A Short History of the Six Day War

On June 5, 1967, Israel went to war with its neighbours. By June 10, Israel had more than tripled in size. In a decisive victory in six short days, Israel defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, who in turn had help from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Sudan and Tunisia. Soon dubbed "the Six Day War", this short, regional conflict would go on to have enormous implications for Israel, the Middle East and the peace and security of the world.

This article will summarise, in three parts, the causes, conduct and consequences of the Six Day War. It attempts to give a simple but not simplistic account of the facts, inasmuch as the facts can be ascertained from noteworthy historical accounts of the war. war.

This account will begin with the consequences, consequences, followed by the conduct co nduct of the war in its most important events and finally, finally, the war's causes. We start with the consequences of the Six Day War in order to show the reader the enormous impact this small war has had, and w hy he or she should continue reading.

Consequences

The Six Day War's consequences consequences were numerous and far-reaching, and so me of them plague the region to this day. day. The changes of perceptions of threats in the area, the 1973 Yom Kippur War and subsequent Egypt-Israel peace accord, the hostage massacre at the Munich Olympics and the increased importance of the Middle East as a Cold War hotspot are some of the war's short term outcomes. I will attempt to outline the longer lasting ones here. They are the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, fundamentalism, the occupation the Palestinian territories and military and nonmilitary conflict.

First, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, fundamentalism, or Islamism, or jihadism, or whatever you want to call it, is an indirect consequence of the Six Day War. War.

Before the Six Day War, Pan-Arabism was the motto of the day. Egypt, under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Nasser, had become the leader of a kind of anti-colonial, antiIsraeli, socialist movement in the Arab world. This movement was a source of  unity and the reason why Arab states combined their armed forces o n the eve of the Six Day War. In a very unusual act as governments go, Egypt and Syria had even united under one state to form the United Arab Republic, though only for three years. Nasser was very charismatic and popular and, in the lead up to the Six Day War, was assured a win by those around him.

One year before the Six Day War, in 1966, Nasser ordered the execution of  Sayyid Qutb, a leading intellectual member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb was not a terrorist (and the Brotherhood is not a terrorist organisation), but he played a big role in the rise of Islamic terrorism. When he was executed, he was made a martyr. martyr. His ideas spread and "jihadist" organisations like alQaeda followed them.

The transnational Islamist movement arose in a vacuum. After the Six Day War, the Arab leaders (the losers) bickered and fought. Each heaped culpability on the others and suddenly, suddenly, unity was no longer a priority. priority. Some leaders, such as Jordan's King Hussein, wanted a peace accord with Israel, while Nasser engaged Israel in the pointless but deadly War of Attrition. PanArabism thus discredited, Islamic fundamentalism became the new ideology of the Muslim world. While most Muslims do not fall under this banner, banner, Islamism has attracted people from countries as diverse as Indonesia, Morocco, India, Iraq, Britain and Spain. And the main target o f anger and terrorism in the name of Islam has been Israel.

In the second lasting consequence of the Six Day War, Israel acquired the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. It occupies the last four of these to this day. day.

The return of the Sinai to Egypt was the major reason that Egypt and Israel were able to sign a peace agreement in 1978. Israel and Jordan signed a peace accord in 1994 but return of the West Bank was not part of the deal. It was believed that the Golan Heights could be returned to Syria and the West Bank to Jordan for peace accords, but they were not. The Heights were not of  sufficient importance to Syria and peace with Syria not of sufficient interest to Israel to ever make the exchange. And no one wants the Gaza Strip. What problems these territories have caused.

The acquisition of territory by conquest and the settling of it with the conquering state's citizens are both strictly prohibited by international law. With the exception of East Jerusalem, which the vast majority of Israelis refuse to give up, the government of Israel once hoped that the occupied territories could be returned for peace treaties ( "Land for Peace"). At the same time, however, however, it was allowing Jewish settlers into all areas of the territories. Settlements began springing up everywhere. Settlements in the Sinai were uprooted to return the land to Egypt, and settlements in Gaza were removed in 2005 for reasons we will not go into here. But there are still half a million Jewish settlers in all the occupied territories. Going into all the trouble they have caused for both Israel and the Palestinians Palestinians is the subject of  the book "Lords of the Land" by Idith Zertal and Akiva Eldar; suffice it to say, say, the occupation and settlement are the primary reasons the Palestinians Palestinians are angry.

