A2013 Law 100 (Persons and Family Relations), EAPangalangan

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 I.

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Introduction A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law  Article III, Section 1: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.  Article II, Section 12: The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.  Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.  Article II, Section 14: The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.  Article XV, Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.  Article XV, Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.  Article XV, Section 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.  Article XV, Section 4. The family has the duty to care for its elderly members but the State may also do so through just programs of social security.  Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses o Griswold v. Connecticut Facts: Appellants were convicted of violating a Connecticut statute which makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Held: The statute is unconstitutional because it violates the right to marital privacy which is a right under the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. o Eisenstadt v. Baird Facts: Appellee convicted of violating a Massachusetts statute which made it a crime for persons that are not physicians to sell, lend, or give away any contraceptives to unmarried persons. Held: There is no fit between the statute and the goal of the state. In prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the state irrationally and unwittingly imposes unwanted pregnancies from unsafe sex as a form of punishment, and violates the equal protection clause by providing dissimilar treatments to married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated. Civil Personality A. Concept and Classes of Persons  CC, 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost  CC, 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.  CC, 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within 24hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb  CC, 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract, and by will.  CC, 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to other.  CC, 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) the State and its political subdivisions; (2) other corporations, institutions, and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.  CC, 45. Juridical persons in 44(1) and 44(2) are governed by the laws creating or recognizing them. Private Corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject. Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the provisions of the CC concerning partnerships.  CC, 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of their organization. 1 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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 CC, 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public interest or purpose mentioned in 44(2), their property and other assets shall be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purpose for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of the institution derived the principal benefits from the same.  Geluz v. CA Facts: Wife had abortion three times; the first two known to the husband, but he didn’t know of the third. Husband sued for damages against the physician. Held: Husband cannot be awarded for damages in behalf of his unborn child because the child did not acquire juridical capacity.  People v. Tirol Facts: During the pendency of the appeal, one of the accused died. Held: The death of the accused extinguished his juridical personality. As such, he cannot be held liable criminally. However, the civil liabilities incurred by him remains to be determined which can be recovered from his estates.  Joaquin v. Navarro Facts: The son was shot dead while his mother was trapped inside the burning building. The question is who outlived who? Held: The mother outlived the son: this theory is more tenable since this is based on facts. The theory that the son outlived the mother is merely presumptive. As such, inference that is based on evidence prevails over presumptions made by law [Rule 123 , Rules of Court] Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon 1. Presumption of Capacity  Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas Facts: One of the surety’s wife was pleading that the mental incapacity of her husband at the time of the assumption of the obligation to pay, and as such, should be relieved from compliance with the earlier decision of the court to fulfill the obligation. Held: For insanity to be a valid restriction on the capacity to act, it should meet the ff. requirements: (1) that the insanity is habitual; (2) that the person was insane at the time the act was done; (3) that the act done directly arose from the person's insanity. Otherwise, the person is presumed to be capacitated. In this case, the facts do not prove that Villanueva did not possess the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to the bond which he freely executed. 2. Restrictions on the Capacity to Act  CC, 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.  CC, 38. Minority, insanity, or imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as easements.  CC, 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity, imbecility, the state of being deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are governed in this code, other codes, the Rules of Court and in special laws. Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion. A married woman, twenty-one [eighteen] years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases specified by law.  Minority o Effect on Contracts  CC, 1327 (1). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (1) Unemancipated minors  CC, 1390 (1). Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been no damage to the contracting parties: (1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract  CC, 1403 (3). Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified: (3) those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.  CC, 1397. The action for the annulment of contracts may be instituted by all who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. However, persons who are capable cannot allege the incapacity of those with whom they contracted; nor can those who exerted intimidation, violence, or undue influence, or employed fraud, or caused mistake base their action upon these flaws of the contract  CC, 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.  CC, 1489. All persons who are authorized in this Code to obligate themselves, may enter into a contract of sale, saving the modifications contained in the following articles. Where necessaries are those sold and delivered to a minor or other person without capacity to act, he must pay a reasonable price therefore. Necessaries are those referred to in Article 290  CC, 1426. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact the he has not been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned  CC, 1427. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, who has entered into a contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. 2 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  Mercado v. Espiritu Facts: The appellants, when they entered into a contract of sale of estate with the appellee, actively misrepresented themselves as having reached the age of majority, when in fact they were still minors. Held: The sale of the estate is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment.  Bambalan v. Maramba Facts: Bambalan, when he was still a minor, was coerced and intimidated by his mother to sign the sale of the land he inherited from his deceased father. Held: The minor did not pretend to be of age (as opposed to Mercado), and his minority was well known to the purchaser (defendant). When this is the case, the contract is voidable.  Braganza v. de Villa Abrille Facts: At the time that the transaction (loan) was made, two of the parties were minors. They did not make it appear in the promissory note that they were not yet of age. Held: Minors have no juridical duty to disclose their inability. In order for them to be liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive. Mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute fraud. Though not liable, minors should make restitution to the extent that they profited from the money they received (the money they got were used for their support during the Japanese occupation. o Effect on Marriage  FC, 5. Any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not other any of the impediment mentioned in Articles 37 & 38, may contract marriage  FC, 35 (1). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians. o Effects on Crime  RPC, 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability: (2) A person under years of age. (3) A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person mentioned in said Art. 80.  RPC, 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.  RA 9344  Sec. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.  Insanity o Effect on Contracts  CC, 1327 (2). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.  CC, 1328. Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.  CC, 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. o Effect on Crimes  RPC, 12(1). Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability: 1. an imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or 3 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court. o Effect on Marriage  FC, 45 (2). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (2) that either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.  FC, 47 (2). The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity. Deaf-mutism o CC, 1327(2). The following cannot give consent to a contract: (2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write o CC, 807. If the testator be deaf, or a deaf-mute, he must personally read the will, if able to do so; otherwise, he shall designate two persons to read it and communicate to him, in some practicable manner, the contents thereof. o CC, 820. Any person of sound mind and of the age of eighteen years or more, and not blind, deaf or dumb, and able to read and write, may be a witness to the execution of a will mentioned in Article 805 of this Code. Civil Interdiction o RPC, 34. Civil interdiction. — Civil interdiction shall deprive the offender during the time of his sentence of the rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and of the right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos. Family Relation o RPC, 11(2). Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any criminal liability: Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein. o RPC, 13(5). Mitigating circumstances. — The following are mitigating circumstances: That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. o FC, 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood. o FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage. o CC, 1109. Prescription does not run between husband and wife, even though there be a separation of property agreed upon in the marriage settlements or by judicial decree. Neither does prescription run between parents and children, during the minority or insanity of the latter, and between guardian and ward during the continuance of the guardianship. o CC, 1490. The husband and the wife cannot sell property to each other, except: (1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements; or (2) When there has been a judicial separation or property under Article 191. Absence o CC, 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. o CC, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years. o FC, 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors 4 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  Prodigality o Martinez v. Martinez Facts: The son was asking for a declaration of prodigality against his father, on grounds that his father had been squandering nd the estate by making donations to his 2 wife and her parents Held: Acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable part of the estate. While evidence state that wife’s possession increased greatly, there is no showing that there has been any perceptible diminution of the defendant’s property; it is inferred then that the father is still in the full exercise of his faculty to look over the estate. III. Pre-marital Controversy A. Breach of Promise to Marry  CC, 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.  CC, 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.  CC, 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.  CC, 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.  Wassmer v. Velez Facts: Two days before the wedding, Velez wrote Wassmer a note saying that he could not push through with the wedding. The following day, he sent another note saying the wedding would continue. Velez did not appear on the wedding ceremony. Held: Velez is liable for the cost of the wedding preparations spent by Wassmer. While mere breach is not an actionable wrong, Article 21 of the Civil Code says that when the person willfully causes loss or injury contrary to good custom, he shall compensate the latter for the damages. It is the abuse of right which can be a cause for moral and material damages.  Tanjanco v. CA Facts: Tanjanco succeeded in having sexual intercourse for a year with Santos after he promised to marry her. When Santos got pregnant, Tanjanco refused to marry her. Held: Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. There was no seduction involved. Sexual intercourse for a year does not constitute seduction but mutual passion.  De Jesus v. Syquia Facts: Syquia promised to marry de Jesus. The latter conceived a son. Syquia refused to marry her when she got pregnant the second time because he suspected the child was not his. De Jesus filed for breach of promise to marry. Held: Award for breach of promise to marry is denied. As long as no cost was incurred because of the breach of promise, no compensation can be awarded. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable.  Piccininni v. Hajus Facts: the result of fraudulent representations made by Hajus to Piccininni to the effect that she would marry him and they would live in her house, Piccininni was induced to spend a considerable amount of money in the renovation of the would-be conjugal home. Held: Denial of recovery of property transferred in contemplation of marriage is not necessary to the accomplishment of the object of heart balm legislation and to hold so will have the undesirable effect of placing it within the power of the recipient to renounce a promise and yet retain property bestowed in anticipation of performance. Plaintiff was asserting the defendant wronged him in fraudulently inducing him to transfer property to her [renovation of the house]. The complaint was based on this and not on her failure to marry him. IV. Definition and Nature of Marriage FC, 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code Consti, Art. XV Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development Consti, Art. XV Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State Consti, Art. XV Section 3. The State shall defend: (1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development; (3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and (4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them Loving v. Virginia 5 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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Facts: Plaintiffs were married couple: one was white, the other black. They assail the constitutionality of a Virginia statue banning interracial marriages. Held: The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. The 14th Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Zablocki v. Redhail Facts: Persons wanting to marry, but who have minors not under their custody and which is under obligation to support, shall have to secure permission from the court. Permission is granted on grounds of the person having fulfilled obligation to support illegitimate child before marrying. Held: Right to marry is of fundamental importance. It is recognized as one of the basic civil rights of man fundamental to our very existence and survival. It is a central part of liberty protected by the Due Process clause. Statutory classification in the case is overly inclusive: new spouse may actually better the applicant's financial situation by contributing income from a job. Preventing the marriage may only result in the children being born out of wedlock. Marriage Models 1. Traditional  Graham v. Graham Facts: Wife and husband signed an agreement that wife shall pay husband $300 a month, and that husband shall accompany wife in all her travels which withholds him from getting a job. Held: A private agreement between persons married or about to be married whereby they attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage contract, as defined by law, is contrary to public policy. In this case, In this case, where the husband was stipulated not to work because of the wife's great wealth.  Bradwell v. Illinois Facts: Illinois refused to grant a married woman a license to practice law. Woman assails the constitutionality of the decision. Held: Such decision violates no provision of the Constitution, since the WIFE'S PRIMARY ROLE is the provider of household and child-care services, thus preventing a married woman's entry into the Bar. Also, the inherent legal incapacities of a wife makes the entering of contracts difficult, thus making the legal profession also difficult. 2. Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model  Changing Status of Women: Dunn v. Palermo Facts: Palermo retained using her maiden name even after she got married. The Registrar asserts that she is required under Tennessee statute to assume the name of her husband. Held: Woman upon marriage may elect to retain her own surname or she may adopt the surname of her husband and the choice is hers. So long as a person’s name remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed in prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern as to name used.  By private contract: When valid, when void o In re Santiago Facts: Atty. Santiago prepared a document which authorized the husband and wife to marry again and where each waived any right of action one may have against the other. Held: The agreement is not valid because it is contrary to laws and morals and subverts the vital foundation of the family. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties. o Selanova v. Mendoza Facts: Judge Mendoza prepared and later ratified a document liquidating extra-judicially the CPG of Selanova and his wife. A condition imposed was that the spouses would waive the right to prosecute each other for acts of infidelity. Held: The contract was invalid. Marriage is a special contract. The law provides that any contract of personal separation between husband and wife and every extra-judicial agreement during marriage for the dissolution of conjugal property are void. Requisites FC, 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. FC, 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. 1. Essential  Legal Capacity, Male and Female o Jones v. Hallahan Facts: Two females contend that they were deprived of their constitutional rights to marry, of association and to free exercise of religion when the clerk failed to issue a marriage license to them. Held: Two females are incapable of entering into marriage. There is no constitutional protection of the rights of marriage between two persons of the same sex. 6 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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o Goodridge v. Department of Public Health Facts: Same-sex couples were denied marriage licenses by the Commissioner of Public Health. Held: (1) Marriage licensing statutes were not susceptible of interpretation permitting qualified same sex couples to obtain marriage licenses. (2) Limitation of protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked rational basis and violated state constitutional equal protection principles o Silverio v. Republic Facts: Silverio underwent a surgical procedure of sex reassignment in Thailand. He now wants his name and sex changed in his birth certificate. He is about to get married to a foreigner male. Held: The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. A change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason to justify such change. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership. It is more or less permanent in nature and not ordinarily terminable at his own will. A person's sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person's legal capacity and civil status. Birth certificate is a historical record of facts as they existed at the time of birth. Sex is the sum or peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female. No law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.  Consent freely given o FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. o FC, 45(3). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the Facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife. o People v. Santiago Facts: Santiago raped his niece Felicita. He married her the same afternoon before a protestant minister. Santiago then gave her a few pesos and sent her home. Held: The marriage is void because the man’s consent to marry his niece was absent. The marriage was a ruse for him to escape criminal liability. o Buccat v. Buccat Facts: woman was 6 months pregnant at the time of marriage] Held: Non-concealment that she is no longer a virgin is not a ground for annulment. In marriages during bride's advanced state of pregnancy, it is presumed that groom knows about pregnancy.  Eigenmann v. Guerra Facts: Eigenmann filed an action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was between the ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did not give her consent to the marriage. Held: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral or even by implication. Eigenmann’s mother was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She did not raise any objection and her consent can be gleaned from such acts. Eigenmann is estopped from asserting that he was a minor at the time of celebration of the marriage, having represented himself to be over 25. Formal  FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38.  CC, 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed. When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution. Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.  Authority of Solemnizing Officer o FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable o FC, 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; (2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted by his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing officer's church or religious sect; (3) Any ship captain or 7 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 airplane chief only in the case mentioned in Article 31; (4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; (5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10 o FC, 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. o FC, 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call o FC, 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians o FC, 35 (2). The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so o CC, 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. o Navarro v. Domagtoy Facts: Judge Domagtoy solemnized a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction. Held: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others “any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Solemnization outside the judge’s territorial jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid marriage. The judge is administratively liable, though. o Arañes v. Occiano Facts: A judge solemnized a marriage outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the marriage license being presented to him. He explained he did this out of human compassion and because the parties promised to present their license the afternoon after the wedding. Held: The marriage was void. The respondent judge was faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his territorial jurisdiction.  Marriage License o FC, 9. A marriage license shall be issued by the local civil registrar of the city or municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, except in marriages where no license is required in accordance with Chapter 2 of this Title. o FC, 10. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Republic of the Philippines. The issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by said consular official. o FC, 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local civil registrar which shall specify the following: (1) Full name of the contracting party; (2) Place of birth; (3) Age and date of birth; (4) Civil status; (5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; (6) Present residence and citizenship; (7) Degree of relationship of the contracting parties; (8) Full name, residence and citizenship of the father; (9) Full name, residence and citizenship of the mother; and (10) Full name, residence and citizenship of the guardian or person having charge, in case the contracting party has neither father nor mother and is under the age of twenty-one years. The applicants, their parents or guardians shall not be required to exhibit their residence certificates in any formality in connection with the securing of the marriage license. o FC, 12. The local civil registrar, upon receiving such application, shall require the presentation of the original birth certificates or, in default thereof, the baptismal certificates of the contracting parties or copies of such documents duly attested by the persons having custody of the originals. These certificates or certified copies of the documents by this Article need not be sworn to and shall be exempt from the documentary stamp tax. The signature and official title of the person issuing the certificate shall be sufficient proof of its authenticity. If either of the contracting parties is unable to produce his birth or baptismal certificate or a certified copy of either because of the destruction or loss of the original or if it is shown by an affidavit of such party or of any other person that such birth or baptismal certificate has not yet been received though the same has been required of the person having custody thereof at least fifteen days prior to the date of the application, such party may furnish in lieu thereof his current residence certificate or an instrument drawn up and sworn to before the local civil registrar concerned or any public official authorized to administer oaths. Such instrument shall contain the sworn declaration of two witnesses of lawful age, setting forth the full name, residence and citizenship of such contracting party and of his or her parents, if known, and the place and date of birth of such party. The nearest of kin of the contracting parties shall be preferred as witnesses, or, in their default, persons of good reputation in the province or the locality. The presentation of birth or baptismal certificate shall not be required if the parents of the contracting parties appear personally before the local civil registrar concerned and swear to the correctness of the lawful age of said parties, as stated in the application, or when the local civil registrar shall, by merely looking at the applicants upon their personally appearing before him, be convinced that either or both of them have the required age. o FC, 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married, the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth or baptismal certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the deceased spouse or the judicial decree of the absolute divorce, or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of his or her previous 8 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 o

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marriage. In case the death certificate cannot be secured, the party shall make an affidavit setting forth this circumstance and his or her actual civil status and the name and date of death of the deceased spouse. FC, 14. In case either or both of the contracting parties, not having been emancipated by a previous marriage, are between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, they shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, exhibit to the local civil registrar, the consent to their marriage of their father, mother, surviving parent or guardian, or persons having legal charge of them, in the order mentioned. Such consent shall be manifested in writing by the interested party, who personally appears before the proper local civil registrar, or in the form of an affidavit made in the presence of two witnesses and attested before any official authorized by law to administer oaths. The personal manifestation shall be recorded in both applications for marriage license, and the affidavit, if one is executed instead, shall be attached to said applications FC, 15. Any contracting party between the age of twenty-one and twenty-five shall be obliged to ask their parents or guardian for advice upon the intended marriage. If they do not obtain such advice, or if it be unfavorable, the marriage license shall not be issued till after three months following the completion of the publication of the application therefore. A sworn statement by the contracting parties to the effect that such advice has been sought, together with the written advice given, if any, shall be attached to the application for marriage license. Should the parents or guardian refuse to give any advice, this fact shall be stated in the sworn statement. FC, 16. In the cases where parental consent or parental advice is needed, the party or parties concerned shall, in addition to the requirements of the preceding articles, attach a certificate issued by a priest, imam or minister authorized to solemnize marriage under Article 7 of this Code or a marriage counselor duly accredited by the proper government agency to the effect that the contracting parties have undergone marriage counseling. Failure to attach said certificates of marriage counseling shall suspend the issuance of the marriage license for a period of three months from the completion of the publication of the application. Issuance of the marriage license within the prohibited period shall subject the issuing officer to administrative sanctions but shall not affect the validity of the marriage. Should only one of the contracting parties need parental consent or parental advice, the other party must be present at the counseling referred to in the preceding paragraph. (n) FC, 17. The local civil registrar shall prepare a notice which shall contain the full names and residences of the applicants for a marriage license and other data given in the applications. The notice shall be posted for ten consecutive days on a bulletin board outside the office of the local civil registrar located in a conspicuous place within the building and accessible to the general public. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. The marriage license shall be issued after the completion of the period of publication. (63a) FC, 18. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for marriage license, but shall nonetheless issue said license after the completion of the period of publication, unless ordered otherwise by a competent court at his own instance or that of any interest party. No filing fee shall be charged for the petition nor a corresponding bond required for the issuances of the order. (64a) FC, 19. The local civil registrar shall require the payment of the fees prescribed by law or regulations before the issuance of the marriage license. No other sum shall be collected in the nature of a fee or tax of any kind for the issuance of said license. It shall, however, be issued free of charge to indigent parties, that is those who have no visible means of income or whose income is insufficient for their subsistence a fact established by their affidavit, or by their oath before the local civil registrar. (65a) FC, 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold characters on the face of every license issued. (65a) FC, 21. When either or both of the contracting parties are citizens of a foreign country, it shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage, issued by their respective diplomatic or consular officials. Stateless persons or refugees from other countries shall, in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity herein required, submit an affidavit stating the circumstances showing such capacity to contract marriage. (66a) FC, 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also State: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a) FC, 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a) 9 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 o FC, 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. (n) o FC, 25. The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a registry book strictly in the order in which the same are received. He shall record in said book the names of the applicants, the date on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary. (n) o FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a) where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) o FC, 27. In case either or both of the contracting parties are at the point of death, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license and shall remain valid even if the ailing party subsequently survives. (72a) o FC, 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. (72a) o FC, 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. (72a) o FC, 30. The original of the affidavit required in the last preceding article, together with the legible copy of the marriage contract, shall be sent by the person solemnizing the marriage to the local civil registrar of the municipality where it was performed within the period of thirty days after the performance of the marriage. (75a) o FC, 31. A marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew members may also be solemnized by a ship captain or by an airplane pilot not only while the ship is at sea or the plane is in flight, but also during stopovers at ports of call. o FC, 32. A military commander of a unit, who is a commissioned officer, shall likewise have authority to solemnize marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians. (74a) o FC, 33. Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic cultural communities may be performed validly without the necessity of marriage license, provided they are solemnized in accordance with their customs, rites or practices. (78a) o FC, 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing Facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage. o PD 965. the additional requirement of FAMILY PLANNING INSTRUCTIONS to marriage licenses WHEREAS, the Government has adopted a national population program to achieve and maintain levels of population most conducive to the national welfare; WHEREAS, an essential element of the population program is to inform and instruct the people on family planning and responsible parenthood; and WHEREAS, an effective mode of implementing the program would be to require all applicants for marriage license to receive instructions and information on family planning and responsible parenthood before they are issued the marriage license, and to create the administrative machinery for giving such instructions and information;

