Admin Digests2

UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, and HOME INSURANCE AND GUARANTY CORPORATION,petitioners, vs. BF HOMES, INC., respondents. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999 Facts: United BF Homeowners Association, Inc.(UBFHAI) is the sole representative of all homeowners of BF Homes while BF Homes, Inc (BFHI) is the owner- developer of the subdivision. Due to financial difficulties, BFHI was placed under receivership by SEC for 10 years under Atty. Orendain for 10 years. Atty. Florencio B. Orendain took over management of respondent BFHI. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, Atty. Orendain entered into an agreement with the two major homeowners' associations, the BF Parañaque Homeowners Association, Inc. (BFPHAI) and the Confederation of BF Homeowners Association, Inc. (CBFHAI), for the creation of a single, representative homeowners' association and the setting up of an integrated security program that would cover the eight (8) entry and exit points to and from the subdivision. Subsequently, this tripartite agreement was reduced into a memorandum of agreement, and was amended. 6

Pursuant to these agreements, petitioner UBFHAI was created and registered with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC), and recognized as the sole representative of all the homeowners' association inside the subdivision. Respondent BFHI, through its receiver, turned over to petitioner UBFHAI the administration and operation of the subdivision's clubhouse and a strip of open space respectively. The first receiver was relieved and a new committee of receivers, composed of respondent BFHI's board of directors was appointed.

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Based on BFHI's title to the main roads, the newly appointed committee of receivers sent a letter to the different homeowners' association in the subdivision informing them that as a basic requirement for BFHI's rehabilitation, respondent BFHI would be responsible for the security of the subdivision in order to centralize it and abate the continuing proliferation of squatters. On the same day, petitioner UBFHAI filed with the HIGC a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction against respondent BFHI alleging that the committee of receivers illegally revoked their security agreement with the previous receiver. The HIGC issued ex parte a TRO which enjoined respondent BFHI from taking over the clubhouse, securing all entry and exit points, impeding or preventing the execution and sale of properties and otherwise repudiating or invalidating any contract or agreement or petitioner with the BFHI. Without filing an answer to petitioner UBFHAI's petition with the HIGC, respondent BFHI filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition 14 for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, to enjoin HIGC from proceeding with the case. The HIGC issued an order deferring the resolution of petitioner UBFHAI's application for preliminary injunction, until such time that respondent BFHI's application for prohibition with the appellate court has been resolved. When the twenty-day (20) effectivity of the temporary restraining 15 order had lapsed, the HIGC ordered the parties to maintain the status quo. Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals granted respondent BFHI's petition for prohibition. Motion for reconsideration by the petitioners was denied. Hence this petition. Issues: whether or not HIGC has jurisdiction and authority to hear the case as provided for in sec1(b) rule II of HIGC’s rules of procedure. Ruling: HIGC has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Originally, administrative supervision was vested by law with the SEC but pursuant to PD902-A, this function was delegated to the HIGC. As stated in PD92-A, HIGC was given the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide homeowner’s disputes arising out of the following intracorporate relations: 1. Between and among members of the association; 2.Between any and/or all of them and the association of which they are member; and 3.In so far as it concerns its right to exist as a corporate entity, between the association and the state. When HIGC adopted its revised rules of procedure in the hearing of homeowners’ disputes, it added the phrase “between the association and the state/general public or other entity.” The HIGC went beyond the authority provided by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure. There was a clear attempt to unduly expand the provisions of Presidential Decree 902-A. The inclusion of the phrase GENERAL PUBLIC OR OTHER ENTITY is a matter which HIGC cannot legally do . The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority given it by Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the scope intended. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters 26 not covered by the statute." If a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. Moreover, where the legislature has delegated to an executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authoritygranting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. "A statutory grant of powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.

ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES,petitioner, vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND,respondent. FACTS: On 1 September 1995, the HDMF Board of Trustees, pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7742, issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending and modifying the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. As amended, Section 1 of Rule VII provides that for a company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of Fund coverage, it must have a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the Pag-IBIG Fund. On 16 November 1995, PETITIONER filed with the respondent an application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage because of its superior retirement plan. In support of said application, PETITIONER submitted to the HDMF a letter explaining that the 1995 Amendments to the Rules are invalid. In a letter dated 18 March 1996, the President and Chief Executive Officer of HDMF disapproved PETITIONER's application on the ground that the requirement that there should be both a provident retirement fund and a housing plan is clear in the use of the phrase "and/or," and that the Rules Implementing R.A. No. 7742 did not amend nor repeal Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752 but merely implement the law PETITIONER's appeal with the HDMF Board of Trustees was denied for having been rendered moot and academic by Board Resolution No. 1208, Series of 1996, removing the availment of waiver of the mandatory coverage of the Pag-IBIG Fund, except for distressed employers. On 31 March 1997, PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals. On motion by HDMF, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ground that the coverage of employers and employees under the Home Development Mutual Fund is mandatory in character as clearly worded in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1752, as amended by R.A. No. 7742. There is no allegation that petitioner is a distressed employer to warrant its exemption from the Fund coverage. ISSUE: Whether or not the Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7742, and the subsequent repeal of Section 19 of PD No. 1752 are within the delegated power of the Board. HELD: We find for the petitioner. It is without doubt that the HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 of RA No. 7742 and Section 13 of PD No. 1752 .However, it is well-settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a delegated power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of PD No. 1752.And when the Board subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD No. 1752.Such amendment and subsequent repeal of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend the law.

CHRISTIAN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, INC., Petitioner, vs. SPS. AVELINO C. IGNACIO and PRISCILLA T. IGNACIO, Respondents. G.R. No. 164789

August 27, 2009

Facts: CGA entered into a Contract to Sell a subdivision lotwith the respondents – the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision known as Villa Priscilla Subdivision located in Barangay Cutcut, Pulilan, Bulacan. Under the Contract to Sell, CGA would for the subject property on installment basis. Subsequently, the parties mutually agreed to amend the Contract to Sell to extend the payment period from three to five years, calculated from the date of purchase and based on an increased total consideration CGA religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and defects. CGA learned that the subject property was actually a part of a property under litigation making the contract to sell entered into a rescissible contract under Article 1381 of the Civil Code. Aggrieved after discovering these circumstances, CGA filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC asking trial court to rescind contract and an award of damages. Instead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case Citing PD No. 12 957 and PD No. 1344, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. CGA opposed the motion to dismiss, claiming that the action is for rescission of contract, not specific performance, and is not among the actions within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, as specified by PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344. The RTC issued an order denying the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The RTC held that the action for rescission of contract and damages due to the respondents’ fraudulent misrepresentation that they are the rightful owners of the subject property, free from all liens and encumbrances, is outside the HLURB’s jurisdiction. The respondents countered by filing a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA set the RTC order aside and ruled that the HLURB had exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it involved a contract to sell a subdivision lot based on the provisions of PD No. 957 and PD No. 1344. Contending that the CA committed reversible error, the CGA now comes before the Court asking us to overturn the CA decision and resolution. Issue: is it the regular courts or the HLURB which has jurisdiction over CGA’s action for rescission and damages? Ruling: The action within the ambit of the HLURB’s exclusive jurisdiction and outside the reach of the regular courts since the main thrust of the CGA complaint is clear – to compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did not own. In other words, CGA claims that since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations under the contract, i.e., to deliver the property free from all liens and encumbrances, CGA is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of the payments already made. This cause of action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by Paragraph (b), Section 1 of PD No. 1344, which reads: SEC. 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. Accordingly, CGA has to file its complaint before the HLURB, the body with the proper jurisdiction.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent. G.R. No. 151908

August 12, 2003

Facts: NTC issued 2 memoranda to all cellular mobile telephone services (CMTS) operators which contained rulers and regulations in the billing of telecommunication services and measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidences of stealing cellular phon e units. Petitioners Islacom and PILTEL filed against the National Telecommunications Commission an action for declaration of nullity of the Billing Circular with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order alleging that that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.

Petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications, Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention. This was granted by the trial court. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC from implementing the memorandum circular. In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Subsequently, after hearing petitioners' application for preliminary injunction as well as respondent's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA granted the private respondents' prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the private respondents' complaint and complaint-in-intervention were DISMISSED. Issue: 1. 2. 3.

Whether or not the NTC has jurisdiction over the case Whether or not private respondents failed to exhaust administrative remedies Whether or not NTC has power to issue memoranda subject of the case

Ruling: 1.

2.

3.

The issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards – and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population – and expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution. Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The principle applies only where the act where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasijudicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. Accordingly, records show that petitioners sufficiently complied with this requirement by submitting their position papers. The issuance by the NTC of Billing circular and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rulemaking power. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law.

G.R. No. 131787 May 19, 1999 CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND CBC PROPERTIES AND COMPUTER CENTER INC., petitioners, vs. THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPENT MUTUAL FUND (HDMF); HDMF PRESIDENT; AND THE HOME MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT FUND, respondent.

Facts: Petitioners China Banking Corporation (CBC) and CBC Properties and Computer Center Inc., (CBC-PCCI) are both employers who were granted by the Home Development Mutual Fund (HDMF) certificates of waiver for the identical reason of "Superior Retirement Plan" pursuant to Section 19 of P. D. 1752 known as the Home Development Mutual Fund Law of 1980 whereunder employers who have their own existing provident and/or employees-housing plans may register for annual certification for waver or suspension from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund created under said law. In line with the approval of RA7742 which amended PD1752, HDMF board issued Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 HDMF Circular No. 124-B or the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage. Petitioners thus a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Regional Trial Court of Makati seeking to annul and declare void the Amendment and the Guidelines for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discrection amounting to lack of jurisdiction alleging that in requiring the employer to have both a retirement/provident plan and an employee housing plan in order to be entitled to a certificate of waiver or suspension of coverage from the HDMF, the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power. Respondent Board filed a Motion to Dismiss. The Court dismissed the petition for certiorari on the grounds (1) that the denial or grant of an application for waiver/coverage is within the power and authority of the HDMF Board, and the said Board did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the applications; and (2) the petitioners have lost their right to appeal by failure to appeal within the periods provided in the Rules for appealing from the order of denial to the HDMF Board of Trustees, and thereafter, to the Court of Appeals. The Court stated that certiorari will not lie as a substitute for a lost remedy of appeal. Issue: 1. 2.

Whether or not the court erred in ruling that petitioners should have exhausted its remedy of appeal from the orders denying their application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees and thereafter to the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Whether or not the respondent acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Amendment to the Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. 7742 and HDMF Circular No. 124-B on the Revised Guidelines and Procedure for Filing Application for Waiver or Suspension of Fund Coverage under P.D. 1752 as amended by R.A. 7742, insofar as said Amendment and Guidelines impose as a requirement for exemption from coverage or participation in the Home Development Mutual Fund the existence of both a superior housing plan and a provident plan.

Ruling: 1.

2.

3.

Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Although certiorari should not substitute an appeal, especially for a lost appeal, the petition should still be accepted because it is generally meritorious. Respondent acted in excess HDMF was in excess of jurisdiction. There is no question that the HDMF Board has rule-making powers. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7742 states that the said Board shall promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of said Act. Its rule-making power is also provided in Section 13 of P.D. No. 1752 which states insofar as pertinent that the Board is authorized to make and change needful rules and regulations to provide for, among others, a. the effective administration, custody, development, utilization and disposition of the Fund or parts thereof including payment of amounts credited to members or to their beneficiaries or states; b. Extension of Fund coverage to other working groups and waiver or suspension of coverage or its enforcement for reasons therein stated. It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend as act of Congress .The rule making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. The controversy lies in the legal signification of the words "and/or". In the instant case, the legal meaning of the words "and/or" should be taken in its ordinary signification. It is according ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the term "and/or" is that word "and" and the word "or" are to be used interchangeably. It is clear from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752, intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words "and instead of "and/or”.