A2010 TORTS MAGIC NOTES FOR MIDTERMS
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A2010 legendary digests ^_^ from the work, effort, and money (from fines) of Class A2010. Go go go!...
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TORTS AND D AMAGES
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Torts: not defined in the NCC nor in any Philippine Law BUT many scattered provisions on tortuous acts -usually -usually defines as: (1) what it is not; (2) remedies remedies granted; (3) social/public policy protected Damages: much longer longer treatment treatment in the NCC; more practical importance on damages Practical Legal Relevance: vehicular accidents Intentional tort: not a delict delict (any act or omiss omission ion punishable by law) Why? Intentional act causing damage to another, not a crime Act: intentional, voluntary -damage -may or may not violate a crime Negligence: any act or omission causing damage to another but w/o intent (only difference w/intentional tort) Strict liability: it doesn’t matter if you’re negligent or if you intended it as long as sets of circumstances make you liable
I. INTRODUCTION A. Definitions 1. Tort and Quasi-delict a. Tort Naguiat v NLRC FACTS: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFT). Due to the phase-out of the US bases in the country, Clark Air Base was closed and the taxi drivers of CFTI were separated from service. The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of sep. pay due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat and the company solidarily liable for the payment of sep. pay. ISSUE: WON Naguait should be held solidarily liable with CFTI. YES.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES HELD: Under the Corporation Code, Naguait is liable bec: (1) he actively managed the business; (2) there was evidence that CFTI obtained reasonably adequate insuranc insurance; e; and (3) there was a corporate corporate tort in this case. Our jurisprudence is wanting to the definite scope of “corporate “corporate tort.” Essentiall Essentially, y, “tort” “tort” consists consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply stated, it is a breach of legal duty.
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CORPORATE TORT: in regards to liability of President of CFTI: no definition of corporate tort 2 definitions: long and short (legal basis) Short definition: from a law dictionary What’s What’s wrong wrong with the definition definition in Naguiat? Naguiat? TOO BROAD. BROAD. Any breach of legal duty becomes a tort (so it would include crimes, QD, breach of contract) …very …very sloppy sloppy defini definitio tion n but it’s it’s the only only case case that that defines Tort Why SC gave definition of Tort? They had to determine the liability of the officers (Naguiat) so is it part of the ratio of the case? NO. Obiter. They already found CFTI liable under the Labor Code so SC did not need to establish liability through tort AQUINO (pp. 1-2) Tort: taken directly from the French and is derivation of the Latin word “torquere” meaning “to twist” -common law: an unlawful violation of private right, not created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages -an act or omissio omission n producing producing an injury injury to another, another, without any previous existing lawful relation of which the said said act or omiss omissio ion n may may be said to be a natura naturall outgrowth or incident (other definitions not discussed) -no universal formula for torts liability -includes intentional tort, negligence, and strict liability *Intentional tort: includes includes conduct where the actor desire desires s to cause cause the conseque consequence nces s of his his act or believes the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. -inc -inclu lude des s assa assaul ult, t, batte batter, r, fals false e impr impris ison onme ment nt,, defamati defamation, on, invasion invasion of privacy privacy and interferen interference ce of property
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*Negligence: involves involves voluntary voluntary acts or omission omissions s which which result result in injury to others, others, without without intending intending to cause the same -actor fails to exercise due care in performing such acts or omissions *Strict *Strict Liability: Liability: where where the person person is made made liable liable independent of fault or negligence upon submission of proof of certain facts DE LEON (pp. 1-3) Tort: common law expression -used in French French to mean “wrong”, “wrong”, derived from Latin Latin “tortus” meaning twisted, as if to say tortuous conduct is twisted conduct or conduct that departs from the existing norm - a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject to civil liability -fundamental concept of tort: wrongful act or omission + resulting in breach of a private legal duty (distinguished from a mere breach of contractual duty) + damage from said breach of duty (of such character as to afford a right right of redres redress s at law in favor of the injured injured party party against the wrongdoer) Note (explained (explained definition definition in Naguiat vs. NLRC): NLRC): the term “tort” used by SC has same meaning as tort in commo common n law jurisdic jurisdictio tions, ns, as it was was used used in cases cases involving QD and delicts Tortious act: a wrongful act -comm -commiss issio ion n or omiss omission ion of duty duty of an act by one, one, without without right, right, whereby whereby another another receives receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation (74 Am. Jur. 2d 620) Essence of tort: defendant’s potential for civil liability to the victim for harmful wrongdoing and correspondingly the victim’s potential fro compensation compensation or other relief
Art. 2176, NCC Whoever Whoever by act or omission omission causes causes damage damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there there is no pre-ex pre-exist isting ing contra contractu ctual al relati relation on between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
b. Quasi-delict
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Elcano v Hill N O TE S
A 2176 explanation: First sentence refers to ALL CIVIL LIABILITIES. Second sentence limits QD.
Barredo v Garcia FACTS: A Head-o Head-on n collis collision ion betwee between n a taxi taxi and carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old boy who was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was convicted in a crim case but the right to file a sep civil action action was reserv reserved. ed. The parent parents s of the boy sued sued Barredo, Barredo, the driver’s driver’s employer employer for damages. damages. Barredo Barredo conten contends ds that that under under the RPC, RPC, his liabilit liability y is only only subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil action has been filed against the driver. ISSUE: WON the plaintiffs, may bring this separate civil action against Barredo, making him primarily liable as employer under the CC. YES. HELD: The same negligent act causing damage may produce civil liability arising from a crim under the RPC or create an action for quasi-delict under the CC. Thus, Thus, there there were were 2 liabil liabiliti ities es of Barred Barredo: o: a subsidiary one arising from the driver’s crim negligence nd a prima primary ry one as emplo employer yer under under the CC. The The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred preferred the second remedy. They were acting within their rights in doing so.
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A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES FACTS: In crimi criminal nal case case where where Regina Reginald ld Hill Hill was was charged with the killing of Agapito Elcano, the former was acquitted acquitted for “lack of intent to kill, kill, coupled coupled with mistake.” mistake.” The deceased deceased’s ’s parents parents thereafter thereafter sued Reginald and his father for dmages. CFI dismissed the civil cases on the ground of res judicata. ISSUE: WON the civil action for damages is barred by Hill’s acquittal in the crim case. NO. HELD: Hill Hill’s ’s acqu acquit itta tall in the the crim crim case case has has not not extinguished his liability for QD, hence the acquittal is not a bar to the instant civil action.
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Releva Relevance nce:: clarif clarified ied that that QD includ includes es damage damage to property (same highlight in reviewer) Problem: A2191 A2191(2) (2) gave gave exampl example e where where QD and damage to property [liability of proprietors of excessive smoke]; but this is a Tort on STRICT LIABILITY, not QD!
Baksh v CA
Art. 2176 where it refers to “fault or negligence,” covers not only acts “not punishable by law” but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
FACTS: Baksh was sued for damages for his breach of promise to marry. CA affirmed TC’s award of damages, relying on Art. 21 CC.
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ISSUE: WON damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry based on Art. 21 of the CC. YES.
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-why make intentional acts under QD? To make father and son liable -A 2177, 2177, NCC NCC expres expressly sly points points out that that there’ there’s s a separate civil liability from criminal negligence BUT it seems seems to apply apply to QD only so court court dealt dealt with this limitati limitation on by upholdin upholding g the constructi construction on that upholds upholds “the spirit that giveth life rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker” (A2176 is not just QD, so A2177 really has no problem)
N O TE S
-during -during that time, culpa culpa aquilian aquiliana a (QD) doesn’t cover acts against law? A1903, old CC expressly exclude acts not punishable by law -SC needed to have very strong reason not to follow what the old law says because if A1903 applied literally there would be no culpa aquiliana, if read together with RPC (all acts would be under criminal negligence and imprudence) -so in this case, emphasize scope of culpa aquiliana and delict; delict; why needed? Barredo was arguing that he was not solidarily liable and should only be subsidiarily liable -if applied today, would the result be the same? YES through stare decisis + QD definition changed, removed phrase “not punishable by law”
Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only only inju injuri ries es to pers person ons s but but also also dama damage ge to property. property. It makes makes no distinction distinction bet. Damage to persons and damage to property.
Cinco v Canonoy FACTS: Cinco’s car and a eepney collided. Cinco filed a civil action for damage to property against the eepney’s driver and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a crim case case agai agains nstt the the eepn eepney ey driv driver er.. CFI CFI uphe upheld ld the the suspension of the civil case pending the determination of the crim case.
HELD: Art. 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Art. 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold no. of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Art. 2176 which defined a QD is limited to negligent acts acts or omissi omissions ons and exclud excludes es the notio notion n of willingnes willingness s or intent. Torts is much broader broader than culpa aquiliana bec. it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well.
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ISSUE: WON there can be an independent civil action for damage to property property during the pendency pendency of the criminal action. YES.
so what’s correct? Include or not to include intentional acts? acts? In Baksh Baksh,, David Davide e showed showed role of A21, A21, so he limited limited A2176 to negligen negligentt acts or omission omissions. s. A2176 discussion is not necessary for the disposition of the case (OBITER) THEREFORE, QD still includes intentional acts!
HELD: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent independent civil action as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of t he CC.
***Issue: WON QD covers intentional acts or not? If it covers intentional acts.. Fr litigation pt of view: it doesn’t matter
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Fr academic pt of view: it matters!
2. Damages AQUINO (pp. 842-843) -Reason behind the NCC Title on Damages: to see to it that whenever a right is transgressed, every manner of loss loss or injury injury is compens compensate ated d for in some some way or another. -A2195, NCC: provisions on damages are applicable to all obligations regardless of source (delict, QD, contract, or quasi-contract). -A2196: rules under title of damages are w/o prejudice to special provisions on damages provided elsewhere in the Code. -A2198 -A2198:: princi principle ples s of genera generall law on damage damages s are adopted adopted insofar as they are not inconsisten inconsistentt with the NCC. -Indemnity has to be proportionate to the fault and to the loss caused thereby. -In actions for damages, courts should award an amount (money value) to the winning party and not its equivalent in property. SANCO, (pp. 940-941) Basis of Law: introduced in NCC mostly from American Law since they were either not expressly recognized or rarely allowed under old code, particularly on subject of moral damages Scope Scope of applicabi applicability lity of provision provisions s on damages: damages: appli applicab cable le to all obliga obligatio tions ns arisin arising g from from source sources s enumerated in A1157, NCC, without prejudice to special provision provisions s on damages damages formulated formulated elsewhere elsewhere in said code. -don’t -don’t apply apply to compensa compensation tion of workmen workmen and other employees in cases of death, injury or illness -in other special laws: same rules observed insofar as not in conflict with Civil Code Concept of damages: Damages: the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act -pecuniary consequences which law imposes for breach of some duty or violation of some right.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
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Kinds: compensa compensatory, tory, punitie, punitie, liquidate liquidated d damages damages (damages (damages recoverable recoverable upon breach breach of a contract, contract, as stipulated by the parties), nominal damages (given in vindication of a breach of duty which does not result in any actual or pecuniary damages)
FACTS: Custodio et al built an adobe fence making the passageway to Mabasa’s apartment narrower. Mabasa filed a civil action for the grant of easement of right of way against them. CA, aside from granting right of way, awarded damages to Mabasa.
Damage, damages, injury: material distinctions Injury: Illegal invasion of a legal right Damage: loss, loss, hurt, hurt, or harm harm which which result results s from from an injury; in a popular sense, it is the depreciation in value, regard regardles less s if caused caused by a wrongf wrongful ul or legal legal act; act; as defined by statutes providing for damages: actionable loss, loss, injury injury or harm which which results results from unlawful unlawful act, omission or negligence of another -not synonymous to example, fine, penalty, punishment, revenge, discipline, chastisement Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for damages suffered. Pecuniary loss: loss of money or something by which money or something of money value may be acquired
ISSUE: WON award of damages was proper. NO
People v Ballesteros FACTS: Ballester Ballesteros os et al were convicted convicted of murder. murder. They were ordered to pay actual, compensatory, and moral damages to the heirs of the deceased. ISSUE: WON damages were correctly awarded. YES HELD: Damages may be defined defined as the pecuniary pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained sustained,, or as otherwise otherwise expressed, expressed, the pecuniary pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right.
HELD: In the case at bar, although there was damage, there there was no legal legal injur injury. y. Custod Custodio io et al’s al’s act of constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right. Damage is the loss, hurt or harm, which results from the injury. Damages are the recomp recompens ense e or compen compensat sation ion awarded fro the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. duty. These These situat situation ions s are often often called called damnum absque injuria. injuria. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.
b. Damnum absque injuria AQUINO (pp. 843-845) -“There is no liability even if there is damage because there was no injury.” Mere damage without injury does not result in liability. -A related maxim is qui jure suo utitir nullum damnum facit – one who exercises a right does no injury.
Custodio v CA, supra
Actual or compensatory or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained sustained.. The party claimin claiming g such must present present the best evidence available such as receipts.
“Thus, “Thus, there can be damage without without injury injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.” injuria.”
Moral damages may be invoked when the complainant has experienc experienced ed mental mental anguish, anguish, serious serious anxiety, anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth, and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the offender’s wrongful act or omission.
B. History and Development
Custodio v CA
AQUINO (pp.1-5) “Tort” provisions in our NCC were derived from Spanish, French French and Anglo-America Anglo-American n Law. Therefore, Therefore, RP SC borrows borrows heavily from decisions decisions of the Court in other countries countries especially especially Spain and US and relies from annotation of foreign author.
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Roman Law served as main inspiration of NCC, as quite evident in the field of QD: it added 4 new category of obligations that arise quasi ex delicto (a. liability of a judge judge who misco miscondu nducts cts a case case or gives gives a wrong wrong decision decision;; b. liabilit liability y of an occupier occupier of a building building for double the damage caused by anything thrown or forced out of the building, no matter by whom, on to a public place[A2193]; c. liability of the occupier if he keeps any object object suspended suspended from the building building which which would would do damage if it fell; and d. the liability of the shop keeper, innkeeper, or keeper of a stable for any theft or damage caused caused by slaves slaves or emplo employee yees, s, or in case case of the innkeepers, of permanent residents [A2000].) -Code -Code Commiss Commission ion initially initially wanted wanted to adopt adopt the word “tort” in our NCC but decided later against it because “tort” “tort” in Anglo-Am Anglo-America erican n law “is much broader broader (includes negligence, intentional criminal acts, false imprisonment, deceit) than the Spanish-Philippine Spanish-Philippine concept of obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. Intention Intentional al acts would be governed governed by RPC. RPC. Howev However, er, some some provis provision ions s used used “tort” “tort” and therefore recognize it as a source of liability [Sec22 & 100, Corporation Corporation Code; Art.68 Child and Youth Youth Welfare Welfare Code; Code; Sec. 17(a)(6) 17(a)(6) of the Ship Mortgage Mortgage Decree]. Decree]. Even SC used the term tort in deciding cases involving negligent acts or omissions as well as involv involving ing intent intention ional al acts. acts. They They define defined d it in Naguiat vs. NLRC. -There is an evident intent to adopt the common law conc concep eptt of tort tort and and to inco incorp rpor orat ate e the the diff differ eren ent, t, intentiona intentionall and unintentiona unintentionall common common law torts in the NCC. NCC. Tortious Tortious conduct conduct for which which civil civil remedies remedies are availabl available e are embodie embodied d in different different provisions provisions of the code. code. E.g. Arts. Arts. 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36; A2199 on contributory negligence and proximate cause (however, a blending blending of American American and Spanish-P Spanish-Phili hilippin ppine e Law) NCC
SANGCO (pp. xxxi-xl) Civil Code of the Philippines: based on Civil Code of 1889 1889 (Spa (Spani nish sh and and Fren French ch in orig origin in); ); but but many many provisions from codes of other countries were adopted. Rules from Anglo-American law were adopted because of elem elemen entt of Amer Americ ican an cult cultur ure e that that has has been been incorporated into Fil life during US occupation; because economic relations that continue between US and RP; and because US and English Courts have developed certain equitable rules that are not recognized in the 1889 Civil Code
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES 1889 Civil Code 1. Civil Liability Arising From Criminal Offenses A1089: Civil obligations arise only from law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or omissions punished by law and quasi-delicts. -civil -civil obliga obligatio tions ns from from crime crime or misde misdeme meano anorr was was governed only by Penal Code (A1092) so when criminal action action was instituted, instituted, the civil civil action action arising arising from the crime crime is implied impliedly ly instituted instituted with the criminal criminal action action unless unless the offended party expressly expressly waives waives the civil action action or reserves reserves his right to institute institute it separatel separately y (A122, Law of CrimPro) -rig -right ht to reco recove verr dama damage ges s aris arisin ing g from from crim crime e is completely dependent dependent on the result of the criminal case. If an earlier civil action is instituted, upon start of criminal case, case, the civil civil action action is suspen suspended ded and would would be determined by the result of the criminal case. If criminal action action is dismis dismissed sed,, civil civil action action is also also deeme deemed d dismisse dismissed, d, regardles regardless s if instituted instituted with the criminal criminal action or separately. Civil liability is treated as purely incident incidental al to the criminal criminal liability liability of the offender. The cases of Springer vs. Odin, Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., US vs. Guy Sayco, US vs. Bernardo, and Wise & Co. vs. Larion were ruled using this principle. As ruled in rakes, any civil action not predicated on offense committed or charged (based on law, contract, quasicontract, or QD) cannot be instituted with the criminal action. -When Penal Code revised, RPC retained what is now contained in A100; Rules on CRimPro retained what is contained in Rule 107 (check if still correct) 2. Civil Liability arising from QD A1902: Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable fro the damage done In re: A1903: A1903: punish wrongful wrongful acts or omission omissions s not punishable by law -said articles are not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute either punishable offenses(delicts) or breach of contract. -thus, the liability of employers, employers, et. al. under now A2180 are only subsidiary (in accordance with penal laws) -QD or culpa culpa aquili aquiliana ana or extraextra-con contra tractu ctual al culpa: culpa: causative causative act or omission omission not punished by law and is done ONLY negligently, where civil liability could arise as governed by the Civil Code (not by penal laws), and the party aggrieved could file an ordinary civil action for
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damages using only preponderance of evidence. It gives rise only to civil liability. Here, the employer’s liability for his employee’s NONCRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is direct and primary and not subsidiary, and he could be directly imputed in an action for recovery of damages. -an act or omission will give rise to civil liability only if it causes damage or injury to another or others.
DE LEON (pp.4-8) Tort Tort law emerged emerged out of crimi criminal nal law; law; origin originall ally y concerned principally with violent breaches of the place. (1) Common Common law tort – judges judges usually usually define define what counts as torts and how compensation is to be measured. Still, a statute or even Consti may make certain conduct legally wrongful and may permit recovery of damages for such conduct. (2) No clear clear distinction distinction betwee between n tort and crime crime – initially, this was the case sine the development development of anything like a clearly formulated conception of a tort is comparatively comparatively recent. recent. (3) Notion Notion of tort as a speci specific fic wrong wrong – there there was an attempt in 1720 to consider several specific wrongs in a work consolidating them under the general general heading heading of torts. Torts of a specific specific character have been increasing. (4) Place Place of torts in the Phili Philippin ppine e law – even ifif RP was a civil law country, some of the provisions in the 1889 CC dealth with cases of the nature of torts + with US occupation, a number of laws patterned after Anglo-American Anglo-American models have been passed amplifyin amplifying g the field of torts in Philippine legal system. Functions or goals of tort law Medieval England: discourage violence and revenge Today: compensation of injured persons and deterrence of undesirable behavior: System System of thoughts (sorry, (sorry, no parallelism parallelism in the enumeration of de leon): (1) Morality or corrective justice – defendants should be liable liable fro harms harms they they wrongf wrongfull ully y caused caused and no others; liability imposed when and only when it is “right” to do so (2) Social utility or policy policy – a good-for-all-of-us view: provide a system of rules that works toward the good of society (3) Legal process – litigation process is a good to be preserved rather than abstract ideal of justice or social utility
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(4) potential potential conflicts conflicts – between between justice and policy policy outlook and legal process outlook (5) distribution of loss – the cost of loss suffered by plaintiff is not simply transferred to the defendant but is distributed through the defendant to a large number of individuals (6) redress of social grievances – tort law a popular mechanism that permits ordinary people to put authority on trial (7) a mixed system – system – tort law a “mixed” set of functions CLASSES OF TORTS: Property torts and Personal torts
II. THE CONCEPT OF QUASI-DELICT
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES (4) existence of direct causal connection between the damage damage or prejudic prejudice e and the fault fault or negligen negligence ce of private respondents; and (5) the absence absence of preexisti preexisting ng contractua contractuall relations relations between the parties. The allegation that private respondents violated traffic rules does not detract from the nature and the character of the actio actions ns as one based based on culpa culpa aquili aquiliana ana.. Excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence.
A. Elements Art. 2176, NCC Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Garcia v Florido FACTS: FACTS: A public utility car and a bus collided, resulting in injuries to Garcia et al. The chief of police filed a criminal case against the bus driver. Garcia et al filed a civil action for damages against the owners and drivers of both vehicles. Bus company and driver filed a motion to dismiss. CFI dismissed the civil action holding that the right to file a separate civil action was not reserved and that the action was not based on QD.
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NOT E
Important: Take note of 4 elements of QD: (1) acts or omissio omission n constituti constituting ng negligen negligence; ce; (2) damage; (3) direct causal connection between damage and act or omission; (4) no preexisting contractual relation. The case mentions 5 elements but Prof. Casis mentioned 4.
Andamo v CA
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Important: Take note of 3 elements of QD: (1) damage damages s suffer suffered ed by plaint plaintiff iff;; (2) fault fault or negligence of defendant; (3) fault of defendant caused damages suffered by plaintiff
Taylor v MERALCO FACTS: 15-year old David Taylor with 2 others (Manuel and Jessie) Jessie) experime experimented nted with detonatin detonating g caps were taken taken from from the premi premises ses of MERAL MERALCO CO.. David David and Manuel ignited the contents of the cap, resulting in an explosio explosion n which which led to David’s loss of his right eye. David’s father filed an action for damages. ISSUE: WON the plaintiff can recover damages in this case. HELD: NO. In order to recover damages, the following must be established: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence by act or omission of which defendant person personall ally, y, or some some person person for whose whose acts acts it must must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connectio connection n of cause and effect between between the negligence and the damage.
FACTS: The Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette caused the construction of waterpaths and contrivances in its compound. compound. This allegedly allegedly caused flooding and damage damage to the adjacent adjacent lot, property of the Andamo spouse spouses. s. The Andam Andamos os filed filed a crimi criminal nal case case for destruction by means of inundation, and later also filed a civil action for damages against respondent corporation. The civil case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the crim case was field ahead of it.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper.
