

Held: No. The Secretary of DOJ did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the DO 182. The Secretary of Justice did not exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned issuance were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates' efficiency and economy in conducting the preliminary investigation involving the legacy APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987

HELD:

DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P.,petitioners, vs. HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET, respondents.

Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

FACTS: 





Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." One of the grounds relied upon by the Petitioners, is that stated in Paragraph D which states that Section 44 of the same decree amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides: The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.



On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

ISSUE: WON Presidential Decree 1777 amounts to undue delegation of legislative powers to the executive

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained: ... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action, but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action;

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332334). Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. * The instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 141949

CEFERINO PADUA, petitioner, vs. HON. SANTIAGO RANADA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF MAKATI, RTC, BRANCH 137 et al

existing laws. Provided: Finally, that pending finality of the decision, the Board may require the Petitioner to deposit in whole or in part in escrow the provisionally approved adjustment or initial toll rates." (Emphasis supplied)

FACTS:

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  

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October 14, 2002

The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway The above Resolution approving provisional toll rate adjustments was published in the newspapers of general circulation. Tracing back the events that led to the issuance of the said Resolution, it appears that Citra Metro Manila Tollways Corporation (CITRA) filed with the TRB an application for an interim adjustment of the toll rates at the Metro Manila Skyway Project – Stage 1.CITRA moored its petition on the provisions of the "Supplemental Toll Operation Agreement" (STOA), authorizing it, as the investor, to apply for and if warranted, to be granted an interim adjustment of toll rates in the event of a "significant currency devaluation." Claiming that the peso exchange rate to a U.S. dollar had devaluated, CITRA alleged that there was a compelling need for the increase of the toll rates to meet the loan obligations of the Project and the substantial increase in debt-service burden. Due to heavy opposition, CITRA’s petition remained unresolved. This prompted CITRA to file an "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval," this time, invoking Section 3, Rule 10 of the "Rules of Practice and Procedure Governing Hearing Before the Toll Regulatory Board" (TRB Rules of Procedure) which provides:

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

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CITRA moved to withdraw its "Urgent Motion for Provisional Approval" without prejudice to its right to seek or be granted provisional relief under the above-quoted provisions of the TRB Rules of Procedure, obviously, referring to the power of the Board to act on its own initiative. Hence, petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita, as toll payer assail before this Court the validity and legality of TRB Resolution No. 200189. As a toll payer, Padua claims that: (1) Resolution No. 2001-89 was issued without the required publication and in violation of due process; (2) alone, TRB Executive Director Jaime S. Dumlao, Jr., could not authorize the provisional toll rate adjustments because the TRB is a collegial body; and (3) CITRA has no standing to apply for a toll fee increase since it is an "investor" and not a "franchisee-operator." Private respondent CITRA, in its comment counters that: (1) the TRB has primary administrative jurisdiction over all matters relating to toll rates; (2) prohibition is an inappropriate remedy because its function is to restrain acts about to be done and not acts already accomplished; (3) Resolution No. 200189 was issued in accordance with law; (4) Section 3, Rule 10 of the TRB Rules is constitutional; and (5) private respondent and the Republic of the Philippines would suffer more irreparable damages than petitioner.

ISSUE: WON TRB has jurisdiction to issue Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway

