Admin Digests - Group 3

April 23, 2018 | Author: Kai Lopez | Category: Fine (Penalty), Crime & Justice, Crimes, Unfair Labor Practice, United States Congress
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Admin Digests - Group 3...

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safety in! and foster sound economic condition in! such transportation! and to improve the relation between! and coordinate transportation by! by! air  carriers0 Dto promote safety of flight in air commerce in the @hilippines0) 3Sec. ! '& ??B5 %D the general supervision and regulation of! and :urisdiction and control over! air carriers as well as their property! property rights! e7uipment! facilities! and franchise! in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of  carrying out the provisions of this &ct) 3Sec. , '& ??B5 %D power to issue! deny! amend! revise! alter! modify! cancel! suspend or  revoke! in whole or in part! upon petition or complaint! or upon its own initia initiativ tive! e! any tempor temporary ary operat operatin ing g permit permit or Certif Certifica icate te of @ublic @ublic Convenience and Necessity) 3Sec. ,3c5 3,5 '& ??B5 %Dpower %Dpower to investiga investigate! te! upon complain complaintt or upon its own initiative! initiative! whether any individual or air carrier! domestic or foreign! is violating any provision of this act! or the rules and regulations issued thereunder! and shall take such action! consistent with the provisions of this &ct! as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision! or rules and regulations so issued.) 3Section ,3F5 '& ??B5 %Dpower %Dpower to review! review! revise! revise! reverse! reverse! modify modify or affirm affirm on appeal appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil &eronautics &dministrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this &ct or rules and regulations issued thereunder. "t has the power also either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil &eronautics  &dministrator!  &dministrator! to determine whether to impose! remit! mitigate! increase! or compromise! such fine and civil penalties! as the case may be. 3Sec. ,3A5 3G5 '& ??B5 %Dpower to impose fines andHor civil penalties and make compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil &eronautics &dministrator  3Sec. +83,?5 '& ??B5 > he he fine fine impo impose sed d on @&L by C&# C&# is that that fine fine or civi civill pena penalt lty y contemplated in the provisions of '& ??B and not a fine in the nature of a criminal penalty as contemplated in the '@C! because the %fine) in this case was imposed by C&# because of @&L=s violation of C&# rules on flagstops without previous authority. he C&# explained in its resolution that the %imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules! regulations or re7uirements of  the government regulating agency.) > here exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.&.#. is fully authori$ed by law 3'& ??B5 to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. o deprive the C&# of 

that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the C&# is given full power on its own initiative to dete determ rmin ine e whet whethe herr to %imp %impos ose! e! remi remit! t! miti mitiga gate te!! incr increa ease se or  compromise) %fines and civil penalties!) a power which is expressly given to the C&& whose whose orders orders or decisi decision on may be review reviewed! ed! revised! revised! reversed! modified or affirmed by the C&#. #esides! to deprive the C&# of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can :ust disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. "f everytime the C&# would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulatio regulations ns it would have to resort to courts courts of :ustice in protracted protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent! efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their  vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air  transit. > 6owever! @&L committed the violation of the C&# regulation against flagstops without malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same. Aor this reason! the penalty imposed by the C&# may be mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum. 'esolution appealed appealed from is modified modified by reducing reducing the Dispo Disposit sition ion 'esolution administrative fine imposed on the appellant @&L to @,.

SCOT,S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER && Phi* 2; -AUTISTA ANGELO; A##( 2/% 1&/ N'#!) @etition for review F'c() > Nena *icaller was employed as a salesgirl in the ScotyEs Fept Store > his store was owned and operated by Yu Ii Lam! 'ichard Yang! Yu Yu Si Iiao and 6elen Yang. > @ursuant to section ;3b5 of the "ndustrial @eace  &ct! Nena *icaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her  above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of  her membership membership in the National National Labor (nion and that! prior to her  separatio separation! n! said employers employers had been 7uestioni 7uestioning ng their their employees employees regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their  right to organi$e under the law. > he employers denied the charge. hey claim that the complainant was dismisse dismissed d from the service service because because of her misconduct misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co>employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of 

*anila who! after investigation! filed the corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in court. > the court found the following facts/ Nena *icaller was earning @.J a day. &fter every New Year! she was given from @,J to @8 as bonus whereas the other employees were only given @B. Aor three consecutive years! she was given a first pri$e for being the best seller! the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organi$ed a union among the employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the National Labor (nion. Later! the National Labor (nion sent a petition to the store containing ten demands and Nena was called by the management for 7uestioning and! in the managerEs office! she was asked who the members of the union were! but she pretended not to know them. > 'ichard Yang and Yu Si Iiao! together with a brother>in law! went to Nena=s house and 7uestioned her regarding her union membership. > Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel! &tty. Koa7uin Yuseco! and there she was again 7uestioned regarding her  union activities and was even made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union. > the manager of the Store! Yu Ii Lam asked each the every employee whether they were members of the union. > the union gave notice to strike to the management. (pon receipt of the notice! the management hired temporary employees e7ual in number to the old. he new employees were affiliated with another labor union. > an information for threats was filed against Nena *icaller before the municipal court. his was dismissed. ¬her information was filed against Nena *icaller for slander. & third information for slander was filed against her before the same court. &nd on November +! she was dismissed for insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls inside the store during business hours. &nd on the strength of these facts the court found respondents! now petitioners! guilty of unfair labor  practice and ordered them to pay a fine of @,. > @etitioners contend that section 8; of 'epublic &ct No. J?; being penal in character should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in that sense their guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences as was done by the industrial court. "n other words! it is contended that the evidence as regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above>named petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon them is un:ustified.

I((#!) &ny person who violates the provisions of section three this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos! or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year! or both by such free and imprisonment! in the discretion of the Court.  &ny other violation of this &ct which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense. > he above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of  the penalties therein provided. "t merely states that they may be imposed in the discretion of the court. > he word %court) cannot refer to the Court of "ndustrial 'elations for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution. legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal :urisdiction of the Court of &grarian 'elation show that the real intent of congress was to place that court on the same

footing as the @ublic Service Commission and the Court of "ndustrial relations by confining their :urisdiction exclusively to civil matters. > on the issue of employees to a series of  7uestioning regarding their membership in the union or their union activities which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting unfair labor practice. his finding is binding upon this Court following well>known precedents. Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of  @, imposed upon petitioners.

punished by imprisonment for not more than six months! or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars! (nited States currency! or by both such fine and imprisonment! at the discretion of the court0 Provided ! hat violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof! or by that prescribed in this section or by both. > Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph ? on two grounds/ Airst that it is unauthori$ed by section ,- of &ct No. +;;0 and! second! that if the acts of the @hilippine Commission bear the interpretation of authori$ing the Collector to promulgate such a law! they are void! as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.

I((#!) he defendant was charged  i n CA" *anila with violation of paragraphs ? and J+ of Circular No. +-? of the "nsular Collector of Customs. &fter a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude! he was moving her and directing her movement! when heavily laden! in the @asig 'iver! by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew! and without steam! sail! or any other external power. @aragraph ? of Circular No. +-? reads as follows/ %No heavily loaded casco! lighter! or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the @asig 'iver without being towed by steam or moved by other ade7uate power. > @aragraph J+ reads! in part! as follows/Aor the violation of any part of  the foregoing regulations! the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than @; and not more than @;! in the discretion of the court. > #y sections ,! 8! and + of &ct No. ,,+B! passed &pril 8-! ,-! the Collector of Customs is authori$ed to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the "slands! and! with certain exceptions! all vessels engaged in lightering are re7uired to be so licensed. Sections ; and J read as follows/ S9C. ;. he Collector of Customs for the @hilippine "slands is hereby authori$ed! empowered! and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. S9C. J. &ny person who shall violate the provisions of this &ct! or of  any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the @hilippine "slands! under and by authority of this &ct! shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor! and upon conviction shall be

H!*+) ,ES > he necessity confiding to some local authority the framing! changing! and enforcing of harbor regulations is recogni$ed throughout the world! as each region and each a harbor re7uires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power! and which! when kept within the proper scope! are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. he complaint in this instance was framed with reference! as its authority! to sections +,, and +,- 1,- and +,,2 at No. +;; of the @hilippine Customs &dministrative &cts! as amended by &ct Nos. ,8+; and ,J. (nder &ct No. ,8+;! the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations! but also to fix penalties for violation thereof! not exceeding a fine of @;. > his provision of the statute does! indeed! present a serious 7uestion. One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is! that the power  conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. his doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the

delegate by the instrumentality of his own :udgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of  another. "n the case of the (nited States vs. #reen 3 Aed. @hil. 'ep. 85! an &ct of Congress allowing the Secretary of "n the case of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of  Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Compan   3JJ Cal. -,5! it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authori$ing them to do so! the court saying/ Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of 6umboldt #ay! the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature. Disposition :udgment of the CA" as convicts the defendant of a violation of &cts Nos. +;; and ,8+; is revoked! and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 48;

> his involves 8 cases consolidated by the Court for decision. > "n the first case! Fiego *orales claims that while he was in *anila his daughter sent him a telegram on October ,;! ,-? from Santiago! "sabela! informing him of the death of his wife! *rs. Fiego . *orales. he telegram sent thru the petitioner '[email protected]" however never reached him. 6e had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife! he had to take the trip by airplane to "sabela. "n its answer petitioner '[email protected]" claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago! "sabela to its *essage Center at Cubao! Mue$on City but when it was relayed from Cubao! the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cru$! *anila unreadable and unintelligible. #ecause of the failure of the '[email protected]" to transmit said telegram to him! respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. > "n the second case! @acifico "nnocencio claims that on Kuly ,+! ,-?; Lourdes "nnocencio sent a telegram from @ani7ui! arlac! thru the facilities of the petitioner '[email protected]" to him at #arrio Lomot! Cavinti! Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. he telegram was never received by @acifico "nnocencio. "nspite of the non> receipt andHor non>delivery of the message sent to said address! the sender 3Lources "nnocencio5 has not been notified about its non>delivery.  &s a conse7uence @acifico "nnocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at *oncada! arlac. #ecause of the failure of  '[email protected]" to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown *oncada! arlac on &ugust ,! ,-?;! and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise! he prays for damages. > &fter hearing! the respondent #oard in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inade7uate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of @8 pursuant to Section 8, of Commonwealth &ct ,B! as amended! by @residential Fecree No. , and Letter of "mplementation No. ,. 6ence! this appeal I((#!) "n Arancisco Santiago vs. '[email protected]" 3G.'. No. L>8-8+B5 and Constancio Langan vs. '[email protected]" 3G.'. No. L>8-8?5! this Court speaking thru Kustice 9nri7ue Aernando! ruled/ !There can be no "ustification then for the Public #ervice Commission $now the Board of Communications as successor in interest% imposin& the fines in these two petitions. The law  cannot be an clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the impress of validity.

> "n the face of the provision itself! it is rather apparent that the #oard lacked the re7uired power to proceed against petitioner. Th!! i(

$9hi$ i$ S!ci9$ 21 h!!9 "t is alleged that Circular No. 8>B>, 3the %assailed Circular)5 listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand>new or which were not provided for by #[email protected] #lg. ++! as amended0 and that #[email protected] #lg. ++ enumerated and specifically defined the prohibitedHpunishable acts under  the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not included in the law.

I((#!) Aor an administrative regulation! such as the Circular in this case! to have the force of penal law! 3,5 the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself0 and 385 the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.  ,.he Circular satisfies the first re7uirement. #[email protected] #lg. ++! as amended! criminali$es illegal trading! adulteration! underfilling! hoarding! and overpricing of petroleum products. (nder this general description of  what constitutes criminal acts involving petroleum products! the Circular  merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated! namely/ no price display board! no weighing scale! no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings! no authori$ed [email protected] seal! no trade name! unbranded [email protected] cylinders! no serial number! no distinguishing color! no embossed identifying markings on cylinder! underfilling [email protected] cylinders! tampering [email protected] cylinders! and unauthori$ed decanting of [email protected] cylinders. hese specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law! which seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants.  8.&s for the second re7uirement! we find that the Circular is in accord with the law. (nder #[email protected] #lg. ++! as amended! the monetary penalty for  any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of @8! and a maximum of @;!. (nder the Circular! the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is @8!! an amount within the range allowed by law. 6owever! for the refillers! marketers! and dealers! the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty. his mere silence! nonetheless! does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Aurther! the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that #[email protected] #lg. ++ prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.