o Republic v. CA Facts: Marriage license was missing; Civil Registrar was not able to find the marriage license in its records. Held: Senior Civil Registry Officer wrote, "Said license number does not appear from our records. The certification of ‘due search and inability to find,’ unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Rule 132 of the rules of court, sufficiently proves that the marriage license was not issued. o Moreno v. Bernabe Facts: Respondent Judge married Moreno even without marriage license. He claims to have done it in good faith, “as he was only moved by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant” Held: The absence of any of the essential requisites, even if accompanied by good faith, shall generally render the marriage void ab initio. o People v. Borromeo 10 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 Facts: Borromeo killed his wife and was convicted of parricide. He appealed that he should have been convicted of homicide since he and the deceased were not legally married. Held: There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of marriage. Persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of the marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. o Seguisabal v. Cabrera Facts: Seguisabal filed a case against Judge Cabrera for solemnizing the marriage of Sayson and Jagonoy without the requisite marriage license. Respondent Judge reasoned that he presumed that the papers were in order. Held: The parties were not issued a marriage license because of their failure to attend the required family planning seminar. Absent the license the marriage is void. Thus, despite attestations of good faith, the judge was fined equivalent to 3 months salary for deliberately dispensing with legal requirements. o Alcantara v. Alcantara Facts: The marriage license procured for the spouses are a sham since it was procured from Cavite which is the domicile of neither of the parties, and the marriage license number in the Registry does not match the number in the marriage contract by one number. Held: The marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and the petitioner had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the state's demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which, the general public is interested. To be considered void on the ground of absence of marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts. Church ceremony was confirmatory of the civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. The solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.  Ceremony o FC, 3(3). The formal requisites of marriage are: (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age o FC, 6. No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed by the contracting parties and their witnesses and attested by the solemnizing officer. In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer. o FC, 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect o FC, 28. If the residence of either party is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar, the marriage may be solemnized without necessity of a marriage license. o FC, 29. In the cases provided for in the two preceding articles, the solemnizing officer shall state in an affidavit executed before the local civil registrar or any other person legally authorized to administer oaths that the marriage was performed in articulo mortis or that the residence of either party, specifying the barrio or barangay, is so located that there is no means of transportation to enable such party to appear personally before the local civil registrar and that the officer took the necessary steps to ascertain the ages and relationship of the contracting parties and the absence of legal impediment to the marriage. o FC, 22. The marriage certificate, in which the parties shall declare that they take each other as husband and wife, shall also State: (1) The full name, sex and age of each contracting party; (2) Their citizenship, religion and habitual residence; (3) The date and precise time of the celebration of the marriage; (4) That the proper marriage license has been issued according to law, except in marriage provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; (5) That either or both of the contracting parties have secured the parental consent in appropriate cases; (6) That either or both of the contracting parties have complied with the legal requirement regarding parental advice in appropriate cases; and (7) That the parties have entered into marriage settlement, if any, attaching a copy thereof. (67a) o FC, 23. It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be 11 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the copy of the marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (68a) o FC, 24. It shall be the duty of the local civil registrar to prepare the documents required by this Title, and to administer oaths to all interested parties without any charge in both cases. The documents and affidavits filed in connection with applications for marriage licenses shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax. o Martinez v. Tan Facts: Martinez and Tan appeared before the Justice of the Peace and signed a statement that they agreed to get married. They signed another document, along with the justice and 2 witnesses, stating they appeared before the justice and ratified all the contents of the instrument. The justice pronounced them as man and wife. Held: The marriage is affirmed. The declaration of the contracting parties does not have to be verbalized. The very act of signing a statement that declares that they take each other as husband and wife is sufficient. There was a proper ceremony. There is no particular form of marriage ceremony required. o Madrilejo v. de Leon Facts: Madrilejo and Perez got married in articulo mortis. The priest who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. Held: The marriage was valid. Failure of the priest to send a copy of the marriage certificate does not affect the validity of the marriage. Presumption of Marriage  CC, 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or Facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.  Trinidad v. CA Facts: Petitioner alleges that he is a legitimate child of his father by virtue of his father’s marriage to his mother; however, marriage contract could not be procured because it got burned during one of the fires during the War. Held: In the absence of marriage contract, Marriage can be proved by relevant evidence such as 1) testimony of witnesses to the marriage, 2) couple’s open and public cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, 3) birth and baptismal certificates of children born in such union and 4) mention of marriage in subsequent documents. Preponderant evidence means that as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. To determine this, court considers (1) facts and circumstances in the case, (2) witnesses' manner of testifying, (3) their intelligence, (4) means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, (5) nature of the facts, (6) the probability or improbability of their testimony, (7) their interest or want thereof, and (8) their personal credibility.  Vda. de Jacob v. CA Facts: Vda. de Jacob claiming to be the surviving spouse of the deceased. Their marriage was solemnized by a priest, but said priest lost the original marriage contract. In lieu of the original, a reconstructed Marriage Contract was issued in 1978. Held: Even without a marriage license, petitioner and deceased have been living together for five years as stated in affidavit. The marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license. The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Execution of the contract can be proven by witnesses and solemnizing officer.  Sevilla v. Cardenas Facts: Certification of Civil Registrar stated that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license number is registered for the reason that the employee handling is already retired. Our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem." Held: The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record. In this case, the wordings of the Civil Registrar belie the claim of diligent search. Therefore, if a marriage certificate is missing, and all means HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED to find it, then the marriage is presumed to exist.

Void and Voidable Marriages A. Void 1. Grounds a. Ordinary  FC, 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 12 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: (1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so; (3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered the preceding Chapter; (4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41; (5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and (6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.  FC, 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether relationship between the parties be legitimate or illegitimate: (1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and (2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.  FC, 38. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning for reasons of public policy: (1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree; (2) Between step-parents and step-children; (3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law; (4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child; (5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child; (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter; (7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter; (8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and (9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or his or her own spouse.  FC, 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe.  FC, 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.  FC, 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse  CC, 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.  CC, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs: (1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or airplane; (2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years; (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four years  People v. Mendoza Facts: During the subsistence of Mendoza’s marriage to his first wife, he contracted a second marriage. After the death of the first wife, he contracted a third marriage. Mendoza was prosecuted for bigamy on his last marriage. Held: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for his third marriage. He contracted this marriage after the death of his first wife. The second marriage is void because it was contracted during the subsistence of a prior marriage. It is the second marriage that is bigamous. He need not ask for judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage since before the Family Code, it was not required.  Tolentino v. Paras Facts: Tolentino served sentence for bigamy. After serving his sentence, he went back to his second wife and continued to live with her. It was the second wife’s name that appeared as the surviving spouse in Tolentino’s death certificate. Held: The first wife has the right to seek judicial declaration that she is the lawful surviving spouse. The admission of the man that he committed bigamy is the best proof of the validity of the first marriage. The second marriage is void ab initio.  Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy Facts: Wiegel and Olivia got married under the belief that Olivia’s prior marriage to Maxion was void because the latter forced Olivia to marry him. Held: Olivia’s first marriage is merely voidable, her consent being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because it was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting.  Terre v. Terre Facts: Terre, a law student, married Dorothy. Dorothy was already married but Terre convinced her that the first marriage to her first cousin was void. After their first child was born, Terre abandoned Dorothy and contracted a second marriage. Held: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy’s marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Terre demonstrated grossly immoral conduct. He should have known that a declaration was essential. Terre was disbarred. 13 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

b.

 Atienza v. Brillantes Facts: Judge Brillantes married Ongkiko twice. In both instances, the couple failed to secure a marriage license. After more than 20 years, Judge Brillantes married another woman in California. He said he is single because under the Civil Code, his first marriage is void. Held: the marriage is void but Brillantes has to get a judicial declaration of nullity for the purpose of remarriage. Even if the first marriage was contracted before the Family Code, remarriages after the Family Code are covered by Art. 40.  Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez Facts: In 1993, Judge Sanchez solemnized a marriage between Manzano and Payao despite the fact that they indicated in the affidavits sworn before the judge that they are both separated. Manzano’s widow who he married in 1966, filed a case against the judge. Held: Sanchez should have known that the marriage was void for being bigamous since Manzano had a previous subsisting marriage. The fact that they had been living apart from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve the marriage bonds. Although the law exempts individuals who have freely and voluntarily cohabited for at least 5 years from securing a marriage license, they must be legally capacitated to marry each other. Manzano and Payao’s marriage is void for being bigamous, not because of the absence of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.  Apiag v. Cantero Facts: the 1st marriage was only dramatized, for the families of the man and first wife to save face. Boy did not seek judicial declaration of nullity. 2nd marriage happened before effectivity of Family Code. Held: Old law will apply to petitioner since both marriages were celebrated under the old Civil Code. Thus, no judicial decree of nullity is needed to establish the invalidity of void marriages. Psychological Incapacity  FC, 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.  Santos v. Bedia-Santos Facts: After giving birth, Julia Bedia-Santos left for the US and did not contact her husband anymore. Leouel filed for the nullity of marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Held: Art. 36 of the FC cannot be taken independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts and laws on marriage. “Psychological incapacity” refers to the mental capacity of a party to the marriage to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants [gravity, jurisprudence, incurability]. The facts were not enough to show psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of willingness to comply with marital obligations.  Molina v. CA Facts: Roridel and Reynaldo were estranged. Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity because her husband was “highly immature and habitually quarrelsome who thought of himself as a king to be served.” Held: There is no psychological incapacity. What exist are mere irreconcilable differences. MOLINA GUIDELINES: a. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff b. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. c. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage d. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. e. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage f. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Art. 220, 221, 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and children g. Interpretations given by the Nat’l Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respects by our courts h. The trial court must order prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless SolGen issues a certification.  Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA Facts: After 9 months of marriage, there has been no sexual intercourse or any attempt at it between Tsoi and his wife. Neither party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul the marriage but the husband did not. Held: Abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to psychological incapacity.  Choa v. Choa Facts: Alfonso Chua filed a petition for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity. He cited his wife was immature, inattentive to their children and lacked the intention of procreative sexuality. 14 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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Held: it was not proven that Leni Choa was psychologically incapacitated. At most, the parties were incompatible. Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, and occasional emotional outbursts are not acceptable causes of psychological incapacity. Evidence merely showed that he and his wife cannot get along with each other. There must be a natal or supervening factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage. Antonio v. Reyes Facts: Wife persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. Held: A person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. Republic v. Melgar Facts: wife complained of husband's immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and abandonment of his family. In this case, wife alone testified. Held: In order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Norma's lone testimony should have been adduced. While an actual, medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would have strengthened Norma's claim of Eulogio's alleged psychological incapacity. Norma's omission to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already present at the inception of marriage or that they are incurable. Paras v. Paras Facts: wife complained that husband (1) dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (2) lived with a concubine and sired a child with her; (3) did not give financial support with his children; (4) has been remiss in his duties both as husband and as father Held: The totality of evidence must be sufficient to prove that the spouse is psychologically incapacitated. "Defects" should be present at the inception of marriage. Sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of marriage. Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which grounds need not be rooted on psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity and abandonment and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Also, one's unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one's unfitness as a husband or wife - the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity for marriage. Tongol v. Tongol Facts: husband says their marriage was not a happy one because of her parents' continued interference and attempt to break up their union. Examining psychiatrist concluded that respondent is suffering from Inadequate Personality Disorder [does not function in the way that she feels or she is confident; very much in doubt of her own capabilities; exaggerated emotional reactions; feeling of rejection]. Held: The behavior exhibited by the respondent does not amount to psychological incapacity as contemplated under Art. 36. Psychological incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. In this case, the testimonies revolve around disagreement regarding the management of their business. Disagreement on money matters is not a sufficient ground to declare the marriage null and void. Dimayuga-Laurena v. Laurena Facts: Wife alleges that husband was psychologically incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. Husband gave priority to parents, would come home very late, tried to convert her to his religion, womanizer – such manifest husband’s psychological incapacity. Held: Petitioner fails to prove psychological incapacity of husband, much less its existence at the time of the celebration of the marriage. (failed to conform with Molina guidelines) Te v. Te Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married at a young age. They became estranged because the girl was too overbearing while the boy was too meek to stand up to his wife and make his own decisions. Psychological examinations show that boy is suffering from dependent personality disorder, and that girl is afflicted with antisocial personality disorder. Held: Marriage was void under Art. 36. The disorders suffered by both petitioner and respondent makes them both incapable of assuming the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity, etc. Ting v. Ting Facts: Husband has been having drinking and gambling problems, and has violent outbursts against his wife. Doctor concluded that such behavior of husband are clear indications that petitioner suffers from personality disorder. Second opinion was contrary to first, Doctor stating that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering latter’s good relations with coworkers. 15 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 Held: Wife’s testimony as well as the totality of evidence presented is too inadequate to declare husband psychologically unfit under Art. 36. 2.

3.

Period to File Action or to Raise Defense  FC, 39. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by Executive Order 227 and Republic Act No. 8533; The phrase "However, in case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall taken effect" has been deleted by Republic Act No. 8533 [Approved February 23, 1998] Effects of Nullity  FC, 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.  FC, 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.  FC, 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.  FC, 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n)  FC, 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)  FC, 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.  FC, 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate.  Niñal v. Badayog Facts: Niñal and Bellones were married in 1974. Niñal shot Bellones in 1985, causing her death. After a year and a half, Niñal contracted a second marriage with Badayog without a marriage license. They executed an affidavit stating that they have cohabited for at least five years. Niñal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a declaration of nullity of Niñal’s marriage with Badayog. Held: Second marriage was void for lack of marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring marriage license because their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Of the five years they had cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal impediment. For purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.  Domingo v. CA 16 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

B.

Facts: Delia Domingo filed a petition for Declaration of Nullity and Separation of Property. Her husband filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the petition was unnecessary since their marriage was void ab initio because of Roberto’s previous marriage. Held: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity.  De Castro v. Assidao-de Castro Facts: couple applied for marriage license. Marriage license was granted but already expired when they were planning to get married. They executed an affidavit stating they had been living together as husband and wife for at least 5 years Held: Trial court may declare the marriage void ab initio in the case filed by the wife for support of their illegitimate child. The Court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Also, the falsity of an affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisite of marriage. Voidable 1. Grounds  FC, 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: (1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife; (2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the Facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife; (5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or (6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable.  FC, 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article: (1) Nondisclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband; (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. (86a)  FC, 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods indicated herein: (1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one; (2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity; (3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the fraud; (4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force, intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased; (5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage. (87a)  FC, 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of Facts or confession of judgment.  RPC, 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.  Moe v. Dinkins Facts: Petitioners not allowed to marry by virtue of state statute prohibiting marriages between minors without parental consent. Held: It is the state’s interest to protect the minors from immature decision-making and preventing unstable marriages. The law presumes that the parents possess what the child lacks in maturity, and that parents are more capable to act in their best interests, thus the parental consent requirement. Besides, there is no denial to marry. Marriage is only delayed 17 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  Katipunan v. Tenorio Facts: Marcos Katipunan and Rita Tenorio had been married for seven years. Tenorio suffered a mental ailment. Katipunan wanted to annul their marriage on the ground of insanity. Held: there is no ground to annul the marriage. Insanity occurs after the celebration of the marriage does not constitute a cause for nullity. The wife was mentally sound at the time of the marriage.  Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay Facts: Emilio Suntay was suffering from schizophrenia which had been manifest prior to his marriage to Isabel. The trial court declared their marriage null and void. Held: The marriage is voidable. Being of unsound mind is a ground only for annulment and not for declaration of nullity. When dispositive part is not clear, the body of the decision may be referred to give light to the ruling.  Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat Facts: Mangonon de Buccat gave birth 89 days after her marriage. Her husband filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed her non-virginity. Held: It is not believable that the wife could have concealed that she was six months pregnant at the time of marriage. She was at an advanced stage of pregnancy and the husband should have observed her advanced physical condition. There is no ground for annulment.  Aquino v. Delizo Facts: Aquino wants the marriage annulled because his wife, Delizo concealed that she was four months pregnant with the child of another man at the time of their marriage. Held: Concealment of pregnancy is one of the recognized forms of fraud that may be a reason for the annulment of a marriage. Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino could hardly be expected to know, merely by looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of the marriage.  Anaya v. Palaroan Facts: Anaya wanted her marriage annulled because of Palaroan’s non-disclosure of his pre-marital relationship with another woman prior to their marriage. Held: there is no ground for annulment. Fraud as a vice of consent is limited exclusively to those exclusively to those enumerated by law. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute fraud.  Ruiz v. Atienza Facts: Ruiz impregnated Atienza. Atienza’s father, along with some other companions, went to the boarding house of Ruiz and convinced him to marry Atienza. After the marriage, Ruiz claims that he was intimidated into marrying Atienza. Held: There is no ground for annulment. Neither violence nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Threat cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also not kidnapped by the wife’s relatives. He had many occasions to escape.  Jimenez v. Canizares Facts: Jimenez claims that Canizares cannot copulate because her vagina was too small. Canizares refused to undergo physical examination despite repeated orders by the court. Held: Impotency of the wife cannot be presumed. The defendant’s impotency has not been satisfactorily established as required by law. Lone testimony of the husband that his wife is incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.  Sarao v. Guevarra Facts: Sarao and Guevarra were unable to copulate because on pains on the part of Guevara. Upon physician’s advice, Guevara had her uterus and ovaries removed so she could copulate. After the operation, Sarao claimed to have lost any desire to have intercourse with his wife after her operation and filed for annulment. Held: Impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability to copulate. It must not be confused with sterility. Impotency must exist at the time of marriage. It must also be permanent and incurable. Temporary and occasional incapacity for copulation is not a ground.  People v. Santiago Facts: Santiago raped his niece Felicita. He married her the same afternoon before a protestant minister. Santiago then gave her a few pesos and sent her home. Held: The ceremony cannot be considered binding on her because of duress and would make it voidable had it not been already considered void. 2.

