A2013 Law 116 (Legal Method) MSFeliciano

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 I.

Introduction A. The Case Method  The Common Law Doctrinal Framework (MD Rombauer) o 2 doctrines that work at within the common law framework  Stare decisis – a court will generally follow its prior decisions and a court is expected to follow decisions of the courts of which it is subordinate  Doctrine of precedents – if a court within a similar legal system has previously considered and resolved a particular problem, its decision is worthy of consideration in resolution of future similar cases o 2 types of authority value for judicial precedents  Mandatory – all those which a court should generally consider itself bound to follow - Will depend upon a determination of what law governs - In a given case the mandatory precedents may be those of a court or courts outside the jurisdiction within which a particular case is pending - “Directly in point”  Question resolved in the precedent case is the same as the question to be resolved in the pending case  That resolution of that question was necessary to disposition of the precedent case o Courts should decide only the cases presented to them o Courts create law for future cases is only incidental to their resolution of particular disputes o Dictum – language not necessary to the court’s resolution of the problem; future courts in the same jurisdiction would not be bound to decide a future case in accordance with it.  While a court is not bound to follow dicta from prior mandatory opinions, it may do so.  If Dicta may be considered and well reasoned, it may be persuasive  If the membership of a court has not substantially changed, the court may be inclined to follow its prior dicta  Dicta from a mandatory precedent may ve more persuasive to a trial court than other forms of authority  That the significant facts of the precedent case are also present in the pending case  No additional facts appear in the pending case which might be treated as significant  Persuasive – those which a court should consider and may be inclined to follow o A court may overrule its prior decisions o It may also overrule the decisions of courts subordinate to it o Ideally, an overruling is express – the court discusses the precedent and gives reasons for the decision to overrule it o Implied overrule: a court may reach a result in a pending case which is inconsistent with a directly-in-point, mandatory precedent without mentioning the precedent o Effect of overruling: to deprive a precedent of its mandatory character and reduce its persuasiveness in other jurisdictions. o Factors which make opinion Analysis Difficult  Lack of acquaintance with legal terms, particularly procedural terms  The variant thinking habits and writing styles of judges produce variant degrees of ambiguity of the kinds that can be found in most written communications  Words with multiple meanings: semantic ambiguity – particular meaning intended may not be clear in a particular context  Syntactic ambiguity – uncertainties of modification or reference, unresolved by context  Contextual ambiguity – inconsistencies, either internal (e.g., inconsistent statements within an opinion) or external (e.g., statements which are inconsistent with statements in a n opinion of the same court in an analogous case  Also a consequence of appellate court systems of operation  Most appellate courts have more than one judge, and an opinion, like some committee documents, may have several contributors with only a single acknowledged author  Pressure for majority agreement contributes to lack of clarity + press of time may prevent a judge from writing and organizing well  There may not be a single opinion for a particular case  Dissenting opinion – an opinion explaining the reasons for disagreeing and perhaps explaining in detail what decision the dissenter would have reached, and why.  Concurring opinion – an opinion where a judge may agree with the decision of the majority but reach that decision by different reasoning  There is not an opinion of “the court” although “the court” may have reached a decision (e.g. 4Js=one opinion; 2Js=concurring; 3Js=dissenting)  No decision by the court  4Js=X; 4Js=Y; 1J=Z  Dicta may not be easy to recognize  What part of a prior opinion is the “decision” which a court may feel compelled to follow?  How does one determine “the rules or principles which appear to have been established by prior decisions?  Is overly broad language to be treated as dicta? o Opinion Analysis  Facts  Significant facts  those which affected the decision  You must read an entire opinion before finally deciding which facts are significant  Procedure  You must identify and understand the procedural details mentioned in every opinion which you analyze  Identification of the procedural point appealed may help you identify the issue on appeal  The nature of the action and the remedy sought will be significant as factors limiting the scope of a particular decision  Lower court’s reasoning may be regarded as part of the procedural details  The Question or issue Before the Court  Analysis requires precise identification of the issue or issues decided  The substantive decision can be stated by restating the issue in affirmative form if the answer is yes or in negative form if the answer is no 1 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

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 Precise identification of the substantive decision requires precise identification of the question decided  Initial attempts: try to identify the hierarchy of issues by asking the same “why” question until you arrive at the specific question which the court appears to answer.  Decision  Merely a statement of the procedural action taken or directed with reference to the case before it  Describe the substantive result in a case  Reasoning  Either it can apply an existing rule, or it can develop a new or variant rule  2 types: - Justifying application of an existing rule - Justifying a result Writing and Analysis in the Law (HS Shapo) o Briefing a Case: Finding thee Parts of a Judicial Decision  Facts  Describe the events between the parties that led to the litigation and tell how the case came before the court that is now deciding it  You will not know which facts are relevant until you know what the issue or issues are  You should also include the relevant background of the case  Issues  The question that the court must decide to resolve the dispute between the parties in the case before it  You have to identify the rule of law that governs the dispute and ask how it should apply to those facts  Holdings  The court’s decision on the question that was actually before it  Court may make a number of legal statements, but if they do not relate to the question actually before it, they are dicta.  Reasoning  Explains and supports the court’s decision  It is important to isolate the court’s reasoning from the facts and the holding of the case  Policy  Social policies or goals that the decision-maker wishes to further o Using the Parts of a Judicial Decision  Reasoning by Analogy  Under the doctrine of precedent, judges decide cases according to principles laid down in earlier similar cases  Cases are analogous if they are alike in ways that are important to their outcome and if the differences between them are not enough to destroy that analogy  Issues the court dealt with must be the same or similar in important ways to the issues in your case Obiter Dicta (LF Read) o Judicial Overview  Obiter dicta – court opinions that go into general propositions or make prophetic statements of how the court is likely to act upon other possible or even probable issues that have not yet arisen are not the law and are not binding on anyone o Definition and Function  That useless chatter of judges, indulged in for reasons known only to them, to be printed at public expense ^__^  A gratuitous opinion – whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong, bindeth non, not even the lips that utter it. o Binding Effect  The opinion though presented by a single judge, is nevertheless the opinion of the court, and those who concur therein stand sponsor for its contents  Although not compelling as a precedent, the chances are that the expression is a sound one o Boomerang Effect PACU v. Secretary of Education Facts: Petitioners request that Act No. 2706 (“An Act making the inspection and recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction”) be declared unconstitutional on the following grounds: (1) Act deprives owners of colleges and universities liberty and property without due process, (2) deprives parents of natural right and duty to rear children for civic efficiency, (3) provisions to confer the Secretary of Education unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute unlawful delegation of legislative power. Held: Petitioners have no standing + case is moot and academic. Dicta: Abuse by officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such. The remedy is to challenge these regulations set by the Department and not the law itself. It can be submitted to proper authorities. Geluz v. CA Facts: Wife had abortion three times; the first two known to the husband, but he didn’t know of the third. Husband sued for damages against the physician. Held: Husband cannot be awarded for damages in behalf of his unborn child because the child did not acquire juridical capacity. Dicta: That Abortion is a crime and physician should be criminally liable. Teleron v. Pamil Facts: Fr. Margarito Gonzaga was elected mayor of Bohol. Petition for quo warranto was filed for his disqualification based on the Adminitrative Code, that no ecclesiastic may be appointed or elected in a municipal office. The suit did not prosper, respondent judge held that such ineligibility was already impliedly repealed by the 1971 Election Code. Hence the appeal. Held: (Dicta, because of failure to gather 8 votes for it to have binding effect) Fr. Gonzaga is eligible; 1935 Constitution explicitly declared that “No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.” The invoked section of the Administrative Code is inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. Furthermore, it is not necessary to annul the Administrative Code provision because it is already inoperative by the virtue of the mandate of the 1935 Constitution. Villanueva, Jr. v. CA Facts: 2 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 Held:  Ayala v. Rosa-Diana Realty Development Corp. Facts: Held: B. Feminist Legal Methods  Feminist Legal Methods (KT Bartlett)  Legal Methodology in Some Mixed Jurisdictions (JT Monge) II. Background A. The Philippine Legal System  The Legal System of the Philippines (MS Feliciano)  The Legal System: Analytical Reasoning and Legal Authorities (DB Gatmaytan) III. Statutes and their Enactment A. Definition  Laws, generally o Refers to the whole body or system of law o A rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory vy legitimate power of the state o Includes statutes enacted by the legislature, PDs, and EOs issued by the President, rulings of the Supreme Court construing the law, rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or executive officers pursuant to a delegated power, and ordinances passed by sanggunians of LGUs.  Statutes, Generally o An act of legislature as an organized body, expressed in the form, and passed according to the procedure, required to constitute it as part of the law of the land o those passed by the Philippine commission, the Philippine Legislature, the Batasang Pambansa, and the Congress of the Philippines. o Public Statute  one which affects the public at large or the whole community  General – one which applies to the whole state and operates throughout the state alike upon all the people or all of a class; one which embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any subject or place naturally belonging to such class  Special – one which relates to particular persons or thing of a class or a particular community, individual or thing.  Local – one whose operation is confined to a specific place or locality (e.g., municipal ordinance) o Private Statute one which applies onoly to a specific person or subject B. Classification of Statutes  According to duration o Permanent – one whose operation is not limited in duration but continues until repealed o Temporary – a statute whose duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event  According to application o Prospective o Retroactive  According to operation o Declaratory o Curative – healing acts; rule: if the thing omitted or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be removed or made harmless, is something which the legislature might have dispensed with by a previous statute, may do so by a subsequent one o Mandatory o Directory o Substantive – a law which creates, defines or regulates rights concerning life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or insturmentalities for the administration of public affairs o Remedial – remedial by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations o Penal  In respect to forms o Affirmative o Negative C. Parts of a Statute 1. Title  Constitution, Art. VI, Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. – mandatory provision  Legislature is to refrain from conglomeration of heterogeneous subjects  The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof  Purpose o to apprise the legislators of the object, nature and scope of the provisions of the bill o to prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators o to prohibit duplicity in legislation o to prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling of legislation o to prevent surprise or fraud upon legislature, by means of ptovisions in bills of which the title gave no information o to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings, of the subjects of the legislation that are being heard thereon o aimed against the evils of omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well as surreptitious or unconsidered enactments o used as a guide in ascertaining legislative intent when the language of the act does not clearly express its purpose o not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure  if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead anyone, there is sufficient compliance. 3 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