FACTS: Tayag Tayag who was riding riding on a bicycl bicycle e along along McArthur Highway was bumped by a bus and died. His heirs sued the bus owner and driver for damages. A crim case was also filed against the bus driver. The bus driver was acquitted in the crim case on the ground of reasonable doubt. CFI sustained private respondents’ MTS the civil case on the ground of lack of COA due to the acquittal of the bus driver in the crim case.
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the case was proper. NO HELD: The action was based on QD and it may proceed independently. The essential averments for a QD action are present in this case, namely: (1) act or omission of private respondents; (2) presence of fault or negligence or lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus by its driver resulting in the collision; (3) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision;
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HELD: NO. The civil action was based on QD and may proceed proceed independentl independently y of the criminal criminal case. All the elements of QD are present in the complaint, to wit: (1) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or neglig negligenc ence e of the defend defendant ant and the damage damages s incurred by the plaintiff.
CLASS
NOT E
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NOT E
Important: Qualification of negligence – fault or neglig negligenc ence e is a source source of obliga obligatio tion n when when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation of cause and effect
Tayag v Alcantara
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the civil case was proper. HELD: No. The petitioner’s COA being based on a QD, the acquittal of the driver in the crim case is not a bar to the civil case for damages based on QD.
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All the essential essential averments averments for a QD action action are present, namely: 1) Act or omiss omission ion constit constituting uting fault or or negligen negligence ce on the part of private respondent; 2) Damage Damage caused caused by the said act or omis omission sion;; 3) Direct Direct causal causal relati relation on between between the damage damage and the act or omission; and 4) No pre-exis pre-existin ting g contra contractu ctual al relation relation between between the parties.
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CLASS
NOT E
Important: There must exist exist a direct causal connection connection 1. act or omission I SANGCO (pp. 1-4) Conduct may be legally described in terms of action and inaction inaction or “misfeasa “misfeasance” nce” or “nonfeasa “nonfeasance.” nce.” Misfeasance is active misconduct working positive injur injury y to others others;; while while nonfea nonfeasan sance ce is passiv passive e inaction or failure to take steps to protect them from harm Liability in tort may be predicated upon an injury resulting from an unlawful or illegal act or omission, whether injury is on property or person 2. cause damage I SANGCO (pp. 87-90) QD liabil liability ity presup presuppos poses es 2 condit condition ions: s: (1) a connection of cause and effect between the person liable and the fact from which damage results; (2) a fault of this person, which implies at once an act of intelligent volition that is illicit, or contrary to law It must be shown that the damage to the plaintiff, who must prove it, was the natural and probable, or direct and immediate consequence of defendant’s culpable act or omission Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
3. fault or negligence I SANGCO (p5-7)
-
-
Neglig Negligenc ence e is the “fail “failure ure to observ observe, e, for the protection protection of the interest of another another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circum circumsta stance nces s reason reasonabl ably y impos impose. e. When When the danger is great a high degree of care is necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care.” Negligence is conduct, not a state of mind or the use of sound judgment. Negligence is a matter of risk – that is to say, of cognizab cognizable le danger danger of injury. injury. The actor does not desire desire to bring bring about about the conseq consequen uences ces which which follow, nor does he know that they are substantially to occur, or believe they will. There is merely a risk of such consequences sufficiently great to lead a reasonable man in his position to anticipate them, and to guard against them. The culpab culpabili ility ty of the actor’ actor’s s conduc conductt must must be judged in the light of the possibilities apparent to him at the time and not by looking backward “with the wisdom born of the event.” The standard must be one of conduct, rather than consequences. At the same time, the standard imposed must be an external one, based upon what society demands of the individual rather than upon his own notion of what is proper. Intentional omissions must not be treated as cases of negligence. These are not cases of omissions; they are cases of positive action.
B. Distinguished A. Quasi-delict v Delict Art 2177, NCC Responsi Responsibili bility ty for fault or negligen negligence ce under under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. Art 365, RPC. Imprudence and Negligence. Reckless Reckless impruden imprudence ce consists consists in voluntari voluntarily, ly, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employm employment ent or occupation occupation,, degree degree of intellige intelligence, nce,
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physical physical condition condition and other circumsta circumstance nce regarding regarding persons, time and place. Simp Simple le impr imprud uden ence ce cons consis ists ts in the the lack lack of precau precautio tion n displa displayed yed in those those cases cases in which which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate not he danger clearly manifest.
Barredo v Garcia, supra RULE: A QD or culpa aquiliana aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the CC, with a substantially all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from crime.
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Delict Public interest Penal Code Punish Punished ed only only by penal penal law Guilt Guilt beyond beyond reasonabl reasonable e doubt
Quasi-Delict Private interest Civil Code Any kind of negligence Preponderance evidence
fault
of of
People v Ligon FACTS: Based on the testimony of a taxi driver, Gabat was convicted convicted of Robbery Robbery with Homicide Homicide committed committed against a 17-yo student working as a cigarette vendor. ISSUE: WON Gabat’s guilt was proven BRD. HELD: NO. Gabat’s guilt has not been established established beyond beyond reason reasonab able le doubt, doubt, but prepon preponder deranc ance e of evidence evidence establishes establishes that by his ct or omissio omission, n, with fault and negligence, he caused damage to the victim and should answer civilly for the damage done. It does not f ollow that a person who is not criminally criminally liable is also free from civil liability. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal case must be established BRD, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil acti action on for for dama damage ges. s. The The judg judgme ment nt of acqu acquit itta tall exting extinguis uishes hes civil civil liabil liability ity only only when when it includ includes es a declarati declaration on that the facts from which which the civil civil liability liability might arise did not exist.
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Need to indemnify heirs even if not criminally liable.
Padilla v CA FACTS: Padilla, Padilla, a municip municipal al mayor, mayor, together together with policemen and a civilian, demolished a store and took away its contents, pursuant to a municipal ordinance. CA acquitted acquitted them of the charge of grave grave coercion coercion based on reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay damages. ISSUE: WON CA erred in requiring petitioners to pay damages after acquitting them of the criminal charge. HELD: NO. The civil civil liabilit liability y is not extinguishe extinguished d by acquittal acquittal where the acquittal acquittal is based based on reasonabl reasonable e count as only a preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases. There There is nothin nothing g contra contrary ry to Art 29,CC in the rendition rendition of a judgment judgment of acquittal acquittal and a judgment judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, exting extinguis uish h the civil civil liabi liabilit lity y unless unless there there is a clear clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
Cruz v CA FACTS: Ninevetch Cruz, a surgeon, was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. ISSUE: WON Cruz’s conviction conviction is supported supported by the evidence. HELD: Her guilt was not proved BRD. However, the Court finds her civilly liable for the death of Lydia Umali, for while while a convic convictio tion n requir requires es proof proof BRD, BRD, only only a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
CLASS
NOT E
Important Important:: elements elements of reckless reckless impruden imprudence: ce: (1) the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) doing or failure to do the act is voluntary; (3) without without malice; malice; (4) material material damage results results from from the reckle reckless ss impru impruden dence; ce; (5) there there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offend offender, er, taking taking into into consid considera eratio tion n his empl employ oyme ment nt or occu occupa pati tion on,, degr degree ee of intellig intelligence ence,, physical physical conditio condition, n, and other circumst circumstances ances regarding regarding persons, persons, time and place
Philippine Rabbit v People FACTS: Philippine Rabbit’s employee was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in triple homicide, multiple physical physical injuries injuries and damage to property, property, and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The driver jumped bail. Phil Rabbit’s notice of appeal was dismissed. ISSUE: WON an employer who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. NO. HELD: The subsid subsidiar iary y liabil liability ity of Phil. Phil. Rabbit Rabbit is incide incidenta ntall to and depend dependent ent on the pecuni pecuniary ary civil civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and executory by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Under the 2000 Rules of Crim Proc., the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime is deemed impliedly instituted in a crim action unless the offended party waives the action, reserves the rt to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the crim action. Hence, the subsidiary liability of the employer under Art 103, RPC, may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. The 2000 Rules Rules of Crim Crim Proc Proc delete deleted d the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed allowed these to proceed proceed separatel separately y from criminal criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Arts 32, 33,
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34 & 2176 of the CC shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any crim prosecution based on the same act.
CLASS
NOT E
Important: Clarified 2000 Rules of Court
B. Quasi-Delict v. Breach of Contract Art. 1170. 1170. Those Those who in the performance performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. Art. Art. 1171. 1171. Respon Responsib sibili ility ty arisin arising g from from fraud fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. Art. 1173. 1173. The fault or negligen negligence ce of the obligor consists consists in the omission omission of that diligence diligence which which is requ requir ired ed by the the natu nature re of the the obli obliga gati tion on and and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contra contract ct does not state state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. Art. 2178. The provisions of articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. Notes: Negligence for BoC and QD are defined in the same way as provided by Art 2178.Therefore, if you sue for negligence, you can base the action on quasi-delict, delict, or contract.
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A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES need not proven
Cangco v Manila Railroad FACTS: Cangco’s arm was amputated because he was drawn from under a railroad car. His foot alighted upon a melon at the moment he stepped upon the platform. He sues for negligence in the performance of a contract. MR argues that [1] the breach was due to negligence of servant and [2] it exercised due diligence in selection and supervision. Held: MR is liable. The contract to transport carries with it the duty to provide safe means of entering and leaving the train. It is unnecessary for plai plaint ntif ifff for for BoC BoC to prov prove e the the brea breach ch was was due due to negligen negligence. ce. When a contractua contractuall relation relation exists, exists, the obligor may break the contract by means of an act which woul would d have have cons consti titu tute ted d a viol violat atio ion n of an extr extraacontractual obligation had no contract existed.
Doctrine: QD and BoC are concentric, and QDs are broader. Plaintiff with a pre-existing contractual relation may still sue for QD so long as “had there been a no contract, there is still a quasi-delict.”
Notes: SC held there was a contract of carriage even if Cangco did not pay for a ticket. Also, Sir took note of the 4 main differences of QD and BoC in this case:
1. liab liabil ilit ity y of defendant employer 2. defe defend ndan antt employer’s defense
3. vinculum juris (legal tie)
4. what a plaint plaintiff iff needs needs to prove
Under QD
Under BoC
Presumptive liability
Direct immediate
Rebut presumption through proof of the exercise of due care in sele select ctio ion n and and supervision Created Created by the wrongful or negligent act/omission itself Defendant’s fault or negligence
Prove performan performance ce contract contributory negligence
C L AS S
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o be
1. moral damages
2. defe defend ndan antt carrier’s defense
The contract and its nonperformance. The negligen negligence ce
Recoverable only if passenger passenger dies or there is mali malice ce or bad bad faith (pro (proof of of due due dili dilige genc nce e not not available)
Pr oo oof o f d ue ue di lilig en en ce ce in sele select ctio ion n and and supervision 3. what plaintiff Carrier’s fault or Injury to needs to prove negligence passenger. passenger. No need to prove it was carrier’s Fault
Independent the brea breach ch of the the duty assumed by the parties
Anywhere there are are phys physic ical al in ju ju riries ( Ar Ar t 2219[2])
N OT E S
What is the breach of contract contract committed? committed? Negligence, Negligence, failure to exercise due care Art. 1903 not applicable in cases where there is preexisting relationship Cangco did not pay for his fare so why is a contract contract of carriage carriage at issue? issue? It should be a contract of employment. employment. MERAL MERALCO CO was held liable liable for breach breach of contract. What was the breach? Failure to exercise due diligence This is a landmark case because there is a glaring glaring statement statement in Cangco Cangco that contradic contradicts ts the other cases True True of False False-a -a breach breach of contra contract ct is not a basis for QD: FALSE Cour Courtt in Sang Sangco co said said that that the the circ circle le is CONCEN CONCENTRIC TRIC:: QD is larger larger and that culpa culpa contractual is the yolk So Cang Cangco co does doesn’ n’tt say say that that the the two two are are mutually mutually exclusive exclusive and therefore therefore Cangco Cangco is consistent with Air France Vincu Vinculum lum juris juris distin distincti ction on doesn’ doesn’tt matte matter r because here the act & the breach coincided
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Does not say that when there is a contract, you can’t sue for QD. A2176 expressly excludes cases where there is a pre-existing pre-existing contractual contractual relationship. relationship. But even even if there there is a pre-ex pre-exist isting ing contra contractu ctual al relationship, there is still a cause of action for quasi-delict since it is not expressly prohibited. The ruling on the interpretation of A2176 is not ratio, just obiter. Case is not basis of mutual exclusivity
Fores v Miranda
and
of or
PAGE 8
Rakes v Atlantic FACTS: Miranda was a passenger of a jeep which hit a wall and fractured his right humerus. humerus. He sues under contra contract ct of carria carriage. ge. CA award awarded ed him with moral moral damages. HELD: SC deleted moral damages. Moral damages are not recoverable for actions based on BoC unless there is bad faith. There was no bad faith because: [1] mere carelessness of the driver does not justify the inference of bad faith; and [2] under Art 1756, the presumption is that that commo common n carrie carriers rs acted acted neglig negligent ently ly (and (and not maliciously) Doctrine:
Differences between between QD and BoC in
this case: Under QD
Under BoC
FACTS: Rakes’s Rakes’s leg was amputated amputated because because it was crushed by an iron rail he was carrying on a hand car for Atlantic, his employer. He sues for damages because of Atlantic’s Atlantic’s negligence negligence in not repairing repairing the weakened weakened track. Atlantic argues that remedey for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action HELD: Atlant Atlantic’ ic’s s liabil liability ity to Rakes Rakes ariss ariss out of the contract contract of employme employment nt because because failure failure to provide provide or maintain safe appliances for its workmen Doctrine: Employer’s liability arising out of negligence in contract contract of employme employment nt may be enforced enforced separate from criminal action.
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Statem Statement ent that that you can’t can’t sue for QD when there is a contract is mere obiter, not ratio.
Court already decided that employee is liable Art 1092 & 1903 1903 come come from from pre existin existing g relationship
Rakes Rakes is not the basis basis of the doctrine doctrine that quasi-delict may arise from breach of contract. If there is no contract, it does not mean that there is no existing relationship
Far East v CA FACTS: Plaintiff Luna got a Far East credit card which was dishonored at a despedida party due to a hotlist policy compelled by the loss of the complementary card. He sues for damages. damages. RTC awarded awarded him moral moral and exemplary damages. HELD: Complaint is based on contract because without the contract, the act or omission complained of cannot by itself be an actionable actionable tort. Moral damages damages were deleted because negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luna is not gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Exemplary damages were deleted because DOCTRINE: The test to determine whether QD can be deemed deemed to underlie underlie the BoC s where, without a preexisting contract between 2 parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself.
CLASS
oppr oppres essi sive ve or malevol malevolent ent (Art. 2232)
NOT ES
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
NOT E
Quali Qualifie fies s Air Air France France case: case: QD should should be independent of BoC
Notes: Differences between QD and BoC in this case: Unde QD Under BoC 1. a wa war d f or or Injury If there was bad moral damages fait faith h or gros gross s negligence 2. a wa war d f or or Gross negligence Act that is exemplary as to wanton, damages approximate fraudulent, malice (Art 2231) reckless,
Air France v Carrasco FACTS: Carraso was told by the manager that he must vacate his 1st class seats because a white man who had a bette betterr righ rightt to it. it. RTC RTC and and CA awar awarde ded d mora morall damages. Air France argues that there was no finding of bad faith to justify the award of moral damages HELD: Although there was a pre-existing contract, the stress of the action was put on the wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty, which is a QD. Passengers have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employe employees es with kindness, kindness, respect, respect, courtesy courtesy and due consideration.
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Doctrine: The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort. why discuss this? To determine damages contradicts A2176? No. This is tort not QD
PSBA v CA FACTS: A PSBA student was stabbed and killed by non-students while in the school premises. His parents sued sued PSBA PSBA and its office officers rs under under A2180 A2180 for ther ther negligence, recklessness recklessness and lack of security measures. Defendants argue that they are not covered by 2180 as they are an academic institution. RTC and CA denied motion to dismiss. HELD: The school is not liable under QD because [1] A2180 applies only if damage was caused by students or pupils [2] a 2176 applies only if there isno contractual relation. However, the SC ordered the remand of the case because because there was a contractua contractuall obligatio obligation n to provide both education and security. Trial must proceed to determine if the breach was due t o negligence. Doctrine: Quali ualifi fied ed Air Air Fran France ce v Carr Carras asco co’s ’s pronounc pronouncemen ementt by saying the phrase, phrase, “the act that
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breaks the contract may also bea tort” only applies if the BoC was done in [1] bad faith and [2] in violation of Art 21 (willfully causing loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy)
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QD not applicable applicable when there is a contract According According to Prof. Casis, Casis, the court said that A2176 only applies applies if no contract exists. But in the latter part, it ruled that A2176 can apply if a contract exists. This This statem statement ent (can’t (can’t have have QD if there’ there’s s a contract) contradicts Air France yet later on it cites Air France Based on the cases, the second statement of 2176 defines a QD but it is not laying down a rule rule that that when when ther there e is a prepre-ex exis isti ting ng contractual relationship, there can be no QD. Air France is safer, it said “tort” referring to first senten sentence ce of 2176 2176 such such that that if there there is prepreexisting contractual relationship there can still be a tort.
Syquia v CA FACTS: The parent parents s and siblin siblings gs of the deceas deceased ed Syquia file suit for damages arising from BoC and/or QD against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery because the coffin coffin was flooded flooded due to a hole hole in the wall of the concrete concrete vault vault placed placed by defendants defendants.. CA determin determined ed that there was no negligence. HELD: Action is based on BoC. The Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care govern the relation of the parties and defined their rights and obligations. There is no stipulation that the vault would be waterproof. Plus, Memorial exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in preventing the accumulation of the water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth around the grave filling the same with earth. Doctrines:[1] Doctrines:[1] If there there is a pre-ex pre-exist isting ing contra contractu ctual al relation, then any negligence would be actionable under BoC, BoC, not QD. [2] If there there is no stipulat stipulation ion or legal legal provision to the contrary, the diligence to be observed in
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the performance of a contractual obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
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The notes in this case are rather confusing. Prof. Casis asks how putting a hole in the vault would prevent water from entering it.
AQUINO (pp. 25-26) 1. Culp Culpa a Aqui Aquili lian ana a Dist Distin ingu guis ishe hed d from from Culp Culpa a Contractual Cul pa pa Aq Aq ui ui lilia na na (Q (QD) Cul pa pa Co Con tr tr ac ac tu tu al al (B (Bo C) C) I nd nde pe pe nd nd en en t co nt nt ra rac t Fo un un da da titio n o f l ia ia bi bi lilit y i s the contract and its breach Def en en se se is a va va ilil ab ab le le No de de fe fen se se of of d ilil ig ig en en ce ce of of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of employees Employer’s r es es po pon si si bi bil itit y presumptive
is
employer’ employer’s s liability liability is direct and immediate immediate
2. Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished Distinguished from Crimes Culp Culpa a Aqui Aquili lian ana a (QD) (QD) Crim Crimes es Affect Private Public Interest Concerns Indemnification Penal Code Punishes Repairs Damage or Corrects Broad- include all acts Narr Narrow ow – puni punish shed ed wher where e any any faul faultt or only if there is a penal negligence intervenes law punishing it Employe Employer’s r’s liabilit liability y is Employer’ Employer’s s liabilit liability y is direct and primary subsidiary 3. Concurrence of Causes of Action - Far Far East East Banc Banc v. CA – a sing single le act or omission may give rise to two or more causes of action (i.e. delict, QD, or BoC) - liabil liability ity for a tort tort may may arise arise even under under a contract, where tirt us that which breaks the contra contract, ct, where where an act which which consti constitut tutes es a
breach would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability has the contract not existed.
De Leon (pp.157-160) 1. Requ Requis isit ites es of QD: QD: a. An act act or omi omissi ssion on by by defen defendan dantt b. Fault Fault or negli negligen gence ce by defe defenda ndant nt c. Dama Damage ge or or injur injury y to plaint plaintiff iff d. Dire Direct ct relat relatio ion n of cause cause and effec effectt betwe between en act or omiss omission ion and the damage e. No pre-existing contractual relationship 2. Burd Burden en of Proo Proof f a. Falls Falls on the person person claimi claiming ng damag damages es b. To be esta establ blis ishe hed d with with satisf satisfac acto tory ry evidence c. Negl Neglig igen ence ce is not not pres presum umed ed.. Only nly under Arts. 2180, 2183, and 2191 is presumed and burden of proof shifts to defendant 3. QD aris arisin ing g from from BoC BoC a. “the “the exist existenc ence e of a contr contract act does does not not preclude the commission of a QD..” b. Contr Contract actual ual respons responsibi ibilit lity y and extraextracontractual liability exclude each other and cannot be cumulated. Tort liability arises from BoC when the is act act or omis omissi sion on is in itse itself lf wron wrongf gful ul independent of the contract, the breach of which which being being merel merely y incide incidenta ntall to the commission commission of the tort. Culp Culpa a Aqui Aquili lian ana a and and Culp Culpa a Cont Contra ract ctua uall Distinguished Culp Culpa a Aqui Aquili lian ana a (QD) (QD) Culp Culpa a Cont Contra ract ctua uall (BoC) Wrongful or negligent The act or omission is act or omission omission itself merely merely an incident incident in t he he s ou our ce ce o f t he he the performance of an obligation obligation Plaintiff has burden to Plai Plaint ntif ifff need need not not prove prove the defend defendant ant plead or prove it was was at fault or defe defend ndan ants ts faul faultt or negligent negligence
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o No presumpt presumption ion that defendant was at fault or negligent
PAGE 10 Mere proof of existence of a contract and its breach raises presumption of fault or negligence Gove Govern rned ed by Arts Arts.. 1170- 1174
Go ve ve rn rne d by Ar t.t. 2176; and also g ov ov er er ne ned by Ar t.t. 1172-1174 1172-1174 under Art. 2178 Based on voluntary act or omission which has caused damage to another Requires only preponderance of evidence
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Note from discussi discussion: on: (hindi ko alam kung saang case to related) if there is a pre-existing contractual relation, base action on Art. 21.
III. NEGLIGENCE A. Concept of Negligence 1. Definition; Elements Art. 1173 The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corres correspon ponds ds with with the circum circumsta stance nces s of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligen negligence ce shows shows bad faith, faith, the provisio provisions ns of articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contact does not state the diligence diligence which is to be observed observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a f ather of a family shall be required.
4.