Marriage when One Spouse is Absent  FC, 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary 18 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

3.

proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (83a)  FC, 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio. A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (n)  FC, 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered legitimate; (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; (3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of law; (4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession. (n)  FC, 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.  CC, 83(2). Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases, until declared null and void by a competent court  CC, 85(2). A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage: In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force  CC, 87(2). The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as follows: For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other.  RPC, 349. Bigamy. — The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.  Jones v. Hortiguela Facts: Jones went abroad. His wife, Escano, did not hear from him again. Escano instituted proceedings to declare Jones an absentee. Escano married Hortiguela before seven years has passed after effectivity of court’s order. Held: The marriage is valid. Seven years of consecutive absence is counted from the date of abandonment and not from date of effectivity of the order. Effects of pending Action/Decree  FC, 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent.  FC, 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45. The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings for liquidation. In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.  FC, 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for such matters. The children or their guardian or the trustee of their property may ask for the enforcement of the judgment. The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either of both of the parents; but the value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be considered as advances on their legitime. (n) 19 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third persons. (n)  FC, 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after compliance with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.  FC, 54. Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate  CC, 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.  CC, 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: (1) The court decrees otherwise, or (2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.  Yu v. Yu Facts: Spouses battling for custody of minor child during pendency of declaration of nullity case. Held: petitioner’s filing of the case for declaration of nullity of marriage automatically submitted the issue of the custody of the child. The custody issue in the declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded. 4. Jurisdiction: Tamano v. Ortiz Facts: parties were Muslims Held: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined from the allegations of the complaint as the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. Petitioner and Tamano were married in accordance with the Civil Code; hence, Civil Code is applicable to the case. Assuming that they likewise married under Muslim laws, the same would still fall under the original jurisdiction of the RTC. RTC have jurisdiction over all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations. VI. Legal Separation A. Grounds  FC, 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; (2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation; (3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement; (4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; (6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent; (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad; (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this Article, the term "child" shall include a child by nature or by adoption.  CC, 97. A petition for legal separation may be filed: (1) For adultery on the part of the wife and for concubinage on the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code; or (2) An attempt by one spouse against the life of the other.  People v. Zapata and Bondoc Facts: Bondoc filed a complaint of adultery against his wife Zapata and her paramour in 1947. The wife pleaded guilty. After a year, Bondoc filed a second complaint for adultery committed between 1947-1948. Held: The offenses are considered separate. Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery.  Muñoz v. del Barrio Facts: Jose del Barrio physically maltreated his wife three times. She was hit in the abdomen and face, her hair was pulled and her neck twisted. Held: There is no ground for legal separation. The husband’s action must be calculated to produce death of his wife. Intent to kill must be established with clear and convincing evidence. Maltreatment does not constitute an attempt to kill. [Case wad decided under Civil Code. Under Family Code, there is ground for legal separation under Art. 55(1)]  Gandionco v. Peñaranda Facts: Peñaranda filed a case for legal separation against Gandionco on the ground of concubinage. Several months later, she filed a criminal case for concubinage. Held: The civil action may proceed. The civil action is not one to enforce civil liability but is aimed at conjugal rights of the spouses. No criminal conviction is necessary to issue a decree of legal separation. In legal separation, preponderance of evidence is enough.  Lapuz v. Eufemio Facts: Lapuz filed for legal separation on the ground of abandonment. Eufemio filed a counterclaim for declaration of nullity of marriage. Before trial was completed, she died in a vehicular accident. Held: Death of the plaintiff before decree of legal separation abates the action. There is no more need for legal separation because the marriage is already dissolved by the death of one of the parties. (1) The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. Legal separation 20 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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was not converted into declaration for nullity by a counterclaim, for legal separation presupposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a precondition. (2) An action for legal separation is purely personal. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself. Death abates the action for legal separation.  De la Cruz v. de la Cruz Facts: de la Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years. Held: There is no abandonment but only physical estrangement. Abandonment consists of financial and moral desertion in addition to physical estrangement. Husband continued to give support to his family even while he was away. In this case, there was no voluntary act to forsake the marital vows or to cause perpetual separation.  Ong v. Ong Facts: Husband seeking for a decree of legal separation on grounds of abandonment by his wife. Held: Girl leaving husband due to his abusive conduct does not constitute abandonment. Abandonment referred to by the FC is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. Defenses  FC, 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds: (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of; (2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of; (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for legal separation; (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation; (5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or (6) Where the action is barred by prescription.  People v. Sansano and Ramos Facts: Ventura left Sansano for 3 years without writing to her or sending support. Sansano began to live with Ramos. When Ventura returned, he filed adultery charges against Sansano and Ramos. Both were convicted. After serving sentence Sansano asked Ventura to take her back but he told her to do what she wanted. She again lived with Ramos. Ventura went abroad for 7 years. When he returned to the Philippines, he filed a second charge of adultery and filed a case for legal separation. Held: Ventura consented to the adulterous relations of his wife. He is therefore barred from instituting a case for adultery. The sole purpose of filing the charge is to use it as a ground for legal separation.  Ocampo v. Florenciano Facts: de Ocampo and Florenciano were married in 1938. De Ocampo discovered that his wife was maintaining illicit relations. He sent her to Manila but she continued going out with other men. In 1955, de Ocampo caught Florenciano in the act of having illicit relations. Held: There was no collusion despite the confession made by the guilty spouse outside the court. What is prohibited is a decree of legal separation based solely on such confession. In this case, there was other evidence to prove adultery.  Sargent v. Sargent Facts: Sargent charged his wife with having committed adultery with unknown men and their black driver. The wife denied the charge and alleged that her husband conspired with detectives and servants to falsely accuse her of adultery with the driver. She said that husband solicited driver to commit adultery with her, and afforded him opportunities to do so. Held: Sargent’s acts amount to consent and connivance. He had reason to suspect that his wife was inclined to commit adultery but he did nothing to prevent it. Instead, he connived with the servants and detectives to bring about the adulterous act. A man may not actually participate in a course of action leading to his wife’s downfall.  Brown v. Yambao Facts: Brown filed for legal separation on the ground that Yambao begot a child from an adulterous relationship. Yambao failed to submit answer on time. During cross-examination, it was revealed that Brown also lived with another woman with whom he has begotten children. Held: Legal separation cannot be claimed where both spouses are offenders. One must come to court with clean hands. Moreover, failure of wife to raise a defense may be considered circumstantial evidence of collusion between her and her husband. Lastly, the CC, action for legal separation should be filed within one year from the time the time the plaintiff becomes cognizant of the cause and within five years from and after the date when such cause occurred. [Under FC, an action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause.]  Willan v. Willan Facts: Willan claims that his wife physically and verbally abused him. She also often demanded sexual intercourse even when her husband did not want it. Before Willan left his wife for groom they had sexual intercourse. Held: The last sexual intercourse with the wife constitutes condonation. Willan was free to submit or to resist his wife’s pleadings. He may have been reluctant to submit himself to his wife but this does not mean that he acted involuntarily.  Bugayong v. Ginez Facts: Ginez committed adultery. After finding out [only through letters from relatives], Bugayong cohabited with his wife for two nights and one day. He then filed for legal separation. Held: Any cohabitation and sexual intercourse with the guilty party after the commission of the offense and with knowledge of the offense, is evidence of condonation.  Matubis v. Praxedes 21 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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Facts: Matubis and Praxedes made an agreement waving the right to sue for adultery/concubinage among others. Held: There was consent to the commission of the marital offense. The condonation and consent are not only implied but expressed. Legal separation cannot be claimed. When to File or Try Actions  FC, 57. An action for legal separation shall be filed within five years from the time of the occurrence of the cause. (102)  FC, 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)  FC, 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)  FC, 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of Facts or a confession of judgment. In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.  Ocampo v. Florenciano, supra. Facts: Held: Petition should be filed within 5 years of occurrence and 1 year of cognizance of the ground.  Contreras v. Macaraig Facts: Wife had been hearing of rumors regarding husband’s infidelity since Sept. 1962. She sought for a decree of legal separation only after she saw her husband’s paramour and child and when husband admitted infidelity, which was December 1963. Held: The only time the legal period of one year must be deemed to have started is the time when husband admitted infidelity, when wife really became cognizant of the ground.  Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Facts: Somosa-Ramos filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage and attempt on her life. She also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary and mandatory injunction for the return of her paraphernal and exclusive properties. Ramos opposed, stating that the court cannot try cases within the 6-month cooling off period. Held: The 6-month cooling off period is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion of preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the period. The law remains cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself. Effects of Filing of Petition  FC, 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other. The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court.  FC, 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article 49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the common children.  De la Vina v. Villareal Facts: Geopano filed for legal separation on the ground of concubinage by her husband, de la Vina Held: a married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband, where the husband has given cause for divorce or consents. In an action for divorce, a wife can seek an injunction to curtail the husband’s power of administration over the conjugal property to protect her interest.  Reyes v. Ines-Luciano Facts: Reyes filed for legal separation on the ground that her husband attempted to kill her. She was granted alimony pendente lite by the judge. Husband claims that wife is not entitled to support because she is facing a charge of adultery. Held: Mere allegation will not deprive the wife of her right to receive support pendente lite. Adultery must be established by competent evidence. Support pendente lite comes from the conjugal funds and not the personal funds of the husband. Effects of Decree  FC, 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bonds shall not be severed; (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2); (3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, subject to the provisions of Article 213 of this Code; and (4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law. (106a)  FC, 64. After the finality of the decree of legal separation, the innocent spouse may revoke the donations made by him or by her in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the latter as beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable. The revocation of the donations shall be recorded in the registries of property in the places where the properties are located. Alienations, liens and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the complaint for revocation in the registries of property shall be respected. The revocation of or change in the designation of the insurance beneficiary shall take effect upon written notification thereof to the insured. The action to revoke the donation under this Article must be brought within five years from the time the decree of legal separation become final.  Insurance Code, 11 22 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  Bañez v. Bañez Facts: there was an action pending for legal separation; petitioner contends that multiple appeals are allowed. Held: (1) Execution pending appeal is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may result from the issuance of the writ. (2) The effects of the decree, such as entitlement to live separately, dissolution and liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, and custody of the minor children follow from the decree of legal separation. They are not separate or distinct matters, rather they are mere incidents of legal separation. Thus they may not be subject to multiple appeals.  Dissolution and Liquidation of ACP or CPG o La Rue v. La Rue Facts: Wife sought and was granted divorce. Marriage was a traditional one in that husband works while wife stays at home. Held: Wife was entitled to equitable distribution in a no-fault divorce especially since she contributed her earnings during the early years of marriage to conjugal property and since her homemaker services were contributed over a considerable period of time, which also contributed to the economic well-being of the family unit. According to the theory of equitable distribution – homemaker services are valid contributions to the conjugal properties, subject to the following conditions: (1) that it is NOT LIMITED to the possessory interest of a real estate; (2) that it depends on the QUALITY of the services rendered, whether the wife has been frugal or excessive in her expenses; (3) the age and health of the wife, as well as the LENGTH of the marriage.  Custody o FC, 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.  Other Effects o CC, 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation o Matute v. Macadaeg and Medel Facts: Husband brought action for legal separation against wife and brother on grounds of adultery. The action was granted and the father was given custody of four minor children. Father went abroad and left children under care of sister. Upon his return, mother asked permission to bring children to Manila for two weeks. Mother did not return children and is no custody now asking of them. Held: Even though children wish to be with their mother, the children's choice of parent is overruled because the parent is UNABLE TO SUPPORT HERSELF. o Laperal v. Republic Facts: Laperal and husband has been legally separated. Held: A woman’s married status is not affected by a decree of legal separation, there being no severance of the vinculum. Thus she should continue to use the name employed before legal separation. F. Reconciliation  How Done: FC, 65. If the spouses should reconcile, a corresponding joint manifestation under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation.  Effects o FC, 66. The reconciliation referred to in the preceding Articles shall have the following consequences: (1) The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated at whatever stage; and (2) The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime. The court's order containing the foregoing shall be recorded in the proper civil registries. o FC, 67. The agreement to revive the former property regime referred to in the preceding Article shall be executed under oath and shall specify: (1) The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime; (2) Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse; and (3) The names of all their known creditors, their addresses and the amounts owing to each. The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the court in the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors named therein. After due hearing, the court shall, in its order, take measure to protect the interest of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registries of properties. The recording of the ordering in the registries of property shall not prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient separate properties to satisfy the creditor's claim. VII. Divorces A. Foreign Divorces  CC, 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.  FC, 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. (17a) Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by Executive Order 227) 23 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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 Van Dorn v. Romillo Facts: Upton, a US citizen, divorced his Filipina wife with the representation that no community property existed. Later on, he filed a suit claiming that the business of Alice was a conjugal property. Held: A divorce obtained abroad by aliens from their Filipino spouses may be recognized in the Philippines provided that it is valid according to the alien spouse’s national law. The husband is stopped by his own representation that there is no community property.  Quita v. CA Facts: Quita and Padlan married in 1941. She sued Antonio for divorce in 1950. The decree was granted in 1954. She contracted a second marriage, but also ended in divorce. She then married the third time. When Arturo died, he left no will. The question therefore is who the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo is. Held: There is a need to determine the factual issues of the case, mainly the issue on the citizenship of the petitioner when she acquired the divorce because it will determine whether the divorce will have legal effect in the Philippines. a Filipino expatriate, upon obtaining a foreign citizenship AT THE TIME OF THE FOREIGN DIVORCE, is no longer bound by the laws of the Philippines, thus making the divorce VALID, provided that the divorce is also valid where they obtained it. In this case, it should be determined whether Quita was already a US citizen by the time she divorced Arturo.  Llorente v. CA Facts: deceased and petitioner were married. Deceased was admitted to US Citizenship and became a naturalized American. When deceased learned of petitioner’s infidelity, he refused to forgive her and acquired a decree of divorce when he returned to the US. Deceased remarried, and stated in his last will and testament that his properties be bequeathed to his second wife. Held: The divorce obtained was valid and recognized in the Philippines since petitioner is already an American citizen when divorce was decreed. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from the foreigner are issues best proved by foreign law, which must be pleaded and proved.  Garcia v. Recio Facts: Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen. They separated and obtained a divorce in Australia. Recio became an Australian citizen. he subsequently married Garcia, a Filipina. Held: The divorce between Recio and Samson was not proven to be sufficient to enable Recio to contract a second marriage. Divorces are of different types. One is absolute divorce, which terminates the marriage. The second is limited divorce that suspends that marriage and leaves the bond in full force. In this case, it was not proven that the divorce obtained by Recio and Samson was an absolute divorce. Muslim Divorces  Code of Muslim Personal Laws, 45. Divorce is the formal dissolution of the marriage bond in accordance with this Code to be granted only after the exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. It may be effected by: (a) Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq); (b) Vow of continence by the husband (ila~); (c) injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband (zihar); (d) Acts of imprecation (1i'an); (e) Redemption by the wife (klan'); (f) Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to repudiate (tafwid); or (g) Judicial decree (faskh).  Yasin v. Sharia District Court Facts: Yasin filed a petition to resume the used of her maiden name. Yasin has been granted a decree of divorce under Muslim laws. Held: Yasin may revert to the use of her maiden name. the marital ties no longer exist between her and her former husband. There is no need for judicial confirmation for this as the use of her former husband’s name is optional and not obligatory for he

VIII. De Facto Separation  FC, 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.  FC, 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.  FC, 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing Facts. The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. 24 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned.  FC, 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to present said witnesses. (n)  FC, 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory  Perez v. CA Facts: Ray and Nerissa Perez are separated in fact. They both want custody of their three-year old son. Both have ample means to support their son. Held: Custody is given to the mother. A child under seven years of age should not be separated from his mother without justifiable reason.  Estrada v. Escritor Facts: Escritor and her husband are separated in fact for almost twenty years. She and another man are living together as husband and wife. Estrada alleges that Escritor is immoral for living with a man not her husband. Escritor alleges that she is not immoral and her living with her current partner has the blessings of her Church, Jehovah’s witness. Held: Despite the presence of a Jehovah Witness "pledge of faithfulness" amounting to marriage, each of the spouses are PRESUMED to be separated in fact without a decree of legal separation stating otherwise. IX. Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect  RPC, 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article  Anti-Rape Law (RA 8353). Art. 266-A: RAPE: WHEN AND HOW COMMITTED – rape is committed: (1) by A MAN who shallhave carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (2) by ANY PERSON who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Art. 266-C: EFFECT OF PARDON – the subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. [2] In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio.  FC, 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.  CC, 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action  RA 9262, Section 6. ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN – the crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (1) threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family; (2) depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; and (4) preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties. (f) inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against 25 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (h) engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;(2) peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) engaging in any form of harassment or violence. (i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.  RA 9262, Section 26. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE – victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code  Narag v. Narag Facts: Wife is asking for husband’s disbarment because he used his position as a professor to lure a former student into becoming his concubine. Held: obligation to cohabit is NOT PUNISHABLE, but failure to do so constitutes immorality  Goita v. Campos Rueda Facts: Goita left the conjugal home because Campos wanted her to perform lascivious acts with his genital organ. When she would refuse, he would maltreat her by word and deed and inflict injuries upon her. Held: Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse only. The husband has to provide support for wife since she left the conjugal home with just cause.  Warren v. State Facts: Husband is charged with rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife. Held: There is no implicit marital exemption existed within rape statutes. Marital rape is a violation of the wife's INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY and cannot be justified based on the status of marriage.  Thurman v. City of Torrington Facts: Wife and her son brought civil rights action against city and police officers thereof, alleging that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated by the nonperformance of official duties by the officers in regard to threats and assaults by the wife’s estranged husband. Held: POLICE PROTECTION is a right afforded to all persons under the Equal Protection Clause. A man is not allowed to physically abuse a woman merely because he is her husband. Police who discriminates against women abused by their husband are guilty of failing to provide protection. Right to life must prevail over privacy of family relations  People v. Liberta Facts: Liberta convicted of rape and sodomy against his estranged wife Held: Marital exemption for rape is unconstitutional. Besides, court order for separation makes marital exemption not applicable. It is the act of rape that disrupts the marriage and not the seeking of protection of the wife. Statutes with MARITAL EXEMPTIONS are irrationally underinclusive as there is no fundamental difference between married and unmarried victims of rape Fixing the Family Domicile  FC, 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family  Tenchavez v. Escaño Facts: Escaño left Tenchavez, obtained divorce in US and married another man. He seeks award for moral damages on grounds of refusal to perform wifely duties, denial of consortium and desertion. Held: Divorce was invalid since wife was still a Filipino when it was sought and granted. A spouse's refusal to stay with the other does not give rise to moral damages. The award for damages is merely incidental to the petition for legal separation. Cohabitation/consortium should be from the SPONTANEOUS ACT of the spouses, and not from compulsion.  Dadivas v. Villanueva Facts: Dadivas was forced to leave conjugal home because of Villanueva’s extra marital relations with four women in ten years. He is also abusive of his wife, physically and verbally. Held: Dadivas is entitled to support and custody of their children. She left with just cause. A husband cannot by his own wrongful acts relieve himself of the duty to support his wife as imposed by law.  Garcia v. Santiago Facts: Santiago’s son impregnated the daughter of his spouse, Garcia, by her first marriage. Garcia left the conjugal home. Held: Garcia is entitled to support. She left with just cause. Her husband threatened her with violence if she would return. Separation is necessary.  Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng (1958)