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o Court: liberal construction of the rule  Subject of repeal of statute o Repealing section in a new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. o Where a statute repeals a former law such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute  How requirement of title construed o Liberal construction o Where there is doubt as to whether the title sufficiently expresses the subject mater of the statute, the question should be resolved against the doubt and in favor of the constitutionality of the statute  When requirement not applicable o Applies only to bills which may thereafter be enacted into law o Does not apply to laws in force and existing at the time the 1935 constitution took effect.  Effect of insufficiency of title o Statute = null and void o Where subject matter od a statute is not sufficiently expressed in its title, only so much of the subject matter as is not express therein is void; unless that provision is inseparable to the others, then the rest of statute remains in force.  Lidasan v. COMELEC Facts: RA 4790 “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Norte” was questioned because the title did not reflect the fact that 2 barrios from the adjacent province, Cotabato, were included in the new municipality formed. Held: Statute was declared unconstitutional because the title did not inform the legislature of persons interested as to the full impact of the law.  Tobias v. Abalos Facts: RA 7675 recognized San Juan and Mandaluyong as distinct representative districts and was challenged for not mentioning any census which indicated that the two cities had the minimum requirement of 250k inhabitants needed to constitute a district, and for resulting in the membership of the House of Representatives to go above the 250-member limit. Held: Court held that Congress had made due consideration of the minimum requirement in the creation of new representative districts, and that the 250-member limit provided in the Constitution is not an absolute value. 2. Enacting Clause  That part of a statute written immediately after the title thereof which states the authority by which the act is enacted  “Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:” 3. Preamble  A prefatory statement or explanation or a finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason or occasion form making the law to which it is prefixed.  Usually found after the enacting clause and before the body  Legislature seldom puts a preamble  reason: it is put in the explanatory note  PDs and EOs generally have preambles 4. Purview  That part which tells what the law is all about  Should embrace only one subject matter  A short title, policy section, definition section, administrative section, sections prescribing standards of conduct, section imposing sanctions for violation of its provisions, transitory provision, separability clause, repealing clause and effectivity clause 5. Other Clauses  Separability Clause o States that if any provision of the act is declared invalid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby o Nullity of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act o Not controlling; courts may invalidate the whole statute where what is left is not complete and workable  Repealing Clause  Effectivity Clause o When the law takes effect o Usually, provision states that it shall take effect 15 days from publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation Rules on Legislative Drafting  Statutes and Their Construction (L Gonzaga) o Two steps involved in legislative drafting: 1.) Ethical or Formulation of Policy, and 2.) Technical or the Mechanics of Bill Drafting. 1. Formulation of Policy  There are two kinds of policy: i.) basic policy, and ii.) immediate objective.  Basic policy is the general or overall principle that everyone has agreed upon, while the immediate objective is more specific and targeted.  Policy is determined by the judgment of legislators, with the assistance of specialists, pressure-groups, and others. 2. The Drafting of a Statute  Legislative drafting involves: i.) mastery of language, and ii.) research.  Drafters should also take note of: "(a) The exact state of facts in the field to which the law will relate; (b) The form of previous statutes relating to the same subject in the same jurisdictions; (c) The form of previous statutes relating to the same subject in other jurisdictions; (d) The amnner in which such statutes have actually operated; (e) The consensus of opinion among experts as to the best method for meeting the problem."  The Legislative Reference Service renders technical assistance to Congress by indexing Philippine laws and drafting bills. 3. Objectives of the Draftsman  Drafters should "make his readers understand what is commanded and what is forbidden by the law."  They should not adopt the style of literary composition, but should be "more like that of a man who writes directions on how to use a kodak or how to use a Burroughs Calculator.  This practice will help minimize problems in interpretation. 4 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010  But no matter how precise a statute is crafted, there will still be gaps and ambiguities because: i.) one cannot forsee all the possible consequences of the relations between language, and the persons or situations where it might apply, and ii.) courts in some cases would want to follow a certain policy direction which the statute does not cover. 4. Problems of Drafting  Either related to the form and structure of the statute, or the language used.  Form and Structure o Dividing statutes into sections makes them flexible and facilitates amendments. o Drafters should follow proper construction and logical development of sections and other parts of a statute.  Length of Sections o There is no rule on how long or short sections may be, but it should be "made as brief as may be compatible with accuracy."  Sentence Structure o A legislative declaration consists of a "legal subject" and a "legal action." o More complex provisions also have a "case" where its operation is confined, and "conditions" which trigger its operation. o The Problem of Language o Statutes should be written in "clear, simple, and concise language," but when they deal with technical matters, like laws regulating accounting practices for instance, specialized terms are unavoidable. o Drafters should also avoid variations in expression, that "the same word should not be used in different senses," and that when one word is used, it should be used and defined uniformly throughout the statute. o The present tense should also be used, as it requires less words.  Legislative Analysis and Drafting (WP Statsky) 5. Steps in the Enactment of the Statute  Constitution, Art. VI, Section 26(2). No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.  Constitution, Art. VI, Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. (2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.  Agpalo (see appendix)  Senate Rules  HoR Rules  Commission of Internal Revenue v. CTA Facts: Held:  Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 1 Facts: Republic Act 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. However, the constitutionality of RA 7716 was being challenged on the grounds of its procedural and substantial aspects. 2 Held: Does RA 7716 violate Art VI Sec 24 of the Constitution? NO. It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. Because a bill originating in the House may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the whole. As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute must substantially be the same as the House Bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose amendments”. It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate. Given the power of the Senate to propose amendments, the Senate can propose its own version even with respect to bills which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House of Representatives can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. The Senators, on the other hand, are expected to approach the problem on national perspective. Both views are thereby 3 made to bear on the enactment of such laws.Does it violate Art VI Sec 26 (2) violate the constitution? NO. The president had certified 1

Value Added Tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. 2

Art VI Sec 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. 3

Art VI Sec 26 (2): No Bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members three days before its passage, except when the president certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote theeon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the journal. 5 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 S.No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of three readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of the legislative practice.What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee? The conference committee shall settle the differences of Senate and House of Congress. It shall make a detailed and sufficient report with explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.  Arroyo v. de Venecia Court ruled that it has no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress, unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Pivotal issue was not lack of quorum, but lack of opportunity to raise lack of quorum, a procedural not constitutional requirement. Also, the enrolled bill theory holds in upholding the principle of separation of powers. Evidence of Due Enactment of Statutes 1. Enrolled Bill Theory  the duly authenticated copy of the bill, signed by the proper officers of each house, and approved by the President, is conclusive upon the courts not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.  Field v. Clark Facts: Held:  Mabanag v. Lopez Vito Parity rights amendment pass by a slim margin. May the court intervene and stop enforcement of the policy? Petitioners claim 11 legislators failed to vote against the bill; COMELEC cites election irregularities in suspension. Doctrine: On the issue of jurisdiction vis-à-vis conclusiveness of an enacted bill – Court said it was a substantive matter vs. a matter of evidence. It dismissed the complaint. Influenced if not dictated by President Manuel Roxas, the majority justices held that the question raised was political in nature and so beyond their jurisdiction. It took all of 10 years for the case of Tañada v Cuenco to reject that false doctrine  Casco Phil Chemical Co. v. Gimenez Importation subject to foreign exchange margin fee, but urea and formaldehyde as principal raw materials for glue are exempted. Is urea formaldehyde also exempted? No, it is an intermediate product, in a sense already a finished product. Doctrine: The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary, except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill (from Mabanag). If there was mistake in printing, remedy may only be sought through remedial or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.  Morales v. Subido Morales, already as acting Manila chief of police, is disqualified by the CSC from permanent appointment because he lacks minimum educational and civil service eligibility. Issue is on eligibility vis-à-vis qualification. The Police Act is clear on the qualifications; a favorable amendment was introduced early in the debates but disappeared when the bill was finalized. Enrolled bill is binding, history is not. 2.

Journal Entry Rule  evidence appearing in legislative journals may help determine the validity of the a statute that has been challenged on constitutional grounds. Nevertheless, the enrolled bill is the only prima facie evidence valid.