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NOT E S
AQUINO on negligence (pp. 23-27) Actionable negligence may either be culpa contractual , culpa aquiliana and criminal negligence. Thus, an action for damages for the negligent acts of the defendant may be based on contract, quasi-delict or delict. The bases
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of liability liability are separate and distinct distinct from each other even if only one act or omission is involved.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Test: prudent man o fictitiou fictitious s character: character: ordinary ordinary prudent prudent man can be reasonably foreseen o knowledge of tortfeasor at that time o
Picart v Smith
Wright v MERALCO
FACTS: Picart improperly pulled his horse on the right side (wrong side of the road) of the bridge. Smith drove his car toward the horse, veering away only when the car was only a few feet away from the horse. The horse got spooked and got killed.
FACTS: An intoxicated intoxicated Wright was thrown thrown off his calesa calesa after after it was pitche pitched d forwar forward d by Meralc Meralco’s o’s protrudin protruding g railtrack railtrack.. CFI awarded awarded him damages damages but apportioned the same since he was negligent as well, althou although gh not as neglig negligent ent as Meralc Meralco o in failin failing g to maintain the tract. Both appealed.
HELD: Smith is liable for damages because applying the standard standard of a prudent man, he was negligent. negligent. A prudent prudent man “would have recognize recognized d that the course course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would have have fore forese seen en harm harm to the the hors horse e and and ride riderr as a reasonable consequence of that course.” Smith should have: 1. Stopped 2. Slowed down or 3. Veered to the right. Doctrines: 1. The Constitutive fact of negligence is the reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this pre-vision. 2. Test of negligence – “would a prudent man… foresee harm harm to the the pers person on inju injure red d as a reas reason onab able le consequence of the course about to be pursued?” 3. Take note however, that a person can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Omniscience of the future is not a requirement. Notes: The car was on the proper side of the bridge. Sir thinks that the ruling is problematic because had the car veered away, it would then be on the improper side of the road.
C LA SS
N OT ES
definition: conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his forego foregoing ing conduc conductt or guardi guarding ng agains againstt its consequences.
HELD: Wright was not negligent because the sudden falling falling of the horse, would ordinarily ordinarily be sufficient sufficient to throw a sober man from the vehicle. Doctrine: Doctrine: If a person’s person’s conduct conduct is characterize characterized d by s proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial whether hi is drunk or sober. Notes: Sir asks the question following the doctrine: If this happened today, would an intoxicated driver be held liable for hitting a man?
-
C LA SS
N OT ES
mere mere into intoxic xicati ation on is is not not in itse itself lf negli negligen gence ce inco inconc nclu lusi sive ve fact factor or
Corliss v Manila FACTS: Plaintiff orliss’ husband died of some serious burns because the jeep he was driving collided with Manila Railroad’s train at the railroad crossing because of his eagerness to beat the locomotive and reach the other side. HELD: Complaint is dismissed. Husband was negligent because [1] one approaching a railroad crossing do so cautiously and carefully. He should look and listen and do everything that a reasonably prudent man would do before he attempts to cross the track; [2] a prudent man under under similar similar circumst circumstance ances s would would have heeded the
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siren of the oncoming train, stopped and allowed the train to pass; [3] the train driver had already applied its brakes and was running at 23-30kph; and [4] he had the duty to stop his jeep to avoid a collision because the driver of the locomotive was not qualified to do so at the time. Doctrine: Negligence is defined as the “want of care required by the circumstances.” It is not an absolute term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circum circumsta stance nces s reason reasonabl ably y requir require. e. Where Where the danger is great, a higher degree of care is necessary. Notes: Sir says says that that based based on jurisp jurisprud rudenc ence, e, the standard of care required for crossing railroads is “stop, look and listen.” Nevertheless as provided by the SC in this case, we cannot provide a standard for all specific cases because because it is difficult. difficult. There There is no formula to determine negligence. Every case must be dependent of its facts.
Valenzuela v CA FACTS: Plaintiff Valenzuela was hit by defendant’s car while while she was attendin attending g to a flat flat tire. tire. She sued for damages based on QD. He argues that he is not liable because of her contributory negligence in parking in a no-park zone and he was driving at a safe speed of 55kph. HELD: The average motorist motorist alert alert to road conditions conditions would have had no difficulty applying the brakes to a car traveling traveling at the speed claimed claimed by him. Therefore Therefore his failure to be alert must be due either to his intoxication or his his speedi speeding. ng. Also Also there there was was no contri contribut butory ory negligen negligence ce because because the Emergenc Emergency y Rule exempts plaintiff plaintiff from negligen negligence ce since since the time for reflective reflective thought or opportunity to weight the situation was absent because she was confronted by danger. Doctrines: [1] adds to the definition in Corliss v. Manila negligence is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others it is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstance justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury [2]the emergency rule can be considered a defense. Notes: SC took into consider consideration ation “normal “normal human human circumsta circumstances nces”” in determin determining ing WON defendan defendantt was
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negligent. (Examples: the light rainfall, visibility of the street 100 meters away, etc.)
Far Eastern v CA FACTS: While on compulsory pilotage for docking, the vessel rams into pier because anchor did not take hold HELD: Both the shipmaster and compulsory pilot are liable. liable. The shipmas shipmaster ter is liable because of his blind relian reliance ce on the compul compulsor sory y pilot pilot and becaus because e he “supinely “supinely stood by” with no watchful watchful vigilance vigilance on his part. The compulsory pilot is liable because he failed to react (or reacted too late) and because he miscalculated miscalculated the bulk and size of t he vessel. Doctrines: [1] Unmin Unmindfu dfull disreg disregard ard or neglec neglectfu tfull relinquishment of duty is tantamount to negligence [2] Extraordinary risk demands extraordinary diligence. [3] The presumption of fault against a moving vessel that strikes a stationary object is rebuttable by proof that the driver was without fault, the collision was the fault of the stationary object, or that it was the result of an inevitable accident. Notes: The defense of liability of another person is not available to join tortfeasors.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES Doctrines: [1] An object can still be placed negligently even if it has a ‘legitimate purpose’ for being there. [2] Defi Defini niti tion on of gros gross s negl neglig igen ence ce as equi equiva vale lent nt to “notorious negligence” which “consists in the failure to exercise even slight care”
Notes: SC, SC, just just like like in Valenzue Valenzuela la v. CA, took into consideration “normal human circumstances” (i.e. that people people would would be looki looking ng up) in determ determini ining ng WON WON defend defendant ant was was neglig negligent ent.. But sir asks, “what “what if the planes had already landed?”
2. Standard of conduct 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
the the pru prude dent nt men men children expert experts. s. Profes Professio sional nals s into intoxi xica cati tion on insanity
1. The Prudent Man Picart v Smith Doctrines: [1] The standard of care is that of a “prudent man” [2] the conduct of a prudent man is determined “in the light of human experience an in the particular case”
FACTS: The plaintiff broke his thigh bone because he slippe slipped d over over a 4-inch 4-inch elev elevati ation on at the the end of the the viewing deck of the airport since he wanted a better view of the incoming incoming passenge passengers rs includin including g his future son- in- law. He filled an action for damages based on QD.
I Sangco (pp.7-8) – 1) STANDARD OF CONDUCT - it is impossible to fix in advance definite rules for all conceiva conceivable ble human human conduct conduct because because of the infinite infinite variety of situations which may arise - standard of conduct must be: i. external and objective ii. the same for all persons iii. must make allowance for the risk apparent to the the act act for for his his capa capaci city ty to meet eet it and and for for the the circumstances under which he must act
HELD: Defendant is liable for exemplary damages since there was gross negligence in failing in its duty to insure the safety of the viewers because the tendency of the viewe viewers rs on the deck deck would would be to look to where where the planes and the incoming passengers are and not to look down on the floor or pavement.
Article 8, RPC A minor fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime and is to be held criminally liable therefore. (this was in Taylor. This also might mean Art 80 RPC)???
Civil Aeronautics v CA
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NOT E S
The new law on negligence of children would still not affect the laws on negligence outlined by Sangco Sangco becaus because e it does does not expres expressly sly repeal the provisions of the RPC. RA 9344 9344 does does not affect affect presum presumpti ptions ons of negligence. However, However, it affects Art. 2180, CC.
Taylor v Manila Railroad FACTS: David David Taylor, 15, and MANUEL, MANUEL, 12, were experime experimenting nting with fulminati fulminating ng caps they found lying around the company’s premises. After applying a lighted match to an opened cap, it exploded causing injuries. David’s father filed a complaint for damages. HELD: In the Turntable and Torpedo cases, the owner of the premises was held liable because of the doctrine of implied implied invitatio invitation n1. This doctrine, doctrine, however however was overturned by Railroad Company vs. Stout which held that while it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determ determin ined ed in each each case case by the circumstances of the case. The law fixes fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and cons conseq eque uenc nces es of his his own own acts acts,, so as to make make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts. Plaintiff was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided avoided the injury which resulted resulted for his own deliberate act. Although the owner of the premises was 1
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and perhaps, if one were to throw upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise.
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negligen negligentt leaving leaving the caps exposed exposed n its premises, premises, plaintiff’s own act was the principal and proximate cause of the accident.
Jarco Marketing v CA
RULE: The The care care and caution caution require required d of a child child is according to his maturity and capacity only and this is to be determines in each case by the circumstances of the case.
FACTS: Zhieneth, 6, was pinned by the bulk of the department store’s gift-wrapping counter/structure and died. The department store contended that it was the child’s own act of climbing into the structure that was the proximate cause of the fall of the counter.
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when children trespass
child child & adult: adult: not same same apprec appreciat iation ion with with regard to contributory negligence for children, you don’t stop at age, you look at circumstances as well
2 cases: cases: “Torpe “Torpedo do (flare (flare gun cases) cases)”” and “Turnt “Turntabl able” e” (DJ stuff) stuff) cases: cases: the questi question on involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, enters upon the railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company's company's premises, premises, at a place place where where the railroad railroad company knew, knew, or had a good reason to suppose, children who would likely to come, and there found explosive signal torp torped edoe oes s left left expo expose sed d by the the rail railro road ad company's company's employees, employees, one of which which when carrie carried d away away by the visito visitor, r, explod exploded ed and injured him; or where such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable left in such condition as to make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where where the infant infant did in fact fact suffer suffer injury injury in playing with such machine. In these, and in a great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises liable. Examples: What if it’s a 25-year old with the mental capacity capacity of a 9-year old? What if it’s a 9-year old with the mental capacity of a 25-year old? Would the doctrine still still apply?
HELD: (Citing (Citing Sangco) Sangco) Since negligen negligence ce may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under 9 years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over 9 but under 15 years of age is rebuttable, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that the child child under under 9 years years of age must be conclu conclusiv sively ely presumed presumed incapable incapable of contribut contributory ory negligen negligence ce as a matter of law. RULE: A chil child d unde underr 9 year years s of age age must must be conclu conclusiv sively ely presum presumed ed incapa incapable ble of contri contribut butory ory negligence as a matter of law. Casis Casis:: Does Does this this mean mean that Sangco Sangco did not set a standard of conduct for children but merely a formula? No. The court did not cite him correctly. Sangco had the standard of an ordinary prudent child.
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Make Make a distin distincti ction on betwee between n child children ren as a tortfeasor and children as a victim
If a child is 8 years old and makes a counter fall over another person who dies, QD can still be filed because negligence is not equal to liability
Difference between accident and negligence: an acci accide dent nt cann cannot ot be fore forese seen en whil while e negligence can can be foreseen. So in this case, case, negligence and accident cannot coincide. Comp Compan any’ y’s s coun counte tera rarg rgum umen ent: t: “It neve never r happened before.” In citing Sangco, there is an analogy between the RPC and and the new Civil Civil Code. If below 9, presumed incapable of negligence (conclusive
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pres presum umpt ptio ion) n),, if abov above e 9 and and belo below w 15, 15, rebu rebutt ttab able le pres presum umpt ptio ion n of inca incapa paci city ty of negligence, if above 15, that of a prudent child or adult. Prof. Casis asks what about a child who is exactly 9 years old? old? Apply the rules on on above 9 belo below w 15 beca becaus use e the the law law shou should ld be construed in favor of the accused. Is there mutual exclusivity between negligence and accident? accident? According According to the Jarco case, none.
Magtibay v Tiangco FACTS: Rowel Tiangco, under 18, was found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence. Being under 18, his sentence was suspended until he reached majority. Later, in view of his conduct, his lawyer recommended the dismissal of his case. CFI dismissed but reversed the right of t he heirs to recover damages in a civil action. HELD: The suspension of sentence did not wipe out his guil guilt, t, but but merel erely y put put off off the the impo imposi siti tion on of the the corresponding penalty in order to give the delinquent minor a chance to be reformed. When, therefore, after he had observed good conduct, the criminal case was dismissed, this does not mean that he was exonerated from the crime charged, but simply that he would suffer no penalty. Nor did such dismissal of the case obliterate is civil liability for damages.
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RULE: Liability of an infant in a civil action for his torts is impo impose sed d as a mode mode,, not not of puni punish shme ment nt but but of compensa compensation tion.. For every tortuous tortuous act of violence violence or other pure tort, the infant tort-feasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same manner and in the same extent as an adult.
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Minori Minority ty is not a factor factor to escape escape liabili liability ty because even though minority is not a factor for negligence, it is a factor for liability
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Del Rosario v Manila Electric FACTS: Alberto Del Rosario, 9, despite the warning of one of his companions, after saying that he had been in the habit of touching wires, put out his index finger and touched a fallen electrical wire. He immediately fell face downwards, exclaiming exclaiming “Ay! Madre”. The end of the wire remained in contact with his body which fell near the post post.. Upon Upon bein being g take taken n to the the hosp hospit ital al,, he was was pronounced dead. HELD: It is doubtful doubtful whether whether contributo contributory ry negligen negligence ce can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity which a child would feel to do something out of the ordinary, and the mere fact fact that that the the dece deceas ased ed igno ignore red d the the caut cautio ion n of a companion of the age of 8 years does not alter the case. But even supposing supposing that the contributo contributory ry negligen negligence ce could could in some measure be properly properly imputed imputed to the deceased, yet such negligence would not be wholly fatal to the right of action in this case,not having been the determining cause of the accident. RULE: It is doubtful doubtful whether whether contributo contributory ry negligen negligence ce can be properly imputed to the deceased, owing to his immature years and natural curiosity.
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Different from Taylor: Taylor – contributory negligence, child o as tortfeasor Del Rosario – victim only o Immaturity Immaturity and natural natural curiosity curiosity taken taken into account
Ylarde v Aquino FACTS: Edgardo Edgardo Aquino ordered his students students to dig beside a 1 ton concrete block in order to make a whole to bury huge stones. He left four of them to level the loose loose soil around the open hole but allegedl allegedly y telling telling them “not to touch the stone”. They, however, playfully jumped into the pit and caused the top of the concrete block to fall towards the opening. Ylarde wasn’t able to climb out and he died because of the injuries sustained.
HELD: The child child Ylard Ylarde e cannot cannot be charge charged d with with reckless reckless impruden imprudence. ce. (citing (citing Sangco) Sangco) The degree degree of care care requir required ed to be exerci exercised sed must vary vary with with the capacity of the person engendered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his own age and experience. The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. (RULE)
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1. type of activity activity involved involved is one that is usually usually engaged in by children 2. one involvin involving g the use of “potentia “potentially lly dangerous, adult-oriented” instrument, like a car. WHERE CHILD IS HELD TO THE STANDARD OF CARE OF AN ADULT, ADULT , his violation of a statute or other enactment entails the same consequences as those of an adult.
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Culion v Phil. Motors Kid was 10/11 yo: *disputab *disputable le presumpt presumption ion under Sangco* *in a case between children and adults, the trend is that adults should know better*
SANGCO (pp. 70-74) UNDER 9 YEARS conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment and is exempt from criminal liability OVER 9 BUT UNDER 15 may or may not be guilty of contributory negligence, negligence, depending upon his his mental develo developm pment ent and other other circum circumsta stance nces s (rebut (rebuttab table le presumption) OVER OVER 15 YEARS YEARS presumed presumed to have sufficien sufficientt capacity capacity and understan understanding ding to be sensible sensible of danger danger with the power to avoid it (STANDARD is still that of a child his age and capacity, and not that of an adult.) STANDARD: ORDINARILY PRUDENT CHILD The standard of conduct which a child must confor conform m for his own own protec protectio tion n is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence and experience under like or similar circumstances or that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same same age, capacity, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under under the same same or similar circumstances. circumstances. TEST as to whether an infant can be subjected to the same standard of care as an adult:
FACTS: When Culion Culion wanted wanted to get his motor schooner repaired, he went to PMC where Quest, PMC”s manager decided to oversee the repairs. Apparently, the tube connecting the carburetor and the fuel tank was not well-fitted, such that the fuel mixture leaked and dripped down to the engine compartment. Quest attention was was called on this but he took it lightly. When the engine was started, there was a backfire and burned the boat. HELD: Ordinarily, a backfire from an engine would not be followed by any disaster, but here the leak along along the pipeline pipeline and the flooding of the carburetor created a dangerous situation, which a prudent prudent mechani mechanic, c, versed versed in repairs repairs of boat engines, engines, would would have taken precaution precaution to avoid. avoid. When a person person holds holds himself out as being being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do. Quest is experienced in fixing car and tractor engines, but not that of boats. A person skilled in in dealing with boats would have been sufficiently warned by the circumsta circumstances nces to cause cause him to take precaution precaution against the danger. Quest did not use the skill that would have been exhibited by one ordinarily expert in repairing gasoline engine on boats. RULE: When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill,
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he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.
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Johnny Quest when a person who holds himself out as being competent to do things, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care & skill of an expert high degree of care
US v Pineda FACTS: Pineda, Pineda, a pharmacis pharmacist, t, sold barium chlorate( chlorate(pois poisonou onous) s) instead instead of potassi potassium um chlorate chlorate which killed 2 horses. HELD: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility responsibility to use care has been variously qualified qualified as “ordinary “ordinary care”, “care of a specially high degree”, “the highest degree of care known to practical men”, which is “the highest practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, vigilanc vigilance, e, and the most most exact exact and reliable reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business business,, in order that human human life may not constantly be exposed to danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poison for harmless medicine”. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, involved, and the skill employed must correspon correspond d with the superior superior knowledg knowledge e of the business which the law demands. The question of negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. RULE: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility responsibility to use care has been variously qualified as “ordinary care”, “care of a specially specially high degree”, “the highest degree of care known to practical men”.
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Relationship: Relationship: danger pharmacist: knowledgeable knowledgeable o buyer: can’t check for himself o Consider nature of work and danger involved
Cruz v CA FACTS: Lydia Umali underwent a surgery under Dr. Ninevetch Ninevetch Cruz wherein the untidy untidy clinic clinic ran out of medicine, blood and oxygen that the patient had to be transferred to another hospital, where she died. HELD: While While it may be true that the circumsta circumstances nces seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, surgeon, this conclu conclusio sion n is best best arrive arrived d at not throug through h the educat educated ed surmi surmises ses nor conjectur conjectures es of laymen, laymen, including including judges, but by the unquesti unquestionab onable le knowledge knowledge of expert expert witnesses. witnesses. For wheth whether er a physic physician ian or surgeo surgeon n has exerci exercised sed the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of courts to the expert expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumst circumstance ances s cited cited are constituti constitutive ve of conduct conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same operation. RULE: The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are capable of intelligently evaluating. evaluating.
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Plaintiff Plaintiff has burden burden of proof; proof; present present expert expert testimony
BPI v CA
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FACTS: BPI’s BPI’s money money market market people people pre-termin pre-terminated ated Fernando’ Fernando’s s placemen placementt through through a phone phone call and only verified verified her identity identity by phone. The phony phony Fernando Fernando deposi deposited ted the two BPI checks checks to China China Bank and thereafter withdrew it all. BPI claimed claimed reimbursement reimbursement from China Bank under its clear warranty. HELD: By the very nature of their work the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of their employees employees and officials officials is far greater greater than those of ordinary clerks and employees. employees. For obvious reasons, the banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of dili dilige genc nce e in the the sele select ctio ion n and and supe superv rvis isio ion n of employees employees.. No matter how many justific justification ations s both banks present to avoid responsibility, they cannot erase the fact that they were both guilty in not exercising exercising extraordinary diligence in the selection and supervisions of employees. RULE: The banks are expected to exercise the highest degree of diligence in the selection and supervision of employees (stems from the nature of their industry)
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Nature of banks: imbued with public interest so there is a higher degree of diligence required
4. Intoxication
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Not negligence in itself but it can be a factor *questions to ask: (1) how do you know if a person is intoxicated or not? (2) when is it a factor enough that it impairs your judgment?*
Wright v Manila Electric FACTS: Plaintiff drove home in a calesa and in crossing the tracks to enter his premises the horse stumbled, leaped forward, and fell, causing the vehicle to strike out of the rails with great force, throwing the plaintiff from the vehicle and causing causing injuries. injuries. The tops of the rails
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appear to be 5 or 6 inches more above the level of the street. Plaintiff was intoxicated intoxicated at the time. HELD: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the mere fact of intoxica intoxication tion establish establish a want of ordinary ordinary care. General General rule: it is immateria immateriall whether a man is drunk or sober if no want of ordinary care or prudence can be imputed to him, and no greater degree of care is required to be exercised by an intoxicated man for his own protection than than by a sober one. If one’s conduct is is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is imma immater terial ial whethe whetherr he is drunk drunk or sober. sober. It is impossib impossible le to say that a sober man would would not have fallen fallen from the vehicle under under the conditions conditions.. A horse crossing the tracks with not only the rails but a portion of the ties themselves aboveground, stumbling by reason of unsure unsure footin footing g and fallin falling, g, the vehicl vehicle e crashi crashing ng against the rails with such force as to break a wheel, this might be sufficient to throw a person from the vehicle no matter what his condition; and to conclude that a sober man would not have fallen while a drunken man did, is to draw draw a conc conclu lusi sion on whic which h ente enters rs the the real realm m of speculation and guesswork. RULE: Mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the mere fact of intoxica intoxication tion establish establish a want of ordinary ordinary care.
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Mere intoxication is not in itself negligence
Inconclusive factor
5. Insanity Art. 2180, NCC The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardian Guardians s are liable for damages damages caused by the minors minors or incapaci incapacitated tated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES The owners and managers managers of an establish establishment ment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Even though the former are nor engaged in any business or industry. The state is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; agent; but not when the damage has been caused caused by the official official to whom the task done properly properly pertains, pertains, in which case what is provided provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils pupils and students students or apprentic apprentices, es, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons persons herein mentione mentioned d prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (1903a) Art. 2182 If the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian, the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed.