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Facts: Chua and Atilano lived with Chua’s parents. They went to Zamboanga to visit Atilano’s parents. Atilano asked to stay behind. After two years, she still did not return. She filed a case for support, saying she cannot return because she cannot get along with her inlaws. Held: Misunderstandings with a third-party is not seen by the law as a just cause to leave the conjugal home. The wife cannot be compelled to live with her husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left. In this case, the husband has option whether to support her or not. The husband has expressed that he is willing to establish a conjugal home separate from his parents.  Del Rosario v. del Rosario (1949) Facts: Wife and mother-in-law could not get along. Her husband does not want to live apart from his mother Held: Genoveva is entitled to support. Although a wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he establishes his residence, the wife cannot be compelled to live with her mother-in-law if they cannot get along. The marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-laws. There is legal justification for her refusal to live with her husband. Mutual Help and Support  FC, 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.  FC, 70. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties  FC, 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)  FC, 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred  CC, 111. The husband is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute proportionately to the family expenses.  McGuire v. McGuire Facts: Plaintiff brought action to recover suitable maintenance and support money from her husband, even while she still cohabits with her husband. Held: Separate maintenance can only be awarded when the wife lives separately or is divorced from husband. The living standards of the family are a matter of concern for the household and not the courts.  Pelayo v. Lauron Facts: The parents-in-law called a doctor to treat their daughter-in-law. The doctor sued the in-laws for payment. They refused to pay, arguing that is the husband who is liable. Held: The husband is liable. The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness comprises one of the natural obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual support. Management of the Household  FC, 71. The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.  CC, 115. The wife manages the affairs of the household. She may purchase things necessary for the support of the family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby. She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is from her paraphernal property.  Hector v. Young Facts: Husband is an architect; wife is a lawyer. When they moved their domicile from one state to another, wife flourished in her profession while husband became jobless. Mother is considered the primary residential parent, since the father had been away for about three years. Held: The court should allocate custodial responsibility based on the parents' past caretaking roles. A parent's financial resources should not be a determining factor in deciding which parent should be the primary residential parent. The fact that one parent is the primary caretaker should always outweigh the fact that the other parent is more financially stable. Both or either spouse may manage the affairs of the household, but it should be out of MUTUAL AGREEMENT rather than unilateral action by one spouse whenever it is convenient for him or her Exercise of Profession  FC, 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious, and moral grounds. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not: (1) The 27 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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objection is proper; and (2) Benefit has occurred to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse who has not obtained consent. The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in good faith.  CC, 117. The wife may exercise any profession or occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may object, provided: (1) His income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing, and (2) His opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the family.  RA 7192, Section 5. EQUALITY IN CAPACITY TO ACT— women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. [2] In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: (1) women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the same conditions as men; (2) women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; (3) women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and (4) married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. [3] In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances.  RA 7192, Section 6. EQUAL MEMBERSHIP IN CLUBS — women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization.  RA 7192, Section 7. ADMISSION TO MILITARY SCHOOLS — any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes. F. Use of Surname  CC, 370. A married woman may use: (1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or (2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or (3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs.”  CC, 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.  CC, 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other relief.  CC, 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.  Silva v. Peralta Facts: Peralta married Silva although the latter had a valid subsisting marriage. Peralta represented herself as Mrs. Silva Held: Peralta should stop using the surname Silva. No valid marriage took place between her and Silva. Doing so constitutes usurpation of name and will give rise to damages, even if good faith is alleged  Tolentino v. CA Facts: Tolentino and David got married in 1931. They divorced in 1943, when divorce was valid during the Japanese occupation. David continued to use the surname of Tolentino. Tolentino remarried. Held: A woman who has been legally divorced from her husband can still use the surname of her former husband. The effects of absolute divorce are similar to the effect of the spouse where the widow may still use the surname of her deceased spouse.  Yasin v. Sharia, supra G. Relief from Courts  FC, 72. When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.  Perez v. Perez Facts: the husband petitioned to have his wife declared a prodigal and be placed under guardianship. Held: the trial court has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court which has jurisdiction. Material injury pertains to personal injury and not patrimonial or financial. It pertains to personal relations between husband and wife [under Family Code, “injury” is given a broader definition to include even financial injuries]  Arroyo v. Vasquez Facts: Vasquez left the conjugal home and then filed for support. Arroyo asked the court to compel her to return. Held: the court may not compel the wife to return to the conjugal home. However, since she left without just cause, she is not entitled to support. Property Relations Between Spouses A. General Provisions  FC, 74. The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order: (1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) By the provisions of this Code; and (3) By the local custom. 28 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 75. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of property as established in this Code shall govern.  FC, 76. In order that any modification in the marriage settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128, 135 and 136.  FC, 77. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of properties.  FC, 78. A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the provisions of Title IX of this Code.  FC, 79. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to be made a party thereto.  FC, 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. This rule shall not apply: (1) Where both spouses are aliens; (2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located; and (3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.  FC, 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages shall be valid  Collector v. Fisher Facts: Spouses Stevenson, both British citizens, were married in Manila. In 1945, they established permanent residence in California. Husband died in 1951 and instituted his wife as heiress to their Philippine property. Held: In determining the taxable net estate of the decedent, ½ of the net estate should be deducted as the share of the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on CPG. Under the old CC, where one spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is the national law of the husband that becomes the dominant law in determining property relations. Since both are British citizens, British laws should apply; however, in the absence of proof of what English law is, court is justified to indulge in “processual presumption" in presuming that the law of England is the same as our law. 1. Requisites for Donations  FC, 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.  FC, 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following articles.  FC, 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.  FC, 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess.  FC, 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.  FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.  Domalagan v. Bolifer Facts: Domalagan agreed to pay a certain amount to Bolifer for the marriage of his son to Bolifer’s daughter. Payment was given but the marriage never took place. Held: The amount constitutes a donation propter nuptias. It may be revoked under FC, 86(1). The law does not render oral contracts invalid. If the parties to an action, during the trial of the case, make no objection to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to writing.  Serrano v. Solomon 29 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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Facts: Solomon executed a Deed of Donation prior to his marriage to Feliciano. The deed stated that if his marriage is childless and if Feliciano predeceases him, half of his properties will belong to his siblings and the other half to the person who reared his wife (Serrano). Feliciano predeceased Solomon Held: Solomon’s donation cannot be considered donation propter nuptias. Marriage was not the only condition for the donation since other conditions were imposed. Even if it was in consideration of the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of the spouses but in favor of a third person.  Solis v. Barroso Facts: Spouses Lambino and Barroso made a donation propter nuptias (land) in favor of their son Alejo and his fiancée Fortunata. One of the conditions is that in case of death of one of the donees, ½ would revert to the donors, while surviving donee keeps the other half. Lambino and Alejo died, Barroso reclaimed lands. Held: The donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private, not public, instrument. It is not valid and does not confer any rights. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.  Mateo v. Lagua Facts: Spouses Lagua made a donation to their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to Mateo. Alejandro’s younger brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for annulment of donation on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime. Held: A donation propter nuptias may be revoked if inofficious. Marriage is merely the occasion and not the cause of a donation propter nuptias. It is subject to being inofficious if it infringes on the legitime of the donor’s heirs. Donation Propter Nuptias of present or Future Property  FC, 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void. Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills.  FC, 85. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the excess. Grounds for Revocation of Donation Propter Nuptias  FC, 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following cases: (1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by Article 81; (2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or guardian, as required by law; (3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith; (4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse; (5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with; (6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.  CC, 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the following cases: (1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of his wife or children under his parental authority; (2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or children under his authority; (3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor. Void Donations  FC, 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.  Nazareno v. Birog Facts: Rodriguez and Braganza were married. They did not have any children. Braganza donated a parcel of land to Bonifacio, a grandson of Rodriguez from a previous marriage. Held: The donation is void. It is an indirect donation to Rodriguez because it is possible for her to inherit from her grandson.  Matabuena v. Cervantes Facts: Matabuena and Cervantes lived as common law spouses. Matabuena made a donation inter vivos to Cervantes. They eventually got married. The sister of Matabuena assails the donation. Held: The donation is void. The prohibition against donation inter vivos between spouses during the marriage applies to common law relationships.  Harding v. Commercial Union Facts: Harding’s car burned. The insurance company refused to pay. It assailed the donation of the car to Harding by her husband, alleging it was a void donation. Held: The prohibition against spouses donating to one another can only be taken advantage of by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer interfere with their rights or interests. The insurance company is not related to the husband and may not assail the validity of the donation 30 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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 Sumbad v. CA Facts: George and Maria were common-law spouses. George donated a parcel of land to Maria. Held: The donation is valid. There was no evidence to support the allegation that George was married to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were still living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was made.  Ching v. Goyanko, Jr. Facts: Joseph and Epifania were married and had 7 kids. Goyanko executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law wife Ching. Held: The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships. The law emphatically prohibits selling of property and donations between common law spouses. If transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law. System of Absolute Community 1. General Provisions  FC, 88. The absolute community of property between spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.  FC, 89. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute community of property during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of property. When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.  FC, 90. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the absolute community of property between the spouses in all matters not provided for in this Chapter. 2. What Constitutes Community Property  FC, 91. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.  FC, 92. The following shall be excluded from the community property: (1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property; (2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall form part of the community property; (3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.  FC, 93. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom. 3. Charges Upon the ACP  FC, 94. The absolute community of property shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor repairs, upon the community property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the family; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-improvement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; (9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the community; and (10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.  FC, 95. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the community property. 4. Ownership and Disposition of the ACP  FC, 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is 31 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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5.

6.

incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offeror.  FC, 97. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in the community property.  FC, 98. Neither spouse may donate any community property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress. Dissolution  FC, 99. The absolute community terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.  FC, 100. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.  FC, 101. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities  FC, 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94. (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. (5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51. (6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.  FC, 103. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.  FC, 104. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of each.  Oñas v. Javillo 32 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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Facts: Javillo married Levis. Upon her death, Javillo contracted marriage with Oñas without liquidation of the properties of his first marriage. Upon Javillo’s death, he left 31 parcels of land wherein 20 parcels were acquired during his marriage with Oñas. Held: The property corresponding to the first marriage consists of 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels were acquired during the marriage. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.  Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo Facts: Delizo contracted a second marriage after the death of his first spouse. Upon Delizo’s death, his children from his first marriage filed an action for partition of conjugal properties. The children allege that the Caanawan property belongs to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage. Held: The property belongs to the second marriage. The decisive factor in determining which partnership the homestead belongs to is the time of registration and not the issuance of the homestead patent. It was only during the second marriage that the land was registered. As for other properties, Since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each spouse cannot be determined w/ mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be divided between the 2 conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership Conjugal Partnership of Gains 1. General Provisions  FC, 105. In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal partnership gains shall govern their property relations during marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of supplementary application. The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256.  FC 106. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.  FC, 107. The rules provided in Articles 88 and 89 shall also apply to conjugal partnership of gains.  FC, 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. 2. Exclusive Property  FC, 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse: (1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own; (2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title; (3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and (4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the husband.  FC, 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the registry of property of the place the property is located.  FC, 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same.  FC, 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse.  FC, 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.  FC, 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the conjugal partnership of gains.  FC, 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case.  Lim v. Garcia Facts: Lim died intestate, leaving his widow and 9 children. The children contend that certain properties should not be included in the conjugal property because Lim brought these into the marriage. The children also allege that the trial court erred in excluding from the inventory three parcels of land which Lim’s widow claim to be paraphernal property acquired by exchanging properties exclusively belonging to her. Held: The three parcels of land were acquired by the widow through exchanging properties which she inherited from her father. The three parcels of land are paraphernal property. The evidence presented by the children was not sufficient to overcome the 33 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

3.

presumption that the properties included in the conjugal property belong there. Unless it is proven that the property is part of the separate estate of one of the spouse, it will be considered conjugal property.  Rodriguez v. dela Cruz Facts: Rodriguez inherited a parcel of land from her father during a subsisting marriage. When she contracted a second marriage, she allowed her second husband to administer the property. Held: The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed to retain ownership of the property she brought into her second marriage.  Peoples Bank and Trust Co. v. Register of Deeds Facts: Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property; People’s Bank as trustee was to redeem mortgage and collect rents while lot remains unsold. Held: Wife, as owner and administratix of her paraphernal property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they still have to answer to expenses in the administration and preservation of the paraphernal property. Either spouse may transfer the administration of his or her exclusive property to a 3rd person instead of the other spouse.  Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat Facts: Wife executed in favor of her husband a general power of attorney, which, among other things, authorized him “in her name, place and stead, and making use of her rights and actions,” to borrow money and execute a mortgage over her properties. Loan secured by husband signed merely in his own name and not as attorney-in-fact. Loan unpayed, property auctioned. Held: The husband may have had authority to borrow money and mortgage real property of wife but the law specifies how and in what manner it should be done. In this case, husband executed mortgage in his personal capacity, not as the atty-in-fact of the wife. Husband signed the mortgage but it does not appear that he signed it for his wife. To make the mortgage valid, it should have been signed by the husband in his own proper person and by him as attorney in fact for his wife. In order to bind the principal by a deed executed by an agent, the deed must upon its face purport to be made, signed and sealed in the name of the principal.  Castro v. Miat Facts: Spouses Moises and Corcodia bought a piece of land on installment basis in 1977. Concordia died in 1978. It was only in 1984 that Moises was able to pay its balance. He secured his title over the property in his name as widower. Held: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, CC applies. The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of common fund. It is clearly conjugal. CC, 160 provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or the wife.” The presumption applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. CPG a. Presumption that property is conjugal  FC, 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.  Jocson v. CA Facts: Emilio sold to his daughter, Augustinia, majority of his properties. Emilio’s son, Moises, claims that it cannot be validly sold since the properties form part of Emilio’s community property with his wife Alejandra. Held: Registration of a property under the name “Emilio Jocson married to Alejandra Poblete” does not prove that the property belong to the community. It, at best, merely conveys the civil status of the owner. Sufficient proof must be shown to prove that the property belongs to the conjugal partnership.  Francisco v. CA Facts: Petitioner contends that certain properties are part of the CPG of the her marriage to Eusebio. Children from Eusebio’s first marriage contends that such properties were their father’s exclusive property from the first marriage. Held: The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. The fact that the person is the applicant or the licensee [as to the building permit] is not determinative of this issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal. b. Properties that compose the CPG  FC, 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties: (1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both of the spouses; (3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property of each spouse; (4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found; (5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting; (6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and (7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. 34 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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d.

e.

 Zulueta v. Pan Am Facts: Zulueta sued Pan Am for breach of contract on carriage and quasi-delict when Pan Am off-loaded Zulueta and family without just cause. Held: The award for damages is part of the conjugal partnership. The presumption is that when Zulueta entered into the contract of carriage with Pan Am, he used conjugal funds to buy the plane tickets. It is also presumed that the trip was for the common benefit of the family.  Mendoza v. Reyes Facts: Julia Reyes sold 2 parcels of land without the consent of her husband. She alleges that the properties were paraphernal. Held: Properties brought during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal. Since the funds used to acquire the properties came from loans obtained by the spouses, it made the funds conjugal in nature and the property bought using conjugal funds is conjugal as well.  Villanueva v. IAC Facts: Modesto Aranas owned a Lot. Both he and his wife died intestate, wife predeceased him by two years. There were no legitimate children but two illegitimate children. Illegitimate children borrowed money from Bernas with the Lot as collateral. Villanueva contends that Lot was hers by virtue of wills of Modesto and his wife. Held: Since the land was inherited, it is the exclusive property of the husband. Since the wife died ahead of the husband, she has no successional rights over husband's property. Property purchased by installment  FC, 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.  Castillo v. Pasco Facts: Castillo and Pasco got married in 1931. They purchased a fishpond. The first installment was paid with the exclusive funds of Pasco. The next two installments were paid using conjugal funds. Held: The property is 1/6 paraphernal and 5/6 conjugal. The first installment was purchased using Casco’s exclusive property. The subsequent payments were paid through a loan by spouses (ownership to two patrimonies)  Lorenzo v. Nicolas Facts: Clemente purchased 2 parcels of lands. Even before her marriage to Lorenzo, she already paid 116.84 for one parcel and 169.16 for the other. She continued paying for these lots during the marriage. One of the parcels was conveyed while Lorenzo was still alive, while the other parcel was conveyed 4 ½ years after Lorenzo’s death. Both lots were registered under her name. Held: Both lots are paraphernal properties of Clemente. However, what were paid during coverture are considered useful expenditures for which the conjugal partnership must be reimbursed. Rules on Improvement  FC, 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules: When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.  CC, 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership. Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.  Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun Facts: Canullas inherited his father’s house. He later abandoned his family to live with his concubine. Canullas sold the land to his concubine. Held: The sale is void. The husband cannot alienate conjugal property without his wife’s consent. (CC, 158: both land and building belong to CPG but CPG is indebted to husband for value) Charges upon the CPG  FC, 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this Code on Support; (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit 35 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010



 













of the conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs upon the conjugal partnership property; (5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage upon the separate property of either spouse; (6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a professional, vocational, or other activity for selfimprovement; (7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the benefit of the family; (8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for self-improvement; and (9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to groundless. If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. FC, 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the partnership. however, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been paid for the purpose above-mentioned. FC, 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property. Javier v. Osmeña Facts: Collantes, husband of Javier, contracted a debt with Osmeña as a commission merchant. Collantes assumed this debt as he succeeded Javier’s fathere in the business. The exclusive property of the wife consisting of 2 parcels of land and usufructuary interest was auctioned to cover the debt. Held: The fruits of the exclusive property of the wife belong to the conjugal partnership and are liable for the payment of the debt. The debts contracted by Collantes during the marriage, for and in exercise of his industry or profession are not his personal and private debts. It is through his industry that Collantes contributes toward the support of his family. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin Facts: Perez acquired debt in his shoe manufacturing business. The court ordered shares of stock registered under the name of Perez levied. Cobb-Perez opposed, arguing that the shares of stock are community property and cannot be held liable for the personal debt of her husband Held: Perez is stopped from claiming that the shares of stock are conjugal property since he represented himself to be the sole owner from the start of litigation. Even if the stocks were conjugal, which the spouses failed to prove, it must be proven that the debt was a personal obligation for which the husband alone must be held liable. The debts in this case were incurred for the purpose of exercising the husband’s profession through which he supports his family. DBP v. Adil Facts: Spouses obtained a loan from DBP in the amount of 2,000 payable in 10 years. Because the debt remained outstanding even after the lapse of the 10-year period, the husband executed a second promissory note. Held: The husband bound the partnership for the promissory note he signed. The loan is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership and the partnership is liable for the obligation. Luzon Surety v. de Garcia Facts: Vicente Garcia guaranteed a surety bond. The principal debtor defaulted. A writ of garnishment was issued against the sugar quedans of the Garcia spouses. Held: The conjugal partnership cannot be made liable for the surety executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in the absence of proof that it was done to benefit the family. Ayala Investment v. CA Facts: Ching, as the VP of Philippine Blooming Mills, signed as a surety to the company’s loan to AIDC. Upon faulre of the company to pay the loan, a writ of execution was issued against the conjugal properties of Ching and his wife. Held: The loan contracted by Ching as surety is purely a corporate debt. Signing as a surety is not an exercise of Ching’s industry or profession. The obligation was not obtained gor the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Ching’s conjugal property is not liable. Carlos v. Abelardo Facts: Honorio Carlos is suing his daughter and son-in-law, spouses Abelardo, to pay the US$25,000 he lent them to purchase a house and lot. Held: The conjugal partnership is liable. The defendants never denied that the check was used to purchase their house and lot. Said house served as their conjugal home, thus benefited the family. Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman 36 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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g.

Facts: de Guzman contends that part of the payment for the subscription of stocks of the Carandang spouses were paid by him. CA held that Carandang spouses are jointly and severally liable for their loan. Held: Spouses were married before the effectivity of the FC. CPG governs their property relations. All property acquired during their marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. Credits loaned during the time of marriage are presumed to be conjugal property. Administration and Disposition of the CPG  FC, 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.  FC, 125. Neither spouse may donate any conjugal partnership property without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.  Felipe v. Heirs of Maximo Aldon Facts: Almosara and Maximo acquired several parcels of land during their marriage. Wife sold the lots without the consent of husband. Held: The sale is void. The wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership by selling conjugal property without the consent of her husband.  Tinitigan v. Tinitigan Sr. Facts: The husband sold a conjugal property without the wife’s consent to answer for a conjugal liability. Held: The sale was valid. The husband may dispose of conjugal property without the wife’s consent if it is for a conjugal liability which could endanger the family’s social standing. The husband sold the property for the benefit of the family  Guiang v. CA Facts: Over the objection of Gilda and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her husband sold to Guiang spouses one-half of their conjugal property, consisting of their house and lot. Held: Any alienation or encumbrance made by the husband without the consent of the wife would be considered as null and void.  Relucio v. Lopez Facts: Angelina filed a petition for appointment as sole administratix of conjugal partnership of properties with forfeiture and a demand for an accounting against her husband and his concubine, Relucio. Held: The administration of the property of marriage is entirely between the spouses to the exclusion of other persons. The concubine has nothing to do with the administration of conjugal properties.  Jader-Manalo v, Camaisa Facts: The Manalo spouses offered to buy a property of the Camaisa spouses. The offer was made to the husband in the wife’s presence. The contract was signed by the husband only. Later on, the husband told the Manalo spouses that they were backing out. The Manalos filed a suit to compel Norma to sign the contract. Held: The properties subjects of the contracts in this case were conjugal. Hence, the consent of both the husband and the wife must concur for the contracts to sell to be effective. The wife may have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties but being merely aware of a transaction is not consent. Court authorization under the said article is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated. In the absence of proof showing the wife’s incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.  Villanueva v. Chiong Facts: Spouses are separated in fact. During their marriage, they acquired a certain parcel of land. In 1985, Florentino sold ½ of the lot to Villanueva spouses. After last installment payment, Villanueva spouses demanded execution of deed of sale. Elisera refused to sign deed of sale. Held: Lot was conjugal. Separation in fact does not affect conjugal partnership. Sale is void; Elisera’s consent required. Dissolution of the CPG  FC, 126. The conjugal partnership terminates: (1) Upon the death of either spouse; (2) When there is a decree of legal separation; (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.  FC, 127. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall not affect the regime of conjugal partnership, except that: (1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be supported; (2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required by law, judicial authorization shall 37 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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be obtained in a summary proceeding; (3) In the absence of sufficient conjugal partnership property, the separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse present shall, upon petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.  FC, 128. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligation to the family, the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may impose. The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations. A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling. h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities  FC, 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply: (1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the exclusive properties of each spouse. (2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an asset thereof. (3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121. (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them. (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse, even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse from the conjugal funds, if any. (7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code. (8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with Article 51. (9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.  FC, 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated marriage shall be void. Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.  FC, 131. Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon such proof as may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the different partnerships in proportion to the capital and duration of each.  FC, 132. The Rules of Court on the administration of estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.  FC, 133. From the common mass of property support shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children during the liquidation of the inventoried property and until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds the fruits or rents pertaining to them.  Santero v. CFI of Cavite Facts: Pablo Santero had two common-law wives. Of the first he had 3 children and of the second, 7 children. Held: Even if some children have already reached majority or is married is immaterial. It is not a determining factor of their right to allowance under A. 188. Allowance will be considered as advances from their shares in inheritance from dad. However, illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from legit children & relatives of dad/mom & vice-versa. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse 1. Judicial Separation of Property for Sufficient Cause  FC, 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. 38 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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3.