"SECTION 3. Provisional Relief. – Upon the filing of an application or petition for the approval of the HELD: initial toll rate or toll rate adjustment, or at any stage, thereafter, the Board may grant on motion of the We take cognizance of the wealth of jurisprudence pleader or in its own initiative, the relief prayed for on the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction without prejudice to a final decision after completion and exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this of the hearing should the Board find that the era of clogged court dockets, the need for pleading, together with the affidavits and supporting specialized administrative boards or commissions documents attached thereto and such additional with the special knowledge, experience and evidence as may have been requested and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes presented, substantially support the provisional on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, order; Provided: That the Board may, motu proprio, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of continue to issue orders or grant relief in the discretion, is indispensable. Between the power exercise of its powers of general supervision under APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend is to refer it to the former."[24] In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,we ruled: "x x x, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court." Petitioner Padua’s "Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order to Stop Arbitrary Toll Fee Increases" is DENIED and petitioner Zialcita’s "Petition for Prohibition" is DISMISSED.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. 115844. August 15,1997 CESAR G. VIOLA, Chairman, Bgy. 167, Zone 15, District II, Manila, petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL M. ALUNAN III, Secretary, DILG, ALEX L. DAVID, President/Secretary General, National Liga ng mga Barangay, LEONARDO L. ANGAT, President, City of Manila, Liga ng mga Barangay,respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Cesar Viola, a Bgy. Chairman, challenged the validity of Art. III, §§1-2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay Officers so far as they provide for the election of first, second and third vice presidents and for auditors for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters. Petitioner’s contention is that the positions in question are in excess of those provided in the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160),Petitioner argues that, in providing for the positions of first, second and third vice presidents and auditor for each chapter, §§12 of the Implementing Rules expand the number of positions authorized in §493 of the Local Government Code in violation of the principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they are designed to implement.

deem necessary for the management of the chapter. We hold that §493 of the Local Government Code, in directing the board of directors of the liga to “create such other positions as may be deemed necessary for the management of the chapter[s],” embodies a fairly intelligible standard. There is no undue delegation of power by Congress. While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs of the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the National Liga would be no different from the local chapters. Section 493 actually gives the board the power to “[1] appoint its secretary and treasurer and [2] create such other positions as it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter.” The additional positions to be created need not therefore be appointive positions.

ISSUE: Is the power to create additional positions necessary for the management of the National Liga and Local Liga Chapter vested upon the respective Board of Directors. HELD: Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the creation of the additional positions is authorized by the LGC which provides as follows: §493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

JEAN L. ARNAULT vs EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS FACTS:

Petitioner was an attorney in-fact in the negotiations for the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines.

The Senate of the Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby created a Special Committee to determine “whether the said purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution.

Petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question.

Petitioner was imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison until such time when he shall reveal to the Senate the name of the person who received the part of the purchase price.

Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible to attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of police power of the state in the judicial department.

The judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established in the Constitution. The only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.

Petitioner contended that the Senate of the Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the money to, that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt. ISSUE: WON the courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their proceedings. RULING: There was an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative if legislation, or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

US vs Ang Tang Ho, GR No. 17122, February 27, 1922 Facts: At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations. August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold. August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an excessive price when he sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868.

complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions the Governor-General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define “extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor-General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General. It must be conceded that, after the passage of act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price, even at a peso per "ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice, and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. That is to say, in the absence of a proclamation, it was not a crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence. The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 delegation to the Governor General a valid delegation of power? Held: No. The said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the GovernorGeneral to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was not

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA), Hon. G.V. Tobias, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, The Hon. Jacobo C. Clave, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and Virgilio A. Yuson (G. R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987)

ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which it was not authorized to perform.

FACTS:

HELD:

Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter.

No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction,basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged.

On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed —i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.

The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business involving ...specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."

Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers

DARIO VS MISON FACTS: 

President Aquino promulgated Proclamation No. 3 Declaring a National Policy to implement the reforms mandated by the people, protecting their basic rights, adopting a provisional constitution and providing for an orderly transition to a government under a new Constitution.

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Then the President issued a number of executive orders and directives reorganizing various other government offices, which led to EO No. 127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern.

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The petitioner was a Deputy Commissioner at the Bureau of Customs.

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The petitioner was one of the personnel that were terminated from office.

ISSUE: 

WON the petitioner’s dismissal was legal.

HELD: 

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With respect to EO No. 127, Commissioner submits that under Section 59 thereof, those incumbents whose positions are not included therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the service. He submits that because the removed personnel have not been reappointed they are considered terminated. To begin with the Commissioner’s appointing power is subject to the provisions of EO No. 39. Under EO No. 39 the Commissioner of Customs may appoint all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the President. Accordingly with respect to Deputy Commissioner Dario, Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.

APOE | AUSL | AY 2014-2015| Sat 9 - 12PM | Atty. Berns Guerrero | Admin Law by H. De Leon | Week 2: Chapter 2 Cases, Separation and Delegation of Powers