Third and most important, and related to Israel's territorial gains, it may be fair to say that all major violence against Israelis and Palestinians since June 1967 has been due to the consequences of the Six Day War. One consequence of the 1948 war, the first Arab-Israeli war, was the beginning of  the Palestinian refugee problem. The Six Day War exacerbated it. The Palestinians were pushed in greater numbers into refugee camps in places

like Lebanon and Jordan. Palestinians were a big presence in western Jordan, and around 1970 had almost carved out an autonomous enclave on the East Bank of the Jordan River. The Palestinian organisation Fatah, led by Yasser Arafat, conducted border raids on Israel and fought with Jordanians as well.

In September of 1970 ("Black September"), Palestinians attempted to assassinate King Hussein. They also hijacked airplanes and, after removing the hostages, blew them up on television. The Jordanian army attacked and, after a year of fighting, drove them out of Jordan to Lebanon.

The Six Day War is also known as the third Arab-Israeli war; the fourth one was in 1973; and the fifth one was Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, and after a short time staying out, Arafat's guerrillas entered the fray. The Israeli Defense Forces, or IDF, entered Lebanon in an attempt to shore up a friendly government and take out the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. For For some time it occupied Beirut, but was forced to retreat to a small part of southern Lebanon that it held as a buffer. buffer. Israel's invasion is generally generally held as the progenitor of Hizbullah, which prodded Israel into violence several times since, most evidently in the 2006 Lebanon War. In what many Israelis saw at the time as unprovoked and unnecessary violence, in 1982, the IDF killed several thousand Lebanese, enabled the massacre of more than 800 Palestinian refugees and suffered more than 600 casualties.

The occupation of the territories turned the IDF from a defense force into a police force, setting up checkpoints, defending settlers and bulldozers, arresting and shooting Palestinians for violating curfews. This oppressive policing of Palestine led to the first Intifada. The typical image of the Intifada is the Palestinian boy throwing rocks at Israeli soldiers. The first Intifada was an uprising against Israeli control of the Palestinian territories and lasted for

six years. The second Intifada, characterised less by stones and more by suicide bombings, also lasted several years (when it ended is disputed) and a third one may be in the works. works .

Contrary to what many Israelis believe, the Intifadas were spontaneous, not planned. They were not the attempted destruction of the State of Israel by the Palestinians but may be likened more to the Warsaw Ghetto uprising against the Nazis: people were herded into terrible conditions and handled with violence. Only the most sheeplike people would not consider fighting back. Things have not gotten any better in the occupied territories and there is no solution in the works. The Palestinians were the real victims of the t he Six Day War, a war that, in the minds of too many people, has never been resolved.

Conduct

Why did Israel win the Six Day War? There are a few reasons. First, it attacked preemptively. preemptively. Israel's attack may or may not have been justified (though, as I will explain in the third section, the historical record implies that it was) but it was a surprise. Surprise attack is a good goo d strategy. strategy. Second, Israelis generally felt that their backs were against the wall. The prevailing feeling in Israel before the war had been one of fear (which, again, we will go into in the final section of o f this account), and when fear is translated into fight (as opposed to flight) it is deadly. deadly. The prevailing feeling among Arabs was hubris. Third, Israel had superior forces, and relied on air power at the beginning of its campaign. Fourth, the Arab armies had poor leadership and organisation, and were not as prepared, as numerous or as mighty as they had thought. This section will expatiate o n the most important events of the war.

By 07:30 on June 5, 200 Israeli planes were aloft and heading to Egypt. A

Jordanian radar officer noticed and radioed his commanding officer in Amman. The officer in Amman relayed the information to Cairo. However, However, the Egyptians had, just the day before, changed their codes and had not notified the Jordanians. The Israeli aircraft destroyed most of Egypt's air force and antiaircraft weapons on the ground.

Now in control of o f the air, air, Israel sent tanks across the Sinai desert. They suffered many casualties but still did better than the Egyptians. Majo r General Ariel Sharon, prime minister during the Second Intifada, was commander of  one of the most powerful of the armoured divisions that took the Sinai. Battles continued and Israeli tanks kept advancing. By day 4, there was no more doubt that the Egyptians were defeated and that Israel had taken the Sinai.