 FC, 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property: (1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; (2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee; (3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court; (4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101; (5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused that power; and (6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable. In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.  Garcia v. Manzano Facts: Spouses live separately from each other. Wife assumed complete management and administration of the conjugal partnership. Held: (CC) The wife does not administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of the husband. In the event of such maladministration by the wife, the remedy of the husband doesn’t lie in a judicial separation of properties but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the communal property & the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal property.  Partosa-Jo v. CA Facts: Partosa-Jo filed a claim for support and judicial separation of property. Jo admitted to have cohabited with three women and sired 15 children. Held: Physical separation coupled with the husband’s refusal to support wife constitutes abandonment. The spouses have been separated for more than a year and reconciliation is highly improbable. Judicial separation of property is justified.  Dela Cruz v. dela Cruz Facts: de la Cruz began to live away from his wife and six children. He never visited the conjugal home for three years. Held: Since there was no abandonment by the husband, there is nothing to justify a separation of conjugal partnership properties. Voluntary Separation of property  FC, 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the separation of their common properties. All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary interest.  In re: Voluntary Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Spouses Bernas Facts: Spouses Jose Bernas Sr. and Pilar Manuel Bernas agreed to dissolve the community property believing it would be more advantageous to everyone, including the husband’s children by a previous marriage. Held: Voluntary dissolution of community property is subject to judicial approval. All creditors shall be notified. The children by a previous marriage should be given notice. The CPG of the previous marriage shall be dissolved before the voluntary dissolution of the CPG of the second marriage  Lacson v. San Jose Facts: The spouses have been separated in fact for more than 5 years. They had an amicable settlement wherein they agree to dissolve their CPG subject to judicial approval. Held: The propriety of the dissolution of the CPG is manifest. The spouses have had a lengthy separation. Separation of property between the spouses & the dissolution of the CP since is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Such approval was obtained & it doesn’t appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by the arrangements. Separation in fact for at least 5 yrs makes it proper to sever their financial & proprietary interests. However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership, this court does not hereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.  Maquilan v. Maquilan Facts: Wife convicted of adultery. Husband filed for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. During pre-trial, spouses entered into a compromise agreement (partial settlement of CPG), which was given judicial imprimatur. Held: Voluntary separation of property may take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for the same do not require the intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial separation of property. Liquidation and Dissolution of Property  FC, 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code. During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their children.  FC, 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.  FC, 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property.  FC, 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by creditors. 39 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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F.

 FC, 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances: (1) When the civil interdiction terminates; (2) When the absentee spouse reappears; (3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power, authorizes the resumption of said administration; (4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal separation resumes common life with the other; (5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously deprived thereof; (6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year, reconcile and resume common life; or (7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary separation of property may thereafter be granted. The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67.  FC, 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. 4. Sole Administration of Other Spouse’s property  FC, 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to the other spouse: (1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other; (2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee; (3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction; or (4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an accused in a criminal case. If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. Regime of Separate Property  FC, 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.  FC, 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall pertain to the absolute community.  FC, 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property.  FC, 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate properties. The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage  FC, 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.  FC, 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article. The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.  Yaptinchay v. Torres Facts: Yaptinchay, a married man, cohabited with Teresita. Upon Yaptinchay’s death, Teresita sought to repossess the lot in Forbes Park that served as her and Yaptinchay’s home. Held: Teresita was not able to show that she had actually contributed in the acquisition of the property. Hence, the rules on coownership cannot apply. The property belongs to Yaptinchay’s conjugal partnership with his wife. 40 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  Juaniza v. Jose Facts: Jose was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney that was involved in a vehicular accident. He and his common-law wife, Arroyo, were both ordered to pay damages by the trial court Held: Arroyo is not liable. Since Jose is married to Ramos, it is the conjugal partnership that owns the jeepney. The conjugal partnership is liable for damages.  Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS Facts: Consuegra contracted two marriages. Upon his death, the two wives wanted to get his retirement insurance benefits. Held: The equitable solution was for the 2 wives to each be given ½ of the benefits. The first wife was the wife recognized by law. the nd second wife, on the other hand, married Consuegra in good faith. It was also the 2 wife and her children who were acknowledged beneficiaries of the insurance.  Maxey v. CA Facts: Maxey and Morales lived as common-law spouses from 1903 to 1918. They were first married in 1903 but the marriage was void because military weddings were not yet recognized then. They were validly married in 1919. Morales died shortly after. Morales was a housewife all those years. Held: Co-ownership arises even if a common-law wife is not gainfully employed. Morales ran the household and held the family purse. It would be unjust if a woman who is a wife in all aspects except for a valid marriage will be required to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. The Filipino woman traditionally holds the purse and runs the household.  Valdes v. RTC Facts: Valdez and Gomez sought for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36, which the court granted. Held: Co-ownership is the property regime between the two since their marriage is void ab initio.  Cariño v. Cariño Facts: Cariño contracted 2 marriages. Upon his death, both women filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance. Held: Both marriages were void. The first marriage is void for lack of marriage license. The second marriage is void for being bigamous. Article 147 governs the first marriage while Article 148 governs the second. One-half of the subject ‘death benefits’ under scrutiny shall go to the first wife as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining to the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs, his children with the first wife.  Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva Facts: From 1927 until her death in 1980, Gonzales cohabited with Villanueva without the benefit of marriage. Villanueva was married to another until her death in 1963. Held: The relationship of Villanueva and Gonzales was adulterous until the death of Villanueva's legal wife, that was from 1927-1963. No co-ownership between the parties existed during this time. It is necessary for each of the parties to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.  Saguid v. CA Facts: Gina and Saguid cohabited with each other while Gina was separated in fact with her husband. Gina worked abroad. Held: Their property regime is governed by Article 148. Proof of actual contribution is required. The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts an affirmative issue. in the absence of proof of extent of the partners' respective contributions, their shares are presumed equal. If there is proof, then shares are limited to the proven amount.  San Luis v. San Luis Facts: San Luis contracted 3 marriages in his lifetime: #1 died, #2 divorced, #3 current. Children from first marriage moves to dismiss case on grounds that San Luis is only a mistress, Gov’s marriages still subsisting. Held: Since respondent cohabited with the man [deceased], she is qualified as an interested person. If she proves the validity of the divorce and man's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was performed under the laws of the USA, then she may be considered as a co-owner. XI. The Family A. Members of the Family 1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations  FC, 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect.  FC, 150. Family relations include those: (1) Between husband and wife; (2) Between parents and children; (3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.  FC, 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the same case must be dismissed. This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the Civil Code. 2. Support 41 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set forth in the preceding article: (1) The spouses; (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood.  FC, 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.  FC, 197. In case of legitimate ascendants; descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership.  FC, 198. During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order.  FC, 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters.  FC, 200. When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred.  FC, 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient.  FC, 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.  FC, 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand. Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance.  FC, 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.  FC, 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution.  FC, 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being reimbursed.  FC, 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to the child when urgently needed.  FC, 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.  Lacson v. Lacson Facts: father was ordered to pay children a specific sum which represented support in arrears Held: The requisite demand for support has been made sometime in 1975. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. This happened when mother of children went to their paternal grandmother’s house and asked for support. Father also acknowledged his obligation when he wrote a note stating that he will sustain his 2 daughters "as requested by their mother." 3.

Funerals

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 CC, 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.  CC, 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.  CC, 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.  CC, 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.  CC, 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.  CC, 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.  Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer Facts: Petitioner, a non organization that provides housing to retarded citizens, alleges that their home is included in the definition since the requirement for a domestic bond has been met by the relationship forged among residents as they lived and worked together in their ‘family environment‘. Held: Family: single individual or a collective body of persons doing his/their own cooking, living upon the premises of a separate housekeeping unit in a domestic relationship based upon birth, marriage, or other domestic bond. Concept of "domestic bond" implies the existence of a traditional family-like structure of household authority. It includes resident authority-figures charged with the responsibility of maintaining a separate housekeeping unit and regulating the activity and duties of the other residents. There should also be a quality of cohesiveness and permanence in the relationship of residents. Extensive outside aid in the management and operation of a household detracts from the family nature of the home.  Mendoza v. CA Facts: Husband left for US and refused to support wife. Alleges that complaint contained no allegation that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made before filing of suit. Held: Future support can't be subject of a valid compromise. Thus, a showing that efforts have been made to compromise is not required for the case to prosper  Mendez v. Eugenia Facts: Mendez, et. al. argue that the court erred in dismissing their complaint against the Biongsons for lack of earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the parties being members of the same family. Held: The litigants are not family members within the contemplation of the law. the parties are collateral relatives who are not brothers and sisters. Only members of the same family are required to exert efforts to arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted.  Guerrero v. RTC Facts: Hernando and Guerrero, brothers-in-law, both claim ownership of a lot. The RTC judge ruled that the parties should have alleged in the complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise was exerted since they are members of the same family. Held: Brothers-in-law are not members of the same family. No earnest efforts toward a compromise are needed.  Hontiveros v. RTC Facts: Spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against Augusto’s brother Gregorio and the latter’s wife Teodora. The trial court held that complaint was not verified as required by FC, 151 and therefore, it did not believe that earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a compromise. Held: Whenever a stranger is a party to a case, FC, 151 will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of Gregorio, is considered a stranger since the law does not consider in-laws as members of the same family. Teodora, a sister-in-law of Augusto, is also a stranger. The Family Home  FC, 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the land on which it is situated.  FC, 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.  FC, 154. The beneficiaries of a family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.  FC, 155. The family home shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment except: (1) For nonpayment of taxes; (2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home; (3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and (4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the building. 43 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 156. The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the latter's consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head of a family on his or her own property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home.  FC, 157. The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its constitution, the amount of the three hundred thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation. For purposes of this Article, urban areas are deemed to include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed to be rural areas.  FC, 158. The family home may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of the person constituting the same, the latter's spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.  FC, 159. The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family home.  FC, 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply. At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.  FC, 161. For purposes of availing of the benefits of a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may constitute, or be the beneficiary of, only one family home.  FC, 162. The provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.  Siari Valley Estates v. Lucasan Facts: Parcels of land of Lucasan were sold at a public auction to satisfy a judgment rendered against him. Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He contends that the lands is where he and his wife extrajudicially constituted a family home hence the land is exempt from execution. Held: A family home constituted after a debt has been incurred is NOT exempt from execution. Otherwise, debtors who aim to circumvent the law may prejudice creditors.  Modequillo v. Breva Facts: Modequillo incurred liability for a vehicular accident in 1976. The judgment was rendered in January 1988. Modequillo claims that the land executed to satisfy the judgment is a family home. Held: The law that governs is the Civil Code where a public instrument is needed to constitute a land as family home. The Family Code became effective only on August 3, 1988 after liability was incurred and after judgment was rendered. Prior to the effectivity of FC, land was not a family home. FC, 153 cannot be given retroactive effect.  Taneo v. CA Facts: As a result of a judgment against them, two of petitioners’ properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. Subject properties were auctioned and subsequently conveyed to private respondent. One of the properties was the family home of the petitioners. Held: Since money judgment/debt was rendered/incurred before the house was erected and instrument constituting it as family home was registered, the family home is not exempted from execution or forced sale. Besides, house should be constructed on land not belonging to another.  Versola v. Madolaria Facts: Private respondent, Dr. Ong Oh loaned P 1,000,000 to Dolores Ledesma. Ledesma promised to execute a deed of real estate mortgage over her house and lot. Ledesma subsequently sold the property to petitioners, for 2.5 M. Petitioners paid 1M as down payment agreeing on 75,000 monthly to cover the balance of 1.5 M. However, even before the monthly installments were due Ledesma demanded that petitioners pay the balance. Petitioners sought a loan from Asiatrust Bank, which was granted. Held: The right to exemption of forced sale under Article 153 of the FC is a personal privilege granted to a judgment debtor and as such, it must be claimed by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and proved to the Sheriff. Failure to do so would estop the party from claiming exception. Petitioners did not set forth any evidence to substantiate their claim that the property to be sold at the execution was indeed exempt for having been constituted as a family home.  Patricio v. Dario III 44 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 Facts: Marcelino died intestate. Marecelino Marc extrajudicially settled the deceased’s estate. Marcelino Marc formally advised Dario III that they want to partition the properties and terminate the co-ownership. Respondent refused. CA dismissed case on ground that family home should continue despite death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The minor beneficiary is the grandson of the deceased. Held: To be a beneficiary of the family home, 3 requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the FC; (2) they live in the family home; (3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family. Grand child satisfies 1st two requisites. However, the head of the family in the family home in this case is the grandparent. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents. Therefore, he cannot be considered a beneficiary of the family home. Important to note on this case are the ff: (1) occupancy of the family home by the owner or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual [something real or actually existing]. (2) Legal support has the ff. characteristics - personal, intransmissible, cannot be renounced, cannot be compromised, free from attachment or execution, reciprocal, variable in amount. (3) We have to follow the order of support in Art. 199.  Veneracion v. Mancilla Facts: Wife secured a loan and mortgaged residential lot. The title states that she was single; children are claiming that the residential property is their family home Held: Petitioners are required to allege with particularity in their petition the facts and the law relied upon for annulment as well as those supporting their cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Such requirement, as well as the requirement for the petitioners to attach to the original copy of their petition the affidavits of their witnesses and documents supporting their cause of action or defense, are designed to convince the appellate court of the substantive merit of their petition to avoid its outright dismissal; or for the CA to make a finding of a prima facie merit in their petition and give due course thereto and order the service of the petition and summons on the respondents. Unless petitioners append to their petition the appropriate documents, the appellate court might dismiss the petition outright or deny due course to the petition.  Arriola v. Arriola Facts: Decedent’s child from first marriage filed for partition of properties of decedent against children from second marriage. Held: Subject house was built by the decedent on his exclusive property. Said house has been the residence of petitioners [2nd family] for 20 years. House is therefore the family home. This being so, it is shielded from partition under Article 159 of FC [family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor.] The family home cannot be partitioned this time, even if it has passed to the co-ownership of the heirs, parties herein.  Spouses Kelly v. Planters Product Inc. Facts: Petitioner Auther G. Kelley, Jr. acquired agricultural chemical products on consignment from respondent PPI in 1989. Due to Auther's failure to pay despite demand, PPI filed action for sum of money and won. Sheriff sold a property of Kelley spouses to pay for the amount. Held: Nueva Vizcaya RTC has jurisdiction over case since only Auther is a party to the Pasig RTC case. Wife and children are strangers to that case involving the sheriff selling on execution the alleged family home. Case remanded to RTC to determine W/N property is family home (must concur with requisites in FC)  Albino Josef v. Santos Facts: Petitioner failed to pay respondent for shoe materials he brought on credit. Petitioner contends that one of the properties is the family home and thus exempted from execution. Held: Petitioner is meritorious; writ of execution void. CA should have earnestly determined petitioner’s allegation that property is family home. The family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special cases. XII. Paternity and Filiation A. Legitimate Children 1. Kinds of Filiation  FC, 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or illegitimate.  FC, 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the child. a. Biological-Natural  Perido v. Perido Facts: Perido’s children by his first marriage claim that Perido’s children by his second marriage are illegitimate. Held: The children are legitimate. There was no legal impediment for Perido to marry at the time of the birth of his eldest child by his second marriage. Perido’s first wife died long before.  Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao 45 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

b.