> Clearly! it is #[email protected] #lg. ++! as amended! which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. he Circular merely implements the said law! albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers! marketers! and dealers. Nothing in the Circular  contravenes the law.

PU-LIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA [email protected] DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIT, V. SM PRIME HOLDINGS >. PER+3T+

F'c()) 1. he instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on

2.

3.

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Aebruary ! 88 by the @ollution Control Fivision of the LLF& of  the wastewater collected from herein respondentEs S* City *anila branch. he results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with law On *arch ,8! 88! the LLF& informed S* City *anila of its violation! directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said company '$+ ordering the latter to pay a penalty of One housand @esos [email protected],!.5 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from  Aebruary 88! the date of inspection! until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater  'espondentEs @ollution Control Officer re7uested the LLF& to conduct a re>sampling of their effluent! claiming that they already took measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLF&. @etitioner! however! re7uired respondent to pay a fine of Aifty housand @esos [email protected];!.5 which represents the accumulated daily penalty computed from Aebruary ! 88 until *arch 8;! 88. "n two follow>up letters dated Kuly 8! 88 and November 8-! 88! which were treated by the LLF& as a motion for reconsideration! respondent asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the LLF& in its *arch ,8! 88 Notice of iolation and Order of October 8! 88 on the ground that they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the p6 levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their

re7uest for re>sampling leading to a minimal damage to the environment. 'espondent also contended that it is a responsible operator of malls and department stores and that it was the first time that the wastewater discharge of S* City *anila failed to meet the standards of law with respect to inland water  denied  *' also denied .  &ggrieved! respondent filed a petition for certiorari  with the C& praying for the nullification of the Orders of the LLF& dated October 8! 88! Kanuary ,! 8+ and *ay 8?! 8+. . On Kune 8J! 8! the C& rendered its Fecision granting the petition of herein respondent and reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of the LLF&. 'uling that '$ '+=i$i('iv!

'!$c( 59 "t is alleged that the *aguianes are being illegally deprived of their  liberty by the provincial officials of that province. 'ubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at igbao! *indoro! against their will! and one Fabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. : &dministration Code authori$es the establishment of settlement area for  non>Christians. & 'esolution was passed by the @rovincial #oard of  *indoro providing a selected public Land in igbao as site for permanent sewttlement of the *angyans. >he resolution was approved by the Secretary of "nterior and it was ordered that *angyans who refuses to comply shall be imprisoned. 'ubi and other *angyans were arrested0 thus! they applied for 6abeas Corpus.

I((#! here is distinction between delegation of power to make law which

necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. he Legislature merely conferred upon the @rovincial Government with approval of the @rovincial #oard the power to execute the law. he @rovincial Government and the @rovincial #oard are best fitted to select the most favorable site for improving the lives of  the *angyans. he Government must guarantee peace and order to encourage immigrants to invest in *indoro and to protect crops and persons of settlers of *indoro from predatory men. Di(59(ii9$/ @etitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of  their liberty. 6abeas corpus can! therefore! not issue. his is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.

2. PU-LIC INTEREST PEOPLE V ROSENTHAL AND OSMEA 6 Phi* 326; LAUREL; "#$! 12% 1&3& N'#!) &ppeal from :udgment of the CA" F'c() > 'osenthal and Osmea 3appellants5 were charged and found guilty of  violating &ct 8;J,! commonly known as the #lue Sky Law! in the CA". hey both appealed to the "&C! but since the appeal also 7uestions the constitutionality of &ct 8;J,! the case was referred to the SC > the law essentially re7uires corporations who want to offer securities 3shares of stocks5 to obtain a certificate or license from the "nsular  reasurer. he reasurer is to issue the same if! upon his examination of  documents! he deems it advisable and satisfactory that the stocks be sold in the @hilippines. he &ct also gives the reasurer the authority! whenever in his :udgment it is in the public interest! to cancel the permit. he decision of the reasurer was appealable to the Sec. of Ainance > the acts complained of consisted in buying and selling of the stocks at high and speculative prices 3they bought at @;Hshare and sold at @,> @+Hshare5. &lso! they allegedly were not licensed to sell stocks. > on appeal! the appellants contend that the law was unconstitutional on + grounds/ undue delegation of legislative power 3for although it empowers the treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits! no standard or rule was fixed which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued! thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance! with the result that! legislative powers being unduly delegated to the reasurer50 does

not afford e7ual protection before the law0 and that it is vague and ambiguous

I((#!) he &ct furnishes a sufficient standard for the reasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. he certificate or permit to be issued under the &ct must recite that the person! partnership! association or corporation applying therefor  %has complied with the provisions of this &ct)! and this re7uirement! construed in relation to the other provisions of the law! means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the "nsular reasurer when the provisions of &ct 8;J, have been complied with. (pon the other hand! the authority of the "nsular reasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation %is in the public interest.) "n view of the intention and purpose of &ct 8;J, to protect the public against %speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky) and against the %sale of stock in fly> by>night concerns! visionary oil wells! distant gold mines! and other like fraudulent exploitations)! we hold that %public interest) in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the "nsular reasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or  permits. > &ct 8;J, allows appeal from the decision of the reasurer to the Sec of  Ainance. 6ence! it cannot be contended that the reasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence. > he theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers! and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. hereby! the %rule of law) was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it sub:ect to control by certain legal devices. &s a corollary! we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority! and from the earliest time &merican legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. "t is frankness! however! to confess that as one delves into the mass of   :udicial pronouncements! he finds a great deal of confusion.

> the maxim % dele&atus non potest dele&are or dele&ata potestas non  potest [email protected]   has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of  modern governments! giving rise to the adoption! within certain limits! of  the principle of %subordinate legislation)! in practically all modern governments. Fifficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. 6all v Geiger>Kones/ it is well>settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts! upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business. (n denial of eAual protection of the law?

> ¬her contention is that the &ct denies e7ual protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions. > 6all v Geiger>Kones/ "f a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent! the ,th &mendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law. (n va&ueness and uncertaint of the law?

@eople v Aernande$ and rinidad/ &n &ct will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine! with any reasonable degree of certainty! what the legislature intended. > &n &ct will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no ade7uate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed! if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means! and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith. Disposition Fecision affirmed with modifications 3lower penalty5.

> Kune 8! ,-+- P the Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of "ndustrial 'elations that an industrial dispute existed between the 6&'Foffs! or suspensions of  employees or laborers! tenants or farm>laborers! hours of labor! or  conditions of tenancy or employment! between employers and employees or laborers and between landlords and tenants or farm> laborers. > he petitioner suggests that if an industrial dispute between an employer and its employees causes a strike or lockout arising from differences as regards a minimum wage! C"' would be without authority to take cogni$ance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless the @resident! under Sec ; of C&,+! directs it to investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned! with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry. o adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all 7uestion! matters! controversies! or disputes arising between! andHor affecting employers and employees and to frustrate the very ob:ective of the law! namely! to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the Government could be made effective in order to prevent non>pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. "t is fundamental that the intention and policy of the National &ssembly! as expressed in the enactment! should be effectuated! and the &ct should receive a construction that will lead to this result. 8. NO Reasoning 

> he contention that Sec  C& ,+ is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the court and depriving 6&'F he Chancellor of the #oard of 'egents re7uested three members of  the #oard to view the picture and to make a report to the entire #oard.  &fter viewing the film! the committee reported that in its opinion there was basis for the claim that the picture was sacrilegious. > &ppellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the 'egents. &mong the claims advanced by appellant were 3,5 that the statute violates the Aourteenth &mendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press0 385 that it is invalid under the same &mendment as a violation of the guaranty of 

separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of  religion0 and! 3+5 that the term  sacrilegious is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. > he &ppellate Fivision re:ected all of appellantEs contentions and upheld the 'egentsE determination. he New York Court of &ppeals! two :udges dissenting! affirmed the order of the &ppellate Fivision.

I((#!) o hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the Airst and Aourteenth &mendments! however! is not the end of our problem. "t does not follow that the Constitution re7uires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. #ut the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press! like the Airst &mendmentEs command! do not vary. hose principles! as they have fre7uently been enunciated by this Court! make freedom of expression the rule. here is no :ustification in this case for  making an exception to that rule. > he statute involved here does not seek to punish! as a past offense! speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subse7uent punishment. On the contrary! New York re7uires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who :udge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. his Court recogni$ed many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. > New YorkEs highest court says there is nothing mysterious about the statutory provision applied in this case/ "t is simply this/ that no religion! as that word is understood by the ordinary! reasonable person! shall be treated with contempt! mockery! scorn and ridicule . . . . his is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. > "n seeking to apply the broad and all>inclusive definition of  sacrilegious given by the New York courts! the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views! with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. (nder such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another! and he would be sub:ect to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority.

> &pplication of the sacrilegious test! in these or other respects! might raise substantial 7uestions under the Airst &mendmentEs guaranty of  separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. 6owever! from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press! it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to :ustify prior  restraints upon the expression of those views. "t is not the business of  government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine! whether they appear in publications! speeches! or motion pictures. > Since the term sacrilegious is the sole standard under attack here! it is not necessary for us to decide! for example! whether a state may censor  motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. hat is a very different 7uestion from the one now before us.

. ADE?UATE AND EFFICIENT INSTRUCTION PACU v SECRETAR, & Phi* 60 Phi*i55i$! A((9ci'i9$ 9 C9**!!( '$+ U$iv!(ii!( 7PACU8% !c. v. S!c!' 9 E+#c'i9$ he case revolves around @&C(=s 7uestioning of the constitutionality of   &ct No. 8?B an act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of @ublic "nstruction. (nder its provisions! the Fepartment of 9ducation has supervised and regulated all private schools in this country without protest! and with the general ac7uiescence of the public. @&C( argues that the act is unconstitutional as/ ,. "t deprives owner and teachers of schools and parents of liberty and property without due process of law. 'e7uiring a permit before a person can exercise a right is censorship. Specifically! they refer to Sec + of the &ct which re7uires a permit in order to open a private school. 8. "t deprives parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their  children for civic efficiency @rovisions conferring on the Sec. of 9ducation unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. @&C( alleges that sections , and B of &ct 8?B does not state general or specific description of what constitutes a general standard of efficiency. Nowhere in this &ct is there any indication

of any basis or condition to ascertain what is Eade7uate instruction to the public.E Nowhere in this &ct is there any statement of conditions! acts! or  factors! which the Secretary of 9ducation must take into account to determine the Eefficiency of instruction. +. @&C( further argued that the permit re7uisite was only introduced to the  &ct 8?B on ,-+B in Commonwealth &ct ,J. making re7uirements provided by law not inconsistent with this #ook! each rule shall become effective fifteen 3,;5 days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law! or specified in the rule in cases of  imminent danger to public health! safety and welfare! the existence of  which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. he agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.

S!ci9$ /. Publication and Recordin&.  > he (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center shall/ 3,5 @ublish a 7uarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding 7uarter0 and 385 Ieep an up>to>date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect! together with a complete index and appropriate tables.

3,5 "f not otherwise re7uired by law! an agency shall! as far as practicable! publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. 385 "n the fixing of rates! no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two 385 weeks before the first hearing thereon. 3+5 "n case of opposition! the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

CHAPTER 3 AD"UDICATION S!ci9$ 10. Compromise and +rbitration.   > o expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations! every agency shall! in the public interest! encourage amicable settlement! comprise and arbitration.

S!ci9$ . (mission of #ome Rules.  > 3,5 he (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome! expensive or otherwise inexpedient! but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it! and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general sub:ect matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. 385 9very rule establishing an offense or defining an act which! pursuant to law! is punishable as a crime or sub:ect to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.

S!ci9$ . 2istribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules.  > he (niversity of  the @hilippines Law Center shall furnish one 3,5 free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office

S!ci9$ 11. )otice and Hearin& in Contested Cases.  > 3,5 "n any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. he notice shall be served at least five 3;5 days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date! time and place of the hearing. 385 he parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. "f not precluded by law! informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation! agreed settlement or default. 3+5 he agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.

