Ac71657 2009 Urbanops PDF

 

 

 Army Code 71657 (2009)

 ARMY FIELD MA NUAL VOLUME 2

OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS

PART 5 URBAN OPERATIONS

This publication supersedes AC 71657  AFM Vol 2 Pt 5 Urban Operations (2002) 2009

Issue 4.0: October 2009

 

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The contents provide clear military information concerning the most up to date experience and best practice available for commanders and troops to use in their operations operations and training. If you are prosecuted for a breach of health and safety law, and it is proved that you have not followed the relevant provisions of the ACOP, a court may find you criminally liable unless you can show that you have complied with the requirements of health and safety legislation since it is a breach of this legislation which renders a person criminally liable. Breaches or omissions of the ACOP could result in disciplinary action under the provisions of the Army Act.  Amendment No 4.1

Date Nov 09

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PREFACE BACKGROUND 1. The increasing complexity of the contemporary and future operating environments, of which the urban environment is but one aspect, will pose a challenge to armed forces which operate in them, demanding new tactics, specialized equipment and heightened levels of discrimination. This emphasises the need for an agile and flexible force that can succeed when when faced with situations across the spectrum of conflict. Such agility and flexibility will, in part, be determined by the composition of the deployed force; but it is critically dependent on that force being well practiced in Tactics Techniques and Procedures (TTP). 2. This manual describes the different TTPs required to operate in the urban environment and deliberately focuses on combat operations as these are the most demanding circumstances circumstances under which soldiers will have to operate. operate. However, many of the TTPs are relevant to operations across the Spectrum of Conflict and there is a new chapter on Stability Ops. Soldiers deployed on operations, where they will have to un undertake dertake tasks in towns and villages, will employ these TTPs to varying degrees depending on the intensity of combat operations. operations. Training for combat opera operations tions is the foundation for all operations operations in an urban environment. “The Army will need to be cautious about drawing general conclusions from urban operations in Basra Basra and Baghdad. Unless all or most most of the favourable factors apply in a future operation, the result could be very different. different. There is considerable considerable reason to continue to teach tactics for urban operations in the anticipation that it will not be so easy, whilst stressing the need to be pragmatic and to exploit local circumstances”1.  3. Whatever challenges are inherent in warfare are magnified significantly in the urban environment. From Stalingrad to Inchon to Panama to B Basra, asra, operations in urban area areas s have been characterized by “poor communications, difficult command and control, difficult target acquisition, short engagement ranges, reduced effectiveness for fire support assets, and difficulties in providing logistical support”. Tall buildings, se sewers, wers, and tunne tunnels ls give the battlefield dimensions of height and depth that are absent on open terrain. 4 In essence, fighting in urban areas is primordial and brutal. The enemy is at close range; snipers and explosive devices may be present; stress is extremely high; and the opposing force force is frequ frequently ently indistinguish indistinguishable able from the civilian popula population. tion. Demographic and urbanization trends in the developing world are likely to lead to such environments that are even more stressful and more difficult for ope operations. rations. Increasingly be better tter informed through the growth of media sources, urban human populations will be the “vital ground” in the resolution of of any armed conflict. Nevertheless, brutal, close combat demands that a war fighting ethos be maintained throughout all levels of training and education. 5. Historical data suggest that it is extremely difficult for modern forces to make best use of their technological advantages against a determined adversary in an urban environment. The differen differentt characteristics of the various urba urban n environme environments, nts, including 1

 Operations In Iraq - An Analysis From The Land Perspective. Page 3-16 (Army Code 71816).

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population and structure density, low, medium and high buildings, subterranean structures et al, tend to negate the technological advantages (e.g. close air support, mobility, communications, etc) enjoy enjoyed ed by modern m military ilitary forces. The ad advantage vantage of military technology, typically associated with long-range, high technology weapons platforms that use mass and mobility, is significantly reduced in urban environments. 6. It is precisely for this reason that less sophisticated forces are drawn to urban areas. Such battles in the recent past, like at Grozny, Mogadishu, Jenin and Gaza 09 have been characterized by conflict between modern combined arms forces and informally organized irregulars. Aware of the increasing unwillingness to take casualties or cause c collateral ollateral damage, and understanding the lack of comparative advantage in the urban environment, adversaries are increasingly likely to engage military forces in cities. 7. The degeneration of urban operations into a series of small group or even of individual battles was evident evident in operations as different as Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. The nature of built up areas is resp responsible onsible for this fragmentation process. process. As battles proceed, proceed, the streets and building-blocks of the urban physical morphology fragment urban operations into conflict, between force elements usually of section or platoon size, with generally insufficient space for the deployment and manoeuvring of la larger rger units. Combat disintegrates into a series of more or less separate and isolated conflicts around such fortress areas. 8. Given that much of an urban battle is likely to take place inside buildings or underground, it is likely to be invisible to all except those actually fighting it on the ground.  As a result, it will difficult for higher-level commanders to maintain an accurate accurate picture of the battlefield at any given given time. Given this inevitable fragmentation, operational e effectiveness ffectiveness will depend greatly on the quality of leadership at lower levels.  AIM 9. The purpose of this publication is to explain the effect that combat in urban areas will have on the conduct of military operations and to describe the tactics and procedures involved in their prosecution. 10. The doctrine underpinning the overall principles for military operations does not change simply because of the altered physical conditions of the urban environment and thus this publication publication compleme complements nts AFM Volume Volume 1 Part 2 ‘Battlegroup Tactics’. It also records those tactical factors that need greater emphasis where urban conditions affect operations. SCOPE 11. The publication is split into three parts. Relevant historical examples and appropriate quotations are included throughout to provide an insight into how soldiers have operated in these conditions during previous campaigns. a. Part Pa rt A .  Part A describes Urban Warfare, the environment, issues relating to coalition operations and the military interaction with the civilian population.

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b. purpose e of which is to Part B. B . Part B deals with fighting the Urban Battle, the purpos provide a guide for use by commanders, staff officers and regimental planners in units and at formation le level vel when operating in u urban rban and built-up conditions. It describes the effects that this environment will have on combat operations, the functions in combat, the employment of particular weapon systems and the tactics used by the combat arms. c. Part C deals with aspects that concern the individual, how he Part C. C. survives, lives, trains for and operates in these conditions and is designed for the young officer and and NCO as a basis for further instruc instruction. tion. It provides some tactical features about the movement of troops and urban operations at Section and Platoon level. It also covers su subterranean bterranean o operations, perations, night operations and the use of obstacles. THE LAW OF ARMED CONF CONFLICT LICT   12. The content of this p publication ublication is not an authority to o operate perate outside the Law of  Armed Conflict (LOAC), and must not be used or interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the principles below (IAW JSP 383, LOAC M Manual anual 2003). In the event event of any doubt, guidance must be sought through the chain of command.  APPLICATION  APPL ICATION THROUGH L LEADERSHIP EADERSHIP   13. Although doctrine and TTPs p provide rovide practical g guidance uidance on the conduct of o operations, perations, their publication, publication, alone, will not significantly a add dd to operational s success. uccess. Unless s soldiers oldiers understand doctrine, are well trained in the TTPs and are sufficiently motivated to carry out their tasks to the best of their ability their effectiveness on the battlefield, as individuals or part of a team, will be limited. limited. It is leadership which ensures ensures that training is e effective ffective and drills are learned and followed c correctly. orrectly. It is leadership which drives effective effective action and motivates soldiers soldiers to give their utmost to achieve the common purpose. It is lea leadership dership which turns the bald statements of facts in these publications into battle winning or lifesaving action. And moreover, it is strong leaders who recogn recognise ise that doctrine writers do not have a monopoly on wisdom and adapt and develop this guidance to win in the prevailing circumstances.

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 ARMY FIELD FIEL D MANUA MANUAL L VOLUME 2 OPERATIONS IN SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTS PART 5 URBAN URBA N OPERATIONS OPERATIONS PREFACE

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CONTENTS

v  PART A – URBAN WARFARE

CHAPTER 1 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 2

THE URBA URBAN N ENVIRONMENT The Military Significance of Urban Warfare The Nature of Urban Operations The Nature of Urban Terrain Other Factors in Built Up Areas

A-1-1 A-1-2 A-1-4 A-1-8 

URBAN COALITION OPER OPERATIONS ATIONS

Section 1

Urban Coalition Operations

A-2-1

Section 2

Operating Under US Command

A-2-2

CHAPTER 3 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3

MILITA RY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIA N POPULA POPULATION TION The Status of Civilians Military Responsibilities and Authority Civilian Factors

 ANNEX A TO PART A

TYPES OF BUIL BUILDING DING CONSTRUCTION

A-3-1 A-3-2  A-3-5   A-A-1   A-A-1 

PART B – FIGHTING FIGHTING THE U URBA RBAN N BA BATTLE TTLE CHAPTER 4 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 5 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4

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PREPARING FOR THE URBAN BA BATTLE TTLE Operational Planning Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace ISTAR Command, Control and Communications

B-4-1 B-4-7 B-4-12 B-4-15

ALL AL L ARMS COMBAT Close Combat Combat Support Combat Service Support Recent Lessons Identified

B-5-1 B-5-23 B-5-42 B-5-50

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CHAPTER 6 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 7 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 CHAPTER 8

CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS Introduction Planning an Attack The Stages of Offensive Action Urban Strike Operations

B-6-1  B-6-4  B-6-7  B-6-15

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS Introduction The Elements of a Defensive Operation The Use of Delay in Defensive Operations Enhanced Blast Weapons

B-7-1 B-7-1  B-7-10 B-7-14

STABIL STABILITY ITY OPERATION OPERATIONS S

Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

Introduction Factors for Consideration during Stability Operations Security and Control Initial Restoration of Essential Services and Facilities Interim Governance Tasks

B-8-1 B-8-2 B-8-4 B-8-6 B-8-7

Section 6

Military Support to Security Sector Reform

B-8-7

PART C – URBAN COMBAT SKILLS CHAPTER 9 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7 Section 8 Section 9 Section 10 CHAPTER 10 Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5 Section 6 Section 7

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COMBAT SKILL S Camouflage and Concealment Fighting Positions Movement Entry Techniques Clearing Buildings Defended Localities Navigation in Built-Up Areas Casualty Evacuation Ammunition Resupply Isolated Personnel in the Urban Environment

C-9-1  C-9-3  C-9-11  C-9-16 C-9-27 C-9-32 C-9-34  C-9-35 C-9-37 C-9-39

WEAPON EFFECTS EFFECTS   Introduction Small Arms Grenades Heavier Infantry Direct Fire Weapons Tank Weapons Indirect Fire Weapons CBRN

C-10-1 C-10-2 C-10-4 C-10-5 C-10-6 C-10-7 C-10-7

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CHAPTER 11

SUBTERRA SUBTERRANEAN NEAN OPERATIONS

C-11-1

CHAPTER 12

NIGHT OPERATIONS

C-12-1

CHAPTER 13

THE USE OF OBSTA OBSTACLES CLES IN URBA N OPERATIONS

Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Section 5

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Introduction Lethal and Non-Lethal Obstacles Mines Demolitions Booby Traps

C-13-1 C-13-1 C-13-2 C-13-3 C-13-4   C-13-4

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URBAN URBA N OPERATIONS PART A URBAN WARFARE

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  CHAPTER 1 SECTION 1 – THE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF URBAN WARFARE ‘The future of war is not the son of Desert Storm, but the stepchild of Chechnya.’ General Charles C Krul Kr ulak, ak, US USMC MC   1. Whereas 2% of humanity lived in urban areas in 1800, 47% of the world’s population do now and by 2030 2030 this figure is estimated to grow to above 60%. In developing nations nations,, the current trend towards conurbations with 10 million or more inhabitants is expected to continue. Land Forces should expe expect ct to ope operate rate routinely in urban areas, where the adversary operates amongst the population and where cultural understanding and sensitivity will be crucial to military success. Land Force Forces s need to be appropriately structured, equipped and trained to understand the constraints and exploit the opportunities presented by such complex battlespace. 2. Potential enemies recognise the inherent danger and complexity of the urban environment to the outsider and may view it as their best chance to negate the technological and firepower advantage of modern armed forces, possibly as a component of hybrid warfare1. 3. An intelligent enemy will exploit this benefit in a number of ways. The urban environment gives him the opportunity to cause a significant number of casualties that will damage both the morale of his oppon opponents ents and the sup support port of their domestic electorate. electorate. He may incite mistakes mistakes and over-reaction against the civilian po population. pulation. Above all, he will strive to seize and retain the initiative or at least delay his opponents’ attempts to do the same. He fully understands tha thatt his conflict is fought ‘amongst the people’ and, espec especially ially in large conurbations, he will attempt to capitalize on his endeavours both internally through direct influence of the local population and externally through indirect influence of the world community facilitated by the ever present media. 4. The same skills required to defeat an enemy in a complex, modern urban environment will also be required in other situations where the enemy makes use of mud built houses or subterranean subterranean tunnels. Such skills demand a high level of training, all arms co-operation and judicious and comprehensive use of all the resources available. 5. Non-combatants present a particular difficulty in urban warfare as operations are likely to be fought fought amongst the civilian population. Their presence d demands emands a v variety ariety of additional skills and resources in order to gain their support and to prevent them from both interfering with our own operations and providing willing or unwilling succour to the enemy. 6. Irregular opponents and complex terrain mean that engagements are often fought at low levels with outcomes determined by initiative, resolution, firmness, skill, courage and, above all, sound leadership.

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The Land Warfare Centre working definition of hybrid warfare is,   ‘Asymmetric ‘Asymmetric   strategies waged by 1 1 operationally integrated  integrated hybrid adversaries, adopting a broad range of  modes of conflict , methods in warfare , and types of technolog technology/capabilities, y/capabilities,   whose tactically fused actions will usually be synchronised for strategic 1 effect, and which usually take place in a populated battlespace  within within  complex terrain’ terrain’.

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  7. The high density of communication and information systems in the urban environment favours favours the rapid and widespread disse dissemination mination of in information. formation. Information and news will spread like wildfire, whether intended or not. This carries the risk that the situation is misjudged by rumour or deliberately propagated misinformation and that, consequently, wrong decisions are made. 8. The worldwide use of the English language and developed communications systems of all sorts will enable even the most backward insurgent or enemy to interfere with insecure communications systems and take advantage of poor voice procedure and security. The insurgent is able, with currently available technology, ins instantaneously tantaneously and and effectively to coordinate his operations, fires and activities against a conventional opponent over a wide time and space continuum. SECTION 2 – THE NATURE OF URBAN OPERATIONS BACKGROUND   BACKGROUND 9. The UK should expect urban operations to be an integral and principal part of any military campaign. In the final instance, military campaigns campaigns may well be won won or lost in the urban environment.  environment.  Military operations require UK, coalition and allied forces to conduct a range of activities right across the spectrum of operations, from Military Assistance to Civil Effect (MACE), through Counter Insurgency (COIN) to Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA).  All these operations may take place place predominantly in urban areas. 10. Contemporary operations have been characterized as being ‘... ‘...confronted confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of 2 concept of a ‘Three Block War’ three adjacent city blocks’ – the ‘Three Block War ’ . The concept relates to military operations of varying intensity taking place in close proximity to each other. It demands the highest levels o off professional collective and individual individual competence at the same time as discipline, war-fighting skill, courage and leadership. THE SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS 11. offensive,, defensive and General.. The three principal land tactical activities are offensive General 3 stability operations . Any and a allll of these activities could take place place in built-up area areas, s, and the operational conduct of each will be affected by the urban environment. FIBUA is attritional in nature, costly in casualties and involves large amounts of resources, time and effort. Historically, the strategic a advantage dvantage of the early and rapid seizure of ground led to the operational military imperative imperative to bypass built up up areas. Sophisticated, long-ran long-range ge antiarmour defence tended to be based in the forward edges of villages and the leading edges of woods, designed to canalise armour into killing zones between towns and villages. Consequently, there was little need to prepare for fighting in built up areas. Experience over the last decades has shown that the advantage of conventional armed forces is largely negated in the the urban en environment. vironment. The future ope operational rational environment will demand the highest levels of skill on the part of all military forces to defeat his enemy who will often be

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  The ‘Three Block War’  was a concept devised by Gen Charles Krulak in the late 1990s to describe the complex spectrum of challenges likely to be faced by soldiers on the modern battlefield. In three contiguous city blocks soldiers may be required to conduct full scale military action, peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief.  3  Army Doctrine Publication, Land Operations, DGD&D, AC 71819.

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  operating on his home territory while, if necessary, gaining and retaining the support of the indigenous population. 12. environment he heavily avily Offensive Operations. Operations . Conventional operations in an urban environment 4 favour the defence. Historical evidence   suggests that to capture and hold a city the attacker may require an adv advantage antage of 5:1 or 6:1. Three tactical c concepts, oncepts, Penetration, Penetration, Thrust and Saturation, should be considered for use in offensive operations. a. Penetration..  Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly Penetration defined objectives, either enemy or terrain, that can be secured, defended and subsequently used as forward operating bases. b. b.   Urban thrust is focused on attacking an enemy on a narrow axis Thrust .  Thrust. of advance. The thrust maximizes combat power at the point of the attac attack k with a view to upsetting the enemy balance, capturing ground and forcing the enemy to withdraw. c. Saturation..  Urban saturation is a similar tactic to that used by police forces Saturation responding to an emergency and requiring b backup. ackup. The s saturation aturation concept considers numerous fire teams or section-sized units operating in a dispersed, noncontiguous fashion fashion in the urban environment. As these u units nits patrol their ass assigned igned area, they have to be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by neighbouring teams. 13. built-up areas, the concept of defensive o operations perations Defensive De fensive Opera Operatio tio ns ns.. In large built-up should be mobile and should exploit depth, with the defender concentrating on moving forces from key terrain features or buildings to other similar features, to counter the main enemy thrust and to maximise his w weapons’ eapons’ capabilities. Although the principles employed are the same as for other defensive operations, the differences lie in the techniques employed and the the prioritisation and emp emphasis hasis on essen essential tial features. These are: a. To give early warning of the intention to defend a built-up area. This is essential to enable the necessary pre-positioning of Combat Supplies and other defence materiel. b. When time permits, to ensure that planning for the defence is detailed and centralised. Since most actions are conducted by small units, control is decentralised. Detailed Intelligen Intelligence ce Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) will be essential and has to include types of building construction, routes through and around the battlefield, including underground systems, and civilian communications facilities and utilities. The defen defence ce should seek to exploit the three dimens dimensional ional nature of urban operations. 14. operations s are planned planned continuo continuously usly and conducted Stabilit Sta bilit y Ope Operations rations.. Stability operation concurrently with offensiv offensive e and defensive operations. They a are re defined as military operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms mechanisms of gov government. ernment. These operations will include Peace K Keeping, eeping, Peace Enforcement, Conflict Prevention, Humanitarian Assistance, Irregular Warfare, PostConflict Reconstruction and Non-Combatant Evacuation. The training requirements 4

 Russian wars in Chechnya (Grozny) 1994, 2000.

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  involved in the preparation for involvement in stability operations can be found in Army Field Manual Volume 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’. SECTION 3 – THE NATURE OF URBAN TERRAIN 15. Civilisation is in the middle of a surge of u urbanisation rbanisation with m more ore than a dozen new ‘mega cities’ and slums slums having bee been n established in the las lastt two decades. One of Africa’s largest slums is in Nairobi Nairobi and is home to so some me 750,000 peop people. le. The population the there re is growing by 5% each each year and it is wid widely ely believed to be close to crisis. Municipal wastecollection rates dropped from 90% in 197 1978 8 to 33% in 1998. When it rains rains,, storm water washes the accumulated accumulated waste into the water sourc sources es used by the poo poor. r. Yet Nairobi is not exceptional by international standards. Conditions such as these are the main reason why, every day, there occur about 6,000 deaths around the world from water-borne diseases. Despite all this, people people are moving to cities in droves. droves. In 1950, two-thirds o off the world’s population lived in rural areas. New York City was then the only settlemen settlementt with more than ten million people. people. Today there are twenty such mega-cities and more are on the way. Most of these mega-cities are in developing countries that are struggling to cope with both the speed and the scale scale of human migration. Estimates of the future spread of of urbanisation are based on the observation that in Europe, and in the Americas, the urban share of the total population has has stabilised at 7 75-85%. 5-85%. If the rest of the world follows this pa path, th, it is expected that in the course of the next decade an extra 100 million people will join the cities of Africa and 340 million the cities of Asia – the equivalent of a new Bangkok every two months. By 2030 it is es estimated timated that nearly two-thirds of the world’s popu population lation will be living in urban areas.

Fig A-1-1 The Surge of Urbanisation Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  16. History also shows that the transition can be uncomfortable. The slums of Manchester were, in their their time, just as awful as those those of Nairobi today. But people move there for exactly the same reason; however nasty conditions seem, the opportunities of urban life outstrip those of the countryside. 17. Some experts indicate that governments, international donors and aid agencies spend too much much on rural development development and neglect neglect the cities. Most states hav have e a rural development policy, policy, but only a few have urban one ones. s. Moreover, these exp experts erts point out that, although rural areas often have worse sanitation, greater illiteracy and homelessness than cities, such figures are deceptive deceptive.. Being illiterate, h homeless omeless or without acces access s to unpolluted water are far more serious problems in a crowded city than in the countryside. In many rapidly developing cities, the slums and shanty towns are growing twice as fast as the whole city. Worldwide, more than one one billion urban dw dwellers ellers live in inadequ inadequate ate housing. These neighbourhoods are characterised by newly arriving rural immigrants building haphazard shanties shanties on squatter plots. plots. Such slums be become come epicentres o off unrest, disease and hunger and are focal points for aid relief and efforts to improve or demand change. However, operations in these areas can be more difficult than in a high rise city centre due to transient populations populations and tempo temporary rary structures. The conditions in urban areas will give rise to grievances and long standing rivalries and could well be the cause of future political instability. It is reas reasonable onable to anticipate that future military operations, conv conventional entional or otherwise, will have to focus more on on undeveloped slums in and around major cities. Sadr City in Baghdad is one example. URBAN CHARACTERIST CHARACTERISTICS ICS 18. Built-up areas are characterized by density of construction and population, street patterns, compartmentalization, affluent and poor sections, modernization and the presence of utility systems. The differen differences ces are in size size,, level of dev development elopment and sty style. le. A typic typical al urban area consists of the following elements:

Fig A-1-2 Exampl Example e of a T Tow own n Ce Cent ntre, re, N Newry ewry,, N Nor orth thern ern Ireland, 200 2006 6 Issue 4.0: Oct 09

A-1-5

 

  a. the e core has undergone more recent developme development nt City Core. Core. In most cities, th than the core periphe periphery. ry. As a result, the two regions are often quite different. Typical city cores of today are made up of high-rise buildings which vary greatly in height. Modern planning for built-up areas allows for more open space spaces s between buildings than in old city cores or in core p peripheries. eripheries. Outlying high-rise a areas reas are dominated by this open construction style more than city cores. b. Commercial ribbon development includes rows of Commercial Ribbon. Ribbon . stores, shops and restaurants that are built along both sides of major streets through built-up areas. areas. Usually such such streets are wide and ope open. n. The buildin buildings gs are uniformly two to three storeys tall – about one storey taller than the dwellings on the streets behind them. c. The core periphery consists of streets with continuous Core Periphery. Periphery . solidly constructed buildings. d. sprawl prawl and outlying indu industrial strial areas consist of Outlying Areas. Areas . Residential s low buildings that are normally detached and arranged in irregular patterns along the streets with many open areas

Fig A-1A-1-3 3 Re Resid sid ential S Sprawl prawl e. underground erground s systems ystems that Subterranean . It is not so easy to categorise the und abound in cities and towns, and which provide an additional dimension to urban operations. Most European houses have cellars, usually s self-contained, elf-contained, which differ with the type of building. Many towns h have ave sewage systems or, les less s commonly, conduits for electric or telephone cables which are large enough to permit passage of troops. Some cities have u underground nderground railways or rivers. It is imp important ortant to be aware of the tactical implications i mplications of any underground systems.

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  f. orr the Historical City Centre. Centre. For towns, particularly the centre of towns o older parts of the town, the houses are normally closely packed with smaller streets and open areas laid o out ut in an irregula irregularr manner. Outside the town a more modern and methodical layout can be assumed.  assumed.  g. compact, ct, usually comprising a few Villages.. Most villages are small and compa Villages streets with one central street where any shops and offices may be situated.  Although there may be much open land around a village, within tthe he village itself the density of housing and construction could well be the same as for a town.  town. 

Fig A-1-4 A-1-4 Village of Mud D Dwelli welli ngs, Afghanis tan

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  SECTION 4 - OTHER FACTORS IN BUILT UP AREAS TERRAIN 19. Urban terrain is complicated. The primary impact of urban terrain is that it limits individual fields of view. A soldier in an urban environment could find himself fighting almost alone or with perhaps only one or two other men from his section within sight. The enemy could be 20 cm away behind a wall, cognisant of of his prese presence, nce, or no not. t. A family o off non-combatants could be similarly situated. Movement is canalised by doors, stairways, alleyways, streets, roads, walls and fences; some provide provide p protection, rotection, som some e do not. The enemy could be in front of him, behind him, above him or below him, and he will not know. His sense of direction will be dis distorted torted by the way the streets are laid out, and his hearing will be affected by the noise of battle echoed and distorted by buildings. The sound of rifle shots will ricochet like the rounds themselves and he will not know from where they were fired. He will not always be able to see his commander or necessarily necessarily know where he is. Using his radio will frequently be impossible impossible and voice co contact ntact difficult, d dangerous angerous o orr pointless. The adva advantage ntage will always start with the defender who will know the ground better than his opponent, will have prepared his fields of fire and obstacles and is at home in his warren. 20. Classic urban operations training has focused on the difficulties of fighting in first world villages, towns and cities. The problem problems s posed by the potential western urban battlefield have been exacerbated by the growth of multi-story urban cores, residential, commercial and industrial areas and subterranean levels. The contemporary urban environment could also include the complete spectrum of habitation from large, unmodernised towns crowded by small streets and alleyways, through underdeveloped slums in and around rapidly developing cities, to mud huts and jungle villages.  villages.  21. Operating in built up areas is exacerbated by difficulties beyond war-fighting. Inadequate housing in slums and shanty towns, neighbourhoods characterised by rural immigration and by haphazard shanties on squatter plots will become epicentres of unrest, disease and and hunger. Even relatively low levels of damage to urban infrastructure can cause serious problems problems to water supply, se sewage wage disposal an and d to communication link links. s. The efficiency, health and survivability of the soldier as well as the non-combatant will all be affected and threatened. 22. All arms fighting in built up areas is very likely to cause collateral damage. The damage to buildings of all types will create difficulties for the movement of vehicles and troops and can cause cause fundamental change changes s to the topography of the urba urban n terrain. Rather than enable the destruction of the enemy, our use of heavy and support weapons can provide him with improved obstacles to conventional offensive military operations, with cleared fields of fire and imp improved roved defensive protection. The nature o off operations ca can n Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  radically alter the terrain in a built-up area in a short period. Incidental or intentional demolition of structures can change the topography of an area and destroy reference points, create obstacles to mobility and provide additional defensive positions for defenders.

Fig A-1-5 A-1-5 High Rise Re Resident sident ial Area, G Grozny, rozny, Chechnya THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT  ENVIRONMENT   23. Operations, especially those of an urban nature, are conducted amongst the people and in the presence of th the e media. As well as providing the enemy with the chance to reduce the technological advantage of his opponent and cause him significant casualties, the urban environment allows the enemy to provoke mistakes by conventional forces against the civilian population, such as over-reaction, collateral damage against their homes, disruption of vital facilities, large-scale arrests and the break-up of families and communities. Fighting in pop population ulation centres giv gives es give the enemy a c chance hance to win the battle for the “hearts and and minds” of the non-combatant civilians. Moreover, objective an and d subjective media reporting provides opportunities for the enemy to gain the initiative and prevent his opponents from doing so.   24. The populations of la large rge cities and towns throughout the world are dense and complicated. Unlike rural inhabita inhabitants, nts, discrete urba urban n dwellers are permitted permitted an anonymity anonymity wherein they can foster a distorted view of the general good. Soldiers involved in u urban rban operations must understand the historical background and aspirations of the different networks of the urban society in which they operate, be prepared to anticipate people’s reaction to events and expect to be able exploit their knowledge by the way they operate. 25.  An on ym i ty . In an urban environment the insurgent or terrorist can remain anonymous. The urban environmen environmentt can provide the home a and nd background for the friend friends s and relations who who can provid provide e his cover. By using disg disguise uise or subterfuge subterfuge,, the enemy combatant or foreign fighter can immerse himself into the indig indigenous enous population. population. Being Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  anonymous, the enemy can plan and conduct operations more easily and without risk of compromise. He or she can undertake offensive actions for longer and more precisely than in conventional warfare, often under direct view, but without the knowledge of the external force. 26. increases ases the difficulty of Density of Population. Population . The density of urban population incre the identification of the foe, facilitates the initiation of terrorist actions, enables the use of willing or unwilling human shields an and d makes atrocities more effective. The presence of numerous civilians results in many becoming casualties, as a result of both the primary effects of munitions and the secondary effects such as collapsing structures and flying glass. 27. Information and Influence. Influence. The presence of the media in built up areas can be exploited by the enemy. The enemy needs the oxygen of publicity to survive and win. The effects of his actions can be disseminated rapidly around the globe in the presence of the media. A clever enemy will also exploit the me media dia to place his opponent in a bad light. CIVILIANS   CIVILIANS 28. The term ‘civilian population’ refers to all civilians living in the area of operations who are not members of the the armed conflicting pa parties. rties. It includes formal, informal, nationa nationall and international organisations and groups, as well as government and non-government organisations. Neither the civilian population nor ind individuals ividuals uninvolve uninvolved d in combat can can be made the target of attack. 29. History has shown that p people eople invariably will no nott or cannot leave the u urban rban environment even when when it becomes the scene of intense military combat. The presence of possibly large numbers of uninvolved people may thus be a characteristic feature of urban operations, and tactics and operations must take account of this fact.

Fig A-1-8 Civilians 30. The attitudeoperations. of the civilian population will have a decisive impact on the planning and conduct of military

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  MAPPING AND DIGITAL DIGITAL MAPPING DATA 31.  Conventional urban cartography will not necessarily provide sufficient detail, 31.  currency or accuracy fo forr an ade adequate quate terrain analysis of built-up areas. Consideration should therefore be given to the use of intelligence gathering systems to get the best information. Image maps are re regularly gularly produced alon along g with some overlay overlay information, such as roads and key buildings in order to provide the most up to date mapping for urban operations. However users s should hould be aware of the disad disadvantages vantages of imagery over conventional mapping namely; loss of detail due to glare, shadow, vegetation and snow and the potential displacement of buildings due to height. 32. Other than by the study of o open pen source internet information, which may be out of date or inaccurate, electronic intelligence-gathering systems will not always be able to quickly capture information about the sewer, subway and underground water systems that an enemy can use for individual a and nd group infiltration and movement. The capacity a and nd capability of elevated railways and major transit routes to carry troops and vehicles will be critical to operational planning. Knowledge about fuel and gas supply and s storage torage facilities, electric power stations and emergency systems, and mass communications facilities is critical to the urban battle and there are country-wide infrastructure booklets available from the Defence Intelligence Services (DIS) or other military sources. 33. Certain public buildings need to be identified during the Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) phase of an IPB IPB.. Hospitals, clinics, surgical facilities facilities,, buildings that that may pos pose e a RADIAC hazard and religious buildings will need to be treated according to the laws of war and the rules of engagement. Public utilities, such as power stations and water processing plants, must be identified and careful consideration given to whether or not they should be targeted. Lack of water, for example, c could ould well force population movement to seek adequate supplies resulting in both hindrance to military operations and the distracting requirement to avert humanitarian problems. The locations o off civil defence facilities, such as air raid shelters, and food supplies will similarly affect operations. 34. Public stadia, parks, sports fields, school playgrounds and other open areas will offer all troops, in particular snipers, relatively good visibility of their targets and must be noted. Such areas can also provide civilian holding areas, interrogation centres, insurgent segregation areas and and prisoner of war holding facilities. These open areas can provide the opportunity for re-supply by air and consideration must be given to their protection from fire and view. 35. Construction sites and commercial operations such as warehouses, building supply depots and railway maintenance yards, can serve as primary sources of construction materials when rubble is not present or insufficient. 36. Roads, rivers, streams and bridges can provide suitable avenues of movement. Public baths, swimming swimming facilities and ciste cisterns rns are useful in p providing roviding bathing facilities. They also provide an alternative water source in the event of the breakdown of public utilities. WEATHER  WEATHER  37. Some consequences of weather effects are peculiar to an urban environment and will affect tactical considerations.

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  38.

Precipitation.. Precipitation a. Heavy precipitation can destroy roads, railways, bridges and other structures, particularly those in close proximity to waterways. b. Rain or melting snow can flood basements and subway systems. If automatic pumping facilities that normally handle rising water levels are deprived of power, storm drains and other sewer systems will become hazardous or impassable. c. Chemical agents may be washed into underground systems by precipitation. Systems may contain agent concentrations much higher than surface areas and become contaminated contaminated ‘ho ‘hott spots’. These e effects ffects becom become e more pronounced as agents are absorbed by permeable sewer walls.

39.

Visibility..  Visibility a. Air inversion layers are common over low lying cities located in depressions or in river valleys. Inversion layers trap dust, chemical age agents nts and other pollutants, reducing visibility, and also creating a rise in ground and air temperature. b.

Many large urban areas are located on rivers and river junctions. Rivers,

canals and waterways often create a potential for fog in the low lying areas. 40. through gh city streets and their effect on high Wind.. The channelling of strong winds throu Wind rise buildings may present difficulties and have an adverse effect on the conduct of operations.

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CHAPTER 2 SECTION 1 - URBAN COALITION OPERATIONS “The requirement for successful military operations will remain based on skill, courage, character and resources: but there is a new element, multinationality, which has more potential, particularly in terms of human resource, than anything that preceded it.”  it.”  RUSI RU SI Jour nal, Apr 199 1996, 6, “ Pa Partn rtn ership for Peace Peace”” , Lt Col PJF S Schof chof ield RGJ. COALITION OPERATION OPERATIONS S 1. UK urban operations may be conducted as part of an international response to a crisis, under a UN mandate for example, as part of a formal military alliance such as NATO or as a coalition coalition of international partners. The UK could be in a leading role with other nations’ forces OPCOM, OPCON or TACOM, or it might be subordinated to another nation or multinational headquarters. A formation or battlegroup involved in such operations operations should expect close military interaction at all levels with headquarters, commanders, staff, units and sub-units sub-units from other nations. nations. The danger and difficulty of fighting in the urban environment may be exacerbated by the unfamiliar experience of such intercultural reliance, and it is therefore vital that friction is minimised if all elements are to add value in an optimal manner. manner. This is best achieved by developing an understanding of of the other nations’ culture, doctrine and capabilities, preferably prior to deployment. 2.

The following are general considerations for UK Forces operating with other nations: a. planning ing Planning Practices. Practices . Superior HQs from other nations may expect plann practices that UK commanders may find prescriptive or perhaps only partially useful. Joint drills and planning procedures should be confirmed and rehearsed, and acronyms explained and understood. Commanders should make personal confirmation of the mission and e execution xecution of u urban rban operations. There may be a requirement for additional Reports and Returns and shared SOIs and SOPs. b. The Chain of Command. Command . Units attached to other nations during urban operations may lack the support of an appropriate intermediate command and may require higher HQ functions1. There may be n no o ded dedicated icated UK L Legal egal Advisor. National Political Caveats in urban operations may oblige units to adjust operational plans at short notice. Headquarters’ establishments m may ay have to be increased. Consideration should be given to the use of liaison officers at appropriate levels of command to improve operational situation awareness. c. Rules of Engagement (ROE). (ROE). ROE may vary between allies, affecting tactics and and ope operational rational proc procedures. edures. Pre-operational a agreements greements must inc include lude a commonly understood ROE matrix. d. Equipment   Interoperability Interoperability.. Complete equipment interoperability is an unrealistic aspiration. aspiration. However, c capabilities apabilities utilizing the electromagnetic electromagnetic spe spectrum ctrum must at the very least avoid mutual interference, and should where possible offer a

1

  For example in Joint Fires, expanded J2, J5, HUMINT, HUMINT, ISTAR, Battlespace Logistics and Planning,

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workable degree of interoperability. Where this is not possible, co consideration nsideration must be given to modifying or replacing existing equipment, or indeed procuring new capabilities. The first priority for a any ny headqu headquarters arters acting within a coalition is to ensure that there is IT and co communications mmunications interope interoperability. rability. Other areas that m must ust be considered include intelligence databases, ECM and force tracking systems.  systems.  Although not a formal alliance, the armies of ABCA nations have e.  AB CA 2. served together on numerous numerous occasions. The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook (COH) provides general advice on coalition operations and specific guidance on urban operations. SECTION 2 - OPERATING UNDER US COMMAND

Fig A-2-1 US T Task ask For Force ce 2-2 Tactic al Operatio n Centr Centre, e, F Fallu allu jah 2004 2004   3. In the case of major combat operations, strategic guidance3 states that the UK is to be prepared to provide a co combat mbat division to w work ork within a US corps. Similar but lower levels of subordination might occur. The US Army has identified the generic military capabilities needed to support the types of possible operational relationships between the US and allied/coalition forces in urban o operations. perations. The list is not ex exhaustive haustive4, but includes: a.

Integrated multinational command and control.

b.

Interoperable communications and information systems.

2

  An organization promoting interoperability between the armies of America, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 3  Defence Strategic Guidance, 2008. 4

 Further detail can be sought from the US Army Multination Force Compatibil Compatibility ity Concept and the US Army International Activities Plan (AIAP).

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c.

Common situational awareness.

d.

Collaborative planning.

e.

Integrated coalition combat identification system.

f.

Integrated battlespace management.

g.

Exchange of intelligence and classified information.

4. When operating under US command in the urban environment UK elements should request the appropriate appropriate levels of resources to achieve full interoperability. Units should ensure: a.

Close and adequate integration in the superior headquarters.

b.

Sufficient US representation in UK headquarters.

c.

Passage of information and data exchange. exchange.  

d.

Understanding of the specialised use of information technology. technology.  

e.

Exploitation of intelligence and ISTAR assets.

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CHAPTER 3 MILITARY INTERACTION WITH THE CIVILIAN POPU POPULA LATION TION SECTION 1 - THE STATUS OF CIVILIANS THE PRESENCE OF CIVILIANS 1. The presence of civilians complicates the conduct of operations, and civilians abound in urban areas. In many cases, p people eople will not or cannot leave the urban environment even even when it b becomes ecomes the scene of inten intense se military conflict. Their presence has a significant and not necessarily negative impact on the planning and conduct of operations. For example, a com commander mander should a attempt ttempt to capitalize on their presence presence by shaping their attitudes, but he may be constrained in his freedom of action by both his mandatory obligations and any discretionary commitments in respect of their welfare and benefits.

Fig A-3-1 Bloody Sunday, Lond onderr onderry, y, 30 Ja January nuary 19 1972 72 2. The term ‘civilian population’ refers primarily, but not exclusively, to the indigenous inhabitants, but not only them. them. It also refers to all civilians present in the area of operations operations who are not members of the armed conflicting pa parties. rties. It includes formal, informal, national and international organisations and groups as well as government and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). According to the Law of Armed C Conflict onflict (LOAC), neither the civilian population nor individuals uninvolved in combat can be made the target of attack.

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NON-COMBATANTS, PERSONS ACCOMPANYING THE ARMED FORCES AND CIVILIANS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 3. Under the LOAC, some members of armed forces, such as medical personnel and chaplains, are classified as non-combatants and do not have the right to take a direct part in hostilities1. 4. are Persons the armed Examples forces withare an civ identity card authorizing them to do so treated as aaccompanying s PWs when captured. civilian ilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units and personnel manning service organisations responsible for the welfare of the armed forces2. 5. Civilian combatants who take up arms against an invading enemy force without time to form regular armed forces (levée ( levée en masse)  masse)  are entitled to PW status if they wear a fixed, distinctive insignia that can be seen at a distance; carry their weapons openly; and operate according according to the rules and cus customs toms of warfare. Other civilians who provid provide e assistance to such groups may or may not be entitled to status as combatants, depending on whether or not they are actually members o off the resistance group. When dealing with such individuals they should be treated as PW until a higher authority determines their status. 6. Armed civilian groups that do not meet the criteria of a legal resistance as described above, or individuals caught in the act of sabotage, terrorism, or espionage are not legal combatants. If captured, they may be c considered onsidered criminals under the provisions of the LOAC. They are to be treated human humanely ely and with res respect, pect, but should be interned in a facility separate from that in which PWs are held. When poss possible, ible, they should be transferred to the local local police as quick quickly ly as possible. Reprisals, mass pun punishments, ishments, taking of hostages, corporal punishment, pillage and destruction are prohibited. SECTION 2 - MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY CIVIL OBLIGATIONS 7. Military ilitary Co Cooperation operation (CIMIC) sta staff ff and the Legal Advisor General.. The Civil M General (LEGAD) have the responsibility to advise the commander about his legal and moral obligations to the civilian population. This requiremen requirementt can be fulfilled by CIMIC staff conducting coordination coordination for the health and w well ell being of civilians. It can include the reestablishment of water systems, the distribution of available food stocks, clothing and medical supplies and the establishment of displaced persons, refugee and evacuee camps. If the civil government is not functioning, it is the commander’s responsibility to conduct evacuation planning planning and to provide for the well being of the c civilian ivilian population. He should do this only with those internal assets already available. 8. between tween CIMIC staff and, where san sanctioned, ctioned, Hos Hostt Nation (HN) Liaison.. Liaison be Liaison government departments, promotes the conduct and success of urban operations. 9. Responsibilities. The primary responsibility of the CIMIC staff is the co-ordination of activities necessary for the evacuation of civilians from the battle area. This is accomplished in two separate but supporting actions: 1 2

 JSP 383, Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, paragraph 4.2.2.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoner of War (GC III), Art 4.

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a. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with the military police and, where present and friendly, local police, in plannin planning g civilian eva evacuations. cuations. Such evacuations are, where possible, geographically de-conflicted with military operations. b. CIMIC staff co-ordinate with Psychological Operations (Psyops) staff, local government officials, radio and television stations, newspapers and others, to publicise the evacuation plan. 10. Relations with the Media. Media. While free access by the media to units in the field is desirable, operational security, existing guidelines and rules of engagement considerations take first priority. All members of the media v visiting isiting the operation operational al theatre must must have an escort officer. Ensuring that the media follows the established guideline guidelines s and unders understand tand the rules of engagement will help prevent negative publicity that could jeopardize the operation. Consideration sho should uld be given to u units nits appointing a represe representative ntative to serve as a point of contact with the local population, in order to deal with their concerns. LAW LA W OF A RMED CONF CONFLICT LICT CONSIDER CONSIDERATIONS ATIONS   11. the e main purp purposes oses of th the e LOAC is to protect civ civilians ilians from the General.. One of th General effects of hostilities. Civilians may be reluctant or unable to leave their homes, homes, and their presence must be considered considered in the planning and conduct of urban operations. operations. The impact of civilians in the urban battlespace will affect: a. area rea in numbers will cau cause se bloc blockages kages Mobility.. Refugees fleeing the urban a Mobility on routes routes us used ed or targeted by the military. Plans should be ma made de to provide alternative routes that will have to be broadcast, marked and controlled, although there is no guarantee that the population will do wha whatt it is told. Help from any local authorities should be sought. b. Firepower .  The principle of proportionality must guide the commander in his planning decisions. decisions. The LOAC draws distinctions between military personnel and their resources and civilians and their possessions, including their homes, religious buildings and communities. communities. Commanders must do everything p possible ossible to minimise civilian casualties and minimise collateral damage caused to civilian property and possessions. The presence of civilians will influence the choice of w weapon eapon systems or munitions to achieve the necessary military effect as well as the designation of no-fire and restricted-fire areas. c. obstacles stacles in the urban environment will Protection.. The types of defensive ob Protection be limited by the presence presence of civilians. Minefields must be ma marked rked and guarded to 3 prevent unwitting entry by anyone .  LEGAL ADVICE 12. Legal advice is offered to the formation commander through the Legal Advisor (LEGAD) on his staff. staff. The LEGAD provid provides es support on operational law issu issues es including ROE, LOAC, use of force, and and captured personn personnel. el. Additionally, the LEGAD will have an understanding of host nation law and other policy guidelines that may apply. 3

 The UK is a party to the Ottawa Convention 1997 and possession or use of anti-personnel landmines is prohibited. The use of anti-tank mines mines is permitted in some cases. Minefields cannot be used to designate refugee routes. (JSP 383 6.13 – 6.14).

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LEGAL AUTHORITY AUTHORITY   13. The limits of the authority of a commander must be understood. Where UK forces are present in a state by virtue of an invitation from the government of that state, the actions of the commander must fall within the mission mandate and not infringe the sovereign powers of the government. When there is no ru ruling ling government, the a authority uthority of the commander may reach further and will encompass the civil tasks that would otherwise be met by the th Host Nation h government. commander r will need that de degree gree of authority necessary toe acc accomplish omplish his is mission mission.. AA commande host government, where po possible, ssible, remains responsible for the safety and well-being of the civilian population. 14. Commanders at all levels are responsible for protecting civilians and their property to the maximum extent possible. possible. Looting, vandalism, ex excessive cessive collateral da damage mage and brutal treatment of civilians are all strictly prohibited and individuals who commit such acts may be in breach of the LO LOAC AC and military law. The religions and customs of the c civilian ivilian population must be treated with respect. Women, particularly, should be protected against any form of abuse. abuse. Operations in built-up a areas reas may result in complex situations that that may require further legal adv advice. ice. Certain con control trol measures such as road block blocks, s, curfews curfews,, escorts, buffer zones and no-go areas should be considered to ensure the safety and well being of civilian communities. 15. Civilian property and possessions must be respected and not attacked. Private property must be respected. The requirement to respect private prop property erty is subject to the conditions of the conflict. For example, military operations inevitably cause damage to private property. In some c cases, ases, forces are entitled to requisition property for necessary military purposes. purposes. Still, the principle of re respect spect is important. Moreover, specific guidance should be issued for the procedures armed forces must follow if and when requisitioning is considered necessary. necessary. A note detailing the use of or damage to civilian property shou should ld be kept or given to the owner so that he has evidence of a claim if compensation for use or damage becomes becomes availab available. le. In some c cases, ases, use of homes or property requires that payment be made. In some circumstances, an occupying force may requisition commodities. 16. The presence of d deployed eployed troops should be under the authority of a p politically olitically brokered mandate that will provide the force with legitimacy and define how it may conduct operations. 17. The legal authority of the commander over civilian government officials and the civilian populace must be determine determined d rapidly. The host nation’s responsibility for its own population can affect the comm commander’s ander’s authority in civil-military matters. In areas where where the local government’s authority is limited, the commander may be required to assume greater responsibility for the safety and well being of the civilian population. CONTROL MEASURES MEASURES   18. A commander may enforce control measures to conduct operations, maintain security, or to ensure the safety and well-being of the civilians, as follows: a. could establish a curfew to maintain Curfew..  A commander defending a town could Curfew security or to aid the control of military traffic. The curfew ma may y not be impo imposed sed as a

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punishment; it would would not be lega legal. l. A curfew should be imposed th through rough the offices of the civilian authority, if present and effective. b. Evacuation..  If the purpose is to use buildings or quarters for operational Evacuation reasons, to enhance security or to safeguard civilians, the commander can require the evacuation evacuation of civilians. If he doe does s so, he must specify and safeguard the evacuation route. route. Food, clothing and sanitary facilities should be provided at their destination until the evacuees can provide for themselves. c. Forced Labour .  The LOAC prohibits the use of civilians in combat. However, civilians can be used if the operational requirement demands it as long as it is out of contact. contact. Guidelines for the u use se of civilian lab labour our should be published by the appropriate formation commander after seeking higher authority. The commander may oblige civilians over the age of 18 years to work, and permitted  jobs could include the maintenance of public utilities, so long as those utilities are not used in the general conduct o off operations. Jobs can also include services to the local population such such as care of the wou wounded nded and burial of the dea dead. d. Civilians can be obliged to help evacuate and care for military wounded, so long as it does not involve any physical danger. Prohibited jobs include digging entrenchments, constructing fortifications, transporting supplies or acting as guards. Civilian volunteers can, nevertheless, be employed in such work. SECTION 3 - CIVILIA N FACTORS “In June 2006, US Army and US Marine Corps units and elements of the Iraqi Army commenced Operation Together Forward, the attack to regain coalition control over Ramadi. Instead of a classical approach to urban warfare involving overwhelming use of forces and firepower, Coalition Forces opted for an operational design built around the concept: Clear-Hold-Build. Clear-Hold-Build. Coalition forces attacked Ram Ramadi adi from three sides (the fou fourth rth being protected by a river). Along each axis of attack, the objective was fairly shallow – just deep enough to establish a new Combat Outpost (COP). As soon as the COP was established and security in place, efforts shifted to training and introducing Iraqi Police and  Army units.   Additionally, Civil Military Operations Centers were introduced and local works projects were begun. begun. Once all of this had be been en initiated, Coalition Forces and Iraqi forces would leave enough force behind to ensure continued security and would commence another shallow attack wh where ere the process was rep repeated. eated. Without a doubt th this is proces process s lasted longer than than alternative approac approaches; hes; however, the advantages we were re clear. The Iraqi Police and Army were given as much responsibility responsibility as they could handle. handle. This Iraqi face on operations built confidence in Government of Iraq’s ability to provide security. Cleared areas were held, instead of simply captured and then abandoned. This provided continuous security throughout cleared parts of the city, and established the security backdrop that was vital to enabling the reconstruction reconstruction process to b begin. egin. Finally, a slower and m more ore deliberate approach, minimizing civilian casualties and collateral damage, built civil support not only for the operation, but for Coalition Forces” US LTC Matth Matthew ew J. Van Wagenen 1-37 1-3 7 AR Ta Task sk For ce, Ar Ramadi

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LOCAL GOVE GOVERNMEN RNMENT T 19. The military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a weak host nation government, or in the absence of a working indigenous or international administration. administration. This is particularly likely to be the case in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations, when the military may be the only organisation capable of delivering governance. 20. Such tasks may range from CIMIC liaison to the establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some responsibility for the provision of essential services. 21. The military sh should ould seek to ha hand nd re responsibility sponsibility for go governance vernance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be to establish the environment in which civil agencies can operate. 22. A close liaison and working relationship should be developed with local government police and military forces. forces. In addition to info information rmation on items of special interest, they m may ay provide information on the following: a.

The population

b.

The density of the built-up area

c.

Fire fighting capabilities

d.

The location of hazardous materials

e.

Security capabilities

f.

Civil evacuation plans

g.

Key public buildings.

They may also provide English interpreters. 23. Further advice about the provision of g governance overnance can be found in A Army rmy Field Manual, Volume 1, Part 9, Tactics for Stability Operations. FOOD 24. Rapid urbanisation in developing countries, including the wide-scale abandonment of rural life and family farms combined with undeveloped and inefficient industrial urban programmes and social infrastructure have frequently led to food shortage shortages. s. The military implications are significant. significant. As well as being the cause o off mass migration a and nd instability, food shortage leads to revolts and increased support for armed opposition groups. 25. Neutral, non-governmental organisations that supply food can be the target of armed factions and deployed troops may be required to provide and maintain humanitarian and

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food distribution networks. It could be the resp responsibility onsibility of deployed troops to provide life support to populations who could be providing succour to their opponents. DISEASE  DISEASE  26. Operating in the urban environment requires an efficient and comprehensive service infrastructure to remain healthy and s sound. ound. It needs clean water, food supp supplies, lies, sewage and theth associated socialininfrastructure counter disease and rubbish functiondisposal, properly. hospitals properly. In someand areas the e rapid growth urb urbanisation anisation to has ov overtaken ertaken the development of basic infrastructure such as the development and expansion of sewage and water supply systems. 27. In many parts of the world, in overpopulated shanty towns, many even without toilet facilities, thousands of people live cheek by jowl, thereby providing ideal conditions for the transmission of of airborne, waterborne a and nd contact-transmis contact-transmission sion disease diseases. s. The problems are exacerbated by rapidly increasing population size and the lack of social support infrastructure. Troops deployed into urban areas are required not on only ly to provide for their own health needs, but may require the resources to provide basic and improved medical support to the indigenous pop population. ulation. They need to do so as part of the operational requirement, and as part of the tactical battle and strategic campaign to win over the support (hearts, minds and bodies) of the people. 28. Maintaining the health and welfare of troops in an urban environment requires planning, preparedness and good organisation and the maintenance of essential services.  Arrangements will have to be made for constant supplies of fresh water, effective sewage and rubbish disposal disposal and full time medical supp support. ort. The same hygiene arrangements must be made available to the indigenous population to achieve operational and strategic campaign goals. POLLUTION 29. Pollution can cause health and environmental problems. For example, cities in China have recorded up to nine times the levels of sulphur dioxide in comparable developed cities. cities. Sub-surface land and water levels levels contaminated by toxic waste waste have caused high levels of birth defects in babies. babies. One of the responsibilities of a force deployed into the urban environment will be to ensure its own protection and possibly that of the civilian population, against the consequences of widespread pollution and associated disease. TOXIC WASTE4  30. Within an urban environment there is a particular threat from chemical, radiological and biological toxic hazards. hazards. All those operating in such an environment environment must be mindful of the implications of 'not knowing knowing what is behind the wall'. Exposure to toxic chemic chemicals als may come from natural sources or mo more re likely from general general industrial toxic waste. A military force must be aware of the medical implications. 31.

Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH) may have immediate or long term health

effects on personnel, personnel, as well as impacting o on n a commander's o operational perational capability. Toxic materials may be released through battle damage, accidents or terrorism. 4

 See

also Chapter 10, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 26-30.  

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REFUGEES  REFUGEES  32. The danger of operations in urban areas together with infrastructure damage is likely to result in significant proportions of the civilian population fleeing to seek refuge elsewhere. Such migrations may both interfere w with ith the conduc conductt of military operation operations s and create humanitarian problems en route and at any final destination.

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   ANNEX A TO PART A TYPES OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION INTRODUCTION 1. Chapter One, 3, gives a broad description of the nature of urban conurbations. This Section annex provides prov ides some structural information and factors thatterrain shouldand be considered when selecting selecting buildings to be us used ed in the prosecution of military operations. operations. It is intended to provide an o overview verview for the all arms comman commander. der. More detailed tech technical nical 1 information can be found in Military Engineering, Pamphlet Number 2, Field Fortifications . 2. The follo following wing des descriptions criptions and diagrams of building buildings s are intended to help commanders identify identify the type of con construction struction and their key characteristics. The table at the 2 end of this Annex  provides generic information about building characteristics and advice on their suitability for defence. MASS CONSTRUCTION BUILDINGS 3.