Facts: Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo. William Liyao, Sr. was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao. Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son. Son claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao, Sr. Held: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. Liyao, Jr. cannot choose his own filiation. If Corazon’s husband, Yulo, does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed and the child cannot choose to be the child if his mother’s alleged paramour.  SSS v. Aguas Facts: Husband died. Surviving spouse claimed for death benefits. Rosanna indicated in her claim that Pablo is likewise survived by his minor child Jeylnn Held: Only Jeylnn was able to establish her right to a monthly pension because the photocopy of her BC which bears the signature of Pablo. A BC signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity. However, this cannot extend to Janet because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Her BC was not verified in any way by the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy. A record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Witnesses in this case said that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. There's also no proof the she was legally adopted, hence the court cannot consider her a dependent. Biological-Assisted Reproductive Technology  In Re Baby M Facts: A woman agreed for a certain fee, to be artificially inseminated with the semen of another woman’s husband, to carry the child so conceived to term, and, after its birth, to surrender it to the natural father and his wife. After the child’s birth, surrogate mother and her husband wished not to go through contract. Held: The surrogacy contract conflicts with laws and public policy. The mere fact that a child would be better off with one set of parents than with another is insufficient basis for terminating the natural parent’s rights. While custody was properly granted to the natural father since evidence clearly proved such custody to be in the best interest of the infant, termination of the surrogate mother’s parental rights in the adoption of the child by the wife of the natural father must be voided.  Johnson v. Calvert Facts: Husband and wife brought suit seeking declaration that they were the legal parents of child born of woman in whom couple’s fertilized egg has been implanted. Held: Although Uniform Parentage Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and giving birth as means of establishing mother and child relationship, when the 2 means do not coincide in one woman, she who intended to procreate child - that is, who intended to bring about birth of child that she intended to raise as her own is the natural mother. Gestational surrogacy contract did not violate public policies on the grounds that (1) it runs afoul constitutional prohibitions on involuntary servitude and (2) it tend to exploit or dehumanize women of lower economic status.  In Re Adoption of Anonymous Facts: Former husband of petitioner’s wife refused consent on adoption of child. Held: A child born of consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage. Therefore the father of such child is the “parent” (contemplated by law, which, in this case is Domestic Relations Law Section 111) whose consent is required to the adoption of such child by another.  Field, “Do New Reproductive Techniques Threaten the Family?” o Fears about commercialization of childbearing and childrearing + fears of exploitation of women and of the poor o Fear that surrogacy involves an attack on our concept of family.  The picture of a mother handing over her child and getting paid for it does not fit easily with current values or with conventional notions of the family o Destructive to families  It must inevitably harm the older children whom most surrogates have: how a mother explains to her children that she is giving away or selling their newborn sibling  Often, the surrogate’s parents and even her in-laws are also very upset that their grandchild is being given away or sold, and the conflict can cause a permanent rift in the family o Surrogacy and other new reproductive techniques tend to undermine our concept of family o Artificial insemination  Oldest and simplest of reproductive techniques other than sexual intercourse  Procedure: involves depositing ejaculated sperm in a woman’s uterus with a needleless syringe  MORAL OBJECTIONS  To beget, without the possibility of a continuing father-child relationship, would be to withdraw bioloigical potential from personal potential – to reverse the long process of evolution by which biological capacities have been humanized  SOCIAL ISSUES  Whether AID should only be availed of by married couples. o In vitro fertilization  Process by which a doctor stimulates a woman’s ovaries, removes several eggs (laparoscopy) and fertilizes them in a Petri dish 46 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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o Ovum donation  procedure to transfer the fertilized ova to the uterus of a woman other than the egg donor  Issue  Meaning of genetic tie that are even more pressing than in the classic case in surrogate motherhood.  When the egg is donated by one woman and incubated in another, the intention might either be that the egg donor would be the child’s mother  Roman Catholic Church  It threatens the sanctity of the traditional family unit for a third party to have any role in donating or in gestating the child  objectionable because one of the genetic parents will not be part of the child’s family unit.  Threat to the nuclear family  They challenge not only what remains of the traditional nuclear family as a norm, but even our ways of thinking about ourselves and our families.  Problems  How to regulate the embryo conceived in vitro or the newly conceived embryo that has been flushed out of the egg donor - What limits should society place upon how the embryo developing in a Petri dish can be kept alive outside the womb? If there were none, scientists may develop the technological capability that they will be able to create people in this way. (alters our conception of human life)  Moral obligation to transfer all ova to a receptive uterus - Each of the fertilized ova represents life  those who oppose abortion would oppose death of these embryos  they should not be created unless transfer is assured.  Abortion issues - doctors generally consider it risky for a woman to bear more than 3 or four babies at a time - Many of those doctors will abort “the excesses” on the ground that this ‘selective abortion’ would preserve the life of the remaining fetuses.  Embryo research per se re: birth defects, genetic diseases, cancer, etc. can save other people – woman could be motivated to conceive and abort for commercial purposes.  Embryo research w/ intention to develop to term – possibility for broad genetic experimentation and manipulation – may allow parents to select the gender or to diagnose hereditary diseases before implantation.  Determining the reason for the creation of embryos – for research or for implantation  Future research and implantation a.k.a. indefinitely freezing the fertilized egg for future use – creation of a market for frozen embryos.  The possibility is that parent/s might have died already ‐ question on survivorship & succession, custody, support, etc.  Robertson, Legal Issues in Human Egg Donation and Gestational Surrogacy (see Summary) Impugned Legitimacy  FC, 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds: (1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse; (2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or (3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.  FC, 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.  FC, 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary: (1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage; (2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.  FC, 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.  FC, 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded. If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. 47 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010  FC, 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the preceding article only in the following cases: (1) If the husband should died before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action; (2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or (3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.  Andal v. Macaraig Facts: Emiliano became sick with TB. Felix, his brother, came to help with the farm. Felix had sexual intercourse with Emiliano’s wife starting May 1942. Emiliano died on January 1, 1943. On June 17, 1943, the wife gave birth to a boy. Held: The son was born within 300 days from the death of Emiliano hence presumed to be the legitimate son of the latter. The fact that Emiliano was suffering from TB does not prevent sexual intercourse between him and his wife.  Jao v. CA Facts: Jao filed petition for recognition and support against Perico. Based on the Blood Grouping Test, Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico. Held: There is almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity. the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product of the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents. But if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods of the parents are cross-matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.  Macadangdang v. CA Facts: Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had an affait with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967; Mejias and Anahaw separated after that. In October 1967, Mejias gave birth to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in the baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to recognize Rolando as his son. Held: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days after the spouses separated. No proof was presented to show that sexual intercourse between the spouses was impossible. Only the husband can impugn the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.  Chua Keng Giap v. IAC Facts: Petitioner insists that he is the son of the deceased Sy Kao. Sy Kao denies that petitioner is their son. Held: Who better than the mother herself would know if the person was really her son? More than anyone else, it was the mother who could say who could say that petitioner wasn’t begotten of her womb. Mothers can deny filiation only with respect to herself and the putative child.  Cabatbat-Lim v. IAC Facts: Violeta is claiming to be the only child of the late Dra Esperanza Cabatbat. Held: Factual findings indicate that child is not born of the deceased; she is only a ward (ampon) without formal adoption proceedings. The action is not impugning legitimacy since the claim is not that child is illegitimate but that she is not the decedent's child at all.  Republic v. Labrador Facts: Gladys Labrador filed for a petition for correction of entries in her niece’s Birth Certificate. She contends that niece’s parents are not married, thus she can’t use the father’s sername. Held: A petition for substantial correction/change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar as well as all other persons who have an interest that would be affected thereby; a full hearing and not just summary proceedings must be conducted. The change of surname is substantial since it will affect her legitimacy and successional rights  Tan v. Trocio Facts: Tan seeking to disbar Trocio on ground of immorality. Tan contends that Jewel is Trocio’s son. Held: An unwanted son, as the child would normally have been, should, of all names, be called “Jewel.” Pictures of father and son showing allegedly their physical likeness to each other, and showing unusual closeness between the two are inconclusive evidence to prove paternity.  People v. Tumimpad Facts: Tumimpad and Prieto raped a child with Down Syndrome. Child got pregnant. Held: Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that the man is not the father of a particular child.  Benitez-Badua v. CA Facts: Benitez-Badua claiming that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente. Evidence points out that she is not the child of the deceased. Held: Proof of filiation cannot be used in a situation where the child does not belong to either spouse in the first place, as marked by the absence of a record of birth.  De Aparacio v. Paraguya Facts: Priest impregnated woman. Woman married off another man to save face. Priest died and instituted child as sole heir. Held: A child born 192 days after the celebration of the mother's marriage is still presumed to belong to that marriage. 180-day rule only applies to when there is a previous marriage, and not to premarital relationships. In this case, It is not necessary to determine paternity since the priest has no other compulsory heir. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. 48 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 B.

Proof of Filiation 1. How to Prove Filiation  FC, 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 129. Sec. 4: JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS – An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 7: EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD — when the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 36: TESTIMONY GENERALLY CONFINED TO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; HEARSAY EXCLUDED — a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 39: EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE – ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE — the act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 40: FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE — the reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.  Revised Rules of Court, Rule 130. Sec. 41: COMMON REPUTATION — common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation.  CC, 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.  Constantino v. Mendez Facts: Amelita Constantino filed an action for acknowledgement, support of her child, and damages against Ivan Mendez. Mendez denied having sexual intercourse with Constantino Held: Filiation was not ptoven by clear and convincing evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is on Constantino. Constantino’s testimony as to when she had intercourse with mendez is contradicted by evidence.  Mendoza v. Mella Facts: Paciano Pareja donated a lot to his son, Gavino. Gavino disappeared and was presumed dead, leaving behind his commonlaw wife, Catalina, and son. Pareja sold the land. Catalina claims ownership for her son. Held: Catalina’s son cannot be considered an acknowledged natural son of Gavino. The only evidence is a certified copy of the boy’s birth certificate, the original not signed by the parents. The birth certificate is not a public document because Catalina and Gavino did not write an acknowledgment.  Lim v. CA Facts: Lim and Uy are both alleging that they are heirs of deceased Susana. Held: Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or by a competent public official, with formalities required by law. Marriage contract presented by petitioner does not satisfy the requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the CC of 1889. Marriage contract is a mere declaration of the contracting parties, in the presence of the solemnizing officer and 2 other witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband or wife. It does not possess the requisite of a public document of recognition. It is not a written act with the intervention of the notary; it is not an instrument executed in due form before a notary and certified by him.  Heirs of R. Bañas v. Heirs of Bibiano Bañas Facts: Raymundo Bañas was the child of Dolores Castillo and of an unknown father. Bibiano Bañas shouldered his education. Upon Raymundo’s death, his heirs filed for partition or recovery of hereditary share against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo was a recognized natural child of Bibiano. Held: There was no voluntary recognition. The note signed “Su padre, B. Banas” is not sufficient proof of a voluntary recognition. It is merely indicative of paternal solicitude and not acknowledgement of paternity. 49 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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 Uyguangco v. CA Facts: Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco. Graciano admits having no documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Held: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. Since Graciano seeks to ptove filiation based on FC, 172(2), it should take place during the lifetime of the alleged parent.  Mariategui v. CA Facts: Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three marriages with three different women and sired three sets of children. st nd rd He died intestate and the children from his 1 and 2 marriages excluded the children from the 3 marriage in the extra-judicial partition of deceased’s properties. rd Held: The children from the 3 marriage continuously possessed status of legitimate children. Filiation of legitimate children may be established by the record of birth appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.  Acebedo v. Arquero Facts: Edwin Acebedo claims that Eddie Arqureo, and not he, is the father of his wife’s daughter. Acebedo alleges that the Baptismal Certificate of the child reflects the name of Arqureo as father. Held: A canonical certificate is conclusive proof only of the baptism administered. It merely attests to the fact which gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to the parentage of the child baptized.  Herrera v. Alba Facts: In May 1998, Rosendo filed fo compulsory recognition against petitioner. Rosendo agreed to DNA paternity testing but Herrera opposed. Held: DNA analysis is admissible as evidence. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of Probability of Paternity (W) is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is a refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected to the Vallejo standards - how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the test. 2. Action to Claim Legitimacy  FC, 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. 3. Rights of Legitimate Children  FC, 174. Legitimate children shall have the right: (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames; (2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and (3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil Code.  Republic v. CA and Vicencio Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was the legitimate child of Pablo and Fe. Pablo abandoned them and was eventually declared an absentee. Fe married Ernesto who has constantly treated Cynthia as his own daughter. Cynthia filed petition for change of surname with consent of Ernesto. Held: There was no proper and reasonable cause to warrant a change of name. a legitimate child shall use the surname of his or her father.  De Asis v. CA Facts: Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son, brought an action for support and maintenance against the alleged father de Asis. De Asis denied filiation. Vircel agreed to a compromise that she would not pursue the case if Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim. After 6 years, Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance for her son. Held: The right to support cannot be the subject of compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waiving the right to future support is the need to maintain one’s existence. Illegitimate Filiation 1. Proof of Filiation  FC, 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.  Leuterio v. CA Facts: Petitioner claims that she is the natural daughter of Ana and Pablo. Held: Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence needed to prove dad’s involuntary recognition of child. Birth & baptismal certificates and photos don’t bear father’s signature expressing his acknowledgment of the child. The continuous possession of 50 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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the status of a natural child, tolerated by his father and justified by direct acts of the latter, does not, of itself, constitute evidence of acknowledgment that he is so in effect. It is, at most, an evidence to compel the father to acknowledge him. Uyguangco v. CA Facts: Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco. Graciano admits having no documents to prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Held: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred. Since Graciano seeks to ptove filiation based on FC, 172(2), it should take place during the lifetime of the alleged parent. Rodriguez v. CA Facts: Alarito Agbulos filed an action for compulsory recognition and support against Rodriguez. At the trial, the plaintiff presented his mother to testify as regards Alarito’s paternity. Held: Mother’s testimony should be allowed. FC allows the establishment of illegitimate filiation in the same way as legitimate filiation. The prohibition against the identification by the parent acknowledging of the identity of the other parent refers to voluntary recognition provided for in Art 278 and not to compulsory recognition. Aruego, Jr. v. CA Facts: Antonia and Evelyn filed petition to declare them as illegitimate children plus acknowledgment as compulsory heirs on the basis of open and continuous possession of status. Held: Giving FC retroactive effect and at the same time prejudicing or impairing vested or acquired rights in accordance with the CC or other laws is prohibited by Article 256 of the FC. The fact of the filing of petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at that time, and such right can no longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law. The right was already vested when she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Jison v. CA Facts: Monina alleged that she is the illegitimate daughter of Francisco. Franscisco denied paternity. Held: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Her witnesses established her claims. However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the Local Registrar where Francisco is named as her father. Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming Francisco as her father. There was no showing that Francisco had anything to do with the filing of said certificates. Alberto v. CA Facts: Ma. Teresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late Juan Alberto and is entitled to a share in his estate. Held: Theresa was able to prove her open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. Juan allowed her to use the surname Alberto since birth, Juan gave money as support and he also openly introduced Theresa as his daughter to family and friends. Guy v. CA Facts: Private respondents allege that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate children of deceased Sima Wei. Guy contends that the action already prescribed. Held: Illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the family code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to 4 years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the FC. The court before which a petition for letters of administration were filed is not precluded from receiving evidence on a person's filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of the recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. Agustin v. CA Facts: Prollamante sued Agustin for support and support pendente lite. Held: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt modern and scientific ways available. DNA testing is now available for identification and parentage testing. Courts should not hesitate to apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. In re: Intestate Estates of Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia Facts: Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: (1) A claim for compulsory recognition through the open and continuous possession of the status of illegitimate child, (2) Voluntary recognition through authentic writing. Held: Although child possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of putative father, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts. This prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia. The claim of voluntary recognition should likewise fail. An authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition is a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent. This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his. This does not include the report card from UST even though putative father's name appears as her parent/guardian. The report card did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia and he did not participate in its preparation. Similarly, published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. 51 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

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 Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz Facts: Diaz filed complaint for compulsory recognition. Mother was married to a Japanese but had a relationship with another man, Rogelio Ong Held: This presumption, however, is not conclusive and may be overturned by evidence to the contrary. With DNA testing, we can determine with reasonable certainty the filiation of the child. Death of the father does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of DNA. "Biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person's body, even if inanimate objects that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. The death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. Any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. Rights of Illegitimate Children  FC, 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.  RA 9255  David v. CA Facts: Ramon Villar, a married man, had three children with his secretary David. Ramon recognized the children as his. Ramon refused to return Christoper, his youngest child, after a trip. Held: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the parental authority of his mother. The fact that Ramon recognized the child may be a ground for ordering him to give support but not for giving him custody of the child.  People v. Namayan Facts: Namayan convicted of rape. Victim got pregnant. Held: The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with it among others the obligation to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its origin does not prevent it and to support the same. There are also no legal impediments for both parties.  Mossesgeld v. CA Facts: Elezar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate of his illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld Calasan. The local civil registrar refused to register the birth certificate of Jonathan using the surname Calasan. Held: Illegitimate children must use the surname of their mothers regardless of whether or not they had been acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth. The father may however choose to legally adopt the child. Once adopted, the child may use the father’s surname.  Republic v. Abadilla Facts: Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot 2 children during their common law relationship. The children’s birth certificates indicated their surname as Abadilla. Held: Illegitimate children should use the surname of their mother. The surname of the children in their birth certificates should be changed to Celestino.  Gonzales v. CA Facts: Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brother of Ricardo alleged that they are the only heirs of the deceased. Empaynado siblings filed a motion, alleging that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo. Held: The evidence pre ented proved that the 3 sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo. Hence, they are entitled to inherit Ricardo’s estate. Article 988 of CC provides that “in the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants, illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.”  Republic v. Vicencio Facts: Cynthia Vicencio was the legitimate child of Pablo and Fe. Pablo abandoned them and was eventually declared an absentee. Fe married Ernesto who has constantly treated Cynthia as his own daughter. Cynthia filed petition for change of surname with consent of Ernesto. Held: There was no proper and reasonable cause to warrant a change of name. a legitimate child shall use the surname of his or her father.  Gan v. Reyes Facts: Bernadette Pondevida wrote August Caezar Gan demanding for support of their ‘love child’, in order that she may send the child to school. Gan denied paternity of the child, prompting Bernadetter to institute in behalf of her daughter a complaint for support. Held: In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality.  Tonog v. CA Facts: Dina and Daguimol had a child. When Dina went abroad to work, she left her daughter with Daguimol and his parents. Father requested for and was granted petition for legal guardianship of child. 52 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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Held: Art. 176 of the FC [illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of the mother] and Art. 213 [no child shall be separated from the mother unless there are compelling reasons] do not intend to denigrate the important role fathers play in the upbringing of their children. Court recognized that both parents complement each other in giving nurture and providing that holistic care which takes into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social, and spiritual needs of the child. The case was over the guardianship of the child whose mother is working in the US. The Court is being asked to rule on the temporary custody over the minor while the guardianship case has not been terminated. Since the welfare of the minor is the controlling factor, the Court awards the temporary custody to the father. The child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment to.  De Guzman v. Perez Facts: Roberto and Shirley had a child but never married. After a while, Roberto married another woman and had 2 children with her. Other than 3 instances (2 for education and 1 for hospitalization), Roberto never provided for financial support. Held: Neglect of child is a felony punished under Art. 277 (2) of the RPC. It is also known as "indifference of parents." This being so, petitioner cannot be punished under RA 7610 [Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act]  Zepeda v. Zepeda Facts: child seeks damages from his father because he is an illegitimate child - he seeks damages for the deprivation of his right to be a legitimate child, to have a normal home, to have a legal father, to inherit from his father, to inherit from his paternal ancestors and for being stigmatized as a bastard Held: An illegitimate child has no cause of action for the genuine and severe emotional distress resulting from the shame of being an adulterous bastard. In short, illegitimate children cannot claim damages arising from their illegitimate status.  Alba v. CA Facts: Hererro wanted Rosendo’s surname from Hererra to Alba. Held: An illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mother's surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child indentifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father's surname, reflecting his status as an illegitimate child. In this case, the minor is an illegitimate child not recognized by father as evidenced by his strong assertion that he is not the father of the child.  Republic v. Capote Facts: change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores as she is an illegitimate child. She wants to go to US Held: Child is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while her mother always recognized him as her child. Legitimated Children  FC, 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.  FC, 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.  FC, 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.  FC, 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth.  FC, 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.  FC, 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time their cause of action accrues.  Estate of de los Santos v. Luciano Facts: Leon Escobar and Josefa Esguerra lived as common low spouses and begot Tomasa. They subsequently got married and had two children, Antonio and Fortunato. Tomasa had a legitimate daughter, Maria Luciano. Antonio took care of Maria when Tomasa died. Upon Antonio’s death, Maria alleges that she is entitled to inherit from the intestate estate of Antonio, who has no other heirs. Held: Maria is the legitimate niece of Antonio Escobar. Tomasa was legitimated by the marriage of her parents hence a legitimate sister of Antonio. Maria is entitled to inherit from Antonio.  Ramirez v. Gmur Facts: Samuel, a Swiss, lived and died in Iloilo, leaving a valuable estate which he disposed by will. His widow Ana Ramirez was named executrix. The will effectively ignored the possible claims of two sets of children born of his natural daughter Leona Castro. According to a baptismal certificate, she was born of one Felisa Castro and an unknown father. However, there was a document exhibiting Samuel Bischoff’s recognition of her. Held: Leona was in an uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural child & treated as such by Samuel. Furthermore, she was recognized in a public instrument, which was corroborated by the priest in charge. Her legitimate children are entitled to inherit from Samuel. Her children from second marriage, which was bigamous since divorce was invalid, are not entitled. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated & acknowledged natural children, excluding kids of adulterous relations.  In re: Julian Wang Facts: change of name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. They want to drop the middle name since they plan to stay in Singapore and Carulasan sounds funny there 53 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 Held: Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes filiation, in which case they may bar the father's surname. XIII. Adoption A. Pre-Adoption and Adoption Procedures  Adopted 1. Biological parent signs a Deed of Voluntary Commitment. Rescissible within 6 months. 2. Voluntary Commitment: Declaration of Availability for Adoption 3. Involuntary Commitment: (1) Announcement of Missing Child in tri-media, (2) Declaration of Abandonment, (3) Declaration of Availability for Adoption 4. Case Study Report  Adopter 1. Inquiry 2. Attendance of Adoption Fora and Seminars 3. Case Study Report Application for Adoption 4. Matching 5. Placement 6. Supervised Trial Custody 7. Home Study Report 8. Recommendation and Consent 9. Petition for Adoption 10. Adoption Decree  FC, 184. The following persons may not adopt: (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.  FC, 187. The following may not be adopted: (1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority. (2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and (3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded. B. Who may adopt/be adopted  RA 8552, Sec. 7: WHO MAY ADOPT – (a) any FILIPINO [1] of legal age, [2] fully capacitated, [3] of good moral character, [4] not convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, [5] emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, [6] at least 16 years older than the adoptee, [7] and who is in a position to support and care for children in keeping with the means of the family; (b) any ALIEN with the same qualifications as above, provided: [1] country of origin has diplomatic relations with the Philippines, [2] living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the application and maintains such residence until the decree is entered, [3] certified by his or her consul to be capacitated to adopt, [4] and the adoptee is allowed entry to the country as his or her child. #3 may be waived for aliens, provided: (i) the alien is a former Filipino adopting a relative within the 4th civil degree, (ii) or the alien seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, (iii) or the relative within the 4th civil degree of his or her Filipino spouse; (c) the GUARDIAN with respect to the ward, after the termination of guardianship and the clearing of financial accountabilities. [2] Spouses MUST JOINTLY ADOPT, except: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other; (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his or her own illegitimate child, provided that the other has consented; (iii) if legally separated. If spouses jointly adopt, parental authority shall be exercised by them jointly.  RA 8552, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED – (a) any person BELOW 18 who has been judicially declared as available for adoption; (b) the LEGITIMATE CHILD of one spouse by the other spouse; (c) ALL ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN by a qualified adopter to improve his or her status to that of legitimacy; (d) a person of LEGAL AGE, provided that he or she has been treated as if the adopter's own child since minority; (e) a child whose adoption has been PREVIOUSLY RESCINDED; (f) a child whose parents HAVE DIED, provided that no proceedings shall be instituted within 6 months of the death.  FC, 183. A person of age and in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate, in keeping with the means of the family. Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title. In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older than the person to be adopted, unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the adopted, or is the spouse of the legitimate parent of the person to be adopted.  FC, 184. The following persons may not adopt: (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral 54 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoptions as may be provided by law.  FC, 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.  FC, 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.  FC, 187. The following may not be adopted: (1) A person of legal age, unless he or she is a child by nature of the adopter or his or her spouse, or, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his or her own child during minority. (2) An alien with whose government the Republic of the Philippines has no diplomatic relations; and (3) A person who has already been adopted unless such adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded.  In Re: Adoption of Edwin Villa Facts: Luis and Edipola Santos, a childless couple, file a petition for the adoption of the minor Edwin Villa, a full-blooded brother of Edipola. The Solicitor General opposed. Held: There is no provision of law that prohibits relatives by blood or affinity from adopting one another. No dual relationship shall result because filiation is limited between the adopter and the adopted.  Republic v. CA and Bobiles Facts: Petitioner seeking that CA erred in not giving retroactive effect to FC provision on adoption. Adoption proceedings started February 1988. FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Held: The woman has already acquired vested right to adopt, thus the FC should not be retroactively acquired. Family Code provisions on adoption are not retroactive in so far as they do not impede on the expediency of the adoption, because the prime consideration is the child's welfare, and should not be delayed. Husband's consent in an affidavit annexed to petition is also enough to make him copetitioner  Republic v. Toledano Facts: Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to adopt Solomon, Evelyn’s minor brother. Alvin is a natural born American citizen while Evelyn was a former Filipina who became a naturalized American citizen. Solomon and his mother consented to the adoption. Held: The Clouse spouses may not adopt Filipino children. Alvin is not qualified to adopt under the Family Code because he is not a former Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn, as a form Filipino citizen, is qualified to adopt but the Family Code requires spouses to jointly adopt. Hence, spouses may not adopt Solomon (NB: RA8552: qualified resident aliens may adopt Filipino children)  Republic v. Miller Facts: In July 1988, spouses Miller filed petition to adopt Michael. Trial court granted petition. Solicitor General opposed, saying FC should be given effect in this case and not PD 603. Held: The enactment of Family Code will not impair the right of alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder.  In Re petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim Facts: Spouses Lim took care of Michelle and Michael since they were little. They acquired the children by simulated birth. When husband died, wife remarried. By this time, children were of age. Wife decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty provided for in RA8552 for those who simulated the birth of a child. Everyone whose consent was required gave their consent (Michelle’s husband, Michelle and Michael, and petitioner’s husband) Held: Wife must jointly adopt the children with her new husband, as stated in ArtIII(7) of RA 8552. Nature of Adoption Proceedings  Lazatin v. Campos Facts: Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis as an adopted child. Held: Renato has not established his status as an adopted child. Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the existence of the records is proven along with the contents of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out.  Santos v. Aranzanso Facts: Paulina and Aurora are adopted. Their adopter died intestate; first cousins assailed the validity of adoption on grounds that no consent was given by the parents of the adopted. Held: Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned their kids, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.  DSWD v. Belen

