A Critical Analysis on Political Dynasty.

A RESEARCH PRESENTED TO THE COLLEGE OF LAW POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILLIPINES Mabini campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON POLITICAL DYNASTY

SUBMITTED BY:

EMMANUEL S. CALIWAN

JURIS DOCTOR 2013

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON POLITICAL DYNASTY. EMMANUEL S. CALIWAN "We must view public office as a way to serve the people, not to profit at their expense." — Jose W. Diokno

I.OUTLINE II. ABSTRACT A. Defining Political Dynasty B. Current State of the Philippine Government and Election. C. The Evils of Political Dynasty.

III. INTRODUCTION A. HISTORY A.1 Emergence of “Political Dynasties” A.2 1987 Constitutional Provision on the ban for Political Dynasty. A.3 The Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission. A.4 Erap, Gloria and Election Problem of the Present.

IV. LEGAL ISSUES A. Why Political Dynasty does pervade the Government if it is prohibited by the 1987 Philippine Constitution? B. Is Referendum an answer?

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V. ANALYSIS

A. Sociological Analysis A.1 Randy David Sociological opinion B. Legal Analysis B.1.Hector De Leon’s legal analysis B.2.Retired Justice Isagani Cruz legal commentaries B.3.Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. legal analysis B.4.Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago’s Senate Bill 2649

VI. CONCLUSION

VII. RECOMMENDATION. A. Retired Justice Artemio Panganiban “Options to stop political dynasties” B. RA 6735 Initiative and Referendum Act

VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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II. Abstract “Political dynasty” refers to the situation wherein members of the same family are occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different positions1. In the Philippines, political dynasties are prevalent in areas with more severe poverty. This paper will discuss using the paradigm of critical legal studies to ascertain what are the impediments be it legal or cultural on the passage of the Anti-Political Dynasty Act and what can be done legally to pass such important measure in limiting or in a way diminishing corruption in the governmental institution that we all belong.

First I will focus on Martial law days to the passage of the 1987 Constitution. Focusing as well to the records of the Constitutional Commission particularly, on the debate and inclusion of the provision, on the Anti-political dynasty. I will also discuss

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Mendoza, Ronald Et al. Political dynasties and poverty: Resolving the “chicken or the egg” question retrieved from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48380/MPRA Paper No. 48380, posted 17. July 2013 14:23 UTC.

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why is there no law or any legislative enactment up until this very moment to give teeth to the provision on political dynasty. Secondly, I will lay down contemporary analysis using legal, sociological and investigative reports and writings in relation to the issue of Political Dynasty. To give more emphasis why is there such a need for a law or a statutory enactment to curb the evils that Political Dynasty brings. Lastly I will discuss “alternative” ways of creating an Anti-Political Dynasty Law. And finally I’ll try using the available Laws within the Philippines to propose the creation of an act that will prohibit the existence of political dynasties. And

Research in different fields of social sciences--- from sociology, economics, political economy, political science and even law shows the tendency of elites to persist and reproduce their power over time, potentially undermining the effectiveness of institutional reforms. One particular form of elite persistence is illustrated by the existence of political dynasties. A natural question is whether certain political reforms can break dynastic patterns and open up the political system. In this paper I will show the need for a law that will curb the evil of political dynasty by showing what political dynasty is doing to our society in general and government in particular. What particular evils can be addressed by the Anti-Political Law? And that such legislative construction can also be a powerful aide in stopping corruption in the government specially needed in times like ours of different scams left and right---PDAF, Malampaya and the list goes on. The challenge lies on how would a law be passed that is in a way would limit the people on congress. Congress as we all know by now in the word of the Retired Justice Isagani Cruz is “the principal protectors of political dynasties.” As also 4

observed by Fr. Joaquin Bernas S.J. that congress is “the principle playground of political dynasties.” But I believe that there is a way in this legal dilemma for it to be reconciled and a law be passed in relation to giving teeth to the toothless provision of constitution in political dynasty.

III. Introduction The 1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 2, Section 26 restrictively provides: The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit political dynasty as may be defined by law. Many Sociologists posits the idea that the Philippine Society revolves around extended families. Given positive points in the arena of social and behavioral aspect of human society. Yet in the political domain such positive concept alienates and dehumanizes the citizenry willing to serve and a lot their talents in the development of

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our nation. To quote Senator Miriam Defensor- Santiago (extended family in politics or Political Dynasty) “finds its pernicious effects in the political arena where public office becomes the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are well entrenched in Philippine politics. The monopoly of political power and public resources by such families affects the citizenry at the local and national levels2.”

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Senate Bill 2649 ,Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago

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HISTORY

Emergence of political dynasties3

The occurrence of political dynasties was believed to be first recorded in the pre-Magellanic period. In his book The Making of a Filipino, Renato Constantino pointed out that “communities at this time were already accustomed to an early form of government and politics.” The pre-colonial society had the datu, raja, and maharlika as rulers and stewards of tribal communities. According to Constantino, their strong familial bonds espoused the development of the leadership and social prestige of this ruling class. Perhaps the datu, raja, and maharlika class served as archetypal models for the formation of political dynasties in the Philippines.

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Records of the Constitutional Commission sited in Elefante, Fil V. “How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came about”. Philippine Graphic and “How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came to be”. Philippine Graphic.