Mass construction buildings are those in w which hich the outside walls support the weight of

the building and its contents. Additional support, esp especially ecially in wide buildings buildings,, comes from using load-bearing interior walls, strong points (called pilasters) on the exterior walls, castiron interior columns, and arches arches or braces over the windows windows and doors. Modern types of mass construction buildings are wall and slab structures such as many modern apartments and hotels, and tilt-up structures structures commonly used for industry industry or storage. Mass construction buildings are built in many ways: a.

The walls can be built in place using brick, block, or poured-in-place concrete.

b.

The walls can be prefabricated and "tilt-up", or as panels.

c.

The walls and roofs can be prefabricated and assembled like boxes.

Fig A-AA-A-1 1 Ma Mass ss C Constru onstru ction Buildi ngs

1

  Further advice about structures and fortifications is available from the Brigade Close Support Engineer Regiment or Works Group RE 2  Building Types and Characteristics, taken from Military Engineering Vol 2, Pam 2

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  BUILDINGS BUILT WITH BRICK 4. Brick buildings are the most common and the most important of the mass construction buildings. In Europe, brick building buildings s are commonly cov covered ered with a rendered finish so that bricks do not show. a.

Small Shop. Shop . One of the most common uses of brick building buildings s is the small shop.

These buildings found in all built-up areas but are most common at the edge of any business andare industrial area.

Fig A-AA-A-2 2 Brick Buildings

b. Warehouse.. A wa Warehouse warehouse rehouse is ano another ther co common mmon mass construction building usually situated in industrial areas and along commercial ribbons. It is normally built of poured-in-place reinforced reinforced concrete or of p prefabricated refabricated walls that a are re "tilt-up". The walls of warehouses warehouses provid provide e good c cover, over, although the roof is vulnerable. These buildings are built on slabs, which ca can n normally support the weight of vehicles vehicles.. The wide doors and entrances can provide excellent cover and concealment for tanks. tanks.  

Fig A-A-3 Warehouse Warehouse   c. Public Gathering Places. Places . Public gathering places (churches, stadiums) are mass-construction buildings buildings with large, ope open n interiors. The walls provide good cover, Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  but the roof does not. The interior walls are no nott load-bearing and a are re normally easy to breach or remove. Public gathering places a are re most common in the cen centre tre and edge of cities, residential, and outlying high-rise areas.

Fig A-A-4 Public Place Places s 

FRAMED BUILDINGS  BUILDINGS  5. Framed buildings are supported by a skeleton of columns and beams and are usually taller than frameless buildings and th the e exterior walls are n not ot load-bearing. These are often referred to as clad buildings. There are th three ree main type types: s:

Fig A-A-5 A-A-5 Light Structured Frame Framed d Bui ldings a. Heavy Clad Framed Buildings. Buildings . The walls of heavy clad buildings are made of brick and block that are sometimes almost as thick as frameless brick walls, although not as protective. Heavy clad framed buildings are foun found d in the centre and and edge of large cities and towns. They can be recognized by a classic style or architecture in which each building is designed with three sections the pediment, shaft, and capital. Unlike the brick building, the walls are the same thickness on all floors, and the windows are set at the same depth throughout. Often the frame members (the columns) can be seen, e especially specially at the ground floor. The claddin cladding, g, consisting of Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  layers of terra cotta blocks, brick, and stone veneer, does not provide as good a cover as the walls of brick brick buildings. It provides some p protection rotection against small-arms fire and light shrapnel fragments but does not withstand fire from heavy weapons. (1) The floor plans of these buildings depend upon their functions. buildings normally have small offices surrounding an interior hall.

Office

(2) Department normally have fire large, open interiors. Often sections there is o af mezzanine level within wstores ithin the store. Steel doors often exist b between etween of the store. The steel fire doors a are re normally activ activated ated by heat. Once closed, they are difficult to breach or force open, but they effectively divide the store into sections. (3) Another type o off heavy clad frame framed d building is us used ed as a high high-rise -rise factory. Such buildings are normally easily recognized because the concrete beams and columns are visible visible from the outside outside.. They are usually located in older industrial areas. Because the floors are o often ften made to support h heavy eavy mach machinery inery this building provides good overhead cover.

Fig A-A-6 Hea Heavy vy Clad Framed Buil ding

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Fig A-A-7 Hea Heavy vy Clad Framed D Departm epartm ent Store

b. Light Clad Buildings. Buildings . Light cla clad d building buildings s are modern b buildings uildings c constructed onstructed mostly of glass. glass. Most framed buildin buildings gs built in rec recent ent years are light clad buildin buildings. gs. They are found found in both core and ou outlying tlying high-rise region regions. s. Their walls cons consist ist of a thin layer of brick, lightweight con concrete, crete, or glass. Such ma materials terials provide minimal protection against any weapon. However, the floors of the bu buildings ildings are much heav heavier ier and provide moderate moderate overhead cover. The rooms in light clad framed b buildings uildings are much bigger than those in heavy clad; buildings also usually stand detached from other buildings. The interior partitions are thin, light, and eas easy y to breach. breach.  

Fig A-A-8 Ligh t C Clad lad Frame Framed d Buildi ng

c. Multi Storey Car Pa Park rk.. A building in the urban area where all floors can support vehicles. Multi storey car park parks s are normally high enough to prov provide ide a 360-degre 360-degree e field of fire for Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) weapons.  weapons. 

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Fig A-A-9 Multi Storey Ca Carr Pa Park rk FLOOR PLANS 6.

Floor plans in buildings follow predictable patterns.

One of the factors that will

determine a floor plan is buildingtoshape. basic principle governing shap shape e is that rooms normally hathe have ve access o outside utsideThe light. This principle helps tobuilding d determine etermine the floor plans of large buildings.

Fig A-A-10 A-A-10 Buil ding Shapes and S Sizes izes

RESIDENTIAL RESID ENTIAL BUILDINGS 7. In cities with Euro European pean influence houses are n normally ormally m mass ass c construction onstruction brick buildings interspersed with tall concrete apartment buildings.  buildings.   8. Rural buildings in North and South America, and south-east Asia are commonly made of wood. In continental Europ Europe, e, southwest As Asia, ia, and sub-Sah sub-Saharan aran Africa, where wood wood is Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  extremely scarce, rural buildings are normally constructed of concrete blocks.  blocks.  9. In the M Middle iddle East and tropical regions, the most common housing is th the e en enclosed closed courtyard. Houses are add added ed one to ano another ther with little regard to the street pa pattern. ttern. The result is a crooked, narrow maze, which is harder to move through or to operate vehicles and weapons.  weapons. 

Fig A-A-11 Enclosed Courtyard BUILDING TYPE TYPES S A ND CHARACTERISTIC CHARACTERISTICS S 10.  Certain characteristics of both mass construction and framed buildings can be 10.  helpful in analysing a built-up area. Details are shown below3: Ser (a) 1

Construction (b) Post and Frame

2

Masonry

3

Good quality brick or concrete block.

4

Low quality brick

Examples © Old farm houses, cottages

Characteristics Characteristics (d) Weak walls and timber rafters offering no frontal protection. Stone or brick outer infill. Studded partition interior walls. High fire risk. Sway reinforcement probably necessary. Town halls, banks, Probably solid walls. Usually two to chateaux and large four storeys high with wooden floor  joists, but banks may have solid manor houses. floors. Thickness of walls diminishes with height. Possible fire hazard. Floors may require props. Movement within buildings invariably easy. Resistance to sway governed by location of interior walls. Detached or semiBuildings probably have cavity walls detached houses. and may have reinforced concrete floors. Small fire risk. Sandbags needed to provide full protection. Party walls provide some resistance to sway. Props needed if floors have timber joists. Terraced houses, Buildings easily demolished by direct shops. fire weapons. Medium fire hazard. Walls offer little protection, but shops may have cellars.

Recommendation Recommendation (e) Avoid where possible.

Usually a good choice if not isolated.

Good choice.

Avoid unless cellars can be used.

3

 Taken from Military Engineering Volume II Pamphlet No 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8

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  5

Large commercial

Type A – A – Modern department stores, factories or commercial offices

Type B – B – Older department stores and commercial premises 6

Medium/high rise concrete block construction

Type A – A – Offices

Type B – B – Apartments.

7

11.

Single floor industrial

Warehouses and single floor factories.

Solid concrete or steel frame buildings with strong floors but walls may be weak, frequently with large windows. Difficult to collapse building and frame resistant to sway. Likely to have cellars. Movement within building easy. Low fire risk. Strong walls and floors. Fire hazard low to medium dependent on type of floor. Walls give good protection but additional sandbags desirable. Internal movement relatively easy. Large windows, frame construction, reinforced concrete floors, weak walls. Probably low fire risk. Difficult to collapse building but walls and windows offer no protection. Movement between floors usually difficult. Tall buildings conspicuous. Probably have cellars. Small windows, reinforced concrete load-bearing outside walls. Probably good protection, but movement between floors probably difficult. Usually low fire risk. Tall buildings usually surrounded by open space with lack of covered routes for removal of casualties etc. Note: Some apartment blocks have Note: prefabricated walls and are prone to vertical collapse. Difficult to identify. Usually steel or reinforced concrete frame construction with brick or lightly clad walls. Little overhead or frontal protection unless there are substantial dwarf walls, but floors are usually strong.

A possible choice if protection can be achieved.

Good choice.

Possible choice if protection can be achieved.

Possible choice.

Poor choice. Of little value without substantial protective work, but they provide cover from view.

The table above describes the construction and materials used in industrialised and

developed It should be no noted ted even that construction standards variable in less developed areas. or regulated areas and, if a structure appearsare to va fitriable into one of well the categories described in the table, caution should be exercised where there is any doubt about the the quality of construc construction tion or materials use used. d. There is always po potential tential for unexpected and catastrophic collapse.

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URBAN URBA N OPERATIONS PART B FIGHTING FIGH TING THE THE URBAN B ATTL ATTLE E

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CHAPTER 4 PREPARING FOR FOR THE U URBAN RBAN BA BATTLE TTLE SECTION PLANNING NNING SECTION 1 - OPERATIONAL PLA “In one moment of time, our serving members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistan assistance. ce. Inoperations the next m moment, they will holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping –oment, and, finally, theybewill fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle – all on the same day…all within three blocks.” General Charles C Kru lak, USM USMC C

Fig B-4-1 The T Thr hree ee Block Bl ock War, U UNPR NPROFO OFOR, R, Form er Yugos Yugoslavi lavi a 1 1993 993 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS 1. Operations in the urban environment are an integral part of any military deployment need to fight in built-up areas will be or posture and cannot be viewed in isolation .  The need dictated by the strategic and operational requirements, the commander's intentions, and the apparent intentions of the enemy. enemy. The urban environment has has certain implications implications for operational planning. a. assume that Offensive Operations. Operations . Planning for offensive operations must assume fighting will take place in the parts of built-up areas where people people live. These urban areas, from small rural hamlets to large, modern cities may be of tactical, operational or strategic strategic importance. importance. They may encompass encompass the infrastructure infrastructure of government, communications centres, transit routes or industrial or logistic logistic facilities. They may include centres of population that need to be defended and protected against an

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insurgency that aims to use them for malevolent purpose. During any offensive operation, plans will need to be made to capture, clear or neutralise built up areas. b. area rea can be made either to Defensive De fensive Opera Operation tion s . The defence of an urban a deflect an enemy advance into killing areas between urban areas or to draw the enemy into the urban environment in order to wear him down by attrition and delay. The concealment and protection afforded by towns and villages confer considerable advantages to itthe defen defender. der. Built-upto areas mayfrom canalise enemy armour intoareas. open country where becomes vulnerable flank fire the edges of the built-up This may disrupt an enemy force requiring it to carry out repeated fixing or clearance operations. In clos close e cou country ntry the judicious use o off built-up areas by the defender, in conjunction with other obstacles, can block and delay the enemy advance by forcing him to undertake undertake lengthy and costly clearance ope operations. rations. The nature of built-up areas makes them suitable for delaying operations although the potential for becoming fixed, isolated or decisively engag engaged ed should no nott be underestimated. Small forces can hinder the tactical movement of much larger forces and ultimately may be able to trade less space for time than in open country. c. areas pose difficult problems Large Town and City Fighting. Fighting . Large built-up areas for attacker and defender alike. Their size, density, density, and complexity complexity will require large large numbers of troops and significant time for preparation neither of which may be available. Large towns and cities cannot cannot be disregarded, however, however, since they they may offer good transit routes or protection which is denied in open country, or they may be strategically significant. d. Stabilit Sta bilit y Ope Operations rations.. In addition to delivering the kinetic effect traditionally associated with military activity, there will be a requirement to influence the perceptions and attitudes through influence influence activity. Military operations may be multitasked and troops may be conducting stability operations alongside colleagues involved in conventional conventional military operations. operations. Stability operations will take place amongst the people and be conducted within the urban environment. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING PLANNING   2. The urban environment has implications for command nodes every level. The more limited capacity for surveillance and target acquisition, theatpresence of noncombatants, the requirement for increased intelligence capture and force protection, difficulties with communications, the fleeting nature of targets and limited engagement opportunities will provide additional challenges to headquarters. 3. Consideration should be given to enhancing the resources for headquarters nodes at battlegroup level and below to include assets responsible for: a. ISTAR.. ISTAR devices can provide useful information if it can be gathered, ISTAR collated and appropriately disseminated rapidly and laterally. The information provided by UAV, air, aviation and technical and close observation sources should be organised, organised, prioritised and rapidly disseminated. The volume of data can be increased during coalition operations. b. the e urban urban en environment vironment Human Terrain Mapping. Mapping . Intelligence gathering in th and particularly in the context of hybrid war is critical to operational success. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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People-centric intelligence based on human terrain mapping, including information about tribal dynamics, indigenous social and caste behaviour, work and social routines and politics should be gathered, recorded and passed quickly to the levels that need it. c. Influence Activities. Activities . Close quarter fighting is a psychologically charged activity that affects all sides, and can be exploited for advantage. (1) The successful tactics of the Chechen insurgents in Chechnya in 19991  had a major effect on the self-confidence of the conventional Russian forces, and consequently consequently on the tactics of the Russian c commanders. ommanders. When Hamas in 2008 manipulated images of the Israeli invasion of Gaza for international media consumption, their propaganda successfully affected the operational battle by limiting the types of operation the IDF 2  could undertake. At the strategic level, potential casualty lists may have consequences for each level of urban fighting. (2) The co-ordination of Media, CIMIC and Information3  operations (“Influence Activities”) supports the execution of conventional military operations through the following: (a)

Shaping the presentation of the conflict.

(b) Isolating the opposition from positive or supportive local and international opinion. (c)

Offensive operations (PSYOPS, Media, EW, CNO).

(d)

Defensive activity.

(e)

Exploiting psychological and media opportunities.

d. non-combatants, mbatants, the ne need ed to provide Fires.. Owing to the presence of non-co Fires protection to civilians and the possibility of fratricide, the integration and management of the three-dimensional battle-space in the urban environment requires enhanced control. e. Soldiers-First . The all-round threat in urban environment requires the preparation of soldiers from all arms to be prepared to fight to achieve their primary task, be it repair, equipment m maintenance, aintenance, resupp resupply ly or other duties duties.. Consideration should be given to the preparation and training for urban combat of all troops involved in urban operations.

1

  Russian armoured substantial loss of life.columns attempting to penetrate Grozny were ambushed, sealed and destroyed, with 2  Israeli Defence Forces. 3  Including PSYOPS, EW, Deception, Key Leader Engagement (KLE), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP) and Computer Network (CNO) operations.

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THE MANOEUVRIST MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS IN URBAN AREAS 4. The nature of built-up areas restricts tactical movement and operations may necessarily develop develop into a series series of low-level tactical engagements. Offensive momentum can easily be lost and an operation may develop into a battle battle of attrition. attrition. Attritional operations prove costly costly in time, casualties and resources. While this may be necessary necessary or unavoidable at some stages of an operation, planning should be guided by a manoeuvrist approach to such operations. INFORMATION   INFORMATION 5. The collection of detailed and accurate information, and the intelligence produced as a result, is more complex in urban operations than for operations in any other environment. There has to be a detailed collection plan and co-ordinated collection effort both before and during the operation. The information information gathered should then be incorporated incorporated into a comprehensive IPB, and continually monitored and amended as the operational situation dictates. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS  OPERATIONS  6. The attacking force should have a superiority of at the very least 3:1 in order to overcome the advantages advantages of the defence. defence. The defender will have greater local knowledge of the terrain. He will have made made his defensive plans around the nature of the urban infrastructure in which which he chooses chooses to fight. fight. He will try to limit by every every means at his disposal the information information gathering capability capability of his opponent. opponent. He will site his killing killing areas around structures that limit the flexibility of the attacker. To gain the initiative over over the defence, the attacking force should always use its combat power to seize objectives that reduce or negate the capacity capacity of the defence to continue to fight. This should be done by coordination of direct and indirect fire and the strict synchronization of the movement of every element involved involved in the attack. attack. The attacker must must gain and retain the initiative as early as he can. can. He must must dictate the tempo tempo of operations. As well well as being systematic in his approach to the capture and retention of key ground and to his destruction of the enemy and his ability to fight, the attacker must be prepared to exploit any and every weaknesses in the defensive plan. He must risk bypassing enemy enemy locations in order to secure key objectives andthe all operation troops involved in the operation expect will to have fight in all directions as progresses. The use should of deception give tothe attacker advantage at every stage of the operation. The infantry should provide provide the majority of the troops involved in any urban operation, but plans must make use of every soldier from every arm and every available weapon system to achieve the commander’s aim. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS OPERATIONS   7. As in every other defensive operation, urban defence must be aggressive. Wherever possible, possible, the ba battle ttle should b be e taken to the attacke attacker. r. The attacker’s options should always be be limited by the a actions ctions and the initiative of the defence. The defender should seek should  seek to destroy the cohesion of each attack force. The attacker will be unsure of his ground. He will be u uncertain ncertain of what and whom he is facing, and h he e will be afraid. afraid. This weakness, like every other, should be exploited by the defence. The defence must not allow the attacker to retain the initiative. Defence should be conducted using using a combined arms force and every weapon and soldier available. available. The defence should seek to exploit the advantage of his intimate knowledge of the built-up area to delay and disrupt the attack Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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with highly mobile forces able to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to another. The defender should aim to surprise his enemy, to ambush him where he does not expect it. He should channel channel enemy forces into killing areas dominated dominated by strong points where the defence maintains the initiative, freedom of movement and local superiority in firepower. Maximum use should be made of reserves, particularly during the later stages of the operation. Small and comparatively lightly armed and equipped equipped forces in defensive operations can be singularly effective, can impose delay and can causing significant numbers of casualties on significantly largertoforces. larger The employdefensive employment ment of local loc al counter attacks, ambushes and determined attempts re-occupy previous locations will be effective ways to discomfort, confuse and disorientate the enemy. COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT SUPPORT   8. Urban operations of any type will create increased demands for resources, ammunition, engineer engineer stores and large numbers of of specialist stores. There will be a likelihood of high casualty rates and high ammunition expenditure that will require additional planning, production production and and issue. issue. Additional resources may be required to reinforce and expedite existing casualty evacuation and improve ammunition re-supply chains. Re-supply points points for all natures may need to be much closer to the the forward elements than would otherwise be the case. ORGANISATION 9. Combat in urban terrain can have implications for the command organisation at unit and sub-unit level. Consideration should should be given to the increment of intelligence staff staff at sub-unit level as a result of the increased intelligence requirements for all urban operations. It can also be considered at at platoon level in the case of detached platoons. platoons. The increased collation and planning requirements for stability, and particularly COIN, operations may also need to be reflected in incremental change. 10. The need to organise urban combat along ‘all arms groupings’ requires the reorganisation of platoons and companies to be able to fight independently and with the capacity to use every every arm and tool at its disposal. disposal. There is a need to include include engineer, support weapons, air and indirect fire control and interpreter facilities at platoon level and below to enable mission-orientated groupings COMMAND AND CONTROL 11. Urban combat is a particularly confusing form of combat where the commander’s will is not always straightforward to execute. execute. The commander commander will need to take take advantage of of every opportunity to unbalance the enemy and it is imperative that the intention of the overall commander is clearly understood by every soldier at every level, and that, if possible, the outcome of each small, low-level tactical engagements conform to his plan. 12. Retention of the initiative will b be e a defining factor in the success, or not, of all urban combat. Once the commander’s parameters are decid decided, ed, define defined d and promulgated, subordinates can be give as much freedom of action and, if possible, time, to achieve their tasks. 13. In order to provide and encourage the maximum amount of freedom of action to his subordinates (and thereby extend his influence over the battlefield), the commander should Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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provide the best possible system of immediate communication and situational awareness to all. Urban operations can create increas increased ed difficulty to com communications munications and may may require significantly more communications assets to overcome limitations on range than would normally be required.  OPERATIONAL ATIONAL FACTORS OTHER OPER 14. axes Built-up areas aret often and rail networks. Roads raillikely are needed as for movemen movement and hubs lines ofofroad communication. There are and thus to be circumstances when it will be necessary to retain or regain control of built-up areas in order to dominate the transport infras infrastructure. tructure. Furthermore thes these e areas often contain valuable economic installations installations and large numb numbers ers of workers. They may therefore therefore be regarded as areas of strategic importance. 15. Whether attacking or defending, a large number of dismounted infantry are required. If a built-up area is defended, it may be preferable to an attacker to bypass or encircle it rather than become engaged in the task of capturing the area. Operational imperatives will determine whether this is either necessary or possible 16. A built-up area which can easily be avoided has little defensive value though it may have a channelling effect. effect. A built-up area is usually only worth defending defending if it will oblige the enemy to make make a time-consu time-consuming ming manoeuv manoeuvre re to bypass it. The decision to defend a an n urban area will involve the use of a significant number of troops for a considerable amount of time and will place the indigenous civilian population at threat. GUIDELINES 17. All operational and tactical planning for urban combat, at every level, should include reference to the points below: a. control, and Simple Plan. Plan . Fighting in urban areas is particularly difficult to control, communication is likely to be difficult. A simple and flexible flexible but thorough plan that exploits the benefits of mission command is therefore essential. b. . Fighting in the urban environment is multi-dimensional: the Thoroughness. enemyThoroughness will be in sewers, in rooms, along streets and on rooftops. rooftops . Absolute care must be taken to clear and secure all areas as they are captured in order to prevent re-infiltration and counter-attack. c. characterised by by brutal, high intensity intensity Momentum.. Urban operations are characterised Momentum combat. In every type of urban operation operation commanders commanders must ensure that the relentless pressure is maintained on an enemy who is never allowed to retain or regain the initiative. d. imposed operational operational constraints of of collateral damage damage and Fires.. Within the imposed Fires ammunition resupply and availability, maximum use should be made of all available firepower, munitions and weapon systems. e. deception ception is a particula particularly rly useful means o off Deception.. In urban areas, de Deception confusing the enemy and its use should be encouraged at all levels.

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SECTION SECTI ON 2 - INTELLIGENCE PRE PREPARATION PARATION OF THE B BATTLESPACE ATTLESPACE WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ‘Failures in intelligence preparation meant that the 6,000 Russian force attempting to penetrate the city was fighting an enemy far better prepared for a defensive battle, and much larger than expected. Within the first few hou hours rs of battle, Russian units were trapped in the streets, their armoured vehicles destroyed by enemy troops shooting from upper and lower stories of buildings that main tank guns c could ould not engage. As happened 50 years before in Berlin, entire tank columns were effectively paralyzed by the immobilisation of the lead and tail vehicles vehicles.. Russian troops troops unwittingly collaborated in the destruction b by y remaining in the APCs, mistakenly believing that they were safer in their armoured vehicles that out.’ Russi a’s Chechen Wars , 199 1994-2 4-2000 000 Lessons f rom Urban Combat, R Rand and

Fig B-4-2 Russi an BMP1P BMP1P,, Grozny INTRODUCTION 18.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)4  process within an urban

environment broadly follows that for any operational planning, although several factors require further consideration. consideration. This section is not an explan explanation ation of the IPB process, but rather it outlines some of the considerations for conducting IPB in support of urban operations. GENERAL 19. The continuing growth of built-up areas around the world increases the likelihood of conducting the full spectrum spectrum of operations within complex urban enviro environments. nments. As with any IPB, the initial stage of the process graphically records the results of the Intelligence Estimate, including; analysis of the ground, the adversary, most likely and most dangerous courses of action and indicate where friendly fri endly forces may best target adversary weakness.

4

  Details of the IPB process are outlined in AFM Vol 1 Part 8 Command and Staff Procedures Chapter 3  Annex A.

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IPB WITHIN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT   20. The urban environment is viewed by many hostile factions as a means to negate the technological and firepower advantage of a sophisticated army. army .  Any future conflict is likely to have a significant significant urban dynamic. It will increasingly be imp important ortant to maintain the so social, cial, economic and political institutions almost simultaneously in order to maintain a degree of stability. Intelligence supp support ort to the IPB process is not d doctrinally octrinally different to any other environment, there are simply different considerations and potentially larger volumes of data to be managed operating within a complex environment 5. The three distinguishing characteristics of the urban environment are: terrain, society and infrastructure.

Fig B-4B-4-3 3 Russian S Sold old iers Pa Patro tro lli ng thr through ough Grozny, 1 199 999 9 BATTLES BA TTLESPACE PACE AREA EVALUATIO EVALUATION N6  21.  Mobility Corridors 21.  Corridors.. Urban areas are often considered restricted or severely restricted for any manoeuvring unit, especially armoured and some mechanised formations. However some urban operations will require certain mechanised and armoured elements to operate within the confines confines of an urban env environment. ironment. Outside of conventiona conventionall high intensity operations the ability of an adversary to move around within an urban area using a predetermined Mobility Corridor (MC) must be considered in terms outlined below in the terrain analysis section. 22.  Avenue 22.  conventional tional Avenues s of Approach Approach.. While units may be unable to deploy in a conven tactical formation, an urban Avenue of Approach (AA) should not be discounted in the first instance. The option of a c conventional onventional adversary conducting manoe manoeuvre uvre operations within an urban environment should always be considered in terms of capability (both fire power 5

  The 4 stages of the IPB process are Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE), Threat Evaluation (TE), Threat Integration(TI) and Decision Support is the from of the Decision Support Overlay (DSO). 6  BAE outputs are Mobility Corridors/Avenues of Approach, Terrain Analysis and Weather Analysis.

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and mobility) and and nature of the urban terrain. When friendly forces are c conducting onducting a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or Peace Support Operation (PSO) an adversary is likely to be operating as an irregular force and as such the considerations for MC and AA will be potentially different. different. The agg aggregation regation of adjacent a and nd adjoining MCs may determine primary routes and direction of threat that may be deemed an AA. 23.

Terrain Analysis Analysis.. The specific type of urban area must be considered. Density,

layout, pattern and construction type can have significant effects on survivability, Command and Control (C2) and Intelligence, Su Surveillance rveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) efforts. For example, buildings may collapse or whole city blocks may be destroyed or burned down, leaving only rubble. rubble. These effects ca can n be tactically significa significant, nt, as some terrain features will significantly change and fields of fire will open and close. close. The output outlines the effect of the urban environment on both both friendly and enemy operations. This analysis should info inform rm the commander commander how the adve adversary rsary may use the ground to best adv advantage. antage. When considering urban terrain it is necessary to adopt a more lateral approach to the determination of MC and AA. A three-dimensional approach should be adopted. The following list is by no means definitive or exhaustive: a.

b.

c.

Surface.. Surface (1)

Road.

(2)

Railways.

(3)

Tram.

Sub-Surface. Sub-Surface. (1)

Impassable.

(2)

Negotiable – walking.

(3)

Negotiable – crawling.

 Ab ov e-Sur e-Surff ace ace..  (1)

Interior – rooms, stairwells, lifts, and internal utilities ducting.

(2)

Exterior – walkways, fire escapes, tiered structures.

 A major consideration is the obstruction to movement within the urban environment. Any obstruction, whether man made or as a result of destruction of the infrastructure, will canalise movement. An u understanding nderstanding of the land use will outline some mobility considerations for both adversary and friendly forces. 24.  An aly si s of th e Soc environment nvironment are like likely ly to Societ iet y . Operations within an urban e involve a large number number of non-combata non-combatants. nts. The increased likelihood of any future op operation eration having a significant urban dynamic requires all soldiers to have a level of cultural higher er leve levell of knowledge and sound cultural awareness.. Intelligence Staffs with a high awareness understanding erstanding will assist the understanding   will deliver better results from IPB. A greater und understanding

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IPB process, reduce cultural bias and provide a degree of decision support to the commander. Such considerations are: a. History, Culture and Social Structure. Structure. An understanding of the local population and the origin and development of the dominant culture in the region can give an insight insight into likely adversary activity activity.. Fundamental to this is attempting to identify key leaders (tribal, political, religious and economic) for subsequent engagement. An understand understanding ing of the local culture, customs, politics and religion combined with a level of understanding of the social structure will assist in assessments of likely civilian population reaction to military milit ary activity. b. Population Popula tion De Density, nsity, Ethnic Mix, E Economic conomic Situa Situation tion and Educa Education tion.. An understanding of such factors can highlight possible targets for Ops Support and provide an indication of the likelihood of certain Ops Support functions being successful. Knowledge of the urban population dynamic is likely to give an indication of the possible Displaced Persons and Refugees (DPRE) that may immediately impact friendly forces. 25.  An alys Within the urban environment the al ys is of t he Ur Urban ban Inf ras tr uc tu r e. infrastructure is likely to be a key co consideration. nsideration. Such infras infrastructure tructure has significant implications for the mobility of ground, aviation and air assets as well as sustaining the indigenous population. Analysis of the infrastruc infrastructure ture will also indic indicate ate poss possible ible Toxic Industrial Hazard (TIH). Areas for c consideration onsideration inc include: lude: a.

Transport networks including road, rail, bridges, ports and harbours.

b. Communications networks including radio, TV and telephone networks such as landline and mobile options. c.

Urban fuel supplies including coal, oil and gas.

d.

Water supply.

e.

Waste disposal.

f.

Medical facilities, including the maintenance of the indigenous capabilities.

g.

A nuclear power plant or commercial chemical installation.

26. Weather Analysis. Analysis . Within any environment analysis of the weather provides implications for both air and ground operations. Weather can imp impose ose co considerable nsiderable restrictions on sensors sensors and certain m manoeuvre anoeuvre elements. The output is the production of the weather overlay. An example within the u urban rban environmen environmentt could be the impact of rainfall and subsequent runoff rendering tunnels as severely restricted terrain.

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THREAT EVALUATION 27. Threat Evaluation (TE)7  is the definition of the enemy capability, unconstrained by the effect of the environment. environment. The threat within an urban environment can be more difficult to define. Due to the large civilian pop population ulation the threat spectrum can range from conventional to hostile irregular forces, criminal elements and political movements and demonstrations. Conventional fo forces rces are like likely ly to conform to an urba urban n doctrine te template mplate utilising known weapon s systems. ystems. However, irregu irregular lar forces operating within an urban environment are unlikely to follow a template and the Threat Evaluation will depend on the specific adversary adversary and urban area. Such threats c could ould include sa sabotage, botage, subversion and even theft. As with any IPB, the threat w will ill require continual review for each assessed adversary in order to develop a recognised modus operandi (MO). THREAT INTEGRATION8  28. Similar to the terrain considerations, the threat within the urban environment is 3dimensional and due to the possible nature of the adversary, multi-faceted, from high intensity conventional conventional urban operations to lower intensity COIN or PSOs. The constraints of the battlespace on the adversary tactics and likely deployments will outline a Most Likely (ML) and Most Dangerous (MD) COA. DECISION SUPPORT OVERLAY 29. The end product of IPB, the Decision Support Overlay (DSO) remains a graphical display of the the commander’s plan based on the ass assessed essed threat COA. Production of the DSO within the urban battlespace provides the same outputs; where the enemy should be targeted by direct fire, indirect fire, air, aviation and engineer assets in order to achieve a desired affect in time and space. It is based on both friendly and assessed enemy timelines. It is important to also consider the impac impactt of non-kinetic effects within the threedimensional urban battlespace. INFORMATION INFOR MATION A AND ND INTELLIGENCE COLL COLLECTIO ECTION N 30.

Urban areas impose considerable constraints on certain collection assets. The full

spectrum of collection capability fromques National to Tactical assets can be deployed to good effect in order to answer answer intelligence questions tions within the urban b battlespace. attlespace. The individual representatives from each of the following disciplines will be able to best advise on the capabilities including; human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence including geospatial intelligence (IMINT/GEOINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), counter-intelligence (CI) and open-source intelligence (OSINT).

7

  Threat Evaluation is is an understanding of the enemy capability, tactics and vulnerabilities. Outputs are: Doctrine Template, High Value Target List (HVTL), Operational Situation Data, Organisational Charts, and Threat 8

Evaluation.  Threat Integration develops likely enemy Coarse of Action (COA) and attempts to identify activities that when observed will confirm or deny a particular COA the enemy commander may have chosen. Outputs are: COAs, Event Overlay, Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), and recommendations for the ISTAR plan and Situational Overlay.

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SECTION 3 - INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLEANCE, TARGET ACQUISITION AND RECONNAISSANCE ISTAR IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 31. The Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capability provides timely and actionable information to support the commander and the decision making process. UK doctrine states that operations s should hould be intelligence-led; the ISTAR process builds on the Intelligence Cycle 9 with practices and procedures designed to harness the capability capability of the collection assets. The information gathered gathered,, assembled and collated at HQ level will provide the intelligence critical to the planning and conduct of successful military operations. operations. At the basic, but frequ frequently ently the most produ productive, ctive, level ISTAR is provided to the commander through the eye eyes s and ears of his soldiers. In conventional operations, battalion resources will include the reconnaissance platoon with its specialised vehicles, training and equipme equipment. nt. In certain e environments, nvironments, information can be gathered through covert operations and close observation techniques. 32. It is critical that commanders at a allll leve levels ls un understand derstand the type, quantity and capabilities of the ISTAR assets available to them, and should understand: a.

How ISTAR works within formations.

b.

Who is responsible for conducting ISTAR.

c.

What products are available and how to bid for them.

d.

ISTAR collection effects.

33. The nature of the urban environment can render reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence and target acquisition problematic. The urban environment limits the individual’s field of view. The enemy co could uld be behind a wa wall, ll, and so could a fa family mily of noncombatants. Urban furniture, buildings, doo doors, rs, stairways, alleyways, s streets, treets, roads, walls and fences impede movement, limit observation and deny intelligence gathering. The practical limitations of manoeuvre in and amongst buildings and the advantages provided to the defender of ease of concealed movement the ly physical of accurate who and timely information difficult. The advan advantage tage willmake invariab invariably remaingathering with the protagonist will know the ground better than his opponent.

9

 Direction, Collection, Processing and Dissemination.

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Fig B-4B-4-4 4 Conduct ing Rea Real-Time l-Time Urban S Surveil urveil lance 34. In the urban environment, ISTAR is a support to planning. ISTAR improves situational awareness and targeting, enables real-time monitoring and surveillance, assists decision making making and improves force protection. A battlegroup deploying on operations can have access to a wide range of ISTAR assets and should expect to receive comprehensive briefings on their capabilities. The battlegroup should include include these assets in pla planning nning and training prior to deployment. 35. During urban operations the battlegroup G2 cell may be supplemented by ISTAR, PSYOPS, HUMINT, CIMIC and other other specialists. The intelligence that the G2 c cell ell provides about enemy intentions and capabilities will derive from the intelligence and information gathered from formation HQ, the analysis of information from casual contacts gained through patrolling, patrol reports, and the information gathered by all the available ISTA ISTAR R assets. This intelligence may be further sup supplemented plemented by other sources sources and agencies. ISTAR ASSETS AND CAPABILITIES 36. Technological advances continue to improve ISTAR capabilities and effect. With increased stand-off, ISTAR assets are delivering better effect, viewing and listening to a wider portion of the electro-magnetic spectrum and communicating this data back to deployed HQs in greater greater detail over longe longerr distances at greater speeds. ISTAR gathering sensors are contained in satellites, fixed 10  and rotary wing11  aircraft with cameras and a ‘sparkle’ function12, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs 13), balloons, overt and covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors and covert military activity. The bearer system systems s deliver various options for communicating information. Further systems aid the interpretation, translation and analytical function to provide corroborated intelligence intelligence to meet the original Reque Request st for Information (RFI). Fusion o off multiple assets is the key to maximising the potential of ISTAR. 37. Real-time ISTAR input provides an essential aid to battlespace management, allowing the ground commander to fight the battle with the most accurate and recent 10 11 For

instance NIMROD at 28,000 feet.  For instance BROADSWORD, an Electro Optical Infrared MX5 Camera fixed to a SEAKING helicopter at 8,000 feet. 12  LO with UHF comms to ground units and an IR beam to designate targets visible through II sights. 13  Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Characteristics will be found in the ISTAR Handbook and the SOHB.

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information available. A Ground Co Control ntrol Station (GCS) monitors the rea real-time l-time and other ISTAR input. The downlink can be vie viewed wed in the battlegroup operations room14 and on a mobile version in battlegroup tactical HQ.  HQ.  THE ISTAR PLANNING FOCUS 38.

The planning focus is influenced by detailed planning needed to conduct operations

in a built-up area, the impact of the presence of non-combatants on kinetic operations, the need to gain and retain the support of the local population and the human dimension on media operations. a. For certain operations, JARIC15 can provide detailed aerial photography and imagery analysis. b. Current intelligence and historical information should be available from within battlegroup and brigade resources. c. ISTAR assets, including guard (point of origin) reports, CCTV footage and information analysis can provide intelligence to supplement force protection. d. UAVs provide high-resolution imagery of any target and area of interest and a real-time downlink to the GCS. Low altitude, oblique photos of targets (IMINT16) in the urban environment can be obtained, enabling accurate estimates to be made of building dimensions17, occupation details, use and target status. e. Surveillance of the electro-magnetic spectrum enables radio and telephone signal capture and additional information. f. ISTAR can provide route cover for vehicles by looking ahead and in depth for the enemy18. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ENGAGEMENT   39.

ISTAR assets with Target Acquisition and Precision Strike19  capabilities enables

engagements in line with with the normal targeting proce process. ss. Theatre SOIs should d describe escribe the decision-making requirements for Positive Identification (PID). ISTAR ASSET USE 40. The availability of technical means of information gathering does not negate the need for the analysis of historical and current threats, the synchronisation of intended targets and the allocation of co-ordinated nicknames to geographic points and areas in order that the land, air and maritime components of all participating nations have a common understanding. 14

 Consideration can be given to including the Royal Engineer representative, the BC, the FOOs and the FAC in the GCS. 15  Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre, UK based. 16

17 Imagery

Intelligence.   Wall height, gate width and approximate strength, window elevation from the ground, window size, roof height. 18  Including, in Stability Operations, RPG gunmen, IED teams and SA firers. 19  For instance Fast Air with targeting pod and armed UAV, such as HERMES and PREDATOR.

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41. The standard of IMINT from m many any of the ISTAR sources can be of high quality, but consideration should be given to the use of several source types, not necessarily airborne, focussed on a specific location to capitalize on the strengths and overcome the weaknesses of each. 42. The strengths and weaknesses of ISTAR assets, and associated capabilities, must be understood. The best imag imagery ery in the world might be of little use if the ope operating rating crew and downlink are of dubious dubious quality. The use of secure internet chat room rooms s with UAVs can involve delay and a time lag following comman commands. ds. Pre-training for ISTAR operations using non-UK equipment should be considered in a coalition environment. 43. The G2 elements of the battlegroup must remain inquisitive, and use the assets to their full potential during the limited time that t hat they are assigned.  SECTION 4 – COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS COMMUNICATIONS   ‘With ill-defined front lines, and a defence in depth of no more than a few hundred yards in places, command posts were almo almost st as vulnerable as forw forward ard positions positions.. Colonel nd Vishnevsky, the commander of the 62   Army’s artillery division wrote to a friend from hospital. “When I left the bunker, I could hear sub-machine gun fire all around us.” A German tank came right up to the entrance of his bunker and “its hull blocked the only way out.” Vishnevsky and his officers had to dig for their lives to escape escape into the gully on the far side.’  An t ho ny Beev Beevor or , Stalingrad, Penguin Books COMMAND 44. Commanders must be able to engage and interact with the enemy, to keep pace with the complex urban environment, to predict how the operation is going to change and to minimise the impact of combat on the civilian population. 45. In order to be able to m maintain aintain mobility and to minimis minimise e the stress levels of th their eir troops in a complicated and dangerous environment, plans should be flexible enough to be able to do the following: a.

react quickly to the changing situation.

b.

ensure effective all arms co-ordination and

c. gain the maximum benefit from dynamic training and liberal interpretation of doctrine, so that soldiers will either instinctively know what to do or use their initiative to overcome an unforeseen problem. 46.

The factors that underpin successful urban operations are as follows: a.

Tactical and mental agility in the three block war context.

b.

Identification and location of friend, foe and non-combatant.

c.

Sharing and acting upon pertinent information.

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d.

Location, observation and tracking of the enemy.

e.

Provision of precision effects with graduated firepower.

f. Provision of physical mobility able to cope with the constraints of urban terrain. g.

Provision of timely Combat Service Support.

h.

Interpretation of the local culture, customs and behaviour. behaviour.  

CONTROL ‘In urban areas, areas, ground operation operations s tend to b become ecome decentralized decentralized.. It is therefore high highly ly important that C2 be flexible, adaptive a and nd decentralized as well. Essential to C2 is the thorough knowledge and understanding of the commander’s intent at every level of command. To further en enhance hance dece decentralized ntralized C2, comm commanders anders at all levels should issue mission-type orders and use implicit communications wherever possible.’  possible.’  US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 2002 02 47. Operations in urban areas are invariably difficult to control. In every campaign theme and tactical activity commanders and headquarters at battlegroup level and below need to be far forward, in immediate contact behind and close to the troops in combat. Troops fighting in built up areas may know little about how the battle is progressing or where their commanders are. Situational Aw Awareness areness (SA (SA)) information passing through headquarters must must be made av available ailable to the lowes lowestt level. Shared situational aw awareness areness (SSA) is key to understanding the progress of the battle and to avoiding friendly casualties.  All soldiers must be aware of the location of friendly troops across or within their own boundaries. 48. The presence of NGOs (such as the Red Cross, Médecins Sans Frontières,  Charities, Private Military Companies), OGDs (such as DfID20  and the FCO21), and local agencies and authorities, authorities, must be ac accounted counted for. Troops must hav have e a clear understa understanding nding of where they are, what they are doing, how they are controlled and how they affect the tactical plan. The Civil-Military Coope Cooperation ration plan should b be e briefed to the lo lowest west level. level.   49. The screening of ra radios dios and GPS and the complex three d dimensional imensional urban environment restrict the ability to know where troops are and what they are doing. Personal, visual and electronic communication is difficult in areas subject to significant screening, both both within buildings and in streets between buildin buildings. gs. Consistently ma manned nned secure voice radio is the key to all-informed real time command and control. 50. All round observation using eyes and ears is necessary in the contact battle, but this should be balanced against the security offered by ISTAR and surveillance devices operated remotely or from behind behind armour. Troops in combat sh should ould be fighting ‘heads up’ up’ for best effect, or if they cannot, due to incoming fire or the threat of snipers, through optics and sights. Peering at a co computer mputer screen could prove fatal, both to AFV crewmen and to those they are supporting with fires and kinetic effect. 20

 DfID – Department for International Development.  FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

21

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51. The complexity of urban operations and vulnerability of all ranks, including commanders, demands demands simple drills, clearly und understood erstood by everybo everybody. dy. Complicated plans, drills and procedures may lead to confusion, exacerbated if commanders become casualties and communications fail. 52. The information provided by fighting vehicles with access to battlefield management, including automated position location technology, must be made available to the dismounted troops. troops. HQ locations should be selected for both security and acce access ss to protected reliable communications. 53. Combat ID is useful but not infallible means of avoiding fratricide. Its effectiveness can be enhanced enhanced by the use of bound boundaries aries as restrictive fire lines. Boundaries are a fault line, but SSA and better multi-spectral ISTAR offers the chance to move with assurance, to engage targets more more precisely an and d to permit clos closer er direct and indirect indirect fires. Precision and tailoring of effects and yields allows strike to be modified and the minimisation of collateral damage. 54. In the urban environment, the importance of sectors, report lines, boundaries and collection points is increased a and nd can b be e significant. Attention must be paid to all three physical dimensions – above, on and below ground. a. defined and recognisable sectors sho should uld be n numbered umbered or Sectors.. Clearly defined Sectors lettered. Sectors will normally be allotted as c company ompany group ta tasks sks and then divided into sub-sectors for platoon tasks. b. landmarks, dmarks, for Report Lines. Lines . Report lines should reflect clearly identifiable lan example, for streets, rivers, railway lines, at right angles to the line of advance. c. sub-units ub-units should be c clearly learly Boundaries.. Boundaries between units and s Boundaries identifiable. Main thoroughfares prov provide ide the obvious ap approach proach for enemy m movement, ovement, the likely focus for operations, and equally identifiable alternatives should be sought. Direct fire weapons provide the ability to interlock and overlap arcs, but in the urban environment, in order to reduce the chances of fratricide, consideration can be given to using boundaries as restrictive fire lines. d. Collection Points. Points . Protected and accessible collection points should be established by each each company group group.. It is here that combat supplie supplies s are delivered by the battlegroup and collected by platoons, and casualties and PWs collected and escorted to the rear. COMMUNICATIONS ‘Under fire, the battalion commander was still trying to get communications with his subordinate units. The radio operators in the [command veh vehicle] icle] were still having difficulties receiving and sending radio messages. The two-storey houses they were bumped up against were masking the VHF signals. Even in his Humve Humvee, e, he couldn’t get a consisten consistentt signal among the labyrinth of houses.’ Nasiriyah, Na siriyah, Ira Iraq, q, 20 2003 03,, from “ Ambush Alley” Tim Pritchard

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55. Military operations in urban areas have demonstrated how easily VHF radios are screened and and how their range c can an be reduced. Commanders sh should ould be prepared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications, and consider the consequent consequent force pro protection tection issues. All radio users should be trained in and employ basic skills which are just as important in the era of digital communications – movement to establish communications, elevation where possible and avoidance of obscuration from walls or buildings. Although movemen movementt between defensive locations may be difficult and dangerous, dangerous, command must be close a and nd personal. Once battle is jo joined, ined, communication difficulties may demand a greater level of mission command and delegation of authority, and will place greater importance on planning and mission rehearsal. Inadequate communications and VHF screening necessitates a greater emphasis on simple plans, defined sectors sectors and clear boun boundaries. daries. Commanders mus mustt consider the need to use runners, dispatch riders and, as a last resort, local communication systems, landline and mobile phones. The use of low level code codes s like BATCO can help negate the security issue. The assumption must be made that everything said will be heard and compromised. 56. Although Personal Role Radio (PRR) equipment is robust, light and user-friendly it operates on VHF VHF and therefore suffers from screenin screening. g. It may be both necessa necessary ry and possible during protracted COIN and Peace Support operations to establish a radio network based on commercial secure bulk CIS developed either on satellite telephones, where there could again be security issues, or a pocket-phone network based on high VHF or UHF bands via permanent, protected protected rebroadcast stations. Radios should be carefully sited and maximum use made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennae to high spots. The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power options on radios, where these exist, might improve commu communications. nications. Security is critical, even relatively unsoph unsophisticated isticated 22 enemies will exploit the radio spectrum. For example, lo local cal civil systems  within an urban environment are able to monitor a and nd interfere with military communications. If all electronic communications fail, information might have to be passed by foot or motor transport. SECTION 5 - ELECTRONIC WARFARE ‘Communications will be difficult and the security of communications communications vital. During the battles for Grozny, the Chechens, many of whom had served in the Russian Army and spoke Russian, were able to use use the Russian radio radio net to their advantage. advantage. The young, inexperienced and not fully trained Russian troops initially often spoke in clear, in large part because the forces operating the equipment were not familiar with the requirement for secure communications. communications. Their conversations were not only monitored, monitored, but the Chechens Chechens were able to transmit disinformation which led to Russian forces being drawn into harm’s way.’ Russia’s Chechen Wars, 1994-2000, Lessons from Urban Combat, Rand 57. The problems of Electronic Warfare (EW) in the urban environment are exacerbated by the density of radio and particularly mobile telephone use and by screening from urban infrastructure. EW systems hav have e to function with the clutter and multi-path effects inherent in built up areas, and frequently suffer reduced range and low-power transmission.

22

 For instance those from local taxi firms, local radio stations etc.

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58. In the urban environment EW detachments are deployed either in static HQ overwatch or embedded with units. units. EW detachments can be d deployed eployed on foot, by vehicle or or at short-halt capable of 24-hour 24-hour operation. Where possible E EW W sensors should operate from a secure location, but can be deployed in the light role if required. 59.

The purpose of EW is to provide the commander with electronically gathered

information of the enemy’s enemy’s intentions a and nd capability. EW operators are ab able le to provide the bearing, location, intentions and movement of the threat and can be networked with other detachments and ISTAR ISTAR assets to provide a p position osition fixing capability. EW detachments are capable of electronic attack, although its use should be co-ordinated in order to minimise the impact on other spectrum users. 60. Increasingly sophisticated enemies operating in a built up area will have similar electronic surveillance and electronic attack resources capable of significant intercept and intrusion. Units must ensure rigorous emission control control policies, good v voice oice procedure an and d communications security.

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  CHAPTER 5  AL L A RMS COMBAT COMBA T SECTION SECT ION 1 - URBAN URBA N CLOSE COMBAT ‘They knew the houses they were hiding in and where the most complex hiding spots were located. They knew the s spots pots that gave them the best geome geometry try to fire on us without us seeing them. These guys were smart, well trained and, worst of all, willing to fight to the death…..they knew how to fight us in an urban environment. They didn’t c challenge hallenge the tanks or armour armour but blended in…without obvious signs to target. They would m move ove from house to house house and fall bac back k as we app approached. roached. They had wea weapons pons and ammu ammunition nition staged in every house house.. It was really complex.’  Al Fall uj ah, Ir aq, 2004 ‘A Tale Tale of Three Thr ee Cities’, Russell Glenn

INTRODUCTION 1. Urban Close Combat is a brutal, manpower intensive infantry-led business. Combat is often at very short range and the soldier is faced with an enemy who can be above him, below him and behind him1. Fratricide is an ever present dan danger  ger 2. 2. The nature of military operations since the end of the Cold War and global urbanisation since 1945 reinforce the fact that operations in urban areas are not only increasingly likely in any future conflict, but may well be a future enemy’s preferred ground for his military operations. THE FUNCTION AND ROLE OF TROOPS IN CLOSE COMBAT 3. Unit and formation structures should be optimized for urban fighting into taskorganized combined arms groups. 4. The combination of forces at the lowest levels, such as armour, infantry and aviation with engineer support to each, are likely to be critical to achieving success in urban terrain. The groupings must always have the necessary elements of manoeuvre, firepower, protection, command structure, and logistic support to achieve and capitalise on tactical success. The grouping should be dependent upon the mission and the enemy threat. The types of forces employed will be dictated by the operating environment. 5. The urban environment favours c close lose combat by dismou dismounted nted troops. Weapon systems are  are limited by cover and range from getting the platforms with long range weapon systems maximum advantage from their systems. They are also v vulnerable ulnerable to attack at close close range by small arms and short range anti-tank weapons. weapons.  

1

 Nearly every unit involved in the attack on Fallujah by US forces in 2004 suffered more casualties from rifle and machine gun fire from behind them than from in front. The enemy had either been bypassed or, more often, had moved into empty buildings captured, cleared and then vacated by the advancing US formations and units. 2  The majority of Russian fatalities during the first battle for Grozny in 1994 were caused by their own side.

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  6. In the urban environment, whether in offence or defence, dismounted forces will normally be based on infantry formations. Support to the infantry will be provided by other other arms and services which which must be be able to operate in the dismounted role. role. The primary aim of the infantry and the other dismounted troops will be to close with and defeat the enemy by firepower and close combat. 7.

The means by which dismounted troops close with the enemy can be various.

Tactical and operational movement into the dismounted environment can be by armoured fighting vehicle, on foot or by helicopter. helicopter. Each of these methods methods offers different levels levels of mobility, protection and firepower, but will not change the fundamental role of the dismounted soldier soldier once he has closed with the enemy. The tactical mobility of the dismounted troops will dictate the level of integral fire support and logistic backup available. The Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) will provide the higher level of fire support and logistic backup required, play an important part in the commander’s tactical plan, provide a communications base and, if necessary, improve the speed for casualty evacuation. However, in spite of ever increasing levels of physical protection, such as additional armour packs, they will remain vulnerable to Emplaced Explosive Ordnance (EEO). 8. Despite significant advances in weapon, equipment and vehicle development the way to conduct close combat and fight at close quarters has not changed for many years and is unlikely to change change significantly in the future. Developments in technology technology for urban operations will provide alternative ways of gaining intelligence but close combat will be won by individual initiative, courage, leadership, determination and collective team work. 9. Every soldier in the urban environment, of any rank and from any arm, is vulnerable to attack at close quarters. He or she can expec expectt to be required to engage in close c combat ombat with the enemy. The scope of urban operations will range from infantry units fighting with or without armour support, through every level and type of stability operation, to encounters by support personnel personnel with the enemy at close rang range. e. Distinction cannot be drawn b between etween those whose raison d’être is d’être is to close with and engage the enemy and those for whom such an encounter would be unlikely in a rural environment. 10. Urban close combat has been defined as 'operations which take place on foot, in direct fire contact with the enemy and involving the deliberate application of concentrated violence to achieve achieve the mission'. mission'. Following this definition, definition, the following lessons lessons can be drawn: a. Weapons, ammunition and equipment used in close combat should be small and light enough to be carried and use used d effectively in close comb combat. at. Consideration should be given to the issue of a pistol to all ranks as a secondary weapon. b. For the dismounted soldier, close combat will generally take place at ranges from 200m down to the length he he need thrust his bayonet. The shorter shorter the range over which he is fighting the more stark, dangerous and personal the environment becomes. The soldier should seek seek to use all his available available weapons to give him him the greatest possible stand-off distance and all round utility. c. The constant 360 degree vulnerability of the close combat soldier increases the need for all round defence and protection.