S!ci9$ 12. Rules of Evidence.  > "n a contested case/ 3,5 he agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct

of their affairs. 385 Focumentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts! if the original is not readily available. (pon re7uest! the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. "f the original is in the official custody of a public officer! a certified copy thereof may be accepted. 3+5 9very party shall have the right to cross>examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. 35 he agency may take notice of :udicially cogni$able facts and of generally cogni$able technical or scientific facts within its speciali$ed knowledge. he parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.

S!ci9$ 13. #ubpoena. > "n any contested case! the agency shall have the power to re7uire the attendance of witnesses or the production of  books! papers! documents and other pertinent data! upon re7uest of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. (nless otherwise provided by law! the agency may! in case of  disobedience! invoke the aid of the 'egional rial Court within whose  :urisdiction the contested case being heard falls. he Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.

S!ci9$ 14. 2ecision.  > 9very decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. he agency shall decide each case within thirty 3+5 days following its submission. he parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their  counsel of record! if any! or to them.

S!ci9$ 1/. 4inalit of (rder.  > he decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen 3,;5 days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or :udicial review! if proper! has been perfected. One motion for  reconsideration may be filed! which shall suspend the running of the said period.

S!ci9$ 1. Publication and Compilation of 2ecisions.  > 3,5 9very agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the ad:udication of  contested cases. 385 "t shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his e7uivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of  those decisions or final orders for use by the public.

S!ci9$ 1. 3icensin& Procedure.  > 3,5 (nless otherwise provided by law or executive order! an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Fepartment head.

S!ci9$ 20. Perfection of +dministrative +ppeals. > 3,5 &dministrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen 3,;5 days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected! by filing with the agency which ad:udicated the case a notice of appeal! serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency! and paying the re7uired fees. 385 "f a motion for reconsideration is denied! the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal! reckoned from receipt of the resolution of  denial. "f the decision is reversed on reconsideration! the aggrieved party shall have fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. 3+5 he agency shall! upon perfection of the appeal! transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency.

S!ci9$ 21. Effect of +ppeal. > he appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law! or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal! as it may deem :ust! considering the nature and circumstances of the case.

S!ci9$ 22.  +ction on +ppeal.  > he appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may! on its own initiative or upon motion! receive additional evidence.

S!ci9$ 23. 4inalit of 2ecision of +ppellate +&enc.  > "n any contested case! the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen 3,;5 days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof.

S!ci9$ 24. Hearin& (fficers.  > 3,5 9ach agency shall have such number of 7ualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and ad:udication of contested cases. 385 No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of  prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related case.

appellant shall have fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. 3B5 he review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or! in the absence thereof! in any court of competent  :urisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the 'ules of Court. 3?5 'eview shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. he findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law.

S!ci9$ 2. Transmittal of Record.  > udicial Review . > 3,5 &gency decisions shall be sub:ect to :udicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. 385 &ny party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek :udicial review. 3+5 he action for :udicial review may be brought against the agency! or its officers! and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the 'ules of Court. 35 &ppeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal! and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. he petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review! and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from! together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. he petition shall be under oath and shall how! by stating the specific material dates! that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. 3;5 he petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One 3,5 motion for reconsideration may be allowed. "f the motion is denied! the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of  denial. "f the decision is reversed on reconsideration! the

-. IN RULE:[email protected]% PRICE% WAGE OR RATE FIING

I((#!) @ri >@riva vate te resp respon onde dent nt Kaci Kacint nto o 6ern 6ernan ande de$ $ 36er 36erna nand nde$ e$55 file filed d an administrative complaint against Cleto &sprec for unprofessional conduct

process. 'eally all that the law re7uires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial! an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning . @etitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the #oard. &s he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing! he cannot look to the law or to a :udicial tribunal to whipsaw the #oard into giving him a new one. 6e cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the #oard in proceeding in his and

his counselEs counselEs absence. absence. &nd this because because without without cause cause or reason! reason! without any excuse at all! counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 8. Y9S Ratio.  Leonides Leonides C. #&SCONC"LL #&SCONC"LLO! O! filed filed a complaint complaint with the @hilippin @hilippine e Overseas 9mployment &dministration [email protected]&5 he employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompeten incompetentt performanc performance e as chief engineer of the M71 Boraca. hey claim that he was iv!$ 'i @O9& @O9& consid considere ered d the case submit submitted ted for resolu resolutio tion n b mutual  mutual  a&reement of the parties after submission of their respective position  papers and supportin& documents. POEA A+=i$i('9 Ach'c9(9

#*!+ h' 5iv'! !(59$+!$ On appeal! the NL'C affirmed the @O9&.

ISSUES ,. he 'ural ransit 9mployees &ssociation denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Kacob >Furing the hearing of Bachrachs petition! *r. Koseph Iaplin! general manager of 'ural ransit! was presented as the lone witness >&fter *r. Iaplin concluded his direct testimony! the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross>examination of the witness. he case was reset on various dates but *r. Iaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. >he employeeEs association filed a motion praying that/ 3a5 the testimony of *r. Koseph Iaplin be stricken from the records 3b5 the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss *aximo Kacob from the service be denied/ and 3c5 the Company be ordered to reinstate *aximo Kacob immediately with backwages from Kune -! ,-B, up to the date of his actual reinstatement. >he C"' dismissed the companyEs petition! lifted the suspension of  driver Kacob! and ordered his reinstatement with backwages >BachrachDs  motion for reconsideration having been denied! it filed the instant @etition for certiorari

I((#!) he Court of &ppeals further held that the trial courtEs :udgment! confirming the SecretaryEs decision! should be (! '(i+!  and that the *inister of Natural 'esources should review anew the decision of the Firector of *ines and! thereafter! further proceedings will be taken in the trial court. he antecedental proceedings are as follows/ 3,5 "n *ines &dministrative Case No. >88?! Firector Go$on issued an order dated October ;! ,-B wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants 3Xambales Chromite *ining Co.! "nc. or the group of Gon$alo @. Nava5. "n that case! they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty>nine mining claims located in Santa Cru$! Xambales. On the basis of petitionersE evidence 3the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest5! Firector Go$on found that the petitioners did not

discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. "n that same order! Firector Go$on ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio *artine$ and @ablo @abiloa! now the private respondents>appellees! were duly located and registered 3pp. 88>8+,! 'ecord on &ppeal5. 385 he petitioners appealed from that order to the Secretary of   &griculture and Natural 'esources. appellants were deprived of due process! meaning fundamental fairness. Di(59(ii9$ Order of the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources S9 &S"F9

I((#!) Once the charges were filed! 'ivera was placed under preventive suspension. &fter a formal investigation! the L#@ held 'ivera guilty of  grave misconduct and acts pre:udicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section ,8! 'ule R"""! of the 'evised Civil Service 'ules. 6e was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section +! paragraph 3d5! of the &nti>Graft and Corrupt @ractices &ct 3'epublic &ct No. +,-! as amended5. he penalty of forced resignation! without separation benefits and gratuities! was thereupon imposed on 'ivera. On appeal! the decision was modified by the *erit Systems @rotection #oard 3*[email protected]#5 which held 'ivera guilty only of committing acts pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. he L#@ filed a motion for the reconsideration of *[email protected]#Es decision. "n its resolution! the *[email protected]# denied the motion. > 'ivera and the L#@ both appealed to the CSC. he CSC dismissed the appeal of 'espondent George 'ivera! finding him guilty of Grave *isconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. 'ivera filed a motion for reconsideration! which the CSC denied in its 'esolution No. ->,8?B. > @etitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. he SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitionerEs failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its 7uestioned resolution. 'ivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the CourtEs dismissal of the petition! now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde! who earlier participated in her capacity as the #oard Chairman of the *[email protected]# when the latter had taken action on L#@Es motion for reconsideration!

also took part! this time as a CSC Commissioner! in the resolution of  petitionerEs motion for reconsideration with the CSC.

I((#!) "n Xambales Chromite *ining Company vs. Court of &ppeals! the decision of the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the SecretaryEs own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Firector of *ines. Calling the act of the Secretary a mockery of administrative :ustice! the Court said/ %"n order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce! then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review0 otherwise! there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. he decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view0 inevitably! it would be the same view since being human! he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. > Given the circumstances in the case at bench! it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving 'iveraEs appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and conse7uence to a fundamental aspect of due process. he argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in *[email protected]#Es decision of 8 &ugust ,-- is unacceptable. "t is not denied that she did participate! indeed has concurred! in *[email protected]#Es resolution of + *arch ,--! denying the motion for reconsideration of *[email protected]#Es decision of 8- &ugust ,--. cdrep Dispositive Resolution set aside ! case remanded to C#C 

AMERICAN INTER:FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT% GARMENTS  TETILE EPORT -OARD  GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. 7PHILS.8% INC. 16 SCRA 40&; GUTIERRE>% "R.; M' 23% 1&&1 N'#!) A55!'* F'c()

> GLO'"O(S was found guilty of dollar>salting and misdeclaration of  importations by the G9# and! as a result of which! the export 7uotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the G9# decision! GLO'"O(S filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court! contending that its right to due process of law was violated! and that the G9# decision was not supported by substantial evidence. > Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLO'"O(S! the Court issued a resolution ordering G9# to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLO'"O(S. > 6owever! GLO'"O(S filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted > GLO'"O(S filed another motion to dismiss with pre:udice! which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution. > *ore than 8 years later! GLO'"O(S filed with the G9# a petition for  the restitution of its export 7uota allocation and re7uested for a reconsideration of the G9# decision dated &pril 8?! ,-J. > GLO'"O(S again alleged that the charges against it were not supported by evidence. > *oreover! it alleged that the G9# decision canceling its export 7uotas was rendered as a result of duress! threats! intimidation and undue influence exercised by former *inister 'oberto . Ongpin in order to transfer GLO'"O(SE export 7uotas to *arcos crony>owned corporations Fe Soleil &pparel *anufacturing Corporation 1FS&2 and  &"AC. > GLO'"O(S further alleged that it was coerced by *r. 'oberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into :oint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of FS& and petitioner &"AC which were allowed to service GLO'"O(SE export 7uotas and to use its plant facilities! machineries and e7uipment. > G9# denied the petition of GLO'"O(S. &n appeal was then taken to the Office of the @resident. > &t this point! &"AC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLO'"O(SE appeal claiming that the G9# decision has long become final! and that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export 7uotas which were legally allocated to it. > he Office of the @resident ruled in favor of GLO'"O(S! finding the proceedings before the G9# in ,-J irregular! and remanded the case to G9# for further proceedings. > he *' of &"AC was subse7uently denied.

I((#!(/ ,. he dismissal of the first petition was clearly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. 6ence! the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid>air cannot! under the circumstances! constitute res :udicata. R!'(9$i$/ > Aor a :udgment to be a bar to a subse7uent case! the following re7uisites must concur/ . . . 3,5 it must be a final :udgment0 385 the court which resolved it had  :urisdiction over the sub:ect matter and the parties0 3+5 it must be a  :udgment on the merits0 and 35 there must be identity between the two cases! as to the parties! sub:ect matter and cause of action. > he well>entrenched principle is that a :udgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right! as distinguished from a :udgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point. 3Feang v. "&C5. > he protestation of Glorious Sun of non>disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subse7uent accommodation by the G9# of its re7uest for copies of the relevant documents. > he petitioner claims that the subse7uent disclosure of the documents by G9# to Glorious Sun in ,-J? cured the defect of non>disclosure of  evidence in ,-J under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landmark case of &ng ibay v. C"' and other  subse7uent cases. > he documents used by the G9# in its ,-J decision and referred to in the ,-J? decision as being intact relates to what the G9# labeled as Focuments used by G9# and &dditional Focuments which! as earlier discussed! were either not disclosed to &ppellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence.