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During the Spanish colonial period, the term principalia was introduced. The principalia embodied the new kind of local elite. To Constantino, the principalia “was composed of the wealthy landowners, many of whom were descendants of the early datus and maharlikas.” This time, the former datu “has been entrusted with fiscal and administrative duties and became adjuncts of Spanish power. From mere administrators of socially-owned land during the pre-Magellanic period, the principalia eventually became formal owners of these lands.” The principalia, along with the mestizos, illustrados, mestizo-sangley, creole, and Chinese mestizos constituted the local oligarchs of the country. In Landlords and Capitalists, political scientist Temario Rivera revealed that about 87 families controlled the top 120 manufacturing companies from 1964-1986. Sixteen of these families—about 20 percent—were involved in politics. Most of them were members of the landowning elite that emerged during the 19th century, including the Aranetas, the Cojuangcos, the Jacintos, the Madrigals, and the Yulos. “Through government influence,” writes Rivera, “landed capitalists caused the diversion of state resources to traditional elite economic activities like sugar and coconut milling, limiting further industrial diversification.” The third period was highlighted by “the introduction of education and suffrage by the US that catapulted the elites in the first local elections in 1903 and the first national elections in 1907,” Tuazon explained. The elites capitalized on education to acquire new knowledge and information. Through education, both the local and national elites obtained a new form of mechanism, which the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu called “cultural capital.” Education was the ticket to election participation and a prerogative of wealth. In history, the first elections only catered to the propertied class, which comprised less than one percent of the 8

population. William Howard Taft directed this first-ever election limiting the number of participation only to the local and national elites. A CenPEG study on familial membership in public offices (1907 -2004), that is, from the 1st Philippine Assembly to the present Congress of the two Houses found that Congress is home to 160 families that have continuously served each house with two or more family members. In the 1946 Congress, out of the 98 congressmen elected, 61 came from families with members in elective positions from 1907 to 1941. The development of both the local and national elites enhanced their monopoly over the landowning system, and businesses such as mining, logging, sugar, tobacco, real estate, media, links to banks, and others.

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1987 Constitution’s Provision on the Ban for Political Dynasty4

Before the Marcos dictatorship, in what has been described as an era of elite democracy, political control was dominated by a relatively small class of political families like the Ortegas in La Union, the Abads in Batanes, the Albanos in Isabela, the Cojuangcos in Tarlac, the Laurels in Batangas, the Fuentebellas in Camarines Sur, the Aquinos in Sorsogon, and the Cuencos and the Osmeñas in Cebu, to name some. Under the authoritarian regime of Marcos, some survived and thrived like the Ablans in Ilocos Norte, the Asistios in Caloocan, the Dys in Isabela, the Escuderos of Sorsogon, the Josons in Nueva Ecija, and the Romualdezes in Leyte. Brimming with idealism after Marcos’ ouster, the framers of the 1987 Constitution, painfully aware of the potential abuse and excess of allowing select families to have political control, introduced Article II, Section 26, which states that

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First three paragraph are taken from Rufo, Aries EDSA’s failed legacy: Political dynasties, retrieved from www.Rappler.com

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the State “shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.”

The Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission5

Origin The provision on political dynasties was proposed by Commissioner Jose Nolledo during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission in 1986. As originally worded, the provision was “the State shall broaden opportunities to public

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Elefante, Fil V. How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came about ,referencing the minutes of the meeting of the 1986 Constitutional Commission retrieved from http://www.philippinegraphic.ph/index.php/main-story-graphic/102-how-the-constitutional-ban-onpolitical-dynasties-came-about and http://www.philippinegraphic.ph/index.php/nation/111-how-theconstitutional-ban-on-political-dynasties-came-to-be

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office and prohibit political dynasties.” This was eventually changed during the deliberations made by the Constitutional Commission on Sept. 23, 1986. Comm. Nolledo vividly described the then political dynasties in this wise:

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As now appearing in many parts of our country, Mr. Presiding Officer, we seem to approve of the practice that public office is inherited. Now, in order to make this provision more palatable to the Members of the Constitutional Commission, I have decided to restrict the meaning of political dynasty as a suggestion to the forthcoming Congress of the Philippines. x x x I am talking of this in terms of the scope of the term “political dynasty” by saying that a prohibition against political dynasty, Mr. Presiding Officer, is designed to avoid circumvention of the provision limiting reelection of public officers to give a chance to others in running for public office. I would like to be specific, Mr. Presiding Officer. In the case of the local government officials like governors, for example, we allow them to have two reelections. If he is reelected twice, he can no longer run for reelection in which case, he will ask his close relative – a son or daughter or a brother or a sister – to run for public office under his patronage. And in this case, we circumvent the rule against further reelection because it may also happen that his younger son may run for governor and he is still strong enough to exercise moral as well as effective influence upon the son. And the son becomes a subaltern, subjecting himself to the will of the father who was apparently retired. And so, in the case of a President, for example, under the provisions of the Constitution, the President cannot run for reelection. So if the incumbent President cannot run for reelection, she can ask, for example, Noynoy Aquino – assuming that he is already of age – to run for President, thereby negating the laudable purpose for prohibiting reelection. That seems to me to be the meaning of political dynasty although Congress may still widen the meaning of the term. In the case of a governor, Mr.

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Presiding Officer, if he has run for election for the same position, the governor, who is now incumbent, must have built fortunes and even private armies to assure the perpetuation through the election of close relatives. His built-in advantages over his opponents will not widen political participation in an election. x x x.3

Debate On Sept. 17, 1986, Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta asked two questions: “How do we broaden opportunities to public office and how do we prohibit political dynasties? Are not these two goals too lofty and are they achievable at all?” “Although this was initially decided by the Commission when we took into consideration the report of the Committee on Local Governments, I still hope that the Commission will see the proper light,” Nolledo replied. The Commission had junked the proposal to include the prohibition of political dynasties in the local government section of the Constitution. “I am the author of this provision because I take into consideration the political realities in the Philippines where we have small political kingdoms in different parts of the country. I am talking of family dynasties. For example we have dynasties in Luzon, in Visayas and in Mindanao,” Nolledo added. “It seems to me that public office becomes inherited,” he said. “Our government becomes monarchical in character and no longer constitutional. And so, I plead to the Members of this Commission to please approve this provision.” Nolledo added that it would be better to leave the matter of determining the circumstances under which political dynasties should be prohibited. “This Commission will not determine hard and fast rules by which political dynasties may be condemned,” Nolledo said. “But I think this is a very progressive provision and,

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in consulting the people, the people will like this provision. I hope the commission will hear the plea of our people.” Villacorta acknowledged that there was merit to Nolledo’s proposal. However, Villacorta said that Congress would want to be clearer as to the contemplation of the committee with respect to this prohibition of political dynasties.