 Smith v. Thompson Held:  Astorga v. Villegas Upon being informed that the enrolled bill did not contain the amendment proposed by Senator Tolentino (regarding the powers of the Vice-Mayor of Manila) when the House bill was raised to the Senate, the Senate President withdrew his signature and notified the President of the mistake, who then likewise withdrew his signature. Fact is, there was no opportunity to apply enrolled bill theory. Doctrine: Journals of Congress may be resorted to when there is alleged discrepancy between draft and final texts of a statute. Here, journal showed that substantial and lengthy amendments were accepted but not included in final version signed by president. Validity of Statute  Requisites for exercise of judicial power/review - Actual case or controversy - Standing - Mootness - Political Question IV. Effect and Application of Statutes A. When Statute Becomes Effective  General Rule: Where the law is silent as to its effectivity, CC, 2 applies.  CC, 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.  CC, 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.  EO 200, as amended by EO292 Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.  Tañada v. Tuvera Held: All laws or statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition of their effectivity. For a law which is made effective by legislature upon its approval or on any other date without previous publication will violate the due process clause of the Constitution which requires its publication before it becomes binding.  Phil. Veterans Bank Employees v. Vega Facts: Dispute as to time, when a rehabilitation order by law became effective. In ongoing liquidation proceedings, judge proceeded saying effectivity of RA 7169 is conditional on the approval of a rehab plan by the Monetary Board. Had the law divested from the judge the authority to proceed with liquidation? Yes. 6 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

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Held: Doctrine: Although it is the general rule that laws become effective only after 15 days following publication in the OG, Congress has the discretion to provide otherwise. In this case, Sec. 10 of RA 7169 states that the said law takes effect upon its approval. Signed by the President on Jan 2, 1992, the law is deemed to have taken effect that date. When Regulation Becomes Effective  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 2. (definitions)  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 6. Omission of Some Rules. - (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.  EO 292, Book VII Sec. 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.  People v. Que Po Lay Facts: Held: A person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette  Yaokasin v. Commissioner of Customs Facts: Customs seize 9000 bags of sugar owned by Yaokasin. RTC granted replevin but Customs appealed saying commissioner of Customs has power of automatic review over the decisions of the collector of customs in protest and seizure cases per MO 20-87 implementing Sec. 12 of the Internal Revenue Plan. Enforceable even if not published in the OG? Yes. Doctrine: The acting commissioner, in issuing the memo circular was directing strict compliance with an existing provision of law, which mandates automatic review of decisions of collectors in seizure and protest cases which are adverse to the government. Protects the interest of the government in the collection of taxes and customs duties. Without the automatic review, collector would have unbridled discretion in determination of smuggled goods. The decision of the collector, unless appealed by the aggrieved party, would be final. The owner of the goods cannot be expected to appeal the collector’s decision when it is favorable to him. A decision that is favorable to the taxpayer would correspondingly be unfavorable to the government. Also, it was only an administrative order of the commissioner of customs to his subordinates. MO 20-87 requiring customs collectors to comply with Sec. 12 of the IRP is an issuance to only particular persons or a class of persons. Need not be published, on the assumption that it has been circularized to all concerned.  Phil. International Trading Corp. v. COA Facts: PITC’s charter expressly exempted it from the law decreeing the position classification and compensation system. COA contended that the PITC charter has been impliedly repealed by Sec16 of RA6758 (All laws, decrees, EOs, corporate charters, etc, that exempt agencies from the coverage of the System, or that authorize and fix position classifications … are hereby repealed.) Held: There was implied repeal the legislative intent to do so being manifest  GMA Network, Inc v. MTRCB Facts: Held: Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. When Ordinance Takes Effect  LGC, 54. Approval of Ordinances. - (a) Every ordinance enacted by the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan shall be presented to the provincial governor or city or municipal mayor, as the case may be. If the local chief executive concerned approves the same, he shall affix his signature on each and every page thereof; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the sanggunian, which may proceed to reconsider the same. The sanggunian concerned may override the veto of the local chief executive by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance or resolution effective for all legal intents and purposes. (b) The veto shall be communicated by the local chief executive concerned to the sanggunian within fifteen (15) days in the case of a province, and ten (10) days in the case of a city or a municipality; otherwise, the ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he had signed it. (c) ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by the majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay.  LGC, 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive. - (a) The local chief executive may veto any ordinance of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan on the ground that it is ultra vires or prejudicial to the public welfare, 7 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

D.

stating his reasons therefor in writing. (b) The local chief executive, except the punong barangay, shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriations ordinance, an ordinance or resolution adopting a local development plan and public investment program, or an ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto in the manner herein provided; otherwise, the item or items in the appropriations ordinance of the previous year corresponding to those vetoed, if any, shall be deemed reenacted. (c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the local chief executive concerned by two-thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval of the local chief executive concerned.  LGC, 56. Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. - (a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to the sanggunian panlungsod or sangguniang bayan shall forward to the sangguniang panlalawigan for review, copies of approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public investment programs formulated by the local development councils. (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances and resolutions, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of his comments or recommendations, which may be considered by the sangguniang panlalawigan in making its decision. (c) If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such an ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in whole or in part. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has taken. (d) If no action has been taken by the sangguniang panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.  LGC, 57. Review of Barangay Ordinances by the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan. - (a) Within ten (10) days after its enactment, the sangguniang barangay shall furnish copies of all barangay ordinances to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned for review as to whether the ordinance is consistent with law and city or municipal ordinances. (b) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, fails to take action on barangay ordinances within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be deemed approved. (c) If the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, finds the barangay ordinances inconsistent with law or city or municipal ordinances, the sanggunian concerned shall, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, return the same with its comments and recommendations to the sangguniang barangay concerned for adjustment, amendment, or modification; in which case, the effectivity of the barangay ordinance is suspended until such time as the revision called for is effected.  LGC, 58. Enforcement of Disapproved ordinances or Resolutions. - Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned.  LGC, 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. (a) Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be, and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned. (b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days after approval thereof. The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned, and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and posting. (c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. (d) In the case of highly urbanized cities, the main features of the ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation.  Bagatsing v. Ramirez Facts: What law shall govern the publication of tax ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila? The Revised City Charter RA 409 (special) or the Local Tax Code P.D. No 231 (general but specific)? Revised Charter of the City of Manila required publication before the enactment and after the approval thereof in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city. The Local Tax Code only prescribes for publication after the approval of “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges” either in a newspaper or publication widely circulated within the jurisdiction of the local government or by posting in the local legislative hall and 2 other conspicuous places. Held: A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its particular provisions. A subsequent general law similarly applicable to all cities prevails over any conflicting charter provision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state. Language o the Statute that Shall Prevail  Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 6. The national language of the Philippines is Filipino. As it evolves, it shall be further developed and enriched on the basis of existing Philippine and other languages. Subject to provisions of law and as the Congress may deem appropriate, the Government shall take steps to initiate and sustain the use of Filipino as a medium of official communication and as language of instruction in the educational system.  Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 7. For purposes of communication and instruction, the official languages of the Philippines are Filipino and, until otherwise provided by law, English. The regional languages are the auxiliary official languages in the regions and shall serve as auxiliary media of instruction therein. Spanish and Arabic shall be promoted on a voluntary and optional basis.  Constitution, Art. XIV, Sec. 8. This Constitution shall be promulgated in Filipino and English and shall be translated into major regional languages, Arabic, and Spanish. 8 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

E.

F.

G.

 EO 292, 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. - (1) Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. (2) If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. (3) The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency. Manner of Computing Time  CC, 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise. If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included.  Civil Code – 365-day year and 30-day month  National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson Facts: Held: Year=365 days; But, article 12 defining years as 365days is unrealistic; however, remedy is not judicial legislation. Territorial Extent of Operation  Consti, Art. 1. The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.  RA 9522  CC, 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations.  CC, 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.  RPC, 2. Application of its provisions. — Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code. Prospective and Retrospective Operation of Statutes, Administrative Rulings and Circulars and Judicial Decisions  Constitution, Art. III, sec. 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.  CC, 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.  Adm. Code, Sec. 19. Prospectivity. - Laws shall have prospective effect unless the contrary is expressly provided.  RPC, 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.  Chapter IX, Agpalo o Prospective  One which operates upon facts or transactions that occur after the statute takes effect one that looks and applies to the future  Well-settled rule of statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the intendment of the legislature to give them a retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.  Lex prospoici, non respicit  The law looks forward, not backward  Lex de future, judex de praeterito  the law provides for the future, the judge for the past  Law is a rule established to guide actions with no binding effect until it is enacted; hence, it has no application to past but only future times  Nova constitution futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis  A new statute should affect the future, not the past.  All laws operate prospectively, unless the contrary clearly appears; in every case of doubt, the doubt will e resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. o Retroactive  A law which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already passed  One which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past  Some statutes by nature are intended to be retroactive: remedial and curative laws  General rule: NULLUM CRIMEN SINE POENA, NULLA POENA SINE LEGIS  There is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law  Ex post facto law  A law which makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act  A law which aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed  A law which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment  A law which alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony the the law required at the time of the commission of the offense  A law which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right  A law which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitle 9 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

  



 Bill of Attainder  A legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial  Essence: substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt  Bar  serves to implement the principle of separation of powers  Procedural and Curative laws are given retroactive effect  Procedural: adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their invasion People v. Sumilang Facts: Late filing of motion for reconsideration in arson case, because attorney served as guerilla. Doctrine: Procedural laws are retroactive, and are applicable to cases pending at the time. Salcedo v. Carpio Facts: Held: Retroactive laws are not unconstitutional if they do not impair vested rights. Tiu San v. Republic Facts: Whether the conviction of an applicant for naturalization for violation of a municipal ordinance would disqualify him from taking his oath as a citizen pursuant to a statute which provides that an applicant may be allowed to take his oath as a citizen if after 2 years from the promulgation of the decision granting his petition “has not been convicted of any offense or violation of government rules.” Held: As the law did not make any distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita, the conviction of the applicant for violation of a municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and precluded the applicant from taking his oath. Chavez v. Court of Agrarian Relations The amendment of RA 1199 by RA 2268 providing for the continuance of the relationship in the event of the tenant’s death or incapacity between the landholder and one member of the tenant’s immediate farm household within the second degree of consanguinity and who shall cultivate the land himself personally xxx which took effect on June 19, 1959, cannot be applied retroactively. To hold otherwise would lay open this provision of the law to the objection of unconstitutionality of the ground that it impairs a substantive right that has already become vested (to the landowner).