> &t any rate! the conclusions of G9# as to the excessiveness of   &ppellantEs import prices drew a controverting statement from its own 'aw *aterials "mportation 'egulation Fivision! > Aindings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality! and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. his general rule! however! is not without exceptions. > &s recently reiterated! it is :urisprudentially settled that absent a clear! manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of :urisdiction! the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. > Specifically with respect to factual findings! they are accorded respect! if not finality! because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their   :urisdiction. > Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they are not supported by evidence0 where the findings are initiated by fraud! imposition or collussion0 where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular0 when palpable errors are committed0 or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest. 3*apa v. &rroyo! ,?; SC'& ?B 1,-J-25 > "n the case at bar! the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export 7uota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. Ainally! &merican "nter>Aashion is hardly the proper party to 7uestion the *alacaang decision. "t was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. "t was created obviously to be the recipient of export 7uotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. "t was se7uestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of in:ustice inflicted on another private corporation. Dispositive/ *A' is G'&N9F. he instant petition is F"S*"SS9F. he 7uestion decision and resolution of the Office of the @resident are hereby  &AA"'*9F. eparate $pinion

FELICIANO >concurring/ " concur in the result reached by the Court! that is! that petitioner   &merican "nter>fashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse

of discretion or act without or in excess of :urisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the @resident in rendering its decision in [email protected] Case No. +?J, dated ? September ,-J-.

PEFIANCO V. MORAL 322 SCRA 43&; -ELLOSILLO; "'$ 1&% 2000 N'#!)@etition for review of decision of C& F'c() > Sec @efianco of F9CS seeks to nullify C& decision. > 9x>Sec Gloria filed complaint against *oral! Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty! grave misconduct and conduct pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. he complaint charged respondent *oral with the pilferage of some historical documents. > FoK Special @rosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. *oral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding *oral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. > *oral did not appeal but filed a @etition for @roduction of F9CS "nvestigation Committee 'eport. 6er petition was twice denied. > *oral instituted an action for mandamus and in:unction before regular  courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the F9CS "nvestigation Committee 'eport and that the F9CS Secretary be en:oined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. > Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for  lack of cause of action! but the trial court denied his motion. hus! he elevated the case to the Court of &ppeals on certiorari. C& sustained C. > Sec Gloria filed instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec @efianco.

ISSUES ,. he challenged Order of the trial court dated 8+ &pril ,--? falls short of 

the re7uirements prescribed in 'ule ,B. he Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court=s :urisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioner=s motion to dismiss was being denied. > Kudges should take pains in crafting their orders! stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance! which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance! when refused! of a ministerial duty! this being its main ob:ective. "t does not lie to re7uire anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. "t is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act re7uired. > "n her petition for mandamus! respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the 2EC# 'nvesti&ation Committee Report   and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner F9CS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. > @rimarily! respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the F9CS resolution dismissing her from the service. #y her failure to do so! nothing prevented the F9CS resolution from becoming final. > *oreover! there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrary! it was held in RuiG v. 2rilon  that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to in7uire into charges filed against him. 6e is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record! and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. 'espondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. > *ore importantly! the F9CS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission! that is! it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent=s removal from office was grounded. Disposition @etition is granted.

NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO -ERNA-E G.R. N9. 12&&14; PARDO; M' 12% 2000 N'#!) &ppeal from the Fecision of the Court of &ppeals F'c() > & newspaper published an article saying that #ernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of @C soldiers! policemen! firemen and :ail personnel who were already dead! on awol! suspended and separated from the service. > @resident 'amos instructed the F"LG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. he Secretary referred the directive to the @[email protected] Firector General! who ordered the Criminal "nvestigation Service Command to investigate the charges. > 'espondent was informed of the article and SHSupt. 'omeo &cop ordered him to explain through affidavit. > 'espondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution! except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of ? treasury warrants. C"CS Firector &ngel Mui$on submitted to the Chief! @[email protected]! a memorandum confirming respondent=s allegations. > #y command of the @olice Feputy Firector General! respondent was suspended from the police service for - days. Subse7uently! he was given notice of complaintHcharge and order to answer within ; days from receipt of the complaint. > 'espondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. > he C"CS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applicable to administrative proceedings0 hence! the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer. > he Summary Fismissal 6earing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondentEs dismissal from the @[email protected] service. he @[email protected] "nspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary Fismissal Officer. > he Chief @[email protected] ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll syndicate! unexplained assets or  wealth! and falsification of public documents 3falsified his transcript of  records with @(@5 > 'espondent appealed to the [email protected]* National &ppellate #oard! which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the @[email protected]

> 'espondent filed with the Court of &ppeals a petition for review challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of  due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 8! '. &. B-?;. > &fter due proceedings! the C& promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 8! '. &. B-?;! but setting aside the decision of the National &ppellate #oard for failure to comply with the due process re7uirement of the Constitution.

I((#!) type proceeding. Fue process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. he essence of due process is simply to be heard! or as applied to administrative proceedings! an opportunity to explain oneEs side! or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Reasoning 

> 'ecord shows that respondent was given notice of the complaintsHcharges against him and an opportunity to answer. 6e submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. 6e even appealed from the decision of the Chief! @[email protected] dismissing him from the police service to the National &ppellate #oard! and submitted a memorandum. Conse7uently! he was given more than ade7uate opportunity to explain his side. 6ence! there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Disposition @etition G'&N9F.

accused 9F"LLO *ON9*&YO'! then O"C>'egional Firector! 'egion """! of the [email protected] in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property. "t accused *ontemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works pro:ects. > *ontemayor submitted his counter>affidavit before the @hilippine Commission &gainst Graft and Corruption [email protected]&GC5 alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister>in>law 9stela Aa:ardo. hey were advised by an immigration lawyer 3they wanted to emigrate5 that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the (S. 6e claimed that Aa:ardo offered to buy the #urbank property and put the title in the names of *ontemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiting her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier ac7uired in @almdale! Los &ngeles. 6e also attached a Consolidated "nvestigation 'eport of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. > he Office of the @resident! concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the @C&GC! ordered *ontemayor=s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. 6is *A' was denied and his appeal to the C& was dismissed.

ISSUES ,. examine the complainant. 6e voluntarily submitted to the :urisdiction of the @C&GC by participating in the proceedings before it. 6e was duly represented by counsel. 6e filed his counter>affidavit! submitted documentary evidence! attended the hearings! moved for a reconsideration of the &dministrative Order issued by the @resident and eventually filed his appeal before the C&. 6is active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency! if there was any! and satisfied the due process re7uirement. > he lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non> appearance of the complainant did not divest the @C&GC of its authority. (nder Section + of 9O ,;, creating the @C&GC! complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. "t is not uncommon that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. he Ombudsman! under the Constitution! is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. he Court  &dministrator of this Court investigates and takes cogni$ance of! not only unverified! but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of 9thical Conduct. his policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimi$e! if not eradicate! graft and corruption in the service. > "n administrative proceedings! technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. &dministrative due process cannot be fully e7uated with due process in its strict :udicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Disposition @etition is F"S*"SS9F.

SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC 41& SCRA 3/4

F'c( 















 

SHOPPES MANILA% INC. vs.

THE HON. NLRC% LA-OR AR-ITER ERMITA A-RASALDO:CU,UCA '$+ LORIE TORNO



C+33E>(; #R.; >.? >anuar 8; 5employee! *aricar #uan! were tasked to handle the inventory of finished products. Sometime later! the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its production department that! according to other  employees! the private respondent had been stealing  +M'#ET+ items from the factory so an investigation was conducted on Kuly +,! ,--? where two witnesses gave their account 3one of finding numerous I&*"S9& clothing in respondent=s home and the other  of the respondent encouraging her to steal a belt from the stocks5. On the same day! the respondent was made aware of the allegations against her and she had her home inspected. Furing the course of  the inspection! various I&*"S9& clothing and wallpapers were found in her home. On the basis of the said report! the petitioner issued a disciplinary action form suspending the private respondent indefinitely without pay. On &ugust 8;! ,--?! a notice of dismissal was addressed to the private respondent specifying the charge against her! the factual basis thereof and the imposable penalties for the said charge if  proven and was called to the 6ead Office in order to explain herself. he private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. Conse7uently! the petitioner decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment. he private respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal. he case was raffled to L& umanong! however despite various mandatory conferences they didn=t reach an amicable settlement and the petitioner filed for the conduct of a full blown hearing which was granted by L& umanong and set for hearing. 6owever! the hearing failed to materiali$e because of the absences of either the private respondent or her counsel. *eanwhile! L& umanong was replaced by L& Cuyuca who ordered the case submitted for decision and redered a decision stating that respondent was illegally dismissed awarding her with full backwages and separation pay since reinstatement was not feasible due to the strained relations between employer and employee.

 





@etitioner appealed to the NL'C which affirmed the ruling of the L&. Fissatisfied the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the C& via 'ule B; of the 'oC he C& likewise affirmed the NL'C ruling and denied the petitioner=s *'. 6ence! the present petition.

I((#!(H!*+ 3,5 two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath! together with supporting sworn statements and documents! in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. "f the answer is found satisfactory! the disciplinary authority shall dismiss the case. S9C. J. Procedure in +dministrative Cases +&ainst )onPresidential +ppointees. T xxx 3+5  <hough a respondent does not re7uest a formal investigation! one shall nevertheless be conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent! including the supporting documents! the merits of the case cannot be decided :udiciously

 &dministrative Order No. ?! as amended by &dministrative Order  No. ,?! 'ule """! Section ;! governing the procedure in administrative cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. @etitioner argues that the &dmin. Order No.? is inferior to the provision in the  &dministrative Code which entitles respondent to a formal investigation if he so desires.  &dmin Order No. ? particularly governs the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombusman. he 'ules of @rocedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was issued pursuant to the authority vested in the office under '& B?? or the Ombudsman &ct of ,-J-. 'ules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law! partake of the nature of a statute. @rovisions in the &dministrative Code cited by petitioner apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. he administrative complaint filed against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombusman! therefore! rules of procedure in &dmin Order No ? must be followed. he SC has ruled on the primacy of  special laws and of their implementing regulations over the &dmin Code of ,-J? in settling controversies specifically sub:ect of these special laws. Hon. >oson vs Exec. #ec. Torres / Loc Gov Code of ,--,! its "'' and  &dmin Order No. 8+ govern administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials whereas the 'OC and the &dmin Code of ,-J? apply in a suppletory character to all matters not provided in  &dmin Order No. 8+. S&CON/ Sexual 6arassment &ct against 'ayala before FOL9 Secretary. FOL9 Secretary referred the Complaint to the Office of the @res! 'ayala being a presidential appointee. he [email protected]! through then 9xecutive Secretary 'onaldo Xamora! ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. he Committee found 'ayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under &O 8;. Secretary Laguesma submitted to the [email protected] a copy of the Committee 'eport and 'ecommendation that the penalty should be suspension for  six 3B5 months and one 3,5 day! in accordance with &O 8;. [email protected]! through 9xecutive Secretary Xamora! issued &O that concur with the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the 'ayala and latter is F"S*"SS9F from the service. 'ayala filed a *otion for 'econsideration! which the [email protected] denied. @etition for Certiorari and @rohibition with @rayer for emporary 'estraining Order  was dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. he C& dismissed petition and held that 'ayala=s dismissal was proper. 6owever in its 'esolution! the C& modified its earlier Fecision/ the penalty of dismissal is F9L99F and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one 3,5 year is 69'9#Y "*@OS9F upon the petitioner. "SS(9/ > at least during the relevant period! from &pril ,--; up to Fecember ,--; when #arien! et al. filed their verified complaint before the "nspectorate Fivision

C& denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 6ence! this petition. '##0E?

INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v MORADAS

$8% ,hether petitioner was denied due process;

Kanuary ,;! 8, Z @erlas>#ernabe! K . Z @etition for 'eview on Certiorari Z Fue @rocess

$5% ,hether the C+ correctl affirmed the C#Cs decision modifin& the  penalt from suspension to dismissal from service.

PETITIONER) "NC Shipmanagement! "nc.! Captain Sigfredo *onterroyo

HELD) Th! 5!ii9$ =#( 'i*. DUE PROCESS AS OPPORTUNIT, TO -E HEARD inflicted burning that *oradas allegedly committed! on the other hand. "t is simply contrary to human nature and experience for *oradas to set himself abla$e because he was caught stealing the shipEs supplies. "t is not true that *oradas failed to rebut the witnessE claim that he saw *oradas go to the paint room and soak his hands in a can full of thinner.