US v Baggay FACTS: In a song service, Baggay suddenly, without provocation attacked a woman with a bolo on her head , from from which which she died. died. He likew likewise ise inflic inflicted ted variou various s wounds on other women with the same bolo, including his own mother. mother. Since Since defendan defendantt was suffering suffering from mental aberration, trial court rendered him exempt from criminal liability but was obligated to indemnify the heirs of the murdered woman. HELD: In the case of a lunatic or insane person who, in spite of his irresponsibility irresponsibility on account of the deplorable condition of his deranged mind, is still reasonably and justly liable with his property for the consequences of his acts, even though performed unwittingly, for the reason that his fellows ought not to suffer from the disastrous results of his harmful acts more than is necessary, in spite of his unfortunate condition. According to law, the person in the first place liable are those who have the
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insane party under their care or guardianship, unless they prove that there was no blame or negligence on their part; but if the demented person or imbecile lack a guardian or some person charged with his care, or if the latter be insolvent, then his own property must meet the civil liability. RULE: Although he may not be held criminally liable, a lunatic or imbecile is still held civilly liable. The person in the first place liable is those who have the insane party under their care or guardianship or guardianship..
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Exemption form criminal liability doesn’t mean exemption from civil liability
B. Degrees of Negligence Art. 2231 In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
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Grossly negligent vs slightly negligent degree of danger cf. value RA 9044 Sec. 6: child 15 & below-incapable of negligence question still to be resolved is the law’s effect on 2180 CC
Amedo v Rio FACTS: Filo Filome meno no Mang Mangui uit, t, a seam seaman an,, jump jumped ed overboard from his ship into the water to retrieve a 2peso bill that was blown by the breeze to the sea. He drowned.
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HELD: He failed to exercise “even the slightest care and diligence”, that he displayed a “reckless disregard of the safety of his person, that he could not have been but consci conscious ous of the probab probable le conseq consequen uences ces”” of his carelessness and that he was “indifferent, or worse, to the danger of his injury”. There is more reason to hold that his death was caused by his notorious negligence. If while he was working, working, his bill merely fell from his pocket, and as he picked it up from the floor something accidenta accidentally lly fell upon him and injured injured him, he would surely surely be entitl entitled ed to compen compensat sation ion,, his act being being obviously innocent. Jumping into the sea, however, is entirely different, the danger which it entails being clear, potent and obvious. RULE: “Notoriou “Notorious s negligen negligence” ce” has been held to be tantamoun tantamountt to “gross negligence”, negligence”, which is want of even slight care and diligence. diligence. -
what what dete determ rmin ines es ifif an act act if negl neglig igen entt is the the danger of an act the the natu nature re of of the act act of of jump jumpin ing g into into the the sea sea involves danger
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Marinduque Iron Mines v Workmen's Compensation
foresight foresight are accustom accustomed ed to use. (failure (failure to exercise exercise care)
FACTS: Mamador Mamador hitched a ride together together with other laborers laborers on a company company-owne -owned d truck. truck. When the truck tried to overtake another truck, it collided with a coconut tree, which resulted in his death. There was a company prohibition against laborers riding the haulage trucks. Petitioner claims that such violation was the laborer's “notorious negligence” which, under the law, precludes recovery.
GROS GROSS S NEGL NEGLIGE IGENC NCE E – descri described bed as failur failure e to exercise even that care which a careless person would use. There is no generally accepted meaning, but the probab probabili ility ty is that that it signif signifies ies more more than than ordina ordinary ry inadverte inadvertence nce or inattenti inattention, on, but less than consciou conscious s indifference to consequences. (extreme departure from the ordinary standard of care)
HELD: Mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily. Violation of a rule prom promul ulga gate ted d by a comm commis issi sion on or boar board d is not not negligence per se; but it may be evidence of negligence. Under Under the circumstance circumstances, s, the laborer could not be declar declared ed to have have acted acted with with negli negligen gence ce since since the prohibition had nothing to do with the personal safety of riders. Getting or accepting a free ride on t he company's haulage truck couldn't be gross negligence, because “no danger or risk was apparent”. RULE: Viol Violat atio ion n of a rule rule prom promul ulga gate ted d by a commission or board is not negligence per se; se; but it may be evidence of negligence.
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What determines if an act if negligent is the danger of an act.
The nature of the act of jumping into the sea involves danger per se.
There’s only an alleged prohibition on part of employer
Why Why noto notori riou ous s negl neglig igen ence ce? ? Beca Becaus use e compar compared ed with with other other cases, cases, the danger danger is apparent and imminent because the shore is 1½ miles away away from the location location of the ship. It was was not not a case case of the the mone money y fall fallin ing g off off someone’s pocket pocket to the floor. He is not said said to be a good swimmer but he jumped into the water water as oppose opposed d to Cuervo Cuervo vs. Barretto Barretto wherein the emoloyer ordered him to jump into the the wate waterr to prot protec ectt the the prop proper erty ty of the the company. What determines the grossness of negligence? negligence? The degree of danger and other factors which would justify the dangerous act.
Even if there was indeed a prohibition, violation of policy is not necessarily negligence per se but it may be an evidence of negligence
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SANGCO (10-12) The amount amount of care care deman demanded ded by the standard standard of reason reasonabl able e conduc conductt must must be propor proportio tionat nate e to the apparent risk.
WILFUL, WANTON, AND RECKLESS – “quasi-intent”, lyin lying g betw betwee een n inte intent nt to do harm harm and and the the mere mere reason reasonabl able e risk risk of harm harm to anothe another. r. They They apply apply to conduct which is still merely negligent but which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were intended (actor has intentionally done an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probably that harm would follow). There is often NO CLEAR DISTINCTION between the above and “gross”, and the two have tended to merge and take on the same meaning as an AGGRAVATED form of negligence, differing in QUALITY rather than in DEGREE from ordinary lack of care.
C. Proof of Negligence 1. Burden of Proof RULE 131: BURDEN OF PROOF PRESUMPTIONS BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Sec. 1. Burden of proof in civil cases. - Each party must prove his own affirmative allegations. Evidence need not be given in support of a negative allegation except when such negative negative allegati allegation on is an essential essential part of the statement statement of the right or title on which which the cause cause of action or defense is founded, nor even in such case when the allegation is a denial of the existence of a document the custody of which belongs to the opposite party. The burden of proof lies on the party who would be defeated if no evidence were given on either side.
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE: Sec. 2. Burden of proof in criminal cases. SLIGHT NEGLIGENCE - an absence of that degree of vigilance which persons of extraordinary prudence and
AND
Sec. 3. Conclusive presumptions. presumptions.
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Sec. 4. Quasi-conclusive presumptions of legitimacy. Sec. Sec. 5. Disput Disputabl able e presum presumpti ptions ons.. - The follow following ing presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence; (a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (b) That an unlawful unlawful act was done with an unlawful unlawful intent; (c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act; (d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns; (m) That official duty has been regularly performed; (n) That a court, or judge acting as such , whether in the Philip Philippin pines es or elsewh elsewhere ere,, was acting acting in the lawful lawful exercise of his jurisdiction; (p) That private transactions have been fair and r egular; (q) That That the ordina ordinary ry course course of busine business ss has been been followed; ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of t hat nature; (ff) That the law has been obeyed; Sec. 6. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy illegitimacy of a child child born born after after three three hundre hundred d days days follow following ing the dissoluti dissolution on of the marriage marriage or the separation separation of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such child must prove his allegation.
1. Pres Presum umpt ptio ion n Art. 2184 In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of the due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty or reckless
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driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two months.
o
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Art. 2185 Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, mishap, he was violatin violating g any traffic regulation.
Art. 2188 There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such such as fire firear arms ms and and pois poison on,, exce except pt when when the the posses possessio sion n or use thereo thereoff is indisp indispens ensabl able e in his occupation or business.
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2x w/in the next preceeding 2 mos: guilty of reckless driving / violation of traffic rules
if the owne ownerr is not in the car, car, does the disputable presumption apply? n/a when the owner is not in the car / o common carrier requires conviction
Art 2185 CC disp disput utab able le pres presum umpt ptio ion: n: viol violat ate e traf traffi fic c regulation o no conviction required howe howeve ver, r, Sang Sangco co says says this this also also o requires conviction ** but when is one “found “found guilty” guilty” of traffi traffic c violation? Art 2188
Art. 1734 Comm Common on carr carrie iers rs are are resp respon onsi sibl ble e for for the the loss loss,, destructi destruction, on, or deteriorat deterioration ion of the goods, goods, unless unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity; (2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3) Act of omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5) Order or act of competent public authority. Art. 1735 In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destro destroyed yed or deteri deteriora orated ted,, commo common n carrie carriers rs are presum presumed ed to have have been been at fault fault or to have acted neglig negligent ently, ly, unless unless they they prove prove that that they they observ observed ed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733.
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disputable presumption:
prima facie presumption injury injury result results s from from posses possessio sion n of o danger dangerous ous weapo weapons/ ns/ substa substance nces, s, except except when the possessi possession on or use ther thereo eoff is indi indisp spen ensa sabl ble e in his his occupation/business
Arts 1734 & 1735 common carriers loss, destroyed, deteriorate presume negligence common carrier UNLE UNLESS SS prov prove e extr extrao aord rdin inar ary y o diligence SANGCO (18-27) It is NEGLIGENCE PER SE when: 1. a professional driver permit s any unlicensed person to drive the car placed under his responsibility responsibility 2. viol violat atio ion n of an ordi ordina nanc nce e proh prohib ibit itin ing g pedest pedestria rians ns from from crossi crossing ng a street street in places other than regular cross-walks 3. drivin driving g a motor motor vehicl vehicle e without without a licens license, e, at a high high rate rate of speed speed and under under the influence of alcohol Where Where there there is NO local local regula regulatio tion n restri restricti cting ng the pedestrian’s rights in the use of a street, a pedestrian HAS THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL upon roads and streets
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WHETHER THERE BE SIDEWALKS OR NOT, although he should should have due regard regard for the rights rights of motor motor vehicles vehicles and should exercise exercise due care for his own safety. Where proof of violation makes: 1. a prima prima facie facie case case of of negli negligen gence ce 2. give gives s rise rise to a pres presum umpt ptio ion n of lack lack of ordinary care PRESUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE FOUR FOUR GENERA GENERAL L GROUND GROUNDS S OR EXCUSE EXCUSES S FOR VIOLATION OF A STATUTE: 1. anythi anything ng that that would would make it impos impossib sible le to comply with the statute or ordinance 2. anythi anything ng over over which which the defe defenda ndant nt has no no cont contro roll and and whic which h plac places es him him or an instrume instrumentali ntality ty that he is operating operating in a position contrary to that required by the statute or ordinance 3. an emer emerge genc ncy y not not of the acto actor’ r’s s own own making which causes him to fail to obey the enactment 4. conduct which comes within an excuse or exception provided in the statute One who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality EXTREMELY DANGEROUS in character is bound to take EXCEPTIONAL precautions to prevent injury being done thereby. The The care care requ requir ired ed is a grea greatt or high high degr degree ee,, or the the HIGH HIGHES EST T degr degree ee of precaution. The presumption presumption DOES NOT APPLY to those those whose whose occupa occupatio tion n or busine business ss REQUIRE REQUIRES S the possessi possession on or use of a firearm, such as peace officers or armed forces, or in the case of poison, the drug companies or stores. WRT to COMMON CARRIERS Common carriers from the nature of their business and for reason reasons s of public public policy policy are bound to observ observe e EXTRAOR EXTRAORDINA DINARY RY DILIGENC DILIGENCE E in the vigilanc vigilance e over the goods and safety of passengers transported by them according to all circumstances of each case. The law on averages under the Code of Comm Commer erec ece e cann cannot ot be appl applie ied d in
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liab liabil ilit ity y
wher where e
ther there e
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IN ALL CASES, CASES, violation violation must be the PROXIMATE PROXIMATE CAUSE.
3. Res Ipsa Loquitor Layugan v IAC FACTS: A truck bumped into the plaintiff while he and a companion were repairing the tire of their parked truck along along the right right side side of the highway. highway. He sustai sustained ned injuries. Defendant contends that the proximate cause was the failure of the driver of the parked truck to install an early warning device. IAC concluded that under the doctrine, doctrine, the plaintiff plaintiff was negligen negligent. t. The question is whether the doctrine was applicable. HELD: Res ipsa loquitor (the thing speaks for itself) – Where the thing which causes the injury is shown to be under under the manage manageme ment nt of the defend defendant ant,, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of t hings does not happen if those who have he management management use proper proper care, care, it afford affords s reason reasonabl able e eviden evidence, ce, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accide accident nt arose from want of care. care. It is not rule rule of substantive law but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. It can be involved when and only when, under under the circumsta circumstances nces involved involved,, direct direct evidence is absent and not readily available. It cannot be availed of when the plaintiff plaintiff has knowledge knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the accide accident nt and all the facts facts and circum circumsta stance nces s attendant attendant to the occurrence occurrence appear. appear. The absence absence of want of care of the driver has been established by clear and convincing evidence. The doctrine does not apply. RULE: Res ipsa can be involed when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
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RIL made a special defense by Isidro to allege negligence of the truck driver and Layugan. IAC ruled RIL as the basis for holding Layugan negligent.
RIL RIL N/A N/A beca becaus use e ther there’ e’s s dire direct ct (cle (clear ar & convincing) evidence
Why? Why? Becaus Because e the mode of proof proof only, only, so when there’s evidence, use evidence / facts so that judgment will be based on facts and not presumptions
Ramos v CA FACTS: Ramos, undergoing a gall bladder operation, went comatose because she was incorrectly intubated. HELD: Res ipsa (The thing or transaction speaks for itself) – the fact of the occurrence of the injury, taken with the surroundi surrounding ng circumsta circumstances nces,, may permit permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact fact for defend defendant ant to meet meet with with an explan explanati ation. on. Requisites are: 1. the the accid acciden entt is of a kind kind that that ordina ordinari rily ly does does not not occu occurr in the the abse absenc nce e of someone’s negligence 2. it is caused caused by an an instrum instrumental entality ity withi within n the exclus exclusive ive contro controll of the defend defendant ant or defendants 3. the the poss possib ibil ilit ity y of cont contri ribu buti ting ng cond conduc uctt which would make plaintiff responsible is eliminated. The fundamental element is “control of instrumentality” which caused the damage. Generally, expert testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits to prove a physician has done a negligent act or that he has deviated from the standard medical procedure, when the doctrine is availed of by the plaintiff, the need for expert medical testimony testimony is dispense dispensed d with because the injury injury itself itself provides the proof of negligence. In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physic physician ian neglig negligent ent upon upon proper proper proof proof of injury injury to patient, without aid of expert testimony, where the court from its common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. The doctrine is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able
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to say, say, as a matte matterr of comm common on know knowle ledg dge e and and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised.
accomp accomplis lished hed if the proble problem m is based based on medical science science (Cruz vs. CA). But if common knowledge can be applied, RIL applies.
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Theoretic Theoretical al basis basis for RIL: The proof should should come from the defendant (RIL is the “bridge” whic which h allo allows ws the the plai plaint ntif ifff to reac reach h the the defendant).
Batiguin v CA RULE: In cases where the doctrine is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without aid of expert testimony testimony,, where where the court from its fund of common common knowledge can determine the proper standard of care.
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FACTS: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation on a patient. Afterwards, she was found to be feverish. When the patient submitted herself to another surgery, she was found to have an ovarian cyst on the left and right side of the ovaries and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the right side of the uterus.
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RIL applicable: No expert testimony Cour Courtt adju adjudi dica cate ted d base based d on com common mon knowledge fund The foundation of RIL is common knowledge evid eviden enti tiar ary y rule rule:: does doesn’ n’tt do away away with with presenting evidence must prove these elements: accident doesn’t occur w/o person’s negligence defend defendant ant has exclus exclusive ive contro controll over over the instrumentality no contributory negligence on plaintiff’s part RIL & malpractice suits: Gen rule: expert expert testimon testimony y needed needed o (Cruz v CA) Excep Exceptio tion: n: If case case can be gleane gleaned d o from common knowledge knowledge (Ramos (Ramos v CA) in Cruz, Cruz, they didn’t provide expert testimony testimony therefore they lost in Ramos, can use common knowledge medical malpractice domain of medical medical science: expert needed RIL common knowledge: knowledge: no need for expert preparation for procedure if ther there’ e’s s fail failur ure e / didn didn’t ’t get get the the resu result lts s expected, RIL n/a *question: when is a medical malpractice case comm common on know knowle ledg dge e or in the the doma domain in of medical science?* RIL is NA in malpr malpract actice ice suits suits if the only showi showing ng is that that the desire desired d result result was not
HELD: Res ipsa – Where the thing which causes the injury injury is shown shown to under under the managem management ent of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the managem management ent used proper care, care, it affords affords reasonabl reasonable e eviden evidence, ce, in the absence absence of an explan explanati ation on by the defendant, that the accident arose from ordinary want of care. All the requisites are present in this case. (1) The entire entire proceedin proceedings gs of the caesarian caesarian were under the exclusive control of Dr. Batiquin. (2) The patient patient underwen underwentt no other other operation operation which could could habe caused caused the offending offending piece of rubber rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that it could habe only been a by-product of the caesarian section. RULE: Res ipsa – Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the Defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of thin things gs does does not not happ happen en if thos those e who who have have the the managem management ent use proper proper care, it affords affords reasonabl reasonable e eviden evidence, ce, in the absence absence of an explan explanati ation on by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of ordinary care.
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DM Consunji v CA Facts: A construction construction worker fell from the 14th floor when the platform assembly he was standing on fell down. Held: The theoreti theoretical cal basis basis for the doctri doctrine ne is its necess necessity ity,, i.e., i.e., that that the necess necessary ary eviden evidence ce is not avai availa labl ble. e. The The defe defend ndan antt in char charge ge of the the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff has no such knowledge. It furnis furnishes hes a bridge bridge by which which the plain plaintif tiff, f, witho without ut knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. complains. It is a rule of necessity. Rule: The theoreti theoretical cal basis basis for the doctri doctrine ne is its necessity.
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RIL applies; all elements present: o enti entire re C-se C-sect ctio ion n unde underr cont contro roll & management of doctor no other operation after C-section o although there is no proof directly linking Dr. Batiquin Batiquin to the rubber, applying applying RIL, Dr. is liable
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RIL applies theoretical basis: proo prooff is in excl exclus usiv ive e cont contro roll of o defendant bridge bridge that connects connects plaintiff plaintiff to the o proof Prof. Casis’s problem: there’s evidence (police report, testimony & affidavit). It is like saying saying that even if there is evidence, one could still argue RIL to win the case. Prof. Casis thinks that it is the victim’s fault for falling off the platform.
SANCO (27-32) RES IPSA LOQUITOR LOQUITOR – the facts or circumsta circumstances nces atte attend ndin ing g an inju injury ry may may be such such as to rais raise e a presumption, or permit an inference, of negligence on
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the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence. It relates to the MODE rather rather than the BURDEN BURDEN of establishing negligence. It is NOT an exception to the rule of initial presumption of negligence, but is DESCRIPTIVE of a class of cases wherein the initial presumption is overcome by evidence inherentl inherently y carrying carrying with it implicati implications ons of negligen negligence ce witho without ut the necess necessity ity of proof proof of specif specific ic facts facts or conduct. WHEN DOES IT APPLY? APPLY? Upon the satisfacti satisfaction on of 3 conditions: 1. The The acci accide dent nt was of a kind kind which which ordin ordinar aril ily y does not occur unless someone is negligent 2. The instr instrum ument entali ality ty or agency agency which which caused caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence 3. The inju injury ry suffer suffered ed must must not have have been been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured COURTS ADD A FURTHER CONDITION: 4. Plaintiff Plaintiff had no no knowle knowledge dge or means means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident
Plaintiff’s negligence Contributory negligence Fortuitous event Assumption of risk Due diligence diligence Damnum absque absque injuria Prescription Double recovery
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automobile, and those to the plaintiff’s car were caused by plaintiff’s own negligence.
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Applies only when both parties are negligent.
Manila Electric v Remonquillo FACTS: Magno was repairing the “media agua” when he was electrocu electrocuted ted to death. death. The galvaniz galvanized ed iron sheet he was holding came in contact with the electric wire. HELD: Court Court said Meralco Meralco was not neglige negligent. nt. But assumi assuming ng it was was Magno’ Magno’s s heirs heirs still still can’t can’t recove recover r because the proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire but the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without without precaution. It is assumed that that due to his age and experience, he was qualified to do the job.
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proximate cause: negligence of repairman in turning with GI sheet
differenc difference e between between this & Astudillo Astudillo v. Manila Manila Electric Co.: Meralco Meralco would’ve would’ve had to have been o more careful if public place
F. DEFENSES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
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* The son could have sued stepbrother of his father for building the house so close to the wire*
HELD: Court found that both plaintiff and defendant were negligent negligent in handling handling their automobil automobile e so both cannot recover. Where plaintiff plaintiff in a negligence negligence action by his own carelessn carelessness ess contributes contributes to the principal principal occurrence as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. RULE: When the negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant is the proximate cause of the accident, they cannot recover from each other.
Bernal v House FACTS: Mother and child were walking along a street, with the child a few steps ahead. ahead. She got startled by an automobile and and ran back to her mother. mother. She fell into a ditch with hot water and later died. CFI denied damages damages to parents because they were negligent. HELD: SC held they were not. Mother and child had had a right to be on that street. There was nothing nothing abnormal in letting a child run along a few paces ahead of the mother. mother. Contribut Contributory ory negligenc negligence e of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery but could only result in reduction of damages.
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No contributory negligence of mother & kid
Even if they did have contributory negligence, it is not a bar to recovery; only mitigates
1. Plaintiff’s Negligence Art. 2179, NCC When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence negligence was only only contributory, the the imme immedi diat ate e and and prox proxim imat ate e caus cause e bein being g the the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Bernardo v Legaspi FACTS: CFI dismissed the complaint filed in an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff’s automobi automobile le by reason reason of defendant’ defendant’s s negligen negligence ce in causing causing a collision. collision. Court Court also dismissed dismissed a crosscomplaint filed by the defendant, praying for damages on the the grou ground nd that that the the inju injuri ries es sust sustai aine ned d by his his
PLDT v CA FACTS: Antonio and Gloria Esteban’s jeep ran over a moun mound d of eart earth h and and fell fell into into an open open tren trench ch,, an excava excavatio tion n allege allegedl dly y undert undertake aken n by PLDT PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system.
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HELD: The accident was due to the lack of diligence of Antonio. His jeep was running along the inside lane of the street but it swerved abruptly, causing the jeep to hit the mound. Proximate cause was the unexplained and abrupt swerving of the jeep. Court also found that the jeep was running too fast. The negligence of Antonio was not only contributory to his injuries and those of his wife, but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident accident and thereby thereby precludes precludes their right right to recover recover damages. NOTES: negligence imputed included knowledge of the place. The Estebans passed that mound several times.
2. Contributory Negligence Art. 2179, NCC When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defend defendant ant’s ’s lack lack of due care, the plaintif plaintifff may may recover recover damages, damages, but the courts shall shall mitigate mitigate the damages to be awarded. (n) Art. 2214, NCC In quasi-del quasi-delicts, icts, the contribut contributory ory negligen negligence ce of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover.