Father and Son “I would recommend that Congress may take this into account; the son may not run because the father has an edge because he controls the incumbent governor and his son is now running,” Nolledo said. “In other words, the Commissioner is mandating Congress to pass laws that will prohibit a next of kin or a member of a nuclear family from running in the same public office, am I right?” Villacorta asked. “Under the circumstances, the son may not run but later on, when the governor is no longer incumbent and the sun wants to run, he can run later. I think there is an interregnum; there is a period during which he cannot run, but he is not prohibited,” Nolledo explained. “The Commissioner is referring only to the same public office,” Villacorta said. “To the same public office or to another public office,” Nolledo answered.

Incumbency Nolledo then used an example to clarify his proposal. “Why do we not make it like this: the husband is the president and he died: the wife runs for President?” Nolledo said. “In that case, I think the Congress may take into account

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that the husband is no longer incumbent. He is dead and may not have control of the facilities of the government. There is no undue advantage that may take place. Perhaps the rule against political dynasty may not apply to such kind of a situation.” “In other words, the Commissioner is limiting the concept of political dynasty to a situation where the next of kin is an incumbent,” Villacorta said. “That is only an example,” Nolledo replied. “There may be other circumstances that we may not now foresee.”

Ople continues the debate On Sept. 18, 1986, Commissioner Blas Ople once again raised the issue of political dynasties after discussing the conceptualization of human life. “I really wish that there had been more time to develop a good debate concerning political dynasties,” Ople asked. “What I can see here is that the first part of Section 23 would broaden the opportunities for public office and then contract the role of dynasties so that there is a kind of mutual displacement. Would that interpretation be right? In other words, we broaden public office at the expense of political dynasties?” “That is correct,” Nolledo replied. “Political dynasties thrive in many parts of the world and are contingent on many factors, although they may be called with other names,” Ople said. “I think what is abhorrent about political dynasties is the monopoly of political power is that right?” “That is correct,” Nolledo said. “Yes, another abhorrent part is that there is a class distinction involved here,” Ople said. “Usually these are families favored by the accident of birth; meaning they were born to families already with accumulated property. Therefore, that is the injustice that attaches to political dynasties. At the same time, when we survey some of the interesting provinces

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around Metro Manila, I think they partake of the different characteristics of traditional political power. I begin to thread on now on some sensitive spots when I point to Batangas.”

Laurel clan “Batangas is Laurel country,” Ople explained. “But in the case of Batangas, I recall that Sotero Laurel was the Secretary of the Interior of the Aguinaldo government in Malolos. Since the revolution, the Laurels have been a leading political family in Batangas. We are privileged to have with us now, right here in this Commission, one Laurel, one of the most eminent of them all. Under the commissioner’s definition of political dynasties, would that encompass the Laurel family?” “I have not actually studied the details involving the Laurel family,” Nolledo answered. “But it seems to me that Don Pepito denies that he has any political ambition at all and he said that the political dynasty provision should not apply to the Laurel family.” Nolledo then reminded his fellow commissioners that under his proposal, it would be up to Congress to define the meaning of political dynasties. “But my concept is that Congress shall see to it that after the permitted reelection has been exhausted, I think the close relatives should not inherit the position because of undue advantage to others who are equally bright but do not possess the necessary financial support,” Nolledo said. “Perhaps one may not run after the last reelection but he can run later on. I am giving an idea to Congress. The denial is not absolute.”

Relationships “We recommend to Congress that the prohibitions should just cover relationships probably up to the third civil degree or degree of consanguinity or affinity,” Nolledo said.

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“We can limit only up to the third civil degree or fourth civil degree depending on the wisdom of Congress.” “Will a gifted child belonging to my family be eternally proscribed from presenting himself for public office later on because of this disqualification?” Ople asked. “No,” Nolledo answered. “As I said, we have not defined. It is up to Congress to state the circumstances under which the prohibition may apply. In the case of my son, if I feel that I have already exhausted my right to be reelected, as a manifestation of self-sacrifice and out of delicadeza, I will tell my son not to run even if there is no prohibition against political dynasty.” Ople suggested that there should be a measure of rationality and logic attached to the provision to avoid the risk of violating the freedom of choice of voters. “They (voters) are entitled to as broad a freedom of choice as the environment can provide and if they want somebody to run for office even if he is closely related to someone in office, do we have the right to curtail the freedom of voters?” Ople asked. “I believe that the roots of political dynasties, to the extent that these are repugnant in a democratic society, are in the society itself—a feudal socioeconomic structure—whereby those who were advantaged by the accident of birth and have been born to considerable possessions and property can acquire an unfair advantage over others. But I think, ultimately, the solution should be to reform those iniquitous social and political structures, but we should minimize invasions into the domains of privacy of people, that is the freedom of the electorate. The right to be voted upon is the inherent right of suffrage, and I hope Commissioner Nolledo will accept that interpretation.”

Regulation, not prohibition On Sept. 23, 1986, Nolledo told his fellow commissioners that his proposal was popular with the public.