A few hours after the attack on Egypt, the US consul-general in Jerusalem mused that Jerusalem might have been spared the violence that was raging around the region. At first, things t hings were calm. King Hussein of Jordan, which controlled East Jerusalem and the West Bank, received a phone call from Nasser saying that Israel had suffered great losses. The Iraqis told him their aircraft were already engaging with Israel's. Hussein ordered the attack.

Bombs from planes and cannons shook Israel for a few hours but then Israel performed two lightning strikes that destroyed Jordan's planes and airfields. They took other positions in Jordan, and over the next two days occupied much of the West Bank. This new territory included the Old City--East Jerusalem. Jews were ecstatic. This was a big cause of their feeling at the end of the war that God was truly on their side: not only had they triumphed over seemingly (but not actually) overwhelming odds, but they had taken back the holy lands of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and the now united holy city of Jerusalem.

On day 2, Nasser declared, erroneously, erroneously, that the US was actively aiding Israel in the fighting. He asked the USSR for equal assistance to ward off the Americans. Radio stations in Syria, Jordan and elsewhere claimed, also erroneously, erroneously, that American or British planes and ships were causing all kinds of trouble. As a result, mobs attacked American embassies throughout the Middle East. Ten oil-producing Arab states including Saudi Arabia and Iraq limited or banned oil shipments to the US and Britain. This began the 1967 oil embargo and the use of the "oil weapon".

The United States continued monitoring the conflict from a distance. The USS Liberty, Liberty, breaking with the 6th Fleet, came close to the Sinai coast. Yitzhak Rabin, then Israeli chief of staff (later prime minister), had warned that all unidentified vessels traveling traveling at high speed would be sunk. The Liberty was not identified fast enough, and Israeli jets and boats attacked it. The ship was badly damaged and 34 American crewmen died. The US and Israeli governments both conducted inquiries and found that the attack was an accident. However, However, some US diplomats and officials say it was not. The Israeli government later paid nearly $13m in settlements. To this day, there are many unanswered questions about the USS Liberty incident.

Back to the front. Syria had also believed the reports that Israel was nearly defeated but nonetheless moved with some caution. When the Israeli Air Force was finished with the Egyptian Air Force, it turned its attention to the Syrian Air Force. In the evening of the first day of the war, the Israelis destroyed two thirds of Syria's fighter jets. Several Syrian tanks were put to rest as well. Syria's army began shelling positions in northern Israel but were soon pushed back again. By day 5, the battle for the Golan Heights was raging. The Golan Heights are a plateau bordering Israel, Syria and Lebanon. In two days, they became an occupied territory and in 1981 were annexed (like East Jerusalem but unlike Gaza and the West Bank) by Israel.

After the last gun had been fired over the Heights, the war was over. over. The ceasefire was signed the next day, day, on June 11th. Israelis proved to the world that it took more than some local bullies to bring it down. But its troubles were not over.

Causes

Finally, we come to the question, how did the war start? It is fair to say that the seeds for this war were planted in 1949, when the Arab armies trying to destroy the nascent Israel were routed, and that the Suez Crisis of 1956 raised tensions in the region even more. But to call those things

causes

of the

Six Day War is like saying World War One caused World War Two; and since the Franco-Prussian War caused World War One, and the Napoleonic Wars caused caused the Franc Franco o Prussi Prussian an War, ar, we can say say that that the French French Revol Revoluti ution on caused World War Two. This is too much of a stretch. Without going back to far, the buildup to the Six Day War started three years earlier, in 1964.

In that year, Levi Eshkol, Israel's prime minister, and Yitzhak Rabin, its chief  of staff agreed on the aims of Israel's defence policy for the first five year plan for the military. The plan said that the State of Israel did not wish for more territory. Israel would not initiate conflict with an Arab state but if war were imposed on it, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would move swiftly into the enemy's territory and destroy its war infrastructure.

More significa significantly ntly,, it was the year border clashes clashes with Syria got deadlier deadlier.. There were three sources of tension on the border: the demilitarised zones, water and Palestinian guerrillas. Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister during the Six Day War, said that in at least 80% of the clashes with Syria, "We would send a tractor to plow someplace where it wasn't possible to do anything, in the demilitarised area, and knew in advance that the Syrians would start to

shoot. If they didn't shoot, we would tell the tractor to advance farther, until in the end end the Syrians Syrians would get annoyed annoyed and shoot." shoot." The Israeli Israelis s were were provoking the Syrians.