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Contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in awarding damages.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES HELD: Court Court said said that that the allege alleged d contri contribut butory ory negligen negligence ce of the victim, if any, does not exonerate exonerate accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
Rakes v A tlantic tlanti c FACTS: The truck plaintiff plaintiff was riding riding fell because because the track sagged. The rails that they were transporting slid off the truck truck and caught caught his lag. lag. Later, Later, his leg leg was amput amputate ated. d. Compan Company y said said Rakes Rakes was was neglig negligent ent because: because: (1) he continued continued his work despite having having noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of along the boards. HELD: As to the first, Court held that Rakes had been working for less than 2 days. He could not have known that that one rail was lower than the other other or that the stringers and rails joined in the same place. As to the second, Court found that there was a general prohibition against walking by the side of the car. The disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not its primary cause. The Court made a distinction between the accident and the injury. If the plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the accident, he cannot recover. But if his negligence only contributed to his injury, he may r ecover the amoun amountt that that the defend defendant ant respon responsib sible le for the accident should pay fpr the injury, less a sum deemed an equitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
Genobiagon v CA FACTS: Rig driven by appellant bumped an 81 y.o. lady who was crossing the street. His defense was that it was the old lady who bumped his car. TC and CA found him guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.
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accident v. injury accident: can’t recover o contrib. to primary event injury: may recover o Defe Defend ndan ant’ t’s s cont contri rib. b. – Plaintiff’s contrib. = Recovery 2 kinds of contribution: (1) contribution to the principa principall event; event; (2) contribution contribution to his own injury
Phil. Bank of Commerce v CA
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FACTS: For over a year, RMC’s secretary had been depositing the company’s money to her husband’s bank account, account, without without the company company noticing noticing it. RMC sued PBC to collect the money. HELD: Court held that the proximate cause was the negligence of the bank. The bank teller was negligent in validating the duplicate copy of the deposit slip even if ccount name was left blank, contrary to the bank’s selfimposed imposed procedure; procedure; and PBC was negligent negligent in the selection and supervision of employees. However, Court found that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly statements of account for more than one year. This This omis omissi sion on by RMC RMC amou amount nts s to cont contri ribu buto tory ry negligence which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to it. Therefore: 60 - 40 ratio in damages.
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Both negligent but proximate cause is the teller allowing the practice of validating incomplete form
Solution to proximate cause issue: 60-40
*Sir has doubts as to the use of the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance in this case*
3. Fortuitous Event Art. 1174, NCC Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise otherwise declared by stipulation, stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.
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** Is this really a defense? **
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there’s only one case cited because in Transpo course course,, Court Court was not always always consis consisten tentt whether a tire blowout is a fortuitous event or not *how different is a tire blowout from a fire?* *memorize elements of Fortuitous Event*
NOTES: Sir said force majeure majeure is not the same as Acts Acts of God.
Juntilla v Funtanar FACTS: Plaintiff was seated in the f ront passenger seat of a public utility jeepney jeepney when the right tire blew up. up. He was thrown thrown out of the jeep and suffered suffered injurie injuries. s. He also lost his omega watch. HELD: SC said said that that ther there e are are spec specif ific ic acts acts of negligence on the part of the respondents. respondents. Jeep was running running at a very fast speed speed and was overloaded overloaded.. In this case, the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent independent of human human will. It was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of the mechanical defects in the tire. CHARACTERISTICS OF CASO FORTUITO: 1. Caus Cause e of the unfore unforese seen en and unexp unexpec ecte ted d occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation must be independent of human will. 2. It must be impossible impossible to foresee foresee the event which which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it is impossible to avoid. 3. The occurr occurrenc ence e must be such such as to render render it impossib impossible le for the debtor to fulfill fulfill his obligati obligation on in a normal manner 4. Oblig Obligor or must be free from partic participa ipatio tion n in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
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Many possibilities were pposed by the Court to justi justify fy that that the tire blowing blowing up was was not a fortuitous event. Important: Important: memorize memorize character characteristic istics s of caso fortuito
Hernandez v COA
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FACTS: Hernandez encashed 2 checks – salaries of employees and and operating expenses expenses of the project. He chose chose to bring bring the money money with him to his house house in Bulacan instead instead of returning to the office in Cavite. Cavite. On his way home, 2 robbers boarded the jeep and took the money money.. He ran after after them, them, but was only able able to apprehend one. He filed a request for relief from money accountability. accountability. COA denied denied the request.
without without human human interventi intervention, on, such as could could not have been prevented by any kind of oversight, pains and care reasonably to have been expected. (3) Assum Assuming ing that that the cause cause was force majeur majeure, e, Gotesco could still be held liable because it was guilty of negligence.
HELD: SC held in favor of Hernandez. Hernandez. The decision he made seemed logical at that time and one that could be expected of a reasonable reasonable and prudent person. person. And if, as it happened, the 2 robbers attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep, while it was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other passengers, it cannot be said that that all all this this was was a resu result lt of his his impr imprud uden ence ce and and negligence. It was a fortuitous fortuitous event, something something that could not have reasonably be foreseen though it could have happened, and it did.
NOTE: Res ipsa loquitur applies in this case.
NOTES: This case doesn’t doesn’t say that robberies robberies are fortuitous events. It just said that this particular particular robbery was a fortuitous event.
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robbery in this case was FE o but not all robberies are FE’s some human acts can be considered FE it may be an accident but not really FE
Gotesco Investment v Chato FACTS: Chato and 15 yo daughter went to see a movie at the theater owned owned by Gotesco. Gotesco. Balcony Balcony collapse collapsed d and they sustained injuries. injuries. Chato even went went to Illinois for furthe furtherr treatm treatment ent.. Gotesc Gotesco’s o’s defens defense: e: force force majeure. HELD: (1) Having Having interp interpose osed d force force majeu majeure re as a defense, defense, Gotesco Gotesco had the burden to prove prove that the collapse collapse was indeed indeed caused caused by force majeure. majeure. This Gotesco did not do. Its own witness witness admitted that that he could not give any reason why the ceiling collapsed. (2) Force Force majeure – inevitable inevitable accident accident or casualty; casualty; even which we could could neither neither foresee nor resist; resist; any accident accident due to natural natural causes, causes, directly, directly, exclusiv exclusively ely
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Ong’s incompetence incompetence is not equal t o Act of God not necessarily Act of God just because there are no / unknown explanations even assuming that there’s FE, Gotesco is still liable liable becaus because e there’ there’s s impli implied ed warran warranty ty in public places still negligent o Just because you cannot explain it, it does not necessarily mean that it is fortuitous.
Servando v Philippine Steam FACTS: Plaint Plaintiff iffs s loaded loaded their their cargo cargo on board board appellant’s vessel. vessel. Cargoes were discharged discharged unto the warehouse of Bureau Bureau of Customs. Customs. A fire of unknown unknown origin razed the warehouse, destroying the remaining cargo. HELD: Court said that where the fortuitous event is the immediate and proximate cause of the loss, obligor is exempt from liability liability for non-performance. Caso fortuito – an event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. foreseen. In this case, there was was not a shred of proof that the cause cause of the fire was in any way way attributabl attributable e to the negligence negligence of the appellant appellant or its employees. NOTE: NOTE: event.
This case case established established that fire is a fortuitous fortuitous
C LA SS fire was FE
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*it *it was was take taken n for for gran grante ted d that that a fire fire is a fortuitous fortuitous event (there was no explanati explanation on given why fire was a fortuitous event)*
National Power v CA FACTS: Respondents filed a complaint for damages against NPC for loss of lives and property caused by the flooding flooding of Norzagaray, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Bulacan. They claimed claimed that despit despite e knowl knowledg edge e of the impen impendin ding g entry entry of the typhoon Kading, NPC failed to exercise due diligence in monitoring the water level so when the water level went beyond the maximum allowable allowable limit, NPC suddenly, negli negligen gently tly and reckle recklessl ssly y opened opened 3 of the dam’s dam’s spillways. HELD: SC did not accept defense of force majeure. PRINCIPLE OF ACT OF GOD strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering inot the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in part the result of the participation of man, whether to be from active intervention or neglect, or failur failure e to act, act, the whole occurren occurrence ce is thereb thereby y humanized.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES HELD: Court found that other than the report submitted by the engineer engineers, s, no investigation investigation was conducted conducted to determine the real cause of the incident. Respondents did not even show that the plans, specs and design of the school building were defective. On the other hand, city building building official official testified that the school school obtained obtained both building permit and certificate of occupancy; same official gave go signal for repairs of damage of typhoon and subsequently authorized the use of the entire 4 th floor of the building; annual maintenance inspection and repair of the school building was regularly undertaken; and that no complaints have been lodged in the past. Therefore, petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of the school building. Typhoon was the proximate cause. CASO CASO FORTU FORTUITO ITO – event event which which takes place place by accident and could not have been reasonably foreseen, it is an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. 2 GENERAL CAUSES: 1. By nature- earthquakes, storms, floods, etc. 2. By the act of man- armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibition, etc.
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the flooding of the Angat River was not FE but due to the negligence of NPC is typhoon a force majeure? No because in this case there was negligence *so is force majeure really a defense then?*
Southeastern College v CA FACTS: During During a typhoon, typhoon, school’s school’s roof was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of respondent’s respondent’s house. A team of engineer engineers s conducted conducted an ocular ocular inspectio inspection n and found that the causes may have been the U-shaped formation of the buildi building ng and the impro improper per anchor anchorage age of the trusses to the roof beams.
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typhoon is FE flying roof is FE typhoon typhoon was proximate proximate cause of damage damage to neighboring house *take this case for definition of force majeur* *credibility of ocular inspection discredited so this is strange because this runs counter to Gotesco* *they could have used RIL*
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Afialda v Hisole FACTS: Caretaker of carabaos was gored by a carabao and he later later died as a conseque consequence nce of his injuries. injuries. Action was predicated on Art 1905 CC. HELD: HELD: Court Court said A1905 makes possessory possessory user of animal animal liable for any damages damages it may cause. cause. In this case, the animal was under the control of the caretaker. It was his business to try to prevent the animal from causing causing injury injury to anyone, anyone, includin including g himself. himself. Being injured by the animal under these circumstances was one one of the the risk risks s of the the occu occupa pati tion on whic which h he had had voluntari voluntarily ly assumed assumed and for which he must must take the consequences.
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inherent risks voluntarily & knowingly assumed by caretaker when he agreed to be caretaker
Ilocos Norte v CA FACTS: After a 2-day typhoon, Isabel went out of her house to check on her grocer store. She waded in waistdeep flood and got electrocuted. According to the NPC Engr, there were no INELCO linemen who were going around. HELD: HELD: Court said that contrary to petitioner’s claim, the maxim maxim “violenti “violenti non fit injuria” injuria” does not apply apply here. Isabel should not be punished for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal in injury. A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger, he must abide by the consequence, if an emergency is found to exist, or if the life life or property of anothe anotherr is in peril peril or when when he seeks seeks to rescue rescue his endangered property.
4. ASSUMPTION OF RISK
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Rule Rule is the Emergen Emergency cy Rule: Rule: A person person is excused from the force of the assumption of risk rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a k no nown da ng ng er er he mu st st a bi bi de de by t he he
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conseque consequences, nces, if an emergenc emergency y is found found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peri peril, l, or when when he seek seeks s to resc rescue ue his his endangered property.
*SANGCO (pp.81-84) NOTES: NOTES: VIOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA: INJURIA: applies to noncontractual relations; 3 requisites: (1) plain plaintif tifff had actual actual knowl knowledg edge e of the damage; (2) he understood an appreciated the risk from danger; (3) he voluntarily exposed himself to such risk.
5. DUE DILIGENCE Ramos v PEPSI FACTS: Ramos’ car collided with Pepsi truck driven by Andres Bonifacio. HELD: HELD: SC found Bonifacio Bonifacio negligent, negligent, but absolved absolved Pepsi for having sufficiently proven that it exercised due diligenc diligence e in the selectio selection n of its driver (backgrou (background nd check, clearance, previous experience, physical exam, driver’s exam- theoretical and practical driving exams). In order that defendant may be considered as having exercised all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver’s license; he should have carefully exami examined ned the applic applicant ant for emplo employm yment ent as to his qualifications, his experience and record of service. The presumption of negligence on the part of the master or employer, either in the selection of servant/ employee or in their supervision, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant/employee may be rebutted if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and supervision, he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.
Metro Manila v CA
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Allied Banking v CA FACTS: A jeep jeep and a bus collide collided. d. Their Their owners owners refused to pay damages to the injured passenger. HELD: SC held held that that testim testimoni onial al evide evidence nce of due diligence, in order to hold sway, must be corroborated by documentary evidence. Mere formulation of various company company policies policies on safety safety (as testified testified by Christian Christian Bautista), without showing documentary proof that they were being followed or complied with is not sufficient to exempt petitioner from liability arising from negligence of its employees. NOTES: NOTES: defense of due diligence diligence is plausibl plausible e when defendant has presented enough evidence to overcome the presumption of negligence. It is not enough that it is alleged. (Sir: (Sir: MMTC MMTC said said that that it was not enough enough to issue issue manuals etc, but implementation or actual enforcement is more important.)
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it is not enough that the company company provides provides manuals there there has to be proof proof of enforc enforcem ement ent and actual application
6. DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA 7. PRESCRIPTION Kramer v CA FACTS: 1976: 2 vessels collided - 1981: Phil Coast Guard concluded that the collision was due to M/V Asia’s negligence -1982: Coast Guard suspended 2nd mate of M/V Asia. -1985: -1985: Petitione Petitioners rs instituted instituted complain complaintt for damages damages against respondent. Motion to dismiss was filed on the basis of prescription. HELD: SC dismissed the case, saying that according to Art. Art. 1146, 1146, action action based based on quasiquasi-del delict ict must must be instituted within 4 yrs. Prescriptive period period begins from the day the quasi-delict was committed.
FACTS: Apr 1, 1976 1976 – Yujuic Yujuico o obtain obtained ed loan loan fr GenBank payable on or before Apr 1, 1977 - Mar 25, 1977 – Monetary Monetary Board issued resolution resolution forbidding GenBank from doing business in Phils. - Allied acquired all assets and assumed all liabilities of GenBank - Feb 7, 1979 1979 – Allied Allied filed filed compla complain intt agains againstt resp resp Joselita for collection of a sum of money - 1987 – in the course of the proceedings, resp sought to implead implead Central Bank and Aurellan Aurellano o as 3 rd party defendants. It was alleged that by reason reason of the tortous interference by the CB with affairs of GenBank, resp was prevented from performing his obligation under the loan. - RTC denied admission of 3rd party complainant. - Petitione Petitionerr claims claims that cause cause of action has already already pres prescr crib ibed ed.. Sinc Since e it was was foun founde ded d on tortu tortuou ous s interference, it prescribes prescribes in 4 yrs. Petitioner believes believes that the cause of action accrued on Mar 25, 1977, the date when Monetary Board ordered GenBank to desist from doing business business in the Philippines. Philippines. Complainant Complainant should have filed before Mar 25, 1981. - Responde Respondent nt relies relies on the Doctrine Doctrine of Relations Relations or Relations Bank Doctrine to support his claim that the cause cause of action action as agains againstt the proposed proposed 3rd party defendant defendant accrued accrued only on Dec 12, 1986 when the decisi decision on became became final final and execut executory ory.. Thus, Thus, it is contended that while the 3rd party complaint was filed only on Jun 17, 1987, it must be deemed to have been instituted on Feb 7, 1979, when the complain in the case was filed. HELD: Action for damages arising from QD should be filed within 4 yrs from the day cause of action accrued. The cause of action in this case accrued on Mar 25, 1980 when the Monetary Board ordered the GenBank to desist fr doing biz in the Phils, while 3 rd party complaint was was file filed d only only on Jun Jun 17, 17, 1987 1987 the the acti action on has has prescribed. NOTE, MEMORIZE ME (in footnote so not doctrine)! “Relations Bank Doctrine” – principle of law by which an act done at one time is considered by a fiction of law to have been done done at some antecedent antecedent period. It is a doctrine which, although of equitable origin, has a well recognize recognized d applicati application on to proceedin proceedings gs at law; a legal legal fiction fiction invented invented to promote the ends of justice justice or to
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prevent injustice and the occurrence of injuries where otherwise there would be no remedy.
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Take note of Relations Bank Doctrine *Not sure if Relations Bank Doctrine is ratio in this case*
8. DOUBLE RECOVERY Art. 2177, NCC Respon Responsib sibili ility ty for fault fault or neglig negligenc ence e under under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff plaintiff cannot recover recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
IV.
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ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the death of the victims?
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident?
HELD: The proximate cause of the death of the victims was their failure to take precautionary measures for their safety. Considering the nature nature of the task of emptying a septic tank, especially one which has not been cleaned for for year years, s, an ordi ordina nari rily ly prud pruden entt pers person on woul would d undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. More so with Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job.
HELD: The overturning of the bus, and not the fire that burned the bus, is the proximate proximate cause. The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural natural sequence sequence of the overturning overturning of the bus, the trapping of the passengers and the call for outside help.
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Usually it’s the shorter definition that’s being cited in the other cases. So for our purpose-shorter version The longer longer versio version n can be shorte shortened ned by removi removing ng “sufficient intervening cause” *memorize definition of proximate cause*
1. Definition Bataclan v Medina FACTS: A bus speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2am when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and turned turned turtle. 4 passengers passengers were were unable to get out of the bus. Calls Calls and shouts shouts for help were made made in the neighborhood. neighborhood. At 2:30am, 10 men men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled with petroleum. petroleum. When they approached approached the bus, a fier fierce ce fire fire star starte ted, d, burn burnin ing g the the bus bus and and the the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, overturned, the gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
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tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire.
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Definition #1 of proximate cause according to Bataclan v. Medina: Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous continuous sequence sequence,, unbroken unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
CAUSATION
A. Proximate cause
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Definition #2 of proximate cause according to Bataclan vs. Medina: More comprehe comprehensiv nsively, ely, the proximate proximate legal legal cause cause is that acting acting first and producing producing the injury injury either either immedia immediately tely or by setting setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuou continuous s chain chain of events, events, each having having a close close causal causal connectio connection n with its immedia immediate te predec predecess essor, or, the final final event event in the chain chain immedia immediately tely effecting the injury injury as a natural natural and probable probable result of the cause which first acted, acted, under under such such circum circumsta stance nces s that that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily ordinarily prudent and intellig intelligent ent person, person, have have reason reasonabl able e ground ground to expect expect at the moment of his act or default that an in jury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Fernando v CA FACTS: Bertu Bertulan lano o was was invite invited d to bid bid for the reemptying of a septic tank, which had not been cleaned for 19 years. Before the award was made (he lost), he and 4 companio companions ns surreptiti surreptitiousl ously y entered entered the septic septic tank, without clearance clearance from the market market master. They died in the septic tank due to the intake of toxic gas produced from the waste matter therein.
Note: Note: The court adopted adopted the Bataclan definition definition of proximate cause.
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Government negligence was not the proximate cause because it was not continuing. The claimant claimant must must establish establish that he had no negligence. A higher degree of diligence is expected from an expert. Prof. Casis included the case to show that it is not necessary to attend school to be an expert. Quoted Taylor, but it should have been Rakes
Urbano v IAC FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right right palm. palm. Javier Javier was was brough broughtt to a doctor doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty dirty shallo shallow w irriga irrigatio tion n canal canals s after after a typhoo typhoon. n. On November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON the hacking by Urbano of Javier was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. ---NO. HELD: The tetanus, not the hacking, was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. The death of the victim must be the direct direct,, natura naturall and logica logicall conseq consequen uence ce of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused (People ( People v Cardenas). Cardenas). Medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that that the infecti infection on of the wound wound by tetanus tetanus was was an efficient efficient intervening intervening cause later later or between between the time Javier Javier was wound wounded ed to the time of his death. death. The
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infection infection was, therefore, therefore, distinct distinct and foreign to the crime. Note: Note: The court adopted adopted the Bataclan Bataclan definition definition of proximate cause.
Phoenix Construction Inc. v IAC FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street in such a manner as to stick out onto General Lacuna St., partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30AM, Dionisio was on his way home when his car headlights allegedly suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on “bright” “bright” and saw the truck truck looming looming 2 ½ meters meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck. ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: The wrongful and negligent parking of the truck, and not the negligence of Dionisio, was the proximate cause of the accident. The truck driver’s negligen negligence ce was far from being being a pass passiv ive e and and stat static ic cond condit itio ion n and and was was rath rather er an indispensable indispensable and efficient cause. The collision of Dionisio’s car with the dump truck was a natura naturall and forese foreseeab eable le conseq consequen uence ce of the truck truck driver’s negligence. The improper parking of the truck created an unreasonable risk of risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna St. and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held liable. What the petitioners describe as an “intervening cause” was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the dump truck. Quot Quotin ing g Poss Posser er and and Keet Keeton on on “For “Fores esee eeab able le intervening causes” : If the interve intervenin ning g cause cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonable to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to antici anticipat pate e under under the partic particul ular ar circum circumsta stance nces, s, the defendant may be negligent xxx because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may e negligent only for that reason. reason. Foreseeab Foreseeable le interveni intervening ng forces forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence. Note: Note: Court mentioned foreseeability.
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Pilipinas Banking v CA
Quezon City v Dacara
FACTS: Florencio Reyes issued two post-dated checks. To cover the face value of the checks, he requested PCIB to effect a withdrawal from his savings account there and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Santos, who made the deposit, wrote the wrong account number on the deposit slip, but wrote the name of Florencio Reyes as the depositor’s name. The Current Account Bookkeeper of Pilipinas Bank, seeing that that the accoun accountt number number coinci coincided ded with with the name name Flore Florenci ncio, o, deposi deposited ted the amoun amountt in the accoun accountt of Florencio Amador Florencio Amador .
FACTS: At about 1AM, Dacara, (son of petitioner), while driv drivin ing g a Toyo Toyota ta Coro Coroll lla, a, ramm rammed ed into into a pile pile of earth/ earth/str street eet diggin diggings gs (accid (accident ent mound mound)) found found at Matahimik St. The lower court found that no evidence was was pres presen ente ted d that that suff suffic icie ient nt and and adeq adequa uate te precautionary signs were placed in the said street.