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  Fighting can be at very close range for protracted periods of time time.. At d. Stalingrad in 1942 and 1943 the defending Russians used every different type of weapon and soldier to fight the battle. battle. They hugged the en enemy emy as close as pos possible sible to prevent him effectively using his supporting arms, exhausted him through constant attrition and by fear and proximity, thereby causing him to open fire at every opportunity, day and night, to give away his position. 11. Dismounted close combat involves both individual and collective activity. The individual fighting soldier is constrained by time, space, and the range of the weapons and equipment he can can carry. Collective activity will be based on the ability ability of individual groups of soldiers to move, close with and encircle his enemy, supported by direct-fire and longer range weapons. 12. service, ervice, the co core re function of the urban so soldier ldier Summary.. Regardless of his arm or s Summary is to close with the enemy enemy and defeat him. Whatever he does, in o order rder to survive and win, he must have the right weapons, and the ammunition and support that he needs to complete his task. 3 THE USE OF GRENADES IN CLOSE COMBAT  

13. grenades are an essential w weapon eapon for assaulting a and nd clearing Grenades.. HE Hand grenades Grenades buildings. Grenade ammunition expenditure is likely to be heavy. During WW2, it was common for a battalion fighting in urban areas to use in excesses of 500 hand grenades in a day. The HE grenad grenade e is the mos mostt commonly use used d grenade du during ring combat in bu built-up ilt-up areas and is used used while clearing room rooms. s. The overuse o off HE grenades in lightly constructed buildings may cause cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that fragments fragments may penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms. 14. Grenade Machine Gun.  Gun.  The Grenade Machine Gun (GMG)4  can provide high explosive fire support support to a range of 2000m. With a cyclic rate of 350 rounds rounds per minute, it provides the battlegroup commander with an ac accurate curate high rate of fire. It can also be fired in single shot. It is particularly useful ag against ainst dismounted pers personnel, onnel, soft skinned ve vehicles hicles and light armoured vehicles. 15. Underslung Grenade Launcher.  Launcher.  In comparison to the use of hand thrown grenades, the use of an Underslung Grenade Launcher (UGL) significantly reduces the vulnerability of the firer. UGL should be used to assist initial entry into buildings and launch grenades into openings ab above ove ground floor level. Their use in inside side buildings for room clearance is likely to be limited. The 40mm U UGL GL fitted to the SA80 L85A2 rifle fires the High Explosive Dual Purpose (HEDP) Grenade. It can:

3

a.

Penetrate 45 mm of steel.

b.

Penetrate 300mm of concrete.

c.

Produce casualties within a 5m radius of grenade.

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 10.   Man-portable or vehicle mou nted, normally fired by a two or three man team but can be operated by an individual if required.  4

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Fig B-5-2 B-5-2 UG UGL L Being Fired in Afgh anistan, 20 2007 07 5

SNIPERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT   16. General.. Snipers can be highly effective in a General number of roles in the urban environment. The value of th the e sniper to a unit depends on the type of operation, the level of conflict and the Rules of Enga Engagement. gement. To provide timely and effective support, the sniper needs a clear picture of the commander’s concept of operations and intent in order to operate operate in independently dependently when necessary. Clear control measures must be employed to prevent fratricide and to maintain control.  An effective sniper group can disrupt the enemy a great deal and cause delay out of all proportion to its numbers. The effectiveness of a sniper will largely depend on the terrain, and the complex nature of the different types of urban dwellings will directly affect how the sniper can be employed. 17. A sniper can provide a 24 hour Capability.. Capability capability and his role is not limited to simply engaging enemy targets. Likely tasks for snipers in the urban environment are as follows:

Fig B-5B -5-3 3-U UK K Sni per,  Af gh ani st an, 2007 2007  

a. Urban to Rural/Rural to Urban Engagements. Engagements . Snipers are in a good position to utilise their weapon ranges to the maximum without becoming decisively engaged. Their stealth is a huge advantage advantage in mixed environments. environments. b. Denial of Key Terrain. Terrain . Snipers can efficiently and effectively deny key terrain such as routes and specific buildings to the enemy in a built up area. 5

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 9.

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  c. Covering Obstacles. Obstacles .  Snipers can be utilised to cover obstacles and assist in choking enemy enemy movement. movement. Enemy commanders commanders are likely to move forward to observe and should be priority targets. d. Supporting the Close Battle. Battle. Snipers are able to support troops during urban penetration and urban thrust thrust operations in a variety of different ways. ways. They are able to support local counterattacks with precision fire and provide a screen either as part of an ISTAR plan or part of a guard force providing both precision fire and observation. e. Sniper teams can be employed in isolation, Isolated Employment. Employment . maximising their stealth, although this may carry significant risk. f. adjust Control of Offe Offensive nsive Support. Support . A sniper should be able to call in and adjust Offensive Support Support (OS) and should be employed within within the OS bubble. He may wish to utilise OS rather than compromise compromise his position using his rifle. Snipers should be able to call in and control control mortar and artillery artillery fire. The use of of black light to enhance night capability offers a distinct advantage. g. The enemy will almost certainly have his own Counter Sniping. Sniping . snipers/sharp shooters shooters operating in the urban environment. Snipers will be looking for signs and patterns of enemy snipers. Our own snipers can reduce and restrict the enemy sniper’s observation, movement and their ability to shoot.

Fig B-5-4 Bosn ian Sniper, Form er Yugosl avia 19 1993 93   h. employed by the commander in TASKORG/Groupings.. Snipers may well be employed TASKORG/Groupings a mixed grouping eg ISTAR. Flexibility should be used when employing employing snipers for a specific task particularly when screening or guarding an area - using a cocktail of weapon systems in a screen or guard matrix may produce the best effect. i. Flank and Rear Observation. Observation . Snipers can be used to protect troops by the provision of early warning of follow up action and counter attacks, and by engaging such activity with precision fire and OS.  j.  At t ack ackii ng Targ ets of Opp or tu ni t y . Targets of opportunity may be given priorities by by the commander. Types of targets might include enemy snipers,

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B-5-5

 

  commanders, vehicle commanders, radio operators, engineers, and machine gun crews. k. inevitably use OPs OPs as a means to observe Observation Posts. Posts . Snipers will inevitably and carry out much much of their task. Both urban and rural OPs OPs can be used used depending on the ground. Urban tasks could include include gaining information on the enemy, enemy, establishing enemy habits and patterns, triggering reserves and QRFs, monitoring local reactions to operations, calling for OAS and destroying key personnel. 6 l. Heli-Sniping . Firing from helicopters is a task for which snipers are not normally trained, but heli-sniping is a possibility for short duration urban operations, particularly when elevation elevation and clear clear shoots are difficult. Heli-sniping may be used by a commander on specific urban penetration operations.

18. move ve or be position positioned ed with lead or fighting Positioning.. A sniper does not have to mo Positioning elements. He may have to occupy a higher position to the rear or flank, potentially some distance away from the element element he is supporting. By operating far from the other elements, a sniper avoids decisive engagement but remains close enough to engage distant targets.  A sniper is likely to get the best observation and arcs of fire from elevated positions, although he should not be placed in obvious positions, such as church steeples and roof tops, since the enemy can often observe and and target such such locations. locations. Indirect fire can can generally penetrate rooftops and cause casualties casualties in top floors of buildings. Furthermore, snipers should not be positioned where there is heavy traffic; these areas invite enemy observation as well.  A sniper must consider a variety of factors when selecting a fire position or observation post including the following: a. good od commun communications ications in order to both Communications.. A sniper needs go Communications coordinate with the force elements that he supports and apply offensive support. This may be difficult to achieve in urban terrain.

Fig B -5-5-5 5 1BW Snipers , Iraq, 2004 2004  6

 Firing unrestrained weapons from helicopters requires specialised training, and may only be carried out by suitably qualified aircrew and snipers operating (and practised) as an integrated team, specifically authorised for the task.'

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  b. overr likely enemy Observation.. Good observation with cleared fields of view ove Observation locations and routes routes is essential. Ideally, a fire position s should hould offer long-range field fields s of fire and all round observation. c. Concealment and Survival. Survival . The sniper must be covert and understand the three dimensional aspect to concealment in the visible light and thermal spectra. The use of solid, robust structures for protection from both direct and indirect fire should be sought. sought. As well as selecting a suitab suitable le position with c cover over from fire, he also needs protection from the elements. d. Sustainability.. Depending on the duration of the operation, snipers will need Sustainability to be re-supplied. Thought must be given to the meth method od of re-supply including including the use of covered approaches and caches. e. snipers ers should withdraw to a  Al t ern ati ve Pos it io ns . After engaging a target, snip pre-planned alternative position in order to avoid compromise. 19. Building Construction. Construction . The m material aterial and structure o off buildings in the area of operations should be considered, in respect of both protected positions and planning weapon effect. The type of building a and nd the mate materials rials used in its construction has an impact on ammunition penetration thus ammunition selection. 20. Sniper Target Building Breakdown. Breakdown . The following is a diagram of how a sniper might define a point on a target target building. This method is easy to use and brings troops onto onto the target quickly and efficiently.

Fig B-5-6 B-5-6 Sniper Colour Clock Code

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  21. tasks during an offensive offensive operation in an urban Offensive Operations. Operations . Sniper tasks environment can include the following: a. can be employed during the investment, dominating dominating Investment.. Snipers can Investment ground around the objective. b.

Break-in.. Break-in

The attacker attacker will be at his most vulnerable vulnerable during the break-in

battle. Precision fire support is critical in order for assaulting troops to secure a foothold. c. Securing the Objective. Objective. The assaulting troops should conduct a systematic approach to the securing of of the objective and and will require support support throughout. The enemy is likely to have established strong defensive positions with a comprehensive obstacle plan. plan. Overwatch through through the provision of precision precision fire support support and the the coordination of OS by snipers enables commanders to manoeuvre more freely. d. enemy from the area, snipers can be Clearance.. In clearing the remaining enemy Clearance used as cut-offs and in overwatch positions, guiding clearance troops on the ground and engaging enemy when necessary. e. enemy counter attack attack and sniper sniper fire is high Re-organisation.. The threat of enemy Re-organisation during the re-organisation. re-organisation. Snipers can be employed to counter this and and provide commanders with early warning of any enemy attack. 22. tasks during during a defensive operation in an urban Defensive Operations. Operations . Sniper tasks environment can include the following: a. Perimeter Force. Force. Snipers can be an integral part of the perimeter force providing observation for early warning, coordination of OS and precision fire. b. can be used in conjunction with the disruption Disruption Force. Force. Snipers can force, either organic to it or in support. c.

main defensive area snipers can be tasked to Main Defensive Area Area.. In the main

engage in selected killing areas, cover obstacles and assist in preventing the enemy from grouping for coordinated attacks. d. deployment of a reserve, reserve, snipers can be used to provide Reserve.. On deployment Reserve precision fire support, assist in guiding their manoeuvre on the battlefield and adjust OS. 23. employed effectively, snipers not not only Effects Of Sniper Weapon Systems. Systems . When employed have a physical impact on the enemy but also a significant psychological effect, particularly in an urban environment. Commanders need to have an understanding of the effects effects of the weapons and optics optics a sniper carries in order for him to be employed employed for best effect. Part C, Chapter 11 contains detail of sniper weapon effects.  24. priorities for snipers are determined by by the relative Sniperr Priorities Snipe Priorities.. Engagement priorities importance of of the targets to the enemy. Sniper targets usually include include commanders, commanders, enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons.

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  25. Limitations on Employing Snipers in t he Urban Urban Environment. Environment. Limitations on the use of snipers in the urban environment may include the following: a.

Degraded communications.

b. Disrupted command and control, leading to degraded situational awareness and the possibility of fratricide. c. Difficulties in sustaining the sniper(s). This is a particular issue when snipers are deployed in relative isolation. The duration of sniper sniper operations will generally generally be short as re-supply will will heighten the risk of compromise. compromise. The pre-positioning pre-positioning of combat supplies can extend duration. d.

Restricted fields of view and arcs of fire due to the complex terrain.

e. Ammunition penetration of buildings. necessary.

Armour piercing rounds may be

f. Employing snipers in isolation carries risk. dedicating a QRF.

This can be mitigated by

g. All buildings that need to be occupied by a sniper should be cleared first. A sniper may need assistance to clear a suitable fire position or OP before occupation. h. There is a risk of compromise after an engagement with a sniper rifle. The use of suppressors and alternative positions will mitigate this. i.

The weather has an impact on visibility and sustainability. FIGHTING VEHICLES7 

GENERAL 26. Fighting vehicles consist of tanks, tracked and wheeled Infantry Infantry   Fighting Vehicles (IFVs), recce vehicles and other armed vehicles8. They can b be e used very e effectively ffectively in intimate support of dismounted forc forces es in urban operations. In urban terrain, their mobility, firepower, communications and surveillance and target-acquisition attributes are invaluable to dismounted troops. Up-to-date descriptions of the capa capabilities bilities of AFVs in current use may be found in the All Arms Tactical Aide Memoire. 27. In built-up areas, AFVs are vulnerable as their mobility and firepower can be restricted. In urban terrain streets and alleys constitute ready ready-made -made fields of fire and killing areas. AFVs are restricted by o obstacles, bstacles, can be c canalised analised by urban infras infrastructure tructure and can be subject to possible ambush a and nd short-range attack. Gun elevation, depression an and d traverse are restricted. restricted. Infantry intimate su support pport reduces the risk to AFVs, howeve however, r, and should be considered the norm.

7

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 16-20.  including protected mobility platforms.

8

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  28. Conventional FIBUA defensive operations are centred on prepared and fortified positions. All app approaches roaches to thes these e pos positions itions are normally normally   covered by fire and may be 9 protected by landmines, IEDs   and obstacles. Tanks and oth other er AFVs can be us used ed effectively with dismounted infantry in the pursuit and in armoured raids into urban terrain. Consideration should be given to avoiding weight-supporting constructions (eg bridges, flyovers) until they have been cleared by dismounted forces and confirmed, if necessary, by specialist reconnaissance. THE EMPLOYMENT OF AFVs OTHER THAN TANKS TANKS   29. AFVs other than tanks that can contribute to the urban battle consist of CVR(T) Scimitar, Warrior IFV and other armed protected mobility vehicles that may be issued for specific operations. operations. They may all, to va varying rying degrees degrees,, offer p protection, rotection, firepower and mobility as well as providing the means for the movement of personnel, freight and casualties.  AFVs IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 30.

The likely tasks for AFVs in urban offensive operations are to: a.

Provide protected transport for infantry as close as possible to the objective.

b.

Provide intimate support to assault troops on the objective.

c.

Destroy enemy positions with direct fire.

d.

Breach walls en route to, and in, the objective area.

e. Isolate the objective by movement and with direct fire to prevent enemy withdrawal, reinforcement, or counterattack. f.

Counter enemy armour.

g.

Provide II and TI illumination of targets.

h.

Establish roadblocks and barricades.

i.

Provide re-supply of ammunition and explosives for the assault force.

 j.

Provide a mobile reserve.

k.

Evacuate casualties.

31. To maximise offensive momentum dismounted infantry and AFVs must work together. Good com communications munications b between etween the dismounted infantry and AFV is critical. External telephones fitted to AFVs provide the primary and best means of communication to dismounted infantry. infantry. AFVs can provide direc directt fire sup support port to d dismounted ismounted infantry who themselves can provide close protec protection tion to the vehicle. Combined Arms training should be conducted at all levels down to single AFV/section level. 9

 Improvised Explosive Devices.

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  32. Smoke from AFVs can be used to screen the movement of the vehicle10  and dismounted troops troops or blind the e enemy nemy.. Consideration s should hould also be given to the incendiary effect of smoke munitions.  AFVs IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 33.

Typical tasks for AFVs in urban defence include: a.

Providing a mobile reserve.

b. Providing fire support including DFs and FPF for the defending forces and mutual support to other AFVs from protected fire positions. c.

Providing rapid, protected transport for the infantry.

d.

Providing mutual support for anti-tank weapons.

e.

Covering obstacles by fire.

f.

Providing re-supply of ammunition and other supplies.

g.

Evacuating casualties from areas under fire.

h.

Defending flanks

i.

In co-operation with the dismounted infantry defending buildings and routes.

34. AFVs should be integrated into the defensive plan to make use of their protection, firepower and mobility to cover likely approa approaches ches and sele selected cted killing areas. Routes and fire positions should be carefully prepared to provide protection against enemy anti-armour weapons. Plans for the defence should include the use of alternative fire positions for AFVs and the preparation of withdrawal routes.

10

  Either from Multi Barrelled Smoke Grenade Discharger’s (MBSGD) or, in the case of CR2, its on board smoke generators.

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Lessons fro m an extended defensive fir e fight usi ng IFV IFVs s at Re Red d 10, Basra City, 21 May 2007:   Importance of good vehicle maintenance and battle procedure by all section members.   Importance of good driver training. Drivers must b be e confident and able to us use e their initiative.   Live firing from vehicles should be practised every day, including the use of alternative fire positions.   Target Indication is difficult. Good target indication and clear fire con control trol orders are essential. Use tracer and, if n necessary, ecessary, button c compasses ompasses on wrist wrist watches for target indication.   Smoke will obscure the enemy and blind your fire.   Carry as much vehicle and personal ammunition as you can in your vehicles.   Be proactive in defence.   The driver is alone. He ca can n hea hearr gunfire and commands on his headset. Get down to him.   Use more protection on armoured vehicles – eg sandbags.   The vehicle crew must multi-task – use BOWMAN, drive, command the vehicle.

•

•

•

•

• •

• •

•

•

Cpl J P Smit Smith, h, R Coy, 4 RIFLES RIFLES,, 200 2007 7

 AFV CA NNON 11 35. General.. The 30mm Rarden cannon , mounted on CVR (T) Scimitar and Warrior General 510/511, can provide significant firepower to the infantry and can be used either in intimate support or from a stand-off position. position. In addition, the co-ax co-axially ially mounted machine guns can enhance the level level of suppressive fire. Two types of ammunition are av available: ailable:

a. Sabot    Ar mo ur Pier ci ng Dis car cardi di ng Sabo Sabott . Armour Piercing Discarding Sabot (APDS) is the main main anti-armour round available for use with the 30mm cannon. It is suitable for engaging light armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m. b. High Explosive. Explosive. High Explosive (HE) rounds are suitable for engaging softskinned vehicles, vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry ou outt to 1500m. HE has the mo most st utility in an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the more extensive collateral damage of a High Explosive Squash Head (HESH) round. 36. several eral limitations when using 30mm cannon cannon in the u urban rban Limitations.. There are sev Limitations environment: a. Like the tank main armament in the urban environment, 30mm cannon is restricted in elevation and traverse. b.

HE rounds may have limited effect against hard structures, eg concrete or

reinforced buildings. 11

  See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 14-15. The Rarden Cannon is soon to be replaced by a 40mm CTA (Cased Telescope Ammunition) system.

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  c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban environment due to their size and weight. d. Although not as hazardous to dismounted troops as the 120mm tank gun, 30mm cannon does produce a minimal danger from ejected rounds, as well as the associated dangers of the phosphorous from the smoke grenade dischargers. 12

TANKS   ‘When the lead UK tank came into sight, they made a direct hit with the first [anti-tank] round, disabling the tank and blocking the route of advance with the whole line stalled behind it. Similarly, when a tank ca came me to a halt beside a ta tallll building on a secon second d road, a demolition team collapsed the façade of the building on top of the tank, thereby stopping the second tank.’ Jaff a, Pa Jaffa, Palest lest ine, 1948 “City Fights”, Benjamin Runkle

Fig B-5B -5-7 7 UK Sherman Tank i n Palesti ne, 19 1948 48 37. The powerful, high-velocity gun that is mounted on tanks provides the infantryman with major contribution to success in built-up areas: heavy, direct, fire s support. upport. Although the infantry assumes the lead role during combat in built-up areas, tanks and infantry must work as a close team. The tank, u using sing HESH, c can an provide effec effective tive direct fire ag against ainst buildings as the round will breach most walls and fortifications. The co-axial mac machine hine gun can provide effective neutralising covering fire. EMPLOYMENT EMPLOYME NT OF TANK TANKS S  38. As part of the all arms battle, battle,   tanks are best suited to tasks within the Investment Force, or direct Fire Support Group in offensive operations and in the Perimeter Force in defensive operations. operations. In these roles they can m make ake maximum use of their firepower and

12

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 16-20.

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  mobility without exposure exposure to the threat o off hand held an anti ti armour weapons. Other points to note are: a. Tanks need infantry on the ground to provide security in built-up areas and to designate targets. Against targets protected b by y structures, tanks should be escorted forward to the most covered loc location ation that provides a clear shot. On the spot instructions by the local infantry commander are essential to ensure that the tank's fire is accurate and and its exposure is limited. The tank comman commander der may have to halt in a covered position, dismount, and reconnoitre a route forward into a suitable firing position. b. Tanks are equipped with very effective thermal sights that can be used to detect enemy personnel and weapons that are hidden in shadows and behind openings. Dust, fires, thick s smoke moke and atmosp atmospheric heric conditions significantly degrade these sights. c. Burning particles from white phosphorous turret-mounted grenade launchers can easily start uncontrolled fires and are hazardous to dismounted infantry near the tank. The tank commander and the local infantry commander s should hould coordin coordinate ate when and under what conditions these launchers can be used. d. The tank's size and armour can provide dismounted infantry with cover from direct fire weapons weapons and fragments. With co-ordination, tanks can provide moving cover for infantrymen as they advan advance ce across sma smallll open areas. However, enemy fire striking a tank but not penetrating is a major threat to nearby infantry. Fragmentation generated by anti-tank rounds and ricochets off tank armour have historically been a prime cause of infantry casualties while working with tanks in built-up areas. e. Some tanks (normally the squadron 2IC's tank) are equipped with dozer blades that can be used to remove rubble barriers under fire, breach obstacles, or seal exits. 39.

vulnerable lnerable to han hand d held anti-tank weapons Limitations . Tanks can be particularly vu

which can find ample ample cover in th the e urban environm environment. ent. However, this limitation is only valid where the enemy has such a c capability apability that can defea defeatt our tanks. Intelligence staff advice on the current and any likely future enemy anti-tank capability should thus be sought before planning operations, in order to asses assess s the risk. Particular limitations of eleva elevation, tion, depression and traverse are sh shown own in Figures B B-6-7 -6-7 and B-6-8. Where possible, tanks should take advantage advantage of open areas which offer the best fields of fire. The weight of tanks may cause collapse of cellars, drains and underground systems and therefore routes and firing positions have to be reconnoitred with care.

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Fig B-5-8 B-5-8 – Challenger T Two wo Elevation Re Restr strict ict ions

Fig B-5-9 B-5-9 – Challenger T Two wo Depression Re Restr strict ict ions 40. best st urban target effects when fired Firing Angles. Angles . Tank guns produce their be perpendicular to the hard surface.  ANTI-TANK  ANTI-TA NK WEA WEAPONS PONS IN THE URBA URBAN N ENVIRONMENT13  PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT 41.

The likely tasks for anti-tank weapons14 in the urban environment are as follows: a. has s an effective thermal sight and should Surveillance Operations. Operations .  Javelin ha be incorporated incorporated into the STAP. When the armoured thre threat at is low and observation difficult, Javelin should be fully utilised for observation. b. primary rimary weap weapon on use used d for force protec protection tion will be Force Protection. Protection .  The p 15 NLAW . Concurrent with all operations is the requirement to use anti-armour weapons for force protection. This type of operation will be carried out by all troops throughout the urban battlefield.

13

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 11-12.  This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 6, Anti Tank Weapons Effects. 15  See below.

14

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  c. (2500m), 0m), thermal sight and anti-armour Flank Protection. Protection . The long range (250 capability of Javelin means that it can be ideally used for flank protection on the edges of the built up area. SPECIFIC FACTORS OPERATIONS

FOR

THE

USE

OF

ANTI-TANK

WEAPONS

IN

URBAN

42. Consideration should be given to the following factors when using anti-armour weapons in the urban environment: 16 a. Soft Launch. Launch . Both Javelin  and NLAW can be fired from a confined space. This potential should be exploited where possible.

b. Firing fr om Eleva Elevated ted Positions Positions.. The use of NLAW from upper storeys will protect the firer from an enemy’s tank main gun and coaxial machine guns fire due to the limits of weapon elevation. elevation. Furthermore, the top armour on a tank is thinner and will improve the chance chance of an effective immobilizing strike. Using these tec techniques, hniques, NLAW may be used used in offensive and defensive operations. It is particularly effective in ambushes. c. Safe Launch. Launch . Safe Launch will be critical in the urban environment. Any obstruction can cause premature detonation or ricoc ricochet. het. Commanders should ensure they are aware of, and if necessary remove, potential obstructions from the likely flight path of the missile d. made e of other w weapon eapon systems Use of Other Systems. Systems . Effective use can be mad in an anti-armour capacity, particularly in the urban ambush. ambush. The use of sn snipers ipers will be highly effective against against exposed AFV comm commanders anders and drivers. Blast and directfire damage to antennae, optics and other external equipment can significantly reduce AFV fighting ability. NLAW

Fig B-5-10

NLAW NLAW  

17 43. General.. NLAW   is one man, disposable, fire-and-forget weapon with a range of General between 20-400m for moving moving targets and up to 600m for static targets. targets. NLAW can be fired

16

 Javelin has a minimum minimum range of 65m, NLAW a minimum range of 20m.

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  from an enclosed or exposed position in the Over-fly Target Attack (OTA) or the Direct  Attack (DA) mode 44. NLAW is an all a arms rms weapon, available to all troo troops ps operating in the Scaling.. Scaling battle-group and should should be dep deployed loyed with all gro groups ups operating in the urban battlefield. All units receive high-scaling of NLAW for anti-armour tasks in urban operations. NLAW should be deployed with rifle platoons and the anti-tank platoon for offensive and defensive action in the urban environment, and to other elements of the battle-group, including attached CSS elements, for self-defence. 45. primarily rily used to defeat light armou armoured red vehic vehicles les an and d Employment.. NLAW is prima Employment neutralize fortified firing positions. positions. Due to the des design ign of the warhea warhead d and the narrow blast effect, it is not as effective in this role as heavier weapons such as a tank main armament. a. NLAW is most effective when firing from upper storeys, or from the flanks and rear. When firing at main ba battle ttle tanks, these we weapons apons should always be employ employed ed against weaker areas in volley or paired firing as they normally require a number of hits to achieve a kill on a tank tank.. Firing from upper stories protects the firer from tank main guns and coaxial machine gun fire since tanks cannot sharply elevate these armaments. In addition the top armour o on n a tank is normally mu much ch thinner than elsewhere, thus greatly improving the chance of an effective immobilising strike. Using these techniques, NLAW may be used in offensive and defensive operations. It is particularly effective in ambushes. b. The effect of NLAW against buildings or defensive positions is likely to be limited. The shaped charge is unlikely to create a significant breach in a wall or cause casualties to those those inside the building. However, the blast and sho shock ck may be sufficient to neutralize neutralize a defen defensive sive position in a room for a short period. Against structures, shaped-charge weapons should be aimed about 6 inches below or to the side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy behind the wall. 46. Back-blast.. During fighting in built up areas, Back-blast areas, the back-blast area in the the open is more hazardous due to loose rubble and the channelling effect of the narrow streets and alleys. It is not advisable to fire NLAW from inside a building although firing from an enclosed space is possible. The most serious haz hazard ard that can be expected is hearing loss. Structural damage to the the building can also occur. These risks s should hould be asses assessed sed against the advantages gained by firing from cover. JAVELIN 18 47. General.. Javelin   provides a highly flexible stand-off precision weapon ideally General suited to ISTAR and fire support tasks. Its use in urban environment will depend on the possibility of using its range range,, its lethality an and d flexibility of employme employment. nt. It is man-portable and has a low low logistic burden. Primarily an anti-armour we weapon, apon, it can be used against secondary targets. A number of specific tactical cons considerations iderations must be considered considered in order to employ the weapon effectively:

17

 Due into service 2009. This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; NLAW Fire Effects. 18  This section should be read in conjunction with section 6, Chapter 10; Javelin Fire Effects.

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  a. the minimum range of Range.. As engagement ranges are likely to be close, the Range only 65m in direct a attack ttack mode provides a particularly usefu usefull capability. Longer engagements are possible in less dense areas and where the Command Launch Unit (CLU) has line-of-sight to the target position. b. developments velopments a are re often located a along long can canals als and rivers Visibility.. Urban de Visibility which create potential potential for fog in low lying areas. areas. Air inversion laye layers rs are common especially where cities or towns are in low lying bow bowls ls or valleys. These trap du dust, st, chemical agents and pollutants, increa increasing sing obscuration and reducing v visibility. isibility. Like all thermal surveillance devices, the CLU will be affected by these obscurants. c. short hort as the urban e environment nvironment will Time.. Engagement times are likely to be s Time only present present fleeting targets. Timely ISTAR feeds, careful careful targeting, efficient inaction drills and fire control w will ill all be of paramount impo importance. rtance. Engagement difficulties will also demand a greater scale of battery coolant units (BCUs) than is usually allocated. allocated. To increase in-action time, operators sh should ould adopt the tactical carry when contact is imminent. d. acquisition and reduce Field of Fire. Fire. To improve the opportunities for target acquisition vulnerability in the urban environment, use should be made of separate observers to locate the target and call forward the Javelin and any other direct fire system, by providing a quick and accurate target indication. Care must be taken to n note ote and avoid the urban furniture (street lights, power lines, walls, fences, bridges, trees and large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, and rubble) that will affect the ability to engage moving targets. The requirement for impro improved ved fields of fire ma may y necessitate the occupation of an exposed building. e. Firing Positions. Positions . Firing positions can be constructed on or inside buildings, although positions outside of buildings may offer considerable tactical advantages. Positions should be selected that provide protection from direct and indirect fire. Safe Launch is absolutely critical in any environment. An obstruction c could ould cause a premature detonation or ricoch ricochet. et. Concealment, including the u use se o off thermal protection, will be essential for urban OPs. f. such h as buildings, bunkers, sniper sniper Secondary Targets. Targets . Secondary targets suc positions, fire bases, mortar base plates, hovering rotary aircraft and non-armoured vehicles will present themselves in the urban environment.

Fig B-5B-5-11 11 Point of Aim aga against inst a Ma Masonr sonr y Struct ure

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  (1) needs ds to be carefully selected for Engagements.. The attack mode will nee Engagements the target type and and the track gates adjusted to the visible centre of mass mass.. It may be difficult to achieve ‘lock-on’ with small targets at longer ranges. (2) Weapon Effect. Effect . The Javelin warhead will penetrate approx 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie gla glass, ss, wood, etc.) the larger seconda secondary ry charge may not detonate detonate until a subseque subsequent nt impact is made. Against a robust structure the penetration will only create a fist size hole and is therefore unsuitable for creating creating access points. If the structure is weak, there is a far greater chance it may create larger l arger damage and possibly even collapse. g. environmentt maximises Trigger OP OPs s . The use of an OP matrix in the urban environmen the ability of Javelin Javelin teams to identify a armoured rmoured targets. The ISTAR feed mitigates the fleeting nature of urban engagement, allow the early initiation of Battery Coolant Units (BCUs) by anti-tank detachments and the immediate engagement of targets on acquisition. h. Time of Flight. Flight . Commanders must be aware of the time of flight of their weapon system to any likely targets in their cho chosen sen engagement area. If an AFV is capable of transiting through the engagement area more quickly than any missile will reach its intended target, either a new position must be found, or obstacles must be placed to slow down vehicles. i.  At tac k Pro f il e. Due to the attack profile of the Javelin missile in top attack mode, it is likely that some ‘street furniture’ may have to be removed to ensure safe launch of the weapon system. If this is un unfeasible, feasible, direct a attack ttack should be used, although frontal engagements will be less successful.  ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS IN THE URBAN URBA N ENVIRONMENT19 

Fig B-5B-5-12 12 Ant i-Structu re Muniti on

19

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Para 13.

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  48. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire-and-forget weapon for use against (primary targets) urban structures and bunkers and (secondary targets) light  AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the  ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that penetrates concrete structures and e enables nables subseque subsequent nt physical access. access. The purpose of the BIC is to create a hole sufficiently big to enable access to fighting troops. MORTARS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT20  49. The 60mm21 and 81mm mortars can be used effectively in the urban environment. 22  In comparison with their use in open terrain, mortars in the urban environment have reduced killing zones, an impaired ability of the observer to record and adjust the fall of shot and poor communications between the commander, the MFC and the mortar base-plate positions. Nevertheless, the array of mo mortar rtar ammunition a and nd fuse typ type e will provide an effective and useful contribution to both offensive and defensive operations in urban areas. 50. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. The trajectory of mortars operating in the high angle will be less affected but ‘dead space’23 will be about half the height of the building behind which lies the target. MORTAR EMPLOYMENT 51.

In urban operations, the following points about the use of mortars should be noted: a. In offensive operations mortars can fire into buildings and the deep spaces between them. In defensive operations m mortars ortars positioned behind bu buildings ildings are difficult for the enemy to accurately locate and even harder for him to hit. b. Mortars can be fired through the roof of a ruined building if the ground-level flooring is solid enough enough to withstand the recoil. If there is only concre concrete te in the mortar base plate area, mortars can be fired using sandbags or Raschen Bags24 as buffers under the base plates and curbs as anchors and braces. c. The 60mm and 81mm have limited effect on stronger structural targets. Even with delay fuses they seldom penetrate more than the upper stories of light buildings. However, their wide area coverage and multi option fuses make them useful against an enemy force advancing through streets, other open areas, or over rubble. r ubble. d. Mortar platoons often operate more than one mortar detachment during fighting in built-up areas. Mortars can be dispersed and converge on the same target to achieve a similar beaten zone as a mortar line. e. All of the standard mortar projectiles are useful during fighting in built-up areas. HE is likely to be the most commo commonly nly used round. WP is effective in starting

20

 See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 24-25.  The 60mm Mortar is due into service in 2009. 22 This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects. 23  The area that will not receive the fall of shot. 24  A Raschen Bag is a bag of ballast that is placed underneath the baseplate to improve the accuracy of the mortar when used in snow or other soft ground conditions. It is named after Colonel Dan Raschen, Royal Engineers, the inventor. 21

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  fires in buildings which may force the enemy out of cellars and light frame buildings. It is also the most effective mortar round against against dug-in enem enemy y tanks. Even nearmisses blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches. f. Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in built-up areas than than in open terrain. However th this is tenden tendency cy to linger means that its indiscriminate use can create adverse affects for friendly forces. g. Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of limited use because of the deep canyons and building shadows. shadows. Rapidly shifting wind c currents urrents in built-up areas also affect mortar illumination, making it less effective. EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS 52. During the ‘break-in’ phase of an assault of a defended urban area, mortar sections should normally be deployed outside the built up area. MFCs should be located with an Infantry Company or battlegroup, either with the commander, the lead platoon or in an  Anchor or Air OP. The use of an Air OP has to be judged against against resources and the current air threat. The concept w will ill be to provide a heavy enough weight of fire, coordinated with other indirect and direct assets, to allow the infantry to enter the town or city and gain a foothold. Other roles will be of harassing fire to the depths or andtoflanks of the enemy urban area to stop enemy reinforcement the defended localities neutralise forces attempting to leave the town. 53. key y to indirect fire is good observation. The MF MFC C must be high Indirect Role. Role. The ke enough to be able observe the target areas, and maintain good communications to the tactical commander. commander. The mortar line can remain centralised, group grouped ed as in sections or deployed as dispersed dispersed barrels. It is important that the MFC understand understands s the tactical plan in order to react quickly when when the plan changes changes.. Accurate and rapid mortar fire can can be used in urban areas to destroy enemy positions, block enemy approach routes, forming up positions and disrupt possible c counter ounter attack. In the assault, fire must be lifted at the last safe moment (LSM). LSM must be jud judged ged carefully, but c can an be reduced by the tactical commander. Tactical command commanders ers may choos choose e to reduce the s safety afety distances. 54. used d in the direct fire role, if necessa necessary. ry. The targe targett is Direct Role. Role. Mortars can be use adjusted by sight by the section commander until the rounds are accurate. EMPLOYMENT OF MORTARS IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS 55. The range and concentrated fire capability of the mortar should be exploited in the early stages of an enemy assault by being deployed to the forward edge of the built up area. The mortar OPs shou should ld be sited as far forward as p possible ossible in order to maximise their range. Reserve mortar lines s should hould be reconn reconnoitred oitred and prepared a amongst mongst the streets and buildings as the OPs w withdraw ithdraw into the urban area. Base-plate position positions s should be preprepared to allow for a swift re-occupation. 56. Mortars can be deployed to the rear o of, f, or outside, the town or city in order to provide unrestricted fire. Communications w will ill be critical to the c coordination oordination of accu accurate rate and timely indirect fire; the use of line can also be used as a back up to VHF com communications. munications. The MFC needs to be high enough enough to maintain good visibility of the target area. He may deploy

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  to a tall building, a building on a street junction or an air OP if the aircraft are available and the air threat is low. 57. Concentration of Fire. Fire. The concentration of fire must be carefully coordinated to achieve the greatest greatest destructive damag damage e to the enemy. Mortar fire is unlikely to penetrate armour but will force the crew to close down, restricting their v view iew and capab capability. ility. Splinters will damage surveillance and communication equipment, and thereby degrade the operational effectiveness of armoured vehicles. Converging fire on a specific target in order to maximise concentration must be judged against the resources available and the type of target that is being engaged. engaged. The use of mortar rounds onto a street in a linear fashion can be used to break up an attack in depth. The re-supply of of mortar lines must be carefully coordinated and can be achieved through the use of pre-dumped ammunition.  AMMUNITION 58.

Mortar ammunition includes: a.

High Explosive. Explosive. (1)

radius s of HE roun rounds ds is reduced by the walls of Lethality.. The lethality radiu Lethality

buildings area around around point of impa impact. However round detona detonating ting due in an enclosed hasthe a greater level ofct. lethality whichamay be enhanced to the ricochet effect off road surfaces and buildings. (2) on n the HE roun round d will enable the round to Delay.. Use of the delay fuse o Delay penetrate a tiled roof before exp exploding. loding. The delay w will ill be about 0.0 0.05 5 of a second between first penetration and explo explosion. sion. Use of the delay fuse against thick, sun dried mud roofs will be less effective. (3) proximity fuse will ena enable ble rounds to be exploded Proximity.. Use of the proximity Proximity at seven feet or 14 feet above ground. Tall buildings can cause proximity fused mortar rounds to detonate prematurely if they pass too closely.  b.

Illumination.. Illumination (1) The 81mm mortar burn time for white illumination is 33 seconds over a 200m radius. The 60mm bu burn rn time is 25-35 seconds over over a 200m radius. The radius could be limited by shadow caused by buildings and walls in the immediate vicinity. (2) The use of IR illumination by the 81mm mortar enables troops equipped with Night Vision Systems to see without the enemy being aware they are being illumina illuminated ted (IR Illumination ha has s a small noise and light signature when when used). The radius is the sa same, me, 200m, b but ut the burn time is increased to 90 seconds. (3) Urban areas degrade the effects of illuminants. They are often of limited use because because of the deep canyons an and d building s shadows. hadows. Rapidly shifting wind currents in built-up areas also degrade mortar illumination.

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  c.

White Phosphorous. Phosphorous . (1) White Phosphorus (WP)25 is effective in starting fires in buildings which may force the the enemy o out ut of cellars and light frame bu buildings. ildings. It is also th the e most effective mortar round against dug-in enemy tanks. Even near-miss near-misses es blind and suppress tank crews, forcing them to close hatches. (2) Mortar smoke tends to persist longer and give greater coverage in built-up areas than in ope open n terrain. However this tendency to linger means that its use can create adverse affects for friendly forces. SECTION 2 – COMBAT SUPPORT

 ARTIL LERY A AND ND NAVA NAVAL L GUNFIRE IN SUPPORT OF URBA N OPERATIONS26  59. fundamental ental capab capability ility of field artillery27. It shatters the General.. Firepower is the fundam General enemy’s cohesion cohesion and undermines his will to fight. It enables the combat arms to manoeuvre through either the application of firepower or the demonstrable capability to apply firepower. The roles an and d tasks of close support artillery and Nava Navall Gunfire Support (NGS) do not change in the urban environment, although the manner in which they are applied muof must st precision be tailored to that environme environment. nt. TheGMLRS, wid wider er proliferation andtheinc increased reased availability guided munitions, in particular has increased utility of artillery in urban operations. Provided that the target information is sufficiently accu accurate, rate, then the significant reduction in probable error means that the impact of collateral damage is vastly reduced. 60. The close proximity of b buildings uildings and other obstacles affects Deployment.. Deployment manoeuvrability, and and can create a significant cresting problem. The deploy deployment ment of guns can also be complicated by th the e proximity of the local local population. Furthermore, the effects of guns firing in built up areas may reduce the stability of buildings and structures and create the added added danger of falling masonry on o own wn troops and c civilians. ivilians. However, mindful of certain considerations and constraints, guns can deploy into and fire from urban areas. Examples are firing from within a roofless building with walls capable of withstanding the blast and overpressure created by firing, or hiding in buildings and moving outside to engage from a firing point. 61. have ve significant utility in urban opera operations, tions, although due Employment.. Artillery can ha Employment consideration must be given to co collateral llateral damage and ROE issues. In the indirect role, UK artillery systems can be fired in the high angle, thereby reducing the constraining impact of ‘dead space’ space’ behind b buildings uildings at the target end. The advent of precision-guided artillery has vastly increased the utility of artillery in urban areas with a limited collateral damage footprint. The following factors should be conside considered red when directing effect from artillery systems into urban areas: a. Fuze Settings. Settings .  The fuzes on artillery HE rounds can be set to suit certain conditions as follows:

25

 The use of WP can be deemed unlawful if it is employed contrary to the LOAC, in particular against civilians and their property, and against combatants were it to cause unnecessary suffering. 26  See also Chapter 10 ‘Weapon Effects’, Paras 21-23. 27  This section should be read with Chapter 10, section 7, Indirect Fire Effects.

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  (1) Proximity.. Artillery fuzes can be set to proximity (airburst), which is Proximity effective against personnel and soft-skinned vehicles in the open, although it has little effect against robust structures; this might be taken into consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage. The safety distances for proximity are greater than for other fuze settings. (2)

structures,, but the Point Detonatin g (PD (PD)). HE PD is effective against structures

round explodes on impact with the ground or a structure, so if a round were to hit a structure, then much of the explosive effect would be outside of that structure. (3) structure, then it is Delay.. If a round with a delay fuze were to strike a structure, Delay likely that the round would penetrate and detonate inside the structure, with the structure itself perhaps containing some of the fragmentation and blast effects from the round. Furthermore, if the round were to strike the ground, then – depending on the nature of that ground – the round might detonate in the ground, which would absorb some of the blast and fragmentation effect. This might be taken into consideration as a way to reduce collateral damage. b.

 Am mu ni t io n .  (1) High Explosive. Explosive. High Explosive (HE) is best used in the high angle (as described described above) when firing into or from an urban environment. High angle allows the engagement of targets on the ground between buildings that may otherwise be in the shadow shadow of said structures. High angle also allows the blast and fragmentation to be directed straight down onto the target rather than losing kinetic effect on walls and other obstacles behind which the enemy may take co cover. ver. When engaging targets with HE, co consideration nsideration should be given given to the penetration qualities of the rounds. Setting a delay on the fuze will allow the round to penetrate some roofs before detonating within the structure. The blast effect of an HE shell detonating w within ithin a clo closed sed structure should be considered as the main effect of the round as opposed to fragments of splinters. The blast will be contained within a structure and follow the path of least resistance (through open doorways, along corridors) and will have a greater effect than shell splinters, the effects of which may be constrained by thick walls an and d floors. The blast of an HE shell is likely to cause secondary fragmentation from windows and doors which will add to the splinter effects and may cause injury outside of the safe distance of a round. This is especially especially true in area areas s with large, glass fronted structures. Proximity can be used to neutralise threats in the open and on top of buildings. However, as with mortar proximity fuzes, shells passing close to tall structures may function prematurely due to the sensitivity of the Doppler radar based fuze system.  system.  (2) Smoke can be used in the urban environment but Smoke.. Smoke consideration must be given to what effect it will have on friendly forces as well as the enemy. enemy. Unlike mortar smoke, artillery smoke is not WP but Base Ejecting (BE). BE red p phosphorous hosphorous (RP) can still be used to blind ene enemy my forces including armoured crews but is less likely to have an incendiary effect. RP will hug the ground more than WP which has a tendency to pillar, and due to this ground hugging characteristic it may leave the tops of taller buildings

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  exposed and the enemy on them unsu unsuppressed. ppressed. The move movement ment of air through an urban environment means that smoke fired into it will linger on the downwind side of any structure and may swirl in directions other than straight downwind. This may cause problems for any friendly troop troops s who may subsequently move move into that location. Smoke can be use used d to mark targets for air assets but it will be more difficult to locate a point of origin within an urban environment especially if there is any wind present due to the swirling effect of the smoke.  smoke.  (3) same e problem as Illumination.. Artillery illumination suffers from the sam Illumination mortar illumination (see (see above). Illumination can also be fired to b burn urn on the ground which can be an effective marker, both day and night, for air assets. Illumination burning on the ground or on buildings may also start fires which may force the enemy enemy out of cellars and light frame buildin buildings. gs. Users must be aware of the secondary effects of burning buildings, such as smoke, and the consequences for friendly troops who may need to fight through the area later on. There may be a risk to own troops from illumination carrier shells shells.. Also, in counter insurgency campaigns the enemy have been known to use expended carrier shells to construct IEDs.  IEDs.   (4) . Inert can be used ed in thehole direct indirect and fire Inert. roles. Inert In the directammunition fire role it can be us used to both knock holes s inand structures destroy the fabric fabric of buildings. This requires the guns to be relatively relatively close to the target and this is not desirable. In the indirect role, inert rounds can be used to as a statement of intent alongside a deliberate info ops campaign in order to have an effect on the enemy whilst reducing collateral d damage. amage. Due to the lack of any blast effect, an effect on the enemy from an inert round requires an obvious direct hit on the intended target, or at least an indication in the mind of an adversary that a round has landed. landed.   62.

Precision Pre cision Munitions Munitions.. a. Guided Muniti ons Guided ons.. GPS guided munitions such as GMLRS have significa significant nt utility in urban operations due to their accuracy and the ability to use a delay fuze, thereby achieving penetration into a structure and potentially containing much of the effect of the strike within the structure. GPS guided mun munitions itions rely on a mensurated grid for target engagement, and are therefore not suitable for use against mobile targets. The following table illustrates some of the characteristics of GMLRS: GMLRS:  

Ser Ser 1.

Cha Characteris racteris tic Purpose  (Effect)

Re Remarks marks   Destruction and Neutralisation – effective    Attrition – possible (resources permitting)   Suppression and harassing fire – ineffective 200lb class warhead, blast optimised, containing 54lbs of HE. One rocket has a lethal splin splinter ter (fragmentation) distan distance ce of 40m. The warhead (incl. rocket) has poor fragmentation qualities.   Compounds – Point Detonating (PD) is effective •

•

•

2.

Warhead

3.

Target Set

•

•

   

•

Buildings trenches – Delay ( DS) (DS) is effective Bunkers –&Delay Deep (DD) isShallow effective (dependent upon

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  protection) 28 (static only)   Personnel – PD  is effective (static    Soft skin vehicles – PD is effective (static  (static only)    Armoured vehicles – Ineffective Accuracy GMLRS accuracy depends principally upon the ‘quality’ of the target location GR. GR. On operations in Afghanistan FSTs routinely observe GMLRS impact within 10m of the point of aim when used in conjunction with a mensurated target GR. Surprise The rocket glides silently for the last 2/3 of its trajectory. The rocket impacts without warning. Trajectory Default is ‘vertical - 89º’ (nominal - 65º is available). Weapons that impact vertically spread fragment less than weapons coming in from the side. Vertical trajectory n negates egates any error in the fire mission altitude. Range Maximum 70km, minimum 15km Responsiveness Planning time from the call for fire until the platform is ready to fire can be significant due to the requirement to clear airspace. (On Op HERRICK 9 in 2008/9 2008/9 the average h has as been around 8 mins.) Time of flight varies from 20 seconds to 2.5 minutes, depending on range. •

•

•

4.

5. 6.

7. 8.

29 b. Loitering Munitions. Munitions . Loitering munitions (LM) are due into service in 2010 . LMs will provide a precise method of engaging a static or moving target.

63. attemptt to reduce the collateral d damage amage effects of massed or Point of Aim. Aim . In an attemp non-precision artillery, the point of aim can be adjusted by the observer. For example, artillery fire can be employed on the fringes of urban areas as a cut-off, or to fix an adversary, whilst reducing the destructive effect of artillery inside the urban area. In a similar vein, artillery can be used to demonstrate close to or in urban areas, most notably with non-lethal natures natures such as smoke or illum illumination. ination. However, steps must be take taken n to 30 ensure that the empty carrier shells do not cause undesired effects .  64. Environment ironment it is Factors Affecting Employment. Employment . In the Contemporary Operating Env very unlikely that forces will be able to operate without restrictions, even in high intensity operations. The following should be considered: a. Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE). (CDE). The CDE process may limit the ability of an observer to attack targets. While the use o off artillery should be p proportionate roportionate and collateral damage minimised, this must not so restrict freedom of action that the required effects cannot cannot be achieved achieved.. Specific and clea clearr instruction on CDE m must ust be given to maximise freedom of action, including procedures for authorising fire when required. b. ROE. ROE authorising the use of crew served and indirect fire weapon systems often have a number of conditions. Built up areas are likely to inc include lude Restricted or Prohibited Targets within their bounds and civilians could still be, or be 28 A

proximity fuze for GMLRS is due into service in 2009. This will increase the efficacy of GMLRS against personnel in the open and soft-skinned vehicles (static only). 29  As at Apr 09: EOC is Dec 10. 30  During 2008 while firing in support of troops in contact and aware of the risks, a carrier shell fired from UK

artillery killed an Iraqi woman in Basra province.

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  presumed to be, in the area, all of which must be considered when planning for the use of artillery in th the e urban environment. Any proced procedures ures for the clearan clearance ce or authorisation of fires must be clear and responsive to the needs of the troops in contact. c. need d to select the ammunition wh which ich will achieve the  Am mu ni ti on . The nee required effect is not not specific to the urban environment. CDE and ROE may may limit the ammunition available for for selection. The environment itse itself lf can limit the effectiveness of some ammunition ammunition or change the manner in which it can be used. Illuminating ammunition can be used to mark targets for aircraft by allowing the flares to burn on the ground; in the urban environment this may start fires that could create obstacles, obscuration or even force troops out of key locations. d. Location of Observers and Fire Support Teams . The coordinated use of indirect fire in any environment relies on the effective deployment of observers in order to conduct conduct dynamic procedural procedural control o off fires and join jointt fires. Observers and Fire Support Teams (FSTs) find maintaining coverage of the ground challenging, particularly when mobile, mobile, as fields of view are usually very limited. limited. Observers need the ability to move quickly (protection should be a key consideration) to control engagements and to co communicate mmunicate effectively if they are to influence th the e battle. A combination of anchor Ops and withgen theeral manoeuvre one way of achieving this. The anchor will observers ha have ve a good general commandtroops of theisground, with the other observers more limited in their coverage, but well placed to conduct individual attacks. attacks. The plan for the dep deployment loyment of o observers bservers must be specifically addressed during the Plan Review Execute Evaluate (PREE) cycle and use of Air Observation Posts (AOPs) should be co considered. nsidered. When in range, naval g gunfire unfire can provide effective fire support. If naval gunfire is u used, sed, a lia liaison ison team s should hould be attached to the the appropriate un units. its. Any liaison un unit it would operate at the unit’s ma main in CP. Two firepower con control trol teams normally o operate perate at the com company pany level, providing ship-to-shore communications communications and coordination for nava navall gunfire support. It should be noted that due to the nature of naval gunfire support (NGS) and technology, certain constraints apply apply to the type of fire that can be made available. Current NGS offers highly accurate flat trajectory fire rather than effective suppressive fire. e. indicated, icated, the nature of the env environment ironment may  Am mu ni ti on Selec Selectt io n . As ind change the selection selection criteria for some ammunition natures. The risk of fire has been highlighted and must be considered when planning missions, particularly with illuminating and WP rounds. PD and Delay fuzes will function in the upper levels levels of a building, with little or no effect on the lower ones. Against concrete reinforced structures considerable amounts of ammunition may be required to cause damage and casualties, which may be prohibitive wither in terms of CSS or damage caused. HE fuzed with proximity will have little effect on the structures themselves, but is effective for clearing streets or rooftops rooftops.. The availability o off precision munitions will directly affect the the way that artillery is fought in this environment. environment. GMLRS (Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems) is extremely effective as it has good penetrative capability and (providing the target information is sufficiently accurate) it can be used to attack specific parts of the building thus containing the effects, reducing collateral damage and the risk to friendly forces. f. has as shown that in the urban environme environment nt Engagement Ranges. Ranges . Experience h engagements happen happen at very s short hort range. This affects the wa way y that artillery can be be

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  used as targets may be too close to friendly forces to be engaged with ‘dumb’ munitions. However the buildings thems themselves elves may provide sufficient protection for fire to be brought into very close range, although the weight of fire (eg the number of guns) and ammunition nature (area coverage coverage)) have to b be e considered. GMLRS will allow the execution of attacks within close proximity to friendly forces. g. High/Low Angle Fire. Fire. In relation to the line of fire, there will be areas ‘behind’ buildings which which artillery cannot en engage. gage. High angle fire reduce reduces s the size of these areas because the angle of d descent escent is much steepe steeper. r. However, there will always be areas which cannot be engaged, although the size will vary considerably depending on the complexity and high rise development of an urban area. area. Other weapon systems will be required to achieve effects in these areas. h. Direct Fire. Fire. In the direct fire role artillery has historically played an important part in urban operations. operations. Whilst use of a artillery rtillery in the direct fire role would normally be associated with defence of the gun position, it could feasibly be utilised as a direct fire weapon in certain situations, for example to achieve elevations that some other direct fire weapon weapon systems are unable to reach. However, the minimum ‘time to fuze’ function must be considered. Furthermore, artillery can be used in the direct role to destroy structures when ‘top attack’ might not be feasible; the advantage with using this way, as a opposed to weapons such round as tanks fire a highartillery velocityin round using fixed charge, is thatsystems the artillery canwhich be fired using a low low charge. This ensures target effect with a reduced danger template beyond the target, and consequent reduction of ROE and collateral damage concerns. Self-propelled artillery h has as particular utility in this role, s since ince the detachment is afforded a degree of protection by the gun. . i. systems ystems are e effective ffective in the urban environm environment, ent, but their STA.. Artillery STA s STA use must be carefully planned in order to reduce any limitations produced by the physical conditions. conditions. The ASP sou sound nd ranging system will detect acoustic e events, vents, but accuracy may be reduced as buildings can affect acoustic wave propagation. Radars have significant dead ground in their coverage as a result of buildings blocking the radar beam; this is equally true of moving target and weapon locating radars. UAVs remain a potent capability in built-up areas, although the more dense and high rise an urban area is, the more complex the mission planning will become.  AIR DEFENCE IN SUPPORT OF URBA N OPERATIONS 65.  Ai r Defen Defence ce (AD) (AD).. AD systems can be effective in urban operations. The major constraint is the requirement to acquire and track targets in an uninterrupted manner over a significant missile time of flight. This is hindered by the presence presence of tall buildings, bu butt may be mitigated by deploying lau launchers nchers on high points. HVM can be dismounted an and d fired 31 from the shoulder or from the LML , which gives it greater flexibility to deploy in urban areas including, if necessary, necessary, deployment by SH or stairs to high rise roof tops. Rapier FSC is more constrained by its radar requirements, but could, for example, be driven to the top of a multi-storey car park. The denser, more complex a and nd high rise an urban area, the more difficult AD operations will become and consideration should be given to deployment outside or on the fringes of the urban area.