 Buyco v. PNB Facts: Held:  Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue Facts: Cebu Portland Cement claims that the percentage taxes collected by the CIR are refundable since under RA 1299, producers of cement are exempt from the payment of the said tax. The statute defined the words “minerals” and “mineral products.” Petitioner claims that the purpose of the amendment was merely to clarify the meaning of the said terms, and cement should be considered as a “mineral” product even before the enactment, and therefore exempt from sales or percentage tax, pursuant to the National Internal Revenue Code. Court of Tax Appeals claim APO Portland cement is a manufactured product. Does RA 1299 operate prospectively and exempts “cement” from payment of sales tax as under the term “mineral products”? No. Doctrine: A statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Tax laws operate prospectively, whether they enact, amend or repeal, unless the purpose of the legislature is expressly declared or may clearly be implied from the language used. In case of doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.  DBP v. CA Facts: DBP allocated over a million pesos as budget for a housing project for their employees of 159 lots in the proposed Diliman Estate Subdivision of the People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. (PHHC), and has paid P400,000 in downpayment. RA 3147 passed in 1961 amending certain provisions of the DBP Charter, recognizing the housing benefit. The legality of the project was assailed and during pendency, PHHC sold two blocks to Nicandro couple, although registration incomplete. Court held RA 3146 was passed to cure any doubts on the legality of the acquisition by DBP of realty lots for its employees, and is rendered valid. Doctrine: Curative statutes are forms of retrospective legislation, which reach back on past events to correct errors or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose of the parties intended, but which has failed due to some statutory disability. However, a curative statue may not be given retroactive effect where it will impair vested rights. A vested right is one which is absolute, complete, and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and pefect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.  Tac’an v. CA Facts: Felipe Tac-an executes contract for three-hectares of land in return for lawyering services. But Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu required all contracts to be executed before a judge, justice or notary public and approved by provincial governor. Does repeal of the old AC by RA 4252 be accorded retroactive effect? No. Doctrine: Even if eventually repealed, the statute had full force while in effect. Statute was also substantive in nature so repeal cannot be applied retroactively.  Eugenio v. Drilon Subdivision and Condo Buyers’ Protection PD 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactivity but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law, culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances, and conditions it sought to remedy must be enforced.  Alunan III v. Mirasol Facts: DILG postponed SK elections in Manila by four years to coincide with next elections. Elections had been held only two years before, in 1990. A closer look on the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee clarifies the validity of the KB elections held between 1988 and 1992. The inclusion of the exemption clause of Sec. 532 of the Local Government Code in said Code is a result of the deliberation of the legislators taking into account those elections that have already been held prior to the passage of the law. Such law was deemed to be a curative law. Doctrine: In general, curative laws, which in essence are retrospective in effect, are enacted to validate acts done which otherwise would be invalid under existing laws, by considering them as having complied with the existing laws.  Co v. CA 10 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

V.

Facts: On December 15, 1981, Justice Secretary issued a circular holding that “where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of BP22.” Circular overruled by doctrine in Que v. People. Could Co be held criminally liable under Que ruling for issuing a rubber check to guarantee the performance of an obligation, at a time when the circular has not been reversed? Held: No. Que ruling could not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospectivity principle and the doctrine that the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification is an operative fact negating acceptance of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. Amendment, Revisions and Repeals A. Amendments  Legislature has the authority to amend, subject to constitutional requirements, any existing laws  The change or modification, by addition, deletion or alteration of a statute which survives in its amended form  Effected by the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of the statute either expressly or impliedly  Express: done by providing in the act that specific sections or provisions are amended as recited therein (“to read as follows”)  Implied: neither presumed nor favored o Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the same subject, in the absence of a clear inconsistency between them o There is implied amendment where a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as the later act may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent provision of the latter  Takes effect after 15 days following its publication in OG or newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after such publication  How construed o A statute and its amendment should be read together as a whole o Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally enacted in its amended form o Construed by comparing it with the original statute to determine its proper construction  General rule: prospective operation; procedural laws  retroacts insofar as pending and undetermined cases are concerned  Effect on vested rights: will not be construed retroactively if to o so will impair vested rights or obligations of contract  Where a court originally obtains and exercises jurisdiction pursuant to an existing law, such jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired by the subsequent amendment of the law, unless expressly said so [applies to quasi-judicial bodies]  Where a statute which has been amended is invalid, nothing in effect has been amended.  Estrada v. Caseda Facts: On August 11, 1945, plaintiff notified defendant in writing to vacate the part of her dwelling under lease, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy. Defendant refused to do so. On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought the suit for unlawful detainer. On October 13, 1945, the municipal court gave judgment for plaintiff. On appeal, the CFI reversed the municipal court basing on Commonwealth Act No. 689, which was approved October 15, 1945. Section 14 of the Act limited its application to two years after its approval. On October 18, 1946, Republic Act No. 66 was passed and amended Section 14 of CA 689, by extending the effectivity of the Act for a period of four years after its approval. Held: An amended act is ordinarily construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead. The amended act is read as if it had been originally enacted in its amended form. In accordance with this rule, the amendment by RA 66 should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, which is October 15, 1945.  Erectors, Inc. v. NLRC Facts: While OFW respondent's case was pending in the Labor Arbiter, POEA was formed and was vested with the jurisdiction to try and hear cases of all OFW's. The SC later held that the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the case. Doctrine: Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be void for want of conformity with certain existing legal requirements. Hence, the law creating POEA, being not a curative statute cannot be given retroactive effect. Only curative ones can retroact.  Manila Jockey Club v. PAGCOR Facts: Held:  Sarcos v. Castillo Facts: Governor Castillo of Surigao del Sur suspends Mayor Sarcos of Barobo. Sarcos authorized illegal logging to raise funds for police uniforms and arms. Such power however was taken away from provincial officers when Decentralization Act was amended by RAC. Doctrine: The purpose of the later law is to decentralize power and grant local government greater autonomy. Also, even the earlier law put the power on provincial board, not just the governor. B. Revisions and Codifications  Purpose: restate the existing laws into one statute, simplify complicated provisions, and make the laws on the subject easily found.  Presumption: author has maintained a consistent philosophy or position o Rule: code is enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and is to be considered as such and n as a series of disconnected articles or provisions o Conflict: later provision prevails  What is omitted is deemed repealed o Reason: a revision or codification is intended to be a complete enactment on the subject and an expression of the whole law thereon o Rule: subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute o When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a repeal, all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed  Change in phraseology in the revised statute or Code from that of the old law does not, by itself, imply that it was the intention of the lawmakers to amend or change the construction of the old laws  Rule: in the revision or codification of statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words in the later statute can be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts  Codification should be construed as a continuation of the existing statutes o Presumption obtains that the codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly existed 11 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

C.

o Rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a single section on separate sections, does not operate to change the operation, effect or meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of such nature  Montelibano v. Ferrer Facts: Held: city charter of Bacolod merely incorpotated CC of Manila. It may be presumed that legislative did to adopt settled interpretation  American Bible Society v. Manila Facts: The American Bible Society (plaintiff-apellant) is a non-profit organisation based in New York and has a branch in Manila. They have been selling and distributing bibles as translated to different dialects. The City Treasurer of Manila, however, imposed that the American Bible Society is operating a business of general merchandise and cannot continue without securing a Mayor’s permit and a nd municipal license which requires a payment of license fees covering the periods of 1945 to the 2 quarter of 1953, amounting to P5821.45. This was all according to Ordinance No. 3000 as amended by Ordinances No. 2529 as promulgated by the Revised Administrative Code. The Revised Administrative Code also empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to collect taxes and fixed license fees not in excess of PhP 500 per annum. The American Bible Society contends that this was expressly repealed by the enactment of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. However, the American Bible Society did pay the amount under protest and filed the case based primarily on the constitutionality of the Ordinance (or the fact that they are asked to pay license fees for the operation of their bible distribution). They argued that it is against their constitutional freedom of exercise of religion Held: The Revised Manila Charter does state the power of the City Treasurer to collect fees, however, it does not really repeal what the Revised Administrative Code states. In fact, it is treated as a re-enactment of the said provision, since the only thing missing in the Charter was the PhP 500 limit. Therefore, even if the Ordinances 2529 and 3000 were enacted under Revised Admin Code, they are still in effect. *Not that it matters because the court held that you can’t apply it in the case at bar and ruled for the re-fund of what the American Bible Society paid to the City Treasury].  ABS-CBN v CA Facts: Held: the re-enactment of a statute substantially unmchanged is persuasive indiction of the adaption of a prior executive construction.  Mecano v. COA Facts: Case involved a claim for reimbursement by a government official of medical and hospitalization expenses pursuant to Section 699 of the Revised Adm. Code of 1917, which authorizes the head of office to cause reimbursement or payment of medical and hospital expenses of a government official in case of sickness or injury caused by or connected directly with the performance of his official duty. COA denied claim on the ground that the Adm. Code of 1987 repealed Sec 699 because it was omitted in the revised Code. Held: Legislature did not intend, in enacting the new code, to repeal Sec.699. by providing in its repealing clause that “all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,” the new Code did not expressly repeal the old Code as the new Code fails to identify or designate the act/s that are intended to be repealed. Nor can it be said that new code impliedly repealed sec699.  Ortiz v. COMELEC Facts: Held: Repeals  CC, 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.  Adm. Code, Sec. 21. No Implied Revival of Repealed Law.- When a law which expressly repeals a prior law itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided.  Adm. Code, Sec. 22. Revival of Law Impliedly Repealed. - When a law which impliedly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the prior law shall thereby be revived, unless the repealing law provides otherwise.  Legislature has plenary power to repeal, abrogate or revoke existing laws  Constitution prohibits passage of irrepealable laws; all laws are repealable  Either total or partial, express or implied  Laws are repealed only by the enactment of subsequent laws; they are not repealed by disuse or customs and practice to the contrary  Repeal by implication o Proceeds on the premised that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect o There must be sufficient reveleation of the legislative intent to repeal o 2 well-settled categories:  Where provision in the 2 acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one  If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act  Legislative intent to repeal a prior law is also shown by the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter  revised statute is in effect a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new statute shall prevail and whatever is excluded therefrom shall be discarded  Where a new statute is intended to furnish the exclusive rule on a certain subject, it repeals by implication the old law on the same subject, or where a new statute covers the whole subject matter of an old law and adds new provisions and makes changes, and where such law is evidently intended to be a revision of the old act, it repeals old act by implication  Repeal by reenactment o Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject matter in substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed  Implied repeal when later law is expressed in the form of a universal negative  “All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” 12 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

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o A clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter o Presumption against implied repeal and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeal apply ex proprio vigore Repeal by implication not favored As between two laws, one passed later prevails General law does NOT repeal special law, generally o A general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same subject, unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the o Generalia specialibus non derogant  A general law does not nullify a specific or special law o Reason: legislature considers and makes provision for all the circumstances of the particular case o General and special laws are read and construed together and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by constituting the special law as an exception to the general law When special or general law repeals the other o There is always partial repeal where the later act is a special law o Whether a subsequent general law on a subject has repealed or amended a prior special act on the same subject by implication is a question of legislative intent Effects of repeal o Statute rendered inoperative o Does not undo the consequences of the operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is directed by express language or by necessary implication o Repeal of a law does not render illegal what under the repealed ac is legal o Neither repeal nor expiration of the law deprives the court of the authority to act on the pending action and to finally decide it US v. Soliman Facts: The accused was convicted and sentenced under Section 3 of Act No. 1697 (Act 1697, which defined and penalized the crime of perjury, is actually a repealing law as it rescinded the provisions of the Penal Code defining and penalizing the crime of perjury) with six months imprisonment and P300.00 fine. However, by 1916, Act 1697 has been expressly repealed by the enactment of the Administrative Code (Act No. 2657). Held: Where an act which penalizes an offense repeals a former act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not deprive the court to try, convict and sentence offenders charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal, UNLESS the new law wholly fails to penalize the act which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law. It would only affect the penalty to be imposed if the repealing statute provides new penalties. Gaerlan, Jr. v. Catubig Facts: Whether Sec12 of RA170 as amended (City Charter of Dagupan), which fixed the minimum age qualification for members if the city council to 23 years old, has been repealed by Sec6 of RA 2259 (An act making elective the offices of mayor, vice0mayor and councilors of chartered cities) which fixed the age qualification to 25. Held: Yes, there was an implied repeal of S12 of the charter of Dagupan because the legislative intent to repeal the charter provision is clear from the fact that Dagupan City, unlike some cities, is not one of those cities expressly excluded by the law from its operation and from the circumstance that it provides that all acts or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are repealed Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters v. Feliciano Facts: Jose Feliciano, General Manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, requested the importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic council in Resolution No. 70 series of 1964. Petitioner Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association with Ramon Gonzales assailed the importation as contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice. Respondents, meanwhile, anchor the validity of importation on the provision of RA 2207. Held: . RA 3452 Sec. 10 states that importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties. RA 2207 Sec. 2 meanwhile states that should there be an imminent shortage on the local supply of rice of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, the President of the Philippines may authorize such importation thru any government agency that he may designate. The contention that RA 2207 has been repealed by RA 3452 is untenable. Sec. 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides: “All laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.” It predicates intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found existing and prior Acts. The presumption is against implied repeals. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant to the prior existing law. A mere difference in the terms and provisions is not sufficient to create a repugnancy between them. Furthermore, the two laws refer to different methods applicable to different circumstances.