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“It seems to me that the resolution asking for a provision in the Constitution to prohibit political dynasties is very popular outside but does not seem to enjoy the same popularity inside the Constitutional Commission,” Nolledo said. “This provision will widen political opportunities contrary to the opinion of Commissioner (Christian) Monsod because I feel that when we talk of equal political opportunities, we have also to talk more or less of equal conditions under which candidates run for public office. And with this provision, Mr. Presiding Officer, we do away with political monopoly.” After acknowledging the opposition to his proposal, Nolledo suggested that what he actually meant was to regulate political dynasties. “Now in order to make this provision more palatable to the members of the Constitutional Commission, I have decided to restrict the meaning of political dynasty as a suggestion to the forthcoming Congress of the Philippines,” Nolledo said. “I believe, Mr. Presiding Officer, that this prohibition is not actually prohibitory but only regulatory. I am talking of this in terms of the scope of the term ‘political dynasty’ by saying that a prohibition against political dynasty, Mr. Presiding Officer, is designed to avoid circumvention of the provision limiting reelection of public officers to give a chance to others in running for public office. I would like to be specific, Mr. Presiding officer.” Nolledo used the Aquino family as an example to bolster his argument. “And so in the case of a President, for example, under the provisions of the Constitution, the President cannot run for reelection,” Nolledo explained. “So if the incumbent President cannot run for reelection, she can ask, for example, Noynoy Aquino—assuming he is already of age—to run for President, thereby negating the laudable purpose for prohibiting reelection. That seems to me to be the meaning of political dynasty although Congress may still widen the meaning of the term.”

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Opposition Commissioner Monsod then asked permission to be recognized. Monsod said the discussion on political dynasties was like “a replay of the debate” the commission had in the Article of Local Governments when it was decided to junk the proposal to ban political dynasties. “This body voted down a similar proposal on prohibition of political dynasties in the Article on Local Governments,” Monsod said. “And here we are giving exactly the same reasons; we are indulging in the same kind of debate on the same issue. Mr. Presiding Officer, as we said before, the assumption here seems to be that we are underestimating our people in their right to choose; we are trying to put a prescreening mechanism so that public office is not after all accessible to all because we are going to prohibit or exclude certain people from running for public office. And my point is, we should have a little more faith.” “We should give our people full choice. Let them run and let the people decide. That is the essence of suffrage,” Monsod added.

Deletion Monsod then moved to have the section prohibiting political dynasties deleted, saying that it has been argued and debated fully in the Article on Local Governments. “This body has already made a decision on the same point, and secondly, for the reasons I have stated, I do not think we should curtail the right of the people to a free choice on who their political leader should be,” Monsod said. “I would like to comment on the assertion of Commissioner Monsod that this was already adequately discussed,” Nolledo replied. “The issue, at that time, was whether to

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authorize Congress to include in the Local Government Code a provision against political dynasty. And the issue here now is whether to put that as a declatory principle.” Ople then rose and asked Nolledo whether political dynasties were a cause or an effect, considering the lopsided socioeconomic system in the countryside where the advantage of birth favored those more likely to fall in the category of dynasties as Nolledo called them. “The reasons groups of families rotate power only among themselves is that they were the only ones with the means for sustaining political campaigns, is that not correct?” Ople asked. “Yes, the Commissioner is correct,” Nolledo replied. “In that sense, therefore, so-called dynasties are the effects rather than the causes of an imperfect social and economic system, especially in the countryside,” Ople said. “That is a factor to be considered,” Nolledo answered. Ople countered by suggesting that if political dynasties were the effect rather than the causes of prevailing and traditional social structures that maldistribute opportunities, should this Commission not attack the causes rather than the effects? Ople also suggested that the word “dynasty” was probably being misapplied to distinguished political families. He mentioned the political families of Cojuangco and Aquino in Tarlac, the Padilla family in Manila and Pangasinan, the Rodrigo family in Bulacan, the Laurel family in Batangas and the Sumulong-Cojuangco family in Rizal, and the Calderon family in Nueva Vizcaya. “We see lots of evidence that in fact, people disadvantaged by the accident of birth have indeed risen through their own efforts to become successful competitors of entrenched political dynasties in their provinces and cities,” Ople said. Ople also asked Nolledo if the right of suffrage should not be abridged. Ople explained that the right to vote and to be voted upon was derived from the same concept of the right of suffrage.

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Nolledo denied that his proposal did not infringe upon the right of suffrage. “We only regulate the right of some people to run because we want to equalize the conditions between the poor and the rich candidates,” he said.

Pros and Cons Commissioner Serafin Guingona then rose and supported Nolledo. Guingona noted that the provision on political dynasties would be more acceptable to the Commission if the word prohibit was changed to regulate and that the phrase “as provided by law” be added. Commisioners Rene Sarmiento and Minda Luz Quesada then rose to speak in favor of the section on political dynasties. Commissioner Florangel Rosario Braid then asked Nolledo if the prohibition on political dynasties would lead to the development of a pluralistic society and widen political opportunities. Nolledo answered, “yes.” Monsod then rose in defense of the deletion. The matter was called for a nominal voting on the motion to delete the prohibition on political dynasties. According to the minutes of the Constitutional Commission, there were at least two roll calls made to settle the matter. In the end, the motion to delete the prohibition was turned down by one vote. Seventeen voted to delete the prohibition while 18 voted for retention. Commissioner Hilario Davide abstained. Monsod disagreed with the result and asked for a revote while moving to have recess for lunch. The session was suspended at 12:48 pm and resumed at 3 p.m.