31

 Lightweight Multiple Launcher.

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  ENGINEER SUPPORT TO URBAN OPERATIONS 66. co-ordination o-ordination of e engineer ngineer effort for a allll operations lies with the General.. The overall c General Joint Force Engineer. Engineer. However, decentralised execution is ne never ver more critical than in the urban environment, where reaction times must be fast and effort targeted at the local level.  Although it is normal to resist ‘penny-packeting’ of engineer resources, the best use of combat engineer assets is often gained by using small teams to support the fighting in an urban environment. environment. Nevertheless, there will be time times s when sub-unit or e even ven a u unit nit is focussed entirely on formation level objectives, with peacetime troop, section and crew structures being broken up to create teams that can work on specialist capabilities (eg electrical supply, water provision provision etc). Sufficient flexibility of mind and q quick uick re-organisation is essential to be able to meet the rapidly changing nature of tasks. 67. recognised gnised roles of employment of engin engineers eers for operations apply Roles.. The reco Roles equally to operations in the urban environment as they do anywhere else: a. such uch as steps, ditche ditches, s, Mobility Support. Support . A variety of man-made objects s craters, barriers, man-made obstacles, rubble and/or mines could be used to deny freedom of movement movement or canalise a force. The Trojan brea breaching ching vehicle offers offers an enhanced capability in leading a penetration or thrust in the form of a grab arm and increased power power and protection. It can also op operate erate closed-down with the use of cameras. Explosive breach breaching ing methods may have to be used, though the risk of causing collateral collateral damage is likely to b be e significant. Booby trap cle clearance arance requires dismounted combat engineers and route maintenance tasks require additional plant assets.  Titan bridge-layers can be used to cross gaps during the investment and break-in phases on the edge of the urban environment in order to assist in the breakthrough of protective obstacle belts that cannot be crossed by Trojan and its fascines. Titan can also be fitted with the Bulk Earth Moving Attachment (BEMA) and full/track width mine plough if necessary, allowing it to clear mines and some ditch/earth obstacles. obstacles. Likewise in defen defensive sive operations Titan fitted with a BEMA can can create ‘A’ vehicle pits. b.

Counter-mobility Support Support..

Employment of o obstacles bstacles and mines can be

used deny, delay, disrupt orofcanalise themines enemy, as part of an sinvestment as much as in to defence. The principle emplacing emplacing within obstacle obstacles and covering them with fire remains extant. c. Survivability Support. Support . Survivability is an all arms responsibility. Close support engineers have only a limited knowledge of structures and weapon effects, but can seek specialis specialistt advice from Wks Gp RE. Static defensive positions may require fortification32  and formations or units employing a mobile defence can be advised on existing structures that offer enhanced survivability33. In the Contemporary Operating Environment and Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, field fortifications are required to increase the survivability of potential targets such as camps, patrol bases, observation posts (OP), vehicle check points (VCP). Clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), weapon collection and disposal also

32

 ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Chapter 8 Urban Fortification.  ME Vol 2 Field Engineering - Pam 2 Field Fortifications, Part B Chapter 1 Building Construction Types and

33

Table 8-1.

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  increase the surviva survivability bility of a force. The likely scale o off battlefield munitions clearance and the associated manpower requirement should not be underestimated. d. General Engineer Support. Support . In the build up to combat operations there will be a requirement for general engineering support such as camp infrastructure, range construction and P PW W cages cages.. Although Close S Support upport (CS) engineers will be focussed on preparing for combat, the Joint Force Engineer will be required to balance the competing needs of different elements of the Force. Close support engineer units can undertake most general support engineering tasks, including limited restoration of essential services, route maintenance, camp infrastructure and PW cages. 68.  Guide 68.  following facto factors rs shou should ld be considered when Guidelines lines for Employment Employment.. The following employing Engineers in the urban environment: a. Combined Arms Teams. Teams . At the tactical level, operations in an urban environment normally normally require the deployment of integrated all arm arms s teams. In an urban operation close support engineers may need to be represented as low as platoon or section section level. During the battle for Basra in 2003 some some of the lead platoons had two-man two-man engineer teams in each Warrior fighting vehicle. On dismount the two-man engineer often be to thebuildings. first to exitIt the vehicle totherefore identify and clear mines and boobyteam trapswould or ga gain in entry is essential tha thatt close support engineers are able to fight effectively and are afforded the same degree of protection and mobility as the combat arms that they are supporting. Similarly, larger engineer tasks in the urban environment will normally require the provision of combat arm escorts and protection, unless being undertaken in a benign environment. b. Early Warning and Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance. Terrain and infrastructure information is vital to the planning process for all operations. Such in information formation inc includes ludes mapping, types of urban areas, layouts, building construction, key installations, likely weapon effects on buildings, etc. Much of this is available from o open pen sources and a variety of manned and unmanned collection assets from across the force can contribute to the picture; specialist engineers may be required to collect/provide some information (eg building building construction, weapo weapon n effects). The urban environ environment ment can swallow manpower, manpower, equipment a and nd materiel very qu quickly. ickly. Early warning of like likely ly tasks and information information on availab availability ility of local materiel is essential. Unit diving teams can also provide key information on bridges, waterways and sub-surface systems. c. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace. Battlespace. Allied to the need for an effective means of accessing or collecting terrain and infrastructure information is the need to develop a broad broad approach to the IPB process process.. Engineers can adv advise ise on the availability and vulnerability of essential and non-essential services to local communities, so that a balance can be struck between targeting during war fighting and the need for such services during the subsequent reconstruction and development.

d. . Slick battle procedure is a always lways th the e Battle Procedure Procedure. effective delivery of close engineer support, but even more necessary so in the for urban environment where the demands placed by the three block war can change the nature and type of engineer support (principally between combat and construction

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  engineering) very quickly and o over ver very short dista distances. nces. A high tempo o off response and reaction reaction is therefore required required.. Effective commu communications nications ac across ross the engineer command is essential to d deliver eliver this. Information will h have ave to go up, down a and nd across to ensure ensure engineer comman commanders ders remain constantly updated. It is vital that all incidents are reported in an accurate and timely manner in order that ongoing and subsequent operations operations can benefit from ex experience perience already g gained. ained. The introduction of Bowman and the Makefast Battlefield Information System Application  34  will enhance the communication function.  69.  69. 

Engineers in Offensive Urban Opera Operatio tio ns ns..  a. tactical ctical d doctrine octrine for the emplo employment yment of eng engineer ineer The Investment. Investment . Past ta reconnaissance at both formation and battlegroup level has focused on rural warfighting with very little direction for urban operations. During the transition from the rural battle to the investment of an urban area a key requirement for all arms reconnaissance assisted by engineers, will be to identify routes, vulnerable points, obstacles etc. Their ability to quickly quickly pass likely tasks to the squadron within a battlegroup will enable concurrent activity within the troops and ultimately maintain momentum. Slick battle procedure is n necessary ecessary for the effective delivery of engineer support in the urban environment where the nature and type of engineer support can change very quickly quickly and over very short distances. A high tempo of response response and reaction is therefore required. (1) Terrain and infrastructure information is vital to the planning process in all operations. (a) Formation and battlegroup reconnaissance assets, usually supported by engineers, will be required to select a number of approach routes based on the identification and assessment of natural and man-made obstacles surrounding and leading some way into the urban environment. The provision of detailed 3-dimensional terrain analysis including the subterranean attack corridors is likely to be key to success. (b) Early identification of the types of urban terrain35  including key structures, likely enemy strong points, HQs or communication centres, will be critical to shaping the operation. (c) The identification of essential services (water, gas, electricity) will be critical. critical. The assau assaulting lting force mu must st understand how each utility system works in order to be able to disable key elements as necessary and reinstate them post conflict. (2) As the battle progresses reconnaissance assets should be focusing on the identification of enemy in-depth positions, likely counter-attack routes and counter-mobility task tasks. s. When face faced d with a large urban sprawl, reconnaissance assets will have to travel greater distances to circumnavigate an urban area to avoid a tactical engagement.

34

Alternatively, the

 Engineer planning tool on Bowman   Financial/Business district, Historical/Old town, High, Medium and Low Residential and Slums/Shanty

35

towns, Heavy Industrial and Light Industrial. See Part A, Chapter 1, paragraph 20.

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  reconnaissance assets will be forced to move into depth using a secure urban avenue of approach some distance from the objective. (3) As part of FR and operational intelligence gathering, conduct route reconnaissance; early identification of obstacles, structures (including sewers and tunnels) and strong points; terrain analysis; and potential counter-mobility options on possible counter-attack routes. b. The Break-In. Break-In . The use of engineer assets to contribute to the collection of terrain and infrastructure information has been covered in the paragraphs above, but it is worth reiterating that their tasks are continuous and as varied as each new avenue of approach that presents presents itself. The engineer asse assets ts embedded in Forma Formation tion Recce will remain with squadrons gathering high-level, coarse-grained information. Engineers working with the battlegroup close recce will refine the knowledge of terrain, infrastructure and routes. routes. Integral recce, ie those assets within engineer squa squadrons, drons, will complete detailed recces to enable engineer tasks to be undertaken. (1) Working with battlegroup close recce, Close Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance. engineer close recce assets should be focussing on the detailed reconnaissance of obstacles alon along g the avenue of a approach. pproach. Other tasks will include preparation harbour the areas/hides etc. of initial reports and the preliminary identification of (2) Integral Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance. Integral reconnaissance, ie those assets within engineer squadrons, will complete the detailed recce of engineer tasks to enable materiel and troops to be brought forward and the task completed in a timely manner. (3) variety riety of man-made objects such as d ditches, itches, CS Engineering. Engineering . A va craters, barriers, rubble and emplaced explosive ordnance can deny freedom of movement or canalise a force. Mechanical (Troja (Trojan n or plant) or explosive (PE4) breaching methods methods should be used. Whether light, armoured, field or a mixture, commanders should expect to be tasked to provide the following support: (a)  Ar mo ur ed Eng Engii neer neerin in g . Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles and mines are anticipated, otherwise it should be positioned well forward. Careful con control trol is required to ensure that it does n not ot become isolated from the armour/infantry it is supporting by becoming too focussed on the task ahead. Situation depend dependant, ant, the vulnerability vulnerability of Trojan and the increased chance of flanking or elevated RPG attacks in the urban environment make it essential that mutual support and close armoured protection is maintained whilst engineers are on task. The rapid deploym deployment ent of fascines to co combat mbat anti-tank ditches and well practised mechanical breaching drills will enable the remainder of the battlegroup to exploit success. (b) . The engineers are key s sustainable ustainable Combat Engineering Engineering. mobility measures and influencing the momentum of to a battlegroup through mobility tasks during the break in battle.

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  (i) require uire defile Mobility.. Battlegroup and follow-on forces req Mobility lanes, the clearance of fields of fire and route clearance along alley ways, through structures (houses /gardens /garages) all of which may contain mines or booby traps traps.. The clearance of UXO and the associated manpower requirement should not be underestimated and rarely will there be sufficient specialist EOD troops to clear everything: it will be essential to prioritise the work and it may be necessary to use combat engineers on occasion with with the au authority thority from the JF engineer. At the same time, infantry soldiers do not receive training on the identification, assessment and disposal of booby traps and mines. Therefore, in order to maintain momentum and to ensure routes are opened in a timely manner it is essential that engineer assets are placed well forward and grouped with the assaulting sub-units. (ii) Counter-Mobility.. The employment of obstacles and Counter-Mobility mines can be used to deny, delay, disrupt or canalise the enemy. The principle of employing mines within obstacles and covering them with fire remains extant in any type of operation. (iii) Survivability Support. Support . A close support engineer unit can offer some advice on building structures and defensive measures though specialist engineers will be required to advise on weapon effects, particularly defensive measures against Enhanced Blast W Weapons eapons (EBW). Temporary static d defensive efensive positions or patrol bases may require some degree of fortification against counter attacks, reiterating the need to have engineers placed well forward within the lead companies during the break-in battle. b. close lose en engineer gineer s support upport to the tactic of Urban Urban Penetration. Penetration . The c Penetration required is likely to be:  (1) vehicle le if obstacle obstacles s and min mines es are Mobility.. Trojan is a suitable lead vehic Mobility anticipated, otherwise it should be position positioned ed well forward. Titan is vulnerable deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued by engineer engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition c charges harges may 36 have to be conducted by hand . Engineer (Search, EOD and Combat Engineer trained) or Assault Pioneer representation may be required down to section level. If sub-su sub-surface rface routes are be being ing use used, d, dismoun dismounted ted comba combatt engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained troops may be required to clear and prove routes. (2) threatened tened by Counter-Mobility.. Once seized, the target area may be threa Counter-Mobility counter-attack. Hasty ob obstacles stacles ma may y be required to defend the objectiv objective. e. Ditching, improvised obstacles and hand emplaced mines all offer timely solutions.

36

 During the battle for Basra in 2003, mines were cleared from routes by hand whilst under enemy fire.

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  (3) clearance nce ma may y be required an and d the Survivability.. EOD/booby trap cleara Survivability survivability of the defending force can be enhanced by digging fire support positions using all available mechanical assets (eg Trojan and plant) or fortifying the position (bunds, sandbags or Hesco37 walls). c.  c.  engineer ineer support to th the e tactic of urba urban n Urban Thrust . The provision of close eng thrust could include: (1) and nd mines are Mobility.. Trojan is a suitable lead vehicle if obstacles a Mobility anticipated, otherwise it should should be positione positioned d well forward. Titan is vulnerable deployed in the urban environment and should be held further back and cued by engineer engineer recce. Mine clearance and removal of demolition ch charges arges may have to be conducted by ha hand. nd. Engineer (Search, EOD and Co Combat mbat Engineer trained) or assault pioneer representation may be required down to section level. If sub-su sub-surface rface routes are being used, dismo dismounted unted com combat bat engineers, divers or specialist working in Confined Spaces (WICS) trained troops may be required to clear and prove routes. (2) Counter-Mobility. During an urban thrust, the force is vulnerable to Counter-Mobility. attack from the flanks. Hasty ob obstacle stacle emp emplacement lacement ma may y be required to protect the flanks of thrusts. the withdrawal of friendly forcesHasty from obstacles the thrust. may also be used to facilitate d. saturation aturation is s speed peed and Urban Saturation. Saturation . The key to the tactic of urban s flexibility; effective mobility support support is e essential. ssential. Teams res responding ponding to a call for assistance must be able to reach the intended target area rapidly. Engineer representation with each of the deployed teams is preferable, but may not be practical. Accurate terrain intelligen intelligence ce and mapping mu must st be made available available prior to the operation; engineer reconnaissance and analysis must remain responsive throughout an operation. e. dependant, t, commanders should Securing of Objectives. Objectives . Situation and ROE dependan expect to find themselves carrying out a protracted break-in battle which may or may not culminate culminate in an objec objective. tive. At the same time, engineer troops prev previously iously employed with the lead platoons who have gone into a defensive stance may be asked to reorganise in order to provide engineer assistance to secure an objective which by its very nature is likely to be fortified fortif ied in some way. f. Clearance and Reorganisation. Reorganisation . Once the key objectives have been secured it remains an all arms responsibility to conduct a thorough clearance of the area whilst the reconnaissance assets continue to carry out their primary task of identifying enemy counter attack routes or in depth positions. (1) hastily tily built defence defences s and to upgrade CS Troops. Troops . In order to upgrade has routes, CS troops will find themselves retracing their steps to carry out such tasks as mine and ‘bypassed house’ clearance, route upgrades and the marking or clearing of patrol lanes between buildings. (2) EOD and Search. Search . All Arms search teams should b be e used whenever possible. Although not held in close support regiments some RE search and 37

37

 Hesco-Bastion; manufacturer of mesh/geofabric gabions to construct protective walls.

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  EOD assets may be allocated to a formation committed to the clearance of the urban environment to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of the real estate estate to be us used ed by own troops troops.. Further ca capability pability w will ill be required if concerted search operations, or clearance of EO hazards to the civilian population is to be undertaken. (3) robust st engine engineer er logistic chain is required to Engineer Logistics. Logistics . A robu support the varied demands of both combat and force support engineering. The latter demands the wherewithal to conduct local procurement of resources to meet the high tempo of urban o operations. perations. This must include the delegation of purchasing authority to regimental or even squadron level. g. Engineer Tasks. Tasks . Engineers will be required to undertake a variety of tasks during offensive operations, including: (1) Conducting a close technical reconnaissance to determine the exact location and type of enemy obstacles and minefields, and to make breaching recommendations. (2)

Clearing

obstacles38, including mines and booby traps where

necessary. (3) Using of hand-emplaced demolitions to destroy fortifications and strong points that cannot be reduced with the unit's organic assets. (4)

Laying mines and other obstacles to protect flanks and rear areas.

(5) Conducting rapid mobility operations (and non-explosive methods of entry, gap crossing, support to CSS). (6) Constructing rapid reinforcement and force protection of temporary own force locations, together with the provision of counter-mobility effects. (7) 70.  70. 

Restoring utilities/services during subsequent consolidation.

Engineers in De Defensiv fensiv e Urban Ope Operation ration s .  a. defensive fensive situations, when opposed by an Defence against Armour . In de armour-heavy enemy, priority should be given to the construction of anti tank obstacles throughout the built-up area. Use of local materials, where pos possible, sible, makes obstacle obstacle con construction struction eas easier ier and reduces lo logistical gistical requirements. Streets should be barricaded in front of defensive positions at the effective range of anti tank weapons. These obstacles are used to increase the destruction by anti tank fire, to separate dismounted enemy infantry from their supporting tanks, and to assist in the delay and destruction destruction of an attacker. Anti tank mines in and around obs obstacles tacles and covered by fire, help to stop an enemy attack. b. . Engineer armoured armo uredinvehicles andurban plant,operations, in particularwhether Trojan, but Survivability. Survivability also MWT and LWT, have wide utility defensive by

38

 Eg rubble, wire, vehicles, as well as urban structures such as walls, ramps, steps, etc.

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  moving rubble, demolishing buildings for fields of fire or digging in troops and vehicles. c. following ing tasks during the Engineer Tasks. Tasks . Engineers may perform the follow defence of a built-up area: (1)

Construct complex obstacle systems.

(2) Provide technical advice to commanders, to include use of existing facilities. (3)

Convert buildings to rubble.

(4)

Lay mines.

(5)

Assist in the preparation of defensive strong points and fields of fire.

(6)

Maintain counter-attack, communications, and re-supply routes.

(7)

Enhance movement between buildings, catwalks, bridges, and so on.

(8) Construction of operating bases, including force protection and essential services (9) 71.  71. 

Fight as infantry, when needed.

Engineer Ca Capabili pabili ty Re Requir quir ements ements..  a. command and c control ontrol nodes are required Command and Control. Control . Sufficient command to cope with concurrently employing assets in close support of Battlegroups whilst also delivering more general engineering support across the formation’s area of responsibility. In particular, the engine engineer er staff in a brigade headquarters must have the ability to cope concurrently with war-fighting, peace support and humanitarian assistance tasks, including EOD. BGEs will a always lways need to remain with Battlegroups, but squadron headquarters must be able to switch away. Responsibility for the CIMIC and reconstruction effort at formation and battlegroup level could rest with close support engineer COs and OCs, who must interface with the relevant specialist staff at divisional level and above. b.  b.  engineer er recce cap capability ability is required at all levels Reconnaissance. A robust engine Reconnaissance. to work with formation and battlegroup recce as well as being tasked separately to meet critical engineer information requirements. These include identifying sources of materiel, the detailed analysis of damaged structures and the technical assessment of essential services. c.  c.  combat enginee engineering ring will remain the foundation Combat Engineering Engineering.. Basic combat for the delivery of engineer e effort ffort in the urban en environment. vironment. It has applicability across the spectrum of operations. d.  Ar mo ur ed Eng Engii neer neerin in g . Armoured engineers are key to assisting with mobility support to war-fighting missions missions.. Consequently, th they ey must a also lso have the

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  capability to dismount and reinforce combat or construction tasks in the urban environment. e. e.   nott held in close sup support port regiments it should be Sea Searc rch h and EOD EOD.. Although no expected to deploy search and EOD assets with a formation committed to the urban environment so as to ensure, as a minimum, access and clearance of real estate for use by own troops. troops. This will often have to be deployed alongs alongside ide combat engineers with the formation’s fighting fighting echelons. Further capability will be required if concerted search operations, clearance of EO hazards to civilian populations or the training of a local clearance capability is to be undertaken. HELICOPTERS IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 72. Typically, the use of helicopters in urban operations focuses on support to ground troops, who will be predo predominantly minantly dismounted infantry. Missions may involve any of the fundamental aviation roles39, but their viability will depend on the level of threat, and the degree of risk that the commander is prepared to take. a. Where there is a significant threat from enemy AD systems or air interdiction, the preferred tactics for minimising risk are 'nap of the earth' (NOE) flying; agile manoeuvre and long and sensor/weapon sor/weapon stand off ranges. Asofa view rule, and urban terrain will limit or preclude thesesen preferred tactics by reducing fields engagement ranges and constraining the helicopter’s agility because of the compressed manoeuvre space. However, the degree of impact will vary across terrain profiles ranging from small population centres to urban sprawl and high-density high-rise city centres. NOE flight has the advantage of masking th the e aircraft’s approach approach,, which increases surprise. surprise. It also ex exposes poses the he helicopter licopter to the threat of small a arms rms fire (SAF) and other 'low tech' short range weaponry, as urban terrain provides the enemy with an abundance of well concealed and protected fire f ire positions. b. Flight at medium altitudes (1500' - 3000' above ground) substantially reduces the effectiveness of SAF and low-tech projectiles, but increases vulnerability to air to air and surface to air systems, including MANPADs40. Technical countermeasures41  can reduce vulnerability to Surface to Air Missiles (SAM), but the threat from Air Interdiction and sophisticated AD systems will remain. Consequently, w when hen faced with a predominately low-tech threat, such as in PSO and COIN operations, medium level flight is the preferred tactic for reducing risk, and has the added bonus of improving acquisition ranges ranges for sensors and weap weapons. ons. Medium level flight can a also lso be used in a high intensity, hi-tech threat environment, but is only viable when risk can be mitigated by suppressing the enemy AD and air interdiction capability by utilising either ground based systems/activity42, or air component support43. 73. Helicopter crews are able to build detailed situation awareness and a useful rapport with ground units, which will increase with the ability to operate from medium level for 39

 Offensive Action, ISTAR, Control and Direction of Firepower, Command Support, Movement of Personnel and Materiel. 40  Man-pack (shoulder launched) air defence missile systems. 41  Defensive Aids Suites (DAS) fitted to helicopters can include a variety of countermeasures, including  jammers, flares and chaff, which are designed to defeat specific threats. 42  For example: GBAD, Arty Suppression and EW. 43   For example: Combat Air Patrol (CAP) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) packages to

establish local Air Superiority.

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  protracted periods. Attack Helicopters (AH) are capab capable le of quickly providing accura accurate te fire, particularly from the 30mm gun housed in the chin-mounted turret, and effective against personnel and lightly lightly armoured vehicles. AH free-flight rockets may be used against a area rea targets, but must be delivered from a more deliberate flight profile than the off-axis capable chin-gun. Hellfire missiles, although primarily intended for use use against hea heavy vy armour, may also be used successfully to penetrate buildings. buildings. Missiles are availa available ble with either Rada Radarr Frequency (RF) guidance (which can only recognise vehicle targets), or Semi-Active Laser (SAL). Targets for SAL miss missiles iles may be desig designated nated by the AH onboard onboard laser or remotely. Operators of Laser Target Designators (LTD) need to be aware that flat, reflective surfaces, typically found built-up areas, increase the risk of false lock-on. 74. equipped quipped with an excellent range of E Electro lectro Optical (EO), Thermal ISTAR.. AH are e ISTAR Imaging (TI) and radar sensors, which although optimised for target acquisition, can also be used for observation observation and surveillance tasks. Other helicopters can be fitted with EO and TI surveillance systems, many of which can provide real time imagery down-linked to ground stations. Such systems us used ed over urban area areas s at medium height, be beyond yond enemy we weapons apons range, by day or night, can overcome many the difficulties faced by ground based observation, and provide the ground commander with vital information that is responsive to the situation as it develops. 75. twoHelicopter Operations . Helicopter assault operations are normally split into categories:Assault Operations. a. Spaces big enough for large scale helicopter Large-Scale Assaults. Assaults . operations can be found within built up areas, for instance car parks and sports arenas, but they need to be found and consideration must be given to factors such as ingress and egress routes. b. have e to b be e landed Small-Scale Assaults. Assaults . Small teams or individuals may hav onto the rooftop of a specific building. Success depend depends s on minimum expos exposure, ure, thus urban direct assault operatio operations ns are no normally rmally conduc conducted ted at nig night. ht. However night operations have a high degree of risk due to the degradation of Night Vision Devices (NVD) in brightly lit areas and the difficulty in identifying urban obstacles (eg electrical wires, telephone telephone poles poles,, antennas, mines and wire). Such operation operations s are normally conducted conducted by aircraft which rou routinely tinely support SF Ops. Before making such an assault there should be confirmation that no obstacles exist (eg electrical wires, telephone poles, antennas, mines and wire) that could damage either the helicopter or the deplaning troops. In many urban areas there may be buildings with purposebuilt helipads but other buildings, for example multi-storey car parks, are usually strong enough to support the w weight eight of a light helico helicopter. pter. The delivery of troo troops ps onto a building can also be accomplished by abseil, fast-roping or hover-jumping from the helicopter. 76.  Ai r Mov emen can n result ementt of Tro op s and Sup pl ies . The tempo of urban operations ca in a greater turn-over of troops engaged in combat, and there may also be more casualties than with units fighting in open terrain. At the same time, road roads s are likely to be crowded with re-supply units and evacuation vehicles, and may also be blocked by craters or rubble. Helicopters means of bypassing such obstructions, and troops to the last coveredprovide positionashort of the fighting. Similar techniques can bedelivering used for air mo movement vement of supplies and for casualty evacuation.

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  77. Support for Convoys and Vehicle Patrols. Patrols . Helicopters, in particular AH, can provide excellent observation and fire support (top cover) to convoys and vehicle patrols. Overall effectiveness in this role increases with the ability to operate from medium level for protracted periods. 44 78. Close   Combat Attack. Attack . Close Combat Attack (CCA) is a mission flown in close support of ground forces to destroy, disrupt, suppress, fix, delay, deter or otherwise affect enemy forces and requires detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces. AH is the bes bestt platform for providing CCA in the Urban Operations. Other armed aviation can conduct CCA, but limited firepower and protection reduces effectiveness and survivability. The fires capabilities o off armed aviation will b be e maximised when integrated with other force elements including Close Air Support (CAS), Indirect Fire Support and GM.  Armed aviation can be task organised to Ground Manoeuvre brigades and Battlegroups for CCA operations and therefore all commanders and their staffs, down to the lowest level, must understand how CCA can be utilised in support of GM units45.

79. trained d controller 46 using a CCA CC A Contr Control ol.. CCA will normally be conducted through a traine standardised (NATO) call for fire. This en ensures sures that the observ observer er understand understands s and considers the issues relating to ROE, collateral damage, fratricide, and battlespace management. However, in an em emergency ergency situation, it is p possible ossible for an untrained untrained observer to call for Emergency-CCA (E-CCA) using simplified format, which alerts the to emergency nature of the mission, and that athey must take full responsibility for aircrew the target effects. Detailed call for fire procedu procedures res are contained in Annex A to AFM AFM Volume 1 Part 12  – Air Manoeuvre Operations. 80. support ort to ground manoeuvre Communications Planning. Planning . Aviation units providing supp forces must be included included in the commun communications ications plan. At present Battlefield Helicop Helicopter ter (BH) radios are not fully interoperable with BOWMAN, and the deployment of Secure Voice Rebroadcast (SVR) may require special consideration 47. Helicopters can also assist C3 (airborne relays and command posts).  posts).   AIR (FIXED WING) SUPPORT IN THE URBA N ENVIRONMENT 81. compressed ressed battle space in the urban environment inc increases reases the General.. The comp General difficulties experienced under the planning and conduct of ‘traditional’ Close Air Support (CAS48) aircraft operations. Targets are ha hard rd to locate and identify, non-co non-combatants mbatants and both enemy and friendly forces could be intermingled, there is a significant risk of fratricide, and enemy short-range air defence weapons are hard to suppress. 82. excellent ellent cover and conc concealment ealment for a variety of Threats.. Urban terrain provides exc Threats weapon systems. systems. The terrain and infrastructure may limit suppression suppression o options ptions and the cluttered environment with light, fire and smoke will make threat and target acquisition difficult. 44

 The term “close” refers to the battle situation and does not imply a specific distance.  AFM Volume 1 Part 2 – Battlegroup Tactics. 46  A trained controller refers to an individual who has completed a recognised course in CCA and carried out live controls. This is normally restricted to FOO, OP Ack levels 3&4, MFC (A&B), NGA levels 3&4, FAC, and  AAC Aircraft Commanders. The opportunity for live controls currently only occurs during Mission Specific Training (MST).' 47  Appendix 2 to Chapter 2 to AFM Volume 1 Part 12 - AH Interoperability with BOWMAN gives more detail on the capabilities and deployment of SVR. 45

48

 ATP-3.3.2.1 Tactics, Techniques and procedures for close air support operations.

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  83.  Employment. 83.  Employment . When employing CAS aircraft in support of forces operating in the urban environment the following should be considered: a. normally ormally have the ability to remain in a holding Surveillance.. CAS platforms n Surveillance pattern above the threat whilst being able to transmit real-time intelligence to the Ground Commander. Commander. UAVs will offer longer p persistence ersistence in this s surveillance urveillance role. b. platforms latforms can dissuade the enemy Presence.. The overt presence of CAS p Presence from engaging. c. Heavy air bombardment provides tactical Shock and Concussion. Concussion . advantages to an attacker. The shock and c concussion oncussion of the b bombardment ombardment reduce the efficiency of defending troops and can destroy defensive positions. d. Rubble and Debris. Debris . The rubble and debris resulting from air attacks may increase the defender's cover while creating major obstacles to the movement of both defending and attacking forces. e. the

friendly ly troops may may require Proximity . The proximity of opposing forces to friend Proximity. use of precision-guided munitions and may require the temporary

disengagement of limited friendlyby friendly forces in contact. In addition,which the use of affect p precision recision guided munitions may be the proximity of structures may acquisition or the terminal phase of flight of an air weapon. f. use of air weapon weapons s may be restricted by the Indigenous Facilities. Facilities . The use presence of civilians or the requirement to preserve key facilities within a city. g. ground observation may req require uire the Limited Ground Observation. Observation . Limited ground use of an airborne FAC. 84.

Offensive Operations Operations.. CAS may be employed during offensive operations to: a. To support the Investment Force by interdicting entry and exit routes to the built up area. b. To support attacking units by reducing enemy strong points with precision guided munitions. c. To conduct tactical air reconnaissance and to provide detailed intelligence of enemy dispositions, equipment, and strengths.

85.

be e employed during defensive operations: Defensiv De fensiv e Opera Operatio tio ns ns.. CAS may b a. To strike enemy attack formations and concentrations outside the built-up area. b.

To provide precision-guided munitions to support counter attacks.

86. Command and Control. Control . Urban terrain presen presents ts sev severe ere prob problems lems in maintaining communications due to manmade structures that inhibit Line of Sight (LOS) and absorb or reflect transmitted signals, similar similar to weapon employment employment problems. While these problems

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  will force a higher degree of decentralization, the combat force should make every attempt to minimize them. 87. Forward Air Controllers (FAC). (FAC). In CAS positive air to ground communications are essential to coordinate a and nd authen authenticate ticate markings. Considerable training in an urban environment is required for both FAC and aircrew. A high FAC proficiency in normal CAS procedures is critical if the FAC is to step into an urban environment with no previous urban training. For successful urban CAS there a are re a number of specific specific considerations: a. If an FAC on the ground cannot see the target, the engagement should be handed over to an airborne FAC, if available. b. The commanders should be aware that an FAC may not be in position to observe all areas and buildings containing friendly forces due to surrounding structures and battlefield confusion. c. During urban CAS it is likely that the FAC will be marking and engaging targets within 100 meters of his own position, ie within Danger Close parameters, which will in turn be affected by surrounding infrastructure. The FAC mus mustt therefore select the appropriate ordnance to limit the potential of fratricide. d. The tactical situation will be changing rapidly from building to building and the CAS aircraft may need to be used to confirm and report targets in an ISR role. e. The FAC must plan for redundant communications and marking tools as a single tool will not work in all urban environments. A FAC will have to apply g greater reater consideration in utilizing a laser designator as the cluttered environment will affect acquisition and and attack directions. An elevated position will g greatly reatly increase attack 49 success: a ROVER FMV  link provides a pseudo-elevated position50 to the FAC. At night, the FAC can employ the FMV link and use CAS IR pointers to mark for other CAS platforms or ground forces. f.

Normal FAC equipment for urban CAS operations will include: (1)

IR strobe light.

(2)

Chemlights/cyalumes.

(3)

Pyrotechnics (smoke/illumination).

(4)

Access to a grenade launcher with illumination and smoke rounds.

88. urban rban environment is d difficult. ifficult. It is Ground to Air Co-ordination. Co-ordination . Navigation in the u essential for Air that reference reference systems a are re produced ce centrally. ntrally. Ground forces, FAC FACs s and aircrew should perform detailed mission planning to maximise the effectiveness of all assets. An urban grid system should be prepared. The FAC should avoid “overtargeting”51  and select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can more 49

 Full Motion Video.  Although the FAC is on the ground, through ROVER he is getting an elevated ‘Bird’s Eye’ (pseudo) view of the battlespace.

50

51

 ie By numbering every building in the built up area.

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  easily see52. Maps fail to show the vertical development of urban terrain and rapid movement from position can often create confusion between ground and aerial observers as to friendly and enemy locations. Ground forces, FACs and aircrew should perform detailed mission planning to maximise maximise the effectiveness of all assets. assets. An urban grid system labelling structures and prominent features should be prepared. The FAC should select grid sectors based on what the aircrew/aircraft sensors can most easily see such as rivers, road junctions, buildings, bridges bridges etc. The FAC should avoid over targeting (ie nu numbering mbering every building in the city) and simply number buildings in the expected and adjacent objective area. CAS planners nee need d to ensure that a allll involved are using the most current and accurate maps, imagery, etc that are being used for reference. 89. basic sic urban grid dem demonstrates onstrates lettered and numbered numbered Basic Urban Grid. Grid . The ba buildings. Reference to bloc block, k, letter and number will provide a quick cueing process.

SECTION 3 - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT “All units in the division were were on the “front lines”. There was no sa sanctuary nctuary on the battlefie battlefield. ld. Virtually every element of the division was eng engaged aged at some poin pointt in the fight. All movements in the division zone were combat operations….Small paramilitary teams attacked forces around the built-up in anpost attempt to as draw the a city fight. UnitU.S. check points, assembly areas, areas command areas, well asdivision forwardinto elements faced the constant threat of car bombs, dismounted suicide bombers and limited rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) and small-arms attacks by two to four-man teams….All elements in the division had to provide for their own security because the division did not have sufficient maneuver assets to dedicate to force protection.” st

US 1  Sergea  Sergeant nt Fullard, nd B Battery, 1/10 1/10 F Field ield Ar til lery, 2  Ma  Marin rin e Infantr Infantr y Bri gade, Nasiri yah, Iraq, 200 2003 3  CSS GUIDELINES 90. During operations in built-up areas, the terrain and the nature of warfare creates unique demands demands on units and formations. The delivery of timely CSS is affected by increased ammunition consumption, high casualty rates, transport difficulties consequent of the decentralized nature of the threat and the 24 hour and all round vulnerability of all arms. Enduring operations require intimate close support, characterised by discrete task organised logistic groupings that provide first-line support to deployed force elements. Innovative techniques and in-depth planning are required. 91. Troops involved in defensive operations may be fighting for protracted periods in small, often isolated, isolated, groups. groups. Resupply, reinforcement and maintenance will need need imagination, anticipation, robust communications and constant updated situation awareness. Every means of transport asset asset should be considered considered to achieve the aim. 92. An attacking attacking force is also likely to encounter difficulties. CSS planning and preparation preparation has to be thorough for both and defence. defenand ce. for Although res upply will be be extra more more difficult in urban terrain, someattack circumstances limited logistic periodsresupply there could

52

 eg Rivers, roads, road junctions, major buildings and bridges.

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  resources available locally, locally, particularly defence stores and food. procedures should be observed.

Proper requisitioning

93. The nature of the urban environment means that CSS personnel are likely to be caught up in close close quarter fighting. Training must prepa prepare re CSS personnel to be equipped and ready to fight in the urban environment. Every soldier will need to be prep prepared ared to drive, maintain and repair vehicles, navigate, communicate, provide medical assistance and fight to get support forward. The number and complexity of points of d delivery elivery will increase the tempo of operations and the skill required of detachments. 94. In urban COIN operations, similarly there is no distinction between forward and rear, especially when logistic bases form a hub and s spoke poke system. In an era of 360° resupply operations, logistic troops must be more highly trained to enable them to ‘fight logistics through’ and the logistic plan must be in synergy with the overall campaign plan. plan. Logistic resupply of Security F Force orce (SF) and logistic bases may require the creation of Combat Logistic Patrols (CLP), deliberate operations involving all arms and may be joint. Fig B-5-13 Russian Ration Resupply, Stalingrad, 1942 95. Urban operations are manpower intensive. Economy of force may demand the use of logistic troops for operational tasks such as base protection, but these must be of a defined duration, within the capability of the troops deployed and not to the detriment of sustaining the force. 96. Forces providing providing support  support for combat in an urban environment will require a high and constant degree of self-sufficiency.  self-sufficiency.  Guidelines to providing effective CSS to units fi fighting ghting in built-up areas are as follows:  follows:  a. Provide supplies to units in the required quantities as close as possible to the location where those supplies are needed. b. Protect supplies and CSS groups from the effects of enemy fire by using surprise and avoiding detection. c.

Disperse and decentralize CSS detachments.

d.

Provide them with the appropriate communication facilities.

e. Plan for the use of carrying parties and stretcher bearers, down to the lowest level. f.

Position support units as far forward as the tactical situation permits.

g. for the provision of specialist equipment such as grappling hooks, laddersPlan and explosives.

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  h. Plan and use host nation support and civil resources when authorized and practical. COMBAT SUPPLIES “Besides ammunition, the most pressing ne need ed was water. The Germans c cut ut the main water supply to Oosterbeck on the first day of the battle, so as the UK drained their canteens, the search for water became paramount. Storage ta tanks, nks, c central entral hea heating ting sys systems, tems, eve even n fish bowls were drained.”  Ar nh em, Ho l lan d, 1944 “ City F Fights” ights” by NL Lt C Col ol G. G.A. A. Lofaro

Fig B -5 -5-1 -14 4 Stree Streett Fighti ng in Arn hem, 19 1944 44 97. Commanders must plan for the provision of combat supplies in detail. In attack, plans should be made to enable quick replenishment and to provide suitable assets to bring supplies forward. In defence, defended defended locations must be self-sufficient self-sufficient and supplies supplies predumped in accordance accordance with the tactical plan. plan. There will will be a requirement for large quantities of engineer defence stores to be transported and dumped in accordance with the tactical plan. 98.  Am mu ni ti on 53. Combat in the the urban environment environment is characterized characterized by constant constant high ammunition expenditure rates with a corresponding requirement for replenishment.  Average ammunition consumption rates will exceed the standard rate by a factor f actor of two or more. Plans must include how ammunition is to be moved moved right forward to the troops fighting the battle. AFVs will be required to defend defend assets and provide provide casualty evacuation evacuation as well as for the provision of ammunition if the terrain prevents logistic vehicle traffic. The use of carrying parties parties should be co considered nsidered if streets are bloc blocked ked by rubble. In defensive operations ammunition ammunition should be stockp stockpiled iled if poss possible. ible. Early conside consideration ration should be given to breaking ammunition packs down into multi-nature packs to packs  to facilitate distribution to dispersed groups. 99. operational perational requirement for water. The Water . The climate and season affect the o planning rate for normal conditions is 10 litres/man/day, and the worst case is 25

53

 This paragraph should be read with the section on Ammunition Resupply on p C-9-40.

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  litres/man/day54. Plans for the distribu distribution tion of water sho should uld be made as a priority during both defensive operations and prolonged offensive operations, and should take as high a priority as for ammunition and fuel.  100. Fuel Fuel.. Fuel consumption will vary from that of rural war fighting. Combat vehicles will perform less cross-country movement and normally use less fuel in built-up areas. Engineer equipment and power generation equipment will require fuel, although overall requirements will be relatively relatively small. There may be a greater requirement for packed fuel. 101. Rations restrictions strictions to move movement ment in the urban Rations.. Obstacles, obstructions and other re environment may limit the amount of equipment equipment individual troops can carry. Troops may be obliged to carry only ammunition and water, and rations will need to be brought forward at least daily when the tactical situation allows. During defensive urban operations consideration can be given to centralised cooking.  cooking.  EQUIPMENT SUPPORT  SUPPORT  102. General operational erational availab availability, ility, and with it combat effectiveness, is General.. Maintaining op particularly demanding during urban operations and requires engineering commanders with both tactical situational awareness and technical knowledge. The complex urban battlespace is demandingbyand has the potential tosituations present pervasive threats; must the ES challenge is compounded rapidly-evolving tactical and consideration be given to the implications of the time taken to conduct repairs. Nevertheless, in order to maintain combat effectiveness, mission critical equipment should be repaired as close to the point of failure or damage as is technically an and d tactically feasible. Consequently, expedient repair is likely to form the foundation of repairs and should be complemented by robust and agile recovery plans that enable the move of equipment casualties to appropriate repair locations. 103. ES Principles. over-arching ES p principles rinciples a are re app applicable licable to all type types s of Principles . The over-arching operations in all environments. Details of these principles and other aspects of ES do doctrine ctrine are contained in AC 71877 Battlefield ES Doctrine, which must be consulted for urban and all other operations. The close and complex terrain, potential for rapid situational change changes s as well as complexity of command and control (C2) within urban operations all compound the challenge of delivering ES. Specific considerations considerations for ES in u urban rban operations have have therefore been articulated below, using the ES principles as a framework. 104. Re equipment should b be e repaired as c close lose to the point point Repair pair Forw ard ard.. Mission critical equipment of failure or damage as is technically and tactically feasible, in order to maximise combat effectiveness. The urban ba battlespace ttlespace is unlikely to be rigidly structured into linear linear forward and rear areas, however repair forward remains highly applicable in the context that ‘forward’ is in relation to the equipmen equipmentt casualty and its point of failure. Recognising the complex threat that exists within this environment, ES elements will be relatively soft ttargets argets whilst manoeuvring manoeuvring and operating forward. They mus mustt therefore be highly capable capable of fighting in urban operation operations, s, in a addition ddition to conducting their specialist role. To reduce exposure to risk, ES commanders should develop robust and agile recovery plans that enable repairs to be conducted in the most tactically and technically suitable locations, whilst remaining in the forward environment. Where these recove recovery ry assets are exposed to elevated risk, additional force protection should be considered. 54

JWP 4-01.1 dated Mar 05. 05. The planning rate is 10 litres/man/day, and the (NATO approved) worst case is

 JWP 4 01.1 dated Mar 05. 05. The planning rate is 10 litres/man/day, and the (NATO approved) worst case is 25 litres/man/day.

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  105. Stability urban an environm environment ent there will be tactical and technical Stability.. In a complex urb situations that do not provide the stability required to conduct repair. Consequently, the majority of lengthy and complex repair tasks will take place between missions, to deliver inter-mission and subsequent mission ES effect. To generate these effects, there is a requirement for ES capabilities with the stability and time available to generate the longterm sustainment of the force. This is of particular c concern oncern during urban o operations, perations, when the close environment can impede situational awareness, tactical changes can quickly undermine stability for ES, and equipment failures can be high and require increased sustainment effort. However, the urban environment can als also o provide substantial be benefit nefit to the conduct of ES, through the use of hard-standing to improve the efficiency of repairs, and buildings to enhance force protection, provide cover from view and enable the use of non-tactical light in aid aid of ES. Buildings offer the additional advantage advantage of suppressing the noise resulting from ES activity. The use of sp specialist ecialist infrastructure such as utility supplies and overhead cranes can also provide clear benefit to the efficient completion of complex ES tasks. 106. Echelons of ES. ES. ES capability is organized into echelons in order to concentrate effort, optimise effectiveness, minimise the CSS footprint and meet protection requirements. Such organization also enables the principle of repair forward by structuring tactically and technically capable capable assets. The ES structure is laye layered red with mobile and well protected protected assets integral assets to battlegroups, progressively less mobile and protected, but technically more capable, asse ts in a moreand tactically benig benign n environment. Urban operations may may vary considerably in nature, duration and complexity, therefore the supporting ES echelons may require further task organisation into larger or smaller elements to provide the most suitable balance of concentrated effort, effectiveness, CSS footprint and protection. 107. C2 at Every ES Echelon. organisation isation to be responsive responsive to Echelon . For the output of the ES organ the changing requirements placed upon it, effective C2 at every ES echelon is essential. Directed Logistics aims to improve support to units by meeting ES and CSS demands more precisely through accurate forecasting of forthc forthcoming oming mission requirements. REME commanders at every ES echelon are required to direct the required resources effectively, efficiently and intelligently to provide the required equipment availability to enable the commander’s plan to be executed. The close nature of the urban terrain, difficulty in maintaining situational awareness and the potential for a rapidly changing situation all further complicate ES activity and increase the demand for robust planning and highly effective ES C2. Recovery assets, FRT FRTs s and ISTs require particular emph emphasis, asis, since these ES assets will frequently be employed forward, across boundaries and into high threat situations. CONVOY OPERATIONS OPERATIONS   108. Convoy operations in the urban environment should b be e conside considered red as operations in their own right, right, properly p planned lanned and resourced like any other operation in war. The proximity of buildings to the road, restricted numbers of alternative and escape routes, vulnerability to direct conventional and Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive (VBIED) attack and the presence of large numbers of civilians makes reaction to attack extremely difficult. 109. Prote Protection ction and Se Securit curit y . A tactical convoy is a group of at least four vehicles moving under a single c commander ommander ove overr the same route. The convoy must be able to deploy tactically at short n notice. otice. Stocks of similar natures and commo commodities dities should be equally distributed throughout the vehicle packet to ensure the delivery of at least some of

all the natures demanded. Convoys mu must st be afforded protection approp appropriate riate to the threat. Issue 4.1: Nov 09

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  Consideration can be given to the use of an escort force to provide the convoy with additional firepower if required. Consideration sh should ould always be given to the planning o off Close Air Support and indirect DF fire sup support port on targets such as choke points, suspected ambush sites, known danger areas and easily identified terrain features along the route. This requires co-ordination, good communications, training and rehearsal. 110.  Am bu sh Lo cat io ns . Where possible, convoys should not halt in the urban environment. Possible ambus ambush h locations include junctions, bridges, high bu buildings, ildings, crowds, roundabouts, traffic lights and over and underpasses. PROVOST 111. Provost Marshal. The Provost Marshall (PM) serves as the commander's Marshal . proponent for policy, policy, plans, procedures a and nd doctrine of all provost activities. During urban operations, the PM is focussed on the provision, advice and support for the handling of PWs, the regulation of all movement and manoeuvre, and the investigation of all criminal activities. Where viable integral c civil ivil and military police fo forces rces exist, the PM m may ay interact between these agencies, on behalf of the commander, to ensure information sharing, close cooperation and liaison. liaison. Where such forces do not exist, the PM will be required to ensure the maintenance of law and order within the local population, with priority given to the restoration of the local police force, the constitutional and legal system, and judicial and penal services. 112.

Tasks..  The RMP can perform the following tasks during urban operations: Tasks a. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance, route selection, signing and manning of routes and circuits into and around the urban area, and the provision of MP stations and posts. b. Control of displaced persons and refugees in close cooperation with indigenous military and civilian police forces and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs). c. The specialist military police element of a routine UK Forces patrol55, providing special to arm advice on the ground directly to the commander on arrest and detention, searches of people, property or vehicles, incident control, and crime scene management. They will also provide surety to correct handling of evidence and detainees in support of pre-planned operations. d. Provision of advice to the chain of command on PW/Internee/Detainee issues in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP 1.10). e. The implementation of crime reduction initiatives to prevent the wilful and wanton destruction destruction of bu buildings ildings and materiel. Such initiatives should also prevent Service Personnel and civilians from looting, pillaging and other criminal activities in the aftermath of a conflict. f. Liaison (NGOs). with Other Governmental Departments (OGDs) and Non-Government Organisations

55

 Including the provision of Close Protection where required.

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  g.

Policing the force protection measures imposed by the chain of command.

h. The provision of close protection to ‘at-risk’ military personnel and in support of OGD.  OGD.  i. The investigation of all incidents involving absentees and deserters from the UK Forces. 113. Post Conflict. may y lead to a complete collap collapse se of law and Conflict . Conflict in an urban area ma order and a rapid deterioration of any s social ocial fabric. Where this is the c case, ase, there will be a requirement for a protracted military force presence and a defined plan to prevent further deterioration and enable enable Security Sector Reform (SSR). The RMP can contribute towards this plan by: a. Providing a credible police force. The priority will be to fill the vacuum created by conflict; in most cases, the RMP will be the only viable police force able to effectively restore law and order. The focus for the RMP will be maintaining law and order within the local population and service personnel, clarification of the constitutional and legal system56, restoration of the local police force, civilian courts and judiciary, and the continued supervision of these establishments. establishments.   b. The use of the RMP SIB to deal with complex and protracted investigations such as war crimes. c. Specialist oversight and surety to the correct handling and processing of prisoners of war, internees, and detainees in accordance with Joint Doctrine (JDP 1.10).   1.10). d. Through policing activities gather, process and assimilate information and intelligence. e. The regulation of movement and manoeuvre, such as route reconnaissance, route selection, signing and manning of routes into and around the urban area, and the provision of MP stations and posts. f.

Assistance to OGDs and humanitarian agencies.

g.

The training and mentoring of indigenous civil and military police forces.

MEDICAL 114. General an n urban environment may c cause ause General.. Major combat operations within a significant casualties due to fragmentation; burning, collapsing buildings and environmental health hazards. From the po point int of wound wounding ing the sub subsequent sequent extraction extraction,, treatment and evacuation of casualties will be combat power intensive within this challenging environment. Confidence in the delivery of the medical plan will ensure the sustainment of the force and the maintenance of moral. Clinical effect will be bes bestt achieved through the early grouping and forward positioning of assets whilst maintaining balance.

56

 In consultation with Army Legal Services.

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  115. Time Related patient atient Related Constr aints o f Medical Care Care.. Time is a fundamental factor in p survival and recovery, and the siting of medical facilities based on the 1-2-4 hour principle is a clinically critical factor. factor. Ideally, a medica medicall treatment facility offerin offering g Primary Surgery (PS) will be located within one hour of own troops; where this is not achievable, the 1-2-4 Hour principle offers a number of alternatives involving multiple treatment nodes providing damage control control surgery linked by evacuation capabilities. Critically injured pa patients tients who cannot receive PS within one hour should undergo damage control surgery within two t wo hours 57 and PS within four hours . 116. Medical Planning. components ts of med medical ical planning Planning . In addition to ‘time’ the critical componen are the Population at Risk (PAR) and the estimated casualty figures figures.. These coupled with the dispersion of the force will determine the lay-down and force packaging of medical support. 117.  Al lo cat io n of Medi cal As set s . The gene generic ric allocation of a med medical ical regiment an and da close support hospital in support of a ground manoeuvre brigade provides the framework for the delivery of the Seven Capabilities of Care 58  and the flexibility to support the 1-2-4 Hour principle. 118.

off accurate c casualty asualty information Command and Control (C2) (C2).. The timely passage o

facilitates efficient medical decision-making. At battlegroup battlegroup level the medical troop commander provides this function and at brigade level the medical regiment commanding officer provides advice and direction, with SO2 Medical coordinating the staff branch. 119. Sub-Unit Level. ‘buddy-buddy’, -buddy’, team medics Level . Initial treatment will be delivered via ‘buddy and Combat Combat Medic Medical al Techn Technicians icians (CMT (CMT). ). The cas casualty ualty will be ‘extracted ‘extracted’’ from the immediate danger; ‘treatment’ will then be given and subsequent ‘evacuation’ to the most appropriate medical medical treatment fac facility ility will occ occur. ur. The triage59 category will drive the clinical imperative for evacuation. Situational Awa Awareness reness a and nd cross boundary lia liaison ison will be required to ensure that the most effective and timely method of evacuation is supported. Sub-units should be able to identify and enable the use of Emergency Helicopter Landing Sites (EHLS) to receive the t he Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT)60. 120. Battle Group Level. battlegroup p should be enhance enhanced d with a medical troop. Level . The battlegrou This will supplement supplement the Unit Aid Pos Post. t. Capabilities will include C2; a treatment se section; ction; an ambulance section a and nd a dental se section. ction. This will allow the commander flexibility to enhance the unit aid post or to provide an alternative Role 1 facility. 121. Brigade Level. Level . The planning and conduct of these operations is complex. In addition to the support provided to the battlegroups the medical regiment and close support hospital will be able to enhance the baseline ground evacuation capability with the following:

57

nd

 JDP 4-03 Medical Support to Joint Operations 2  Edition dated January 2007. 58   The 7 Capabilities of Care are: Force Health Protection (including Medical Intelligence); Pre Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC); Primary Health Care (PHC); Deployed Health Care (DHC); Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC); Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information, Recording and Management (C4IRM) and Medical Logistics. 59  Triage is the allocation of priorities to casualties. 60

 MERT delivers the Forward Aero medical Evacuation (Fwd AE) clinical capability which might be from the point of wounding.