M9'+'( 'c#'** ='+! ' (5!ciic +!$i'* 9 h' c*'i= i$ hi( 59(ii9$ 5'5! !9! h! LA. ISSUES)  serving in the absence of any showing that they were lying when they made their statements. he problem with this explanation is that h! 9h! c!<

=!=!( @arty Claim. 9ventually! though! &guilar was declared the highest bidder and became the owner since @@G" failed to redeem the property. Subse7uently! [email protected] instituted an action to 7uiet title and to set aside the levy on execution of the sub:ect unit! to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of &guilar! as well as to recover the unit. [email protected] claimed that when @@G" executed a Feed of Sale in his favor! all rights and interests over the unit were transferred to him! and the subse7uent levy and sale thereof to &guilar created a cloud on his title. @etitioners sought the dismissal of the case! arguing that @@G" remained the registered owner of the unit and the title covering the same remained clean and free of annotations indicating claims by third persons. 'C/ "t had no :urisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered by the 6L('#! an agency under the Office of the @resident! because said Office is a co>e7ual body. C&/ "t sustained [email protected] argument that since he was not a party to the 6L('# case! he could not be bound by its disposition as well as the incidents and actions taken therein0 thus! he had the right to file a separate action to protect and vindicate his claim. 

Yes. his CourtEs pronouncement in a former case 1case decided by the SC involving &guilar and @@G" wherein the Court ruled that the foreclosure proceeding already vested ownership to &guilar2 can in no way constitute a final determination of [email protected] claim. "n his &mended Complaint! [email protected] averred that &guilar obtained her title through unlawful means. Clearly! therefore! although captioned as one for Muieting of itle! [email protected] suit is actually a suit for annulment of title. #asic is the rule that 1t2he cause of action in a 1C2omplaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the parties. he allegations in the body of the 1C2omplaint define or describe it. he designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the 1C2omplaint. "t is not even an indispensable part of the 1C2omplaint.







he principle that a person cannot be pre:udiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. hus! we agree with the C&Es pronouncement that since O[@allick was not impleaded in the 6L('# case! he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. #ecause he was not impleaded in said case! he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. #ut! more than the fact that [email protected] was not impleaded in the 6L('# case! he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action! as in this case. &s a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit! he had the right to be heard on his claim.

RA, PETER O. VIVO v(. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION G.'. No. ,J?J; Z November ,8! 8,+

F'c() 



ISSUE) mongering! conduct pre:udicial to the interest of the company! and loss of trust and confidence0B that he should submit a written











explanation of the charges0 and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension. ? @etitioner=s counsel assailed the propriety of the show>cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. @etitioner received the summons to attend an administrative in7uiry! re7uiring him to appear before @&GCO'=s Corporate "nvestigation (nit 3C"(5.J &t the petitioner=s re7uest! however! the in7uiry was conducted at his residence. 6e was furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. he memorandum of charges was based on the statements of @&GCO' personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. 6owever! when his counsel re7uested to be furnished copies of the statements! @&GCO' re:ected the re7uest on the ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront! hear! and answer the charges against him during the administrative in7uiry. he &d:udication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear in order to address 7uestions regarding his case. 6is counsel moved for the re>scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date! but the &d:udication Committee denied the re7uest upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. @&GCO' dismissed the petitioner from the service. ,, & motion for reconsideration was filed! however! denied. @etitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled that @&GCO' had violated the petitioner=s right to due process! and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. "n fine! the Commission finds that the right of ivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding #oard 'esolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the @&GCO' #oard of Firectors. @&GCO' elevated the case to the C&. C& promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. he C& remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits! specifically the issue of whether the dismissal had been for cause.

"SS(9/ ,.. exhaustion of administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of  action! but was denied. 'C set aside the Aormal Charge holding respondentsE rights to administrative due process were violated when they were deprived of  the opportunity to file their commentHmemorandum prior to! or during the preliminary or fact>finding investigation conducted by &tty. 'odulfo! which violation was deemed to involve a purely legal 7uestion! an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. 'C! however! clarified that its ruling was not intended to prevent or avert the [email protected]! violated their due process rights. C& found that Section ,,! 'ule "" of the (niform 'ules on  &dministrative Cases in the Civil Service 3('&CCS5 re7uires that respondents be given the opportunity to comment and explain their  side during a preliminary investigation conducted prior to the issuance of a Aormal Charge and that such comment is different from the &nswer that respondents may file thereafter. C& pronounced that a violation of the right to due process is an admitted exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

I((#!)

you may desire to present in support of your  defense. "n your answer! you should state whether  you elect to have a formal investigation of the charge against you or waive your right to such an investigation. "f you fail to submit your answer within the period aforestated! you will be deemed in default and the case against you will be decided on the basis of the available records. 'espondents filed their '$( 41& U.S. // WHITE; "'$#' 22% 1&/ F'c()) >for various reasons! - high school students were suspended by their  respective school administrators. hey mostly participated in demonstrations in their schools. Fue to this! school administrators suspended them for ten days.

>Ohio law provides for free education to all children between the ages of  six and 8,. Section ++,+.BB of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to , days or  to expel him. "n either case! he must notify the studentEs parents within 8 hours and state the reasons for his action. & pupil who is expelled! or  his parents! may appeal the decision to the #oard of 9ducation and in connection therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. No such procedure is available for cases of suspension. >he nine named appellees! each of whom alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to , days without a hearing pursuant to \ ++,+.BB! filed an action under 8 (. S. C. \ ,-J+ against the Columbus #oard of 9ducation and various administrators of the [email protected] he complaint sought a declaration that \ ++,+.BB was unconstitutional in that it permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind! in violation of the procedural due process component of the Aourteenth &mendment. "t also sought to en:oin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to \ ++,+.BB and to re7uire them to remove references to the past suspensions from the records of the students in 7uestion.

interest at stake. & , day educational suspension bears a lot of  conse7uences for students. >when it is determined that due process is applicable! what has to be known then is what process should be due. >in this case! to impose a standard process for suspension of , days might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and! by diverting resources! cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. *oreover! further formali$ing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. >he Court held that a standard should be available only in cases exceeding , days.

Di((!$i$% P9 he decision unnecessarily opens avenues for :udicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the 7uality of education. *oreover! to the extent that there may be some arguable infringement! it is too speculative! transitory! and insubstantial to :ustify imposition of a constitutional  rule...

I((#!) "t is true that \ ++,+.BB of the Code permits school principals to suspend students for up to , days0 but suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. &ll of the schools had their own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. ><hough Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system! it has nevertheless done so and has re7uired its children to attend. hose young people do not shed their  constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door. . he Aourteenth  &mendment! as now applied to the States! protects the citi$en against the State itself and all of its creatures >> #oards of 9ducation not excepted. > &ppellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Fue @rocess Clause generally! the Clause comes into play only when the State sub:ects a student to a severe detriment or grievous loss. he loss of , days! it is said! is neither  severe nor grievous and the Fue @rocess Clause is therefore of no relevance. >in determining "nstead of re7uesting reconsideration 9ldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of 6ealth! 9ducation! and he Secretary moved to dismiss on the grounds that 9ldridgeEs benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. "n support of his contention that due process re7uires a pretermination hearing! 9ldridge relied exclusively upon this CourtEs decision in Goldberg v. Ielly! which established a right to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. he Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits! unlike eligibility for welfare benefits! is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision! which turns primarily on medical evidence. > he Fistrict Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated 9ldridgeEs benefits abridged his right to procedural due process.

additional or substitute procedural safeguards0 and finally! the GovernmentEs interest! including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re7uirement would entail. > Only in Goldberg has the Court held that due process re7uires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. "t was emphasi$ed there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of  subsistence/ he crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. > 9ligibility for disability benefits! in contrast! is not based upon financial need. "ndeed! it is wholly unrelated to the workerEs income or support from many other sources! such as earnings of other family members! workmenEs compensation awards! tort claims awards! savings! private insurance! public or private pensions! veteransE benefits! food stamps! public assistance! or the many other important programs! both public and private! which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . . . . &s Goldberg illustrates! the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular  decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision>making process. he potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg! although the degree of  difference can be overstated. &s the Fistrict Court emphasi$ed! to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.

ISSUE) he specific dictates of due process generally re7uires consideration of  three distinct factors/ Airst! the private interest that will be affected by the official action0 second! the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used! and the probable value! if any! of 

F'c()

> C. A. Sharp V Company! not being the agent or operator of the vessel! referred the notice to &. . 'ocha! the agent and operator thereof! who answered the notice stating! among other things! that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and! therefore! was not re7uired by law to be manifested. 'ocha stated further/ "f this explanation is not sufficient! we re7uest that this case be set for  investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of  the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense. > he Collector of Customs replied to 'ocha stating that the television set in 7uestion was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for  violating Section 8;8, of the ariff and Customs Code. "n said letter! the collector imposed a fine of @;!. on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within J hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of sei$ure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. > @etitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary in:unction before the Court of Airst "nstance! which was granted. 'espondent interposed present appeal.

I((#!) 'ocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as re7uired by Section 8;8, of the ariff and Customs Code. (nder said section! in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for  the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the re7uirement of the law! among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. he fact that the set in 7uestion was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. "t is still necessary that the vessel! its owner or operator! be given a chance to show otherwise. his is precisely what petitioner 'ocha has re7uested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance! but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of @;!.. his is a denial of  the elementary rule of due process. > rue it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar  as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned! or of any act arising under 

the ariff and Customs Code! are not :udicial in character! but merely administrative! where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded! but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. he right to due process is not merely statutory. "t is a constitutional right. hat this principle applies with e7ual force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the &ng ibay case. Disposition he decision appealed from is affirmed.

-AUTISTA V [email protected]S COMPENSATION 66 SCRA 121; [email protected]; "'$#' 31% 1&& N'#!) @etition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Counsel for claimant #autista filed *A' saying that the hearing of the case was delayed by reason of the repeated non>appearance and motions for postponement on the part of counsels for employer @N' and

the conse7uent withdrawal of the original counsel0 that his failure to appear at the last 8 scheduled hearings was excusable for the reason that he received the notice of hearing 8 days after the scheduled date of  hearing and he informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this fact0 that the counsel of employer @N' was likewise not present at the last scheduled hearing. Counsel also informed hearing officer of the fact that claimant is already dead without however stating the date and cause of  death. > *A' was denied but hearing officer ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to the respondent Commission for review. 'espondent Commission! on the basis of the evidence on record! affirmed the order of dismissal. 6ence! this petition! which the Court subse7uently treated as a special civil action

I((#!) 'espondent he very rules of the Commission re7uire the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel! through the latter! so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested partyEs right to a hearing. @atent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. > (nder the circumstances! claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Conse7uently! the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counselEs repeated non>appearance at the said hearings cannot stand. > he hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and to the pre:udice of the laborer! the late claimant &ndres #autista! as demonstrated by his obdurate handling of claimantEs excusable non> appearances at scheduled hearings! on one hand! and his mild treatment of respondent employerEs repeated failure to appear at scheduled hearings and its motions for postponement! on the other. he records clearly show that while respondent had asked for and was granted at least ; postponements0 claimant! on the other hand! only moved for  postponement once and that was even on a :oint motion with respondent employer  Disposition @etition is granted.