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Resumption Once the session resumed, Sarmiento opposed Monsod’s motion. Davide, who abstained, sided with Monsod in calling for a revote. Davide added that Monsod’s motion was in order. The Presiding Officer, Commissioner Efrain Treñas, then called for a vote on Monsod’s motion. Commissioner Luz Quesada questioned the ruling, prompting the presiding officer to say, “Let the whole Commission decide this matter.” At 3:13 p.m., Monsod then asked to have the session suspended for a few minutes. His motion was granted. When the session resumed at 3:27 p.m., Sarmiento rose and told the Presiding Officer that Monsod’s motion was improper because under the rules being used by the Commission, commissioners were not allowed to change their vote. Monsod then withdrew his motion. “In the interest of the body so that we do not exacerbate the situation, I would like to withdraw my motion,” Monsod explained. Davide’s proposal Davide then suggested a compromise. He suggested that the word “BROADEN” be changed to the following: “ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO.” “Then instead of ‘OFFICE’, I propose to substitute the same with the word ‘SERVICE,’” Davide proposed. “So the entire section will read: ‘The State shall ensure equal access to opportunities to public service and prohibit political dynasties.’” “If we change ‘OFFICE to ‘SERVICE,’ we would refer to both elective and appointive positions,” Davide explained. “And political dynasties do not necessarily apply to elective positions alone. They would include appointive positions and perhaps more on

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the latter because it is easier to get a political appointment if somebody close to the family is an elective official, but it is difficult to have a political dynasty on the basis of election because election is an expensive exercise.”“I changed the word ‘BROADEN’ to ‘ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS’ because what is important would be equal access to the opportunity,” he added. Davide’s motion was accepted. But the fight was not over. The Constitution’s ban on political dynasties almost never saw the light of day. When it was suggested that the ban be included in the local government section of the Charter, the members of the 1986 Constitional Commission rejected the proposal. Later, Christian Monsod, who was a member of the Constitutional Commission at that time, went toe-to-toe with the ban’s proponent, Jose Nolledo, who wanted to have the ban included in another section of the Charter. Monsod moved to have the prohibition deleted from the proposed Constitution and the matter was put to a nominal vote. Nolledo’s proposal survived by one vote, 17 votes in favor of deletion, 18 votes in favor of retention. Hilario Davide, who later became Chief Justice, abstained. Afterwards, Monsod tried to convince his fellow Constitutional Commissioners to vote again on his motion. His move was opposed by Rene Sarmiento. Sarmiento reminded his fellow commissioners that under the rules they have adopted, they were not allowed to change their vote. Monsod conceded and withdrew his motion. Davide then made a suggestion. He suggested that the wording of Nolledo’s proposal be changed. He suggested that the word “broaden” be changed to the following: “ensure equal access to.” “Then instead of ‘office, I propose to substitute the same with the word ‘service,’” Davide proposed. “So the entire section will read: ‘The State shall ensure equal access to opportunities to public service and prohibit political dynasties.’” Davide’s suggestion was accepted. But the fight against having the ban was not yet over.

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Commissioner Francisco Rodrigo rose and moved that the phrase “and prohibit political dynasties” be deleted. Another Commissioner, Yusuf Abubakar, seconded Rodrigo’s motion. The presiding officer asked Davide to comment on the motion. Davide replied: “I would rather leave it to the Commission, Mr. Presiding Officer.” Nolledo immediately opposed Rodrigo’s motion.

Technicalities Raised Rodrigo responded to Nolledo’s objection. “That is an amendment to the amendment which was neither accepted nor rejected,” Rodrigo replied. “The proponent (Davide) says that he would rather leave it to the body.” Then Serafin Guingona took the floor. “Yes,” Guingona said. “But would that mean that if it is deleted, we will not be able to introduce further amendments along this line not exactly in the same words but still referring to political dynasties, Mr. Presiding Officer?” Nolledo then raised a point of order. “We have already decided to retain these words including prohibition against political dynasty, as stated,” Nolledo said. “There was a move to delete the provision and the substance of the provision is found in the term ‘political dynasties.’ The intention of the committee is to prohibit political dynasties and, therefore, this intention must be correlated with the entire provision. Therefore, the motion of Commissioner Rodrigio is out of order.” Rodrigo disagreed. “My motion is not out of order because what was voted down was the deletion of the whole section,” Rodrigo replied. “And now, there is a reworded proposal, and I am asking for a deletion of a portion of the reworded proposal. There is a difference. After

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the motion to delete the whole section was voted down, this amendment by substitution was submitted. Andy my amendment to the amendment is to delete a portion of the amendment by substitution. So that is not res judicata, if we were to use a judicial term.” Nolledo continued contesting Rodrigo’s proposed amendment. “The very life and substance of the provision is found in the words ‘prohibit political dynasties’ and I think it was in that sense that the Commission voted in favor of retaining the provision,” Nolledo said.

Rules The discussion then focused on the rules of the Constitutional Commission. Regaldo Maambong, another member of the Constitutional Commission, explained that Nolledo’s point of order was covered under Section 50 of the Commission’s rules, which reads: “A motion to strike out being lost shall not preclude an amendment or motion to strike out and insert.” “That is precisely the reason the committee and the Chair allowed Commissioner Davide to introduce an amendment, because if it were not allowed and if we were to follow the point of order raised by Commissioner Nolledo, there is no point of Commissioner Davide standing up and amending the particular section not deleted by the decision of the body,” Maambong explained. “So the amendment of Commissioner Rodrigo is quite valid because of Section 50.” Nolledo remained adamant in his objection. “I would like to say that the motion of Commissioner Rodrigo is really a motion to delete the very life of the provision,” Nolledo said. “So he is restating the original motion which was already defeated.” Rodrigo disagreed.

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“No, Mr. Presiding Officer,” Rodrigo said. “The substance of the provision, even before the amendment, is to broaden the opportunities to public office.” “That is not the substance,” Nolledo immediately replied. “This matter of political dynasty is just a colatilla and in the reformulated amendment by substitution, the substance is also to broaden opportunities to seek public office,” Rodrigo answered. “As a matter of fact, I am asking for the deletion of “and prohibit political dynasties” because, by prohibiting political dynasties, we do not broaden but restrict opportunities for public office. That phrase is even incompatible, inconsistent with the very substance of the proposed amendment.”