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the injury to Reyes? HELD: The The prox proxim imat ate e caus cause e of the the inju injury ry is the the negligence of Pilipinas Bank’s employee in erroneously positi positing ng the cash deposit deposit of Reyes Reyes in the name of another another depositor depositor who had a similar similar first name. name. The employee should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption. Proximate cause is any cause which, in natural and continuous continuous sequence sequence,, unbroken unbroken by any efficient efficient interveni intervening ng cause, cause, produces produces the result result complain complained ed of and without which would not have occurred and from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by anticipated by a person of ordinary care that the injury compl complain ained ed of or some some simila similarr injury injury,, would would result result therefrom as a natural and probable cause. Note: Note: Different definition of PC from Bataclan case. This case adds the element of foreseeability. Prof. Casis’s opinion: opinion: There’s no basis for t his additional element. Under Art. 2202, foreseeability should not be a factor.
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*Sir said that there is a problem with foreseeability as an element. So as a solution, if there’s a case similar to Pilipinas Bank, apply Pilipinas Bank definition*
ISSUE: What was the proximate cause of the accident? HELD: The negligence of the Quezon City Government was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic , common sense, sense, policy and policy and precedent precedent . Note: Note: Followed Bataclan’s definition.
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An admiss admission ion by the court court that that proxim proximate ate cause is what they think is fair in each case.
2. Distinguished from other kinds a. Remote Gabeto v Araneta FACTS: Gayetano (husband of plaintiff) and Ilano took a carromata to go to a cockpit. When the carromata was about about to move, Araneta held the reins of the horse, saying saying he hailed hailed the carromata carromata first. Driver Pagnaya pulled the reins to take it away from Araneta’s control, as a result of which, the bit came off the horse’s mouth. Pagnaya fixed the bridle on the curb. The horse, free form the control of the bit, moved away, causing the carromata to hit a telephone booth and caused it to crash. This frightened the horse and caused it to run up the street street with Gayetano Gayetano still inside the carromata carromata..
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Gayetano jumped or fell from the rig, causing injuries from which he soon died. ISSUE: WON Araneta is liable liable for Gayetano’ Gayetano’s s death. death. ---NO. HELD: Araneta’s act of stopping the rig was too remote from from the the acci accide dent nt to be cons consid ider ered ed the the lega legall or proximate proximate cause thereof. thereof. After Pagnaya alighted, alighted, the horse was conducted to the curb and an appreciable interval of time elapsed before the horse started to career up to the street. Moreover, by getting out and taking his post at the head of the horse, the driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and Araneta cannot be charged with liability for the accide accident nt result resulting ing from the action action of the horse horse thereafter.
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Classica Classicall descripti description on of remote remote cause cause with series of events. It is not the the coun counti ting ng of the the time time but the the SERIES
Urbano v IAC FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right right palm. palm. Javier Javier was brough broughtt to a doctor doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty dirty shallo shallow w irriga irrigatio tion n canals canals after after a typhoo typhoon. n. On November 14, he died of tetanus. ISSUE: WON the hacking was the proximate cause of Javier’s death. ---NO. HELD: There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary necessary precaution precautions, s, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier’s death with which Urbano had nothing to do. Citing Manila Electric v. Remoquillo Remoquillo:: A prior and remote remote cause cause cannot cannot be made made the basis basis of an action action if such remote remote cause did nothing nothing more than
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b. Concurrent Far Eastern Shipping Company v CA FACTS: A ship owned by FESC rammed into the apron of the pier. pier. Kavankov Kavankov was the master master of the vessel. Gavino was the compulsory pilot. ISSUE: Who was negligen negligentt --- Gavino or Kvankov? Kvankov? ---BOTH. HELD: Both Gavino (compulsory pilot) and Kavankov (master (master of the vessel) vessel) were concurrently concurrently negligent. negligent. Gavin Gavino o was negligen negligentt for failin failing g to react react on time; time; Kavankov was negligent in leaving the entire docking procedure up to Gavino instead of being vigilant. Negligence, in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, them, it being being suffic sufficien ientt that that the neglig negligenc ence e of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the whole damage. Reason: Reason : It is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Note: Note: Liability of concurrent negligence = solidary.
NOTE
If the concurre concurrent nt act was the proxima proximate te cause, cause, the degree of participation does not matter. What What is the rule rule on liabil liability ity? ? –liab –liabili ility ty is impossibl impossible e to determin determine e in what proportion proportion each contributed to the injury
NOTE
The remote cause was noted to be the wound of Urbano.
PAGE 28
Sabido v Custodio FACTS: Custodio, a passenger of a bus, was hanging onto its left side. While the bus was negotiating a sharp curve of a bumpy and downward slope, a speeding truck going going in the opposite opposite direction direction side-swiped side-swiped Custodio, Custodio, who died as a result thereof. ISSUE: Who was negligent and what is the extent of liability? ---BOTH solidarily liable. HELD: The carrier and its driver driver were negligent negligent for allowing Custodio to hang by the side of the bus. The truck driver was also negligent for speeding through the middle portion of the road. Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of Custodio’s death. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissi omission on of two or more more person persons, s, althou although gh acting acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person person,, and it is impos impossib sible le to determ determine ine in what what propor proportio tion n each each contri contribut buted ed to the injury injury,, either either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor.
CL ASS
NOTE
Prof. Casis thinks that this is a problema problematic tic case because the facts would indicate that the victim was at fault because he was negligent.
3. Tests a. “But for”
Bataclan v Medina
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Proximat Proximate e cause cause is that cause which, which, in natural and contin continuou uous s sequen sequence, ce, unbrok unbroken en by any effici efficient ent interveni intervening ng cause, cause, produces produces the injury injury,, and without without which the result would not have occurred. Note: Italicized phrase=”but for” test
CL ASS
NOTE
Refers to absolute cause This is the strictest test
b. Substantial Factor
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v IAC FACTS: A jeep was carrying passengers to Pangasinan when its right rear wheel became detached, causing it to be unbalanced. The driver stepped on the brake, which made the jeep turn around, encroaching on the opposite lane. lane. A Philippi Philippine ne Rabbit Bus from the opposite opposite lane bumped the rear portion of the jeep. Three passengers of the jeep died as a result. The Court of Appeals Appeals ruled that the bus driver was negligent. It applied the substantial factor test: It is a rule under this test that if the actor’s conduct is a substanti substantial al factor factor in bringing about the harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. ISSUE: Who is liable?-Jeep. HELD: The Supreme Court was not convinced by the application of the substantial factor test. Even though the bus was driving at 80-90 kph, it was still within the speed limit allowed in highways. The bus driver had little time to react and had no options available: it could not swerve to the right (western shoulder was narrow and had tall grasses; already near the canal) or to the left (it would have it the jeep head-on). Note: Note: The substantial factor test contains no element of foreseeability.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
CL AS S
N O T E S ()
Prof. Casis thinks that this case should not be cited for the substantial factor test because the SC did not apply the test; test; only the CA did. Substantial factor = Main cause, not the only cause Important : memorize the test *This is the only case that defines substantial factor test* *Also see Pilipinas Bank*
1 SANGCO (pp. 103-114) Tests of proximate cause 1. Cause in fact Tradi Traditio tional nally, ly, courts courts have have used used the term term proximat proximate e cause cause as descripti descriptive ve of the actual actual “cause “cause in fact” fact” relati relation on which which must must exist exist between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury before liability may arise. The first step is to determ determine ine whether whether the defendan defendant’s t’s conduct conduct was a factor factor in causing causing plaintiff’s damage. If the injury as to causes, in fact show that the defe defend ndan ant’ t’s s cond conduc uctt was was not not a fact factor or in causing causing plaintiff’ plaintiff’s s damage, damage, the matter matter ends there. there. But if it shows that that his conduct conduct was a factor in causing such damage then the further question is whether his conduct played such a part in causing the damage as would make him the author of such damage and be liable in the eyes of the law. 2. Effectiveness of the cause; ‘but for’ rule
Whether such conduct is a cause without which the injury would not have taken place (referred to as the sine qua non rule) or is the efficient caus cause e whic which h set set in moti motion on the the chai chain n of circumstances leading to the injury
A cause need not be the sole cause of the injury injury but it is enough enough that that it should should be the concurrent proximate cause It is usef useful ul and and gene genera rall lly y adeq adequa uate te for for determining whether specific conduct actually caused caused the harmful harmful result in question question but it cann cannot ot be indi indisc scri rimi mina nate tely ly used used as an unqualified measure of the defendant’s liability
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beca becaus use e an acto actor’ r’s s negl neglig igen ence ce is not not a substantia substantiall factor in bringing bringing about harm to another if the harm was sustained even if the actor were negligent. The converse converse of the rule: a neglig negligent ent act cannot be said to be the proximate cause of an accident unless the accident could have been avoided without such negligent act.
3. Substantial factor test under Restatement Question to ask: Was the defendant’s conduct a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s injuries? The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if: a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm b) there is no law relieving the actor of liabil liability ity becaus because e of the manne mannerr in which his negligence has resulted in the harm It is preferab preferable le to use the ‘but for’ test in connection with the substantial factor test since the former is the adverse of the restatement formulation.
The Restatemen Restatementt adopts adopts the rule that if the actor’ actor’s s conduc conductt is a substa substanti ntial al factor factor in bringing bringing about the harm to another, another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
4. Foreseeability test Neglig Negligenc ence e involv involves es a forese foreseeab eable le risk, risk, a threat threatene ened d danger danger or injury injury and condu conduct ct unreasonable in proportion to danger. Foreseeability becomes a test in an effort to limit limit liabilit liability y to a conseque consequence nce which has a reas reason onab ably ly clos close e conn connec ecti tion on with with the the defendant defendant’s ’s conduct conduct and the harm which which it originally threatened. When When the the resu result lt comp compla lain ined ed of is not not reason reasonabl ably y forese foreseeab eable le in the exerci exercise se of ordina ordinary ry care care under under all all the facts as they they existed, existed, an essentia essentiall element element of actionabl actionable e negligence is lacking.
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A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES prud pruden entt and and expe experi rien ence ced d part party, y, full fully y acquainted with all the circumstances which in fact fact exist, exist, wheth whether er they they could could have have been been ascertain ascertained ed by reasonab reasonable le diligenc diligence, e, or not, would have thought at the time of the negligent act as reasonably possible to follow, if they had been suggested to his mind.
The foreseeability test is applied in conjunction with the natural natural and probable probable conseque consequences nces test.
5. Natural and probable consequence consequence test This test is designed to limit the liability of a negligent actor by holding him responsible only f or or i nj nju ririe s wh ic ic h ar e t he he pr ob oba bl bl e consequences of his conduct as distinguished from consequences that are merely possible. For this purpose, the term “probable” is used in the sense of “foreseeable.” An injury is deemed the natural and probable result of a negligent act if after the event, and viewing the event in retrospect to the act, the injury appears to be the reasonable rather than the extraordinary consequence of the wrong, or such as, according to common experience and the usual course of events, might reasonably have been anticipated. The consequence of the negligent act must be within the range of probability as viewed by the ordinary man. The natural and probable consequences have been said to be those which human foresight can can anti antici cipa pate te beca becaus use e they they happ happen en so frequently they may be expected to recur.
8. Orbit of the risk test
This was intended to be a test of duty and not a test of proximate cause. If the foreseeable risk to plaintiff created a duty which which the defend defendan antt breach breached, ed, liabil liability ity is imposed for any resulting injury within the orbit or scope of such injury, it is not the unusual nature of the of the act resulting in injury to plaintiff plaintiff that is the test of foreseeab foreseeabilit ility y but whether the result of the act is within the ambit of the hazards covered by the duty imposed upon the defendant.
CL ASS
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result, it is quite impossible to distinguish between between active forces and passive situations, particularly since the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the “condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability. It is not the distinction which is important, but the nature nature of the risk and the charac character ter of the intervening cause. cause.
C L A S S
N O TE S
The cause is the active aspect whereas the condit condition ion is the passiv passive e action action that that may produce the injury. It is difficult to distinguish between a cause and a condition because of the time element. A condition was a cause at some point in time. It cannot be cited in saying that cause and conditio condition n are no longer longer applicab applicable le in our jurisdic jurisdiction tion because because it only said that it is discredited.
NOTE
Prof. Casis thinks that the 8 tests mentioned in Sangco are not practical and relevant because they are all similarly described and the courts never use them.
6. Ordinary and natural or direct consequences This test states that, as a matter of legal policy, if negligence is a cause in fact of the injury under under the criteria criteria previousl previously y discusse discussed, d, the liabilit liability y of the wrongdoer wrongdoer extends to all the injurious consequences. consequences. This is based on the principle that in tort, the wrongdoe wrongdoerr is liable liable for all the conseque consequences nces which which naturally naturally flow from his wrongful wrongful act, provided only that they are not too remote, and that as far as proximate cause is concerned, the question is not whether the damage was foreseen or foreseeable, but rather, where it in fact resulted as a direct consequence of the defendant’s act.
FACTS: A dump truck, owned by Phoenix, was parked askew on the right hand side of the street, in such a manner manner as to stick out onto General General Lacuna Street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices placed near the truck. At 1:30 am, am, Dioni Dionisio sio was on his his way way home home when when his car headligh headlights ts allegedl allegedly y suddenly suddenly failed. failed. He switched switched his headlights on “bright” and saw the truck looming 2 ½ meters away from his car. His car smashed into the dump truck.
7. Hindsight test The hindsight test eliminates foreseeability as an element. A party guilty of negligence or omission of duty is responsible for all the consequences which a
HELD: The distinctions between cause and condition have already been almost entirely discredited. Posser and Keeton: Keeton: So far as the fact of causation is concerned concerned,, in the sense sense of necessary necessary antecedents antecedents which have played an important part in producing the
c. Cause and Condition Phoenix v CA
Manila Electric v Remonquillo FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Peñaloza’s 3-storey house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contac contactt with with an uninsu uninsulat lated ed electr electric ic wire wire of Manil Manila a Electr Electric, ic, causin causing g his death death by electr electrocu ocutio tion. n. The The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 ½ feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: What What was the cause cause and conditi condition on of the accident? HELD: The cause was Magno’s own negligence. The condition was the too close proximity of the media agua, or rather, its edge, to the electrical wire of the company by reason of the violation of the original permit given by the city and the subseque subsequent nt approval approval of said illegal illegal construction of media agua.
Rodrigueza v Manila Railroad FACTS: The house of Rodrigueza and 3 others were burned when a passing train emitted a great quantity of
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A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
sparks sparks from its smokestac smokestack. k. Rodrigue Rodrigueza’s za’s house was partly within the property of the Manila Railroad.
ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad’ Railroad’s s negligen negligence ce was the proximate cause of the fire HELD: Yes. The fact that Rodrigue Rodrigueza’s za’s house was partly partly on the defendant’s defendant’s property is an antecede antecedent nt condition condition that may have made the fire possible possible but cannot be imputed as contributory negligence because: (1) that condition was not created by himself; (2) his house remained on this ground by the tolerance, and thus consent of the train company; (3) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justi justify fy the defend defendant ant in neglig negligent ently ly destro destroyin ying g it. Rodrigueza’s house was built on the same spot before the defendant laid its tracks over the land. Note: Condition = plaintiff’s house was partly within the defendant’s property. Cause = the sparks on the train which was the negligent act of the defendant.
C L A S S
McKee v IAC FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite opposite direction directions. s. When the car was 10 meters meters away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into the car’s lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the left and entered the truck’s lane. He then switched on the headlights, braked, and attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – YES.
N OT E S
Rodrig Rodriguez ueza a was was not guilty guilty of contri contribut butory ory negligence Even if condition was created, the company is not not goin going g to be just justif ifie ied d in negl neglig igen entl tly y destroying the house
4. Efficient Intervening cause
as 1) negligen negligence ce per per se or 2) prima prima facie evidence of negligence. It is not an efficient intervening cause when it is already in existence during the happening of the proximate cause.
HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, events, it cannot cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. It was the truck driver’s subsequent negligence in failing to take take the the prop proper er meas measur ure e and and degr degree ee of care care necess necessary ary to avoid avoid the collis collision ion,, which which was the proximate cause of the tragedy.
Bataclan v Medina C L AS S
NOT ES
The efficient efficient intervening intervening cause cause destroys destroys the link between between the negligen negligentt act and injury. It should should occur occur after the purported purported proximate proximate cause because it would then be a condition. Negligence of the defendant if pre-empted by the negligence of the plaintiff. The efficient efficient interveni intervening ng cause cause is actually actually a proximate cause. Although there is still lack of a definite ruling by the Court, Court, any violat violation ion of admin administ istrat rative ive ordinances and the like would either be seen
FACTS: A bus was speeding on its way to Pasay City at 2AM when one of its front tires burst, as a result of which the vehicle zigzagged, fell into a canal or ditch, and turned turtle. Four passengers were unable to get out of the bus. Calls and shouts for help were made in the neighborhood. At 2:30AM, 10 men came, one of them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick fueled in petroleum. When they approached the bus, a fierce fire started, burning the bus and the 4 passengers. It appears that as the bus overturned, the gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline
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tank, spreading over the bus and the ground under it, and that the lighted torch set it on fire. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – NO. HELD: The coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of passengers and the call for outside help. It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highway men after looting the vehicle sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle.
C LA SS
NOT E S
The Court did not agree with the theory of the defense that it was the bringing of the torch which was the proximate cause as it was an act of rescue and hence cannot be considered as negligence
Manila Electric v Remonquillo FACTS: Efren Magno repaired the media agua below Penaloza’s 3-story house. In the course of the repair, the end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contac contactt with with an uninsu uninsulat lated ed electr electric ic wire wire of Manil Manila a Electr Electric, ic, causin causing g his death death by electr electrocu ocutio tion. n. The The distance from the electric wire to the media agua was only 2 ½ feet, in violation of the regulation of the City of Manila requiring 3 feet. ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – YES. HELD: Efficient intervening cause: cause: the negligent negligent and reckless act of MAgno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to
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avoid its contacting the said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.
C L AS S
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
*Limited *Limited applicati application on because because it’s municipa municipall ordi ordina nanc nce. e. Can Can you you appl apply y this this if what what is involved is a national statute?- You might be able to use argument by analogy*
NOT ES
The IC here was the “t urning” What could have been the IC now becomes the remote cause
Teague v Fernandez
Urbano v IAC
FACTS: A vocational school for hair and beauty culture had only one stairway, stairway, in violation violation of an ordinance ordinance requiring 2 stairways. A fire broke out in a nearby store and the students students panicked panicked and caused caused a stampede stampede.. Four students died.
FACTS: On October 23, 1980, Urbano hacked Javier in his right right palm. palm. Javier Javier was was brough broughtt to a doctor doctor who issued a certificate stating the incapacitation is from 7-9 days. On November 5, Javier was seen catching fish in dirty dirty shallo shallow w irriga irrigatio tion n canal canals s after after a typhoo typhoon. n. ON November 14, he died of tetanus.
ISSUE: WON there was an independ independent ent interveni intervening ng cause – NO. HELD: the violation violation of a stature stature or ordinance ordinance is not render rendered ed remote remote as the cause cause of an injury injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the stature or ordinance was intended to prevent. In the present case, the violation violation was a continuing violation in that the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent the specific situation of undue crowding in case of evacuation. Note: The PC of the deaths is the overcrowding brought about about by the violat violation ion.. Howev However, er, the court court did not specifically identify the violation itself as the PC.
C L AS S
NOT ES
Rule: if the injury was caused by an act which the statut statute e violat violated ed tended tended to preven prevent, t, the viola violatio tion n of the statut statute e can be consid considere ered d negligence per se and is the proximate cause. But this is only of limited application and is not yet settled. Effects of violation of statute is not settled. It can be: a) negligence per se, b) prima facie proof proof of neglig negligenc ence, e, c) rebutt rebuttabl able e proof proof of negligence, d) proof of negligence
ISSUE: WON there was efficient efficient interveni intervening ng cause cause – YES. HELD: The death must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings, in the case at bar, show that the infection of the wound by the tetanus was an effacing effacing intervening intervening cause later or between between the time Javier was wounded to the time of death.
CLASS
FACTS: Picart riding his pony was on the wrong side of the road. Smith driving his car stayed on his right lane and so both Picart and Smith were on the same lane. Smith stayed on his lane and swerved to the other lane quickly, thereby almost hitting the pony. Pony became frightened and lost control and Picart was thrown out of the pony and got injured. Picart then filed a case against Smith RATIO: The negligent negligent acts of both parties parties were NOT contemporaneous. Negligence of Smith succeeded the negligence of Picart Picart by an appreciable appreciable interval. th saw the pony when he was still far and he had control of the situation. was his duty to avoid avoid the threatened harm by bringing the car to a stop or taking the other lane to avoid avoid the collisio collision. n. t take take into into consid considera eratio tion n the NATURE OF HORSES and the ANIMAL NOT BEING ACQUAIN ACQUAINTED TED TO CARS. CARS. ligence ligence of Smith: when when it exposed Picart and pony to danger. danger. This negligence negligence of Smith was the immediate and determining cause of the accident and the antecedent negligence of Picart was a more remote factor -Applied the LCCD and made the defendant liable
CLASS
NOT E
Import Important ant:: there there should should be a sequen sequence ce of events
NOT E
Was there expert testimony here or did they use RIL?-no discussion in the case
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impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
4. Last Last Clea Clearr Cha Chanc nce e
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N OT E S
Take note of the definition of last clear chance in all the cases.
Picart v Smith *Provides for the classic definition of Last of Last Clear Chance: Chance: the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
Bustamante v CA - Practical importance of LCCD The negligent negligent defendant defendant is held liable liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent negligent in placing placing himself himself in peril, peril, if he, aware of the plaintif plaintiff’s f’s peril, peril, or should have been aware of it in the reasonable exer exerci cise se of due due care care,, had had in fact fact had had an opportuni opportunity ty later later than that of the plaintiff plaintiff to avoid an accident FACTS: Collision between a truck and a bus when the bus tried to overtake a hand tractor . Bus saw that the truck’s wheels were wiggling and that truck was heading towards towards his lane. lane. Still, Still, bus driver driver did not mind and •
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instead applied more speed. speed . Thus, many were killed and injured injured.. Victims’ Victims’ heirs filed this case to claim claim damages from bus and truck RATIO: Last Clear Chance Doctrine: negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoide avoided d injuri injurious ous conseq consequen uences ces to the plain plaintif tiff f notwithstanding the plaintiff’s plaintiff’s negligence. negligence. The practical import (stated above) provides that negligent defendant shall shall be liable liable to negligen negligentt plaintiff plaintiff.. Thus, Thus, the LCCD does does not not aris arise e wher where e the the pass passen enge gerr dema demand nds s responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. obligations. The doctrine also cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test whether one of them should be liable to the injured person. person. So, the doctrine cannot apply in this case because this is NOT a suit between owners and drivers but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles - did not apply LCCD
C L AS S
N O T E S ()
Last clear chance contemplate contemplates s a series series of negligent acts.