E?UITA-LE [email protected] CORP v. NLRC 23 SCRA 3/2; Vi# ; "#$! 13% 1&& N'#!) Special civil action of certiorari F'c( >Sadac was appointed @ for the Legal Fepartment of 97uitable. >Nine lawyers + of the bankEs Legal Fepartment under 97uitable! addressed a letter>petition to the Chairman of the #oard of Firectors! accusing Sadac of abusive conduct! inefficiency! mismanagement! ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. @rivate respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter. >*orales! Chairman of the #oard of Firectors! called the contending lawyers to a conference in his office in an attempt to resolve their  differences! it failed. #oard of Firectors! apprised of the situation! adopted a resolution directing one of its directors! #anico! to look further  into the matter and to determine a course of action for the best interest of the bank. #anico met with the complaining nine lawyers! he was warned that if private respondent were to be retained in his position! the lawyers would resign en masse. >*r. #anico submitted a report to the #oard of Firectors and said that there was abusive conduct and mismanagement and was inefficient and ineffective.he #oard asked Sadac to voluntarily resign. hey emphasi$ed that they are :ust saying that the #oard has lost its confidence on him and they are waiting for his voluntary resignation. Sadac again made a re7uest for a full hearing and cautioned that! under  Section +, of the Corporation Code! individual members of the #oard could be held accountable for voting or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. >Sadac persisted in his re7uest for a formal investigation. (nheeded he filed a complaint in the NL'C for illegal dismissal and damages. >#oard of Firectors terminated Sadac and reiterated that it was one between client and lawyer. 6e also is disentitled from his compensation. he #oard instructed management to take the necessary steps to defend itself and all the members of the #oard of Firectors from private respondentEs complaint. >Labor>&rbited sided with 97uitable! the involved lawyer was a mere legal assistant tasked with certain duties not all that related to the practice of law. he Labor &rbiter concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action because a lawyer>client relationship should instead be governed by Section 8B! 'ule ,+J! of the 'ules of Court. &lso! there

were valid grounds and he was not denied due process! holding that private respondent was heard exhaustively on the matter of the charge lodged against him and that! for valid practical reasons! petitioners were not in a position to accede to the demand for a formal hearing. >NL'C concluded differently. he NL'C ruled that private respondent was denied the right to due process. >97uitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution.

I((#!( ,. employee relationship re7uiring the procedural re7uirements 8. :udicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures! nonetheless! they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other  party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. "t would be unfair for CO& to hold former  Governor @aredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities > hird! the *S'# decision became final and executory. Ainal :udgments may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court! not even by the Supreme Court! much less by any other  official! branch or department of Government Disposition Fecision of CO& set aside

2. WHEN NOT RE?UIRED SUNTA, v PEOPLE G.R. N9. L:&430 PADILLA% % .; "#$! 2&% 1&/ N'#!)@etition for a writ of certiorari  F'c() > Fr. &ntonio Nubla! father of &licia Nubla! a minor of ,B years! filed a verified complaint against 9milio Suntay in the Office of the City &ttorney of Mue$on City! as follows/ he accused took &licia Nubla from St. @aulEs Colleges in Mue$on City with lewd design and took her to somewhere

near the ([email protected] compound in Filiman! Mue$on City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. &licia Nubla is a minor of ,B years. > @etitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the FA&. @etitioner  left the @hilippines for San Arancisco where he is at present enrolled in school. he offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the CA" of Mue$on City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. he private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order directing such government agencies as may be concerned! particularly the N#" and the FA&! for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the @hilippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. he Court granted the motion. > 'espondent Secretary cabled the &mbassador to the (nited States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Arancisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the @hilippines to answer the criminal charges against him. he 9mbassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State Fepartment that 9milio SuntayEs presence outside the @hilippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government! that his passport has been withdrawn! and that he is not considered under the protection of the @hilippines while abroad. 6owever! this order was not implemented or  carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order  that the issues raised may be :udicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary re7uesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered! and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. he respondent Secretary denied counselEs re7uest and the Court denied the motion for  reconsideration. > @etitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be carried out only through the cancellation of his passport! the said order  is illegal because while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Aoreign &ffairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the SecretaryEs discretion is abused! the court cannot! in the first instance! take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled. > @etitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Aoreign &ffairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports! such discretion cannot be exercised until after hearing! because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.

ISSUES

,. o forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings! de #isschop filed the present case.

ISSUES

Oi!  @rohibition is not favored by the Courts. "t will issue only if there is no other plain! speedy ! and ade7uate remedy. he use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens= confinement and proposed expulsion from the @hilippines is now a settled practice. 6abeas corpus affords prompt relief  from unlawful imprisonment of any kind! and under all circumstances. he existence of habeas corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of  prohibition. DISPOSITION he order appealed from is reversed. he petition for  prohibition is dismissed.

,. his is not a violation of the due process clause0 the letter advising #isschop to depart in ; days was a mere formality! and far from final! because the re7uirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily! the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. > "t is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. &s per "#+! C99*!) +#! 59c!(( 9 *'<

i( $9 $!c!(('i* #+ici'* 59c!((; =#ch 9 h! 59c!((  =!'$( 9 & copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 8B Sept ,-JJ. & 8, &pril ,-J-/ Solar went to 'C MC on petition for certiorari with preliminary in:unction against the #oard. 'C dismissed SolarEs petition upon two 385 grounds/ that appeal and not certiorari from the 7uestioned Order of the #oard as well as the Solar went on appeal to the C&. C& reversed the Order of dismissal of  C and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. C& also declared the C&! in so ruling! held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of the #oard may result in great and irreparable in:ury to Solar0 and that while the case might be moot and academic! larger issues demanded that the 7uestion of due process be settled. he #oard=s *A' was dismissed. 6ence! this petition for certiorari.

Th! -9'+( '#!() >that its ex parte Order dated 88 Sept ,-JJ and the that the ex parte Order and the Section ?3a5 of @.F. No. -J + authori$ed the #oard to issue ex parte cease and desist orders 3a5 whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an immediate threat to life! public health! safety or  welfare! or to animal or plant life! or 3b5 whenever such discharges or  wastes exceed the allowable standards set by the [email protected] >"t is not essential that the #oard prove that an immediate threat to life! public health! safety or welfare! or to animal or plant life exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. "t is enough if the #oard finds that the wastes discharged do exceed the allowable standards set by the [email protected] >Sec; of the 9ffluent 'egulations of ,-J8 sets out the max permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewater treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class &! #! C! F! S# and SC in accordance with the ,-?J [email protected] 'ules and 'egulations. ullahan>ine:eros 'iver is classified as inland waters Class F 3for agriculture! irrigation! live stock watering! industrial cooling and processing5 >Note/ the plant under its previous owner! Aine ouch Ainishing Corporation! was issued a Notice of iolation on 8 Fec ,-J; directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. he new owner Solar extile Corporation! after informing the Commission of  the plant ac7uisition! was summoned to a hearing held on ,+ October  ,-JB based on the adverse findings during the inspectionHwater sampling test conducted on J &ugust ,-JB. >he inspection reports of November ,-JB and September ,-JJ make clear that there was at least prima facie evidence before the #oard that the effluents emanating from SolarEs plant exceeded the max allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the [email protected] and that accordingly there was ade7uate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the #oard. >he #oard refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order  until after the November ,-JB and September ,-JJ re>inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. he 3

 @.F. -J! Section ?! paragraph 3a5! provides/ 3a5 @ublic 6earing . . . @rovided! hat whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life! public health! safety or welfare! or to animal or plant life! or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission! the Commissioner may issue an ex>parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior  public hearing. he said ex>parte order shall be immediately executory and shall r emain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court..

#oard appears to have been remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis>a>vis Solar. Solar! on the other  hand! seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated! pollutive effluents into the ullahan>ine:eros 'iver! presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. >9x parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the @hilippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course! including multiple and se7uential appeals such as those which Solar has taken! which of course may take several years. "t is a constitutional common place that the ordinary re7uirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved! through the exercise of police power.

c. FORM OF AND PROMULGATION OF "UDGMENT INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES% INC. 10 PHIL 2& -AUTISTA ANGELO; A5 2&% 1&/ NATURE @etition for review of a decision of the Court of "ndustrial 'elations

F'c() > & complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice > 6earings were conducted by the hearing examiner! &tty. 9miliano abigne! at which both parties! represented by counsel! appeared. > &fter the presentation of the evidence! the hearing examiner rendered his report stating that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been

substantiated by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. 6e also found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause. > he court approved the hearing examinerEs recommendation and rendered the following order/ 6earing 9xaminer *r. abigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair labor practice. he facts are stated in the 6earing 9xaminerEs dated *ay ,B! ,-;;.  &fter a perusal of the record of the case! the Court finds no sufficient  :ustification for modifying said recommendation! findings and conclusions! and conse7uently! this case is hereby dismissed. SO O'F9'9F. > @etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration! which was denied by the court en banc. > 6ence this petition for review. > "t is contended that the afore7uoted order runs counter to the Constitution which provides that No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based 3&rticle """! section ,850 and to 'ule +;! Section ,! of the 'ules of Court! which provides that a court decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. &nd the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does not contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based on said evidence! which counsel claims does not meet the re7uirements of the law and the Constitution.

ISSUE Such is the present situation. he court approved the report of the hearing examiner after a perusal of the record of the case. his presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no :ustification

for modifying his findings and conclusions. his is a substantial compliance with the law. > inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision :ustifies the summary disposition of petitionerEs application in the manner followed by respondent @ublic Service Commission. > "n  +n& Tiba v. Court ! speaking of the Court of "ndustrial 'elations! which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of 7uasi>:udicial powers like the @SC! the Court made clear that while it 3the C"'5 is free from the rigidity of certain procedural re7uirements! it does not mean that it can! in :usticiable cases coming before it! entirely ignore or  disregard the fundamental and essential re7uirement of due process.) > he failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the reasons for the decision! which necessarily would likewise re7uire a finding of facts! cannot receive :udicial approval. > he denial of Serrano=s petition was plain and palpable error. here is a need then to remand the matter to the @ublic Service Commission so that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law. Only after it has rendered its decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does the power of review on the part of this Court come into play. Disposition Fecision set aside! case remanded to @S C.

SOLID HOMES% INC. VS. LASERNA 720068 P9$!$!) Chico>Na$ario! K.

F'c() Laserna and Ca:ipe! as buyers! entered into a Contract to Sell with Solid 6omes over a parcel of land located in Loyola Grand illas! Mue$on City. NC'5 > a complaint was filed before the FO6 'esident Ombudsman against Fir. *a:arais! &cting &dmin Officer Cabrera! and respondents! for an alleged anomalous purchase by FO6>NC' of ,!; bottles of Aerrous Sulfate 8; mg. with it # Complex and Aolic &cid capsules worth @++!. >the 'esident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Sec of 6ealth recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge. Sec of 6ealth filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co> respondents for Grave *isconduct! Fishonesty! and iolation of '& +,-. >9xec Sec 'uben orres issued &O 8-J creating an ad>hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the FO6>NC' employees. he said &O was indorsed to the @residential Commission  &gainst Graft and Corruption [email protected]&GC5 >the @C&GC took over the investigation from the FO6. &fter the investigation! it issued a resolution finding *a:arais! Camposano! Cabrera! &gustin! and @ere$ guilty as charged and recommended to @res 'amos that they be dismissed from government service. >@res 'amos issued &O +- finding *a:arais guilty and dismissed from

service and remanded records of case to Sec of 6ealth for appropriate action. >Sec of 6ealth issued an Order disposing of the case against respondents and Cabrera. he dispositive portion said/ pursuant to the 'esolution rendered by the @C&GC! respondents Camposano! Cabrera!  &gustin! @ere$ are hereby dismissed from the service. >'espondents filed *A' of the said Order. Sec of 6ealth denied. hey filed appeal wH the CSC. CSC denied. 'espondents went to the C&. >C& held that the @C&GC=s :urisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. hus! the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. *oreover! in simply and completely relying on the @C&GC=s findings! the secretary of  health failed to comply with administrative due process.