Lost and Confused Minda Luz Quesada then took the floor. “Parliamentary inquiry,” Quesada said. “Can we ask our parliamentarian, Commissioner Maambong, clarification for us ‘nonparliamentarians’ who are getting confused with the rigmarole of rules that are being used?” Quesada added that she and several of the commissioners were getting “lost somehow in the process of the discussion.” Maambong turned to the Presiding Officer and was granted permission to explain. “Mr. Presiding Officer, let us translate the Rules into simple terms,” Maambong said. “We have a formulation presented by the committee. Then there was a motion to delete. The motion to delete was lost. What is the effect? We are back to square one. We still have the formulation of the committee, which is now subject to amendment and that is exactly what we are doing. When the motion to delete was lost, the original formulation of the committee remains on record and it is now subject to amendment.”

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Maambong explained that when the motion to delete was lost, it did not preclude an amendment or motion to strike out and insert. “Meaning, we are back to square one,” he said. “We still have the original formulation of the committee, which is now subject to amendment.” Quesada then asked if the basic concepts in the proposed provision could be changed. “We can change the concept; we can even change the whole provision because we are now open to amendment—we call it primary amendment—because the original provision is now back in the committee report, since the motion to delete was lost,” Maambong explained.

More questions Guingona then took the floor and asked if the Commission had approved Rodrigo’s proposed amendment. “My opinion is, if the proposed addition is substantially the same as the portion that was deleted, then that cannot be considered anymore,” Rodrigo answered. “But if it is not substantially the same, then it cannot be considered.” Afterwards, the Presiding Officer recognized Nolledo and allowed him to take the floor. “I would like to respond to the statement of Commissioner Rodrigo that the prohibition of political dynasties is only correlative to the first part,” Nolledo said. “I was interpellated by Commissioner Ople and I agreed with him when he asked if it was the intention of the committee to prohibit political dynasties in order to widen opportunities to public office and I answered yes.” Nolledo reiterated that he disagreed with Ople’s view. Ople had earlier suggested that prohibiting political dynasties would limit opportunities to public office. Nolledo then asked Rodrigo if he wanted to hear the explanation again. “The gentleman has said enough,” Rodrigo replied.

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Whatever way After Rodrigo had his turn, Sister Christine Tan, another member of the Constitutional Commission, asked to be recognized. “The Chair recognizes Commissioner Tan,” the Presiding Officer said. When Tan took the floor, she told her fellow commissioners that the “main content” of what they voted on so passionately was the issue of political dynasties. “We can apply the law in whatever way we wish so that it comes out that we are not returning what we tried to delete, but in our hearts we know that the main point was political dynasties,” she said. She also wanted to be put on record that those who vote against deletion were voting against political dynasties and those who vote for deletion wanted political dynasties to be perpetuated. Commissioner Crispino de Castro then took the floor and argued that the issue at hand was not political dynasties. “We are talking here of Rule X, Section 50 of our rules as well explained and expounded by Honorable Maambong,” de Castro said. At this point, Commissioner Yusuf Abubakar took the floor. “It seems the debate centers on a proposition that is vital to our democracy,” he said.

Elect their own Abubakar sided with those in favor of deleting the phrase “prohibit political dynasties” from the provision currently under debate. “How can we, on the assumption that we are only appointed, or even if we were elected, suppress the voice of the people if they want an elected representative to continue with one, two, three terms?” he asked. “So be it. We are not here to suppress that voice.”

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He also reminded his fellow commissioners of the dictum that the voice of the people is the voice of God. “So I agree with the proposition of Commissioner Rodrigo, which is to eliminate that portion and let the beginning stand and eliminate ‘prohibit political dynasties.’” At this point, the Presiding Officer appointed Maambong as acting Floor Leader in the absence of Commissioner Napoleon Rama. Maambong then took the floor and announced that the Commissioners present were now ready to vote on the motion to delete the phrase “prohibit political dynasties.”

A technicality Sarmiento prevented the vote from taking place by reminding everyone that the first attempt to delete the entire provision on political dynasties was rejected by a vote of 18 against 17. He added that Rodrigo’s attempt to delete the phrase “prohibit political dynasties,” was out of order. “My submission, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the motion to strike cut is a violation of what we have approved favourably this noon and a violation of Section 50 of our Rules,” Sarmiento said. De Castro, who answered Sarmiento’s assertion, bluntly told Sarmiento to read the second sentence of Section 50. “It states and I quote: ‘A motion to strike out’—and that is the motion of Commissioner Monsod to delete—‘being lost,’ which was lost by questionable votes, ‘shall not preclude an amendment,” De Castro explained. De Castro also pointed out that Rodrigo’s motion was in reaction to Davide’s amendment.

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Point of order Rodrigo, who agreed with De Castro, then said: “The body should vote on whether to vote for or against my amendment.” Davide reacted to Rodrigo’s statement. “Mr. Presiding Officer, for the record, my amendment was not an amendment by substitution,” Davide said. “My amendment is to change only the following words— ‘broaden’ and ‘office.’ And so, it is not to be considered technically as an amendment by substitution.” Commissioner Jose Suarez took the floor and focused on Nolledo’s motion: “And the Gentleman is saying that because of such a development, that should practically bar any futher motion to delete the substance of this particular provision?” Nolledo replied that Suarez was correct. “Before the motion to delete was filed by Commissioner Monsod, all the discussions were centered on whether or not to prohibit political dynasties,” Nolledo said. “And that is the reason the Gentleman is saying that the Honorable Rodrigo, with due respect to him, is out of order in this regard,” Suarez replied. Rodrigo immediately responded to the development. “I am only asking for the deletion of a portion of the section as reworded by the proponent, Commissioner Davide,” Rodrigo said. “I think the situation should be to let the body vote on my amendment. Why prevent the body?” Commissioner Ambrosio Padilla, who was the vice president of the Constitutional Commission, took the floor and tried to clear the matter up by suggesting that a vote be taken. Maambong then asked if Davide’s amendment had been accepted by the Commission. Commissioner Gregorio Tingson told Maambong that Davide’s changes had already been accepted.