The definition of last clear chance in the case of Bustamante is deemed to be the common definition (from the point of view of recovery of plaintiff) and is defined as an exception to a rule. The doctrine of last clear chance would apply even even if the plaint plaintiff iff is grossl grossly y negli negligen gent. t. Exceptions, however, include joint tortfeasors (according to Americn Jurisprudence). Last clear chance cannot apply when there are: 1) contractual relations, 2) joint tortfeasors, 3) concurrent negligence
Phoenix Construction v IAC - basis for saying that there is doubt in the application of the Last Clear Chance Doctrine because of Art. 2179. Howeve However, r, the statem statement ents s made made on the Last Last Clear Clear Chance Doctrine were merely obiter
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES FACTS: Dionisio was on his way home from a cocktails and dinner-meeting when he collided with the dumptruck of Phoenix which was parked askew at the side of the road. road. Thus, Dionisio filed an action for damages against Phoenix. Phoenix . Phoenix Phoenix invoked the Last Clear Chance Chance Doctr Doctrine ine:: Dioni Dionisio sio had the Last Last Clear Clear Chance Chance of avoiding the accident and so Dionisio, having failed to take the last clear chance, must bear his own injuries alone RATIO: The Last Clear Clear Chance Chance doctri doctrine ne of the Common Common Law was imported imported into our jurisdicti jurisdiction on by Picart vs. Smith but it is still a matter of debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippi Philippines nes.. The The doctri doctrine ne was was applie applied d by Common Law because they had a rule that contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a negligent plaintiff . BUT in the Philippines we have Article 2179 of the Civil Code which rejects the Common Law doctrine of contributory negligence. negligence. Thus, the court in this case stated stated that it does does not believe believe so that that the general general concept of Last Clear Chance has been utilized in our jurisdiction. jurisdiction. Article 2179 on contributory negligence is not an exercise in chronology or physics but what is important is the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. community. To say that Phoenix should be absolved from liability would come close to wiping out the fundamental law that a man must respond for the foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. -LCCD -LCCD was not applied applied because because the court court thinks thinks that it is not applicable in our jurisdiction
C L AS S
N OT E S
The issue on the element of foreseeab foreseeabilit ility: y: There There is no genera generall concep conceptt of last last clear clear chance. Rather, what is is more important important is the nature, nature, not the order order of events. events. In last clear clear chance, timing is of the essence.
In the case at hand, the truck driver’s parking askew askew led to an increased increased diligenc diligence e for the driver of the car. court should allocate risks (policy of consideration) consideration) Historical function of last clear chance: mitigate hars harshn hnes ess s of doct doctri rine ne of cont contri ribu buto tory ry negligence
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Nature Nature of neglig negligent ent act should should determ determine ine liability, not sequence of events Does the last clear chance doctrine still stand? Yes, because it was still used in later cases
Phoenix-1987, PBC-1997: appreciably later in time
Philippine Bank of Commerce v CA - apply the last Clear Chance Doctrine when fault or negligence is difficult to attribute FACTS: RMC had an account in PBC and Secretary of RMC was tasked to deposit deposit its money money.. However, it turns turns out that the Secretar Secretary y would would leave leave blank blank the duplicate copy of the deposit slip where the bank’s teller would validate it. Instead of writing the account number of the company company in the original original copy retained by the bank, Secretary Secretary would would write the account account number of husband. Thus, RMC’s RMC’s funds were now now in Secretary’s Secretary’s husband’s account. account. RMC discovered this after 7 yers and then filed a case against PBC to return its money RATIO: PBC was negligent when its employee, teller, validated validated a blank blank duplicate duplicate copy of the deposit slip. PBC was was also also lackad lackadais aisica icall in its select selection ion and supervision on the teller since it never knew that blank deposit slips were validated validated until this incident incident . Court also applied Last Clear Chance Doctrine in saying that PBC was really negligent. LAST CLEAR CHANCE Aka supervening negligence or discovered peril Where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportuni opportunity ty to avoid avoid the impendin impending g harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequence thereof The bank had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation validation procedure. procedure. Still, court said that RMC was also negligent in not checking its monthly stat statem emen ents ts of acco accoun unt. t. Appl Applie ied d 2179 2179 of CC on contri contribut butory ory neglige negligence nce.. 60-40 60-40 ratio! ratio! 40% of the damages shall be borne by RMC; 60% by PBC •
•
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TORTS AND D AMAGES -appl applie ied d LCCD LCCD in know knowin ing g negligent
C L AS S
- CASIS whet whethe herr PBC PBC was was
NOT ES
Elements: 1) 2 parties negligent, 2) appreciable time bet. 2 negligent acts and it is impossible to determin determine e whose whose fault or negligen negligence ce caused caused injury Problem: overlaps with doctrine of concurrent negligence
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES - Thus, Thus, this ruling would clearly apply to exonerate exonerate truck driver - did not apply the doctrine of last clear chance because the other party was not negligent
C L AS S
N OT E S
How did the case of Glan People’s Lumber affect the case of Phoeix? of Phoeix? In the case of Glan of Glan,, last clear chance was deemed to be a valid defense.
- may be used as basis against the ruling made on Last Clear Chance Doctrine in the case of Phoenix
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Pantranco North express Inc v Baesa
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FACTS: Passenger jeepney and Pantranco bus collided when Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepney’s lane Heirs of passengers in jeepney who died filed this case against Pantranco Pantranco wants the court to apply the doctrine of Last Clear Chance against the jeepney driver saying that the jeepney driver had the last clear chance in avoiding the collision. •
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existence of the peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it In this case, jeepney driver did not know of the impending danger because he must have assumed that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approaching from the opposite direction - Court said that the doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered In this case, Pantranco bus was speeding and at the speed speed of the approa approachi ching ng bus preven prevented ted jeepney driver from swerving to avoid collision Jeepney driver had NO opportunity to avoid it - Sole Sole and and prox proxim imat ate e caus cause e of the the acci accide dent nt:: Pantranco’s driver in encroaching into the lane of the incoming jeepney and in failing to return the bus to its own own lane lane immed immediat iately ely upon upon seeing seeing the jeepne jeepney y coming from the opposite direction •
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RATIO: RATIO: - The truck driver was not negligent and so cannot be held liable. Furthermore, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance Chance also also cannot cannot apply apply becaus because e there there is no negligence of the other party - Even assuming that the truck driver was negligent, the doctrine of Last Clear Chance would still absolve him from any actionabl actionable e responsib responsibility ility for the accident accident because both drivers had full view of each other’s vehicle. The truck stopped 30 m away from the jeep and so by this time, the jeep should have stopped or swerved Jeep driver had the last clear chance to avoid the accident It was the jeep’s driver who had the duty to seize the opportunity of avoidance and not merely rely on a supposed right to expect that the truck would swerve and leave him a clear path - The doctrine of Last Clear Chance provides a valid and complete defense to accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith, which involved a similar state of facts
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Glan People’s Lumber & Hardware v IAC
FACTS jeep and cargo cargo truck collided jeepney driver came from a beach party jeep was zigzagging cargo truck was staying on his lane because the line in the road was wrongly painted case filed by heirs of the driver of the jeep who died as a result of the collision
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o
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- did did not not appl apply y LCCD LCCD beca becaus use e ther there e was was no opportunity to avoid the accident and the jeepney driver was not aware of the peril.
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RATIO: - Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty guilty of prior or anteceden antecedentt negligen negligence, ce, although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages - Thus, Thus, Pantra Pantranco nco raises raises the doctri doctrine ne in order order to escape liability - However, the court said that the doctrine of last clear chance cannot be applied in this case! - For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person person who allegedlty allegedlty had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
CLASS
NOT E
Do not apply last clear clear chance chance under under the emergency rule Important: memorize emergency rule
Ong v Metropolitan Water District -Last Clear Chance Doctrine Doctrine was not applied in this case because there was no negligence on the part of the Metropolitan Water District FACTS Kid drowned in one of the pools of Metropolitan Water District Reason why the kid drowned is unknown Employees of the Metropolitan Water District acted as soon as calls for help were heard and tried to revive the kid but he still died Case filed by parents of kid who drowned claiming damages against Metropolitan Water District •
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Parents of kid claim that Metropolitan Water District may still be held liable for the doctrine of Last Clear Chance because it had the last opportunity to save the kid
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES truck was guilty of greater negligence which was the efficient cause of the collision
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o •
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RATIO: Disagreed with the CA and held that both the truck and jeepney were liable The principle of Last Clear Chance would call for the application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the 2 colliding vehicles. It does NOT arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence - did did not not appl apply y LCCD LCCD beca becaus use e ther there e was was a contractual obligation on the part of the carrier to transport its passengers safely •
RATIO: There is sufficient evidence to show that Metropolitan Water District had taken all necessary precautions to avoid avoid danger danger to the lives lives of its patron patron or preven preventt accidents which may cause their deaths Doctri Doctrine ne of Last Last Clear Clear Chance Chance:: neglig negligenc ence e of a clai claima mant nt does does not not prec preclu lude de reco recove very ry for for the the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the latter, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might might have have avoid avoided ed injuri injurious ous conseq consequen uences ces to claimant notwithstanding his negligence The Last Clear Clear Chance Chance doctrine can never apply wher where e the the part party y char charge ged d is requ requir ired ed to act act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. In this case, it was unknown how the kid got into the pool pool and and whet whethe herr the the kid kid viol violat ated ed one one of the the regulations of Metropolitan Water District because he went went unacco unaccomp mpani anied. ed. It also also appear appears s that that the life lifegu guar ard d resp respon onde ded d to the the call call for for held held and and immediately immediately made all efforts to resuscitate the kid There is no room in this case for the application of the doctrine! •
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-applied the LCCD
Canlas v CA
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-Last Clear Chance Doctrine can apply in commercial transactions FACTS: 2 parcel parcels s of land land owned by Canlas Canlas were sold to Manosca Manosca issued 2 check that bounced Manosca was then granted a loan by Asian Savings Bank with the 2 parcels of land as security 2 impostors used who introduced themselves as the spouses Canlas mortgage was foreclosed Canlas wrote to Asian Savings Bank regarding the mortgage of Manosca of the 2 properties without their consent Canlas filed this case for annulment of the deed of real estate mortgage against ASB
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Anuran Anur an v B uno
ASB was negligent in not exerting more effort to verify the identity of the sps Canlas The Bank should have required additional proof of the true identity of the impostor aside from their residence certificate Applied Applied the doctrine doctrine of Last Clear Chance Chance which which states that: Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciable later in a point of time that that that of the other, other, or where where it is impossi impossible ble to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but but fail failed ed to do so, so, is char charge geab able le with with the the consequences arising therefrom In this case, ASB had the last clear chance to prevent fraud, by simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements of banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them For not observing the degree of diligence required of banking institutions, ASB has to bear the loss sued upon •
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LCCD LCCD not applied because because no negligence negligence on the part of Metropolitan Water District was proven
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FACTS: A passenger jeepney was parked at the side of the road since one of the passengers alighted A motor motor truck, truck, speedi speeding, ng, then then bumped bumped into into the jeepn jeepney ey from from behind behind with such such violen violence ce that that 3 passengers died Thus, this case was filed by the heirs of the deceased and of the injured to recover damages from the driver and owner of the truck and the owner of the jeepney CA: applied the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance and held that only the truck was liable because although the jeepney was guilty of antecedent negligence, the •
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C LA SS
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The Canlas sps. were negligent in giving their title to the property to Mañosca. With regard to the special power of attorney: the SPA given to Mañosca was to mortgage so the presence of the Canlas sps. was actually not a requirement. Was there really negligence on the part of the bank even if Manosca had an SPA and the land title? In Canlas, the Court talked about 2 definitionsshort and long: take note of these
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RATIO:
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v CA - Last Clear Clear Chance Doctrin Doctrine e is NOT applicable applicable in culpa contractual FACTS: LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank. •
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After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he had to leave the passbook Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the messenger or any employee of LC Diaz) and was able able to withd withdraw raw P300, P300,000 000.00 .00 from from its account. Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money against Solidbank CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the last clear chance chance to avoid avoid the injury injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify the withdrawal
RATIO: In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa contractual The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind mind the fiduciary fiduciary nature nature of their their relations relationship. hip. However, in this case, they failed to do this. Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative, but here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone else Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of LC Diaz
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
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Thus, Thus, Solidban Solidbank k was negligent negligent in not returning the passbook passbook to messenge messengerr of LC Diaz proximate cause CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance… Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to neglig negligenc ence e in the perfor performan mance ce of contra contractu ctual al obligation to LC Diaz This case of culpa culpa contractua contractual, l, where where neither neither the contributory negligence of plaintiff nor his last clear chance chance to avoid avoid the loss, loss, would would exoner exonerate ate the defendant from liability Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract
LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor impostor and so liability liability of Solidbank should be reduced.—40-60
- LCCD not applied
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Defen Defense se of Isuzu: Isuzu: invoke invoked d Last Last Clear Clear Chance Chance Doctrine SC: The doctrine doctrine of last clear clear chance chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, opponent, is considered considered in law solely solely responsible for the consequences of t he accident - However, no convincing evidence was adduced to support this defense - Furthe Furthermo rmore, re, the doctri doctrine ne cannot cannot be applie applied d because there was no time or opportunity to ponder the situation at all. all. There was no clear clear chance to speak of Thus, driver of Isuzu guilty! - did not apply LCCD because no clear chance
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CLASS
NOT E
Implied that the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable to culpa contractual
Engada v CA - Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied; instead applied the emergency rule. - Last Clear Chance Doctrine was not applied because there was no clear chance –emergency situation.
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c(~_ )o c(~_ )o
FACTS Iran driving a tamaraw jeepney In the other other lane lane was an isuzu isuzu pick-up pick-up that was was speeding. Right signal light was flashing but swerved to the left and encroached on the lane of tamaraw jeepney Tamaraw jeepney tried to avoid the Isuzu pick-up but Isuzu pick-ip swerved to where tamaraw jeepney was going and so they collided Information was then filed against the driver of the Isuzu pick-up charging him with serious physical injuries injuries and damage damage to property property through through reckless reckless imprudence • •
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RATIO: It was the Isuzu pick-up truck’s negligence that was the proximate cause of the collision - Isuzu abandoned his lane and did not first see to it that the opposite opposite lane was free from on-coming on-coming traffic and was available for safe passage. - After seeing the tamaraw, Isuzu did not slow down Iran, tamaraw driver, could not be faulted when he swerved to the lane of Isuzu to the lane of Isuzu to avoid collision Isuzu Isuzu driver driver’s ’s acts acts had put tamara tamaraw w driver driver in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly EMERGEN EMERGENCY CY RULE: an individual individual who suddenly suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, it not guilty guilty of negli negligen gence ce if he fails fails to undert undertake ake what what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence •
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1 Sangco, (pp. 74-81) The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance Also known as the doctrine of discovered peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, negligence, humanitarian humanitarian doctrine, doctrine of gross negligence The The negl neglig igen ence ce of the the plai plaint ntif ifff does does not not preclu preclude de a recove recovery ry for the neglig negligenc ence e of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercisin exercising g reasonabl reasonable e care and prudence prudence,, might might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. A neglig negligent ent defendan defendantt is held held liable liable to a negligent plaintiff or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff’s peril, or according to some authoritie authorities, s, should have been aware aware of it in the reasonabl reasonable e exercise of due care, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. 1. As a phase of proximate cause principle The doctrine of last clear chance negatives an essential essential element element of the defense of contributo contributory ry negligen negligence ce by rendering rendering plaintiff plaintiff’s ’s negligen negligence ce a mere condition or remote cause of the accident. The failure to avoid injuring a person occupying a position of peril may be a supervening cause. 2. Elements and conditions of doctrine Facts required: That the plaintiff was in a position of o danger danger and by his own negligen negligence ce became became unable to escape from such position by the use
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of ordinary ordinary care, either either because because it became became physic physicall ally y imposs impossibl ible e for him to do so or because he was totally unaware of the danger. The defendant defendant knew that the plaintiff o was in a position of danger and further knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known that the plaintiff was unable to escape therefrom That thereafter the defendant had the o last clear chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of ordinary care but failed to exercise such such last last clear clear chance chance and the accide accident nt occurred as a proximate result of such failure To state a cause of action, the pleader must disclose: The exposed condition brought about o by the negligence of plaintiff or the injured party The actual discovery by the defendant o of the perilous perilous situatio situation n of the person person or property injured in time to avert injury Defend Defendant ant’s ’s failur failure e therea thereafte fterr to o exercise ordinary care to avert the injury 3. Parties who invoke doctrine
Many courts take the view that the doctrine of last clear chance is not availabl available e to defendant. defendant. LCC can only be invoked in favor of the person injured, since it implies contributory negligence on his part, and is, generally speaking, only operative in those cases where, notwithstanding the injured person’s want of care, another person wantonly, or with with knowl knowledg edge e of the peril perilous ous situat situation ion of the person injured carelessly or recklessly injured him. The doctrine doctrine embraces embraces successive successive acts of negligence: primary negligence on the part of the defendant then contributory negligence on the part of the the plai plaint ntif ifff whic which h crea create tes s a situ situat atio ion n of inextricable peril to him and then becomes passive or static followed by the subsequent negligence of the defendant in failing to avoid injury to the plaintiff. Although Although the defendant defendant may not invoke the doctrine, it does not preclude him from proving that the plaintiff had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury complained of and thus establish that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately caused the accident and consequently bars plaintiff’s recovery.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES Between the defendants, the doctrine cannot be extended into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them should be held liable liable to the injured injured person person by reason reason of his discov discovery ery of the latter’s latter’s peril and it cannot cannot be invoke invoked d as betwe between en defend defendant ants s concur concurren rently tly negligent. LCC applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations.
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o Philippine Bank of Commerc Commerce e v CA
Glan v IAC
Summary on Last Clear Chance The Last Last Clear Clear Chance Chance Doctr Doctrine ine renders plaintiff’s contributory negligence as a mere condition Invoked by the plaintiff Cannot be invoked by joint tortfeasors Case Plaintiff WON Why? applied the LCCD Pic ar ar t v s. s. Picart Picart (one (one YES Smith had a Smith of the parties clear who caused caused opportunity the collision) to avoid the accident Bustamante Passengers NO No Picart v Picart Picart (one (one Yes Smith had Smith of the clear parties parties who opportunity caus caused ed the the to avoid the collision) accident Bustamante v Passengers No No negligent CA of the bus plaintiff because the plai plaint ntif ifff in the case are the passengers of the the bus bus who are aski asking ng for for damages Phoenix v Phoenix No Doctrine IAC (one (one of the the was not parties parties who carried carried over caus caused ed the the to the CC collision)
Pantra Pantranco nco Baesa
RMC (one of Yes the the parti parties es who caused caused the accident)
Heirs of o f t he he No driver of the jeep (one of the the parti parties es who caused caused the collision) v Heirs of the No passengers of jeep jeepne ney y (no contract)
Ong v Metropolitan Anuran Buno
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Ca nl nl as as v CA
Consolidated Bank v CA
Pare Parent nts s of No the deceased Heirs of the No passengers of jeep (with contract) Can al al s ( on on e Yes of the parties parties who caused caused the inci incide dent nt)) – for the annulment of the deed
LC Di az az – No for the recove recovery ry of the the sum sum of money
Just to know if PBC PBC was was negligent but damages were divided 40-60 Truck dr driver (other (other party in the collision) was not negligent There wa w as no opportunity to avoid the accident and driv driver er was was not aware of the peril Defendant was not negligent There wa w as contractual relation Defendant bank had the last clear c ha ha nc nc e to preven preventt the fraud Note: Note: there there was no contractual relation between Canlas Canlas and the bank Liability of bank bank arose arose from from culp culpa a contractual and so doctrine cann cannot ot be applied
TORTS AND D AMAGES Enga Engada da v CA
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Inur Inured ed part party y No ( ow owner of the Tamaraw)
C L AS S
There wa w as no clear c ha ha nc nc e in avoiding the accident beca becaus use e it was an emergency situation
Accordin According g to Sangco, Sangco, the last clear chance doctrine is a phase of contributory negligence. It is considered in determining proximate cause and should only apply when there is a time sequence.
Other Other names: names: doctrine doctrine of discovere discovered d peril, peril, doctrine of supervening negligence, doctrine of gross negligence, humanitarian doctrine. Last Last clear clear chance chance doctri doctrine ne consid considere ered d to determine the proximate cause. Last clear chance chance doctrine doctrine should not apply apply when there is a time sequence. The element elements s of the doctrine doctrine of last last clear clear chance: a) the plaint plaintiff iff is in dang danger er b) the defendant defendant knew of plain plaintiff’ tiff’s s state state
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the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident Who may invoke? Solely for plaintiff’s benefit
V. STRICT LIABILITY Black’s Law Dictionary definition: Liability does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of an absolute duty to make someth something ing safe. safe. It most often applie applies s either to ultra hazardous activities or in product liability cases. It is also known as “absolute liability” liability” or “liability without fault.”
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Test: when the conditions provided in the law exist, you are already liable
c(~_ )o c(~_ )o
A. Possessor of animals
Art. 2183, NCC The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may caus cause, e, alth althou ough gh it may may esca escape pe or be lost lost.. This This responsi responsibili bility ty shall shall cease only in case the damage damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage.
Vestil v IAC
NOT ES
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
FACTS: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of Vestil’s father, when the victim was playing with Vestil’s child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs old, old, was was brou brough ghtt to the the hosp hospit ital al and and was was late later r discharg discharged, ed, but after 9 days she was readmitted readmitted for exhibiting signs of hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva. The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia. broncho-pneumonia. -Uys sued Vestil for being being the possessor possessor of Andoy. Vestils claimed that they don’t own the dog, that it was a tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it bit her. HELD: The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing the damage. It is based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesse possesses s animals animals for his utility, pleasure pleasure or service service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. - While it is true that she is not really the owner of the house, which was still part of Vicente Miranda's estate, there is no doubt that she and her husband were its possessors at the time of the incident in question. - It does not matter that the dog was tame and was merely provoked by the child into biting her. The law does not speak only of vicious animals but covers even tame tame ones ones as long as they they cause cause injury. injury. As for the alleged provocation, the petitioners forget that Theness was only three years old at the time she was attacked and can hardly be faulted for whatever she might have done to the animal.
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Remote control argument does not lie. This is a strict liability case. Does it matter if the dog is tame? No. Law covers covers even tame animals animals as long as they produce injury Dog follows the house: accessory follows the principal principal (so would a rat living in the house house make the house owners liable if the rat bites a guest and causes the latter’s death?)