I((#!) &dministrative due process re7uires that! prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions!the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face! a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. 3Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents! but solely due process. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed! unless due process is first observed. 5 Disposition @etition is @&'LY G'&N9F

AMERICAN TO-ACCO CO v THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS  SCRA 26; ANTONIO; Oc. 14% 1&/ F'c()) > petitioners are challenging the validity of 'ule ,BJ of the 'evised 'ules of @ractice before the @hilippine @atent Office in rademark Cases as amended! authori$ing the Firector of @atents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear !inter partes!  proceedings. Said 'ule likewise provides that all :udgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Firector and signed by him. hese proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name! interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the 7uestion of priority of adoption and use of a trade>mark! trade name or service>mark! and cancellation of  registration of a trade>mark or trade name pending at the @atent Office. > (nder the rade>mark Law 3'epublic &ct No. ,BB 5! the Firector of  @atents is vested with :urisdiction over opposition! interference and cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise! the 'ules of @ractice in rade>mark Cases contains a similar provision! thus/ ,BJ. (ri&inal "urisdiction over inter partes proceedin& . > he Firector  of @atents shall have original :urisdiction over  inter partes

proceedings. "n the event that the @atent Office should be provided with an 9xaminer of "nterferences! this 9xaminer shall have the original :urisdiction over these cases! instead of the Firector. "n the case that the 9xaminer of "nterferences takes over the original  :urisdiction over inter partes proceedings! his final decision sub:ect to appeal to the Firector of @atents within three months of the receipt of  notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 8! +! ! B! ?! J! ,! ,,! ,8! ,+! ,! ,; and 88 of 'ule , of the 'ules of  Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate! and the appeal fee shall be @8;.. > he 'ules of @ractice in rade>mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Firector of @atents and approved by the then Secretary of &griculture and Commerce. > Subse7uently! the Firector of @atents! with the approval of the Secretary of &griculture and Commerce! amended the afore>7uoted 'ule ,BJ to read as follows/ ,BJ. (ri&inal >urisdiction over inter partes proceedin&s . >  h e Firector of @atents shall have original :urisdiction over inter partes proceedings! 1"n the event that the @atent Office is provided with an 9xaminer of "nterferences! this 9xaminer shall then have the original  :urisdiction over these cases! instead of the Firector. "n the case that the 9xaminer of "nterferences takes over the original :urisdiction over  inter partes proceedings! his final decisions shall be sub:ect to appeal to the Firector of @atents within three months of the receipt of  notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 8! +! ! B! ?! J!,! ,,! ,8! ,+! ,! ,;! and 88 of 'ule , of the 'ules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate! and the appeal fee shall be [email protected];..2 Such inter partes  proceedings in the @hilippine @atent Office under this itle shall be heard before the Firector of @atents! any hearing officer! or an rankin& official  desi&nated b the 2irector; but all "ud&ments determinin& the merits of the case shall be personall and directl prepared b the 2irector  and si&ned b him . 39mphasis supplied.5

> "n accordance with the amended 'ule! the Firector of @atents delegated the hearing of petitionersE cases to hearing officers! specifically! &ttys. &mando *ar7ue$! eofilo elasco! 'ustico Casia and 6ector #uenalu$! the other respondents herein. > @etitioners filed their ob:ections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases! alleging that the amendment of the 'ule is illegal and void because under the law the Firector must personally hear and decide inter partes cases . Said ob:ections were overruled by the Firector of  @atents! hence! the present petition for mandamus! to compel he

Firector of @atents to personally hear the cases of petitioners! in lieu of  the hearing officers.

ISSUE) he power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an ade7uate source of authority to delegate a particular function! unless by express provisions of the &ct or  by implication it has been withheld. > he nature of the power and authority entrusted to he Firector of  @atents suggests that the aforecited laws 3'epublic &ct No. ,BB! in relation to 'epublic &ct No. ,B;5 should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws.  &s such officer! he is re7uired! among others! to determine the 7uestion of priority in patent interference proceedings! decide applications for  reinstatement of a lapsed patent! cancellations of patents under 'epublic  &ct No. ,B;! inter partes  proceedings such as oppositions! claims of  interference! cancellation cases under the rade>mark Law and other  matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. "t could hardly be expected! in view of the magnitude of his responsibility! to re7uire him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. his would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. he remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. > hus! while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law! this does not preclude a delegation of the power  to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. > he rule that re7uires an administrative officer to exercise his own  :udgment and discretion does not preclude him from utili$ing! as a matter  of practical administrative procedure! the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts! on the basis of which the officer  makes his decisions. "t is sufficient that the :udgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authori$ed by law. Neither does due process of law nor the re7uirements of fair hearing re7uire that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. &s long as a party is not deprived of his right to

present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof! and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record! there is no 7uestion that the re7uirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. 1/ "n short! there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer  concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 1 "t is! however! re7uired that to give the substance of a hearing! which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which :ustifies them. > "n the case at bar! while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of 7uestions raised at the hearings of these cases! the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and 7uestions involved is left to the Firector of @atents. &part from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not :urisdictional! petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been pre:udiced by the proceedings. Di(59(ii9$ @etition is dismissed

AL-ERT v GANGAN 3/3 SCRA 3; -UENA; M'ch 0% 2001 N'#!)@etition for certiorari F'c() > @etitioner 'amon &lbert! president of the National 6ome *ortgage Ainance Corp 3N6*AC5 approved loans taken out to finance several pro:ects in pursuance of its Community *ortgage @rogram 3C*@5! a low> cost home financing scheme. One of the pro:ects under this program was the &*&IO pro:ect for which @+B!?-B!?,,.;; was released and approved by petitioner. > (pon petitioner=s instruction! an inspection of the said pro:ect was conducted and it was found that the pro:ect was + months in arrears in their amorti$ation. #ecause of this finding! petitioner ordered other  investigations be conducted. &fter investigation! the Co& 'esident  &uditor of N6*AC disallowed the loan granted to the &*&IO pro:. for  the following reasons/ 3a5 non>submission of documentary re7uirementsHnon>complying or defective documents as re7uired under  N6*AC Corporate Circular No. C*@>,0 and 3b5 irregularHexcessive expenditures per CO& Circular No. J;>;;& > *onths later! petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter>complaint against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for  the fraud with respect to the &*&IO loan transaction. @etitioner also

filed a civil case for sum of money! annulment! damages and attorney=s fees with preliminary attachment! against S6GCC"! &*&IO! Sapang @alay V Fevelopment Aoundation! "nc.! and other persons responsible for the misrepresentation! tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to &*&IO pro:ect. > he Commission on &udit 3CO&5! after investigation! later found petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing payment of loan proceeds obtained by &*&IO. he CO& disallowed the plan payment because it found the payment irregular and an excessive expenditure! and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to sec. ,+ of  @F ,;! which states! %expenditures of government funds or uses of  government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.) > "n his *A'! which was later denied! &lbert=s defense was that he cannot and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the loan as he acted only in the performance of his official duties and that there was no clear showing of bad faith! malice or gross negligence on his part. > he CO& in dismissing said *A' stated thus/ &lbert himself was the final approving authority of the transaction in 7uestion and that the officersHemployees who processed the same were directly under his supervision. 6e could have conclusively determined the validity of a transaction involving such a large amount. &lbert=s claim of good faith and exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions! and these presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an offense! as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds resulted from official action. Lastly! it stated that Sec+. 3-5 of '& +,3&nti>Graft Law5 declares to be unlawful the act of %entering! in behalf of  the government! into a contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same! whether or not the public officer profited or  will profit thereby. :  &ggrieved! petitioner filed this case contending that he can=t be held personally liable for the amount of @+B! ?-B!?,,.;; representing the loan proceeds to &*&IO! because the 7uestioned CO& decisions don=t have any findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction. 6e claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad faith! with malice! or gross negligence when he approved the loan transaction.

I((#!) the #oard of Commissioners reversed the decision of the #oard of  Special "n7uiry and ordered the exclusion of @edro Gatchalian for being improperly documented. @edro was accordingly. #ut! although the

warrant for his exclusion was issued in Kuly! ,-B8! @edro Gatchalian was taken into custody by the immigration authorities only Kune B! ,-B;. > *acario &rocha! on behalf of @edro! petitioned the CA" for a writ of  habeas corpus! claiming that the detention of @edro! a Ailipino by the "mmigration Commissioner is violative of said petitionerEs constitutional rights. 'espondents immigration officials countered that the exclusion order was issued pursuant to the decision of the #oard of Commissioner! finding @edro to have failed in proving the allegation that he is a Ailipino citi$en. > "n its decision! the court sustained petitionerEs theory that the decision of reversal of the #oard of Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond the prescribed one>year period. 6olding that the decision of the Special #oard of "n7uiry! admitting the @hilippine citi$enship of @edro Gatchalian had already become final! the Court ordered his immediate release from detention and en:oined respondents! permanently! from arresting! deporting and otherwise depriving of his liberty. On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court! @edro Gatchalian was released from custody of the immigration authorities at oEclock in the evening of &ugust +! ,-B;. > he cause of petitioner and appellant Commissioner of "mmigration in this Court hinges on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the decision of the #oard of Commissioners reversing that of the Special #oard of "n7uiry. Aor if! indeed! the reversal was made on Kuly 8! ,-B8! as asserted by @edro! instead of Kuly B! ,-B8! as maintained by ivo 3the Commissioner of "mmigration5! then the admission on Kuly B! ,-B, by the Special #oard of "n7uiry of the fact of @edroEs @hilippine citi$enship would have become final and! therefore his detention by the immigration authorities would be unlawful. > pursuant to Section 8? 3b5 of Commonwealth &ct B,+! as amended by '& ;+! the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry shall become final unless reversed on appeal by the #oard of Commissioners! or in the absence of an appeal! unless reversed by the #oard of Commissioners after a review by it! motu proprio! of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the said decision.

ISSUES ,.reviewable since ,-B, because of its confirmation by the ma:ority of the preceding #oard of Commissioners.

H!*+) ,. Y9S. Ratio he mere fact of a retyping of dates on the face of the documents!

without further evidence of record! does not suffice to convict the three members of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners of maliciously antedating their decision! considering the presumption of regularity in official actuations! and the serious implications of the charge! which amounts to no less than a falsification of official documents. Such an offense cannot be lightly inferred! but must be clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt. he operative date of the CommissionersE action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a #oard! regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared! written and signed. Reasoning 

> the decision of the #oard of Commissioners! the notification to appelleeEs counsel that such decision was rendered! and the warrant of  exclusion! bear the date Kuly B! ,-B8! or within one year from the reviewed decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. "t is contended! however! that in all of these documents! the date of promulgation of the decision appeared to have been originally written as Kuly 8! ,-B8! but the number 8 was erased and superimposed by B. > ivo insists that these erasures and substitutions were corrections made only to rectify clerical mistakes. > the accusation of @edro is negatived by the official minutes of the #oardEs proceedings! which clearly show that the resolution to exclude was adopted on Kuly B! ,-B8. No alteration in dates appears in these. "n fact! the alterations observed are susceptible of the explanation that the date Kuly 8 was originally placed by the stenographer or typist because it was then that the reasoned and extended decision was typewritten in final form! but that it was corrected to Kuly B! the date it was voted! because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopted. > the Court below erred in finding and declaring that the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry in the case of petitioner>appellee had become final and unreviewable! and that its review and revocation by the Commissioners of "mmigration was null and void. 8. NO. Ratio "ndividual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a #oard. he Legislature organi$ed the #oard of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion. he powers and duties of  boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members separately. heir acts are official only when done by the

members convened in session! upon a concurrence of at least a ma:ority and with at least a 7uorum present. Secondly! the aforementioned *emorandum Order! issued in the exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Fepartment 6ead! expressly declares that the public interest so re7uiring! it is ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the #oard of  Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu proprio of decisions of  the #oard of Special "n7uiry! are set aside and this nullification included the alleged ,-B, decision. Dispostion decision and order of CA" reversed! nullified and set aside.

NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R. NO. 24600; CASTRO; M' 2 1&6 F'c() > On Kuly -! ,-B, the petitioner! with three other persons! supposedly his widowed mother 3Folores Neria5 and two younger brothers 3Aelix and *anuel Neria5! arrived at the *anila "nternational &irport from 6ongkong on board a Cathay @acific &irways plane. he immigration inspector at the airport! not satisfied with the petitionerEs travel documents and those of his companions upon primary inspection thereof! referred the matter of  their admission to the #oard of Special "n7uiry for investigation to determine filiation and paternity to a Ailipino citi$en. &ccordingly! the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , conducted a hearing on Kuly ,! ,-B,! at which time the petitioner offered oral and documentary evidence to support his claim for admission as a Ailipino citi$en &fter the conclusion of the investigation! the said board on &ugust 8! ,-B, deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for petitionerEs admission. he board on the

same date rendered its decision! declaring Folores Neria a Ailipino citi$en! and the petitioner a Ailipino citi$en as he is an illegitimate son of  Folores! and allowing his admission into the @hilippines. his written decision was subse7uently submitted to the members of the #oard of  "mmigration Commissioners. he "mmigration authorities issued "dentification Certificate ,B+B to the petitioner! attesting that he was admitted as a citi$en of the @hilippines per decision of the #oard of  Special "n7uiry No. , dated &ugust 8! ,-B,. > On Kanuary 8! ,-B8! the Secretary of Kustice issued *emorandum Order - 3exh. ?5! directing that 1i2t appearing that for the past several years! the #oard of Commissioners of "mmigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it!D it is hereby ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the #oard of Commissioners on  &ppeal from! or on review motu proprio of! decisions of the #oard of  Special "n7uiry are set aside. he #oard of Commissioners is directed to review! in accordance with S!ci9$ 2 78 9 C9==9$ "n compliance with the above directive! the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners! proceeded to review motu proprio the entire proceedings had before the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , relative to the petitionerEs case and that of his supposed relatives. & hearing officer of  the #ureau of "mmigration was directed to conduct an investigation of the entire proceedings of and the evidence presented before the #oard of  Special "n7uiry No. ,. On the basis of a memorandum of the hearing officer! the new #oard of "mmigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Ailipino citi$en and! conse7uently! reversed the decision of the #oard of  Special "n7uiry No. ,! and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the @hilippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port from whence he came or to the country of which he is a national. he petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision. his motion was denied by the new #oard.