 Lagman v. City of Manila Facts: Held: First, RA 409 is a special law and of later enactment than CA 548 and the Public Service Law (CA 146). So, if there is conflict between the provisions of the former act and the latter act, a general rule in statutory construction is that the latter act prevails over the former and that a special law controls over the general law, irrespective of dates of passage. Moreover, CA 548 does not confer “exclusive” authority to the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations relating to national roads. As such, the Manila Charter is deemed enacted as an exception to CA 548.  NPC v. Arca Facts: Whether Sec.2 of CA120 creating the NPC, a GOCC, and empowering it “to sell electric power and to fix the rates and provide for the collection of the charges for any service render: Provided, that the rates of charges shall not be subject to revision by the Public Service Commission” is repealed by RA2677 amending the Public Service Act and granting the Public Service Commission the jurisdiction to fix the rate of charges of public utilities owned or operated by the government or GOCCs. Held: No. A special law like CA120, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, like RA2677, although the terms of the general statute are broad enough to include the cases in the special law, in the 13 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 absence of a clear intent to repeal. The authority of the PSC under RA2677 over the fixing of rates of charges of public utilities owned or operated by GOCCs can only be exercised where the charter of the GOCC concerned does not contain any provision to the contrary.  People v. Pimentel Facts: Antonio Tujan was charged with Subversion under RA 1700 (Anti-Subversion Law) and Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition in Furtherance of Subversion under PD 1866. A motion to quash was filed by Tujan alleging double jeopardy, and that common crimes such as illegal possession of firearms should be deemed absorbed by the charge of subversion, citing Enrile vs. Salazar. Judge Pimentel granted the motion. Hence the appeal. Held: What PD 1866 punishes is illegal possession of firearms. It only added penalty when the possession is in furtherance of subversion. It is substantially different to RA 1700 which penalizes any person who knowingly, willfully and by over act affiliates with, becomes or remains a member of a subversive organization. They are not the same offenses and both charges can co-exist. However, the subsequent repeal of RA 1700 by RA 7636 decriminalizes subversion and is applied retroactively to Tujan. Thus, the offense of simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, now under RA 8294 which amended PD 1866, remains the only charge.  RP v. Marcopper Mining Corp. Facts: Whether or not the PAB under RA 7942 (Phil. Mining Act of 1995) been divested of its authority to try and hear pollution cases. Held: The provisions of RA 7942 do not categorically and expressly repeal the provisions of RA 3931, as amended by PD 984 and EO 192. (Pollution Control Law). Neither is there implied repeal. There is no irreconcilable conflict between the two laws. Ratio: Sec 19 of EO 192 vested the PAB with powers to adjudicate pollution cases in general. RA 7941 gives the mines regional director exclusive jurisdiction over the safety inspection of all installations, surface or underground in mining operations, hence his role is COMPLEMENTARY to that of the PAB.  Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole Facts: It is claimed that Sec.19 of RA6770 (Ombudsman Act), which grants disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to discipline elective and appointive officials, except those impeachable officers, has been repealed by RA7160 (LGC), insofar as local elective officials are concerned, because the latter is a subsequent law which vests disciplinary authority against elective local officials in the various officials therein named. Held: Both laws should be given effect because ‘there is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act; the 2 statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold one and strike down the other.’ Interpretare et concordare leges legibusm est optimus interpretandi modus  every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence VI. Nature and Concept of Statutory Construction  Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law  Drawing of warranted conclusions respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text  Interpretation  art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words ;;; construction  process of drawing warranted conclusions now always included in diret expressions  almost synonymous  Cardinal Rule in the Interpretation of all law  ascertainment of the true intent of the legislature o Object of all judicial interpretation is to determined legislative intent  Legislative Intent  the vital part, the essence of the law; intent is the spirit which gives life to legislative enactment  Legislative purpose  reason why a particular statute was enacted by congress  Legislative meaning  what the law, by its language, means; what it comprehends, what it covers or embraces, what its limits are  Object of inquiry is not only to know what the legislature meant by the language used, but also to determine whether the language used sufficiently expresses that meaning  Primary source of legislative intent: statute itself  Court may look beyond: legislative history, for example  Construction is a judicial function  Legislature cannot overrule judicial interpretation  Supreme Court may overrule or change previous constructions  Condition sine qua non before courts may construe: THERE BE A DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE; where there is no ambiguity or doubtful meaning, there is no room for construction. o Court may not construe where a statute is clear  A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction  Frankfurter, On the Reading of Statutes  Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes  Sloovere, Preliminary Questions in Statutory Interpretation  People v. Mapa Facts: Section879 of RAC exempts peace officers from the requirements relating to issuance of license to possess firearms. Mapa claims he is a peace officer by virtue of him being a secret agent of a provincial governor. Held: A person appointed secret agent by a provincial governor is not a “peace officer” entitled to possess and carry firearms without the required license.  Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia Facts: Petitioner filed a suit for injunction against the spouses Josefa and Vicente Garcia to enjoin them from selling sugar allegedly owned by their conjugal partnership. Held: Contrary to A161 of the Civil Code. The only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession, or business with honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. No liability was incurred by the conjugal partnership. The law’s language is clear and does not admit of doubt. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to.  Matabuena v. Cervantes Facts: Felix Matabuena died intestate and Petronilla Cervantes was his common-law spouse. Cornelia Matabuena, Felix’ sister, sought that the donation of Felix of a parcel of land to Cervantes be declared null and void by virtue of Article 133 of the Civil Code, and that she be declared the sole heir to the property. 14 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 Held: There is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. The same reason for prohibition applies, that because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor.  Alonzo v. IAC Facts: W/N actual knowledge by the vendors of the sale of the lots suffices for the prescription period of the right of redemption to start running. Held: The purpose of the rule in Article 1088 of the Civil Code on giving written notice to the co-heirs of the sale of an heir’s share is that as long as the redemptioner (co-heir) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof, the 30 days for redemption start running. In this case, there was no written notice, and to follow the law to the letter would mean that the prescription period has not even begun. But it would be highly improbable that the co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought the area occupied by the Alonzos had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia, especially considering the erection of the permanent semi-concrete house and the fencing around the area, which is an act of ownership, without objection or at least inquiry on the part of the co-heirs.  People v. Nazario Facts: Eusebio Nazario was charged with the crime of Violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 4, as amended by Mun. Ord. 15, as finally amended by Mun. Ord. 12, taxing fishpond operators (Php3 per hectare). He refused to pay the taxes, claiming that he did not know whether he was covered by the Ordinance or not, since he was just a lessee of a public land, that he was not a resident of the municipality, and that it was an ex post facto law. Held: A statute/act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ to its application. It must be perfectly vague on its face, i.e., it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction (unlike a legislation in imprecise language, which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrased, and can be saved by proper construction). In this case, it is clear that Nazario falls within its coverage, because, as the actual operator of the fishponds (financed the construction, introduced the fish fries, and employed laborers), he is effectively a “manager of fishponds in places within the territorial limits of” the municipality (Ord. 4). VII. Object and Methods of Construction A. Methods of Determining Legislative Intent 1. Verba legis (literal interpretation/plain meaning rule)  Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation  Verbal egis non est recedendum  from the words of a statute there should be no departure  Colgate Palmolive Phils. Inc. v. Gimenez Held: Where a law does not distinguish between “stabilizers and flavors” used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or denral cream, courts are not authorized to make any distinction, and must construe the words in their generic sense 2. Ratio legis (interpretation by considering the spirit and reason of the law/Golden Rule)  Hidalgo v. Hidalgo Facts: The issue in this case is WON the plaintiffs as share tenants are entitled to redeem the parcel of land they are working from the purchasers thereof. They invoked the right of redemption granted by Sec. 12 of RA 3844. No 90-day notice of intention to sell the lands for the exercise of the right of pre-emption prescribed by section 11 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code was given by respondent vendor to petitioners-tenants. The SC ruled in their favor saying that the very essence of the Land Reform Code is the abolition of agricultural share tenancy. Doctrine: Where the true intent of the law is clear such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof. Whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice, and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose of the statute. 3. Mens legislatoris (Mischief Rule)  In construing a statute, the purpose or object of the law or the mischief intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of the law are important factors to be considered in its construction  Court must look into the object to be accomplished, evils to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and should give the law a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effectuate its purpose  US v. Toribio Facts: Whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited under Sec30 & 33 of Act1147 which provide that “no large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughter house except upon permit secured from the municipal treasurer Held: When 2 or more interpretations are available, adopt which will most tend to give effect to intent of lawmaker; Law refers to slaughtering anywhere without a permit from municipal treasurer; Intent of law is to avoid theft of cattle and make easy its return when lost, strayed, or stolen; If to allow only slaughtering in municipal slaughterhouse, will allow thieves to enjoy fruits of their crime since Carmen has no slaughterhouse  Macabenta v. Davao Stevedore Terminal Co. Facts: Conrado Macabenta worked as a laborer at Davao Stevedore’s Manay site, commuting some 48 kilometers from his home in the city three times a week. He died from a vehicular accident en route to work. His common-law wife Leonora married him during his two-week hospitalization. Together with their child Raquel, born posthumously, she claimed some P3,000 as Conrado’s benefits. Held: Yes, a woman living with the deceased as his wife or actually dependent on him at the time of an employees’ death is considered a dependent, as well as their natural children below 18. 4. Equity of the Statute (Clean Hands Doctrine)  CC, 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.  CC, 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.  Amatan v. Aujero Facts: Person charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining, whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto. The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by the judge pursuant to 15 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 Sec2 Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows an accused, with the consent of the offended party, to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged Held: Yes. The fact of the death of the victim for which the accused was criminally charged cannot, by simple logic and plain common sense, be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the lower offense of attempted homicide. In instances where the literal interpretation of a provision of a law would lead to injustice or to a result directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the CC admonishes judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case of doubt, the intent is to promote right and justice. The fact of the death of the victim and the gravamen of the charge against the accused cannot and should not be ignored in favor of a more expedient plea of either attempted or frustrated homicide. The respondent judge is thus guilty of gross ignorance of the law.  Abacus Securities v. Ampil Facts: Held: the in pari delicto rule refusing legal remedy to either party is an illegal agreement and leaves them where they were before the agreement. VIII. Interpretation and Construction in Relation to Language of the Statute  Surplusage and superfluity disregarded  Redundant words rejected  Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude construction  Exemption from rigid application of law  Law does not require the impossible A. Common Meaning Rule  When the words and phrases of a statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says  Words construed in their ordinary sense  in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning  A word of general significance is to be taken in its ordinary and comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning  General prevails over restrictive  Generic term includes things that arise thereafter  Song Kiat Chocolate Factory v. BSP Facts: WON cocoa beans may be considered as “chocolate” for the purposes of exemption from the foreign exchange tax imposed by RA 601 as amended. Held: No. Having in mind the principle of strict construction of statute (since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and ambiguous terms).  Kuenzle & Streiff v. Collector of Customs Facts: Held: Where a Statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or phrase should not, by construction, be given a different meaning  Tan, et. al. v. People Facts: Petitioner were charged with violation of Sec. 68, PD No. 705 as amended by EO No 227 (Sec 68: penalizing cutting, gathering, collecting timber or other forest product). Trial court convicted the petitioner for failure to comply with the Forestry Reform Code. CA also ruled against them. Petitioner then questioned treatment by the lower courts of lumber as timber and/or forest product within the contemplation of PD 705, as amended. Held: Lumber is included in the term timber. In Mustang v CA, “the Revised Forestry Code contains no def'n of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as defined in Sec. 3, the latter is found in the def'n of processing plant. The Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary and common usage meaning. And in sofar as possession of timber without the required legal documents is concerned, Sec. 68 P.D. 705, as amended makes no distinction between raw or processed timber. Neither do we. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. B. Terms with Legal Meaning  Statutory definition o Statute defines particular words and phrases used therein o The legislative definition controls the meaning of the statutory word, irrespective of any other meaning the word or phrase may have in its ordinary or usual sense  Words with commercial or trade meaning  common in use between merchants and traders, generally accepted by the community should not be given a new or strange interpretation  Words with technical or legal meaning  should be construed according to the sense in which they may have been previously used  Technical/legal prevails over ordinary/general meaning in the absence of any qualification or intention to the contrary  Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute  Bernardo v. Bernardo Facts: WON, bona fide occupants as contemplated in CA 539 are actual occupants Held: NO, A bona fide occupant is one supposes that he has a good title and knows of no adverse claim, one who supposes that he has vested rights but is ignorant that the title is contested by any other person claiming a superior right to it. An honest belief to one’s right. TO WHICH the petitioner is not covered. C. Terms with Multiple Meaning  General rule: a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute  Meaning of term dictated by context  while ordinarily a word or term used in a statute will be given its usual and commonly understood meaning, the context in which the word or term is employed may dictate a different sense; the context in which the word is used oftentimes determines its meaning.  Carandang v. Santiago 16 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

D.