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  a. deliver liver Pre-Hospital Emergency Care (PHEC) MERT.. MERTs are trained to de MERT including resuscitation. resuscitation. The vulnerability of helicopters to small arms fire within the urban environment may limit their freedom of action. b. Manoeuvre re (LM) can be deployed Role 2 Light Manoeuvre. Manoeuvre. A Role 2 Light Manoeuv to ensure the delivery of damage control surgery within two hours of woun wounding. ding. This enhances the opportunity to manoeuvre whilst ensuring clinical timelines are supported. Role 2 LM has a planning con constraint straint of 72 hours. c. delivers livers primary surgery Close Support Hospital. Hospital . A close support hospital de and can deploy in support of a manoeuvre brigade to ensure that primary surgery can be delivered within four hours of woun wounding. ding. The holding polic policy y of the facility will affect it’s agility and a ability bility to manoeuvre. Tactical ME MEDEVAC DEVAC to subsequent deployed hospital care may be undertaken by ground or air. 122. Force Support. Hospital ital underpins the provision of deployed Support . The Force Support Hosp hospital care; care; this ca can n either be a Role 2 Enhanced or a Ro Role le 3 fa facility. cility. Strategic MEDEVAC out of the theatre of operations will take place; this is likely to be to Role 4 (National Health Service) capability in the UK. 123. Inter-Hospital Evacuation. Evacuation . The evacuation assets allocated to the force will provide inter-hospital evacuation. evacuation. The span of res responsibility ponsibility for this ground ground evacuation for the deployed hospital care ranges from the Role 2 LM to the Force Support Hospital. 124. Psychological Impa management of the psy psychological chological impact on soldiers is Impact ct.. The management a commander’s commander’s respons responsibility. ibility. At unit level Trauma Risk Man Management agement (TriM) can be undertaken following a traumatic incident which has the potential to cause physical, emotional and and psycho psychological logical harm. Trained medic medical al personne personnell within the Field Mental Health Team are able to provide both hospital based care and outreach services within battlegroup areas. SECTION 4 - RECENT LESSONS IDENTIFIED  IDENTIFIED  125. Background Background.. Recent experiences of fighting in an urban environment are the Second Battle of Fallujah and the earlier battles for Baghdad and Basra during the warfighting phase of operations in Iraq.  Iraq.  126. Basra and Baghdad. recent operations in Basra Basra Baghdad . There are a variety of reasons why recent and Baghdad Baghdad were unlike unlike those of other earlier earlier urban operations. These include include the following:   following: The aggressive use of armour in urban operations was only possible to the a. extent seen seen because because of the protection enjoyed by our AFVs. One Challenger Challenger received 14 hits hits from RPGs, and none penetrated the the armour. However, the antitank systems used by the Iraqis were of old patterns such as the Russian RPG-7. b.

Coalition air forces could operate over built up areas with considerable

freedom, which provided two benefits. The first was effective effective aerial surveillance, largely from UAVs. UAVs. The second second was the ability to attack precisely using Precision Guided Munitions (PGM).

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  Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and other PGMs were employed in c. urban operations for the first time. This meant that, once pinpointed, pinpointed, Iraqi strong points could be attacked accurately with considerable effect and little risk of collateral damage. d. Iraqi forces were insufficiently numerous to form continuous fronts. They could only occupy very small areas of any built up area, leaving gaps and areas of weakness. e. For a number of reasons, including a lack of support from most of the local population, Iraqi forces deployed into enclaves in which they could be accurately located. Consequently they they had little freedom of movement. movement. f. HUMINT was available both from the local population and from other sources. This allowed Iraqi positions to be accurately located, then attacked using either PGMs or ground assault. g. Most buildings were only one or two storeys high, minimising the threat to armour from upper stories and rooftops. h. Coalition forces adapted rapidly to the circumstances in which they found themselves. For example, when they found that their armour armour was largely invulnerable to the anti-tank threat, they adapted their tactics accordingly. accordingly. This is partly a reflection of their professional quality and partly due to the way they are trained to 'think on their feet'. 127.

lessons ns learned from the US urban operations operations in Fallujah include: include: Fallujah.. The key lesso Fallujah a.

Training..  Training (1) Where possible, those involved in urban ops should train with the equipment with which they will fight. (2) FIBUA training needs to be built into more training activity and not simply be the preserve of light role infantry. All arms (and joint) integration is essential. (3) Language training is vital for urban ops where the ability to converse with locals may provide instant clues to what is around the corner.

b. b.  

Tactics..  Tactics (1) The time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and a half hours – if fire support was not used. (2) Clearing houses from the top down was preferred if easy access could be gained to the roof. Methods of entry had to chang change e constantly to avoid setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at other times ‘dynamically’ – ie with all guns blazing.

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  (3) Extensive rehearsals are required with all force elements and equipment. (4) Tanks proved vital in providing immediate fire support and suppression capability. (5) Fire support varied in effectiveness. Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) represented a very effective method of prosecuting targets but could not always be delivered in a time timely ly manner. CAS was insufficiently reliable but was good for d destroying estroying structures. Artillery, aviation and mortars were effective but did not achieve the same deg degree ree of destructive power. AC-130 offered a good combination of precision and destructive power. (6) The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to fight in building buildings s rather try to dominate the approaches to them. It also p prevented revented mutua mutuall support being achieved. The US wa was, s, however, required to force entry into virtually every building. A conside considerable rable variety o off methods o off gaining en entry try – from ta tanks nks down to sledgehammers – were used. (7) Combat ID, especially for CAS, requires considerable thought and practice. Avoidance of fratricide relies on cle clear ar instruction instructions s and detailed knowledge of the ground and grids. (8)

Night time allowed re-supply and hot meals to be brought forward.

(9) CASEVAC required hardened vehicles, an in depth knowledge of a robust plan by all and effective team medics. c.  c. 

Operations..  Operations (1) Tactical surprise is still possible even if operational surprise is lost, through the use of deception and with the committal of sufficient resources. (2) Having taken the decision as to whether to de-populate the urban area or not, it remains vital to seal the city effectively to prevent escape. (3) When the population had been cleared from the city, methodical and slow (‘swamp’) clearance proved more effective and reduced casualties, in comparison to penetration/thrust where insurgents were missed and were able to attack troops from behind. (4) The tactical pause became an essential part of the battle rhythm, allowing control to be re-established and CASEVAC and re-supply to take place. (5)

Do not expect insurgents to abide by the LOAC. Anticipate booby-

traps, and the misuse of religious sites and hospitals.

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  (6) 1st  US Marine Division (1 MARDIV) proved willing to conduct manoeuvre and kinetic strikes in support of intelligence collection operations, especially EW. This yielded informa information tion on enemy s strong trong points, C2 etc etc.. (7) Even with a fully night capable force, the US chose not to fight at night due to the problems of fratricide and comman command d and control. The risk of insurgents infiltrating behind troops during darkness was mitigated by ISTAR assets. d. d.  

Equipment..  Equipment (1) Innovative use of war fighting equipment was essential. Line charges (similar to Giant Viper) were used for the initial breach and to clear daisychained IEDs. (2) Eye protection in urban operations where the volume of dust and debris is generally high led to a number of casualties being avoided.

Fig B-5-15 B-5-15 E Eye ye Protectio n fo r Urban Operations (3) Body armour proved particularly effective and minimised fatal casualties. (4) In order to prevent re-infiltration by insurgents the US used (but did not distribute enough) gunpowder residue detection kits to separate civilians from the Anti-Iraqi Forces Forces (AIF), pa particularly rticularly at food queues. The recommend recommendation ation is for five per battalion. e. e.  

Communications..  Communications (1) Line of sight communications posed problems. VHF performed better than UHF for air/land communications. It became necessary for communications hubs to be established on buildings as the advance continued. (2) Tank communications proved vital in providing a link back to company HQs from squads61 on the ground. (3)

The infantry/tank telephone was extensively used.

61

 Squad is the US term for an infantry section.

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  (4) Maintaining crypto fills required close management. Signallers came forward and filled half the channels with the new crypto while leaving old crypto in the other channels so that those who could not be reached could still be in communication. (5) All levels of command have to be aware of the value of info ops to exploit enemy excesses. excesses. The US did not a always lways manage to get images back quickly enough to meet the requirement. r equirement.

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  CHAPTER 6 CONVENTIONAL OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1 – INTRODUCTION ‘Stalingrad: Urban Warfare favours the defence, 4:1 or 6:1. The prerequisite for a successful attack on an urban area is an effective blockade, prior to the start of operations, combined with comprehensive intelligence and reconnaissance and detailed contingency planning.’ N. N.N. N.Novichk Novichk ov, K hol veg-I veg-Infog nfog lob, 19 1995 95 URBAN PENE PENETRATION TRATION 1.  1.  Urban penetration is designed for operations against clearly defined objectives, either enemy positions or specific terrain.  terrain.  2. The tactical capture and holding of key terrain is critical to the manoeuvrist approach to urban operations. Key urban terrain includ includes es potential objectives su such ch as power plants, water plants, government buildings, communication centres and food storage and distribution centres, the ownership and management of which should provide the means to establish authority and control of the t he urban population and environment. 3. Urban penetration requires the early and rapid seizure of the objective by any means possible. Having seized it, the objective will need to be isolated, to be defended against enemy action and counterattack and to be provided with protection from illegal and spontaneous action by the local population. Movement to the objective can be by air, land, waterway or underground or a combination of all available options. Fig B-6-1 Saint Au Aubi bin-Sur-Mer, n-Sur-Mer, D Day, 6 June 19 1944 44   4. Forces committed to the penetration must be sufficient strong to physically seize the objective, to overcome any opposition during the move to the area of the objective and to provide sufficient security security to the site on once ce it has been captured. Sufficient firepower and protection must be secured to reach the objective area in sufficient force to capture and hold it with enough enough force in reserve to protec protectt it and establish control. Stealth should be considered as the preferred movement tactic in order to maximize surprise and force protection, but this could be difficult to achieve. Any penetration operation should include the maximum flexibility and initiative in s supporting upporting the commander's inten intent. t. Consideration should be given to conducting the attack on multiple axes of advance by dispersed units, as well as on several dimensions (subsurface, surface, structural, etc).

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  5. The defending force must be sufficiently strong to accomplish its mission and should include elements with the capacity to call for direct, indirect fire and air support from outside the objective. objective. If the c commander ommander c chooses hooses to withdraw onc once e his objective h has as been achieved, the penetration will take on many of the characteristics of a raid and should be executed accordingly. accordingly. The withdrawal could take the form of a subsequen subsequentt penetration to a second objective. URBAN THRUS THRUST T 6. 6.   Urban thrust attacks an enemy on a narrow ax axis is of advance. The thrust maximizes combat power at the the point of the attack attack.. It can be describe described d as a dagg dagger er thrust into the enemy defence. As such an attack o occurs ccurs the axis of advance advance must be defen defended ded in order to protect each flank against ene enemy my attacks. This can be accom accomplished plished through a combination of forces, sensors and lethal or non-lethal barriers. 7. The urban thrust can be conducted on multiple axes simultaneously. These attacks should be conducted conducted in parallel and sh should ould be mutua mutually lly supporting. Where possible, the thrust should be conducted at an oblique axis to the street layout, which will reduce exposure in open spaces that could provide the primary or principal killing zones for the enemy. 8. In conducting urban thrust, a commander should consider periodically altering the direction of advance in order to confuse the enemy and not establish a pattern that permits the early preparation preparation of obstacles obstacles,, demolitions, mines and booby-traps. This requires a high level of planning and co-ordination in an environment of communication and coordination challenge. In an urban op operation eration of this nature, the commander’s intent m must ust be known and understood down to the lowest level. 9. The urban thrust on multiple axes can present the commander with different options. One thrust can be stopped at a certain point to form a ‘hammer’, while another may be initiated to act as a ‘hammer’. Thrusts can a also lso be orchestrated so that while o one ne element is stationary, a second element conducts a right or left hook to effect encirclement. 10. A well executed urban thrust avoids a linear assault, confuses the enemy, forces his flanks, separates his forces and and deceives him as to the objective. It could initiate the enemy’s withdrawal before engaging in the necessity of a room-by-room clearance of the town or city. If the enemy is forced to withdraw, his resulting expo exposure sure can be explo exploited ited by tactical aviation and indirect fire.  fire.  URBAN SATURATION 11.  Urban saturation involves the use of numerous fire-teams or section sized units 11.  operating in a dispersed, non-contiguous fashion. As these force elements enter and assimilate their assigned area, they should be prepared to respond rapidly to calls for assistance by neighbouring neighbouring teams. Their response to a call for assistance will de depend pend on their own situation, the distance from those making the request and their capacity to add value to the task. The speed of reaction will b be e critical to the success o off the concep concept. t. This concept will most likely be employed in the capture of villages, small towns or suburbs. 12.

A call for assistance should include a brief estimate of the support required. This

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  The commander can then direct the appropriate number of teams to respond to the request and adjust other other units to fill the gap gaps s created. Alternative methods can include the teams closest to the supported unit responding without direction, simply reporting their intention to respond. Good passage of informa information, tion, ac accompanied companied by high levels of training, professional skill and situational awareness, assisted by technical intelligence gathering aids where available available and appropriate, is critical to the success success of saturation o operations. perations. As in all urban operations, operations, fratricide remains a risk that must be managed. managed. 13. Command of the incident should remain with the commander of the unit requesting support as long as he retains the best and most current awareness of the situation. He s should hould assume tactical command of responding units. Command of the incident can be assumed by the senior commander at the earliest appropriate moment. 14. The key to saturation tactics is speed, confidence and mutual su support. pport. The requesting unit must offer rapid and concise information to all potential potential respo responding nding units. Responding units must enable the calling unit to manoeuvre them to advantage as they arrive on the scene until the Fig B-6-2 Street Fighti ng 1 in Cae Caen, n, June 1944 commander can assume control of the situation. Responding u units nits must have th the e flexibility and training to enable early seizure seizure of the initiative. Implicit in this concept is the cap capability ability of junior leaders to assume assume increased leve levels ls of responsibility and comman command. d. The tactic also requires the chain of command to respond quickly and effectively and to adjust forces to cover gaps as required. ‘Benefiting considerably from the human intelligence network that MI6 had established in Basra after the first Gulf War, UK commanders possessed an accurate and up-to date picture of what was was happening in the city. They realised that the Baath Party ac activists tivists and the fedayeen fedayeen were firmly in co control ntrol in the city. Defended by u units nits of the regu regular lar army, consisting of Shiite conscripts, its commander, Ali Hassan al-Majid, devised a political and military approach that aimed to achieve two goals, to keep tight control over Basra’s Shiite population right to the very end and to draw the UK into fighting within the city, hoping that the confusing urban landscape would maximise civilian casualties and take a heavy toll on UK forces. But the UK refused to be drawn into fighting in Basra until the they y were ready. The UK intentionally intentionally kept the cordon around Basra loose. The down s side ide of this strategy was that the fedayeen could use the fleeing crowds as human shields, whom the Baathists mortared enthusiastically as a warning to the others and to gain propagan propaganda da value. On the other side, looser control of access, allowed the UK to infiltrate agents, sniper teams and Special Forces in and out of the city. The defenders ev even en sent out tan tanks ks to the edge edge of their lines of control and then backed them into urban areas, teasing UK troops to follow. UK commanders realised that only gradual, carefully calculated military and political action would loosen the Baathist vice.

1

 British

troops using a French M 1914 Hotchkiss .30in (8mm) machine gun.

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By 27 March, the UK felt comfortable enough to send more snipers into the city and small raiding teams of Warrior APCs attacked areas of Basra supposedly free of significant Iraqi military forces or irregulars. The aim of these probing attacks was at first psychological, but the larger aim was to ensure that the city could be taken without heavy losses or extensive extensive collateral damage. This was followed up by swift raids on Baathist hideouts in the city, carefully coordinated with human intelligence from the inside. Fig B-6-3 Fighting in Basra, 2003 On Sunday April 6th, the UK launched a three-pronged attack with battle-groups of the 7 th   Armoured Brigade consisting of Challenger 2s and Warrior. The initial plan was to punch deep into the city and then pull out that night. The operation went so we wellll that they remained where they were and the main fighting took place in a factory complex where there were no civilians and where the UK could call in air support. Major General Brims decided to finis finish h off the Iraqis with a final stroke. One battle group now moved against the last stronghold, the university defended by 300 fedayeen. Clearance of the stronghold stronghold took ab about out four hours. The UK could not use air or a artillery rtillery support, nor nor could they ide identify ntify clear military targets on the ground. Warrior infantry sections, with supporting fire from Challengers and the Warriors themselves had to winkle out the Iraqis room by by room, building by building. In the words of one of their officers, “It all came down to good old-fashioned bayonet and rifle work.” Willi amson Murr Murray ay a and nd Robert H. Scale Scales, s, Jr, “ The Iraq W War” ar” , Ha Harvard rvard Universi ty Press SECTION SECTI ON 2 - PLANNING AN A ATTACK TTACK GENERAL 15. The conduct of urban operations demands the employment of specific tactical concepts, and specialised specialised skills a and nd techniques. The principles of wa warr remain extant and the concepts of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and its tactical tenets should be applied. 16. Offensive operations in built up areas can require large numbers of troops. Planning must be centrally coordinated but execution should be decentralised where appropriate. 17.

The following points are important when planning offensive operations: a.

Simplicity.. Simplicity

Control is difficult and plans have to be simple and flexible.

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  Orders should cover the whole operation in outline and only the first stage in detail. Plans for each subsequent stage should be made and detailed orders issued as the preceding state state is being completed. Passage of information to the lowest lev level el is important if control is i s to be maintained and success to be achieved. b. war, r, comprehensive IPB for Information.. More than in any other operation of wa Information urban operations operations is critical to success and the minimization o off casualties. The maximum amount of information on the city infrastructure and the defender's dispositions must be be acquired and analyzed. The information sourc sources es will include: (1) Maps2, town plans, guide guide books and plans of essen essential tial services. Street maps, in particular, particular, should be issued down to fire team level. These maps3  can include a building designation system. (2) Technical information gathering means, including commercial imagery services such as Google Earth Pro 4, Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGV). (3)

Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e patrols, standing patrols and OPs.

(4) Overhead imagery and Electronic Warfare (EW) (including a SIGINT capacity). (5) HUMINT including PW, local agencies, including national territorial forces, inhabitants and refugees. THE PLANNING FRAMEWORK 18.

The planning framework for offensive operations is as follows: a. operations s are g governed overned by the need to generate Force Ratios. Ratios . Offensive operation high force ratios well in excess of 3:1. During the Battle for B Berlin erlin in 1945, the R Red ed  Army planned its assault based based upon a force ratio of 8:1.  8:1.  b. Support.. As soon as it seems likely that an assault on an urban area will Support take place, there should be an early re-supply of large quantities of ammunition and explosives of all appropriate natures. Engineer support an and d advice shou should ld be sought early to identify all available sapper and assault equipment and decisions taken on its distribution. Medical su support pport and the casua casualty lty evacua evacuation tion system should be reinforced, including early decisions taken about the organisation and distribution of armoured vehicles for casualty evacuation for assaulting units. c.

Objectives:: Objectives (1) In the case of an assault on an urban area defended in depth, the attack should be planned so that progress to the final objective is made

2

 Electronic mapping will be also needed to be distributed in a form and scale that will be useful to users with User Data Terminals (UDTs). 3   There maybe a requirement in complex urban operations to show height above ground, ground level and

underground systems. 4  A subscription service. Includes Google Street View. Also available to the enemy.  

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  through a series of intermediate objectives. These intermediate o objectives bjectives provide the firm base for subsequent stage planning and operation. Consideration should always be given to the retention in strength of intermediate objectives to prevent re-occupation b by y the enemy. The selection of buildings as objectives may be necessary but consideration must be given to the factors of both ground and enemy to determine the tactical and operational objectives. objectives. Buildings can be bypassed and command commanders ers should try to avoid buildings becoming objectives and becoming the focus of operations. (2) The selection of the final objective should ensure that its capture will make any further defence untenable. (3) The break-in battle may be conducted at night, either as a silent or noisy attack, as an aid to security. (4) Momentum must be maintained during the attack. Planning must remain flexible and tactical success should always be exploited. d.

Re-grouping.. Re-grouping

Sufficient time should always b be e allowed for reinforcemen reinforcement, t,

regrouping, orders and rehearsals. At battlegroup level, the assaulting force is likely to be organised as follows: (1) Investment   Force Investment Force.. indirect fire observers.

Reconnaissance troops, armour, aviation and

(2) Fire Support Group. Group . Armour, anti-tank weapons, helicopters, GPMG (SF) and indirect fire observers. (3) Infantry sub-units, engineers, assault pioneers,  As sau saull t   Force Force.. armour and indirect fire observers with some artillery in the direct fire fi re role. (4) Reserve.. A reserve should id Reserve ideally eally be a third of the total force. It must be a minimum of an infantry sub-unit with combined arms support. e. constant onstant danger in u urban rban Control.. Experience has shown that fratricide is a c Control operations. Strict control by comman commanders ders and frequent re-briefing at all levels is vital if fratricide is to be be avoided. Axes of ad advance, vance, objective, report lines, fire support support control measures and boundaries will assume particular importance. f. Tempo.. Success in offensive operations will be achieved by maintaining a Tempo high operational tempo, tempo, and keeping the enemy off balance balance.. An offensive ope operation ration in an urban environment is a 24 hour battle, characterised by short bursts of violent action followed by by periods to re regain gain balance. Failure to retain ba balance lance will lead to unnecessary casualties. To locate (find (find)) and immobilise (fix) the enemy can be a matter of cunning and stealth and can be conducted at varying rates of operational tempo. Destroying the enemy (strike) should should be co conducted nducted at a tempo where the defender remains immobilised and unable to deploy his reserves or his weapon systems (fixed). The essential requirement is tha thatt co commanders mmanders determine a sustainable tempo of operations while achieving a higher operational tempo than the

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  5 g. Momentum.. Momentum  is the benefit gained by a judicious combination of Momentum tempo and mass. Momentum must be maintained: delay or insufficient/inappropriate/inefficient force gives the enemy opportunity to regroup, react and regain the in initiative. itiative. The plan should allow for:

(1) Successive units and sub-units taking over the advance doing so by a passage of lines operation. Limitations on mano manoeuvre euvre may oblige sub units to be in echelon. (2) Reserves being placed well forward in order to be able to react quickly to the unexpected and exploit tactical advantage. (3) Ammunition expenditure of all natures being heavy and requiring the high prioritization of of the organisation o off the means of resupply. The same will apply to other combat supplies and to the evacua evacuation tion of c casualties. asualties. The difficulties of casualty evacuation m must ust not be und underestimated. erestimated. There are likely to be heavy casualties in all urban operations and the RAP will require additional medical medical resources prior to the start of the operation. There could be a requirement for medical teams to move up each axis closely behind the leading assault forces forces if momentum is to be m maintained. aintained. Their tasks would be to administer immediate first aid, apply triage, mark casualties and move them to suitable collection collection points. In addition a battleg battlegroup roup may need to generate a sufficient number of soldiers to act as stretcher bearers between the RAP and the Collection Points. Consideration mus mustt be given to the use of AFVs for ammunition resupply and casualty evacuation at every stage in the operation. (4) Knowing exactly what is happening. There may be a need for the configuration of increased number of communication systems to achieve the required level of situational awa awareness. reness. Consideration sh should ould be given to the deployment of radio rebroadcast systems as units move forward.  SECTION 3 - THE STAGES OF AN OFFENSIVE ACTION ‘By the time it reached Berlin, Red Army forces had created special assault “storm” groups, specifically developed for independent independent action in urban terrain. Each storm group included a rifle battalion, a sapper company, and armour company or self-propelled assault gun battery, two mortar batteries, a cannon or howitzer battery, one or two batteries of divisional artillery, and and a flamethrower platoon. A d detachment etachment was divided into three to s six ix a assault ssault groups, and a support group. Each assault group comp comprised rised a rifle company, included one or two sapper detachments, an anti-tank rifle detachment, two to five individually carried flamethrowers, smoke devices, three or four other man-portable weapons, and two or three tanks or self-propelled assault guns. Sometimes, groups were further subdivided to better focus on such missions as fire, command, reserves, reconnaissance, and obstacle clearing.. Individual soldiers w were ere supplied with a large num number ber of grenades and explosives. Training and preparation for the urban environmen environmentt emphasised independent thought and action from each soldier.’ Stalingrad, Sta lingrad, Anthon y Beevor, Pe Penguin nguin Books

5

 The linear momentum of a body is the product of its mass and its velocity. Oxford ‘A Dictionary of Physics’.

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   ATTACKS  ATTA CKS ON B UILT-UP A REAS 19. on n a built-up area can be divide divided d into five stage stages, s, although General.. The attack o General some stages may overlap. overlap. There should be no p pause ause between them an and d units should try to immobilise (fix) the enemy and rapidly exploit any penetration before the defender can react. The five s stages tages are inv investment, estment, the break-in, securing the objective, clearing clearing the objective and reorganisation. 20. investing esting the urban area sh should ould be to isolate the area Investment.. The purposes of inv Investment occupied by the enemy, to seize the principal terrain features and to dominate the approaches. a. investment force, for which reconnaiss reconnaissance ance troops and Grouping.. Ideally the investment Grouping armour are best suited, should be grouped under a dedicated commander. Controllers of indirect fire, aviation and air should included. b.

Tasks.. The principal tasks in the investment are to: Tasks (1)

Provide information on enemy dispositions.

(2)

Prevent enemy withdrawal or limit withdrawal options.

(3)

Prevent enemy reinforcement.

(4) Support the break-in, including provision of direct and indirect fire support. c.

Planning Pla nning Considera Considerations tions.. The three principal planning considerations are: (1) Careful planning of the deployment of the different elements of the Investment Force to ensure surprise in timings and approach. (2) Co-ordination of the employment of the Investment Force with the subsequent stages of the operation. (3) Consideration, direction and instruction on the treatment of civilian noncombatants in the battlespace, the need and location of interpreters and arrangements for PWs.

21. seize eize a foothold in the urban The Break-In. Break-In . The break-in phase is the assault to s area. The attacker will be vulnerable to the killing zo zones, nes, obstacles, mines, booby-traps and deployed weapon systems of the defender who will have had time to prepare his defended localities and and their mutual support. It is a critical stage of the offensive operation, and the attacker will be at his most vulnerable. a. break-in reak-in fo force rce sho should uld com comprise prise infantry and armour with Grouping.. The b Grouping engineer or or assault pioneer su support pport and indirect fire controllers. The minimu minimum m combat power necessary at battlegroup level is a rifle company group.

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  6 (1) may be used to sup support port the break-In b but ut is  Ar mo ur  . Armour may vulnerable to concealed anti-tank weapons.

(2) use e of HE and smoke to suppo support rt the  Ar ti l ler y and Mor tar s . The us break-in can destroy key points (particularly with precision munitions such as GMLRS), neutralize enemy positions and cover the movement of assault forces. In addition, artillery may be u used sed to 'fix' any enemy out of d direct irect contact. Commanders must consider risk o off injury to civilians and the problems created by obscuration and rubble. (3)  Av iat io n . Aviation may be used to provide direct fire support and/or a real-time, man in the loop, ISTAR feed on enemy dispositions or counter moves. (4) support shou should ld be coordinated with indirec indirectt fire support. Early  Ai r . Air support consideration should be given to the use of precision guided munitions in order to limit collateral damage. (5) use of UAV and UGV Technical Intelligence Gathering Assets. Assets . The use can be considered to assist in information gathering, tactical awareness and the enhancement of command and control. b.

Tasks.. The main tasks of the break-in force are to: Tasks (1)

Establish a foothold in the urban area.

(2)

Identify the principal enemy defended localities

(3)

Determine the strength, location and future intentions of the enemy.

(4)

Oblige the enemy to commit his reserve, if possible.

(5)

Establish routes for forward passage of lines.

(6)

Provide a fire support base for subsequent stages of the operation.

c. given iven to the following Planning Pla nning Considera Considerations tions . Consideration should be g planning considerations: (1) The plan should be simple and, in the case of a large and welldefended urban area, the objectives limited. (2)

The synchronization of direct and indirect fire support is critical.

(3) Effective engineer support is critical to success. Obstacle, mine and route clearance, the construction of safe lanes and assistance to the assaulting sub-units necessitate detailed coordination. (4) Silent or noisy, the break-in can be conducted at night, as an enhancement to security. Night time will increas increase e the difficulties o off command

6

 Including

armoured Engineer assets, eg TROJAN and TERRIER.  

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  and control, IFF issues for air, aviation and indirect fire controllers and the risk of fratricide. (5) Effective fire support at every level and in support of every sub-unit move is critical during the break-In phase. Direct and indirect fire o on n the immediate defended enemy localities, those providing mutual support and those in depth is vital to both cover unavoidable movement in the open and prevent the enemy from moving his assets. (6) Consideration must be given to the concentration of combat power in the successful break-In. In order to maintain momen momentum tum it may be nece necessary ssary to conduct frequent forward passage of lines. (7) Consideration should be given to the use of deception as an aid to surprise. To be effective it must be c credible redible and c coordinated, oordinated, and the enemy must be given time to react in accordance with the feint. (8) The use of Anti-Structure Munitions (ASM) should be considered as an aid to blocking enemy routes and limiting enemy arcs of fire. 22. objective jective or objectives are sec secured ured from the foothold Securing Objectives. Objectives . The ob gained by the break-in. break-in. The aim of this ph phase ase is to consolidate firm ba bases ses from which to either launch assaults on subsequent objectives, or unhinge the enemy’s defence. a. securing objectives should be similar to that for the Grouping.. Grouping for securing Grouping break-in (para 21.a.). b.

should uld be included: Tasks.. The following tasks sho Tasks (1) The seizure of key terrain and objectives. The ground must be dominated, and the principal routes, bridges, buildings and subterranean features of tactical significance seized. (2) As a priority, the enemy’s freedom of movement and initiative should be limited by observation and fire as much as possible. (3)

Enemy defensive localities must be identified and neutralized.

(4) Enemy withdrawal, administrative and logistic routes should be blocked, although consideration should be given to subsequent own passage. (5) Enemy reserves, command posts and communications should be neutralized. c.

Planning Pla nning Considera Considerations tions.. Planning considerations are: (1)

A systematic approach should adopted to ensure that the enemy’s

ability to influence influence the sec securing uring of each objective is limited. This demands careful coordination between force elements.

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  (2) Strict security and control of the objectives seized and the routes to, from and between them must be maintained in order to prevent enemy reinfiltration and counter attack. (3) Consideration should always be given to the securing of objectives in daylight when enemy enemy positions can be clearly identified. Night operations can be undertaken by troops that are trained and specifically equipped but the dangers of fratricide and the chances of overlooking enemy positions increased. (4) Medical support needs to be as close as possible to fighting elements, and safe routes con constantly stantly identified and reconnoitred for CASEVAC. The demand for ammunition will be great, stocks will need to be well forward and arrangements must be made for continuous resupply. (5) The use of precision munitions to destroy known and clearly identified defensive positions should be con considered. sidered. Consideration should also be given to having indirect fire controllers well forward to react to the unforeseen and be well placed for subsequent phases. 23. of clearance is to strip the ene enemy my and ass associated ociated threats Clearance.. The purpose of Clearance from the area around the objective or between the objectives in order to gain control of the terrain. Clearance mus mustt be method methodical ical and thoro thorough. ugh. No enemy can be allowed to escape or remain hidden. All civilians in the locality must have their non-combatant status confirmed. Residual threats such as mines, booby-traps or IEDs must be rendered safe. This role can be given to reserve or echelon forces if the original echelon is tasked to continue the assault. a. should hould be similar to tha thatt for the break-in Grouping.. Grouping for clearance s Grouping (para 21. a.). b. task will be to clear the area of enemy and and associated Tasks.. The principal task Tasks threats. c.

Planning Pla nning Considera Considerations tions.. Consideration should be given to: (1) The use of sectors, or similar control measures, to ensure the clearance is systematic and no enemy, in pockets or as individuals, are left. (2) Clearance tasks can be allocated to small groups of platoon or section strength. (3)

Clearance tasks are most effective in daylight.

(4) Provision must be made for casualty collection, control of PWs and the evacuation of civilians. 24. The reorganization will be no different to that for any other Reorganization.. Reorganization offensive operation. The conduct a and nd time available for reorganization will be dictated by plans for subsequent operations. operations. Nevertheless, the following p points oints should be considered:

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  a. Despite systematic clearance of the defended location, the threat from snipers and counter counter attack co could uld remain. Care must be taken to cover e every very approac approach, h, including tunnels, alleyways and rooftops, by observation and fire, if possible. Immediately subsequent to the assault, temporary defensive measures should be adopted at every level, including the preparation of direct and indirect-fire defensive fire plans. b.

Regrouping must be considered if casualties have been high.

c.

Immediate or early resupply of ammunition, water and fuel is critical.

d. The evacuation of casualties and civilians, and control of PWs requires considerable manpower and time. THE CAPTURE OF KEY OBJECTIVES ‘Time taken to clear a single (two storey) house was about one and a half hours – if fire support was not used. The US managed to totally dominate the streets through the use of ISTAR and fires. This forced the insurgents to figh fightt the buildings from within rather try to dominate the approaches to them. It also prevented mutual sup support port being achieved. The US was, however, required to force entry into virtually every building. building. A number of methods of gaining entry – from tanks tanks down to sledgeha sledgehammers mmers – were used. Clearing houses from the top down was preferred if easy ac access cess could be gained to the roof. Methods of entry had to be changed constantly to avoid setting patterns, sometimes entering stealthily, at other times ‘dynamically’ – ie w with ith all gu guns ns blazing. The infantry/tank telephone was extensively used.’ ‘A Ta Tale le of Free C Citi iti es’ b y Russell Glenn (Fa (Fallu llu jah, Iraq) 20 2004 04 25. Offensive operations to capture large towns and cities are likely to be conducted at formation level. Battlegroups could be tasked to capture key objectives or features or to secure certain areas. Large towns and c cities ities are invariably centred o on n key features suc such h as rivers or road junctions and key objectives could include river or road bridges, closegrouped government government buildings or ap apartment artment blocks. Areas to be captured could be heavy or light industrial, residential (suburb), office or city-centre. 26. The operational requirement may not allow time for a deliberate assault and the commander could be required to plan a rapid advance through the built up area, leaving the task of clearing to following units. In such instance, the following following points should be noted: a. This type of operation has the greatest chance of success when the enemy has not had time to establish a proper de defence. fence. Maintenance of the momentum o off the assault and keeping keeping the enemy off-balance is vital. The importance of the early seizure of the objective, while the bridge, for example, is still intact, will allow the commander to get through the area quickly before the enemy can react effectively. b. In such cases, contact with the enemy should be avoided if possible. Enemy resistance should should be by bypassed. passed. Anything that delays the seizure of the objective should be avoided. c.

In order to deceive and confuse the enemy as to his intentions, and to allow

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  his forces for movement movement on multiple axes. The lead unit on ea each ch axis would need need to conduct reconnaissance reconnaissance on the move, poss possibly ibly using armoured veh vehicles. icles. Enemy positions might be fixed by fire, and bypassed. d. Momentum can be achieved by mounting infantry in armoured vehicles, albeit at the risk of attack by anti-armour weapons weapons.. Elements of the force, in platoon or section strength, should be dropped off to assume blocking positions, to provide flank, route and rear protection to aid the advance. In such cases, it is impo important rtant to ensure effective command an and d control between the different elements. Plans must be made for the deployment of a reserve in the case of counter-attack. e. Once the objective is seized, a perimeter defence should be established. Dismounted troops should should clear the building buildings s and establish all ro round und defence. The objective should be defended with all available means, including indirect fire and weapons mounted mounted on v vehicles. ehicles. Plans should be made for the early relief of route protection parties. Patrol plans sho should uld be made for listening posts, OPs and deeper deeper reconnaissance to forestall enemy movement and counter attack. INFILTRATION ‘Much of the the fighting con consisted sisted not of attacks, but of relentless, little battles. The battles were fought by assault squads, generally six or eight strong, from the ‘Stalingrad School of Street Fighting’. They armed themselves w with ith knives and sharpe sharpened ned spades for silent killing, as well as sub-machine guns and grenades.’ grenades.’   Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books

27. In certain cases, for example in the case of a city or town not being strongly defended, consideration could be given to the use of infiltration to access the objective. Identified defended localities might not be mutually supporting. They might consist of anti-tank positions on the outskirts, defensive positions and protective posts on the main approaches, or blocking positions on the approaches to the key features in town. Reserves and strong-points might be located in depth inside the towns or cites. The battle group might seize its objective by infiltrating platoons and companies between enemy positions. By using the cover of the town’s infrastructure, the buildings, the alleyways and other covered approaches, the battle group might be able to seize key street junctions or terrain features, isolate enemy positions, and e enable nable fo following llowing

Fig B-6-4 German Troops Fighting at Stalingrad Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  units to pass into the built-up area. Ideally, the tactic of infiltration is p performed erformed in poo poorr visibility or darkness. darkness. Consideration shou should ld be given to the following factors: a. sub-unit ub-unit shou should ld use its own Control.. Control of movement is important. Each s Control infiltration ‘lane’. Depending on the way the built-up area is laid out, each in infiltration filtration lane may need to be 500 to 1,500 metres wide. b. should uld advance on foot, usin using g stealth Movement.. The infiltrating companies sho Movement and all available available cover and concealment. Diversion can b be e effected by mortar mortar and artillery fire to cover cover the sound of infiltrating troops. Consideration can can be given to the use of real-time (down-linked) imagery from manned or unmanned aerial platforms. c. positioned sitioned to cov cover er likely  Ar mo ur Pro tec ti on . Anti-tank weapons can be po avenues of ap approach proach for ene enemy my armou armoured red v vehicles. ehicles. Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e platoon platoon patrols, including elements using hand-held anti-tank weapons, can also provide a screen for battle group flank protection. d. moving ing into the b built-up uilt-up area must secure their Flank Protection Protection.. Companies mov own flanks. Protective e elements lements may be placed along the route as picquets. Engineers can assist by providing counter mobility resources. e.  Ac ti on on t he Obj ect iv e. On arrival at the objective, infiltrating force elements should should co consolidate, nsolidate, reo reorganize rganize and organise the defence. Patrols be mounted to dominate the ground, and ‘blind spots’ nullified by judicious sighting of weapons and observers. observers. A limit of exploitation can be established to ensure control control and security.  ASSA ULTING A TOWN, VILL VILLAGE AGE OR HA MLET 28. Clearing streets and buildings incurs heavy ammunition Clearing Streets. Streets . expenditure. Prophylactic fire u using sing all ava available ilable weapon systems is use useful. ful. To clear a street, two sections sections or platoon platoons s should work in parallel along opposite sides. The third section or platoon should be kept as an immediate reserve. reserve. Commanders should b be e well forward, immediately behind the forward elements, able to observe progress and control movement. Sub-units should move forward alternately with fire support given b by y the other. Direct fire support can be given by tanks that should move between fire positions and be able to provide fire at short notice. notice. AFVs or artillery in the direct fire role can can also be used to provide fire support. The protection of tanks, AFVs and artillery must be balanced against their effect. 29. Clearing Cle aring Buildi ngs ngs.. Prior to the assault of the block or building that is to be cleared, ammunition should be re-supplied and covering fire organised from another sub-unit. Regardless of how the building is captured, from top, bottom or from an alternative level, it must be turned into a firm base from which to cover the seizure of a subsequent building. Sections must be able to communicate by voice and hand signal. Buildings sho should uld be marked to show entry points, whether or not they are clear, casualties, booby traps and the location of the FLOT. FLOT. The use of ch chalk alk or alternative methods of silent communication must be taught, understood and practised.

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  30. Individual   House Clearing. Individual Clearing . Sections should move from building to building by unpredictable routes such as throu through gh walls and sewers or ove overr rooves. If possible, open streets exposed exposed to enemy fire s should hould be avoid avoided. ed. Ideally each buildin building g should be entered entered at the top and cleared downwards. Each building must be thoroughly searc search h as it is cleared, including the outhouses and cellars. Reorganisation can only take place when each floor has been cleared, and ideally should take place on the ground floor, where greater protection protection will be afforde afforded d agains againstt indirect fire. Casualty, PW collection and ammunition re-supply points should be established at ground level. SECTION 4 – URBAN STRIKE OPERATIONS OPERATIONS   31. Urban strike operations are focussed against individuals or groups of people. They normally involve the arrest and detention of insurgents or capture of enemy combatants. 32. Although the size of the force required to carry out urban strike operations may vary, such operations are typically conducted at battlegroup or lower level. 33. The tenets of the Manoeuvrist Approach to urban operations remain extant for Strike operations. To ove overcome rcome or negate the enemy’s will to re resist sist requires an attitude of mind in which achieving surprise and using initiative is combined with high standards of discipline, organisation and a ruthless de determination termination to complete the arres arrest. t. The e enemy’s nemy’s ability to react, flee or resist will be defeated by a combination of high grade current intelligence, tempo, surprise, and simultaneity. 34. Urban strike operations are ‘simple’, where target buildings are adjacent and require only one cordon. They are ‘complex’ when the converse situation pertains. 35. In order to achieve surprise, troops must be capable of reacting quickly to the timely information provided by technical gathering assets, and high levels of competence and readiness are thus essential. PRINCIPLES 36.

The principles of strike operations are: a.

Offensive spirit.

b.

Flexibility.

c.

Surprise and security.

d.

Simultaneity.

e.

Simplicity.

f.

Service Support.

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  TASK ORGANISATION 37. Groupings vary according to the size of the task and the number of troops available. Normally a platoon-size operation for a single small building strike will comprise of the following groupings/tasks: a. breaching team of one or two separate teams The to gain clear and secureAthe compound. It may in include clude a RE EMOE7 team. teamentry, will provide the inner cordon. b. Assault group one, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to secure and clear the ground floor. c. Assault group two, a minimum of two teams, each consisting of two pairs to secure and clear the first floor and the roof top. d. Command team, compromising platoon commander, signaller and the reserve team. This can be the breaching te team. am. e.

Platoon sergeant group comprising medics, Tactical Questioning (TQ) team,

RMP, interpreter and female searcher, if required.

Fig B-6-5 – R Rangework, angework, Shields, Pist ols and Rifles

7

 Explosive Method of Entry.

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  ENTRY AND OPERATION OPERATION   38. The operating procedures will depend on the threat, the commander’s plan and the resources available. available. A typical sequen sequence ce of events is illustrated below.

Fig B -6 -6-6 -6 – U Urban rban Str Strike ike Proc edure 39.

The following additional points should be noted: a. Troops should be ‘stacked’ out of sight until they are required to enter the building. This aids protection an and d surprise. b. The use of a hand grenade, burst of automatic fire or ‘flash bang’, depending on rules of engagement, prior to entry to each room may neutralize any opposition. c. The first soldier to enter each room should be equipped with a pistol and shield. d. Information such as arrests made and the number of occupants should be passed to the command group, and subsequently up the chain of command, as quickly as possible.

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  RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 40. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) governing the regulations for opening fire, the arrest and detention of persons, and the actions of troops in civilian houses and vehicles will be the determining discipline for the actions of the forces involved. 41. ROE mustinbe learned and understood by Instructions every member of the force involved, and willThe be published Theatre Standing Operational (SOI). FACTORS 42.

The following factors are critical to the success of the strike operation: a.  a.  soldier must be briefed on the best av available ailable Curre Current nt intelligence. intelligence.   Every soldier information regarding factors such as the layout of the building, the number of likely occupants and the threat that they t hey might pose. b.  b.  Deception. In order to maximise surprise consideration should be given to all possible means of deception. c.  c.  Planning. Planning for a strike operation might include plans for the positioning of inner and outer cordons, the domination of roof tops, fire support coordination measures (including boundaries, No Fire Lines, identification markers), rigorous command and control measures, preparation for follow up strikes on nearby buildings and complex strikes where more than one building is to be assaulted.  assaulted.  d. Environment.. A  hostile environment may require a mixture of armour and Environment infantry to provide an iron sleeve through which the strike element can approach the target building. In a helicopter delivered strike operation, consideration must be given to the type of ground support required. e.

Combat Service Support Support..  (1) ensure nsure the Equipment   Recovery Recovery.. Robust plans are necessary to e recovery of every vehicle involved in the operation, to understand the capabilities of the recovery assets available and to rehearse elementary skills such as wheel change and track repair, at night if necessary. necessary.   (2) must st be m made ade for immediate medic medical al support Medical.. Arrangements mu Medical and CASEVAC.

f.

‘Ac ti on s On ’ . Plans for ‘Actions On’ should inclu include: de:   Ac (1) Vehicle breakdown en route and on target, including plans for crossdecking. (2)

Vehicle denial policy.

(3)

Wrong target.

(4)

Ambush.

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  (5)

Casualties.

(6)

Withdrawal.   Withdrawal.

g.  At t ach achmen men t s . attachments:

h.

A simple strike operation could include the following

(1)

Tactical questioner.

(2)

Interpreter.

(3)

Female searcher.

(4)

RMP.

(5)

RE search team.

(6)

Dog handler and dog.

ISTAR. ISTAR.

Consideration must be given to utilizing ISTAR capabilities to

establish patterns of life and reaction, track individuals, clear routes ahead of road moves, provide deception measures, support cordon surveillance and provide technical surveillance and ground and a aerial erial fire power. Aerial assets could be used to provide video image to the commander. i. The location of the commander warrants Command and Control. Control . consideration. A choice should be made between commanding dismounted and thereby intimately influencing events, and remaining mounted and being more able to communicate and control wid wider er aspects of of the operation. All troops must know the location location of their immedia immediate te supe superior. rior. Brevity c codes, odes, ide identification ntification ma markers, rkers, control measures and orders for opening fire must be known by all.

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  CHAPTER 7 CONVENTIONAL DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1

1. to those . The principles of defence urban operations as much Enemy Intentions as in any aIntentions. ny other environment. Planning for an apply u urban rban to defence is best preceded by by consideration of the enemy’s intentions, which may include the following: a. Pre-emptio Preemptio n of the De Defence fence.. The enemy commander tasked with assaulting a built-up area will try to prevent the defender from the preparation and consolidation of a strong defensive defensive position. He will try to achieve surprise, either by a rapid rate of advance bringing his forces to bear before a defensive position can be effectively established, by using an air-assault force or a forward mobile or mechanised detachment to achieve early penetration, to by-pass unprepared opposition or to seize vital ground in the urban area before it can be prepared for defence.  b. and d the time and resourc resource e  Av oi dan dance ce of At t ri t io n. n.   The likely attrition rates an consumption of prolonged urban operations may lead the enemy commander to avoid or to minimise his involvement in the urban battle. When time allows, consideration should be given to the advantages of conducting a comprehensive defence of all the approaches to the town or city using the long-range all arms and integral support weapon capabilities to destroy or divert the enemy, and prevent the further preparation of the defensive position before the urban battle is joined. c. intense e indirect and direct fire and air Bombardment.. The enemy could use intens Bombardment bombardment to significantly reduce resistance in a defended urban area, anticipating that subsequently inserted ground forces would face less effective resistance. resistance.   SECTION 2 - THE ELEMENTS OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION GENERAL ‘Chukov’s plan was to funnel and fragment German mass assaults with ‘breakwaters’. Strengthened buildings, manned by infantry with anti-tank guns and machine-guns, would deflect the attackers into channels where camouflaged T-34 tanks and anti-tank guns waited, half buried in the rubble behind. When German tanks attacked with infantry, the defenders’ main priority was to sepa separate rate them. The Russian’s used trench mortars, aim aiming ing to drop their bombs just behind the tanks to scare off the infantry while the anti-tank gunners went for the tanks tanks themselves. The channelled ap approaches proaches would also be mined in advance by sappers, sappers, whose casualty rate was th the e highest of any specialisatio specialisation. n. Wearing camouflage suits, when snow came, they crawled out at night to lay up anti-tank mines and conceal them. An experienced sapper could lay up to 30 a night. night. Stalingrad, Sta lingrad, Anthon y Beevor, Pe Penguin nguin Books 2. In any built-up area, defensive operations should be aggressive, mobile and should exploit depth. The defender defender should concentrate on retaining the initiative, particu particularly larly in

terms of his capacity to move forces and locate those of the enemy, in order to counter 1

 Offensive Action, All Round defence, Depth, Mutual Support, Concealment, Deception, Striking Forces.

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  enemy penetration. The defender sh should ould seek to disru disrupt pt and frustrate enemy intentions in every phase phase of battle. In the preparation for defence in the urban en environment, vironment, consideration should be given to the following: f ollowing: a. The commander’s intentions should be made known as early as possible. Early warning of an intention to defend a built-up area will enable the correct grouping his own forces and the necessary early pre-positioning of engineer resourcesof and combat supplies. b. Preparation of the battlespace by the defender will be essential. Consideration should be given to the clearing of fields of fire, the construction of bunkers, the construction and reinforcing of obstacles, the laying of anti-tank mines and booby-traps2, the construction of concealed routes and underground movement systems, blocking possible enemy avenues of approach and the protection of civilian and military communications and utilities. The defender defender shou should ld always seek to exploit the three dimensional nature of urban operations. c. Concealment and cover will be available but line-of-sight observation will be difficult. Use should be made of observatio observation n devices to cover possible ene enemy my infiltration approaches. approaches. Close attention s should hould be given given to ensuring mutual support and all-round defence. The nature of the terrain will lead to close-qu close-quarter arter combat. Defensive measures may include the barricading of streets and the employment of short-range direct direct fire weapons. Ideally the defence s should hould be based on the following: (1) perimeter rimeter battle is threefold: to The Perimeter Battle. Battle. The aim of the pe provide information about the enemy’s strengths, intentions and avenues of approach, to delay his approach, and to allow more time for preparation for defence of the the battlespace. Information gathering s should hould be carried out with every technical means available and by troops committed to the perimeter force. Delay can be provided by indirect fire, air and aviation s support upport and direct fire and aggressive o operations perations by the perimeter force force.. The perimeter force must move or withdraw when they can no longer influence the battle. (2) battle attle is to caus cause e The Disruption Battle. Battle. The aim of the disruption b attrition, to disrupt the enemy principal and subsidiary approaches, to confuse the enemy about the strengths and dispositions of the defence and draw the enemy towards selected selected ‘killing areas’. The disruption ba battle ttle should be a cocoordinated mobile battle that employs small forces in delaying operations. (3) The Main Defended Area (MDA) Battle. Battle . The aim of the MDA battle is to prevent the enemy from bre breaking aking in to the urban area area.. The MDA should consist of a series of defended localities, ideally mutually supporting, with each comprising strong points sited to defeat the enemy in selected engagement areas. areas. The use o off mobile reserves is important at ev every ery level and in each sector. sector. This battle must be based on an aggressive defen defence ce and the initiative must must be w wrested rested from the enemy at every oppo opportunity. rtunity. Unless the enemy is moving unknowingly towards a designated killing area, every enemy assault or advance should be counter-attacked by any available force

2

  According to the Ottawa Convention 1997, the use of booby-traps is permitted if they are directed only. against enemy combatants and not civilians, and their use is not indiscriminate.

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  of any size, preventing the enemy from establishing a secure footing from which he can exploit further advances. (4)

Reserves.. A mobile reserve is essential to any defensive operation. Reserves

PERIMETER FORCE 3. The perimeter force should be the first element of the defence to encounter the enemy. Its role will be vital to the intelligence p preparation reparation of the defensive defensive battle and the conduct of the initial phase of the battle. Consideration should be given to its grouping and employment as follows: a. Grouping.. The perimeter force should dominate the approaches to the builtGrouping up area and be grouped as tactically appropriate. Each grou group p can comprise reconnaissance, armour, anti-armour, anti-armour, and infantry suppo support. rt. Support from indirect fire, air and aviation should be integ integral ral to the grouping. Engineers may be be required to provide mobility corridors for force withdrawal and can provide obstacle and minelaying support. b.

tasks s for the perimeter force are: Tasks.. Typical task Tasks (1)

To identify enemy strengths, intentions and main effort.

(2)

To delay and destroy enemy reconnaissance and investment forces.

(3) To delay and destroy assault forces in assembly areas and FUPs, using and indirect fire and its integral offensive assets. (4)

To cover obstacles with observation and fire.

c. Planning Pla nning Conside Considerations rations.. Planning considerations for the perimeter force should include the following: (1) Information devices should be sited Perimeter to give as early Siting.. warning Siting and accurate of gathering en enemy emy inten intentions tions sh asould possible. force elements can be sited both on the outskirts of the urban area and beyond. The force must use camouflage and concealment to achieve the task of providing information about the enemy. enemy. They are likely to be priority targets for enemy indirect and air attack. (2)

own n commander. Command.. The Perimeter Force must have its ow Command

(3) Strength.. The amount and type of combat and combat support in the Strength perimeter force must be balanced against the need to prepare the effective defence of the urban area, to enable the collection of timely and accurate information about the enemy and to minimise the loss of equipment and capability before the start of the battle. Consideration mus mustt be given to the importance of mobility and careful planning of the perimeter force withdrawal.

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  DISRUPTION FORCE 4. The disruption force should cause attrition, disrupt the attack and draw the enemy towards selected killing areas. The disruption force should cause significant delay to the start of the enemy operation. a. . The grouping of the disrup disruption tion should uld be ba based sed on sma small Grouping. Grouping infantry teams conducting figh fighting ting patrols, ambus ambushes hesforce and sho tank-hunting patrols. Usell should be made of snipers, armoured support and indirect fire. b.

Tasks.. Tasks for the disruption force may include the following: Tasks (1)

Cause enemy attrition.

(2)

Delay and disrupt the enemy assault.

(3)

Draw the enemy into the MDA killing areas.

(4)

Confuse the enemy about the layout of the defence.

c. Planning Considerations Considerations.. following:

Planning considerations may include the

(1) Force should o operate perate between the perimeter Location.. The Disruption Force Location force and the MDA. MDA. It can operate ou outside tside and within the b built uilt up area and to be effective it should be prepared to conduct mobile, offensive and aggressive action. (2) use e should be made of indirect fire, obstacles Obstacles.. Maximum us Obstacles and mines to slow the enemy's movement and channel him onto selected routes. (3)

Deception.. The disruption force should use deception both be Deception before fore and

during theofbattle, to deceive the enemy as to the location, strength and intentions the defender. (4) Command and Control. Control . The disruption force conducts independent operations, but effective control is essential if it is to contribute to the overall defensive plan. plan. Consideration ca can n be given to the use of the fire sup support port company headquarters to command the force. (5) communication mmunication between the disruption force Communication.. Good co Communication and the battlegroup HQ is essential. THE MAIN DEFENSIVE AREA The fighting in Ortona has become a classic example in the art of street fighting. The. 3rd  Germannd Parachute Regiment was responsible for the Ortona Sector and had made its 2 Battalion under Captain Liebschev responsible for the town.