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“Since that is accepted, there is now a pending motion to amend the amendment of Commissioner Davide by Commissioner Rodrigo,” Maambong said. “But just to keep the parliamentary situation in order, we cannot proceed to that unless we resolve the point of order raised by Commissioner Nolledo. And the point of order raised is that we cannot vote on the motion of Commissioner Rodrigo to delete the words ‘prohibit political dynasties.’” Maambong also pointed out that since the body was apparently split into those who believed that Section 50 applied to the situation and those who believed otherwise, the Presiding Officer must rule on Nolledo’s point of order. “The Chair rules that the point of order raised by Commissioner Nolledo is not well taken because of Section 50,” the Presiding Officer said. Nolledo tried to appeal the ruling of the Chair but was thwarted by Maambong, who said: “An appeal to the ruling of the Chair is not debatable.” Maambong put the matter to the floor so that the body can vote on it. The Commissioners upheld the ruling of the Presiding Officer with 18 votes in favor and 14 against with no abstentions. This paved the way for the Commissioners to vote either in favor or against the phrase “and prohibit political dynasties.”

Aborted attempt After the bell was rung and the Commissioners called in, Commissioner Colayco tried to prevent the vote from taking place. “I believe we are departing from past practice,” Colayco said. He warned that if this vote was taken, it would effectively paralyze their proceedings. “We will be back to where we were,” he said. “Again, what will stop somebody with another amendment to amend the vote which, in effect, struck out the section, which we have agreed upon by a vote of 18 to 17 to remain?” Colayco added that Rodrigo’s motion to delete the phrase was inconsistent with the first vote which

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approved the retention of the controversial provision. The Presiding Officer immediately responded that Rodrigo’s motion was in order. Thereafter, Colayco conceded and dropped his objection.

The vote Maambong then reminded everyone that those who vote “yes” would be voting for the deletion of the words “and prohibit political dynasties” while those who would vote “no” were for the retention of the said phrase. The matter was finally put to the floor. The results of the nominal voting were 18 votes in favor and 21 votes against. “The proposed amendment of Mr. Rodrigo is lost,” the Presiding Officer said. Then Commissioner Serafin Guingona proposed that the words “as may be provided by law” be added. Davide objected, saying that that it was inappropriate to add such words to the Declaration of Principles. Instead, Davide suggested that the phrase should be “as may be defined by law.” Guingona agreed. Thus, the ban on political dynasties took its final shape and was included in the present Constitution.

Erap, Gloria and Election Problem of the Present. During the Presidency of the Ex-President Joseph Ejercito “Erap” Estrada — the main slogan of his political regime is “Walang Kaibi-kaibigan, walang kamaganak-kamaganak” (No friends and no relatives...) but as history have judged him of being the first president to undergo impeachment and the first one not to finish his term due to EDSA 2 and the immediate ushering of PGMA’s presidency. It is also a known fact that Erap created his dynasty in the City of San Juan in Metro Manila. 33

Wherein we can see that from his sons, wife and mistresses have all “served” in different capacity in the government as mayor, congressmen and even senator. If Makati is a Binay City San Juan is an Estrada City. Going back to history as Erap left the Malacanang Palace the then Vice President assumed Presidency as per the mandate of the Philippine Constitution. We all know her as President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (PGMA) daughter of the ExPresident Diosdado Macapagal. Her reign in power lasted for almost 9 yrs. President Macapagal-Arroyo herself heads a political dynasty as so do many influential senators and representatives, and local officials too all over the land. GMA has two sons and one brother-in-law now as congressmen. She herself after leaving the presidency still clings to power upon assuming a congressional seat in her hometown in Pampanga.

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During President GMA’s reign of power the Philippines saw one of the most heinous election related crime in the country—the Ampatuan Maguindanao massacre. In a paper I wrote for PLSS (Philippine League of Sociology Students) Conference in the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City I identified the psychoanalytic sociological reason why the Ampatuan Clan6 did the unfathomable. Power and remaining in power is the root cause of everything they clan wants to continue being the local warlords of Maguindanao. Later in the analysis portion of this paper I will present the analysis of one of the most respected sociologist in the country no other than Prof. Randy David of UP.

6

As of the writing of this paper the case of the Ampatuan is still under litigation and the Ampatuan members who are implicated for the crime are detained in Taguig BJMP.

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IV. Legal Issue

Just as been explained in the outline and abstract of this paper if the 1987 Philippine Constitution forbids the proliferation of political dynasty why legally speaking, it still pervades the Philippine society and government? Why if it is supposed to be one of EDSA 1’s lasting legacies – the dismantling of political dynasties and oligarchs which invest political power and perks in only a few still subsist today. Why then is Warlordism still rampant in different provinces all across the Philippines? Can Comelec the foremost commission handling election be empowered to do away with this social ill that pervades and dehumanizes the power of the electorate? Can we people of the Republic of the Philippines where the true sovereignty resides exercise the power allotted to us by virtue of initiative and referendum, enact this law that can ride us of this evil?

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In this paper I wish to answer these legal questions. And with the prayer that the Congress, be cognizant of the social ills. That they may reflect on their every action. That they may work upon in restoring the dignity and glory of their tarnished institution’s reputation7.