In addition, the water issue began in 1964. Israel began withdrawing water from the Jordan River. At a conference, the Arab League approved a $17.5m plan to divert the Jordan river at its sources, drastically reducing the quantity and quality of Israel's water. Knowing that Israelis would not sit back while their their countr country y dried dried up, up, the same same confer conferenc ence e also also create created d a Un Unite ited d Arab Arab Command to protect the project and prepare for an offensive campaign. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, or PLO, was yet another outcome of the conference. The Arab League began construction on its diversion plan the next next year ear. The The IDF IDF atta attack cked ed the the dive iversio rsion n work works s in Syria yria in 1965, 965, exacerbating the border tensions that t hat led to the war. war.

In February 1966, an extreme left wing, anti-Zionist Baath regime took power in Damascus. It called for a popular war to liberate Palestine and sponsored Palestinian guerrilla attacks on Israeli targets. These guerrilla attacks were not about to wipe Israel off the map, but they fanned the flames of mutual hostility between Israel and Syria.

Palestinian guerrillas, mainly Arafat's Fatah, carried out 122 raids between January 1965 and June 1967. They were mostly staged from Lebanon and Jordan, Jordan, but but the guerrill guerrillas as were were largel largely y armed, armed, trained trained and run by Syria Syrian n gener general al staff staff.. In respon response se to one such such attack attack,, the Israel Israelii Defens Defense e Force Forces s attacked the village of Samu on the West Bank. Dozens of Jordanian soldiers were were kill killed ed.. The The atta attack ck shock shocked ed King King Huss Hussei ein n and and expo expose sed d his his mi mili lita tary ry weakness. On April 7, 1967, following a border skirmish, the Israeli Air Force shot shot down down six six So Sovi viet et-m -mad ade e Syria yrian n MiGs MiGs in an air air batt battle le.. The The Syria yrian n government was in a rage. The countdown to the Six Day War had begun.

Because the survival of the Baath regime was important to the USSR, the Soviets sent a report to Nasser that Israel was concentrating its forces on its northern front and was planning to attack Syria. The report was false. Some who were observing at the time said that, although the Soviet warning about Israel's amassing troops on its northern border was wrong, the Israeli cabinet was planning to attack Syria and the Soviets had gotten wind. Nasser knew the report was untrue but he felt that, as the Arab world's leadership was in question, he could not fail to act. Syria already had a defense pact with Egypt. Egypt. There There is gener general al agreem agreement ent amo among ng histori historians ans that that Nasser Nasser neith neither er wanted nor planned to go to war with Israel. What he did was brinkmanship: pushing Israel to the brink and hoping war would not be necessary. necessary.

He did so for several several reasons. reasons. First, he could not afford to look weak in front of his restive public. A major share of his army was already in the Sinai, and it would have been humiliating to pull them back. Second, the other side of  the coin, continuing the troop buildup would enhance his status at home and in the Arab Arab world. world. Indeed Indeed,, reacti reactions ons to the move were, were, in Michae Michaell Oren's Oren's words, "enthusiastic, even ecstatic". Finally, if there was no imminent threat to Syria, Nasser could take credit for increasing Egypt's troop presence in the Sinai without fear Israel would attack. After all, he had already been assured it would not.

Nasser sent a large number of troops into the Sinai, removing the UN troops already there, and closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. The Straits were important because, although alt hough few Israeli vessels actually transversed the Straits, it was where Iranian oil tankers exporting to Israel sailed. But more importantly, according to Aharon Yariv, Israel's chief of intelligence, failure to act to end the blockade of the Straits would make Israel lose its credibility and deterrent capacity. capacity. These tools have been essential for Israel ever since.

In all countries, the masses were whipped into a war frenzy. They heard about the hourly radio reports from Arab countries about Israel's impending doom, and the general feeling was of a noose tightening around the nation's neck. neck. Israel Israel's 's Holoca Holocaus ustt surviv survivors ors were were partic particula ularly rly scared scared when when Israel Israelii newspapers likened Nasser to Hitler. According to Charles Krauthammer, "It is hard to exaggerate what it was like for Israel in those three weeks [before the war]. Egypt, already in an alliance with Syria, formed an emergency military pact pact with with Jordan. Jordan. Iraq, Iraq, Algeri Algeria, a, Saudi Saudi Arabia Arabia,, Sudan, Sudan, Tunisi unisia, a, Libya Libya and Morocco began sending forces to join the coming fight. With troops and armor massing on Israel's every frontier, jubilant broadcasts in every Arab capital hailed hailed the immine imminent nt final final war for the extermina exterminatio tion n of Israel Israel.. 'We 'We shall shall destroy Israel and its inhabitants,' declared PLO head Ahmed Shuqayri, 'and as for the survivors--if there are any--the boats are ready to deport them.'"