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  of booby trapped and mined houses some blown into the streets to form road blocks and others to create fields of fire. All his s strong trong points were linked by mouse-h mouse-holes oles from house house to hous house. e. All the approaches to de defended fended sector were eithe eitherr heav heavily ily nd mined or under con concealed cealed enfilade fire. The 2   Canadian Brigade was given the task of clearing a way through the town and was forced to fight its way from house to house. Every building, when taken, had to be occu occupied pied to stop the Germ Germans ans infiltrating back3into fighting such was closegiven”. qua quarters rters that artillery support was impossible  andit. so The ruthless that was little at quarter   The capture of Ortona, December 1943 st Extract Extra ct fr om a report by 1  Ca  Canadian nadian Divisi on

Fig B -7-7-2 2 1  Ca  Canadian nadian Divisi on Troop s Fighti ng Thro ugh a Defe Defended nded Town i n Italy, 19 1943 43  st

5. Thesupporting Main Defensive (MDA) group consists of a series defendedsupport. localities, ideally mutually and ofArea company s strength trength with ofarmoured These localities form the bulwark bulwark of the defenc defence. e. Their construction sh should ould be the first priority for preparation of the defensive position. a. should uld be primarily infantry supported by armour and Grouping.. Grouping sho Grouping artillery in the direct or indirect fire role. b.

Tasks..  The tasks of the defended localities may include the following: Tasks (1)

Destroy the enemy.

(2)

Break up the momentum of the enemy attack.

(3)

Prevent the break out of the enemy.

3

st

  The capture of Ortona, Decem December ber 1943. Extract from a report by 1  Canadian Division.

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  c. Planning Considerations: Considerations : following:

Planning considerations should include the

(1) alternative ative pos positions itions for every  Al t ern ati ve Pos Posii ti on s . If time permits, altern level of command should be prepared. (2) localities localities should beissited to cover d designated esignated Areas s . Defended killing Killin areas.g Area Mutual su support pport betwee between n localities important and c covered overed movement between defended localities essential. (3)

requires ires a local reserve. Reserves.. Each defended sector or area requ Reserves

(4) Fire Plan. Plan . prepared.

Where con conditions ditions allow allow,, a d defensive efensive fire plan sho should uld be

(5) Counter Attack. Attack .  Plans should be made for counter attack at every level of command and at every every opportunity. Rehearsals should be conducted. conducted.   RESERVE 6. The reserve should be located centrally and should be mobile. It may be used to support any part of the defence. a. reserve erve should be based on infantry a and nd Grouping.. The grouping of the res Grouping armour. Engineers sh should ould be inc included luded if availa available. ble. b.

Planning Pla nning Considera Considerations tions.. Consideration should be given during planning to: (1) Selection, maintenance and protection of covered routes for counterattacks and for movement between localities. (2) The need for the reserve to be immediately available to the commander and for its commanders to be aware of the current phase of the defensive battle. (3) Options for the employment of elements of the perimeter force after their withdrawal.

THE CO-ORDINATION OF A DEFENSIVE OPERATION 7. The coordination of all forces involved in defensive operations is crucial to success. The following points should be noted: a. involving g the mutual support of Planning.. A well-planned defence in depth involvin Planning defended buildings and localities, the use of obstacles, mines, booby-traps, cleared fields of fire and the canalisation of the enemy into killing zones will demoralise the enemy and can contribute to a successful defence. b.

 Ag gr ess essii ve Ac t io n . The defend defender er should exploit his intimate knowledg knowledge e of

the built-up area area to retain the initiative a and nd act offens offensively. ively. Aggressive pa patrolling, trolling, raids, sniping and ambushes should be used continuously to confuse, surprise and Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  put strain on the enemy. enemy. His planning should be disrupted and his weakne weaknesses sses and failures exploited. The defender s should hould be rele relentless ntless in attempting to infiltrate into areas behind the enemy, captured and cleared but not occupied, and should then attack his headquarters and support areas. c.

battlegroup reserve can be used for counter-attack, Counter-Attacks . The battlegroup

but the to urban environment initiativesAtrequire and centralisedshou planning, not in least minimize the risk such of fratricide. every careful level, c counter-attacks ounter-attacks should ld be as spontaneous and immediate as can be achieved, and should take advantage of the cover and concealment afforde afforded d by the built-up a area. rea. Small elements, such as fire-teams, can achieve surprise and recapture terrain and buildings against elements of their own size or bigger when the enemy is disorganised. d. troops s and Frontages.. Defence of towns or cities requires a higher density of troop Frontages smaller defensive defensive sectors than in open terrain. An infantry company o occupying ccupying 1,500 to 2,000 metres in open terrain can be reduced to a frontage one-third the size, 300 to 800 metres, in a built-up area. The tactica tacticall situation, th the e building density, collateral damage damage and street patterns will dictate the frontage of the unit. As an approximate guide the minimum frontages in built-up areas are as follows: Unit (a) Battle Group Company Group Platoon

Frontage (b) 4 to 8 blocks 2 to 4 blocks 1 to 2 blocks

Depth (c) 3 to 6 blocks 2 to 3 blocks 1 block

Note: An average average city bloc block k is taken to have a frontage of 175 metres. These minimum figures apply in areas of dense, block-type construction, multi-storey buildings and underground passages. DEFENCE IN LIMITED VISIBILITY 8.

The attacker may try to use limited visibility conditions, smoke or night-time activities,

to conduct operations operations to sustain or regain mome momentum. ntum. Plans to counter this threat should be an integral part of the STAP4  and should employ the following measures to defend against attacks at night or limited visibility. a. Defensive positions and crew-served weapons can be moved just before dark/stand-to to deceive the enemy as to their exact location. Individual, fire-team, section and gun group positions can often be moved forward, or to an adjacent building where they can cover the same likely enemy approach. b. Unoccupied areas between force elements, which can be covered by observed fire during daylight, should be occupied by standing or listening patrols or secured by mobile patrolling at night. c. Radar, remote sensors, and night observation devices including those of artillery observers should be used to cover streets and open areas at all times.

4

 Surveillance Target Acquisition Plan, made by the comd to coordinate STA resources.

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  d. Nuisance mines, booby-traps, wire and OPs should be positioned on secondary avenues of approach. e. The irregular use of artillery and mortar DFs, OPs, planned direct fire, patrols and anti-intrusion devices should be used to prevent infiltration. f. Artificial illumination can be used where feasible, but it can provide help to both sides. g. Indirect fire weapons, grenade launchers and hand grenades should be used where possible when defences are probed to avoid disclosure of firing positions. h. During an enemy night assault, pre-planned DFs and FPFs should be initiated. Crew-served weapons, AFV we weapon apon p platforms latforms and individual riflemen should fire within their assigned assigned sectors. Grenades and c command ommand detonated mines should be used used to supp supplement lement fire during the approach and the attack. Rapid and early counter-attack should be employed to exploit the enemy’s confusion. i.

Defenders should move back to daylight positions before first light/stand-to.

KEY TERRAIN 9. Key terrain is any place where seizure, retention or control affords a marked advantage. Examples of key terrain are bridges over c canals anals or rivers, building complexes, public utilities, or open areas. areas. The identification of key key terrain allows the de defender fender to select his defensive positions and assists in determining the enemy's objectives. OBSERVATION AND FIELDS OF FIRE 10. buildings gs to General.. The attacker must cross streets and open areas between buildin General advance, and will do so using fire and movement. The fire can be indirect mortar and artillery fire: it can be direct tank, anti-tank, rocket-propelled grenade or machine-gun fire. The defender must remain able to observe these open areas and bring effective fire to bear. The use of concealed mach machine ine guns and snipers can b be e very effective against enemy movement across streets or open areas. 11. Cover and Concealment. Concealment . The cover and concealment provided by buildings, rubble and the urban jungle should be used to prepare and improve defensive positions. Positions may be easily and quickly improved by using materials at hand. When the defender has to move, he can reduce his exposure by: a.

Using prepared breaches through buildings.

b.

Moving through reconnoitred and marked underground systems.

c.

Using trenches.

d.

Using the concealment offered by smoke and darkness to cross open areas.

12. penetration etration that can be achieved w with ith 5.56 mm 5.56mm Bullet Penetration. Penetration . The pen round against exterior walls of brick or concrete will be limited unless significant numbers of Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  rounds are fired. Inside buildings, lightly con constructed structed interior walls and furniture are likely to be penetrated. These effects s should hould be conside considered red both when firing at enemy positions and when balancing the risk to friendly forces in the area. The following common barrie barriers rs in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round fired at less than 50 metres: a.

One thickness of sandbags.

b.

2 inch concrete wall (not reinforced).

c.

55 gallon drum filled with water or sand.

d.

Small ammunition container filled with sand.

e.

Hollow concrete building block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).

f.

Brick veneer.

g.

Car engine block.

13. ammunition nition is considerably more more penetrative 7. 7.62 62mm mm Bull et Pe Penetration netration . 7.62mm ammu than the 5.56mm. The AK47 fires 7.62 x 39mm an and d is the most common assa assault ult rifle in the world. FIRE HAZARDS 14. Detailed knowledge of the terrain allows the defender to avoid potential fire hazards.  All built up areas are vulnerable to fire, especially, but not only, those with wooden buildings. Special attention must be paid to the fire hazards hazards of petroleum stores, gas tanks tanks and electricity electricity stations. All defensive defensive positions should h have ave fire-fighting materials and evacuation plans. COMMUNICATIONS 15. Past operations in urban have demonstrated how, radios easily must VHF be radios are screened and how their range can areas can be reduced. As a consequence consequence, carefully sited and maximum use must be made of rebroadcast stations and the remoting of antennae to high points. The use of the upper end of the VHF band and high power power switches on radios, where these these exist, will also assist. Commanders should be prep prepared ared to encounter difficulty in establishing and maintaining communications; they should therefore plan for the frequent re-siting of rebroadcast stations in order to ensure communications.  All radio users should be trained in and employ basic skills which are just as important in the era of digital communications, such as movement to establish communications, elevation where possible and avoidance of obscurance from walls or buildings. Commanders should also be aware of the effect of environmental factors on range and plan accordingly. If time and the ba battle ttle situation allow, use ca can n be made of civilian civilian fixed and mobile telephony, although it will be insecure and may only be used in accordance with theatre specific mandates. DEFENCE DEFEN CE OF VILL VILLAGES, AGES, STRIP AREAS A ND TOWNS

16.

points oints in valleys, dominating the only avenue Villages.. Villages are often on choke p Villages

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  of approach through the terrain. If the buildings in su such ch a village are we wellll constructed and provide good protection against both direct and indirect fire, a strong defensive position can be created using a company group, while controlling close and dominating terrain with other battalion elements. Villages on the approach approaches es to large towns or cities may be be used by a commander to add depth depth to the defence or to secure the flanks. These villages a are re often characterized by clusters clusters of stone, brick or co concrete ncrete houses an and d buildings. Company-sized battle positions can be established in these small villages to block approaches into the main defensive positions. 17. consist sist of houses, shops and factories and are built along Strip Areas. Areas . Strip areas con roads or down valleys between towns and v villages. illages. They afford the defender the s same ame advantages as villages. If visibility is good and suitable fields of fire are ava available, ilable, a unit acting as a protective force need occupy only a few strong positions spread out within the strip. This will deceive the en enemy, emy, when engag engaging ing at long ranges, into th thinking inking the strip is an extensive defensive defensive line. Strip areas often afford covered withdrawal routes to the flanks once the attacking force is deployed and before the protective force is engaged. 18. Towns and Cities. Cities . Advantage can be gained in the defence of a town or small city/choke point by placing tanks, anti-tank resources and pre-planned indirect fire on the critical approaches through through the built up area. By denying the enemy the ability to bypass bypass the town or city, the defending force w will ill retain control of the ke key y terrain. Reserve forces should always be placed to provide rapid re reinforcement. inforcement. Minefields, other obstac obstacles les and indirect fire will assist in slowing and ca canalising nalising an attack. Finding positions in towns and cities that provide provide both go good od fields of fire and cov cover er is frequently difficult. The forward edges of a town will provide the best fields fi elds of fire but are obvious and will be targeted by tthe he enemy. Civic buildings, and other s stronger tronger structures which provide adequate cover cover and are more suitable for defence, will more likely to be found in the centre of towns and will have more limited fields of fire on likely avenues of approach. The city centre is likely to consist of high rise buildings that will offer the defender observation, protection and good fields of fire, but it will attract indirect and direct fire, limit egress and will be to the detriment of mobility. SECTION 3 - THE USE OF DELAY IN DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS GENERAL 19. Delay within a defensive operation is a s sub-phase ub-phase of c conventional onventional war tha thatt is conducted against a numerically, and possible technically superior enemy in a situation of wide scale hostilities. It should not be confused with othe otherr operations such as key point defence in an urban environment. THE PURPOSE OF DELAY 20. Delay is an operation in which a force under pressure can divert and slow down enemy momentum and inflict damage without bec becoming oming decisively enga engaged. ged. The defender may be outnumbered, the air situation may well be unfavourable and the initiative is likely to be with the enemy. 21.

The use of a an n u urban rban area to delay the en enemy emy can provide the h hinge inge around which

the enemy will be either required to manoeuvre and be channelled into an area favourable for his destruction, or oblige him to assault the defended village, town or city to maintain or Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  regain his momentum. By using indirect and long-range fire effectively, exploiting the restrictions on tactical movement, improving the obstacles generic to urban terrain and using aggressive action to limit the enemy’s options and wrest the initiative away from the enemy, a commander may conduct a successful delay from and in a built-up area. 22.

A b battle attle group is likely to b be e task tasked ed to conduct a d delaying elaying operation a as s pa part rt of a

higher formation's plan in one of the following circumstances: a.

As a covering force during a withdrawal.

b. As an advance guard when encountering superior forces or in response to an enemy counter-attack. c.

As a fixing force in mobile defence.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS 23. When planning this type of operation, the formation commander attempts to satisfy one or more of the following objectives: a.

To slow down the enemy's advance.

b.

To determine the enemy's main effort.

c.

To manoeuvre the enemy into areas where he is vulnerable to counter-attack.

24. A delay operation may b be e c conducted onducted in c conditions onditions of e enemy nemy ground and air superiority. Command, control and communication could be difficult, particularly in a multinational or coalition environment, and commanders should pay particular attention to the cohesion of the force force while the enemy retains th the e initiative. When making his plan the commander should consider the following measures to aid the maintenance of cohesion and control. He should: a.

Make a thoroughly aggressive plan using all available resources and forces.

b.

Give the opportunity for offensive action at all levels.

c.

Retain defensive mobility as long as possible.

d.

Maintain a viable combat service support system.

25. The methods employed to conduct a delay operation are similar to those pertaining to the perimeter force and disruption force. The ultimate intent is to oblige the enemy to alter his line of advance or to delay him by inducing him to attack. THE CONDUCT OF A DELAY 26. operation tion is likely to be complicated a and nd confused, b but ut there will General.. A delay opera General be a number of separate and linked actions for which the commander should plan and

prepare. These stages or actions are:

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27.

a.

Preparatory.

b.

Delaying Action.

c.

Breaking Contact.

should uld be adopted: adopted: Prepara Pre paratory tory Action . The following procedures sho a. operations rations the organiza organization tion of the area us used ed is Organisation . In delaying ope similar to that of the defence. defence. The delay n normally ormally starts on a line given in the mission and extends rearward to a line li ne where responsibility for the enemy is passed to another force, or to a line where the type of operation changes (normally the FEBA, a phase line forward of the F FEBA, EBA, or possibly th the e handover line). Within the area given, the forces forces will usually be assigned lateral boundaries. boundaries. Unit and formation frontages will tend to be larger than in th the e defence. The commande commanderr of a delaying force has to decide which parts of the assigned area he will use for his operation, which parts he may abandon earlier than others, and which ones need only be monitored. In a built-up area less combat pow power er may be required for each task and the nature of the terrain lends itself to dispersed and more mobile operations, however, this increases the problems of command and control. b.

be e allocated to: Battle Procedure Procedure.. Sufficient time should b (1)

An early estimate of the enemy’s intentions.

(2) The deployment and employment of indirect and direct-fire weapon systems, and the preparation of withdrawal routes. (3) Selection and preparation of defended positions and routes through the built-up area.

28.

(4)

Selection and preparation obstacles, barriers and killing areas.

(5)

Coordination with superior and adjacent units.

Delaying De laying Ac tion tion.. a. change ge his Concept.. The concept of the operation is to oblige the enemy to chan Concept routes, to divert his resources and to take offensive action in urban terrain that will cause him delay. When conducting a de delaying laying action, elements of the delaying fo force rce will have to both attack and defen defend. d. The commander s should hould therefore consider consider the following points: (1)  Ag gr ess essio io n . The delaying force must take every opportunity to initiate aggressive action. Troops will be employed in main maintaining taining su surveillance, rveillance, engaging the enemy at long and at short range, delaying the enemy aggressively, withdrawing to the next delaying position or being available as a reserve.

(2) Frustration of Enemy Intentions. Intentions . Frustrate the enemy's desire to move quickly quickly through the area by blockin blocking g roads. Destroy a committed Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  enemy by sealin sealing g routes behind him. destroy an unprepared opponent.

Relatively sm small all urban forces c can an

(3) delaying force should make use o off the depth of the urban Depth.. A delaying Depth area to ambush men and vehicles and to attack the enemy's flank and rear. The majority of the defending troops can engage the enemy along his most likely bear. approach routes and bring a heavy weight of direct and indirect fire to (4) frequently uently and rapidly. Intelligence.. The tactical situation will change freq Intelligence The commander should ensure that he has well organized ISTAR assets providing sound and timely intelligenc intelligence, e, good communica communications tions and as s strong trong a reserve as possible. (5) Counter-Attacks . Maintaining close contact with the enemy and using counter-attacks at every level and every opportunity contributes significantly to the success of the delaying operation. b.

normally lly consist o off three elements: Execution.. The delaying force will norma Execution (1) screen creen mig might ht cons consist ist of reconnaissance forces, longScreen.. The s Screen range anti-tank teams, armour and aviatio aviation n and in indirect direct fire con controllers. trollers. Its task will be to provide early information on the location, strengths and movement of the enemy, to engage and destroy enemy armour and the draw the enemy into into the built up a area. rea. Every opportunity s should hould be taken to cause delay and inflict casualties. (2) should hould consist of a Delaying De laying Forces Forces.. Delaying forces in built-up areas s combined arms groupin grouping g with in infantry fantry in the lead. Mobility, built around a number of prepared positions, is the key to urban delay. (3) should be held av available ailable to deal with unexpected Reserves.. Reserves should Reserves reverses that threaten the cohesion of the t he defence.

c. enemy nemy to take offensive action that will Coordination.. In order to oblige the e Coordination prejudice his advance, the following points should be considered: (1) Every advantage offered by the terrain should be exploited. The enemy’s advance should be impeded and every opportunity should be taken to surprise and ambush him, taking care to ensure timely disengagement. (2) Elements of the delaying force in danger of being overrun or outflanked should be prepared to disengage and withdraw. (3) The fluid situation during delaying operations will necessitate constant and close coordination between sub-units, and effective fire control. d. Disengagement.. Troops withdrawing from a defensive position should break Disengagement cleanly, if possible. Local counter-attacks can help achieve disengagement. The

use of subterranean routes, smoke, direct fire, hasty indirect fire plans and deception may also be considered, but the need for good planning and control is paramount. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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  29. delaying ying force is difficult, espe especially cially if the Breaking Contact. Contact . The withdrawal of the dela force has been unable unable to disengage. The commander’s a aim im should be to preve prevent nt his force from being 'fixed' by the enemy. enemy. Control of the withdrawal is critical and the enemy should be given as little indication indication as possible of the intention to dise disengage. ngage. The withdrawing force must provide accurate accurate information to formation h headquarters eadquarters on its plans. Liaison elements should be attached to superior and adjacent commands to identify withdrawing units as they retire. SUMMARY 30. In a high intensity conflict against numerically superior forces a unit or formation can expect to be tasked tasked with imposing delay on the enemy. Although the defen defender der might be outnumbered, the air situation unfavourable and the momentum and initiative with the enemy, a large built up area can provide ideal terrain upon which to conduct a delaying operation with a comparatively comparatively small force. The force will need to be a combine combined d arms grouping and will require long and short range anti-armour and anti-personnel weapon systems and engineer engineer support. The defence must be aggre aggressive ssive and should be ba based sed on the principles of mobility, res resolution, olution, surprise and clean disengagement. Control will be difficult to achieve but critical to success. SECTION 4 - ENHANCED BLAST WEAPONS 31. Enhanced Blast Weapons (EBW) rely on blast to in inflict flict damage, damage, rather than explosively driven metal metal projectiles, fragments or shaped charges charges.. They may or may not be 5 thermobaric.   32. Troops must be prepared to defend themselves against EBW without reducing their defence capability capability against other w weapons. eapons. Although the a anti-personnel nti-personnel effect of of the EBW remains lethal at or near the point of impact, the intensity of the wave that passes into adjacent rooms and the wider kinetic effect of the weapon will be reduced below the lethality threshold. This will prevent d damage amage to the structure structure and reduc reduce e the chance chance of structural collapse. 33.

The structural defensive measures against EBW are as follows: a. Venting.. ‘Venting' involves creating vents sufficiently big to reduce the Venting intensity of the blast blast wave. The creation of suitable ‘vents’ b by y removing the walls, sections of walls, and/or roofs will have to be balanced against the consequent loss of ballistic protection from other weapons. b. Premature Detonation. Detonation . Causing EBW warheads to detonate outside the structure at a distance from the exterior wall will reduce the effects of the explosion on the structure. structure. Rocket screen screens s similar to tho those se once used used in Northern Ireland should cause the detonation of a single warhead, such as the RPO-A Schmel 6.  Against a tandem warhead, such as RShG-17, the kinetic effect will also be reduced. The detrimental effect on camouflage and concealment of the defended position must be taken into consideration before screens are erected.

5

enoting a very large fuel–air bomb which ignites into a fireball when detonated, creating a powerful wave of  D  Denoting pressure that sucks out oxygen from any confined spaces nearby. nearby . Concise OED. OED.   6  Russian hand held thermobaric weapon. 7  Russian hand held tandem warhead thermobaric weapon.

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  c. equipped ed with EBW, con consideration sideration Building Selection. Selection . If the enemy are equipp should be given to selecting only those buildings with a structural framework of steel or reinforced concrete that will defeat the warhead. d. Buildin g Prepa Preparation ration.. The preparation of prepared positions with lateral and overhead cover should be considered. 

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  CHAPTER 8 STABILITY STABIL ITY OPERATIONS SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1. Stability operations are planned continuously offensive and defensive opera operations. tions. They are defined as:and conducted concurrently with ‘Military operations which contribute to order, security and control in order to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-military and indigenous organisations 1 to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms of government. government. ’ 2. Stability operations form a key component of land tactical activities and have become increasingly prevalent in recent yea years. rs. Military involvem involvement ent could range from conflict prevention measures in failed or failing states to providing support to nation building. Where the security situation is such that civilian actors2 (international or HN) are unable to operate, the military may have to take initial responsibility for the provision of the rule of law, basic utilities and governance until a handover of responsibility can be achieved. 3. There are four interrelated groups of tactical activities associated with stability operations and these cross all likely lines of operation:

4.

a.

Security and control.

b.

Initial restoration of essential services and facilities.

c.

Interim governance tasks.

d.

Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR).

The detail on these activities is contained in AFM Vol 1 Pt 1, 1,’Formation ’Formation Tactics’, Tactics’,

Chapter for 5, ‘Stability This provides should be readon in TTPs. conjunction with AFM Vol 1 Pt 9, Operations’,.which Operations’. detail ‘Tactics Stability Operations’, Operations’ 5. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the issues pertinent to the conduct of stability operations in the urban environment.

1 2 AFM

Vol 1 Part 9 Tactics for Stability Operations.  Civil actors is a collective term for the range of civil agencies, bodies and organisations that may be involved

in addressing the circumstances circumstances and conditions of a conflict or crisis situation. These include: OGDs, International Organisations (IOs); international donors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU); security forces such as the Civil Police; Non Government Organisations (NGOs); the corporate sector; local authorities; and local populations.

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  SECTION 2 – FACTORS FOR CONSIDERATION DURING URBAN STAB ILITY OPER OPERATIONS ATIONS 6. understanding of the physical and cultural environment Demographics . A thorough understanding is essential to the successful successful conduc conductt of any stability operatio operation. n. The following list provides a flavour of some of the subjects requiring analysis in the urban environment:

Fig B-8-1 1 A&SH Protectin g Roman Ca Cathol thol ic Parents and Children Going t o the Holy Cross School, Belfast, Octo ber 200 2001. 1. a. The location of inter-ethnic, -social and -economic boundaries and any resulting areas of contention or violence. b.

Cultural norms and attitudes.

c. The location of key infrastructure (government facilities, power and water plants, schools, hospitals etc) and significant cultural/religious sites. d. The key leaders and opinion formers amongst the population (these may include political, tribal, religious, economic, criminal leaders) and how they communicate with them. e.

Where the loyalties/sympathies of elements of the population lie.

f. Expectations and prejudices of the population (attitude towards police, foreign troops, NGOs, HN government etc). g.

Standard of service provision (sewage, electricity, water, health care etc).

h. The movement of goods and people. How are they moved, where can crowds gather easily, ingress and egress routes for adversaries etc. 7.

Influence Activities Activities..

Support, or at least tolerance, for the military by the local

population is essential to success.  success.   Influence activities are required to influence local, national and regional attitudes and perceptions in order to support the establishment of a

secure environment, the development of law and order and the establishment of a legitimate form of of government. Any information vacuum will be ruthlessly and rapidly exploited by adversaries who are likely to have the advantage of local knowledge and who Issue 4.0: Oct 09 

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  are unconstrained by the need to tell the truth. The military must us use e influence activities in support of all lines of operation. operation. Methods include Key Leader Engagement Engagement (KLE), the use of tactical PSYOPS teams and presence, posture and profile to shape the perceptions of a variety of audiences. Understanding the environment, in its broadest sense, is essential to ensuring that the correct message is delivered. Some examples of how Influence Activity may be employed are given below: a. Promote the authority of and generate popular support for legitimate HN institutions and indigenous security forces. b. Marginalise violent factions, criminals and other spoilers from the majority of public support. c. Develop and protect consent (or tolerance) towards the MNF by the local population. d.

Explain the reason for operations and the use of force by the military.

e.

Communicate instructions, provisions and rules to the population.

f.

Shape conditions prior to military activity in order to pre-empt negative effects.

g. Reinforce and strengthen the will and resolve of the indigenous security forces and allies. 8. Use of Force. Force. The use of force will be governed by ROE. In the urban environment, given the density of the population and buildings, there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage and a subsequent effect on others besides the intended target. Consideration must, wherever wherever possible, be given to the appropriate appropriate use of force. It may be legal to use a particular weapon system (eg JDAM) in response to a given threat (eg sniper team in a minaret) but would it improve the overall situation? 9.

The Adversary. Adversary . Adversaries likely to be encoun encountered tered in the comp complex lex terrain of the

urban environment environ mentcriminal will beand highly diverse. They will willing b be e driven b by y different motives (eg religious, political, ethnic), capable of and to employ a rangemo of tives methods to achieve their ends (including a mix of conventional and asymmetric attack, information operations, intimidation and establishing shadow government) and willing to form alliances of convenience convenience to achiev achieve e common go goals. als. Unconstrained b by y international law they will ruthlessly exploit opportunities that present themselves, seek to undermine what we perceive to be legitimate governance and compete for the support/compliance of the population. 10. conductt of stability operatio operations ns in the urb urban an environment is likely to bear COIN.   The conduc COIN. many of the hallmarks hallmarks of a COIN o operation. peration. The principles of C COIN OIN3 provide a sound basis for the conduct of stability operations. 11. dependent dent on the Intelligence.   Success in urban stability operations is normally depen Intelligence. acquisition of accurate accurate and timely intelligence. The allocation of addition additional al man-power and resources to the collection and subsequent processing of information is therefore critical.

3

 See AFM Vol 1 Part 10 Counter Insurgency Operations.

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  a. urban n s stability tability op operations erations the m most ost critical in information formation a and nd HUMINT.. In urba HUMINT subsequent intelligence intelligence comes from the population. The quantity and q quality uality of this data is dependent, to some extent, on the credibility of the military force, the security that it can provide to the local population and the ability of as many ‘stability operators’ as possible possible to understand and speak the local languag language. e. Every member of the military force has to be aware of the overall intelligence requirements and how his may assist inby theregular Intelligence Collection Plan (ICP). Thisinteractions awarenessand canobservations and should be developed briefings and debriefings. b. IMINT.. Exploitation of imagery intelligence is coordinated within the Joint IMINT Intelligence Cell (JIC). Imagery from T Tactical actical Air Rec Reconnaissance onnaissance (TAR) is interpreted and distributed on request by a Joint  Joint   Reconnaissance Intelligence Cell (JRIC). Collection aircraft may be manned or unmanned, fixed wing, rotary wing or ducted fan, and the product may be “wet film” TI or IR film, digital images or a real time down-link. In addition there are a large number of ground base based d systems ranging from the basic camera to highly sophisticated and specialized photographic equipment. UAVs can a and nd should be made available to provide real time situational awareness to deployed troops. 4 c. SIGINT and EW. EW. SIGINT and EW  can provide a considerable advantage in an urban environment, particularly if the assets are tactically placed well forward and if the information gathered is fed directly to the forces engaged in the fighting by the shortest possible loop. The possibilities have been demonstrated by the increased use of Light EW Teams (LEWT) on operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

d. SSR involves working along alongside side the ind indigenous igenous Other Sources. Sources . Support to SSR security forces who will have their own intelligence capability and intimate knowledge of the operating e environment. nvironment. A sys system tem for using informa information tion provide provided d by the indigenous security security force should be e established. stablished. Members of NGOs ma may y also have useful information. This should be obtained and used sensitively, without compromising their neutrality or their relationship with the military, most likely through CIMIC teams. SECTION 3 - SECURITY AND CONTROL 12. Introduction . Security and control is likely to be the main focus of military activity when conducting conducting stability o operations. perations. The sp specific ecific challen challenges ges po posed sed b by y the urban environment stem from the hig high h densities of buildings and people. Such a complex environment restricts fields of view, disrupts communications and requires significant numbers of troops to control whilst providing adversaries with the opportunity to blend in and move with impunity. 13.  Ai m . The aim of security and control operations is to provide individua individuall security for the population and set the conditions for civil ac actors tors to be able to o operate. perate. The main challenge to progress on the security line of development is that it cannot progress in isolation. Progress is also required simu simultaneously ltaneously o on n govern governance, ance, develo development pment and economics if success success is to be ac achieved. hieved. Military activity clearly ne needs eds to be coo coordinated rdinated with the other lines of of development and s should hould not hamper the their ir progress. Coordination of activity through an ORT or other similar setup is required.

4

 Further details are contained in Part B, Chapter 4, Section 5 – Electronic Warfare

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  14. associated iated with security and control. Tasks.. There are a number of tactical tasks assoc Tasks Details for the TTPs for each task are provided in AFM Vol 1 Part 9 ‘Tactics for Stability  and theatre-specific SOIs will provide additional guidance. Possible tasks may may Operations’ and Operations’ include the following: a. a.  

Patrolling.. Patrolling enables the military force to dominate ground in order Patrolling

to deny its use to hostile forces and gain information. b. soft oft targets by adversaries. Convoy Protection.  Protection.  Convoys are often seen as s Their protection is required to maintain our own operations. c. need d to conduct public order Public Order Operations. Operations . The military may nee operations to maintain law and order where the civilian police are unable to deal with the situation. d. and nd sea search rch ope operations rations may be req required uired in Cordon and Search.  Search.  Cordon a order to detain individuals, obtain evidence or deny weapons and equipment to hostile elements within an area. e. protection tion of routes may be required as a Force Route Protection.  Protection.  The protec Protection (FP) measure or to deny freedom of movement to hostile elements. Route Search and the use of Vehicle Check Points (VCP) provide the means by which this is achieved. Current TT TTPs Ps cove coverr movemen movementt control measures, the checking and search of routes, the use of ECM and IED counter-measures. f. Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas.  Areas.   Key infrastructure, government buildings, vulnerable communities, food storage depots, armouries, magazines and other sensitive locations may need to be kept out of bounds or protected. g. means eans by which the movement of perso personnel nnel can Curfews.   Curfews provide a m Curfews. be controlled controlled du during ring spec specific ific periods of time. The fo following llowing po points ints shou should ld be considered: (1) . environment Curfew timings should support the Design ofofa Curfew-Timings. Curfew-Timings establishment secure and stable but not prevent the civil community from going about its legitimate business (religious activity, obtaining food, fuel etc). (2) restrictions, the reason for them and the Communication.. Curfew restrictions, Communication consequences of breaches must be clearly communicated. (3) Enforcement.. Framework patrolling, Vehicle Check Points (VCP), Enforcement Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) triggered by observation posts, standing patrols and other ISTAR assets provide the means by which the curfew may be enforced. 15.  As ym met ri c Thr adversary ary faced in the u urban rban environmen environmentt will employ Threats eats . The advers asymmetric methods against conventional military forces, HN institutions, the civil population, civil actors and opponents. Kidnapping, snipin sniping, g, ambushes, beatings, torture,

population, civil actors and opponents. Kidnapping, snipin sniping, g, ambushes, beatings, torture, intimidation are common tactics tactics as are the use of IEDs IEDs.. The latter has become increasingly prolific and effective in recent years. Adversaries now employ devices with a range of Issue 4.0: Oct 09 

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  sophistication and means of delivery and are constantly adapting their TTPs to circumvent countermeasures. A system to constantly evaluate the threat and c conduct onduct counte counter-IED r-IED 5 operations   must be established. The TTPs and first principles to counter IEDs and suicide IEDs are given in AFM Vol 1, Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’, and these means must be adapted by theatre specific methods aimed against the latest threat developments. SECTION 4 – INITIAL RESTORATION OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND FACILITIES FACILITIES   16. Military effort may be required in the early stages of an operation, and subsequently in periods or areas where the security situation deteriorates, to restore essential services and facilities6. This is especially important in the urban environment for the following reasons: a.

The urban population is reliant on municipal services.

b. Civil agencies and the instruments of government will be based in towns and cities. c. Civil agencies are incapable of delivering the required effect in a poor security situation. d.

Security may be improved: (1) Directly, for example by fixing populations (using methods such as the provision of clean water in a given area), improving routes (permitting, armoured vehicles/QRF and commercial access) and improving street lighting. (2) Indirectly, by removing causes for discontent amongst the civil population, denying a ‘shadow government’ the opportunity to occupy a vacuum and providing employment for disaffected elements of the population.

17.

The restoration of essential services and facilities for a civilian population, linked to

an Info Ops other succes lines ofs.activity, is an work early must measure that can be Info taken to increase the campaign chances ofand chances mission success. Restoration b be e linked to the Ops messages in order to capitalise on goodwill from the local population and deny criminal groupings unwarranted unwarranted credit. It should be conducted in conjunction with security and control activity, linked to plans for economic growth and complement the longer term development plans plans of OGDs. Restoration activity is likely to b be e conducted primarily by military engineers or contractors with CIMIC staff playing a coordinating role until such a time as civilian actors actors can take responsibility. The military medica medicall services may also be involved where there is a requirement to restore medical facilities for the civilian population and to provide advice on environmental health issues. 18. The nature and size of the military contribution will vary. In some circumstances it may be appropriate to focus the military engineering effort on the restoration of services for the population at the expense of the provision of facilities to the force.

5 6

 Prevent, Detect and Neutralise, Mitigate, Exploit – JDN 05-06 C-IED.   Sewage, Water, Electrical Electrical and Trash (SWET).

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  SECTION 5 - INTERIM GOVERNANCE TASKS 19. It is accepted that the provision of govern governance ance is not gen generally erally a military responsibility and if the military do get involved it is most likely to be in a supporting role. However, in some circumstances, the military may be the only organisation that is able to take responsibility for governing an area. JWP 3-50 – The Military Con Contribution tribution to PSO, identifies that the military may be required to undertake a range of civil administration tasks in support of a weak HN government or in the absence of a working indigenous or international administration. Such tasks may ra range nge from CIMIC liaison to the establishment establishment of an interim military government and are likely to include some degree of responsibility for the provision of essential services. The military should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate indigenous or international civil organisation at the earliest appropriate opportunity. Its primary role will be in establishing establishing the en environment vironment in which civil actors can operate. SECTION 6 - MILITARY MIL ITARY SUPPORT TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 20. Reform  (SSR)7  describes the overall (and largely Definition..  Security Sector Reform  Definition political) process by which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state, including urban urban dwellers, to live in safety. SSR is likely to be a core task in countries emerging from conflict but may also make a significant contribution to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all cases it is seen as a critical activity that prov provides ides the basis for longer-term stability and will address two broad areas; the quality of governance in the state (in terms of the relationships between security sector institutions, wider government apparatus and the general public) and the technical competence and professionalism of those in the security sector.8  21. The Security Sector . The composition of the security sector differs from country to country so there is no universally applicable d definition efinition of it. The military are most likely likely to 9 be directly involved with a range of core security actors  (not just the military) and will need to understand their relationship with and the role of security management oversight bodies,  justice and law enforcement enforcement institutions and non-statutory security forces. 22. . The precise nature ture of tasks required toort support SSR invo will vary according to a Tasks. Tasks range of factors. of Broadlyna speaking military supp support will likely involve lve training tasks, mentoring and then monitoring elements of the indigenous security force (through joint patrols and joint operations), capacity building, equipping and developing the whole range of G1-G9 skills as required10. Such activities must include consideration of urban operations. 23. Working alongside indigenous security forces provides the Opportunities.. Opportunities opportunity to give legitimacy to the operation by showing HN involvement and ownership 7

 See AFM Vol 1 Part 1 Formation Tactics Chapter 5 for more detail.   Joint Doctrine Note – The Military Contribution to SSR provides the strategic level doctrine on SSR and covers the comprehensive cross government approach. 9   Security Actors: armed forces; police and gendarmeries; paramilitary forces; presidential guards; 8

intelligence and security services (military and civilian); coast guards; border guards; customs authorities; reserve or local security units (civil defence forces, national guards, government backed militias) and veterans

groups.  Details on how to approach the development of an indigenous security force and building military capacity are contained in AFM Vol 1, Part 10, ‘Countering Insurgency’ and Insurgency’ and in AFM Vol, 1 Part 9, ‘Tactics for Stability Operations’ and Operations’  and Doctrine Note 07/16 Developing Indigenous Armies.

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  of security operations operations from the outset. It also provides the opportunity for external military forces to capitalise on the local knowledge of the environment and low level HUMINT provided by the security forces.

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URBAN URBA N OPERATIONS PART C URBAN COMBAT COMBAT SKILL S

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CHAPTER 9 URBAN COMBAT COMBAT SKIL SKILLS LS ‘Russian and Chechen sources agree that non-standard squads (sections) were the basis of the rebel force. Such a squa squad d might includ include e two men with RP RPG-7 G-7 or Mukha (RPG (RPG-18) -18) shoulder-fired anti-tank grenade launchers, two with machine guns, and possibly a sniper.  Alternatively, it could comprise one man with a machine gun, one with a RPG, and a sniper, backed up by one or more riflemen, automatic riflemen, ammunition bearers and medics.  Approximately three such squads, with support made up a larger 25-man cell. Three 25man groups made made up a 75-ma 75-man n unit. Each of the latter was allocated on one e mortar crew. This structure contributed significan significantly tly to the effective effectiveness ness of resis resistance tance ambush ambushes. es. The rebels divided the city into quadra quadrants. nts. Within those quadrants, 7 75-man 5-man units deployed along parallel streets with the snipers in covering positions. One 25-man su subgroup, bgroup, which included the unit command, deployed in smaller, six or seven-man formations in the lower stories of buildings along one side of the street (to avoid crossfire and to establish escape routes). The two other 25-man teams deploy deployed ed similarly intro the basements and lower stories at the point point of entry to the a ambush mbush site. From there, they could seal the area and reinforce their compatriots as as needed. In some cases the they y mined the buildings at the point of entry. As the Russian force forces s approache approached d the e entry ntry teams informed the others by Motorola.’ Russi a’s Chechen Wars Wars,, 199 1994-2 4-2000 000 Lessons f rom Urban Combat, R Rand and SECTION SECT ION 1 – CA CAMOUFLAGE MOUFLAGE A AND ND CONCE CONCEAL AL MENT GENERAL   GENERAL 1. Camouflage and concealment in built-up areas is as important to the survival of troops and equipment equipment as in an any y other environment. The changing patterns of terrain and the differing nature of individual buildings make the task of blending with the terrain significantly challenging.  challenging.   APPL ICATION OF CA CAMOUFLA MOUFLAGE GE 2. Urban areas provide plenty of cover from view which should, where possible and practicable, be used to c conceal onceal sold soldiers iers and ma materiel. teriel. Where such concealment is not possible, Urban Camouflage Material (UCM) and locally available materials should be applied using innovation innovation and initiative. The following points should be no noted: ted: a. Buildings provide numerous concealed positions. Armoured vehicles can often find isolated positions under archways or inside small industrial or commercial structures. Thick masonry, stone, or brick walls offer excellent protection from direct fire and provide concealed routes. b. After camouflage is completed, the soldier should inspect a position from the enemy's viewpoint. viewpoint. He should make rou routine tine and periodic ch checks ecks to see if the

camouflage remains natural looking an and d actually conce conceals als the position. If it does not look natural, the soldier should rearrange or replace it.

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c. Positions have to be progressively camouflaged as they are prepared. Work should continue until all camouflage camouflage is complete. When the enemy has air superiority, work may be possible only at night. Shiny or light-coloured objec objects ts that attract attention from the air should be hidden. d.

If the enemy has Thermal Imaging (TI) capability, soldiers have to be aware

that UCM and other drape drape materials will not, on their own, concea conceall vehicles. Thermal Camouflage Woodland Woodland (TCW) has to be used in conjunction with the UCM. Care should also be taken to avoid giving a heat signature to an obviously derelict building. THE USE OF SHADOW 3. Buildings in built-up areas throw sharp shadows, which can be used to conceal vehicles and e equipment. quipment. Soldiers should avoid areas that are not in shadows. Vehicles may have to be moved moved periodically as shadow shadows s shift during the day. Emplacements inside buildings provide better concealment. Other features of shadows that can have useful military application are that: a. Soldiers should avoid the lighted areas around windows and loopholes. They will be better concealed if they fire from the shadowed interior of a room. b. A lace curtain or piece of cheesecloth provides additional concealment to soldiers in the interior of rooms if cu curtains rtains are common to the area. Interior lights should not be used. TEXTURE AND COLOUR 4. Standard camouflage pattern painting of equipment is not as effective in built-up areas as a solid, dull, dark co colour lour hidden in shadows. Since repainting ve vehicles hicles before entering a built-up area will not always be practical, the patterns should be subdued with mud or dirt. a.

The need to break up the silhouette of helmets and individual equipment

exists in built-up areas the same as it does elsewhere, but care must be taken not to negate the e effectiveness ffectiveness of helm helmet-fitted et-fitted nigh nightt vision equipment. Predominant colours are normally browns, tans and greys rather than greens, but each camouflage location needs to be checked for texture t exture and colour. b. Weapons emplacements should use a wet blanket canvas, or cloth to keep dust from rising when the weapon is fired. c. Command posts and logistical emplacements are easier to camouflage and better protected if located located underground. Antennas can be remoted to upp upper er stories or to higher buildings buildings based on remote capa capabilities. bilities. Field telephone wire should be laid in conduits, in sewers, or through buildings. d. Soldiers should consider the background to ensure that they are not silhouetted or sky-lined, but ra rather ther blend in into to their surroundin surroundings. gs. To defeat en enemy emy

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surveillance, soldiers should be alert for common camouflage errors such as the following:

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(1) Tracks or other evidence of activity. hardened roads and tracks wherever possible.

Vehicles should be kept to

(2)

Shine or shadows.

(3)

An unnatural colour or texture, camouflage net should not be used in

an urban environment. (4)

Muzzle flash, smoke, or dust.

(5)

Unnatural sounds and smells.

(6)

Movement.

e. Dummy positions can be used effectively to distract the enemy and make him reveal his position by firing. SUMMARY 5. Built-up areas afford cover, resources for camouflage, and locations for concealment. The following basic basic rules of cover, cam camouflage, ouflage, and conc concealment ealment should be followed: a.

Use the terrain and alter camouflage habits to suit your surroundings.

b.

Employ dummy positions in buildings.

c. Continue to improve positions. Reinforce fighting positions with sandbags or other fragment - and blast absorbent material. d.

Maintain the natural look of the area.

e.

Keep positions hidden by clearing away minimal debris for fields of fire.

f.

Choose firing positions in inconspicuous spots when available. SECTION 2 - FIGHTING POSITIONS  POSITIONS 

GENERAL   GENERAL 6. One of the most important defensive tasks in urban operations is the preparation of individual and fire-team fighting positions. Fighting in built-up are areas as is likely to be at short range, fighting positions have limited arcs and casualties are caused as much by collateral damage as by kinetic or Enhance Enhanced d Blast We Weapons apons (EBW). Consideration s should hould also always be given to the tactical advantages offered by fighting positions outside buildings. FEATURES OF A FIGHTING POSITION  POSITION 

7. Commanders should consider the following factors when establishing fighting positions:

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a.

Protection.. Protection (1) should uld be se selected lected to s suit uit the tactical plan and Buildings.. Buildings sho Buildings consideration should be given to the value and amount of protection the building can pro provide. vide. Weak structures will require time, manpo manpower wer and resources to prepare them for defence. Where possible, solidly constructed constructed buildings able to provide maximum protection from conventional weapons should be used used first. Consideration should be given to the building's potential for collapse if subjected subjected to kinetic or EBW attack. Buildings with an integral framework such as steel beam or reinforced concrete should be selected first. Weak buildings with no integral framework, such as most modern domestic dwellings, should should be avoided. Firing positions should, where pos possible, sible, be positioned on the ground floor with their own structural integrity and should include overhead protection. This will help protect the defender in the case of structural collapse. (2) destroyed ed Destroyed De stroyed Build ings ings.. The use of buildings that have been destroy to create fire positions affords the defender better protection and makes the enemy’s task task of iden identifying tifying fire pos positions itions more difficult. Creation of such fire positions can be improved by constructing reinforced bunkers on the ground floor and collapsing collapsing the building a around round them. Routes in and fields of fire are then created and camouflage improved. Although this op option tion offers maximum protection, it will be difficult and time-consuming to achieve and should not be underestimated. (3) Fire trenches outside buildings can provide Fighting Outside. Outside. effective fire positions. positions. Trenches c can an be in incorporated corporated into a trench system linking fire positions, allowing communication and providing covered routes for f or movement. Such sys systems tems will nev nevertheless ertheless require considerable p preparation reparation and will be manpower and resource intensive.

b. Dispersion.. Defending troops should be dispersed, with the minimum Dispersion personnel in any one building required to achieve the task. The dispersion of individuals and fire-teams must not reduce the capacity for effective mutually supporting fire. Consideration sh should ould be given to the use of alterna alternative tive positions to reduce the impact of casualties caused by collateral damage and building collapse. Once a position is located by the enemy the defender must be able to use sufficient heavy and accurate suppressive fire from concealed mutually supporting positions to allow his rapid escape and redeployment. c. Fields Fie lds of Fire Fire.. In order to provide effective fields of fire over all approaches to the position and to provide mutual support, it may be necessary to reduce or destroy surrounding buildings and structures. d. should hould cover all Identification   of Enemy Firing Positions. Identification Positions . Fields of fire s potential enemy firing positions. positions. These firing po positions sitions should then be denied to the enemy by the use of obstacles, booby traps or by their destruction.

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e. Covered Routes. Routes . Firing positions sh should ould have a att least one cov covered ered route to allow resupply, casualty eva evacuation, cuation, reinforcemen reinforcementt and withdraw withdrawal. al. Firing positions

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paired with alternative positions should have connecting covered routes. PREPARATION 8.

Preparation of fighting positions requires careful planning. a. system tem must be allocated a Selecting Se lecting Positions Positions.. Every rifleman and weapon sys primary arc of fire. Alternative positions should be selected that cover that same primary arc. These positions can be located in adjacent rooms or nearby buildings buildings.. Each firing position should have a secondary position covering a different arc in order to engage attacks from other or unexpected directions.

Fig C-9-1 C-9-1 S Selecting electing Positi ons b. resourcefulness s should hould be encouraged when Weapon Positions. Positions . Individual resourcefulness establishing fighting positions in a bu building. ilding. Positions should be situated primarily on the ground floor although the tactical plan must reflect the enemy’s modus operandi. Positions should be sited as far back into a building as possible. The temptation to fight from windows, doorways and the forward edge of buildings should be avoided in spite of improved improved arcs of fire. Fields of fire sho should uld be obtained by firing from alternate positions, perhaps from different rooms or buildings and should not be achieved by siting the weapo weapon n closer to the window. Every firing positio position n must be designed to suit suit the firer, his weapon and the surround surroundings. ings. Each position ca can n be improvised from furniture, sandbags or other material and debris available.

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Fig C-9-2 C-9-2 We Weapon apon Posi tio ns 9.

Other key considerations in the preparation of a firing position are as follows: a.

Positions should be situated as far back into the building as possible.

b.

Dummy positions can be used to attract enemy fire.

c. Windows/openings that are not required should be blocked to prevent entry. In the case of an EBW threat they should be of light construction so they blow out in the event of an attack. d. The forward apertures should be of the minimum size possible, notwithstanding the requirement to provide firepower onto the likely avenues of approach. The erection of rocket sc screens reens or the use of items such as chain link fencing can negate the effects of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) attack, although this may negate concealment and hinder the use of certain weapons. 10. must ust be Fixed Installations Installations.. Fixed military installations in the urban environment m camouflaged and protected by direct and indirect fire and purpose-made or ad hoc rocket screens. 11. Building Positions. Positions . building.

There are many w ways ays to establish a fighting position in a

a. Window Positio Positio n . Soldiers should kneel or stand on either side of a window. To fire downward from upper floors, elevated firing positions should be constructed back from the window using tables, sandbags or anything else available placed against the wall, positioned to prevent the weapon from protruding through the window. Junior commanders sho should uld inspect individu individual al fire positions to determine the

arcs of fire available to each soldier.

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b. always ays firing from windows, Loopholes.. To avoid establishing a pattern of alw Loopholes loopholes can be prepared in w walls. alls. Again, individual firing positions should b be e sited back from loopholes in order to improve protection.

Fig C-9-3 Cone Shaped Loopholes (1) Several loopholes are usually required for each weapon (primary, alternative, and secondary positions). Loopholes can w weaken eaken w walls alls and reduce protection protection again against st grenades and small-arms fire. Loopholes should not be obvious. obvious. Explosive blasting of loopholes can result in a large hole that will provide insufficient protection and will be seen by the enemy. (2) Loopholes should be cone-shaped to achieve the best arc of fire, to facilitate engagement of high and low targets, and to reduce the size of the exterior aperture. aperture. When not in use, loopholes should b be e concea concealed led and protected by sandbags to prevent their use by the enemy to throw grenades or small arms fire. (3) Loopholes should also be prepared in interior walls and ceilings of buildings to permit permit fighting within the building. Interior loopholes s should hould cover stairs, halls, and rooms, and, if possible, be concealed by debris or furniture. Loopholes in floors willfire allow defender to engage the enemy on the floors below with small-arms andthe grenades. (4) Although walls will provide protection, they should be reinforced with sandbags, furniture filled with dirt, ru rubble bble or other material. Each p position osition should have overhead and all-round protection. c. Other Construction Tasks. Tasks . There will be a requirement to complete other construction tasks in basements, on the ground floor, and on upper floors. (1) Basements and Ground Floors. Floors . Both basements and ground floor levels will require the same amou amount nt of preparation. Every a access ccess to the building, underground or through the attic, that could provide enemy access must be blocked.

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(2) should hould be locke locked, d, nailed shut, and blocked and Doors.. Unused doors s Doors reinforced with furniture, sandbags, rubble, barbed wire or other suitable material. (3) While allowance must be made for the Hallways and Stairs. Stairs . defender's movement, hallways and stairs should be blocked with furniture, barbed wire and if possible booby-trapped.

Fig CC-99-4 4

Bloc king Stairwells

(4) Windows.. All glass should be removed from every window. Windows Windows not in use should be blocked with boards or sandbags. (5) Fighting Positions. Positions . Individual primary and alternative fighting positions should should be constructed thro throughout ughout the building. Fighting positions positions must offer protection from direct-fire weapons and grenades. d. Unoccupied Rooms. Rooms . Rooms not being used should be sealed, and blocked with wire or other obstacles. (1) preparation reparation a as s ground Upper Floors. Floors . Upper floors require the same p floors. Windows shou should ld be covered with wire mesh to block grenades grenades thrown from the outside. The defend defender er must retain the ability to drop his own grenades. (2) troops must prepare and know their way Interior Routes. Routes . Defending troops around the building. building. They must be able able to deal with any thre threat at and engage the enemy from an any y direc direction. tion. Withdrawal routes should be planned, prepared and rehearsed to allow rapid evacuation from the room or the building. ‘Mouseholes’ big enough to allow access to a crawling man s should hould

be made through interior walls to allow movement between rooms. Mouseholes can can be boob booby-trapped y-trapped and should be ma marked rked for both d day ay and

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night identification. Rehearsals should be conducted to a allow llow ev everyone eryone familiarity with the internal routes around the building. (3) Fire Prevention. Prevention . Buildings that use wood in their construction require comprehensive fire prevention measures. The attic a and nd other woo wooden den floors should be covered with at least 2-3cms o off sand or e earth. arth. Water containers should be po positioned sitioned a around round the building for immediate use. use. Fire-fighting materials (earth, sand, fire extinguishers, and blankets) should be assembled and placed on each floor. Available water basins and bathtubs sho should uld be filled as a reserve for fire-fighting. All electricity and gas s should hould be turned off. off. Fire breaks can be created by the destruction of adjacent buildings. (4) defence, cons consideration ideration shou should ld be give given n to Communications.. In urban defence, Communications the extensive extensive u use se of land-line. Telephone lines sho should uld be laid throug through h adjacent buildings or underground systems, or buried in shallow trenches. Radio antennae can be concealed by placing them among other antennae or along the sides of chimneys and towers. If possible they should be hidden hidden from ground observation. Telephone lines within the building can be laid through walls and floors. (5) provides s additional cover cover Rubble.. Destruction of parts of the building provide Rubble and concealment for weapons emplacements, and impedes enemy progress. Engineer advice and help should be sought to achieve this, if possible. (6) Rooftops.. Consideration should be given to the building of obstacles Rooftops on large flat-roofed buildings to prevent helicopter landings. Rooftops accessible from adjacent structures can be covered by fire or with wire and other obstacles. All obstacles should be covered by fire. Entrances to buildings from rooftops should be sealed and blocke blocked. d. Any structure on the outside of a building that could assist scaling the buildings to gain access to upper floors, or to the rooftop, should be removed or destroyed. (7)

Obstacles.. Obstacles

Obstacles should b be e positioned in adjacent streets and

roads to buildings in order create killing areas and to impede enemy armoured and infantry movement. (8) Fields of Fire. Fire. Fields of fire should be maximised around the defensive position. Buildings can b be e des destroyed troyed to enlarge fields of fire. Obstacles to anti-tank anti-tank guided missiles should be cleared. Dead space s should hould be covered with mines and obstacles. FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR TANKS, AFVs AND OTHER ARMED VEHICLES VEHICLES   12. Fighting positions for tanks, AFVs1  and other armed vehicles are essential to complete an effective defensive plan in b built-up uilt-up areas. Vehicle positions a are re selected and developed to obtain the best cover ,  concealment, observation and fields of fire, while still retaining the vehicle's ability to move.