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Facts: Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo, naturalized American citizens, filed a petition to adopt their minor niece. The petition was granted. When travel clearance was being sought from DSWD, it was discovered that DSWD was not informed about the commencement of the adoption proceedings nor was it given notice of the petition being granted. Held: The DSWD has to be notified of the adoption proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is mandatory before adoption is to be finalized. Adoption is a legal device by which a better future may be accorded an unfortunate child. Consent Necessary for Adoption  RA 8552, Sec. 9: (a) the ADOPTED CHILD, if at least 10 years old; (b) the BIOLOGICAL PARENTS of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the government instrumentality or institution that has custody over the child; (c) the adopted or LEGITIMATE CHILDREN of the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (d) theILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN of the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (e) the SPOUSE of the adopter or the adopted.  FC, 188. The written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (1) The person to be adopted, if ten years of age or over, (2) The parents by nature of the child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality; (3) The legitimate and adopted children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent or parents; (4) The illegitimate children, ten years of age or over, of the adopting parent, if living with said parent and the latter's spouse, if any; and (5) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.  Duncan v. CFI Facts: A 3-year old baby was given by his unwed mother to Atty. Velasquez. Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan spouses to adopt the child. Held: Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required to give consent to the adoption. The father’s consent is not required because the child is illegitimate. The mother’s consent is not necessary either, because she is deemed to have abandoned the child and has given the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship. (NB: If under RA8552, Velasquez is not a proper party. Provision says legal guardian)  Cang v. CA Facts: Spousess Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were legally separated. The brother and sister-in-law of Clavano wanted to adopt the 3 children of the spouses Cang. Their 14-year old son signed the petition for adoption along with Clavano. Held: The adoption may not be granted. Cang’s consent as the father is necessary. Despite the fact that Cang abandoned his children, it was proven that he continued to send support for the family from the US. It was mere physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as to constitute abandonment.  Landingin v. Republic Facts: Landingin filed for adoption of her 3 nieces. There was no written consent obtained from the mother of the children, who is in Italy. Held: The discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not anchored solely on the best interests of the child, but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of proposed adoption. The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. The natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. Also, merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not abandonment by the parent to the child. Mother in this case still sends financial support for her children. When mother left for Italy, she did not intend to sever her relationship with her children. She was merely impelled to leave the country for financial constraints.  Ratterman, “Adoption and the Rights of Putative Fathers” o Putative fathers who have established a relationship with their children are considered to have parental rights equal to those of the mother. Problem arises when a nonmarital child is placed for adoption. In instances where the mother has surrendered a nonmarital child or had her parental rights terminated, the legal status of the putative father may create additional delays in finalizing an adoption. o 3 Groups of Nonmarital Fathers (In New York “putative statute”) 1. Fathers with full substantive rights – unwed fathers who have maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact with the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary surrender or have their parental rights terminated before the child can be adopted. This is based on the age of the child. a. Children under 6mos old – a nonmarital child under 6mos old cannot be placed for adoption without the father’s consent if the father has i. Openly lived with the child/child’s mother for a continuous period of 6mos prior to the placement of the child for adoption ii. Openly held himself out to be the father of the child for 6mos prior to the placement of child for adoption iii. Paid/offered to pay medical expenses in connection with mother’s pregnancy/birth of the child New York law evaluates his commitment to raising the child by looking at his relationship with the child’s mother, willingness to acknowledge the child, and his payment of medical expenses 56 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 b.

2.

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Children over 6mos old – father’s consent required if he pays a fair and reasonable sum according to his means toward the support of the child Either visit the child monthly, maintain regular communication >> excused if the father if not physically and financially able to visit or if he is prevented from doing so by the actions of the mother/agency Openly held himself to be the father and openly lived with the child for 6mos in the 1yr period immediately preceding the child’s placement for adoption >> substantial and continuous contact with child Father’s intention alone is not sufficient if not supported by evidence that he supported the child. Fathers with due process rights – putative fathers who do not meet the statutory criteria may still qualify to be “notice fathers,” given due process rights with respect to voluntary surrenders and termination of parental rights involving nonmarital children - Do not include men convicted of rape and child was conceived as a result of rape Those entitled to due notice are those:

- Adjudicated by court - Filed timely and unrevoked notice of intent to claim paternity - Recorded on the child’s BC as father - Openly living with the child and the child’s mother at the time proceeding was initiated - Identified as the child’s father by the mother in a written, sworn statement - Married to child’s mother within 6mos prior to execution of a surrender or initiation of termination proceeding - Filed an instrument with the putative father registry acknowledging paternity of the child  Sole purpose of notification: Enable him to present evidence to the court relevant to the best interests of the child. There is no presumption in favor of the putative father. He will only be given custody if it will be for the best interest of the child.  He may waive his right to notice by signing a written instrument acknowledged or proved under the same procedure as a voluntary surrender. 3. Fathers without rights – fathers who have not made efforts to establish a relationship with nonmarital child o Fathers unable to meet the rights criteria  Domestic violence – fathers legally prevented from visiting or contacting the child because of a court order to protect mother from domestic violence  Incarcerated fathers – consent still needed  Drug addiction – court rejects this excuse  Father unaware of child – court also does not excuse, but it infringed constitutional rights  Mother’s actions – when a mother intentionally prevented a putative from establishing a relationship with the child  Relative’s actions o Delays in adoptions – child’s rights must be considered, not those of putative fathers Effects of Adoption  RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 33: (1) SEVER ALL LEGAL TIES between the biological parents and the adoptee, except if the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a LEGITIMATE CHILD of the adopter; (3) give the adopter and adoptee RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS arising from the relationship of parent and child, including: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; (ii) the right of the adoptee and the adopter to be the legal and compulsory heirs of each other.  FC, 189. Adoption shall have the following effects: (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters; (2) The parental authority of the parents by nature over the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of the parent by nature of the adopted, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by both spouses; and (3) The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives.  FC, 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following rules: (1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession; (2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters; (3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by the adopters. (4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and one-third by the adopters; (5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate; and (6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.  CC, 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.  Tamargo v. CA 57 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

F.

Facts: Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt the ten-year old minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was granted, Adelberto shot and killed Tamargo. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelberto’s natural parents for damages. Held: Adelberto’s natural parents are liable for damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred prior to the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural parent’s actual custody at the time of the accident. The effects of adoption on parental authority cannot be given retroactive effect.  Sayson v. CA Facts: Teodoro and Isabel Sayson died, leaving behind 2 adopted children and one legitimate child. The siblings of Teodoro claims that they are entitled to the intestate estate of Teodoro. The adopted children claim that they are entitled to inherit from the estate of Teodoro’s parents by right of representation. Held: The adopted children are entitled to Teodoro’s estate. Legally adopted children have the right to inherit from the adoptive parents. However, the adopted children may not represent their adoptive parent. Adoption creates a relationship only between the adoptive parents and the adfopted. It does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.  Johnston v. Republic Facts: Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2-year old from an orphanage. The petition was granted and the child was given Isabel’s maiden surname. Isabel filed a motion to change the child’s surname to Johnston. Held: Isabel’s husband did not concur in the adoption. Hence, the child should use Isabel’s maiden name or it may lead to confusion.  Republic v. CA and Wong Facts: Maximo Wong was adopted by the Wong spouses when he was 2 years old. Upon reaching majority, he started a furniture business. Maximo petitioned to change his surname to Alcala, the name of his natural parents. The Wong spouses consented. Held: Maximo may change his name. it was proven that the using of the surname Wong was detrimental to his business. It also caused him embarrassment and isolation in the Muslim community where he resides. Moreover, the change of Maximo’s surname was not done to defraud anyone. Use of adoptive parent’s surname is not the main objective of adoption but merely one of its effects.  Republic v. CA and Caranto Facts: CA granted Caranto spouses’ petition for adoption of Midael with prayer for the correction of the minor’s first name from Midael to Michael. Held: The notice for correction of entry must also be published. While there was notice given by publication, it was only a notice for adoption. The local civil registrar, an indispensible party to the case was not notified. Thus correction of entry must not be granted.  Republic v. Hernandez Facts: The Munson spouses adopted Kevin Earl Moran. Simultaneous with the adoption was the change of name of Kevin Earl to Aaron Joseph Held: The proceeding for adoption and for change of name should be done separately. The adoptive parents can only change the surname of the adopted but not the first name save in cases where the first name falls under the causes allowed by the court for changing first names. (NB: rule is no longer applicable. RA8552 Sec13 allows adopters to change the full name of the adopted and no longer just the surname. Section 7 of the SC 2002 en banc resolution likewise requires the petition to “specifically state at the heading of the initiatory pleading when the petition contains an application for change of name.) Rescission  FC, 191. If the adopted is a minor or otherwise incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon petition of any person authorized by the court or proper government instrumental acting on his behalf, on the same grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority. If the adopted is at least eighteen years of age, he may petition for judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.  FC, 192. The adopters may petition the court for the judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases: (1) If the adopted has committed any act constituting ground for disinheriting a descendant; or (2) When the adopted has abandoned the home of the adopters during minority for at least one year, or, by some other acts, has definitely repudiated the adoption  FC, 193. If the adopted minor has not reached the age of majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption, the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor. If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped, the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over his person or property or both. Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption. The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records in the proper registries.  RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 35: GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION – not subject to rescission by the adopters. The adoption may be rescinded ONLY UPON THE PETITION OF THE ADOPTEE with the assistance of the DSWD, if a minor, or over 18 but incapacitated on any of the ff. grounds committed by the adopters: (1) repeated physical and verbal MALTREATMENT despite having undergone counseling; (2) ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE of the adoptee; (3) SEXUAL assault or violence; (4) BANDONMENT or failure to comply with parental obligations.  RA 8552 IRR Sec 37: EFFECTS OF RESCISSION – (1) restoration of PARENTAL AUTHORITY to the adoptee's biological parents if known, or to the DSWD if still a minor or incapacitated; (2) the RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS are extinguished; (3) cancellation of the new BIRTH CERTIFICATE and restoration of the old certificate of the adoptee; (4) SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS revert to its status at the time of the adoption decree; (5) VESTED RIGHTS acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. 58 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 G.

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Rectification of Simulated Birth  RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 41: [1] A person who has under his or her care and custody a child whose birth certificate has been falsified to make it appear that the child is his or her own son or daughter shall file in the appropriate court a PETITION FOR CORRECTION of the birth certificate and of adoption of the child. [2] Provided, that the person initiates the said proceedings WITHIN 5 YEARS from the effectivity of this Act, and shall thereafter complete the said proceedings wherein he or she shall prove that the simulation of birth was for THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, and that the child has been consistently considered and treated as his or her own child. [3] The DSWD shall conduct its own Child and Home Study Reports to determine if said conditions exist. [4] In all cases of rectification, the standard procedures for adoption shall be followed. Adoption Decree  Reyes v. Sotero Facts: Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco, her niece, along with others, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration and settlement of the estate of Elena Lising. Ana Joyce Reyes opposed the petition claiming that she was an adopted child of spouses Elena Lising and Serafin de los Santos. Held: The adoption decree cannot be assailed collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedent's estate. Contrary proof can be presented only on a separate action brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. Absent a categorical pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications regarding the matter, and the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real. Inter-Country Adoption  RA 8043 (Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995), Sec. 4: THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD — there is hereby created the InterCountry Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption. As such, it shall: (a) protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child; (b) collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the adoptive parents; (c) monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through authorized and accredited agency; (d) prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter improper practices contrary to this Act; (e) promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption; (f) license and accredit childcaring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children; (g) accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children in their own country; and (h) cancel the license to operate and blacklist the childcaring and placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation of any provision under this Act.  Same, Sec. 7: INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION AS THE LAST RESORT — the Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is placed for intercountry adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years.  Same, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED — only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board: (a) Child study;(b) birth certificate/foundling certificate; (c) deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d) medical evaluation/history; (e) psychological evaluation, as necessary; and (f) recent photo of the child.  Same, Sec. 9: WHO MAY ADOPT — an alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent; (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country; (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law; (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted; (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act; (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws.  Same, Sec. 10: WHERE TO FILE APPLICATION — an application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated in English: (a) Birth certificate of applicant(s); (b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable; (c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement; (d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and psychologist; (e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s); (f) Police clearance of 59 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 applicant(s); (g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and (h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family; The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings.  Same, Sec. 11: FAMILY SELECTION/MATCHING — no child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. [2] The clearance, as issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall form part of the records of the child to be adopted. [3] When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines.  Same, Sec. 14: SUPERVISION OF TRIAL CUSTODY — the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of 6 months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child. During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption. J. Adoption Issues  Ziegler, International Adoption on the Best Interest of the Child (see summary) XIV. Parents and Children A. Parental Authority  FC, 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.  FC, 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.  FC, 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.  FC, 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children.  FC, 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.  FC, 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.  CC, 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.  PD 603, Art. 58.  Peskind, Determining the Undeterminable o Best interest standard – indeterminate standard dependent upon the subjective values and life experience of the fact finder and psychological experts  In a large and pluralistic society, it is hard to reach a social agreement about what kind of adults we want children to become, what methods will produce such adults o History of allocations of child custody o Discretionary standard a. Paternal preferences – derived from ancient Rome where pater-familias ruled and dominated all aspects of domestic as well as public life 60 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010

o o

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American colonial era – father as the economic head of the household was awarded custody due to importance of children as an asset to the economy with a deficient labor force b. Transitive period – the children will be best taken cared of and instructed by the innocent party; origination of maternal preference rules c. Maternal preference and tender years doctrine – women came to be recognized as being better able to care for children as a result of “maternal instincts” - Women as having superior morals and nurturing skills, better suiting them for the care and rearing of the children Family law transformed  Emergence of feminism led to demise of maternal preferences for custody Best interest standard  Unpredictability of results encourages parents to engage in strategic behavior, take chances in litigation, and hire expensive experts to highlight each other’s shortcomings than work together to make the best of the inevitable 3 primary objections of the Law Institute on BIS 1. Indeterminacy and predictability – BIS must necessarily be open-ended because each individual child and family situation is unique  Predictable standards – encourage settlement, expedite resolution of custody cases and constrain both conscious and subconscious rogue and subjective rulings based upon fact-finder biases  When a judge relies on the BIS, he is not applying law but is exercising administrative discretion. BIS provides little concrete guidance in determining what is in a child’s best interest.  “The custody case effectively becomes a combination of beauty contest and circus sideshow with both parents attempting to woo the judge with their respective strengths and the concurrent weaknesses of their spouse.”  Can science quantify a child’s best interest? - The courts seem to demand psychological expert testimony to effect what they see as a reasonable resolution to problems with no single correct solution. - Psychological experts are as prone to bias as any fact finder. - Legal process is protracted since it is not simply a case of deciding whether one parent is unfit. - “An irony of the best interest standard is the burden imposed on the children who are its designated beneficiaries.” 2. Difficult to adjudicate  Adjudication – custody litigation usually requires the determination of past acts and facts, not a prediction of future events. Applying BIS requires an individualized prediction. The imposition of the burden on a court to predict the future is daunting and effectively impossible.  BIS is people oriented instead of fact oriented. Acts are determinate and are a concrete basis for courts to rely on. A personoriented rule requires an evaluation of the whole person viewed as a social being 3. BIS is unjust  Litigation is literally invited due to the indeterminacy of the possible outcome  It would expose the child to “split the baby” shared custody arrangement that may be deleterious to their emotional welfare, forcing them to commute between 2 warring homes  Litigation costs are increased  The role of attorney becomes more significant due to imprecise standards, to persuade the court of the correctness of the client’s position Other alternatives to BIS a. Sex-based standards – universally rejected, with constitutional considerations, unfair way to adjudicate child placement; Arbitrary placement based upon sex makes no sense in the light of society’s evolution and the realignment of formerly static parenting roles b. Primary caretaker preferences – relationship criteria such as the amount of time spent with children and the stability of the child’s relationships - Question arises on whether presumptive reliance on implicit considerations of past caretaking responsibilities would enhance the BIS 3 justifications for PCP 1. Protection of the child’s most vital parent-child relationship 2. Avoidance of error, litigation and abusive threats of litigation 3. Compatibility with gender neutrality and the child’s many interests However, there is lack of definition of primary caretaking, which is necessary to achieve any of the standard’s asserted benefits. By focusing on historical conduct as opposed to the more determinative future ability to parent, the PCS requires a dull exposition of virtually all contributions by both parents, despite their often marginal relevance in future parenting responsibilities. Other problems of PCP 1. Results in disguised biases in favor of women who are usually the caretakers 61 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 2. Relies on mechanical standard (anu ba…) 3. Definitional problems c. Least detrimental alternative standard Speedy action is necessary to avoid further harm being done to his chances of healthy psychological development Sets the standards of parents too low, avoiding harm instead of attempting to inspire parenting excellence d. Comparisons of various standards Literature suggests that there is no better alternative to BIS Indeterminacy of BIS is a necessary component of litigation that needs to take into account all the intricacies of human nature. o Practical solutions to theoretical problems  Litigation controls 1. Expedited litigation – closure for the family at the earliest practicable time, local court rules to micromanage custody litigation; conclude within one year from the filing of the petition for dissolution Financial issues must be bifurcated from the custody issues – to disallow a party to attempt to use financial issues as a bargaining chip on custody considerations 2. Less reliance on conclusions of custody evaluators – scrutiny of credentials; court’s reliance on them is misplaced and should be reevaluated 3. Better appellate review – criteria relied upon needs to be set forth clearly in the findings in order that the appellate court has a guidepost in which to measure the court’s ultimate findings and conclusions Written and detailed findings force a trial judge to confront his own biases and predispositions 4. Enhanced trial skills for practitioners and jurists – true expertise on rules of evidence, presentation of evidence, knowledge of effective expert impeachment necessary in custody litigation Certification must be required for lawyers