> he petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying the Court of Airst "nstance of *anila to restrain the Commissioner of  "mmigration and the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners from arresting and expelling him! and prohibit them from taking any further steps or  actions contrary to the decision rendered by the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,. his petition was given due course! and a writ of preliminary in:unction was issued as prayed for. #ut this petition was dismissed. > On &pril +! ,-B; the present petition for habeas corpus was filed! the petitioner claiming that the respondentEs agents picked him up at 'osario St.! *anila! in the evening of the previous &pril 8+ on the supposed claim that he was not properly documented for admission as a Ailipino citi$en when he entered the @hilippines0 and that since then he has been unlawfully and illegally confined! restrained and deprived of his liberty in the #ureau of "mmigration Fetention Station in the 9ngineering "sland! *anila. On the same date! the lower court re7uired the respondent to bring the petitioner before the court on *ay +! ,-B; at J/+ OEclock in the morning. he clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent to submit his return. he latterEs written return of *ay B! ,-B; states! among other things! that the petitioner was under lawful custody on a valid process commanding his exclusion from the @hilippines and ordering his return to the port where he came from or  to the country of which he is a national. > On Kune ,J! ,-B; the lower court dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner is legally detained on a warrant issued by the respondent Commissioner of "mmigration. On Kuly 8! ,-B; the lower court set aside its decision of Kune ,?! ,-B;! and! on the same date! rendered an amended decision completely reversing its decision of Kune ,?! granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. he lower court held that the decision rendered by the new #oard of Commissioners is null and void for lack of :urisdiction! and no administrative action being possible because the 7uestion involved in this case is purely a legal 7uestion! the doctrine of exhaustion of  administrative remedies has no application in this case. On Kuly 88 the clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus .

I((#!) he resolution of this issue! in turn! depends upon the determination of  the date when the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , was promulgated! &ugust 8! ,-B, when it was actually rendered! or  September ! ,-B, when the petitioner was actually notified thereof and a copy received by his counsel. he date of promulgation is important. "t is from that date that the one>year period commenced within which the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the entire proceedings of #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,. > &ccording to the Solicitor General! the correct date of promulgation is September ! ,-B,! because under the "mmigration 'ules and 'egulations! the decision of a #oard of Special "n7uiry shall be rendered in writing!; and under section 8? 3b5! supra! the written decision shall be promulgated0 that the words rendition 3from rendered5 and promulgation 3from promulgated5 connote two separate and distinct acts re7uired to be accomplished by the #oard of Special "n7uiry! for  rendition is the date when a :udge signs his decision and files it with the clerk of court! whereas promulgation is the date when such decision is published! officially announced! is made known to the public! or delivered to the clerk of court for filing! coupled with notice to the parties or to their  counsel0 and that in this case! rendition was accomplished on &ugust 8! ,-B, when the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , concluded its hearing on the petitionerEs case! deliberated thereon! voted for his admission into the @hilippines and rendered its written decision! and promulgation was accomplished on September ! ,-B, when the petitioner was actually notified of the decision! copy of which was received by his counsel. > No amount of hair>splitting in regard to the words rendition and promulgation would convey different meanings. his Court defined promulgation as the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for  filing and publication. he word promulgate was viewed by the ma:ority in @eople vs. Finglasan 3?? @hil. ?B5 as the entry made by the clerk of a  :udgment or order in the book of entries of :udgments made by said clerk. > he petitionerEs argument! at all events! is without merit. Section 8? 3b5! supra! provides that proceedings of the #oard of Special "n7uiry its appraisal of a case on the merits! the result of its deliberation! its decision and notice thereof to an alien! and the time when an appeal may be brought therefrom shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of "mmigration.

> "n this case! &ugust 8! ,-B, was the date when the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , concluded its hearing of petitionerEs case 3".C. B,>8+,8>C5! deliberated on it! and voted for his admission as a citi$en of the @hilippines. &ugust 8! ,-B, was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. hat date and not September ! ,-B,! therefore! is the date of promulgation of the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! which decision should prevail and shall be final ... unless reversed by the #oard of Commissioners after a review by it! motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision. , Computing the one>year period from &ugust 8! ,-B,! the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners had until &ugust 8! ,-B8 within which to review the proceedings motu proprio. > he case of the petitioner was included in the agenda of the #oard of  "mmigration Commissioners for review motu propio for Kuly 8! ,-B8. he case was referred to the "mmigration hearing officer! who! on Kuly +! ,-B8! submitted his memorandum to the said board. he case was again included in the agenda of the said board for &ugust 8! ,-B8! the date it was considered submitted for decision. he minutes of the meeting of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners presented by its Secretary @io Noche and read into the records of this case! however! reveal that the petitionerEs case was actually acted upon and decided! not on &ugust 8! ,-B8! as the decision and the warrant of exclusion would tend to show! but on &ugust J! ,-B8 > he minutes of the meeting of the new #oard of Commissioners and! the testimony of its Secretary show that as late on &ugust J! ,-B8! the new #oard of Commissioners was! only deliberating on the case of the petitioner. he admission of the Secretary of the new #oard of  Commissioners that the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on  &ugust 8! ,-B8! shows that the alteration of the date of the decision of  the new #oard of Commissioners from &ugust J! ,-B8 to &ugust 8! ,-B8 was deliberate. he fact that the case of the petitioner was submitted to the new #oard of Commissioners for its resolution on &ugust 8! ,-B8! is no excuse for ante>dating its decision which was actually rendered after  that date. On &ugust 8! ,-B8! it did not reverse the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! because having actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on &ugust J! ,-B8! it could not have on &ugust 8 resolved to reverse the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. > he alteration of the true date of the decision of the new #oard of  Commissioners! made upon instruction of the respondent Commissioner  of "mmigration! is revealing/ it shows that the respondent Commissioner  knew that the one>year period was to be computed from &ugust 8! ,-B,0 it shows also that he knew that if the decision of the #oard of Special

"n7uiry No. , had to be reversed! the new #oard of Commissioners had to act not later than &ugust 8! ,-B8.  &s it was on &ugust J! ,-B8 when the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of  the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! the review motu proprio was effected B days beyond the one>year period fixed by section 8? 3b5! supra. he said decision of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners! and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of  such decision! are therefore! as correctly found by the lower court! null and void! for lack of :urisdiction! since the decision of the #oard of  Special "n7uiry No. , by that time had already become final. > he respondent also contends that the petitionerEs petition for habeas corpus was prematurely filed! because he did not first appeal the decision of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners to the Secretary of  Kustice! who! by law! is vested with power of control and supervision over  the said #oard. 6owever! #OCEs decision in extenso 3extended opinion5 was not immediately rendered and promulgated. "t appears that the draft of the #OC decision was signed by the Commissioners during the period A##( 13:2. he decision was mailed on A##( 2h  to *rs. GO!

who received the same the following day. (pon *rs. GO=s complaint! CA" held that #OC=s decision was void because it was promulgated after the statutory one>year period.

I((#!) Section 8?3b5 specifies that the decision of #S" shall be promulgatedD not later than two days from the date of the deliberation. he absence of  such a re7uirement with respect to the decision of #OC supports the view that such decision need not be promulgated within the one>year  period. I (#ic!( h' -OC (h9#*+ !vi!< h! +!ci(i9$ 9 -SI '$+

of #S" and adopted within one year from the promulgation of #S"=s decision is sufficient

+!*i!'! #59$ i *oreover! section 8?3c5 expressly re7uires that the decision of #OC in case of an appeal from the decision of #S" should be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision. "n contrast! no such re7uirement is provided for  in section 8?3b5 with respect to the CommissionersE decision in case they motu proprio  review the decision of #S". Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial courtEs decision! the same is considered affirmed. 1only B Kustices 3Aernando! *akasiar! *uo$ @alma! Concepcion Kr.! *artin! KK. and the writer5 voted for reversal. K. eehankee filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief  Kustice 3Castro5 and K. &ntonio concurred. K. #arredo also dissented.2

-ARREDO% ".% +i((!$i$) he operative date of the decision of #OC is the date of promulgation! if  not the date of notice to the party aggrieved.

[email protected]% "% +i((!$i$) > he &ctEs provisions as well as public policy support a construction that re7uires that a resolution or decision of #OC on a review motu proprio must be in writing and promulgated with due notice on the party affected within the one>year period. > Section 8? 3b5 provides that the decision 1of #S"2 shall be promulgatedD not later than two days from the date of deliberation. Section 8? 3c5 likewise provides for a summary period of seven days from submittal for decision within which #OC shall put in writing and promulgate its decision on appeal. 'ead in context! it seems obvious that

h! +!ci(i9$ 9$ ' !vi!< motu proprio  -OC =#( ! $9 *!(( h'$ ' +!ci(i9$ 9$ '55!'* by either party0 it must be duly put in writing and promulgated within the more than ade7uate one>year period fixed by the  &ct. > s7uare meter lot in 'aymondville Subdivision in Sucat! @arana7ue for  @+?!J. as its purchase price. She paid @,!. as partial reservation fee on Kanuary ,;! ,-J- and completed payment of this fee on Kanuary 8! ,-J- by paying @!.. > On Kuly ,J! ,-J-! private respondent paid '9" @,B!B. as full downpayment on the purchase price. 6owever! she was advised by '9" to change her co>maker! which she agreed! asking for an extension of one month to do so. > Aor alleged non>compliance with the re7uirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the original agreement! '9"! through its ice>@resident for *arketing! informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on the +,st of Kuly ,-J-. > On &pril 8! ,--! private respondent filed a complaint for Specific @erformance against '9" with the office of &ppeals! &d:udication and Legal &ffairs 3O&&L&5 of the 6ousing and Land (se 'egulatory #oard 36L('#5 asking that respondent be ordered/ o comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot! #lock ! Lot ,? at the 'aymondville Subdivision! Sucat 'oad! @arana7ue! *etro *anila0 > his petition was amended on &ugust ,?! ,-- by impleading petitioners *agdiwang 'ealty Corporation 3*'C5 which appeared to be the registered owner of the sub:ect lot as per C No. ?B8+. > On &pril +! ,--, the 6L('#! whose authority to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by '9" in its answer! rendered its :udgment

H!*+) Yes. > (nder section ; of 9.O. BJ which defines the powers and duties of the commission! the board is specifically mandated to %adopt rules of  procedure for the conduct of its business) and to perform such functions necessary for the accomplishment of its above mentioned functions. Since nothing in the provisions of either 9.O. - or 9.O. BJ denies or  withholds the power or authority to delegate ad:udicatory functions to a division! we cannot see how the #oard! for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and 7uasi>:udicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power! as a matter of practical administrative procedure! to constitute its ad:udicatory boards into various divisions. > &fter all! the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an ade7uate source of authority to delegate a particular function! unless by express provision of the &ct or by implication it has been withheld. he practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three 3+5 Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the 6L('#! as constituted! only has four 35 full time commissioners and five 3;5 part time commissioners to deal with all the functions! administrative! ad:udicatory! or otherwise! entrusted to it. > &s the Office of the @resident noted in its Aebruary 8B! ,--+ 'esolution denying petitionersE *otion for 'econsideration! it is impossible and very impractical to gather the four 35 full time and five 3;5 part time commissioners 3together5 :ust to decide a case. Considering that its part time commissioners act merely in an exofficio  capacity! re7uiring a

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