1

 For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Section 1, Paragraphs 26-47.

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a. Vehicles should use hull-down positions to provide themselves additional cover and and routes to alternative firing positions must be kept cle clear. ar. Collapsed buildings may impede the movement and routes for s some ome vehicles. It should be remembered that armoured vehicles and their crews will remain most vulnerable to top and rear deck attack. b. Vehicle hide positions provide cover and concealment. Inevitably, structural obscuration greatly limits or prevents the crew from seeing advancing enemy infantry. Close co-ordination and good communications, by radio and telephone, is vital between mounted and dismounted troops. Alternatively an obs observer erver from the vehicle can be concealed in an adjacent building from where he can acquire the target and direct the vehicle to move to its firing position. After firing, vehicles shou should ld move to alternative positions to avoid compromise.

Fig C-9-5 C-9-5 V Vehicle ehicle Hide Positi on, Utili sin g an Observer FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR ANTI-TANK WEAPONS 13.

Anti-tank weapons2 should be employed to maximize their capabilities in the built-up

area. a. Whenever Javelin is fired in the urban environment, urban furniture, including rubble, can interfere with missile flight. When firing do down wn streets, missiles require at least one metre of clearance over rubble. Other obstacles to missile flight can include trees and large shrubs, vehicles, television antennae, buildings, power lines and wires, walls, and fences. b. NLAW is better suited for urban combat:. Its minimum arming distance (1020m) will allow close-range close-range use. Elevated firing pos positions itions should be chosen to allow engagement of the top and rear decks of armoured vehicles. vehicles.  

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2

 For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, Paragraphs 48-55.

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FIGHTING POSITIONS FOR SNIPERS  SNIPERS  14. Snipers3  can be highly effective in urban op operations. erations. An effective s sniper niper or pair o off snipers can cause considerable disruption to enemy movement and cause delay out of all proportion to their numbers4. Particular po points ints to note are: a. General areas (a building or group of buildings) will be designated as the sniper positions, but the sniper himself will select the best position for engagement. Masonry buildings that offer the best protection, long-range fields of fire, and allround observation should be ch chosen. osen. The s sniper niper sho should uld also select several alternative and secondary positions to cover his arcs and areas of responsibility. b. Engagement priorities for snipers are determined by the relative importance of the targets to the effective op operations erations of the e enemy. nemy. Sniper targets usu usually ally include commanders, enemy snipers and the personnel of crew served weapons. c. Built-up areas may limit snipers to firing down or across streets, while open areas will allow engagements at lon long g ranges. Snipers can be employed to cove coverr rooftops, obstacles, dead ground, and gaps. d. Consideration can be given to using snipers on the flanks of a defensive position to impede or interdict enemy movement. SECTION 3 – MOVEMENT INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT MOVEMENT   15. Movement in urban areas is restricted by poor communication, buildings, rubble and obstacles. Movement is a also lso limited by the difficulties of obse observation rvation and the location of enemy positions. All move movement ment mus mustt be supported by ac accurate curate d direct irect fire support. The passage of good, good, clear information a and nd intelligence on ene enemy my positions is v vital. ital. This will reduce casualties and avoid the natural tendency to focus on the nearest buildings. 17. Movement in b built-up uilt-up areas is a skill that every soldier must master and must be learned, practised and rehearsed. rehearsed. Silhouette will be visible against blank w walls alls as well as in open areas and a soldier must select his next covered position before making any move. a. reconnoitred nnoitred the other side side,, the soldier sh should ould Crossin g a W Wall all.. After he has reco roll over the wall, keeping a low silhou silhouette. ette. The speed of movement a and nd a low silhouette will deny the enemy a target. This method of move movement ment must be practised by all soldiers.

3

 For further details see Part B, Chapter 5 ‘All Arms Combat’, Sect 1, paragraph 16-25.  Further details are contained in Infantry Training Volume 1 Pamphlet 4.

4

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Fig C-9C-9-6 6 Low Silho uette Whilst Crossi ng a Wa Wall ll b. observed d Movement   Ar Movement Ar ou nd Cor ner ners s . The area around a corner should be observe before a soldier moves moves to it. A common mistak mistake e is to allow a pe personal rsonal weapon to extend beyond the corner, and expose a soldier’s position and intention.

Fig C-9C-9-7 7 Lookin g Aro und a Corner

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Fig C-9C-9-8 8 Looking A roun d a C Corn orn er with a Mirror c. Movement Past Windows. Windows . Movement past windows present another hazard; the most common mistake is to expose the he head. ad. The correct techn technique ique to pass a window window is to stay below the windo window w level. The same tec technique hnique is us used ed to pass basement windows where the most common mistake is not being aware of it. The correct procedure for negotiating a basement window is either to avoid it or to stay close to the wall of the building and step or jump past the window and provide minimum exposure to view. d. possible. ssible. They may be Use of Doorways. Doorways . Doorways should not be used if po covered by fire or booby-trapped. booby-trapped. If a soldier has to use a doorwa doorway, y, he should move quickly through it to his next position, staying as low as possible to avoid silhouetting himself. Pre-selection positions, speed, peed, a low silhouette, and and the use of co covering vering fire should be employedofwhen using s doorways.

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Fig C-9-9 C-9-9 C Crou rou ched Movement Past a Windo w e. Moving Parallel to Buildings. Buildings . Soldiers will not always be able to use the inside of buildings to advance, so movement forward may be necessary outside buildings. Movement sh should ould always be conce concealed aled and covered by smoke and covering fire. Correctly moving outside a building, building, the soldier ‘hugs’ the side of the building, stays in the shadow, present a low silhouette, and moves rapidly to his next fire position. If an enemy inside the building fires on on a soldier, he exposes himself himself to fire from other fire-team and s section ection members. Enemy further away or to a flan flank k should be engaged by flank sub-units or direct and indirect fire support. f. Openareas, areas, but including streets and be Crossing Areas .killing Areas. avoided. They Open a are re natural can be cross crossed ed alleys, safely cannot if certain fundamental rules are applied: (1) Preparation.. Before moving, a soldier should Preparation should select the next po position sition that offers the best best cover. At the same time time,, he should s select elect the best rou route te to take to get to that position, offering concealment concealment or spee speed. d. He must ensure ensure his fire-team or section can provide direct fire support prior to any move. (2) shortest hortest dis distance tance a across cross s streets treets and between Least Exposure. Exposure. The s buildings should be used and smoke from hand grenades can be used to conceal movement. movement. The cover prov provided ided by walls sh should ould be exploited for as long as possible. possible. By doing so, th the e individual will reduc reduce e the evidence of his intentions and the time that he is exposed to enemy fire.

(3)

be e provided. Fire Support Support.. Direct covering fire support is or can b

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FIRE TEAM MOVEMENT  MOVEMENT  18. Moving as a fire te team, am, from b building uilding to b building, uilding, is the best method of tactical movement. The fire team must ensure that every room is clear of enemy and should use the protection of the bu buildings ildings as cover for a as s long a as s possible. Fire team m movement ovement between buildings buildings must be covered by fire, p preferably referably by another fire team. Bunching should be avoided to minimize the effect of automatic weapons and booby-traps. Movement can be made at street street level or by using roofs and underground sys systems. tems. The hreat of an effective counter-attack will be most real immediately after the successful capture of a building.  building.  

Fig C-9 C-9-10 -10 Fire Tea Team m Movement

Fig C-9 C-9-11 -11 Sold Soldier ier Firi ng fr from om a Covered Position

19. When moving from position to position, each soldier must ensure that he does not mask his supporting supporting fire. When he reac reaches hes the next pos position, ition, he should be prepared to cover the movement of other other members of his fire team or section. The most common error a soldier can make is to fire over the top of his cover and silhouette himself against the wall or building to his rear, and p provide rovide the enem enemy y with a clea clearr target. The best tech technique nique for firing from a covered position is to fire around the side of the cover, and reduce his exposure to the enemy. SECTION 3 - ENTRY TECHNIQUES GENERAL 20. This section describes the tactics, techniques and procedures employed to gain entry to a building, and to create create and successfully exploit exploit a breach. An exploitable breach is one through which armed and equipped soldiers can move quickly, without hindrance and able to use their personal weapons as they move. 21.

Gaining entry to buildings or other structures will be necessary in war to engage and

destroy the enemy. enemy. In certain operations, it may be nece necessary ssary to gain e entry ntry to enable the arrest of wanted individuals individuals and the se search arch of the premises. In both cases, a breach to assist or enable the entry to a building can be made manually or by using explosives. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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22. In conventional operations, breaches can be made using windows or doors, or using large calibre direct or indirect fire weapons 5. During strike (arrest and search) o operations, perations, the surprise and momentum of the assault will be enhanced by the shock of the assault and the rapid exploitation of the breach. CONVENTION CONVE NTIONAL AL ASSAUL ASSAULT T

Fig C-9 C-9-1 -12 2 Tra Traini ini ng on a B omb Site, Lond on Dock lands, 194 1942 2

SECTION 4 – ENTRY TECHNIQUES 23. building uilding from top down is th the e pre preferred ferred me method. thod. To Top Down Entry. Entry . Clearing a b get into a position to create such a breach, walls should be scaled and use can be made of ladders and grappling hooks to gain entry. Consideration can be given to the use of vehicles, abseiling and mechanical lifts to assist entry and casualty evacuation.

Fig CC-99-13 13 Assault ing a Buil din g Using Ladders

Fig CC-99-14 14 Using Grappling Hooks

5

 Tank fire, direct fire artillery, ASM (Anti-Structure Munitions), air or ground launched PGM (Precision Guided Munitions).

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24. Top-down entry may not be feasible or realistic, for Entry at Lower Levels. Levels . instance when the building's upper storeys are either too high or exposed to enemy fire. When entering at ground or lower levels from fr om a stand-off position, the point of entry must be clearly identified and known by ev every ery member of the assaulting section section.. The approach of the assaulting section and its reinforcements to the building should be covered by smoke and small arms fire.

Fig C-9-1 C-9-15 5 Soldiers fro m 40 Commando RM Ga Gaini ini ng A ccess, Af ghanist an 20 2007 07 25. Exploitation.. Exploitation should be noted:

The breach must be exploited quickly.

The following two points

a. The Entrance. Entrance. In conventional assaults, entry should be avoided through windows and doors doors that can be booby-trapped and covered by ene enemy my fire. Rapid entry through the breach will maximise the effects of the blast, concussion and the shock of the unexpected direction of the as assault. sault. Nevertheless, on reaching the point of entry, the assaulting section should be prepared to enlarge the entry point. When the only entry to a building is through a window or door, supporting fire, including the use of grenade launchers, should be directed at it immediately prior to its breach. b. Grenades.. Grenades should be used to clear the first room and reinforce Grenades the kinetic effect of the breach.  breach. 

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Fig C-9-16 Building Floor Exploitation CREATION AND EXPLOITATION OF OF A B REACH 26. Whether or not the breach will be made manually or using explosives, the breaching party must assemble (stack) as close as possible to the entry point to be able to exploit the breach immediately. immediately. The command commander er should co confirm nfirm the positions of the assau assault lt team, stacking left or right of the entry point. 27. Whether making a manual or explosive breach to a building, the commander’s preentry point recce must: a.

Clearly identify the entry point.

b.

Confirm the position of the assault team.

c.

Identify the cover available to the assault team.

d.

Confirm what is on the other side of the entry point.

e.

Know the floor plan behind the entry point.

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Fig C-9-1 C-9-17 7 An Exploit able Breach 26.

27.

The planning for an explosive breach must include the following: a.

Actions in the event that the breach is compromised.

b.

Actions in the event that the breach is not possible.

c.

The size and shape of the charge to be used and the charge preparation.

d.

The safe stacking distance.

e.

The identification of an alternate or reserve breach.

The following factors should be considered when planning to exploit a breach. a. Previous explosive breaches should be avoided as they are likely to be mined or booby-trapped. b. Corners of rooms should similarly be avoided as fire positions for the same reason. c. To suppress defenders when entering a room, a series of rapid shots should be fired at all identified targets and likely e enemy nemy positions. This is mo more re effective than long bursts or spraying the room with automatic fire. d. When targets reveal themselves in buildings, the most effective engagement is the quick-fire technique with the weapon up and both eyes open.

e. Within built-up areas, burning debris, reduced ambient light, shadows and smoke all limit the effect of night vis vision ion and sigh sighting ting devices. The use of a aiming iming stakes in the defence and of the pointing technique in the attack, both using bursts, Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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are night firing skills required of all infantrymen. A soldier using H Head ead Mounted Nigh Nightt Vision System (HMNVS) should be paired with a soldier not wearing HMNVS. f. Shields should only be used where there is sufficient room to enable unimpeded access. access. A shield man should be the first to ente enterr the bu building. ilding. In spite o off 6 the weight of the shield   the shield man must carry his full complement of fighting equipment to allow him to be fully integrated into the team should the shield need to be passed to another tea team m member. The shield man’s persona personall weapon will be slung and his pistol employed to deal with any threat unless he sees fit to use his rifle. g. Exploiting the shock effect of the assault to its best effect, the assault team should move into the first room at the same moment on either side of the shield.  Assaulting troops must be able to use their weapons to engage the enemy whilst on the move, and training must reflect this requirement. h. Ideally every member of the assault group should carry a pistol as his secondary weapon. weapon. Strapped to his leg, e each ach man must be trained to draw and u use se his pistol in case of a stoppage on his primary personal weapon. THE MANUAL MANUAL BREACH BREACH  

Fig C-9-18 C-9-18 Crea Creati ting ng a Ma Manual nual Br Breach each   28. Breaching a Door . When planning a manual breach through a door, consideration should be given to the following:   The door itself: o   The purpose, type, height and thickness of the door. o   Inward or outward opening.

•

o

  Left or right action.

o

6

  The presence of glass panels.

 Type 4 shield will provide protection from 7.62mm rounds at very short range.

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  Whether the door is barricaded.   The door frame.   The hinges.   The locks. o

• • •

29. variety ariety Manual Methods of Entry. Entry . Manual methods of entry can be made using a v of tools and equipment, including the following:            

• • •

•

• •

By shoulder, hand or boot. Sledge hammer. Enforcer 7. Halligan Tool8. Thermal Cutters. Hydraulic Ram.

 ASSAULT  ASSA ULT B REACHING USING EXPLOSIVES 29. Explosive breaching charges can be applied to walls, doors and windows to facilitate entry to buildings. The components, c construction onstruction and effect of th the e individual charges can be found in Military Engineering Volume II, Field Engineering, Pamphlet No 4, Demolitions (Army Code 71670). 30. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by suitably qualified RE or assault pioneers with access to the appropriate material and with the competence to construct the necessary charge. charge. The RE or assault pione pioneer er Explosive Me Methods thods of Entry (EMOE) team should be used to lay and prepare prepare the charge for the breaching team team in a house assault. In order to create an exploitable breach, it is critical that: a. As much of the shock and blast as possible should be used to apply the maximum directed force to the explosion. b.

A number of charges should be distributed over the required area.

c.

The individual charges must be initiated simultaneously.

SAFETY 31. surfaces, es, such as walls immediately in General Safety Considerations. Considerations . Reflecting surfac the vicinity or opposite, can cons considerably iderably increase harmful blast overpressure. RE or assault pioneer advice on safety distances must always be sought. 32. The net explosive quantity (NEQ) of the charge should be Correct Charge. Charge. adequate to defe defeat at the target. Catastrophic structural failure caused by excessive explosive charge might cause blast or other injury to the assaulting troops and hinder successful exploitation9.

7

 The Enforcer is a one man operated battering ram commonly used by police.  The Halligan Tool is a forcible entry combined lever and cutting edge commonly used by firefighters. 9  “You’re only supposed to blow the bloody doors off!”, Michael Caine, The Italian Job, 1969.

8

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Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps

Reflecting Surfaces & Blast Traps

 

`

 

Fig C-9-1 C-9-19 9 Re Reflecti flecti ng Surfaces and Blast Traps Traps   33. distances s will vary according to the NEQ o off the ch charge arge Safety Distances. Distances . Safety distance and the presence presence of oppos opposite ite and adjacen adjacentt blast reflecting s surfaces. urfaces. The minimum ‘s ‘safe afe 10 stacking’ distances for small and medium sized breaching charges in th e ope open n  are : Ser Ser (a) 1

Ch Char arge ge NE NEQ Q (g) (g) (b) 125

Sa Safe fe Di Dist stan ance ce (m (m)) (c) 5

2 3 4 5 6 7

250 500 750 1000 1500 2000

6 7 8 9 10 11

34. off explosive brea breaching ching charges reinforces reinforces surprise, shock shock Charge Effect. Effect . The use o and aggression. Consideration sh should ould be given by the commander to the blast and shock shock effects of the charge on non-combatants, for instance during urban strike operations. TERMINOLOGY 35. describes s the effect of the explosive device against the wall or Coupling.. Coupling describe Coupling aperture so that the force of the blast is direc directed ted through a and nd not parallel to the wall. As much of the blast as possible should ‘couple’ with the target to apply the highest peak shock load (‘punch’) and the highest and longest duration impulse (‘push’). 36. the e sa same me d device evice must be d detonated etonated (“initiated”) Initiation.. Breaching charges on th Initiation simultaneously. This will ensure that the peak shock ag against ainst the target is maximis maximised, ed, undetonated charges are not decoupled and colliding shock waves from individual charges do not interfere with each other. 37. implies s packing the charge with water or other Tamping.. Tamping a charge implie Tamping materials to enhance the effectiveness effectiveness of the ex explosive. plosive. Increasing the amoun amountt of tamping material decreases the amount of uncoupled blast and increases the effectiveness of the charge.   charge.

10

 D/DGD&D/18/27/167 Military Engineering Volume Volume II, Field Engineering. Army Code 71670.

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BREACHING CHARGES CHA RGES 38. Explosive breaching devices must be prepared by the R RE E or assault pioneers and should be used to lay and prepare the charge for the breaching team in a house assault. a.

Breaching charges using in-service explosive stores.

Charges using in-

service explosive stores  stores include: include:   (1) Standard Frame Charge using ‘Charge Demolition Cutting’ 11. A standard frame charge is a squared-off, hollow “D “D”” with five sides. sides. For ease of carriage a hinged carrier frame is usually constructed, although a one-piece frame can be used. Charge Demolition Cutting (CDLC), commonly know known n as ‘Blade’, is a robust, exceptionally flexible and explosive-efficient family of linear shaped charge, designed to cut a wide range of engineering and building materials. Blade is manu manufactured factured in various sizes specified by weight of explosives per metre, metre, 63 g/m, 100 g/m, 24 240g/m, 0g/m, 450g/m and 1150 1150g/m. g/m. The performance characteristics of CDLC (‘Blade’) are detailed in Table 1. Ser Nature g/m 1 2 3 4 5

63 100 250 450 1150

Max Cutting thickness (mm) Ste tee el

Alumini inium

3 6 10 15 30

10 20 35 45 150

Wo Woo od (Oak) 30 40 70 100 200

Laminated Glass 10 10 26 -

Table 1 – CDC CDCL L (‘B (‘Blade’) lade’) Perfo Perform rmance ance

Fig C-9-20 Standard Frame Charge wit h CDLC ((‘Bl ‘Bl ade’)

The Effect

11

 Commonly known as ‘Blade’.

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(2) Gatecrasher 12  is a specialist breaching system, ‘Gatecrasher’.. ‘Gatecrasher’ consisting of pre-moulde pre-moulded d plastic forms utilising water tamping. It consists essentially of a plastic frame to which plastic explosive (PE) or detonating cord is moulded into the recesses (depending on target thickness) and then water is added to the tanks of the moulds to act as tamping. The effectiveness of the explosive is enormously enhanced by heavy tamping using water in an integral compartment.

Fig C-9-21 Gatecrasher (3) ‘Gatecrasher’ Modular 1. 1. Modular Gatecrasher is employed in a similar manner to the original Gatecrasher but the pre moulded plastic form is replaced by a flexible plastic sleeve. It consists of a plastic sleev sleeve e with a series of containers which are loaded with explosive and filled with water. The charge may then then be rolled up and trans transported. ported. To deploy the cha charge, rge, it is unrolled and placed against the target.

Fig C-9-22 Modular Gatecrasher

12

 Gatecrasher is used predominately by US forces.

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(4) Bangalore Torpedo. Torpedo . The latest Bangalore torpedo was introduced into service in 2009. Owing to the torpedo’s low NEQ a and nd the secondary secondary fragmentation hazard of the steel body, the Bangalore torpedo should be only be used as a breaching charge if nothing else is available. b.

include:   Improvised Breaching Charges Charges.. Improvised charges include: (1) Basic Improvised Cruciform Cha Charge rge.. Constructed from a simple “X”, the cruciform charge, made of poles no longer than 750mm long, comprises four plastic explosive (PE) charges at the extremities and a centrally placed ‘kicking charge. The charge is propped against the target. The performance of the cruciform charge is unpredictable. unpredictable. The dimensions of each c charge harge tend to be small and may not produce an exploitable breach.

Fig C-9-23 Basic Improvis Impr ovis ed C Cruci ruci for m Charge - Fa Failed iled Br Brea each ch du e to Poor Charge Size and Distribution (2) Improvised Frame Charge. Charge. The improvised frame charge has a softwood frame that is loaded with detonating cord in the manner of a squared-off figure of eight, or can be loaded with sheet explosive with plastic explosive charges charges tape taped d on. The improvised frame charge offers superior performance over improvised cruciform charges.

Fig C-9-24 Improvised Frame Charge

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(3) The fracture sheet charge can be Fracture Sheet Charge. Charge. constructed from a lightweight plastic sheet fitted with pockets into which charges are loaded loaded.. To be effective, fracture sheet ch charges arges must make intimate contact with the target over their entire surface, usually achieved by using ‘Hydrogel’ ‘Hydrogel’ or p purpose-made urpose-made B Breacher’s reacher’s Tape. Tape. Due to the difficulty in achieving charge-to-target adhesion, fracture sheet charges tend to be used as secondary or reserve charges.

Fig C-9-2 C-9-25 5 Fractu re Sheet Charge

The Effect

(4) Charges Using Inert Charge Container Systems. Systems . Inert charge container systems are plastic or metal containers intended for other applications, packed packed with explosives by the user. This example shows a plastic mortar round container containing caving explosive, PE and detonating cord. Such dedev dedevices ices are very powerful, simple to construct, robust, easily portable and can be propped or hung against the target.

Fig C-9-2 C-9-26 6 Cha Charges rges Using Inert Charge Container Systems

(5) charges can be mad made e by preparing Improvised Slab Charges. Charges . Slab charges two plywood or rigid plastic frames approximately 250mm x 350mm and taping three PE slabs on to each one. Issue 4.0: Oct 09

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(6) Barmine Slab Charges. Charges . Barmines have been used extensively on recent operations operations for breachin breaching. g. To utilise a barmine for E EMOE MOE the fuse is removed and either the full or half of the explosive quantity is used as a charge to conduct conduct a breach. A half barmine has a NEQ of approx approximately imately 4kg.

Fig C-9-27 Barmine Slab Charges SECTION SECTI ON 5 - CL EARING BUIL BUILDINGS DINGS   PLATOON PLA TOON ORG ORGANISATION ANISATION   39. The basic manoeuvre unit for a building clearance is the platoon. should be organised as follows:

The platoon

a. command ommand group includes the pla platoon toon co commander mmander Command Group. Group . The c who is to co-ordinate the support to the assa assaulting ulting fire-teams or sections. He should give a clear ach achievable ievable mis mission sion to the assau assaulting lting section commanders. The command group should be a tactical bound behind the assaulting section and should not become involved involved unless critica criticall to the success of their mission. This is a matter of judgement and the platoon commander must decide the best position from which to co-ordinate the support to the assaulting section. b. aside sault section building andcommander clears it. The  Asshould sau lt Sect io n . The section maintain twoassault identical ntical fire assaults teams. the The section is responsible for the clearance clearance of the building. The section 2IC should simultaneou simultaneously sly identify likely enemy enemy counter attac attack k options. The section commander de decides cides if his section has has the combat po power wer to successfully complete h his is mission. If more manpower is required, another fire team should be allocated. He should n not ot hand over command until he has achieved his mission. If more than on one e additional fire team is required the the platoon comman commander der needs to reas reassess sess the situation. Once the mission is achieved the section commander is to be ready to provide a secure base to launch the next next section into the ass assault. ault. If necessary they will provide fire support to the next next assaulting se section ction until the ec echelon helon section takes over. The assaulting section then becomes the reserve. e.

manoeuvre oeuvre s support upport sec section tion provide provides s fire Manoeuvre Support Section Section.. The man

support to the assaulting section throughout. This must include d depth epth positions and they should avoid becomin becoming g totally focused on the building being cleared. They should be in the best position to support the assaulting section and not necessarily in

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the building next to them. They should b be e prepared to mo move ve at any time during the assault. d. Echelon Section. Section . The echelon section is the next assaulting section. They should be ready ready to move at a allll times. The echelon section should b be e prepared to provide an additional fire team to the assaulting section if required. e. Reserve Section. Section . The reserve section may be tasked to assist the platoon sergeant with ammunition re-supply or casualty evacuation. CLEARANCE DRILLS 40. Ideally, each assault group should comprise at least four men. The basic procedure to support this is as follows: a.

assault. ult. Cover Group Group.. The cover group deploys to support to the assa

b.

First Assault Group. Group . The first as assault sault group effects entry in into to building.

c. . As the section com commander mander of the second nd assa assault ult Second Group group enters theAssault building,Group. the commander of the first assault group (byseco shouting) tells him what has been found in the room, for instance room clear, door leading to cellars, manhole in ceiling. ceiling. This allows the sec section tion commander to carry out a quick appreciation and decide the next logical room to be cleared by the second assault group. ROOM CLEARANCE  CLEARANCE  41. Once the section commander has decided the next room to be cleared, he indicates it to the next ass assault ault group. Blast shields should us used ed if a available. vailable. The ne next xt sequen sequence ce of action is: a.

The assault group leader will nominate who is to open/break down doors,

hatches, windows, windows, post grena grenades des and b be e the first to enter the room room.. The assault group post a grenade in the room and enter immediately after it has exploded, shooting into cupboards cupboards and likely hiding places. Automatic fire should no nott be used unless required, as most modern houses are constructed of concrete which will cause ricochets and and in turn may cau cause se friendly casualties. If furniture is in the room the assault group should check behind to ensure it is not concealing an enemy mousehole. b. Once the room is clear, the assault group should cover any vulnerable points such as doors, mouse mouseholes holes and windows. At the sa same me time, the assault group leader is to ensure an exit point is nominated in case of an enemy grenade and report room clear. c.

At this stage, the section commander and the next assault group move into

the cleared room. room. The link man will be left behind to pass on all information to the remainder of the section/p section/platoon, latoon, and mark the entry point. Once in the cleared room, the section commander will once again decide the next logical room to be

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cleared and task the the next assault group to continue the clearan clearance. ce. This procedure will be continued until the whole house has been cleared. d. Each room has to be completely cleared and secured before moving into the next room; likewise each floor be before fore moving on to the next. If rooms do ha have ve vulnerable points then soldiers have to be left behind to secure that room to prevent an enemy counter attack. CLEARING A STAIRWAY STAIRWAY   42. When mounting stairs movement should be covered by fire and be swift. If possible a tank machine gun or LMG should fire into the upper storey before the stairs are rushed. In passages troops troops should keep to the sides and take c cover over in doorways. Blast shields should be used used if available. The drill to follow is as follows:

Fig C-9-28 C-9-28 Clearin Clearing g a Stairw ay Note Use Use of Shield by Front Soldier a. A single assault group is chosen by the section commander to carry out the clearance of the stairway. b.

Two soldiers move to the base of the stairs.

c. The first soldier throws a grenade up to the next hallway. After it has detonated, he should should be prepared to assault the stairs, firing if nec necessary. essary. He should position himself at the top of the stairs away from the wall in order to enable the next member of the group to pass through without crossing in front of his line of sight. d. Either the first assault group continues the clearance, or, the second assault group can be called forward to cle clear ar the next flight of stairs. The same drill is u used sed

until the whole of the stairs are are clear. The same drill sho should uld be used if clearing the stairs downwards.

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FIGHTING FLOOR TO FLOOR VIA MOUSEHOLES MOUSEHOLES   43. At some stage during the clearance it may be necessary to use vertical mouseholes to continue the clearance of the building. The following drill is carried ou outt when fighting from floor to floor, via vertical mouseholes: a. The section commander decides to use a vertical mouse hole as an entry point to the next floor. b. The assault group chosen by the section commander drops, or throws, a grenade through the mousehole into the next room. c. After the grenade has detonated the assault group drops, or climbs up into the room firing into likely hiding places and furniture. The assault group reports room clear. d. The section commander and second assault group then enter the room via the mousehole, from this point normal room clearance drills are followed. OTHER FACTORS IN HOUSE CLEARANCE  CLEARANCE  44. should ould avoid bunching in one room or stairwell for too long. Crowding.. The sections sh Crowding This is because a single grenade or contact could caus cause e numerous cas casualties. ualties. Once a room has been secured the assaulting sections should spread out as quickly as possible. 45. suitable le cover when moving moving through Use of Cover . Individual soldiers should select suitab the building. They should k keep eep to the walls and avoid window windows, s, doors, floor and c ceiling eiling openings. They have to realise it is their res responsibility ponsibility to selec selectt the cover, not the section commander’s. 46. beware are of bo booby oby traps. If found the they y have to be left alone for Booby Traps. Traps . Always bew specialist attention. The exact location o off the device should be marked and at the poin pointt of entry a blue flag or blue marker should be displayed to indicated the requirement for engineer assistance assistance and to act as a warning that a booby booby trap is in that ho house. use. All other members of the section/platoon need to be warned of the presence of booby traps. 47. can n be a Use of Grenades. Grenades . Care must be taken when using grenades as they ca double edged weapon. weapon. If subject to grenade attack from the ene enemy, my, the immediate action should be to move out or to take take immediate cover by lying flat on the the floor. This is because the majority of the blast and fragmentation is directed upwa upwards rds and outwards. When clearing a house use dummy dummy grenades whene whenever ver possible. Live grenades shou should ld only be thrown when enemy are known known to be in the room. If live grenades are used in eve every ry room, the house would soon be weakened and clearance would become impossible due to dust and rubble. Distraction (flash-bang) grenades shou should ld be used in the case of rooms known to be occupied by civilians. civilians. The use of HE grenade grenades s increases the risk of fratricide. 48.

include clude the us use e of automatic  Au t om ati c Fir e. The drill for assaulting a room may in

fire. Most modern hou houses ses have con concrete crete floors, walls and even ceilings an and d these may cause rounds to ricochet and cause fratricide. fratricide. Similarly if automatic fire is used throughout throughout the house, ammunition expenditure would be high and increase the demand for resupply.

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Ideally, most shooting inside a house should be instinctive single shots which will be far more accurate. Conversely, some houses have ve very ry thin internal walls, shots will pe penetrate netrate these walls and could again again cause fratricide. Pistols can be used where p possible. ossible. 49. needs ds to be com completely pletely cleared and secured before moving moving Clearance. Each room nee Clearance. on to the next room, room, likewise each floor b before efore moving on to the next. If rooms do have vulnerable points then soldiers should be left behind to secure them to prevent an enemy counterattack. 50. combat, at, there will be a need to mark buildings buildings.. The Marking of Buildings. Buildings . During comb This is to show which buildings have been cleared, the location of entry points, the FLOT, the location of casualties and booby traps. Below is the NATO colour c coded oded marking system: a.

Red

-

Forward line of own troops (facing forward). Entry point, building not clear (at entry point).

b.

Yellow

-

Casualty in building, CASEVAC required.

c. d.

Green Blue

-

Entry point/building clear. Engineers required, Booby Traps/obstacle in building.

51. Entering Ente ring a Frie Friendly ndly Held Buil ding ding.. Movement through a building via mouseholes, stairs and doors will be continuous after the attack; ideally the safe route through the building should be marked. Troops passing from room to room known to be in friendly hands should call out "COMING THROUGH" before entering as identification. 52. assistance istance to gain entry into a Difficult Points of Entry. Entry . If the assault group require ass difficult entry point, an additional soldier from the team that has just cleared the last room may be used. used. The drills remain the same. 53.

Enhanced Blast Weapons. Weapons .

If the enemy has an effective EBW capability,

commanders should should weigh the risk of occupying bu buildings ildings against any benefit ga gained. ined. If buildings are to be occupied, the risk may be partially mitigated by minimising the number of soldiers in any individual room or volume of space likely to be affected. REORGANISATION  REORGANISATION  54. Immediately the house/building has been cleared the section commander should start to reorganise. This should b be e done quickly in order to be rea ready dy for any possible possible counter attack. Reorganisation drills a are: re: a.

The section commander should: (1)

Immediately prepare the defence of the building.

(2) Allocate fire tasks to each rifleman, LMG, NLAW and any other section weapon.

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(3) Check on casualties and ammunition, then report to the platoon sergeant.

b.

(4)

Arrange for redistribution of ammunition.

(5)

Deal with PWs and captured equipment.

Fire Support elements should: (1)

Rejoin the remainder of the section as quickly as possible.

(2) Check LMGs, NLAWs and any other platoon weapons are positioned in the best location to provide fire support for counter-attack, the next phase and for surprise enemy locations. c.

Riflemen should: (1)

Check weapons and equipment.

(2)

Check ammunition and prepare grenades.

(3)

Recharge magazines.

55. In principle, the section commander is responsible for the operational reorganisation of the section, arcs, position etc, while the section 2IC deals with the administrative reorganisation (ammunition and casualties). Casualties should be dealt with and evacua evacuated ted as quickly as possible once the whole objective has been cleared. WEBBING AND EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT   60. Webbing and equipment should be kept to a minimum. If webbing and equipment is carried, it should be assembled to allow for quick release to improve entry. SECTION 6 - DEFENDED LOCALITIES GENERAL 61. A defended locality consists of a number of strong points sited in depth. They must have good communications, all-round defence and be able to provide mutual support. Counter attack plans should include providing a local reserve force. The decision as to which buildings should should be used is made by the local commander commander with engineer advice. advice. The selection has to be a trade-off between the tactical and engineer requirements. STRONG POINT  POINT  62. A strong point must not be restricted to on one e b building uilding which can be isolated, and cannot be defended without mutually supporting fire. Robust communications communications to other

strong points and headq headquarters uarters are es essential. sential. Defensive stre strength ngth can be achieved by grouping strong points around an intersection, with fire positions in two or three different buildings providing interlocking and mutually supporting fire. Strong points may be of at

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least platoon strength and should include combined arms assets and direct and indirect fire support. BUILDING REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS   63.

In principle, strong points that include a number of buildings improve the defender's

chances of survival. survival. Choices between flats and single storey hou houses ses should be made with survivability and defensive defensive principles in mind. Consideration must b be e given to a. not ot easy to compare the attributes of buildings Identifying Buildings. Buildings . It is n from the ground. To determine the suitability of a building, it is helpful first to determine what the building is used for because this will usually give a good guide as to which are the strongest. Examples a are: re: (1) Department stores used by the public will have fairly strong floors and the fire risk is usually low. (2) Office blocks with large windows are usually built with a strong frame but have weak walls. (3) Apartment blocks can be deceptive and it is best to take engineer advice as to their strength and weakness. b. insufficient fficient spac space e for troops w who ho Small Buildings. Buildings . Some buildings afford insu must occupy them, and thu thus s concentrate th them. em. A single direct h hit, it, on the buildin building g may destroy the whole group. c. buildings uildings m may ay force the de defender fender to spread his Large Buildings. Buildings . Large b defences too thinly in terms of both manpower and resources. TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 64.

Fields of Fire. Fire. There will always always be some areas of groun ground d around a building into

which the defenders will be unable to fire. These will often be clo close se to the building itself and in the conce concealed aled volume volumes s formed by adjacen adjacentt buildings. The attacke attackerr must be prevented from reaching reaching these areas of dead ground. The use of dan dannert nert wire is probab probably ly the best method. The employm employment ent of all obstacles an and d their cov cover er by direc directt or indirect fire must be an integral part of the defensive plan. 65. access ss to blocks of flats or multi-storey c car ar parks Dominating Buildings. Buildings . Denial of acce to the attackers can be accomplished by mines, booby-traps, wire or obstacles. 66. locations ations allow free freedom dom of Covered Routes. Routes . Covered routes to and from defended loc movement of own troops for casualty evacuation, reinforce reinforcement ment and resupply. Routes should provide both cover cover from view and fire. Such routes shou should ld be improved during the preparation of the defensive position.

67. sited d to engage the External Fire Positions. Positions . External fire positions should be site enemy at up to the maximum effective range o off the weapons used. Arcs should overlap

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and each position should be mutually supporting. Fire positions and withdrawal routes should have overhead cover where possible. SECTION SECT ION 7 - NAVIGATION IN BUIL BUILT T UP AREAS AREAS   GENERAL 68. Navigation in built-up areas presents a unique challenge. In the centre of a city, the normal terrain features depicted on maps may not apply - buildings become the major terrain features and units become become tied to streets. Whilst always trying to m minimise inimise collateral damage, fighting in the city destroys destroys buildings who whose se rubble blocks streets. Street and road signs are destroyed during the fighting if they are not removed by the defenders. Operations in subways and sewers presen presentt other unique challenges. However, maps and photographs are av available ailable to help the unit overcome these p problems. roblems. The G Global lobal Positioning System (GPS) can aid navigation in built-up areas, although its performance may be downgraded. MISSION SPECIFIC MAPPING  MAPPING  69. The and scalesize of of a the citycity, map can vary fromand 1:2 1:2,500 ,500 to 1 1:50,000, :50,000, depending on The the importance density of detail, intelligence information available. mission specific military map can be a topographical map or an image map of a city that is usually at a large scale (1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:12,500 are common), delineating streets and showing street names, important buildings, and other urban elements a. Mission specific map products, prepared by supporting geospatial engineers, can assist navigation navigation in built-up areas. Usually put together using the latest imagery available, these maps have been designed or modified to give information not covered on a standard map, which includes attribution of road and bridge networks, railways, built-up areas, areas, and ess essential ential services. They can be used to supplement military city maps and topographical maps. b.

Once in the built-up area, soldiers should use street intersections as reference

points much as hills and streams in rural terrain. Again special mapping produc products ts can supplement or replace topographic maps as the basis of navigation and are often called “Spot Maps” due to them having coloured routes and numbered spots providing those reference points. These maps enable units to better articulate the their ir position and movement improving command and control, particularly in areas with destroyed buildings and blocked routes. c. The techniques of compass reading and pace counting can still be used, especially in a blacked-out city where street signs and buildings may not be present. The presence of steel and iron in this environment may cause inaccurate compass readings. Sewers hav have e to b be e navigated in much the same way. Maps prov providing iding the basic layout of the sewer system are normally maintained by the civil authorities. This information includes the sewer lines and distances between manhole covers.

 Along basicthrough compass an d pace count techniques, such information information could enable troops with to move cityand sewers.

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d. Operating in a built-up area can adversely affect the performance of electronic devices such such as GPS a and nd data distribution systems. These systems function in a similar way to communic communications ations equipme equipment nt by line-o line-of-sight. f-sight. They cann cannot ot determine underground locations or positions within a building. Such sys systems tems shou should ld be employed on the tops of buildings, in open areas, and down streets where obstacles will not affect line-of-sight readings.   AERIA L PHOTOGRA PHOTOGRAPHY PHY   70. Aerial photography can supplement military city maps and is an excellent aid to detailed planning, by virtue of its currency. SECTION SECT ION 8 - CASUAL TY EVACUATION  EVACUATION  GENERAL   GENERAL 71. Experience has shown that the number of casualties in urban combat is likely to be high. Every effort should be mad made e to evacuate cas casualties ualties as quickly as possible, possible, although casualty evacuation evacuation will be difficult and will consume manpower. manpower. Suitable drills need to be practised levels. Every levels. soldier has how to and giveeffective first aidCASEVAC and assistplan in the evacuationatofall casualties, and there must betoa know co-ordinated at all levels of command. CASEVAC AT PLATOON LEVEL LEVEL   72. There a are re three stages to casu casualty alty evac evacuation uation as follows: a. the e imm immediate ediate protection of the Stage One - Extraction. Extraction . Stage one is th casualties and their extraction extraction out of the contact area. A robust and rapid approach approach towards CASEVAC CASEVAC is ne needed, eded, espec especially ially if there are multiple casualties. Anyone able to walk should be ordered back through the safest line of communication, to enable medics and available manpower to concentrate on more serious casualties.  At this stage it is likely to take at least two men to extract a serious. When in contact, the best method is to drag the casualty by the shoulders of the body armour. Due to the bulky and cumbersome nature of personal equipment, some of it may have to be removed by cutting webbing straps to ease extraction, especially through confined spaces such as mouseholes. b. Stage 2 - Treatment. Treatment . Once casualties have been extracted from the immediate contact contact area, life s saving aving first aid can be administered. Vital equipment such as radios, maps and weapons should be recovered from the casualties and if possible returned to the fighting force. Whilst first aid is being a administered, dministered, preparation for the move move back sho should uld start. Stretchers need to be prepared an and d the triage state should should be reported reported as soo soon n as pos possible. sible. A light-weight stretcher will need four men men to carry the casualty. Consideration sh should ould be giv given en to the u use se of reserve platoons platoons to d deal eal with this stage of e evacuation. vacuation. Friendly dea dead d must be

covered up, kept separate from the other casualties and prepared for evacuation. c. Stage Three - Evacuation. Evacuation . Stage three involves the movement of the casualties to a Helicopter landing Sight (HLS) or a Casualty Exchange Point (CEP).

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The sub-unit sergeant major must ensure that the RMO is waiting to receive and treat the casualties casualties at the CEP. The transfer of casualties to the C CEP EP may b be e physically challenging and involve moving them down stairs, over obstacles and open ground, through mouseholes and over ditches in order to provide cover from enemy fire. Good co communication mmunication is vital. vital.   MARKING CASUALTIES CASUALTIES   73. Casualties that cannot be evacuated must be marked. Using the standard NATO marking system, a yellow marker should be positioned at the point of entry to indicate a casualty in a particular building. A casualty in th the e open should should be moved u under nder cover for protection and his position indicated. If necessary this should be done by sticking a weapon into the ground, ground, bayonet first. The helmet sho should uld remain on the casualty. STRETCHER IMPROVISATION  IMPROVISATION  74. Improvisation may be necessary to provide a stretcher. An improvised stretcher should be strong, light light and narrow with some form o off handles or grips. The following items might be considered for use: a.

Doors/tables/gates.

b.

Ladders.

c.

Bedding/carpets.

d.

Furniture, ie chairs/bed frames.

e.

Poncho, IPE, combat jackets.

f.

Cables/ropes.

CASUALTY PROCEDURES PROCEDURES   75. personall equipmen equipment, t, including rifle and helmet, Redistribution of Equipment. Equipment . All persona should travel with the casualty casualty to the CAP. The following equipment s should hould be considere considered d for redistribution: a.

Radios.

b.

Medical supplies.

c.

Platoon weapons such as LMGs or NLAWs.

c.

Ammunition and explosives.

d. Maps. 76. Movement . When moving casualties ba back ck to the CAP, the c casualty asualty evac evacuation uation party must avoid avoid exposing themselves o orr the casua casualty lty to enemy fire or dange danger. r. The

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following should be considered: a. Movement of an unwieldy stretcher weighed down by a casualty is extremely difficult within a building. building. Progress will be hampered by n narrow arrow corridors, doorways, doorways, mouseholes, stairs, rubble, other troops, resupply parties, reinforcements, resting sections and and reserves reserves.. Movement s should hould be controlled and organised so that normal triage can take place. b. Movement between buildings is again hazardous and difficult. Use must be made of any any cover, such as walls, dead ground and smoke. If under conta contact, ct, covering fire from a section must cov cover er any movement. Movement shou should ld be made along existing safe routes. c. If secured, underground systems can be used as safe routes for evacuation of casualties. Movement may b be e restricted by the confined space of some tunnels, but it may be the t he quickest, safest and least congested option. d. Whenever possible, vehicles (particularly armoured vehicles) should be used for casualty evacuation. e. In a defensive position the priority for the use of safe lanes for casualty evacuation should should be covered in orders. Use of safe lanes will need to be c controlled ontrolled in order to allow for the movement of reinforcements, ammunition re-supply as well as casualty evacuation. 77. company comma commanders nders must ensure that Medical Supplies. Supplies . Section, platoon and company sufficient first aid supplies supplies are carried at e every very level. First field dressings, mo morphine, rphine, crepe bandages and Intravenous (IV) drips should be carried and all ranks must be trained in first aid, self aid and treatment of the most likely l ikely injuries. 78.

Casualties.. Casualties a.

Dead.. All dead bodies, friendly or enemy, Dead enemy, should be p processed, rocessed, including the

redistribution of all weapons and equipmen equipment. t. separately and preferably out of sight.

The bodies should then be placed

b. should ld be giv given en first a aid id and Wounded.. All casualties, enemy or friendly, shou Wounded evacuated. Use can be made of enem enemy y equipment, ammunition and weapons. weapons. SECTION 9 - AMMUNITION RESUPPLY RESUPPLY   79.  Am mu ni ti on Carr iag e. The amount of ammunition and ex explosives plosives expe expended nded in any urban battle is likely to be high. The need for an efficient system of ammu ammunition nition resupply13  is thus vital. The following factors need to be co considered: nsidered: a.

In urban combat each man is likely to require more ammunition than in any

other environme environment. A minimum eight ma magazines gazines pe perr man sh should ould be and issued. Each man should alsont.carry at least of two bandoliers (clipped ammunition) as many 13

 This section should be read in conjunction with the paragraph on Ammunition Resupply on p B-5-48.

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grenades as possible. If possible, ma magazine gazine for magazine ex exchanges changes sh should ould be organised. In add addition ition magazin magazine e cha chargers rgers sh should ould b be e issu issued ed to enable rapid charging. b. Plans must be made for the carriage of extra ammunition. All spare ammunition should be carried individually in a small sack or by sandbags attached by string. If a protracted battle is likely, consideration sho should uld be given to dedicated ammunition carriers with bergens or ammunition boxes stacked on metal frames (for ease of carriage). These will act as either platoon or company company ammunition re reserves. serves. c. Explosive breaching entry charges should be prepared in advance and should be distributed to the assaulting sections sections.. All preparation shou should ld be completed as a part of battle procedu procedure re in the ass assembly embly area. As with any other ammunition natures, explosives must be controlled and resupplied as required. d. The only practical way of achieving a constant and timely resupply of ammunition throughout throughout the battle may be to allocate am ammunition munition parties parties.. These parties should be organised at platoon, company and battle group levels. 80. battle, there is aofn need eed for firefire discipline Fire Discipli Discipli ne ne..ofThroughout unnecessary wastage wastage ammu ammunition. nition.theThe employment automatic should to beprevent s strictly trictly controlled in the urban environment; quick accurate single shots (rapid fire) are normally far more effective. 81. should carry en enough ough ammunition for its initial task. The Resupply 14. Each section should platoon sergeant with the aid of the reserve section section should carry out the resupply task. task. The following points should be considered: a. It is the responsibility of individuals to inform their section 2IC when their ammunition is low. It is the respons responsibility ibility of each sec section tion 2IC to give the platoon sergeant an accurate ammunition state and inform him when the section requires a resupply. b. Any resupply should be along a safe route and, whenever possible, the same route as the assaulting assaulting forces. If this is not po possible, ssible, a separate separate route should be reconnoitred and marked. marked. Possible markings c could ould be a green c coloured oloured symbol or cylume, at the entry point point of each cleared build building. ing. Red and white mine tap tape e can be used to mark the clear and safe route between buildings. c. Extra mousehole and satchel charges should be prepared prior to battle. These should be stored close to the assaulting sections to ensure a quick resupply is possible. d. Ammunition is heavy and bulky and plans must be made for its carriage in the built up area. The use o off stretchers and ladders are an option. Any a ammunition mmunition party must have a group dedicated to t o providing local protection.

14

 This paragraph should be read in conjunction with Part B, Chapter 5, Section 3 ‘Combat Supplies’.

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e. If available, armoured vehicles should be used for ammunition resupply. However, the local area has to be free from the threat of hand held anti-armour weapons out to a minimum range of 400m. f. The supply of ammunition can be linked to the casualty evacuation plan. Stretchers, or vehicles, used for ammunition resupply should be used on the return  journeys for any casualties. g. In defence, carefully planned ammunition dumps can reduce the need for resupply. h. In the assault a reserve pack of ammunition should be prepared in the assembly area. This sho should uld include spare LAWs, mouseholes, satchel charg charges es,,  sacks full of charged magazines magazines and bandoliers bandoliers.. It should be carried by the reserve platoon or ammunition parties ready for quick deployment. SECTION 10 - ISOLATED PERSONNEL IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 82.

General.. General

The urba urban n environ environment ment places significantly differen differentt and potentially far 15

Everything will happ happen en much much unlike fas faster, ter,other and greater demands stress itupon an evader  the consequen consequences cesand of getting wron wrong g will be far .more immed immediate. iate. Furthermore, specific environments such as arctic and jungle, the urban environment covers a wide spectrum of potential evasion locations, from small shanty towns, through areas of heavy rubble, to large high-density modern cities. A standard urban evasio evasion n scenario is thus difficult to define. The nature of urban conflict is such that the risk of isolation is no longer the exclusive premise of the teeth arms, and all personnel should be prepared accordingly. 83. civilians ns ma may y be alerted to the initial location of the Civilians.. Large numbers of civilia Civilians evader, particularly if the isolation event is caused by asymmetric or paramilitary attack close to a densely densely populated area. Once the immedia immediate te danger has passed, the vast vast majority of such personnel personnel move toward an ambush or vehicle crash site. Evaders may be confronted by a crowd crowd whose actions cannot be predicted. predicted. Even members o off the same tribal, ethnic social or religious group may be motivated by a broad mixture of intent, and as such an evader cannot hope to predict their actions. a. assume ssume the wors worstt case should a  As ses sm ent of Int ent . Evaders must a situation arise. Their aim must therefo therefore re be to place a barrier between thems themselves elves and a crowd and thus try to prevent themselves falling into the hands of hostile civilians. Such a barrier may be a physical (eg hard cover) of psych psychological ological (eg the threat of violence). violence). The crowd should perceive the barrier as a risk should should they approach the evader. b. such ch as a Investment Inve stment of Buildi ngs ngs.. Urban evaders should adopt hard cover, su corner in an exterior wall, an entrance to a deserted warehouse or pedestrian underpass, or any appropriate protection. Although every situation will be different, evaders are generally discouraged from entering and taking t aking over houses or occupied

buildings for the following reasons: 15

 See Doctrine Note 06/06 Isolated Personnel in Urban Environments.

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(1)

Occupation of a building may seriously restrict recovery force options.

(2) House owners in many operational theatres are routinely armed and likely to use force to defend their property. (3) It is morally questionable to enter an occupied building while in contact and thus taking the fire fight to the occupants. (4) The investment and defence of an occupied building will often require resources and capability not necessarily available to the evader. c. should uld also be aware that, sho should uld the use of Use of Lethal Force. Force. Evaders sho personnel weapons become necessary, warning shots are only likely to work once.  A crowd should perceive that evaders can and will use lethal force to protect their own lives if it becomes necessary to do so.

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  CHAPTER 10 WEAPON EFFECTS  EFFECTS  ‘First Chechen War, 1994 - Russian Errors: - Significant numbers of Russian soldiers were untrained, did not know or properly understand their weaponry, weaponry, night-vision equipm equipment, ent, armour, etc. Moreover, much of the equipment was in poor condition, and military professionalism was sorely lacking in all ranks. -  Ad hoc units were assembled hastily, and did not train together before they went into combat. Soldiers did no nott understand the effects of the weapo weapons ns the ins insurgents urgents were using against them, in spite of the fact that many of the weapons they were using themselves.’ Russia’s Russ ia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2 1994-2000 000,, Rand SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION  INTRODUCTION  1.

The characteristics and nature of combat in built-up areas affects the choice of

weapon required. Commanders at at all levels sho should uld consider the the following factors when selecting the effect they need: a. Hard, smooth, flat surfaces are characteristic rounds impact perpendicular to these flat surface surfaces. s. round and increases the threat of ricoche ricochets. ts. The glancing blows against hard surfaces means that explosive rounds may not detonate.

of urban targets. Rarely do This reduces the effect of a tendenc tendency y of rounds to strike up to 25% of impact-fused

b. Engagement ranges are close. Studies and historical analyses have shown that only five percent of all targets are more th than an 100 me metres tres away. About 90 percent of all targets are located 50 metres or less less from the identifying so soldier. ldier. Few personnel targets are visible beyond 50 metres and usually occur at 35 metres or less. Minimum arming ranges an and d troop safety from back-blast o orr fragmentation effects should be considered. c. Engagement times are short. The enemy presents only fleeting targets. Enemy-held buildings or structures are normally covered by fire and often cannot be engaged with deliberate, well-aimed shots. d. Depression and elevation limits for some weapons create dead space. Tall buildings form deep deep canyons that are often sa safe fe from indirect fire. Some weapons can fire rounds to ricochet beh behind ind cover and inflict casualties. Accurate targe targett engagement from oblique angles, both horizontal and vertical, demands superior marksmanship skills. e.

Smoke from burning buildings, dust from explosions, shadows from tall

buildings, and the of of light penetrating inner visibility and to increase a lack sense isolation. Added to rooms this is all thecombine maskingtoofreduce fire caused caus ed by rubble and man-made man-made structures. Targets, even those at close range, tend to be indistinct.