Everyone predicted a war. Eshkol was expecting a war; Cairo Radio said "our forces are in a complete state of readiness for war"; Syria's government said "The "The war of libera liberatio tion n will will not end excep exceptt by Israel Israel's 's abolit abolition ion." ." Israel Israel's 's preemptive strike on its enemies was justified to end the tension and the fear--to stop waiting to die and start fighting to survive.

On May 12, in a newspaper interview, Rabin said "the moment is coming when we will march on Damascus to overthrow the Syrian government". On May 19, Rabin told his generals, "[t]he politicians are convinced they can solve the problems through diplomacy. We have to enable them to exhaust every alternative to war, even though I see no way of returning to things the way way they they were were.. If the the Egyp Egypti tian ans s block blockad ade e the the Stra Strait its, s, ther there e will will be no alternative to war." Nonetheless, Rabin also did not think Nasser wanted war.

On May 30, King Hussein flew to Cairo to sign the mutual defense pact with Nasser. An Egyptian general was appointed commander of Jordan's army. On

June 3, two Egyptian commando battalions were flown to Jordan, and on the followin following g mornin morning g an Iraqi Iraqi mechan mechanise ised d brigad brigade e crosse crossed d into into Jordan Jordan and moved to the Jordan River. Egypt and Iraq, traditional enemies, signed a mutual defense pact.

Israel attacked when it did because it obtained approval from the US. Robert McNama McNamara, ra, US Secret Secretary ary of Defenc Defence, e, gave gave Israe Israell a green green light light to attack attack Egypt. However, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, said he was outraged that Israel attacked at all.

What was the most important factor in starting the Six Day War? At a glance, it would appear to have been Nasser and Egypt's amassing of troops in the Sinai and closing of the Straits of Tiran and Gulf of Eliat. The closing of the Stra Strait its s was was an act act of war war in itse itself lf.. But But hist histor oria ians ns disa disagr gree ee with with this this explanation. First, there is evidence that Nasser did not want war. His public was highly belligerent but he knew Egypt could not simply defeat and occupy Israel. He had learned from the Suez Crisis of 1956.

Second Second,, there there are altern alternativ ative e explan explanati ations ons.. Avi Avi Shlaim Shlaim says says that that border border skirmishes with Syria were the main cause of the war. "Israel's strategy of  escalation on the Syrian front was probably the single most important factor in dragging the Middle East to war in June 1967". Israel had been forced to abandon abandon its plan to divert divert water from the Jordan in the central central demilitarised demilitarised zone to the Negev desert (southern Israel) in 1953. The Arab states, led by Syria, poked and prodded Israel by diverting the Jordan River. Israeli and Syria Syrian n troops troops clashe clashed d and Israel Israel gained gained the upper upper hand. hand. "Havin "Having g been been defeated in the water war," says Shlaim, "the frustrated Syrians began to spon sponso sorr atta attack cks s on Isra Israel el from from thei theirr terri territo tory ry by Pales alesti tini nian an guer guerril rilla la organisations." The violence escalated.

Michael Oren believes that, because (arguably) water politics led to fighting

on Israel's northern border, more than anything else, "the war would revolve around water." The Arab League's plans to take most of Israel's water was provocation bigger than its threats, and the dry noose was the catalyst for Israel's decision to strike.

Diplomacy came to naught. Tempers were not defused, the noose was not given any slack, and the push to war continued. At 07:45 on June 5, Israel attacked Egypt, beginning the Six Day War and setting in motion all the conflicts and killings Israel has suffered or delivered since.

Bibliography

Oren, Michael: Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

Finkelstein, Norman: Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Shlaim, Avi: The Iron Wall: Israel Israel and the Arab World

Morris, Benny: Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001

Charles Krauthammer: Prelude to the Six Days: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/05/17/AR2007051701976.html