B. Things thrown or falling from a building Art. 2193 The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
C LA SS
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This provisio provision n applies applies regardless regardless of how things fell from the house. Dingcong v Kanaan
FACTS: -The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the ground floor of house where where they they establ establish ished ed the “Ameri “American can Bazaar Bazaar”. ”. Echeverria rented room in the hotel. -One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to bed, causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages against Echevarria and Dingcongs. HELD: -Echevarria is liable for being the one who directly, by his negligence in leaving open the faucet, caused the water to spill spill to the ground ground and wet the articles articles and merchandise of the plaintiffs. -Dingcong, being a co-tenant and manager of the hotel, with complete possession of the house, must also be respon responsib sible le for the damage damages s caused caused.. He failed failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent these damages, despite his power and authority to cause the repair of the pipes.
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Is A2193,CC A2193,CC applicab applicable le in this case? case? Prof. Casis seems to believe otherwise since A2193 speaks of the liability of a head of family when a structure or similar object falls off the balcony or second storey storey of his building. building. Dingcong is is not the head of a family. Can water be considered as a thing thrown or falling?
C. Death/Injuries in the course of employment Art. 1711 Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employee employees, s, even though the event event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the emplo employee yee's 's own own notori notorious ous negli negligen gence, ce, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due due care care cont contri ribu bute ted d to his his deat death h or inju injury ry,, the the compensation shall be equitably reduced.
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Who Who is liab liable le? ? Empl Employ oyer ers, s, owne owners rs of establishment Who are they liable to? Laborers, employees Under what conditions? Death or illness arising out of the course of employment
Art. 1712 If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidari solidarily ly liable liable for compensa compensation. tion. If a fellow fellow worker's worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker.
Afable v Singer Sewing Machine FACTS: -One Sunday Sunday afternoon, afternoon, Leopoldo Leopoldo Madlangb Madlangbayan ayan,, a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company, while riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At the time of his death death he was was return returning ing home after making some collections. -The widow and children of Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No. 3428, as amend amended ed by Act. Act. No. 3812. 3812. The complaint was subsequently amended, and they sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428. RATIO: -The phrase "due to and in the pursuance of" used in section 2 of Act No. 3428 was changed in Act No. 3812 to "arising out of and in the course of". -The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words words it was not the intention intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employm employment ent of incidenta incidentall to such employment employment,, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special special degree degree by reason reason of such employmen employment. t. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded. -As a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal personal injuries injuries resulting resulting from an accident accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does no arise out of and in the course of his employment. -If the deceased saw fit to change his residence from San Francisco del Monte to Manila and to make use a bicycle in going back and forth, he did so at his own risk, as the defendant company did not furnish him a bicycle
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or require him to use one; and if he made collections on Sund Sunday ay,, he did did not not do so in purs pursua uanc nce e of his his employment, employment, and his employer is not liable for any injury sustained by him.
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Defe Defens nses es avai availa labl ble e to an empl employ oyer er:: a) notorious notorious negligence negligence,, b) voluntary voluntary act of the employee and c) drunkenness. Case distinguishes “arising out of” and “in the course course of.” The first first refers refers to the origin origin or cause of the accident. The latter refers to the time, time, place, place, and circumsta circumstances nces under which which the accident takes place.
D. Product liability Art. 2187 Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries injuries caused caused by any noxious noxious or harmful harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers.
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Who is liable? Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles Under what circumstances? Death or injuries caused by noxious or harmful substances Who are they liable to? Anyone who consumed goods (even if goods were stolen)
Consumer Act Art. 97. Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino Filipino or foreign foreign manufactu manufacturer, rer, producer, producer, and any importer, importer, shall be liable liable for redress, redress, independ independentl ently y of fault, fault, for damages damages caused to consumer consumers s by defects resul resultin ting g from from desig design, n, manuf manufact acture ure,, constr construct uction ion,, assembly assembly and erection, erection, formulas formulas and handling handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof.
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A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it evidences: (a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault. Art. 99. Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier supplier of the services services shall shall not be held liable liable when it is proven: (a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; (b) that the consumer or t hird party is solely at fault. Art. 106. Prohibition in Contractual Contractual Stipulation. Stipulation. The stipulation stipulation in a contract contract of a clause clause preventing, preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than than one person person respon responsib sible le for the cause cause of the damage, damage, they shall shall be jointly liable for the redress
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES establ establish ished ed in the pertin pertinent ent provis provision ions s of this this Act. Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part part inco incorp rpor orat ated ed in the the prod produc uctt or serv servic ice, e, its its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. Art. 107. Penalties. Any Any person person who shall violat violate e any provis provision ion of this this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations with respect respect to any consumer consumer product which is not food, cosmetic, or hazardous substance shall upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) and by imprisonment of not more that one (1) year or both upon the discretion of the court. In case of judicial persons, the penalty shall be imposed upon its president, manager or head. If the offender is an alien, he shall, after payment of fine and service of senten sentence, ce, be deport deported ed witho without ut furthe furtherr deport deportati ation on proceedings. CHAPTER CHAPTER VI. Prohibited Acts and Penalties (RA3720 – Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) Sec. 11. The following acts and the causing thereof are hereby prohibited: (a) The manufacture, sale, offering for sale or transfer of any food, drug, device or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded. (b) The adulteration or misbranding of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic. (c) (c) The The refu refusa sall to perm permit it entr entry y or insp inspec ecti tion on as authorized by Section twenty-seven hereof or to allow samples to be collected. (d) The giving giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Sect Sectio ion n twel twelve ve (b) (b) here hereof of whic which h guar guaran anty ty or undertaking is false, except by a person who relied upon a guaranty or undertaking to the same effect signed by, and containing the name and address of, the person residing in the Philippines from whom he received in good faith the food, drug, device, or cosmetic or the giving of a guaranty or undertaking referred to in Section twelve (b) which guaranty or undertaking is false. (e) Forging, Forging, counterfei counterfeiting, ting, simulatin simulating, g, or or falsel falsely y representing or without proper authority using any mark, stamp, tag label, or other identification device authorized authorized or requir required ed by regula regulatio tions ns promu promulga lgated ted under under the provisions of this Act.
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( f ) The using by by any person to his own advantage, or revealing revealing,, other than to the Secretary Secretary or officers officers or employees employees of the Department Department or to the courts courts when relevant in any judicial proceeding under this Act, any information acquired under authority of Section nine, or concerning any method or process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection. (g) The alteration, mutilation, destruction, obliteration, or removal of the whole or any part of the labeling of, or the doing of any other act with respect to, a food, drug, device, or cosmetic, if such act is done while such article is held for sale (whether or not the first sale) and results in such article being adulterated or misbranded. (h) The use, use, on the the labeling labeling of of any drug drug or in any advertising relating to such drug, of any representation or suggestion that an application with respect to such drug is effective effective under Section Section twenty-one twenty-one hereof, hereof, or that such drug complie complies s with the provisions provisions of such section. (i) The use, use, in labeling labeling,, advertisi advertising ng or other other sales sales promotion promotion of any reference reference to any report or analysis analysis furnished in compliance with Section twenty-six hereof.
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Is a restaurant owner a seller or a processor?
Could the company stipulate limited liability? No. A106 of the Consumer Consumer Act. If basis basis is not Consum Consumer er Act, Act, you can use 2187 on strict strict liability liability which is a powerful powerful provisio provision n except except against sellers (law on SALES will be the basis in this case) E le leme nt nt s o f 2 18 18 7: 7: 1 ) c au au sa sa l l in in k 2) manufacturers, processors What do you mean by similar goods?-Sangcoconsumed by humans. Question: What about those consumed by animals? Do you apply strict liability even if defendant exercised due diligence? Yes. Precisely why it is called strict liability
Coca-Cola v CA FACTS: Geronimo sold food and softdrinks in a school canteen. canteen. A group of parents complain complained ed that fibrous materials were found in the softdrink bottles bought by their children. Upon inspection inspection by the DOH, the bottles
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were found to be adulterated. adulterated. The sales of Geronimo Geronimo drastically dropped and she was forced to close shop. She brought an action for damages against Coca-cola and the trial court ruled that the complaint was based on a contract, not quasi-delict and should have been filed within within 6 months months from the delivery delivery of the softdrinks softdrinks.. Geronimo argues that her case is based on quasi-delict and should prescribe in 4 years. HELD: The Court sided sided with Geronimo. Geronimo. The vendee’s vendee’s reme remedi dies es agai agains nstt a vend vendor or with with resp respec ectt to the the warranties warranties against against hidden hidden defects defects or encumbra encumbrances nces upon the thing sold are not limited to t hose prescribed in A1567. The vendee may may also ask for the annulment annulment of the contract upon proof of error or fraud in which case the ordinary rule on obligations shall be applicable.
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Requisites of 2187: 1) death or injury caused by noxious substance and 2) by manufacturer or processor What is “similar goods?” – Anything intended to be consumed by humans. What if the person who consumed the goods did did not not buy buy them them but stol stole e them them? ? – The The manufacturer/processor manufacturer/processor may still be held liable.
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES article preclude an action for breach of contract and warranty. 2. Requisites of liability under Art. 2187, Civil Code (1) (1) Defe Defend ndan antt is a manu manufa fact ctur urer er or proc proces esso sorr of foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods; (2) (2) He use use noxi noxiou ous s or harm harmfu full subs substa tanc nces es in the the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet articles consumed or used by the plaintiff;
(3)
Plaintiff’s death or injury was caused by the product so consumed or used; and (4) The damages damages sustained sustained and claime claimed d by the plaintiff plaintiff and the amount thereof. The burden of proof that proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it left the hands of the manufacturer and particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff. •
3. Persons who may be held liable, and for what products Manufactu Manufacturers rers and processo processors rs who used used noxious or harmful substances may be held liable. -sellers of the enumerated goods which turn out to be injurious injuriously ly defective defective CANNOT CANNOT be held liable for the obvious reason that they have nothing to do either with the defect or with the manufacture of such product Products: limited to “foodstuffs, drinks, toilet toilet articles and similar goods” •
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II SANGCO (p. 714-734) Product Liability
1.
Governing law: Art. 2187, NCC The elimination in this article of both fault or negligen negligence ce and contract as the basis basis of liabilit liability y thereunder are the essence of strict liability. liability. The consumer’s cause of action does not depend upon the validity validity of his contract contract with the person from whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement. Howeve However, r, Art. Art. 2187 2187 does does not preclu preclude de an action action based on negligen negligence ce for the same act of usin using g noxi noxiou ous s or harm harmfu full subs substa tanc nce e in the the manufacture or processing of the foodstuff, drinks, toilet toilet articles, articles, or similar similar goods which which caused caused the death or injury complained of, if the injured party opts to recover recover on that theory. theory. Neither Neither does this •
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4. Proo Prooff that that food food prod produc uctt was was defe defect ctiv ive e or unwholesome The one seeking to recover is under the duty of proving proving with reasonable reasonable certainty that the food eaten was in fact deleterious. •
Proof of a defect in the product may not be supplied by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, unless the product is one whose character character and content must necessarily have remained unchanged since it left the manufacturer’s possession. possession. Expert Expert testimony testimony is generall generally y necessary necessary to prove the defect in the product. It must must appear appear that that the unwhol unwholeso esome me or unsound unsound quality of the food product product in question question existed at the time the defendant sold it, and did not come into existence thereafter.
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5. Proof of causation One seeking recovery has the burden of proof that that the the resu result ltin ing g illn illnes ess s was was caus caused ed by the the deleterious food. A manufacturer’s strict liability in tort should be defined in terms of the safety of the product “in normal and proper use.” The plaintiff plaintiff must allege and prove that he was using the product in the way it was intended to be used. •
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6. Who may may recover recover • A purchasing and non-purchasing consumer or user of user of a defective food product or toilet article is entitled entitled to recover recover damages damages for physical physical injuries injuries caused thereby.
7. Compensable Damages Expressly limited to “death or injuries caused by any noxious noxious or harmfu harmfull substa substance nce used” used” by “manuf “manufact acture urers rs and proces processor sors s of foodst foodstuff uffs, s, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods.” Applicab Applicable le only to personal personal injuries, injuries, which which incl includ udes es deat death, h, and and only only dama damage ges s aris arisin ing g theref therefrom rom.. This This preclud precludes es claims claims for purely purely pecuniar pecuniary y or commerci commercial al losses losses in absence absence of personal injuries. •
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8. Unavoidably unsafe product The seller of unavoidably unsafe products, with qualific qualification ation that they are properly properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with apparently reasonable risk. •
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Liability for negligence in food products. To constitute negligence an act must be one from which a reasonably careful person would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him to forego the act or to do it in a more careful manner. Whether recovery is sought under strict liability or on faul faultt or negl neglig igen ence ce,, it woul would d seem seem cont contri ribu buto tory ry negl neglig igen ence ce woul would d dimi dimini nish sh recovery. •
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a. Duty of care of manufactu manufacturer rer or processo processorr of food. The duty owed to the consumer by the manufacturer of food food produc products ts intend intended ed for human human consum consumpti ption on is commensu commensurate rate with the danger and the possible and probable result of a lack of care. A high degree of care is required of the producer of foods (in the production production of such product, advertisin advertising, g, inspecting the ingredients and warning the consumers of possible injury from consumption of a food).
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES The seller is not liable when he delivers the product in a safe condition condition and subseque subsequent nt mishandl mishandling ing or other causes makes it harmful by the time it is consumed.
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Important: Requisites of 2187 in Sangco If it falls under A2187, can you still sue for breach of contract? Sangco says, yes.
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he must know the identi identity ty of a person person to whom whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is required in order that the injured injured party may recover recover for the damages damages suffered.
Had legal liability but not under A1314. Is malice required to apply A1314? No damages were due from Espejo because no malice was proven (the motive was only to make profit). Is malice an element of tortuous interference? Court does not say that it is.
E. Interference with contractual relations
c. Duty of seller other than restaurant operator. A vendor of provisions selected, sold, and delivered to the purchaser for his immediate use is bound to know the peril that the provisions are sound and wholesome and fit for immediate use, and if they turn out to be unsound unsound and not wholesome, wholesome, and the purchaser purchaser is injured thereby, the vendor is liable liable to him. d. Duty of warning; inspecting; testing. A manufacturer or seller of a product which, to his actual or constructive knowledge, involves danger to users has a duty to give warning of such danger. danger. As a matter matter of elementary logic, no duty to warn arises with respect to a product which is not in fact dangerous. The vendor of food should indemnify his vendee against latent latent defect defects s contai contained ned in the produc productt which which the vendee vendee,, by inspection or tast taste, e, coul could d not not have have discovered himself. The test of commodities required is no more than that commonly or usually practised by careful dealers under the same same conditio conditions ns and circumstance circumstances, s, which which is at least as high a duty of care as the consumer expects or has the right to expect of his groceryman or food dealer. Note:
Gilchrist v Cuddy FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film “Zigomar”. Gilch Gilchris ristt was the owner owner of a theatr theatre e in Iloilo Iloilo.. They They entere entered d into into a contra contract ct where whereby by Cuddy Cuddy lease leased d to Gilchrist the “Zigomar” for exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. -Days -Days before before the delivery delivery date, Cuddy returned the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. -Gilchrist filed a case for specific performance against Cuddy, Cuddy, Espejo Espejo and Zaldarriaga. Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy. ISSUE: WON Espejo and Zaldarria Zaldarriaga ga are liable for interferin interfering g with the contract contract between between Gilchrist Gilchrist and Cuddy, they not knowing at the time the identity of the parties HELD: YES, YES, Appel Appellan lants ts have have the legal legal liabil liability ity for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This liab liabil ilit ity y aris arises es from from unla unlawf wful ul acts acts and and not not from from contractua contractuall obligati obligations ons to induce induce Cuddy Cuddy to violate violate his contract with Gilchrist. -ART 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that
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Art. 1314 Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.
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b. Duty of care of restaurant operator A restaurateur has no duty to serve “perfect” products. But the law of negligence requires him to exercise a care proportionate proportionate to the serious serious conseque consequences nces that may follow from a want of care.
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So Ping Bun v CA FACTS: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement with DC Chuan covering stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued on month to month basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissol dissolved ved,, origin original al memb members ers of Tek Tek Hua formed Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls were occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua under business name Trendsetter Marketing. -new lease contracts with increase in rent were sent to THE, although not signed. -THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so THE would be able to go back to business BUT instead, instead, SO PING BUN SECURED SECURED A NEW LEASE AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN. ISSUE: WON WON So Ping Ping Bun was guilty guilty of tortuo tortuous us interference of contract HELD: Yes. A duty which the law on torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one party of the enjoyment of the other of his private private property. property. In the case at bar, petitioner petitioner,, Trendsetter asked DC Chuan to execute lease contracts in its its favo favor, r, and and as a resu result lt peti petiti tion oner er depr depriv ived ed respondent of the latter’s property right. - Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from inju injury ry,, and and dama damage ges s are are the the reco recomp mpen ense se or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
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- One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespa nontrespassory ssory invasion invasion of another’s another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if: a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with; b) the invasion is substantial; c) the defenda defendant’ nt’s s conduc conductt is a legal legal cause of the invasi invasion; on; d) the invasi invasion on is either either intent intention ional al and unreasonable or unintentional and and actionable under the general negligence rules. - elements of tort interference: a) existence of a valid contract b) knowledg knowledge e on the part part of the third third party of its existence c) interf interfere erence nce of the third third party party is withou withoutt legal legal justification or excuse - Since there were existing lease contracts between Tek Hua and DC Chuan, Tek Hua in fact had property rights over the leased leased stalls. The action action of Trendsette Trendsetterr in asking DC Chuan to execute the contracts in their favor was unlawful interference. - The The SC hand handle led d the the ques questi tion on of whet whethe herr the the interference may be justified considering that So acted sole solely ly for for the the purp purpos ose e of furt furthe heri ring ng his his own own financial financial or economic economic interest. interest. It stat stated ed that it is sufficient that the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business business interest interest rather rather than in wrongful wrongful motives motives to conclude that So was not not a malicious interferer. interferer. Nothing on the record record imputes imputes deliberate deliberate wrongful wrongful motives or malice on the part of So. Hence the lack of malice precludes the award of damages. - The provision in the Civil Code with regard tortuous interference is Article 1314.
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Did Did not include include malice malice as one of the elements under A1314. A1314. Then discussed discussed Gilchrist in saying that to award damages, there should be malice but it was never mentioned in Gilchrist in the first place. Implied malice as an element. De Leon included malice as an element. Sir said as guidance: If we apply Gilchrist and So Ping Bun, we need malice in 1314. But if question is just on the elements, just answer answer the three elements elements given by So Ping Bun. So Ping Bun was okay had it not cited Gilchrist
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
Sir said that it seems this is the case right now: now: You You can can comp compet ete e in Busi Busine ness ss Contracts as long as intention is financial interest and there is no malice. If this is the case, then one cannot recover from 1314 as against the third party.
AQUINO, (pp. 795-801) Interference with contracts: A. Statutory Statutory provision and rationale: rationale: Under Article 1314 of the Civil Code, a third party may sue a third party not for breach of contract but for inducing another to comm commit it such such brea breach ch.. This This tort tort is know known n as interference with contractual relations. Such interference is considered tortious because it violates the rights of the contacting parties to fulfill the contract and to have it fulfilled, to reap the profits resulting therefrom, and to compel the performance performance by the other party. The theory is that a right derived from a contract is a property right that entitles each party to protection against all the world and and any any dam damage age to said said prop proper erty ty shou should ld be compensated. B. History: History: This particula particularr tort started in the UK in Lumley vs, Gye in 1853 and was first adopted in the Philippines in 1915 in Gilchrist vs Cuddy. C. Elements: 1. Existenc Existence e of a valid contract: contract: This existence existence is necessary and the breach must occur because of the alleged act of interference. No tort is committed if the party had already already broken broken the contract. contract. Neither can action be maintained if the contract is void. However, ther there e is auth author orit ity y for for the the view view that that an acti action on for for interference can be maintained even if the contract is unen unenfo forc rcea eabl ble. e. The The view view is that that indu induce ceme ment nt,, if reprehens reprehensible ible in an enforceab enforceable le contracts, contracts, is equally equally reprehensible in an unenforceable one. 2. Knowledge on the part of the third party of the existence of the contract: The The elem elemen ents ts do not include malice as a necessary act in interference. However, the Supreme Court in its various rulings have held that the aggrieve aggrieved d party will only be entitled entitled to damages if malice was present in the commission of the tortious act. It was held that mere competition is not sufficient unless it is considered unfair competition or the dominant purpose is to inflict harm or injury. 3. Interf Interfere erence nce of the third third party party withou withoutt legal legal justifica justification tion or excuse: excuse: In genera general, l, social social policy policy
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permits a privilege or justification to intentionally invade the legall legally y protec protected ted intere interests sts of others others only only if the defendant defendant acts to promote promote the interests interests of others others or himself himself if the interest which he seeks to advance advance is superior superior to the interest invaded in social social importanc importance. e. Competiti Competition on in business business also affords affords a privileg privilege e to interfere interfere provided provided that the defendant’ defendant’s s purpose purpose is a justifiable one and the defendant does not employ fraud or deception which are regarded as unfair. D. Extent of liability: The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interferen interference ce with contractu contractual al relations relations cannot be held liable for more than the amount for which the party who was induced to break the contract can be held liable. This is consistent with Article 2202 if the contracting party who was induced to break the contract was in bad faith. However, when there is good faith, the party party who who breach breached ed the contract contract is only only liabl liable e for consequence that can be foreseen. In fact, it is possible for the contracting party to be not liable at all, as in the case case wher where e the the defe defend ndan antt prev preven ente ted d him him from from performing his obligation through force or fraud.
F. Liability of local government units Art. 2189 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision.
Guilatco v City of Dagupan FACTS: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Pere Perez z Blvd Blvd.. whic which h is owne owned d by the the nati nation onal al Governme Government. nt. She fractured fractured her right leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and confined. City Engineer testified testified that he supervise supervises s the maintenance maintenance of said manholes and sees to it that they are properly covered. City City Char Charte terr of Dagu Dagupa pan n also also says says that that the the city city supervises and manages National roads and national sidewalks. HELD: City liable liability y of private private corporati corporations ons for damages damages - The liabilit arising from injuries suffered by pedestrians from the defective condition of roads is expressed in the Civil Code as follows:
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Ar titic le le 21 89 89 . Pr ov ovi nc nc es es , ci titi es es a nd nd municipalities municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, streets, bridges, bridges, public public building buildings, s, and other public works under their control or supervision. - It is not even necessar necessary y for the defect defective ive road or street to belong to the province, city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or supervision is exercised over the defective road or street. - In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liabilit liability y of the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to particular to the liability arising from “defective streets, public buildings and other public works.”
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Can Can last last clea clearr chan chance ce appl apply? y? Wasn Wasn’t ’t it Guila Guilatco tco’s ’s fault fault that that she was was neglig negligent ent in alightin alighting g a tricycle? tricycle? No because because it is under strict liability. Sir said it is wise to apply this to the case of PLDT and the accident mound case (DACARA)
A2010 REVISED MAGIC NOTES
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