Facts: Whether an offended party can file a separate and independent civil action for damages arising from physical injuries during the pendency of the criminal action for frustrated homicide Held: term “physical injuries” in CC,33 should be understood to mean bodily harm or injury and not its meaning from the RPC (since “defamation” and “fraud” are given ordinary meaning)  Malanyaon v. Lising Facts: Respondents invoke Article 81 of RPC: “Death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability”  WON “death” amounted to “acquittal” Held: NO. When the statute speaks of the suspended officer being “acquitted” it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. Acquittal is always based on the merits, that the defendant is not guilty because the evidence does not show that his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal does not decide the case in the merits, or that the defendant is not guilty. Noscitur a Sociis (Doctrine of Associated Words)  Where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated.  meaning of unclear word/phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it  Caltex v. Palomar Facts: Held: “lottery” = game of chance, one of the elements of which is consideration; “gift enterprise” and “scheme” means such enterprise as will require consideration as an element  People v. Santiago Facts: Prosecution for libel; Whether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel. Held: No. Amp system not similar to “radio” (which is included in enumeration) – radio’s common characteristic with other enumerated media = permanent nature as a means of publication, which an amp system is not  Buenaseda v. Flavier Facts: WON the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. Held: YES. In this case, the suspension issued is a preventive suspension and not a punitive suspension. It can be inferred from Sec.13(3) of the 1987 Constitution that the word “suspension” in said provision is associated with penalties in administrative cases (e.g. removal, demotion, fine censure). Using the rule of Noscitor a sociis, “suspension” should be given the same sense as the other words which it is associated thus “suspension” in this provision is one which pertains to preventive suspension which is allowed in Sec.24 of RA 6770. What the Ombudsman is not allowed to issue is a punitive suspension and not a preventive suspension.

E.

Ejusdem Generis Rule  General rule: where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things, or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned  Purpose: to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class  To be applicable, following must concur: o Statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase o Particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind o Enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples o No indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broader meaning  Limitations o Where enumeration includes classes and general terms as well, or where specific terms have no distinguishable common characteristics o Where enumeration is exhaustive o Does not require the rejection of general terms entirely  rule intended merely as an AID in ascertaining intention of the legislature and is taken in connection with the other rules of construction o Resorted to for the purpose of determining what the intent of the legislature is in enacting a law  Mutuc v. COMELEC Facts: Held: The general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to; Where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind, accompanied by words of generic character preceded by the word “other,” the generic words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there is something in the context or history of the statute to repeal such inference. It also holds true where the term “otherwise” is used in a statute.

F.

Expressio Unius Exclusio Alterius Rule  Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others.  The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others  Variation 1: what is expressed puts an end to what is implied  Variation 2: a general expression followed be exceptions therefrom implies that those which do not fall under the exceptions come within the scope of the general expression (a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule)  Variation 3: Expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been implied had not been expressed  Limitations: 17 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 o o o

Not a rule of law: it is a mere tool of statcon or a means of ascertaining legis intent xxx  where enumeration is by way of example or to remove doubts only xxx  statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its provision to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow by not including them o disregarded if adherence thereto would cause inconvenience, hardship, and injury to public interest  Manabat v. de Aquino Facts: Enrique Manabat and his wife were sued on a promisory note. The Manabats denied the liability alleging usury. Having failed to appear at the hearing, they were ordered to pay amount plus interest. Held: doctrine does not apply  Canlas v. Republic “Article XVIII. SALES AND SERVICES WITHIN THE BASES” …… Government agencies, including concessions, such as sales commissaries and posts exchanges, messes and social clubs, for the exclusive use of the United States military forces and authorized civilian personnel and their families. The merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies shall be free of all taxes, duties and inspection by the Philippine authorities. While it may be argued that a tax on the income derived from the operation of a concession falls under the term “other taxes” included in the enumeration of the imposts from which a Government agency or private concessionaire is exempted, yet a careful perusal of the same would reveal that which is being exempted from the payment of such exactions is the establishment of the agency or concession designed for the exclusive use of the U.S. military forces and authorized civil personnel and their families. Considering the concession itself and the income accruing therefrom are subject to different taxes, and taking into account the sentence following the enumeration which specifies the “merchandise or services sold or dispensed by such agencies” to be from taxes or duties, it becomes all to obvious that the privilege is intended merely to be confined to the latter and to no other. The maxim, Inclusio unius exclusion est alterius prevails. Moreover, exemption from income tax is treated separately under a separately under a different provision of the treaty.

G.

H.

I.

 Centeno v. Villalon-Pomillos Facts: Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Held: Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others (expression unius est exclusion alterius). PD 1564 merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” only goes to show that the framers of the law never intended to include solicitation for religious purposes w/in its coverage  Canet v. Decena Facts: Whether or not respondent, in her capacity as Municipal Mayor, can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit ti petitioner absent a municipal ordinance which would empower her to do so. Held: No. By withdrawing the municipal ordinance, permit to operate cockpit ceases to have effect. Casus Omissus Rule  A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally  People v. Manantan Facts: Defendant Guillermo Manantan is a justice of the peace in Pangasinan who was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. This prohibits any “justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province....from aiding any candidate, or exerting any influence in any manner in any election or take part therein...” Defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54. Held: The rule of “casus omisus pro omisso habendus est”, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, does not apply in the case for it has clearly been shown that the legislature did not exclude justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. They were merely called by another term, and the omission therefore has not been clearly established as to apply the rule. Ubi Lex Non Distinguit Nec Nos Distinguire Debemos  Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.  Ramirez v. CA Facts: Socorro Ramirez files for a case for damages against private respondent, Ester Garcia. The latter allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a ‘hostile and furious mood’ and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. Held: Petitioner argues that the provision only applies to a person other than the parties of the conversation. However, the Court held that the Act clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person to record such communication by a means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier ‘any’. To further concretize their holding, the Court looked into the Senate proceeding pertaining to this Act. It has been found that the unambiguity if the express words of the provision, taken together with the deliberations from the Senate, supports the view held by the CA that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Doctrine of Last Antecedent  Qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated  In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to ther immediate or last antecedent, and not to the other remote or preceding words or association of words  Florentino v. PNB

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Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 Facts: Whether the qualifying clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement” refers to all antecedents “the Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.” or ONLY the last antecedent, “any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines? Held: only to the last antecedent  Mapa v. Arroyo. We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of development" and not to "facilities, improvements and infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur 9 sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. J. Redendo Singula Singulis  Referring each to each  Referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object or let each be put in its proper place  Requires that the antecedent and consequences should read distributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately related and to which it is most applicable  People v. Tamani. Referring each to each; let each be but in its proper place, i.e., the words should be taken distributively K. Doctrine of Necessary Implication  What is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed  Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights/power/privileges which it grants  One which is compelled by a reasonable view of the statute  May NOT be used to justify the inclusion in a statute of what to the court appears to be wise and just, unless it is at the same time necessarily and logically within its terms  Nor may the doctrine be employed to support an interpretation destructive of the object or purpose of the law  Escribano v. Avila Facts: respondent Judge Avila who later on issued an order of arrest against Escribano after finding the latter guilty of the Respondent Pendatum filed a complaint for libel against Mayor Escribano directly with the CFI of Cotobato for having said “Mr. Pendatum is the worst animal that ever lived in this province”=p in a speech. Complaint was subscribed and sworn to before charges. Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of of another. However, this maxim does not apply here since its application will defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the law. The maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statue, so that the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it.  Atienza v. Villarosa. Doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied in a statute is as much part thereof as what is expressed; necessary to effectuate its purpose. L. Verbal or Clerical Errors  Court, in order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints, which, if uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless  Rufino Lopez & Sons v. CTA. Correcting clerical errors are not judicial legislation. M. Number, Gender and Tense  When the context of a statute so indicates, words in plural include the singular, and vice versa  The masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise  Santillon v. Miranda Facts: Pedro Miranda died intestate leaving one son, Claro and his wife, Perfecta. During his marriage, Pedro acquired several parcels of land in Pangasinan. Claro filed a petition for letters of administration which was opposed by Perfecta claiming that the properties left by Pedro are conjugal in nature. In effect, Perfecta was the one appointed to be the administrator of Pedro’s properties. Held: CC, 966: children = child N. Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words  “or” o disjunctive signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated o “or” between 2 phrases connotes that either phrase serves as qualifying phrase o “that is to say” o successively  “and” o “together with” o In statutory construction implies conjunction, joinder or union  “and/or” o Effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the whole statute  San Miguel Corp. v. Municipal Council Facts: Held: gross value in money = actual market value  Amon Trading Corp v. CA Facts: Petitioners pleaded in defense that they were not liable since private respondent had no privity of contract with them as it was Lines & Spaces through Mrs. Sanchez, that ordered the cement and the subsequent cancellation, and that they refunded the amount to Lines & Spaces. 19 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 Held: There is nothing meaty about the assertion of private respondent that inasmuch as the delivery receipts as well as the purchase order were for the account of Lines & Spaces/ Tri Realty, then petitioners should have been placed on guard that it was private respondent which is the principal of Sanchez. It has been held that in the term “and/or” effect shall be given to both of them conjunctive “and” and the disjunctive “or” ; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the intended purpose. It has also been held that in “and/or” the word “and” and “or” may be used interchangeably. O. Use of “Shall” and “May”  Bersabal v. Salvador Facts: Held:  Fule v. CA Facts: Held:  Office of the Ombudsman v. CA and Macabulos Facts: Dr. Macabulos was investigated for charges of of dishonesty, falsification, grave misconduct, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and violation of reasonable office rules and regulations defined and penalized under the Civil Service Laws. Held: Ombudsman may still investigate. The use of the word may is ordinarily construed as permissive and directory. IX. Aids in Interpretation and Construction A. Intrinsic Aids Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Register of Deeds Facts: Whether or not the owner of buildings erected on premises leased from another person (in this case, government), is required to contribute to the assurance fund Held: YES. Upon examination of the whole Act No. 496, LAND as used in Sec. 99 includes buildings. The same section uses REAL ESTATE as synonymous with LAND, and BUILDINGS are real estate. 1. Title  Where the meaning of a statute is obscure, courts may resort to its title to clear the obscurity  Central Capiz v. Ramirez Facts: Whether privately owned lands come within the scope of Act2874 Held: No. Act was intended to apply to public lands only. Short title: “Public Land Act” 2. Preamble  People v. Purisima Facts: A person was charged with violation of PD9 which penalizes, among others, the carrying outside of one’s residence any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for livelihood, with imprisonment from 5-10 years. Should the carrying of such weapon be in furtherance of, or in relation to, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, etc, as a necessary element of the crime? Held: Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the events that led to the enactment of the decree, namely the state of Martial law in the country, it is an indispensable element of the crime 3. Punctuation Marks  Aids of low degree and can never control against the intelligible meaning of written words  US v. Hart.  People v. Subido Facts: Effect of a comma that separates the clause “with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency” from the preceding clause, “is hereby sentenced to 3 months of arresto mayor …” In case of insolvency, will the accused be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment? Held: The use of comma is to make the subsidiary imprisonment refer not only to the nonpayment of indemnity but also to nonpayment of fine 4. Definition Sections and interpretation Clauses  People v. Buenviaje (chiropractic). Assuming that the term chiropractic does not fall within the term practice of medicine in ordinary acceptation, the statutory definition contained in section 770 of the Administrative Code clearly includes the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The statutory definition necessarily prevails over the ordinary one. 5. Capitalization of Letters  Aid of low degree  Unabia v. City Mayor Facts: Contention: employees in the unclassified service of the government are not entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution because the used of the capital letters in the words Civil Service in ArtXII of 1935 Constitution and the use of small letters “civil service” in the Civil Service Act indicate that only those pertaining to the classified service are protected by security of tenure Held: No validity in argument. Capital letters were used in the constitution to indicate the group. No capitals are used in the similar provisions of the Code to indicate the system. B. Extrinsic Aids (Legislative History Prior to Enactment) 1. Contemporaneous Circumstances  Constructions placed upon statutes at the time of, or after, their enactment by the executive, legislature, or judicial authorities, as well as by those who, because of their involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law  Executive Construction o Construction by officer directly called to implement the laew (circular, e.g.), may be interpretation by usage and practice o Construction by Justice Secretary  may be modified by Executive Secretary o Interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the form of a ruling vy an executive officer exercising quasijudicial functions