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Panel of 3 judges with diverse backgrounds – alternative to traditional use of one judge to try custody cases Custody a. Determining the Best Interest of the Child  Gender and Tender Years Presumption o Rules of Court, Rule 99. Sec. 6. Proceedings as to child whose parents are separated; Appeal. - When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each other, and the question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing the testimony as may be pertinent, shall award the care, custody, and control of each such child as will be for its best interest, permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity, or poverty. If, upon such hearing, it appears that both parents are improper persons to have the care, custody, and control of the child, the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or commit it to any suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society. The court may in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code order either or both parents to support or help support said child, irrespective of who may be its custodian, and may make any order that is just and reasonable permitting the parent who is deprived of its care and custody to visit the child or have temporary custody thereof. Either parent may appeal from an order made in accordance with the provisions of this section. No child under seven years of age shall be separated from its mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefor. o Ex Parte Devine Facts: Custody of spouses’ 2 children were given to the mother by virtue of the “tender years” presumption. Held: The tender years presumption represents an unconstitutional gender-based classification which discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody proceedings solely on the basis of sex. o Cervantes v. Fajardo Facts: child was given up for adoption; biological mother reclaimed child and demands money in exchange for the child. mother cohabits with a man who is not her husband. she also has a child with another man. Held: The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under 5 years will not apply when the court finds compelling reasons to do otherwise. Moreover, adoption terminates parental authority, thus a parent cannot demand custody of the child given up for adoption. o Espiritu v. CA Facts: child wanted to be with father. child saw mother kissing a "bad man" Held: The prime consideration is the child’s best interest. The tender Years Presumption provides that if the child is under seven years of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her choice of parent is paramount. Child's best interest would be better served in an environment characterized by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency. No record show that father is unfit. Besides, the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused emotional 62 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values. She was also convicted for a crime of bigamy. This amount to compelling reasons. o Celis v. Cafuir Facts: Cafuir after giving birth to Joel (John) Cafuir turned over custody to Soledad, fearing the extreme displeasure and anger of her father. Soledad provided for all the needs and comforts of the child, including a nurse hired to care for the child. There was a document stating that the child was “entrusted” to respondents while the second stated that Soledad is the “real guardian” of the child and no one may adopt the child except for Soledad. Held: Documents presented does not amount to renunciation of custody. The mother must have her child back now that she has the means of supporting him. Adopting parents should be indemnified for the amount spent to support child. The relationship between a foster mother and a child is not natural but artificial. Flesh and blood count. o Gamboa v. CA Facts: Husband wants to stay in Boracay, wife wants to stay in Makati. Wife brought daughter to Makati with no intention of going back to Boracay. Held: The so-called tender-age presumption may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother's unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of caring for her minor child. No compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the mother's custody. o Sy v. CA Facts: mother was driven away because of religious differences (praying outdoors in the rain) Held: The law favors the mother if she is a fit and proper person to have custody of her children so that they may not only receive her attention, care, supervision but also have the advantage and benefit of a mother's love and devotion for which there is no substitute.  Parental Unfitness o Feldman v. Feldman Facts: Custody of children transferred from wife to husband on grounds of wife’s sexual deviance. Held: Peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto constitute unfitness for custody. Evidence upon the hearing established that the mother's private sex life in no way involved or affected the children. o Santos, Sr. v. CA Facts: CA granted custody to child’s maternal grandparents and not to his father. Santos is an army lieutenant. Held: In case of absence of either parent, the present parent shall continue exercising parental authority unless he is proven to be unfit. The PROFESSION of the father, by itself, does not constitute unfitness. Same with previous lack of interest and failure to provide support, as those can be attributed to financial circumstances. Only when both parents are dead or absent can parental authority be substituted by grandparents. o Pablo Gualberto v. Gualberto V Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she left him. Held: This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, FC, 213 governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads: “Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reason for such measure.” Role of the Child’s Preference  Pizarro v. Vasquez Facts: Pizarro and children instituted suit to obtain support from Vasquez. Children’s custody placed under Vasquez’s grandparents as per lower court’s decision. Held: Alleged adultery not having been established, wife should be given support. Wife should also be granted custody of children because it is stipulated in the contract of separation and because it would be for the best interest of the children.  Goldstein v. Goldstein Facts: child wants to go with father to Israel Held: Since the factors favoring the awarding of custody to one or the other of the parents were so nearly in the state of equipoise as to make it difficult for the trial justice to decide between them, substantial weight may be attached to the child's preference.  Laxamana v. Laxamana Facts: Custody of the 3 children was given to Lourdes because Reymond had drug-related problems. Held: The fundamental policy of the State to promote and protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which involves the family and the youth. While Reymond may have a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social well-being. Although he is not completely cured of his drug dependence, there is no evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the children with adequate support, 63 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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education and moral and intellectual training and development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain their choices as to which parent they want to live with. c. Presumption for Primary Caretaker  Garska v. McCoy Facts: Circuit Court awarded custody to putative father of child. Held: if both parents are equally fit, and the child is within tender years, then the PRIMARY CARETAKER, in this case the unwed mother, must be presumed to have custody. d. Flip of the Coin  Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication Other Rights and Duies in Exercise of Parental Authority  FC, 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example,and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; (5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) To demand from them respect and obedience; (7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and (8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians.  FC, 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.  FC, 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires.  FC, 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper.  FC, 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper.  FC, 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.  FC, 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.  Salientes v. Abanilla Facts: Because of in-law problems, husband left wife and son. Then on, he was prevented from seeing his son. Held: Habeas corpus may be resorted into in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person thereto. Husband and wife have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Although the couple are separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. 64 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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 Cabanas v. Pilapil Facts: Florentino had a child with a married woman. In his insurance he stated as beneficiary his daughter with his brother Francisco to act as trustee during her minority. Mother Cabanas complained. Held: The insurance proceeds belong to the minor beneficiary. She is under the custody and parental authority of the mother. For the best interest of the child, trusteeship should go to the mother and not the uncle  Libi v. IAC Facts: Ex-couples Julie Ann and Wendell died by gunshot wounds. Julie Ann’s parents filed for damages against Wendell’s parents. Held: Parents are primary liable for damages caused by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses except when they exercised due diligence. In this case, parents did not exercise due diligence since the son gained access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was, they did not know of his job, and the picture of him with a gun.  Lindain v. CA Facts: When plaintiffs were minors, their mother sold parcels of land whose title was under their names. Held: Sale of minor children's property executed by the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because the powers and duties as legal administrator are only powers of possession and management; no power to mortgage, encumber or dispose  People v. Silvano Facts: Silvano alleged of raping his daughter. He contends that it is punishment for her going home late. Held: Sex with one's own child is per se abhorrent and can never be justified as a form of parental punishment  Shields v. Gross Facts: Shields suing Gross for distributing her nude pictures to other magazines. Shields’ mother signed a contract on her behalf, since at that time she was 10 years old. Held: The parent's consent is binding on the infant and no words prohibiting disaffirmance are necessary to effectuate the legislative intent. Inasmuch as the consents in this case complied with the statutory requirements, they were valid and may not be disaffirmed.  Silva v. CA and Gonzales Facts: Silva and Gonzales cohabited without the benefit of marriage. They had 2 children. They got separated, mother has custody of children. Mother married a foreigner. Held: Provisions on the natural and primary rights of parents over their children are not limited to legitimate relationships. Even in the declaration of nullity, visitation rights are granted to the parents who do not have custody of the children. Besides, a few hours spent by the father with his children will not be detrimental to the latter  Eekelaar, “Are Parents Morally Obliged to Care for their Children?” (see Summary)  The Doctrine of Family Integrity: Protecting the Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers… (see Summary) Substitute and Special Parental Authority  FC, 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.  FC, 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.  FC, 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.  FC, 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts.  CC, 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility 65 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.  Palisoc v. Brillantes Facts: Palisoc was shot be a fellow student in the laboratory room of their school. Held: President and instructor are jointly and severally liable since incident could have been prevented if they gave proper supervision. So long as students are in their custody, they stand in loco parentis and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child  Amadora v. CA Facts: Amadora shot by Daffon in the auditorium of their school. Held: Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools, teacher in charge is liable for student's misconduct. In non-academic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not coterminous with semester. As long as student is under the control and influence of school and within its premises in pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is considered under school custody  St. Mary’s Academy Carpitanos Facts: Capistrano died because the car Daniels was driving lost control. They were doing a school event at the time. Held: For the school to be liable, there must be a showing that the act or omission was the proximate cause of the injury  Vancil v. Belmes Facts: Vancil, as grandmother of Belmes’ children, was appointed legal and judicial guardians of Valeria and Vincent. Natural mother Belmes opposed. Held: Mother has preferential right over grandparent to be the guardian of the child. Substitute parental authority should only be conferred if both parents are dead or the parent present is unfit Suspension or Termination of Parental Authority  FC, 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.  FC, 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.  FC, 227. If the parents entrust the management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would have paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to the child's legitime.  FC, 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: (1) Upon the death of the parents; (2) Upon the death of the child; or (3) Upon emancipation of the child.  FC, 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: (1) Upon adoption of the child; (2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; (3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; (4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or (5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority.  FC, 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender.  FC, 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: (1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty; (2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; (3) Compels the child to beg; or (4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased and will not be repeated. 66 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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 FC, 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority.  FC, 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child.  RA 7610  Chua v. Cabangbang Facts: Pacita Chua had a number of sexual liaisons without the benefit of marriage. She eventually cohabited with Sy Sia Lay and bore two children, Robert and Betty Chua Sy. After she separated with him, she later met and had another kid with Victor Tan Villareal. Without means to support the child, Pacita gave her away to a comadre in Cebu. Held: Abandonment is one of the grounds for depriving parents of parental authority. In certain cases, the custody of the child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or against both.  Abiera v. Orin Facts: Held: The right of representation is attached to parental authority or guardianship. It is extinguished with the death of the parent and could not be transferred  Cortes v. Castillo Facts: wife convicted of adultery, but was condoned by husband. Upon husband’s death, wife does not have sufficient means to support children Held: Parents can be deprived of parental authority for the best interests of the child. A showing that the mother tended to corrupt her children is enough to deprive of parental authority Rights and Duties of Children  CC, 356. Every child: (1) Is entitled to parental care; (2) Shall receive at least elementary education; (3) Shall be given moral and civic training by the parents or guardian; (4) Has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to his physical, moral and intellectual development.  CC, 357. Every child shall: (1) Obey and honor his parents or guardian; (2) Respect his grandparents, old relatives, and persons holding substitute parental authority; (3) Exert his utmost for his education and training; (4) Cooperate with the family in all matters that make for the good of the same  CC, 358. Every parent and every person holding substitute parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by precept and example, imbue the child with highmindedness, love of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to democracy as a way of life, and attachment to the ideal of permanent world peace.  CC, 359. The government promotes the full growth of the faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will establish, whenever possible: (1) Schools in every barrio, municipality and city where optional religious instruction shall be taught as part of the curriculum at the option of the parent or guardian; (2) Puericulture and similar centers; (3) Councils for the Protection of Children; and (4) Juvenile courts.  CC, 360. The Council for the Protection of Children shall look after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among other functions: (1) Foster the education of every child in the municipality; (2) Encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents; (3) Protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children, and orphans; (4) Take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency; (5) Adopt measures for the health of children; (6) Promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds; (7) Coordinate the activities of organizations devoted to the welfare of children, and secure their cooperation.  CC, 361. Juvenile courts will be established, as far as practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.  CC, 362. Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court, the father, mother, or guardian may in a proper case be judicially admonished.  CC, 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.  CC, 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.  CC, 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word "Junior" can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either: (1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or (2) Add the Roman Numerals II, III, and so on.  CC, 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.  FC, 213.  FC, 226.  PD 603, Art. 3. RIGHTS OF THE CHILD – all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. (1) The right to be born well. (2) The right to a wholesome family life. The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) The right to a well-rounded development of his personality. The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special talents. The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. The physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. (4) The right to all the 67 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) The right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (6) The right to an education commensurate with his abilities. (7) The right to full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation. (8) The right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, and hazards. (9) The right to live in a community and a society that can offer him an environment free from pernicious influences. (10) The right to the care, assistance, and protection of the State. (11) The right to an efficient and honest government that will deepen his faith in democracy. (12) The right to grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better world.  PD 603, Art. 4: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHILD – every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) strive to lead an upright and virtuous life; (2) love, respect and obey his parents; (3) extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness; (4) exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society; (5) respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) participate actively in civic affairs; and (7) help in the observance of individual human rights, the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace.  Convention on the Rights of the Child  Sawyer, The Child is Not a Person o Family Law  Basically the author is saying that in the perspective of family law, where children’s rights are usually seen, children’s legal personality is suppressed. This is because under this paradigm, the idea of the child is dependent on the family and the child rarely has a positive legal identity separate from his family. The author emphasizes that childhood should not mean their exclusion fro the legal fabric; instead, it should entitle them to a legal personality that accommodates their youth as can be seen in other areas of law.  This assertion is also true internationally. The author sees The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) more of rights for parents and families rather than the children. (Ex: Art 5 speaks of respect for parental guidance, Art 9 on right of children to live with parents, Art 18 on parental responsibilities, etc.) Only Art 12 resembles a particular assertion of the individual legal personality of the child, proclaiming children’s right to be heard in proceedings affecting them.  Despite the enumeration of rights of children, there are only few that are actually attainable in practice. Moreover, children can rarely vindicate their rights without the assistance if adults since, even if they are capable of finding and instructing solicitors, they may not have the resources.  The author says the tendency to conflate children’s identity with that of their parents, as emphasized in family law. Obscures and pathologies childhood. o Alternative Construction of the Child  Property Law: Children are absent in this legal structure since children cannot own a legal estate in land.  Tort: Children are more positively accommodated by tort since the position of children in this aspect is broadly the same as that of adults though a lesser standard of responsible behavior is expected from them. Basically parents are not responsible for their children’s torts just because of their parenthood; only in cases where there is lack of parental supervision.  Obiter: So it’s different in our jurisdiction  here parents are automatically liable subject to defense. So the parents have the burden of proof to show that they have observed the diligence of a good father. Here, the one claiming for damages has the burden of proof to show that parents lacked supervision over their child. Contract Law: Children are more disabled by Contract Law since children have no contracting capacity independent of their parents. Ex: children are not suable in their contracts unless they are for necessaries; valid contracts (by them) cannot easily be enforced.  Obiter: It’s the same here. Since minors generally cannot give consent (CC Art 1327) and when necessaries are delivered to him, he must pay a reasonable price therefore (CC Art 1489). Parents v. Children – When Rights Clash  Strunk v. Strunk Facts: Tommy needs kidney transplant; Jerry, his brother, is a perfect match; however, Jerry is mentally incapacitated. Held: The right to act for the incompetent has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward.  Conservatorship of Valerie N. Facts: Woman with mental problem; parents want her to undergo tubal ligation. Held: True protection of procreative choice can be accomplished only if the state permits the court-supervised substituted judgment of the conservator to be exercised on behalf of a conservative who is unable to personally exercise this right. However, in this case, the record is bereft of information regarding Valerie's capability o conceive or other methods which could prevent conception.  Johnson v. Calvert Facts: surrogate Held: "parent and child relationship" means the legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship." 68 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

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F.

 Gillick v. West Norwalk Facts: contraceptive aids given to children under 16 without parents' involvement and/or consent Held: The welfare of children is our first and paramount consideration and, if a declaration of the court will serve to promote that welfare, it is not useful to investigate the distinction between "rights" and powers. Parental rights to control a child do not exist for the benefit of the parent. They exist for the benefit of the child and they are justified only as so far as they enable the parent to perform his duties towards the child, and towards other children in the family. "The power of parents over their children is derived from their duty."  Curtis v. School Committee Facts: program of condom availability for junior and senior high schools Held: Parents do possess a fundamental liberty interest to be free from unnecessary government intrusion in the rearing of their children. But the parents in the case have failed to demonstrate how the interests are burdened by the condom-availability program. The type of interference necessary to support claim based on an alleged violation of parental liberty appears to be that which causes a coercive or compulsory effect on the claimants' rights. Coercion exists where the governmental action is mandatory and provides no outlet for parents, such as where refusal to participate in a program results in a sanction or in expulsion. Mere exposure to program offered at school does not amount to unconstitutional interference with parental liberties without the existence of some compulsory aspect to the program.  Roe v. Doe Facts: Daughter moved out of dorm without father’s consent. Held: If the parent has no fault and gives reasonable demands, yet child voluntarily does not comply, parent may withhold support. The child's right to support and the parent's right to custody and service are reciprocal.  In Re Edward C. Facts: Children physically abused by father. Mother consents to abuse because of religious reasons. Held: Evidence of actual psychological and physical harm support findings that children were "dependent" children without parents willing to exercise or capable of exercising proper and effective parental control, and that their return to the physical custody of the parents would be detrimental to their welfare  Prince v. Massachusetts Facts: Jehovah's witnesses and Child Labor Law Held: Liberties involved: parents' freedom to bring up the child in the way he should go/teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith; child's freedom to observe these/ to preach the gospel by public distribution of "Watchtower" and "Consolation" in conformity with the Scripture. The state has a wide range of power for limiting religious freedom and authority in things affecting the child's welfare; and that includes, to some extent, religious freedom.  Parental Constent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors ::: The importance of a minor’s right of access to contraceptives and the interest of the family unit in freedom from state interference appear to outweigh any state interest in restricting access, incl. reinforcing parental choices.  Recognizing Adolescents’ evolving capacities ::: The Convention requires governments to 'respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents [or others acting as parents] ellipsis in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child. Many adolescents gain capacity to make decisions for themselves concerning reproductive and sexual health services, and to decide issues of confidentiality. Immature adolescents must be given usual protections. The Convention sets a legal limit on parental power to deny capable adolescents reproductive and sexual health services. The question whether an adolescent is a 'mature minor' must be decided by health service providers independently of parental judgment. The specific duties of government and health service providers to implement adolescent rights regarding their reproductive and sexual health needs are examined. Summary Procedure  FC, 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental authority shall be verified.  FC, 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides.  FC, 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental authority over the child.  FC, 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this Chapter insofar as they are applicable.  RA 8369 Sec. 5: JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS – the Family Courts shall have EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION to hear and decide the following cases: (a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than 9 years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to PD 603; (b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; (c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; (d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; (e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; (f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of the Family Code; (g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority. (h) Petitions for 69 Janz Hanna Ria A2013

Law 100: Persons and Family Relations Prof. E. Aguiling-Pangalangan A.Y. 2009-2010 the constitution of the family home; (i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended; (j) Violations of RA 7610; and (k) Cases of domestic violence against: (1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and (2) children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development. [2] If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties. [2] If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.  Reyes v. Tabujara-Reyes Facts: Held: Both the SC and the CA still retain their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases despite the passage of RA8369 - the law conferring upon the family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of the minor they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left without a remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.  Madrinan v. Madrinan Facts: Held: RA 8369 [Family Courts Act of 1997] did not divest [deprive of authority] the CA and SC of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. The statute must be read in harmony with RA 7029 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA] and BP 129 [Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] in that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and the SC in petitions for habeas corpus where custody of the minors is at issue. The writ filed with the Family Court shall be enforceable within the judicial region to which the Family Court belongs. Petitions filed with the SC, CA or with any of its members shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on merits.

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