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  f. Conventional urban fighting often becomes confused mélées with several small units attacking on converging axes. The risks from friendly fire, ricochets, and fratricide have to be considered during the planning phase of operations and control measures continually continually adjusted to lower th these ese risks. Commanders and soldiers alike have to be aware of the locations and intentions of friendly forces and clearly mark their own progress to avoid the potential for fratricide. g. Both the firer and target may be inside or outside buildings, or they may both be inside the same or separate separate buildings. The enclosed nature o off combat in built-up areas means that the weapon's effect, such as muzzle blast and back blast, has to be considered as much as the round's impact on the target. h. Modern engineering and design improvements mean that most large buildings constructed since WW2 are resilient to the blast effects of bomb and artillery attack. Even though modern buildings may burn easily, they often retain their structural integrity and remain standing. standing. Once high-rise b buildings uildings burn out, the they y are still useful for combat purpose and and are almost impossible to damage further. A large structure can take 24 to 48 hours to burn out and become cool enough for soldiers to enter. SECTION SECT ION 2 – SMALL ARMS 9MM PISTOL 2. The pistol enables the individual to engage targets at close range, to an effective range of 45m. It is effective in bu buildings ildings and room cle clearance. arance. RIFLE AND L IGHT MACHINE GU GUN N  3. Close combat is the predominant characteristic of urban engagements and the rifle and Light Machine Guns (LMG) 1  are the most common weapons fired in built-up areas. Small, fleeting targets are difficult to hit from bunker apertures, windows, and loopholes. This requires pinpoint accuracy accuracy with weapo weapons ns fired in the semi-automatic mode. Killing an enemy through an 20 cm loophole at a range of 50 metres is a challenge, but one that may be common in combat in built-up areas. 4. The performance of ball ammunition is affected by a number of variables including range from the target, material again against st which it is fired, man manufacture ufacture quality an and d age. The penetrative effect of ammunition depends on both the velocity and stability of the round; the greater the range, the lower lower the velocity. Consequently, at ve very ry short ranges a rou round nd will not be fully stable, and this may lessen the effect of the greater velocity. 5. penetration tration that can be achieved with 5.56 mm rifle Weapon Penetration. Penetration . The pene ammunition round against exterior walls of brick or concrete is limited unless significant numbers of rounds are fired. Nevertheless, inside building buildings s the 5.56 mm round may penetrate interior walls and furniture. Consideration shou should ld be given to the risk of ricochet to friendly forces both when firing at enemy positions.

1

 LMGs fires 5.56 mm ammunition and include the MINIMI and Light Support Weapon (LSW).

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  6. Protection.. The following common barriers in built-up areas stop a 5.56 mm round Protection fired at less than 50 metres: a.

One thickness of sandbags.

b.

5 cm concrete wall (not reinforced).

c.

55 US gallon drum filled with water or sand.

d.

Small ammunition can filled with sand.

e.

Cinder block filled with sand (block will probably shatter).

f.

Brick veneer.

g.

Car engine block

MEDIUM AND HEAVY MACHINE GUN 7. inch) . is Like the 5.56 round,tothe ability bility 7.62 mmofand 12.7 mm Weapon We apon Pe Penetration (0.5 rounds tonetration penetrate affected by mm the range thea targetofand type material it is fired against. The 7.62 mm round is affected less by range than the 5.56 mm, whilst the the 12.7 mm's penetration is reduced least of all. The table below explain explains s the pene penetration tration capabilities of a single 7.62 mm (ball) round at closer ranges: Range (metres) (a) 25 100 200

Pine Board (b) 33 cm/13 inches 46 cm/18 inches 104 cm/41 inches

Dry Loose Sand

Cinder Box

(c) 13 cm/5 inches 11 cm/4.5 inches 18 cm/7 inches

(d) 20 cm/8 inches 25 cm/10 inches 20 cm/8 inches

Concrete (e) 5 cm/2 inches 5 cm/2 inches 5 cm/2 inches

For hard targets, 12.7 mm pene penetration tration is affected b by y obliquity an and d range. Both armour piercing and ball ammunition penetrate 36 cm/14 inches of sand or 71 cm/28 inches of packed earth at 200 metres, if the rounds impact perpendicular to the flat face of the t he target.  target.  8. Weapon Effects. Effects .  It should be noted that the AK47 (7.62 x 39mm) is the most common assault rifle in the world and that the penetrative qualities of its ammunition are significantly greater than those those of 5.56 mm ball. The 12.7 mm heavy machine gun can b be e fitted to a number of different platforms, and in view of the excellent penetrative capacity of its ammunition, it can be the weapon of choice in the urban environment. 2

SNIPER SNIPE R RIFLE (L115A3)   9. Snipers exploit the long range, high hit rate probability and penetrative effect of the 8.59mm round fired from the L115A3 rifle to achieve significant physical and psychological

effect.

Commanders sho should uld have an understanding of the effects of the weapons and

2

 See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 16-25.

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  optics that a sniper carries in order to fully utilize this capab capability. ility. summarises the capabilities of the equipment employed by snipers: System (a) Sniper Rifle

 Ammunition Type Type Optics

The table below

Weapon (b) L115A3 8.59mm Accuracy

Capability (c) Probability hit rate:

International

Under 600m – 70% 600m-800m – 50% 800m-1000m – 30% Harassing fire from 1500m+ Defeat CRISAT 3 man at 800m

8.59mm Ball 8.59mm Armour Piercing 5 x 25 x 56 Schmitt and Bender Telescopic Sight x 40 Leopold Spotting Scope SIMRAD KN203 Image Intensifier Sight Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability (STIC) (Weapon and Spotter)

Excellent daytime optics with large zoom capability Sniper Engagement range 400m upwards Detect heat source: Man size target: 1200m-1400m MBT size target: 2500m-3000m

4 SECTION 3 – GRENADES  

10. Grenades.. Grenades, whether thrown by hand or projected by a weapon, provide a Grenades useful method of delivering s significant ignificant effect v very ery quickly. HE hand grenades are an essential weapon for assaulting and clea clearing ring buildings. Grenade ammunition e expenditure xpenditure is 5 likely to be heavy . The overuse of HE g grenades renades in lightly constructed buildings may cause total, or partial, collapse of walls. There is a risk that frag fragments ments may penetrate internal walls, risking injury to friendly forces in adjacent rooms. a.

6 Effects .

(1) hand and gren grenade ade L10 L109A1 9A1 inc incapacitates apacitates a L109A1, Hand Grenade. Grenade. The h protected man at five metres and an unprotected man at 20 metres7. (2) On impact, the UGL Under-slung Grenade Launcher (UGL). (UGL). projectile explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 45mm of steel, 300mm of concrete and cause casualties to a distance of 5m from the explosion. explosion. The UGL burst safety distance of 450m in the open may be reduced by the nature of urban terrain. (3) Grenade Machine Gun (GMG). (GMG). On impact, the projectile explodes and is designed to penetrate up to 50mm of steel, 350mm of concrete and cause casualties casualties to a distance of 5m from the e explosion. xplosion. The GMG bu burst rst 3

 CRISAT - Collaborative Research Into Small Arms Technology , is the EU/NATO standard in the manufacture of military equipment. equipment. 4

5 See

also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 13-15.  During WW2, it was common for a battalion fighting in urban areas in Italy in 1943 to use in excess of 500 hand grenades in a day. 6  Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons). 7  Infantry Training Manual Vol III, SAA (Sect and Pl Weapons).

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  safety distance of 165m in the open may reduced by the nature of urban terrain. (4) The anti-riot, irritant hand grenade (CS) is CS Grenade (C13). (C13). effective 25-35 metres (dependent on wind) from burst. SECTION 4 – HEAVIER INFANTRY DIRECT FIRE WEAPONS  ANTI TA NK WEA WEAPONS PONS8  11. and nd other Javelin.. The primary role of Javelin is to defeat main battle tanks a Javelin armoured vehicles, vehicles, althou although gh it is also effective a against gainst structure structures. s. The warhead warhead will penetrate 1500mm of concrete or sandbag structure and create an over-pressure effect inside. If fired against soft surfaces (ie gla glass, ss, wood, etc.) the larger secondary secondary charge may not detonate. Against a rob robust ust structure th the e penetration will only create a fist size hole.  Although such a hole cannot cannot provide access for a man, it may provoke provoke collapse. 12. NLAW.. NLAW is p NLAW primarily rimarily used to defeat light a armoured rmoured vehicle vehicles s and ne neutralize utralize fortified firing positions. Because the shaped charge warhead has a narrow blast effect, NLAW hasthe limited anti-structure effect. ffect. However, blast t and Against s shock hock may be sufficient to neutralize personnel personnel within a e building fo forr a shortblas p period. eriod. structures, shapedcharge weapons such as NLAW should be aimed about six inches below or to the side of a firing aperture in order to increase the probability of killing the enemy behind a wall.  ANTI-STRUCTURE MUNITIONS9  13. The UK Army will use the Anti-Structure Munition (ASM) from 2009. Lighter but the same length as the NLAW, the ASM is also a one-man disposable, fire and forget weapon for use primarily against urban structures and bunkers and in a secondary role against light  AFVs and soft skinned vehicles. With a combat effective range of between 15m-400m, the  ASM has a tandem warhead break-in charge (BIC) and a follow-through bomb (FTB) that will penetrate concrete structures and and enable physical access. access. The purpose of the BIC is to create a hole sufficiently large to enable the FTB to detonate within a wall, thereby both neutralizing any occupants and creating access for fighting troops.

Fig C-10 C-10-1 -1 Anti-Struct ure Muniti on  

8

 See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 41-47.  See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Para 48.

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  10

30MM CANNON FIRE   14. cannon non and 7.62 mm coax coaxially ially mounted machine g gun, un, General.   The 30mm Rarden can General. mounted on CVR(T) Scimitar and Warrior 510/511, can provide substantial firepower to the infantry. The 30mm cannon can be utilised from either a sta stand-off nd-off or from an intimate support position. Two types of amm ammunition unition are available as follows: a.  Ar mo ur Pier ci ng Dis car cardi di ng Sabo Sabott (APDS). (APDS).   APDS is the main anti-armour round available for use with the the 30mm cannon. cannon. It is suitable for engaging light armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to 1500m. b. engaging gaging soft-skinned High Explosive (HE).  (HE).  HE rounds are suitable for en vehicles, bunkers and dismounted infantry o out ut to 1500m. HE has the most utility in an urban environment, providing assistance to assault troops without the more extensive collateral damage associated with a tank HESH round. 15. limitations ations to the use of 3 30mm 0mm cannon in the u urban rban Limitations.   There are several limit Limitations. environment: a. 30mm cannon may be restricted in elevation and traverse within a built up area. b. HE rounds can have limited effect against harder structures, ie concrete or reinforced buildings. c. The weapon platforms may have difficulty in manoeuvring in an urban environment due to size restriction and weight. Obstacles will also prove more difficult to negotiate negotiate in an u urban rban setting. This will be more prevalent for Warrior variants than CVR(T) Scimitar Scimitar.. 11

SECTION 5 – TANK WEAPONS   16.

In spite of the tank’s vulnerability to short-range anti-tank weapons, the physical and

psychological impact and the shock effect of armour,12at close range, in conjunction with infantry, can be overwhelming in urban close combat . The range, accuracy, destructive potential and absence of minimum range of the tank armament are enhanced by the tank’s protection and mobility. 17. Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) is the principal antiarmour round for the L30 120 mm rifled gun and is designed for engaging enemy armoured vehicles out to a range range of >2000 m m.. Its utility against buildin buildings gs and bunkers is limited. 18. High Explosive Squash Head (HESH). HESH rounds are suitable for engaging bunkers, armoured and soft-skinned vehicles out to a range of 1500 m or area targets out to 8000m. HESH has great utility in an urban environment due to its explosive explosive effect and is particularly useful against concrete reinforced urban structures in support of assaulting troops.

t oops 10

 See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 37-40.  See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 41-47. 12  See Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’. 11

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  19. The smoke round has a range of up to 8 8000m 000m and provides excellent cover for defiles and choke poin points ts in urban areas. However, the smoke is generated by white phosphorus and the use of such ammunition may therefore be restricted by extant ROE. 20 The two 7.62 mm machine guns mounted on the Challenger II tank, one coaxially mounted with the main armament and one located above the t he loader’s hatch, are particularly effective for suppressive fire. SECTION 6 – INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS13  21. General.. The urban environment greatly restricts low angle indirect fire. Mortars General and artillery operating operating in the high angle are less affected. For low angle artillery fire, dead space is about five times the height of the building behind which the targe targett sits. For mortars and artillery operating in the high angle, dead space is only about one-half the height of the building. Both mortars and artillery firing in the high angle can therefore p provide rovide effective indirect fire support during urban operations. 22. Lethality.. In open terrain the 105 mm shell has a le Lethality lethal thal radius of 40m (ground (ground burst) and 50m (air burst) , and the 155 mm shell 55m (ground burst) and 85m (air burst). GMLRS a lethal ground burst, which varies altitude for air burst.rockets In builthave up areas theradius rangeofof80m the for blast and fragmentation of thewith shell or ro rocket cket may be lessened by the physical obstruction of the buildings, although hard surfaces may increase the ricochet range and effect of the explosion. MORTARS (60MM AND 81MM) 81MM)   23. The multi-option fuze on mortar rounds makes them particularly effective weapons in urban terrain. Delay settings can slightly in increase crease penetration and proximity b bursts ursts can increase the lethal area cov covered ered by fragments. fragments. Tall buildings c can an cause proximity-fused mortar rounds to detonate detonate prematurely if they pass too close closely. ly. The 60 mm mo mortar rtar round will not penetrate penetrate most rooftops rooftops,, even with a de delay lay setting. HE rounds are effective, however, in suppressing snipers on rooftops and preventing roofs from being used by enemy observers. 60 mm smoke m may ay be effective when two or three mortars are grouped together. 14 SECTION SECTI ON 7 – CH CHEMICAL, EMICAL, BIOLOGICAL BIOLOGICAL,, RADIOLOGICAL, NUC NUCLEA LEAR R (C (CBRN) BRN)  

24. should uld be aware o off how the urban environment affects the General.. Commanders sho General 15 response to a CBRN threat . Buildings will provide some protection against liquid contamination and fallout. However, in a post-attack situation, hazards may be increased by the tendency for contamination to remain in enclosed sp spaces aces and sheltered a areas. reas. In addition, urban areas represent an increased risk from Environmental and Industrial Hazards (EIH). 25. Inconsistent wind conditions and Detection, Identification and Monitoring. Monitoring . variations from one building to the next may mean that detectors are better employed inside

13

 See also Chapter 5, ‘All Arms Combat’, Paras 67-73.  See also Chapter 3, Section 4 ‘Civilian Factors’ Paras 35-36 – ‘Toxic Waste’. 15   Details are in AFM Vol 1 Pt 5: Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) conditions.

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  a sheltered space than in an asses assessed sed upwind locatio location. n. The vapour ha hazard zard may vary from 16 one room to the next and the use of LCAD  will be essential when outside the protection offered by MCAD17. Buildings must be surveyed surveyed before be being ing occupied. 26. behaviour ehaviour of down down-wind -wind haz hazards ards will be greatly Warning and Reporting. Reporting . The b affected by built-up areas. Plumes may be channe channelled, lled, reducing the spread of vapour. Conversely, eddying and turbulence may cause vapour hazards to spread more widely in an unpredictable way. Only survey an and d reconnaissance will determine the actua actuall extent of contamination. 27. Physical Protection. Protection . Protection may be enhanced in a built up area. Overhead cover and some protection protection from blast is an advan advantage. tage. Risk taking may allow s some ome troops to reduce their dress state where liquid contamination has been avoided and only a vapour hazard remains. 28. Hazard Haz ard Management Management.. In general terms hazard management is complicated by an urban environment. The effects of weathering are reduced due to s shelter helter provided from sunlight and wind. wind. Complicated surfaces, spaces and objects are more like likely ly to harbour contamination. Conversely, acces access s to some essential c counter ounter measure resou resources rces such as water behave easier in an urban environment, it may be possible to identify areas of sheltermay which been unaffected by the CBRNand agent used.

16

 Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector.  Manportable Chemical Agent Detector.

17

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  CHAPTER 11 11   SUBTERRANEAN OPER OPERATIONS ATIONS “As it became increasingly difficult to move above ground, the Poles soon took to using the sewers to send messages, move units and conduct supply operations throughout Warsaw. Soon after, the struggle in the sewers matched the intensity of what was transpiring on the streets above and quickly changed the nature of the fighting.”  Warsaw Wa rsaw i n 194 1944 4 from City Fights Fights b y Ma Majj David M. Tocze Toczek, k, Ballanti ne Book s

GENERAL   GENERAL 1. Knowledge of the nature and location of underground facilities is of great value to both the attacker an and d defende defender. r. To exploit the advanta advantages ges of underground facilities, detailed maps and plans should be used and, if possible a reconnaissance undertaken. This chapter describes the techniques used to deny the enemy use of these features, the tactical value of subterranean passages, and stresses the psychological aspects of extended operations in the underground environment. TACTICAL FACTORS FACTORS   2. In larger cities, subterranean features include sunken garages, underground passages, railway lines, utility tunnels, se sewers, wers, and storm d drains. rains. Many of these features will allow the movement movement of troops. Even in sma smaller ller European towns towns,, sewers and storm drains permit soldiers to move beneath street level during operations. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS  OPERATIONS  3. Subterranean passages provide the attacker with covered and concealed routes into and through built-up built-up areas. The attacker m may ay launch his main attack at street level while using subterranean subterranean pas passages sages to infiltrate a smaller force. The objective of such an attack may be to insert a unit into the defender’s rear, thereby, disrupting his defence and obstructing the avenues o off withdrawal for his forward d defence. efence. Even if a subterranean effort is not immediately successful, it forces the defender to fight on two levels and to extend his resources resources to more than jus justt street-level fighting. The attacker has to consider: a. The need for plans and maps of subterranean passages and, if possible, reconnaissance. b. The threat from ambush and the ease with which the defender may employ obstacles to block subterranean passages. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS  OPERATIONS 

4. The existence of ground, subterranean passages to defend the built-up area above and below but the defenderforces may the use defender subterranean passages to his advantage. When thorough thoroughly ly reconnoitred and and controlled by the defender, subterranean subterranean passages provide excellent covered and concealed routes to move reinforcements or to

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  launch counterattacks. counterattacks. They a also lso provide ready-made lines of communication for the movement of supplies and evacuation of casualties, and provide places to cache supplies for forward companies. companies. The defender needs to consider: a. Tunnels afford the attacker little cover and concealment except for the darkness and any man-made barriers. The passage passageways ways provide tight fields of fire and amplify the effect of grenades. grenades. Obstacles at intersections in the tunnels provide excellent ambush ambush sites. Booby-traps c can an turn the subterranean p passages assages into a deadly maze. b. A thorough reconnaissance of the subterranean or sewer system should be made. To be effective, ob obstacles stacles be located at critical intersections in the passa passage ge network so that they trap attacking troops in a killing area while allowing the defenders freedom of movement. c. There will be a requirement for escape routes in case of bypass by the enemy or the collapse of the subterranean system.

Fig C-11-1 Subterranean Operations RECONNAISSANCE PATROL TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES PROCEDURES   5. Reconnaissance of the subterranean passages of a platoon or company area should normally be the respon responsibility sibility of a patrol of section size. Only in extremely large subterranean features should the size of a patrol be increased. a. The patrol commander should organize his patrol with one soldier tasked with security to the front (the lead scout man) and one tasked with security to the rear.

The patrol directly the shou leadldscout, navigates records datacommander collected bymoves collected the patrol. Thebehind grenadier should follow and the lead scou scout, t, and and the demolitions man man should follow the grenadier. Two riflemen should should be left as a security post at the the point of entry. They are resp responsible onsible for detecting enemy who

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  come upon the patrol unit's rear and for acting as the communications link between the patrol commander and his headquarters. Communications with platoon headquarters will be difficult. b. The patrol commander should carry a map, compass, street plan, and notebook in which he has written the information he has to gather for the higher commander. The grenadier sho should uld carry the tools needed to open open manhole cov covers. ers. If the patrol is to move more than 200 to 300 metres or if the patrol commander directs, the grenadier should also carry a suitable telephone and line for communications. The whole section should be eq equipped uipped with night v vision ision devices, and an infra red source, to mainta maintain in surveillance w within ithin the sewer. In addition, the lead scout will need a ‘feeler’ for trip wires. c. All soldiers entering the sewer should carry a sketch of the sewer system to include magnetic north, north, azimuths, distances distances,, and manholes. They should also carry protective masks, gloves, flashlights and chalk for marking features along the route. Ideally, the patrol should also tak take e a safety rop rope e to which e each ach man is tied. To improve their footing in slippery sewers and storm drains, the members of the patrol can wrap chicken wire or screen wire around their boots. d. A constant concern to troops conducting a subterranean patrol is chemical defence. Chemical age agents nts if used in tunnels are normally encountered in dense concentrations, with no c chance hance of dissipation. A suitable CBRN detection system carried by the lead scout could provide warning of the presence of chemical agents. Detector paper can also be used to detect chemical agents. At the first indication that harmful gases are present, the patrol should put on their respirators. e. In addition to chemical agents, noxious gases from decomposing sewage, especially methane methane gas, can also pose a threat. These gases are not detected b by y the CBRN detection system, nor are they completely filtered by the protective mask. Physical signs that indicate their presence in harmful quantities are nausea and dizziness. The patrol commander should be constantly a alert lert to these signs and know the shortest route to the surface for fresh air. f. Once the patrol is organized and equipped, it moves to the entrance of the tunnel, which is usua usually lly a manhole. With the manhole cover removed. The p patrol atrol should wait 15 minutes minutes before entry to a allow llow any gases to dissipate. Then the lead scout descends into the tunnel to determine whether the air is safe to breathe and if movement is restricted. restricted. The lead scou scoutt should remain in the tunnel for 10 minutes before the rest of the patrol follows. If he becomes ill or is exposed to danger, he can be pulled out by the safety rope. g. When the patrol is moving through the tunnel, the lead scout moves about 10 metres in front front of the patrol commande commander. r. Other patrol m members embers maintain 5 metre intervals. If the water in the tunnel is flowing fast or if the sewer contains contains slippery obstacles, those intervals should be increased to prevent all patrol members from

falling if one slips. All patrol should staysecu tiedrity to the safety rop rope e soroute that they can easman easily ily be retrieved frommembers d danger. anger. shou Theldrear security man marks the with chalk or spray paint so that other troops can find the patrol.

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  h. The patrol leader should note the azimuth and pace count of each turn he takes in the tunnel. tunnel. When he encou encounters nters a manhole to the surface, the g grenadier renadier should open it and determine the loc location, ation, which the pa patrol trol leader then records records.. The use of recognition signals should prevent friendly troops from accidentally shooting at the grenadier as he appears at a manhole. i. The patrol should carry a field telephone in addition to radios and lay line for communications in order to establish a s series eries of tap-in points. Plans have to be made to deny the enemy use of the line.  j. Once the patrol has returned and submitted its report, the commander should decide how to use the tunnel. In the offence, the tun tunnel nel could provide a covered route to move behind the the enemy's positions. In defence, the tunne tunnell could provide a covered passage passage between p positions. ositions. In either case, the patrol members sh should ould act as guides along the route. WEAPON SYSTEMS IN TUNNELS TUNNELS   6.

The confined space of tunnels and sewers amplifies the sounds of weapons firing to

a dangerous level. level. The overpressure from grenades and min mines es exploding in a sewer or tunnel can have adverse effects on friendly troops such as ruptured eardrums and wounds from flying debris. Additionally, gases found in sewers can be ignited by the blast effects of these munitions. For these reason reasons, s, small-arms weapon weapons s should be th the e principal weapon systems employed employed in tunnels and sewers. Friendly troops shou should ld be outside tunne tunnels ls or out of range of the effects whe when n mines or demolitions are deton detonated. ated. The prov provision ision of additional ear protection for subterranean operations should be considered. PSYCHOLOGICAL PSYCH OLOGICAL FACTORS FACTORS   7. Combat operations in subterranean passages are much like night combat operations. The psyc psychological hological factors that affect s soldiers oldiers during night operations reduce confidence, cause cause fear, and increas increase e a fee feeling ling of iso isolation. lation. This feeling of isolation is further magnified by the tight confines of the tunnels. The layout of tunnels could require greater dispersion between positions than is usual for other operations. 8. Commanders should enforce measures to dispel the feelings of fear and isolation experienced by soldiers in tunnels tunnels.. These measures include leadership training, physical and mental fitness, sleep discipline and stress management. 9. Commanders should maintain communication with soldiers manning positions in the tunnels either either by personal vi visits sits or by field telephone. Soldiers man manning ning pos positions itions below ground should be given as much information as possible on the organization of the tunnels and the importance of their task. They should be briefed on plans and o other ther positions if their primary positions become untenable. 10.

Physical and mental fitness can be maintained by periodically rotating soldiers away

from sooperations they they can stand and walk in fres fresh h combat air and in sun sunlight. light. manage management is also atunnels factor of ope rations in tunnels. Historically, bu built-up ilt-up Stress areas has beenment one of the most stressful forms of combat. Continuous darkne darkness ss and restricted m manoeuvre anoeuvre space can cause more stress to soldiers than street fighting.

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CHAPTER 12 NIGHT OPERATIONS THE CHALLENGES OF NIGHT 1. Night-time and limited visibility degrades all the senses, but particularly the primary sense, sight. sight. Night vision devices (NVD (NVD)) are of great value but they do not replace continuous all-round all-round visual awareness. Darkness give gives s an un unqualified qualified advanta advantage ge to an 1 enemy who knows the ground well . These disadvantages disadvantages ca can n be o overcome vercome by discipline, mental strength, enlightened leadership and professional experience. Training and preparation for night operations in the urban environment might be protracted and rigorous, but they are essential to success. 2. At night-time, the human body needs time to recover from daytime activities. During prolonged operations, it is necessary to allow for the movement of combat supplies, equipment and vehicle maintenance maintenance and rest. Night-time may provide that op opportunity portunity and a lower activity regime. 3. There is a need for a different form of discipline at night-time. Day-time reactions, small team drills, hand-signals and the use of oral commands are conducted differently. Training at night must include the night-time passage of information between individual soldiers. 4. The difficulties of conducting urban operations are exacerbated at night. Commanders must anticipate the physical effects of night conditions on soldiers and the technical restraints on their operations while training and preparing soldiers for unbroken day/night operations. operations. There is a n need eed for greater con control trol and rehearsal to overcome the problems of operating at night. 5. Night operations in the urban environment increases risk. The risk of fratricide is higher, the risk of failure to anticipate or understand the enemy’s movement or intentions is higher and the risk risk of plans being misunderstood or going wrong is g greater. reater. These factors increase the need for greater control and the restriction on individual action. 6.

Vehicl Ve hicl e M Mount ount ed Ope Operation ration s . a. operations, s, even simple on ones es but particularly Confusion.. All night urban operation Confusion those conducted in vehicles, can lead to confusion and disorientation on the part of individual soldiers. Changes to pla plan, n, changes to timings, and ch changes anges to vehicle vehicle manning must be understood understood and rehe rehearsed arsed every time by all ranks. Briefing must be comprehensive, the control and counting of individual team members at junior, senior NCO and junior officer level is v vital. ital. Count them out, ch check, eck, count them in, check, count them back. b.

Task Flexibility Flexibility.. All ranks, all trades, all soldiers must be able to carry out

the all tasks of their immediate colleagues. Driver, commande commander, r, signaller, gunner, gunner, 1

 This was particularly well understood by the Russians in Stalingrad who defeated a more technically superior enemy by ‘hugging’ him close, separating the infantry from his indirect fire support and wearing him out. The same applies to the Taliban attacking defended outposts in Afghanistan.

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each soldier must know how to operate the vehicle, the radios, the weapons in his vehicle and be able to replace and carry out the duties of his comrades. c. thatt limited visibility brings will amplify  Ac ti on s On On.. The potential confusion tha the difficulties in nearly every situa situation. tion. Armoured vehic vehicles les might be ambus ambushed, hed, might get lost, might get get separated and will break down. Tactical command commanders ers must plan for the actions on vehicle breakdown and recovery, at night, in contact, with casualties and and in a confined and hostile environme environment. nt. Vehicle comma commanders nders and crews must rehearse and be confident in the plan and their part in it. 7. 7.   that at in urban Surpri se and Opera Operatio tio nal Te Tempo mpo.. Contemporary experience shows th operations disciplined conventional forces can use the surprise that the cover of night provides to conduct operations at night-time with less restriction than they might be able to by day. The civilian population ma may y be subject to some form of curfew; there may not the same opportunity opportunity for the enemy to mingle and hide among amongst st the civ civilian ilian population. There may be a greater opportunity opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to ene enemy my activity. Urban strike operations, for example, can be carried out at night-time with an element of surprise and freedom freedom of movement. Operations involving m military ilitary interaction with the civilian population may only be possible during the daytime, when there is no curfew and the population can be fully and peacefully engaged. ‘A more general tactic evolved, based on the realisation that the Germans were short of reserves. Chuikov ordered an emphasis on night attacks, mainly for the practical reason that the Luftwaffe could not react to them, but also because he was convinced that the Germans were more frightened in the hours of darkness, and would become exhausted. The German Landser came to harbour a special fear of the Siberians from Colonel Batyuk’s th 284  Rifle Division, who were considered to be natural hu hunters nters of any so sort rt of prey. ‘If only you could understand what terror is; at the slightest rustle, I pull the trigger and fire off tracer in bursts from the machine-gun machine-gun’. ’. The Russians also kept u up p the tension by firing flares into the night sky sky from time to time to g give ive the impression of an imminent attack. Red  Army aviation, partly to avoid the Messerschmitts by day, kept up a relentless series of raids every night on German positions. It also served as a another nother part of the wearing down process to exhaust the Germans and stretch their nerves.’‘ Stalingrad, Anthony Beevor, Penguin Books “ OWN OWNING ING T THE HE NI NIGHT GHT”” 8. The advantages brought by technology, discipline, the training advantage and professionalism can can give c conventional onventional armed forces the opportunity to close with and defeat the urban enemy at night. 9. Combined Arms urban warfare brings a Tactical Ta ctical Night Vision Te Technology chnology . variety of NVD tech technology nology to the battlegroup battlegroup.. The sold soldier’s ier’s Thermal Imaging Head Head Mounted Night Vision Systems ((TI)HMNVS) improves individual night-time vision. Information available to the battlegroup is aided by infantry, artillery and engineer armoured

vehicles’ short and long Thermal (TI), the fast-air case of platforms tanks, longer Image Intensification (II).range Sensor podsImaging mounted onand AHinand canrange b bring ring overhead TI imagery as far down as the battlegroup.

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10. By o observing bserving a w wide ide p portion ortion o off the electromagnetic spectrum and ISTAR.. ISTAR communicating this to deployed HQs, ISTAR assets deliver information that can be translated into intelligence. ISTAR gathering sensors in satellites, fixed and rotary wing aircraft with cameras, manned and unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), balloons, overt and covert ground vehicles, masts, unattended covert systems and ground sensors (UGS) are used to provide such information. ‘Operating in urban terrain in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan) and Operation Iraqi Freedom at night places a premium on training, skilled small unit leaders, and technology necessary to acquire and engage the enemy. Maintaining situational awareness to see the enemy, ourselves, and terrain, is difficult but mission essential. In the COIN fight, we use the night to maneuver unimpeded, to infiltrate and to set the conditions for operations. The urban fight at night will make an an already difficult task doubly so. Thermals an and d pass passive ive NVGs don't exc excel el at telling the difference b between etween an armed and unarmed man man in the dark. In all but the most high-intensity scenarios this places a premium on good leadership and judgement. In the urban fight, owning the night is the ultimate high ground; it offers a decisive advantage to those who can seize it, but to get to that point requires a great level of preparation in leader development, training, and use of technology.’ LTC John W Karagos Karagosian; ian; XO, 1-5 1-506th, 06th, 10 101st 1st AB N (AASLT)

 

 ADVA NTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS OPERATIONS   11. When fighting in built-up areas at night, attacking or defending forces have certain advantages as follows: a. In all operations, advantage should be taken of the technology offered by thermal imagery imagery and image intens intensification. ification. The ability to identify, en engage gage and destroy targets before detection by an enemy may favour night operations. b. In periods of limited visibility, attacking forces should take advantage of the enemy's reduced awareness and approach and engage before being detected. c.

Night-time and limited visibility gives the attacker a greater chance of surprise.

d. There may be a greater opportunity at night for conducting covert, small- or large-scale operations or aggressive or kinetic response to enemy activity. DISADVANTAGES OF NIGHT OPERATIONS OPERATIONS   12. When fighting in built-up areas during night operations, attacking and defending forces face the following disadvantages:

a. The cover of night can give an advantage to the enemy, and particularly the insurgent, to move, to mount surprise attacks, to escape and to prepare ambushes without being seen.

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b. Fighting through noisy, dark and unfamiliar rooms and houses by torchlight is chaotic and command an and d control difficult. The risk of casualties and fratricide is increased. c. Soldiers have an instinctive tendency to bunch during night operations, increasing individual and collective vulnerability. d. The characteristics of built-up areas at night-time and in reduced visibility can be disorientating. Target identification and indication is difficult at night and may result in indiscriminate engagement and loss of fire discipline. NIGHT VISION DEVICES (NVD)  (NVD)  13. The characteristics of built-up areas may degrade NVDs and sights. Both operators and commanders must allow for the degradation of their own systems whilst attempting to utilise the impact on the enemy's systems to their own advantage. a. Most built-up areas will have electric power, street lights and building lights. These can cause a "white out" on image intensification devices. b. The chance that fires will be burning in the area of operations is high. This will potentially cause problems for both light intensification and thermal devices. c. Subterranean areas and the interiors of buildings will not have ambient light if the power is off. Passive II require an artificial light source2  to provide enough ambient light for the devices to work. d. The many reflective surfaces found in built-up areas may cause false images, especially for laser range finders and laser target designators. e.

Dust, smoke and fog degrades the performance of thermal imaging devices.

f. Weapons flashes within enclosed areas appear much brighter than by day. Soldiers can lose their night vision and light intensification devices can be overloaded. g. Flares, mortar and artillery illumination and spotlights (visible light or infrared) can be used to blind enemy NVDs or to artificially illuminate the battlefield. FEATURES OF URBAN OPERATIONS AT NIGHT NIGHT   14. General.. Before conducting any urban operations at night the commander should General balance the risks and complexity of such operations against the requirements of the mission. Rehearsals will be important; soun sound d comma command nd and control measures measures can reduce mistakes and casualties. Specific points to note are:

2

 Such as infrared.

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a. Soldiers should clear buildings and rooms using the same techniques they use during daylight to reduce co confusion. nfusion. The soldie soldiers rs should be practised and confident in techniques and equipment. b. Movement will be slower. The problems of night-time target acquisition, clearing buildings, and command, control and communication at night may cause significant delay. Commanders should allocate sufficient time to achieve achieve their planning, preparation and mission. c. NVD should be made available to every single soldier involved in urban operations at night. White light should be used with caution sinc since e it might benefit the enemy. 15. avoiding g fratricide is good training and a high level of Fratricide..  The key to avoidin Fratricide situational awareness. Other con considerations siderations include: a. Fire Support Control Measures should be clearly defined by the use of obvious features on the ground, such as motorways, railway lines, overpasses, distinct buildings, and rivers. b.

Fire control and movement should similarly be tightly controlled.

c. Cleared rooms and buildings should be clearly marked to identify cleared areas to friendly troop troops. s. The use of c cylumes ylumes can be particularly effective. d. Visible markers (for example glint tape or thermal strips) can be attached to individual soldiers and buildings. e.

Safe routes between and through buildings should be marked.

f.

Indirect fire and close air support needs careful co-ordination. co-ordination.  

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 16. In principal, the provision of CSS for night operations differs little from day-time operations. The following points require particular attention: a. Night-time provides the best opportunity for troops for the maintenance and repair of weapons weapons an and d equipment. CSS operations may perforce be carried out principally at night-time and commanders should plan on periods of enforced rest for soldiers during the day to allow for effective administration at night. b. Casualty collection may be significantly more difficult at night-time. Clear methods for marking any casualties must be established before the start of the operation. Commanders should allow for sufficient time for the movement of casualties and the marking of evacuation routes.

c. Collection and control of PWs may require more manpower at night.  Additional personnel should should be nominated before the start of the operation. operation.

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d. CSS relies on the movement of vehicles. Apart from normal night discipline for vehicle movement, the allocation of additional NVD to vehicle crews and detailed route marking may be necessary. 17. Operations in the dense human terrain of the urban environment can be different at night-time. The civilian population may be subject to curfew; there may not the same opportunity fore the enemy to mingle amongst the civilian population nor the immediate possibility, for example, of of spontaneous civilian reaction or civ civilil unrest. There may be a greater opportunity for aggressive and kinetic response to enemy activity.

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CHAPTER 13 THE USE OF OBSTACLES IN URBAN OPERATION OPERATIONS S SECTION 1 - INTRODUCTION 1.

This chapter is intended to give an overview of obstacles and how they might be

used. It provides the all arms commander with an insight into what obstacles he might face in the assault and how how he might us use e obstacles in defence. Further detail and advice will be available from the brigade close support engineer regiment1. 2. In the contemporary operating environment and for the foreseeable future, possibly even in major combat operations, UK forces will wish to minimise permanent damage to urban environments environments and avoid killing or injuring the local population. Whether assaulting into or operating within an urban area we must assume that much of the indigenous population will remain. Causing dam damage age to en enhance hance our own manoe manoeuvre uvre or to deny adversary manoeuvre may well be counter-productive, attracting adverse media, losing the consent of the people or even causing humanitarian problems and displacing the population. Furthermore, the UK m may ay well need to re repair pair any damage in order to win the consent of the people thus add adding ing to the workload workload.. As such, it is unlikely that UK force forces s would use demolitions, or other destructive methods of making obstacles, lay mines/boobytraps or use methods that c could ould injure or k kill. ill. Non-lethal barriers, proba probably bly pre-fabricated and relatively easy to move (with plant equipment if necessary), will be the preferred method of denying adversary manoeuvre. 3. Conversely, adversaries may not operate under the same constraints so UK forces need to be aware of the possible threats from mines, booby traps and other lethal and nonlethal systems. This chapter is intended to give an overview of of obstacles and how they might be used. 4. Both man-made and natural obstacles are used extensively in urban operations to allow the defender to canalize the enemy, impede his movement and disrupt his attack. Obstacles are designed to prevent movement by personnel, separate infantry from tanks and slow or stop armour/other armour/other vehicles. The UK will not us use e AP mines as the these se have been banned under international international law. The use of AT mines by UK forces will be subject to ROE and it is unlikely that their use will be widespread. SECTION SECT ION 2 - LETHAL A AND ND NON NON-LETHAL -LETHAL OBSTACLES 5. Obstacles may be constructed using pre-fabricated concrete sections to create walls, other pre-fabricated or equipment equipment systems, barb barbed ed wire, knife rests etc. Depending on the nature of the operation, they may incorporate anti-tank mines or other explosive hazards and, when few constraints are imposed, could be created with craters, building rubble or destroyed vehicles. vehicles. All obstacles sho should uld be covered by fire and view.

1

 Useful references include ME Vol 2, Filed Engineering – Pam 3 Obstacles, Pam 5 Minelaying

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Fig C-13-1 C-13-1 T The he Use of Obst acles in i n Str Streets eets a. buildings s are constructed to deny cov covered ered routes or Buildings.. Obstacles in building Buildings positions to the enemy. They can be develop developed ed by d destroying estroying the building with explosives or flame, constructing wire obstacles within the building, or preparing the building as a trap (with explosives or flame to be fired after the enemy has occupied it). b. casualties lties and Dead Space. Space. Obstacles in these areas are designed to inflict casua restrict infantry movement in areas that are concealed from observation and protected from direct fire. c. underground nderground s systems ystems that could provide Underground Unde rground Syste Systems ms.. Exits from u adversaries with advantageous positions within or behind the defence must be denied.

Fig C-1 C-133-2 2 Undergrou nd Obstacles SECTION 3 - MINES  MINES 

5. may ay be used individually to reinforce other barriers but are General.. Anti-tank mines m General normally used in quantity quantity to form minefields. In the context of urban operations they would usually be used on on the approaches, rathe ratherr than within an urban area. They can be laid where no natural obstacle exists, but are more effective when laid to strengthen other obstacles. They should alwa always ys be sited to fit the o overall verall tactical plan and form part of the Issue 4: Oct 09

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combined arms obstac obstacle le integration plan. It is on only ly by dominating a minefield and preventing interference with it that the defenders can rely on it as an obstacle; it must be under observation and preferably covered by direct fire, though indirect fire may suffice. The location of mines must be correctly recorded. 6. Considerations for the use of Mines in Urban Areas. Areas . Many of the factors and principles normally considered in the siting and design of minefields in rural areas have to be adapted in order to be fully e effective ffective within the urban environment. Vehicular movemen movementt is far more restricted in a built up area where channelling is often unavoidable and the selected route of a vehicle vehicle more predictable. Fields of fire will be reduced requiring greater use of mines in denying dea dead d ground to the en enemy. emy. Concealment of mines will also become more difficult and different techniques will need to be employed if the mines are to be successfully successfully deployed. There are fou fourr types of mine minefield. field. Due to the many limiting factors, large tactical minefields do n not ot normally have a place in the urban battlefield. The remaining 3 types of minefield can all be used to great effect. a. which h is part of a formation obs obstacle tacle plan, the aim of Tactical.. A minefield whic Tactical which will normally be to break up the enemy's advance, deflect him into a killing area or delay him to give give the anti-tank weapons better targets. They are usually laid mechanically by engineers and are of a considerable size, often being several kilometres in length and many hundreds of metres in depth. b. Protective.. These are for the close in protection of a defensive position or Protective installation and their their laying is an all arms respon responsibility. sibility. They are us usually ually laid by hand and play an important part in enhancing the effectiveness of a defended locality in a built up area. c. assault ault pion pioneers. eers. They are u used sed Nuisance.. These are laid by engineers or ass Nuisance in an effort to delay and disorganise the enemy and to hinder his use of an area or route. This is the type of minefield most likely to be e encountered ncountered in the urban environment. d. Phoney.. An area free of live mines that is usually fe Phoney fenced nced and marked a as s a minefield with the object object of deceiving the enemy. When used e effectively ffectively they can impose similar delays as the real thing as the enemy will treat it in the same way as a live m minefield. inefield. Phoney minefields also enable friendly forces freedom of manoeuvre (for example a counter attack through a phoney minefield). SECTION 4 - DEMOLITIONS 7. The use of demolitions on offensive or defensive operations in urban terrain is likely to be far more common common than during operations in open, na natural tural terrain. Demolitions should be carried out by engineers or assault pion pioneers. eers. However, if eng engineers ineers are involve involved d in higher priority tasks, the preparation of mousehole charges, breaching of walls and destruction of building buildings s may be a accomplished ccomplished by infan infantry try assa assault ult pione pioneers. ers. When assaulting or clearing a built-up area, demolitions will enable the commander to create an

avenue of approach approach through buildings. The creation of mou mouse se holes provides the safest method of moving between rooms and floors

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SECTION SECT ION 5 - B OOBY TRAPS 8. General.. Booby traps have been employed over the years to prevent forces from General freely moving into certain area areas s and res restricting tricting their actions once they get there. The military aims of a booby trap are: a.

Restrict enemy movement.

b.

Create casualties.

c.

Stretch medical resources.

d.

Lower morale.

e.

Create confusion and uncertainty.

f.

Deny comfort and facilities to the enemy.

 All of these points help to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy. A small well motivated booby trap/sabotage trap/sabotage team can create havoc. Unfortunately most a armies rmies use these tactics and whilst the UK Army controls its deployment of booby traps, many adversaries may deploy them at random. With no records kep kept, t, no knowledge of dev devices ices used, often the first indication of devices is when when you take you yourr first casualty. Always assume b booby ooby traps have been deployed until proved otherwise. 9. charges arges may be u used sed to cause damage Offensive Operations. Operations . During raids, delay ch and casualties and also also to create confusion. Traps may be left behind to delay delay a counterattack. 10. with ith nuisance mine mines s on likely lines of Defensiv De fensiv e Opera Operatio tio ns ns.. In addition to their use w approach for men and vehicles, booby traps may be laid in advance of an enemy interspersed amongst tactical obstacles, for instance minefields, wire fences and roadblocks, to impede infantry and prevent detailed reconnaissance and attempted neutralization. Within built up areas areas traps ma may y be laid where platoons are likely to have RVs, such as empty buildings, and also areas likely to be used as fire positions. 11. particularly rticularly valuable weapon to withdrawing Delay De lay Operatio ns ns.. Booby traps are a pa troops as they will slow down any pursuit by inflicting casualties and instilling caution into their movements. Traps will be laid in m much uch the same way as nuisance m mines, ines, being sited in locations which will deny the enemy the use of buildings, approach routes and attractive harbour areas. The presence of booby traps will make troops wary wary and they are likely to treat many harmless situations with extreme caution thereby reducing the rate of advance unduly. 12. reduction ction of casualties from Detection.. The detection of enemy booby traps and the redu Detection them is largely a matter of discipline and training. Knowledge of the subject must b be e

combined with keen keen eyesight an and d a suspicious mind. Every soldier ne needs eds to learn to lo look ok for the signs of unusual activity which will warn of traps, such as absence of people, battery wrappings, wire clippings, loose floorboards etc.

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13. anti-lift ti-lift devices may only be employed on on the orders of the Laying.. Booby traps and an Laying formation commander. If authorised, boob booby y traps should o only nly be laid by Royal Engineers and infantry assault pioneers. 14. Recording.. Units setting booby traps are responsible for recording them. It is Recording essential that accurate records be kept so that traps may be recovered should friendly troops be required to move to the area. Records should be kept at Divisional Divisional HQ which is responsible for informing neighbouring units of the location of booby traps. 15. Marking.. Booby traps are to be marked as soon as they are encountered in an Marking effort to warn troops and prevent ca casualties. sualties. Signs should, whe whenever never possible, be fixed above ground and and in a prominent place to av avoid oid confusion. Policy and method o off marking will be decided by the appropriate commander. It will usually be the same as a mine marking sign (NATO mine triangle). 16. of traps rests Clearance.. Although the responsibility for detection and clearance of Clearance primarily with the Royal Engineers and assault pioneers, other arms are required to maintain detachments trained for the work for the immediate protection of the unit. 17. offensive ive operations all arms must be prepared to a accept ccept the d danger anger Traps.. In offens Traps arising from traps and Royal Engineers should, if possible, accompany the detailed reconnaissance to discover discover the existence o off traps. Even where time and pers personnel onnel are not available to clear the traps, dangerous sites should be marked for the benefit of other troops.

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 AB BREVIA TIONS

1BW 2IC

1st Battalion, The Black Watch Second-in-Command

‘A’ Vehicle  AA  ABCA  AD  AFV  AFM  AIF  AH  AO  AOP  APFSDS  APC  APDS`

Armoured Vehicle Avenue of Approach American, British, Canadian, Aus Australian tralian and New Zealand Air Defence Armoured Fighting Vehicle Army Field Manual Anti-Iraqi Forces Forces   Attack Helicopter Area of Operations Air Observation Posts Armour Piercing, Fin Stabilised, Disca Discarding rding Sabot Armoured Personnel Carrier Armour Piercing Discarding Sa Sabot bot

 AR  ASM  Avn

 Armored Reconnaissance Reconnaissance (US) Armored (US) Anti-Structure Munition Aviation

BAE BC BCU BE BEMA BG BGE BIC BMP

Battlefield Area Evaluation (RA) Battery Commander Battery Coolant Unit Base Ejecting Bulk Earth Moving Attachment Battlegroup Battlegroup Engineer   Break-In Charge Boyevaya Mashina Pekhoty (Боевая Машина Пехоты - Fighting Vehicle of Infantry)

C2 C3 C4IRM

Command and Control Command, Control, Communications Medical Command, Control, Communication, Computerisation, Information, Recording and Management and Medical Logistics. Combat Air Patrol Combat Aid Post Cartridge Close Air Support Casualty Evacuation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Close Combat Attack Collateral Damage Estimate

CAP CAP Cart CAS CASEVAC CBRN CCA CDE

CDLC Cdo CEP CI CIDNE

Charge Demolition Cutting Commando Casualty Exchange Point Counter-Intelligence  Counter-Intelligence  Combined Information Data Network Exchange Exchange  

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CIMIC CLP CLU CM CNO CO COH COIN COP Coy CP CPERS CR CS CSM CSS CTA CVR(T) CVR(T)

Civil Military Co-operation Co-operation   Combat Logistic Patrol Command Launch Unit Centimetre Computer Network Operation Commanding Officer Coalition Operations Handbook Counter Insurgency (US) Combat Outpost Company Command Post Captured Personnel Combat Recovery Close Support Company Sergeant-Major Combat Service Support Closed Telescope Ammunition Combat Vehicle Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e (Tracked) Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance (Tracked

CWS Cylume

Crew-Served Weapon Sight Fluorescent Light Marker

DA DAS DD Det Cord DF DF DfID DHC DS DSO

Direct Attack Defensive Aids Suites Delay Deep Detonation Cord Direct Fire Defensive Fire Department for International Development Deployed Health Care (DHC) Delay Shallow Decision Support Overlay

EBW ECM EEO EHLS EIH EMOE EO EOD ERW ES

Enhanced Blast Weapon Electronic Counter Measures Emplaced Explosive Ordnance Emergency Helicopter Landing Site Environmental and Industrial Hazard Explosive Method of Entry Electro-Optical Exploded Ordnance Disposal Explosive Remnants of War Equipment Support

FAC FFD

Forward Air Controller First Field Dressing

1

FIBUA Fig FLOT FMV FOO

Fighting in Built Up Areas Figure Forward Line, Own Troops Full Motion Video (RA) Forward Observation Officer

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FP FPF FPM FR FRT FSC FST FTB Fwd AE

Force Protection Final Protective Fire Force Provost Marshal Formation Reconnaissanc Reconnaissance e Forward Repair Team Fire Support Centre Fire Support Team Follow-Through Bomb Forward Aero-Medical Evacuation

G2 GC GBAD GCS GEOINT GM GMG GMLRS GPMG

General (Staff Operations) Two (Intelligence) Geneva Convention Ground Based Air Defence Ground Control Station Geospatial Intelligence) Guided Missile Grenade Machine Gun Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket Systems General Purpose Machine Gun

GPMG (SF) General P Purpose urpose M Machine achine G Gun un (Susta (Sustained ined Fire) GPS Global Positioning System GR Grid Reference HE HEDP HESH HLS HMNVS HN HQ HUMINT HVTL

High Explosive High Explosive (Dual Purpose) High Explosive (Squash Head) Helicopter Landing Site Head Mounted Night Vision System Host Nation Headquarters Human Intelligence High Value Target List

ICP ICRC ID IED IFF IFV II Illum IMINT IPE IPB IR

Intelligence Collection Plan International Committee of the Red Cross Identification Improvised Explosive Device Identification (Friend of Foe) Infantry Fighting Vehicle Image Intensifier Illumination Imagery Intelligence Individual Protection Equipment Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Infra-Red

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

IST ISTAR IT

Intimate Support Team Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance Information Technology

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JARIC JDAM JDP JF JIC JOA JRIC JSP JWP

Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre Joint Direct Attack Munition Joint Doctrine Publication Joint Force Joint Intelligence Cell Joint Area of Operations Reconnaissance e Intelligence Cell Joint Reconnaissanc Joint  Joint Service Publication Joint Warfare Publication

KG KLE

Kilogram Key Leader Engagement

LAW LCAD LEGAD LM LMG LO

Light Anti-Tank Weapon Lightweight Chemical Agent Detector Legal Advisor Light Manoeuvre Light Machine Gun Liaison Officer

LOAC LofC LM LOO LOS LSM LSW LTD LWT

Law of Armed Conflict Line of Communication Loitering Munition Line of Operation Line of Sight Last Safe Moment Light Support Weapon Laser Target Designator Light Wheeled Tractor

MACE MANPAD MASINT MBT MC MCAD MD MDA MEDEVAC MERT MFC ML MM MNF-I MO MPS

Military Assistance to Civil Effect Man-Pack Air Defence Missile System Measurement and Signature Intelligence Main Battle Tank Mobility Corridor Manportable Chemical Agent Detector Most Dangerous (COA) Main Defensive Area Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC Medical Emergency Response Team Mortar Fire Controller Most Likely (COA) Millimetre Multinational Force - Information Modus Operandi Military Provost Service

3

MSR

Main Supply Route

MWT

Medium Wheeled Tractor

NATO NEQ NGO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Net Explosive Quality Non-Governmental Organisation

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NGS NLAW NOE NVD

Naval Gunfire Support New Light Anti-Tank Weapon Nap of the Earth Night Vision Device

OAS OC Off Ops OGD OP OPCOM OPCON Ops OPSEC OS OSCE OSINT OTS

Offensive Air Support Officer Commanding Offensive Operations Other Government Department Observation Post Operational Command Operational Control Operations Operations Security Security   Offensive Support Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Open-source intelligence Over-fly Target Attack

Pam PAR PD PE PH PHC PHEC PHF PHO PID PIR Pl Sgt PM PPP PREE PRR PSO Psyops PW

Pamphlet Population at Risk Point Detonating Plastic Explosive Prisoner Handling Primary Health Care Pre Hospital Emergency Care Prisoner Handling Force Prisoner Handling Organisation Positive Identification Priority Intelligence Requirements Platoon Sergeant Provost Marshal Presence, Posture and Profile Plan Review Execute Evaluate Personal Role Radio Peace Support Operation Psychological Operations Prisoner of War

QRF

Quick Reaction Force

RAP RE Recce REME

Regimental Aid Post Royal Engineers Reconnaissance Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers

RF

Radar Frequency

RGJ RM RMO RMP ROE

Royal Green Jackets Royal Marines Regimental Medical Officer Royal Military Police Rules of Engagement

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RP RPG RPO-A RShG-1   RShG-1 RUSI RV

Red Phosphorous Rocket Propelled Grenade (Russia) Schmel Rocket Launcher (РПО- А Шмель) (" Bumblebee" )  (Russia)  (Russia) Assault Rocket-Propelled Grenade  Grenade  Royal United Services Institute Rendezvous

SA SA SA80 SAL SAM SEAD Ser SF SF SH SIB SIGINT

Situational awareness Small Arms Small Arms 80 (UK Army Rifle) Semi-Active Laser Surface to Air Missile Suppression of Enemy Air Defence Serial Security Force Special Forces Support Helicopter Special Investigation Branch Signals Intelligence

SMK SOHB SOI SOP SSA SP Pol SSR STAP STIC SVR

Smoke (UK Army) Staff Officers’ Handbook Standing Operational Instructions Standing Operational Procedures Shared Situational Awareness Services’ Personnel Policy Support to Security Sector Reform Surveillance and Target Acquisition Plan Sniper Thermal Imaging Capability Secure Voice Rebroadcast

TACOM TACSAT TAR TCM TE TI TI TIH TriM TQ TTPs

Tactical Command Tactical Satellite Tactical Air Reconnaissance Thermal Camouflage Material Threat Evaluation Thermal Imagery Threat Integration Toxic Industrial Hazard Trauma Risk Management Tactical Questioning Tactics, Techniques, Procedures

UAV UCM UDT

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Urban Camouflage Material User Data Terminals

5

UGL

Under Slung Grenade Launcher

UGV UHF UK UN US

Unmanned Ground Vehicle Ultra High Frequency United Kingdom United Nations United States

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UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force USMC United States Marine Corps UXO Unexploded Ordnance VBIED VCP VHF

Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Vehicle Check Point Very High Frequency

Wks Gp RE Works Group Royal Engineers WP White Phosphorous