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Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010

X.

 Great weight: it comes from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law thus construed  the factors leading the court to give the principle of contemporaneous construction much weight are the respect due the government agency or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence, expertness, experience and informed judgment  Phil. Sugar Centrals Agency v. Collector of Customs Facts: Whether the government can legally collect duties “as a charge for wharfage” required by a statute upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves For the last 26 years, wharfage duties have been levied and collected even during the period when the government never owned nor operated a wharf Held: Yes. 2. Policy  A construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it  A decent respect for the policy of the law must save the court from imputing to it a self-defeating, if not disingenuous, purpose 3. Legislative History of Statute  History of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its inception until its inactment into law  History proper covers the period and the steps done from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by legislature  Oliva v. La Madrid. The legislative history of RA 2670, amending RA No. 720, shows that the original proposal was to give homesteaders or free patent holders 10 years to redeem their property foreclosed by rural banks. This period, being too long, was rejected as this would dissuade rural banks from granting loans to homesteaders or free patent holders. Thus, the latter would retain the right to redeem within 5 years from the conveyance of their properties as provided in the general law, Commonwealth Act No, 141. 4. Contemporaneous and Practical Construction  UP v. CA.  Nestle v. CA. The construction given by the SEC should be upheld because interpretation and application of a statute given by the administrative agency charged with its application is entitled great respect and accorded great weight unless it is shown that such construction is in sharp conflict with the governing statute or Constitution and other laws. Officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the consideration pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law. 5. Other Aids  Dictionaries  Document  President’s message to legislature, Explanatory note, legislative debates, views and deliberations, reports of commissions  Scientific and political writing  Legal Treatises Construction of the Statute as a Whole, Its Part and Other Statutes  Aboitiz v. City of Cebu [wharves] Sec 17 (v) empowered the Municipal Board “to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the use, of public landing places, wharves, piers, docks and levees”. “Public Wharves” is meant to refer to those owned by the City of Cebu. Sec 30 has a similar bearing granting the City Engineer “the care and custody of all public docks, wharves, piers, levees and landing places when erected” – meaning those constructed and owned by the city. According to Sec 1142 of the revised Admin Code, those belonging to the National Government remain under the exclusive control, direction and management of the Bureau of Customs and Aboitiz have been paying accordingly to the National Gov’t pursuant to RA 1371 for the use of wharves Sec 17 (w) is plainly evincive of the power to tax for revenue purposes and is only limited to public wharves owned by the city and not owned by the National Government. Ordinance NO. 207 is declared null and void.  Araneta v. Concepcion. All the provisions of the law, even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given effect by reconciling them if necessary.  Magtajas v. Pryce. An ordinance to be valid must not contravene the constitution or any statute. The flaw in the ordinances in this case is that it contravenes PD 1869. There is also no sufficient indication of an implied repeal. Assuming there is conflict between the two, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by harmonizing them. This is possible in this case. Thus, the resolution of the problem is to hold that under the LGC, LGus may prevent and suppress al kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by statutes like PD 1869.  Laguna Lake DA v. CA Facts: Which agency of the government – LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region – should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? LLDA statute specifically provides that the LLDA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects in or affecting the said region, including the operation of fishpens. On the other hand, RA7160 (LGC) grants the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. Held: The two laws should be harmonized, and that the LLDA statute, being a special law, must be taken as an exception to RA7160, a general law  UP BOR v. Auditor General.  Nat’l. Tobacco Administration v. COA. Educational assistance is not one of those “allowances” authorized to be given by Sec 12 and Sec 17 of Salary Standardization Law, but a financial assistance. Second sentence of Sec12 (which says that compensation being received by incumbents as of July 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized) should be read in conjunction with the first sentence (where all allowances are integrated into the prescribed salary rates except allowances incurred in the performance of their official functions). However, the non-inclusion of the DBM of educational assistance in CCC 10 cannot amend the second sentence of Sec 12 of RA 6758. The circular cannot extend the law or expand its coverage as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature.  Co v. Civil Register of Manila.  Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas.  MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay. The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 21 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Legal Method Prof. M. S. Feliciano AY 2009-2010 and 37 of RA 9003, enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps. The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience. A discretionary duty is one that “allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform.” Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. XI. Strict and Liberal Construction: Mandatory and Directory  People v. Terrado. Penal statutes are strictly construed against the state.  Santos To v. Cruz-Paño.  In Re: Amount of Monthly Pension of Judges. Remedial laws should be liberally construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefited.  Alpha investigation and Security Agency v. NLRC. Wage orders, being statutory and mandatory cannot be  Bermudez v. Torres. When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary,” found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. XII. Constitutional Construction  Dela Cruz v. Paras [prohibition of operation of bars] Ordinances by virtue of the general welfare clause must be reasonable, in consonance with the laws and public policy of the state. Such sweeping exercise of lawmaking power is unreasonable. It is a clear invasion of personal and property rights.; Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs but it can regulate such.  Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Supreme Court held that the salaries of judges, like those of other government functionaries, should also be subject to income tax.  Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA. Presumption of constitutionality; speculations/probabilities cannot nullify an EO  Ordillo v. COMELEC. Since the constitution speaks of provinces an autonomous region has to consist of more than one province. Hence, if only one province ratifies the Organic Act drafted by Congress, the creation of an autonomous region does not succeed.  Calderon v. Carale. Confirming the appointment of the Chairman of NLRC is NOT needed. Confirmation is required only for the first group of officers mentioned in Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Chairman of the NLRC does not belong to the first group but to the second group. The Congress may NOT expand the list of those to be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.  Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS. Patrimony means heritage, referring not only to natural resources but to the cultural heritage of Filipinos as well. Manila Hotel has become a landmark-a living testament of Philippine heritage. A provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative w/o the aid of enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected is self-executing.  Province of Rizal v. Exec. Sec. The Supreme Court en banc ruled and decided to close the first and old sanitary landfill which was also located in Barangay Pintong Bukawe. In the said decision, the Supreme Court said that the maintenance of a sanitary landfill inside the Marikina Watershed, particularly in Barangay Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal is illegal. The Supreme Court recognized the ecological importance of Barangay Pintong Bukawe as part of Marikina Watershed Reserve created under Executive Order No. 33.

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