7

As of the writing of this paper the Institution of Congress is facing a problematic situation. Members from both Senate and House of Representative are being implicated in a Billions of Pesos propensity scam coming from PDAF and Malampaya. Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada and Ramon Bong Revilla Jr. are the once being heavily implicated. It can be seen that the list even if it is not representative enough shows that those implicated are coming from Political Clans or Political Dynasty it can be remembered that Juan Ponce Enrile tried to put his son in one of the seats in senate. While Jinggoy Estrada, son of Erap, belongs to the Clan of the Estrada of San Juan. And Bong Revilla Jr. son of the previous Senator Revilla Sr., husband of the incumbent Congresswoman Lani Mercado, father to Julo Revilla a seating mayor in the Province of Cavite.

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V. Analysis

"Republics are created by the virtue, public spirit and intelligence of the citizens. They fall, when the wise are banished from the public councils, because they dare to be honest, and the profligate are rewarded, because they flatter the people, in order to betray them." Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845) US Supreme Court Justice Sociological Analysis Prof. Randy David the foremost Sociologist from the University of the Philippines wrote in the Philippine Daily Inquirer8 that the main reason for the proliferation of Warlordism in the Philippines particularly in the Ampatuan, Maguindanao where the most heinous crime related to an election happened I because they make used of their big clan as a political power to reckon with in his own “These people do not bother to recruit proxies to run for public office and

8

David, Randy Warlords in a Weak State Philippine Daily Inquirer (2009)

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represent their interests; they themselves become the officers of the state, bequeathing public positions to their children as if these were part of the family heirloom. Their private armies, usually entered as “force multipliers” in the war against terrorism and crime, are paid for and maintained with government funds. Even the local police are “their” police. The internal revenue allotment (IRA), given regularly to local government units, becomes their private cash box. No government auditor would dare question their expenditures. What we have here is the colonization of the weak state by local warlords recycled as public officials”. Prof. David further asserts that “This situation, so pervasive still in our country today, will not disappear as long as our national politicians choose the path of enlisting outmoded local power systems into their political parties, rather than patiently create modern organs of political aggregation appropriate to a democracy. When the national leadership is strong and rests on a clear popular mandate, it is in a better position to dismantle the anachronistic local power centers that operate side by side state institutions. It need not tolerate, or worse accommodate, the existence of parallel sultanates and their abusive armies. But where we have an insecure leadership that colludes with a broad range of non-accountable forces to keep itself in power, it is the modern state that withers away. This, in a nutshell, is the story of our society’s troubled transition to modernity. The transition has not merely prolonged the life of feudal lords; it has equipped them with the latest weaponry, and given them strategic positions in the modern state from which they could continue their oppressive rule”. This analysis is akin to saying that political dynasties make used of their position in the public office as a means of gaining power and dominion over other individuals more equipped in serving the populace that them. And when they are being treated they used the power of their private armies to dispatch of the so called 39

“enemy” which happened to the family of Governor Toto. This is the evils that the Commissioners of the Constitution sees but did not fully act with.

Legal Analysis Hector De Leon on his book, Textbook on the Philippine Constitution. Expressly mentioned that constitutional policy on the prohibition of political dynasties expresses a national commitment to democratize election and appointment to positions in the government and eliminate a principle obstacle to “equal access to opportunities for public service”. The dominance of political dynasties not only kept more deserving but poor individuals from running or winning in elections; it also enabled powerful and affluent politicians to corner appointive positions for their relatives and followers9. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz mentioned in a column published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer that (our election are) “plagued by the

9

De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, pp.79(1994)

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unwelcome political dynasties enjoying special privileges in our republican society that indulges the rhetorical shibboleth that all men are created equal. Since the beginning of our elective government in the early 1900s, several families have maintained their control of their respective constituencies, monopolizing political power like royal prerogatives shared only among their members to the exclusion of other citizens equally competent if not in fact better endowed”10. He further asserts that bottom line is that the provision is at best only meaningless embroidery in the Constitution of 1987. He further blames the Constitutional Commission of 1986 for this serious anomaly. He blames it for recognizing the problem but not doing anything about it when it had the chance to do so while framing the present Constitution. He blames its members for failing or deliberately refusing to directly prohibit and punish political dynasties as inimical to republican government. The harmful dominance of this greedy group was there for all to see, but all the commissioners did was look the other way and innocently say in Article II, Sec. 26 of their magnum opus:

10

Cruz, Isagani End political dynasties, Inquirer (2007)

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The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law? Constitutional Construction will tell us that the above quoted section is by its terms not self executing as most constitutional provision are or should be immediately effective without a need for statutory implementation section 26 is the opposite and remains toothless unless activated by congress. Once again Hector De Leon is persuasive saying that the “State is expressly mandated to prohibit political dynasties. Congress has no discretion on the matter except merely to spell out the meaning and scope of the term11. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas S. J. a member of the constitutional commission and current dean of Ateneo School of Law has another take to the matter referencing his analysis on the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission – “As can be seen, it is a limp-wristed provision. It is like most of the provisions in the Declaration of Principles. They are not strict constitutional provisions which bind; they merely served to shorten Commission debates. At best they invite Congress to accept an idea

11

De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution, pp.79(1994)

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and to give it substance and form12”. But Fr. Bernas has somewhat gives an idea on how to go around the dilemma of a congress not willing to enact a law that will surely hurt its turf. The same article written for the Philippine Daily Inquirer posits a question – “Will a constitutional amendment by referendum and plebiscite, as suggested by the currently disheartened Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes, succeed in drafting a provision that defines what political dynasty means?13 In 2011, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago filed Senate Bill 2649 on political dynasties. Her Explanatory Note14 pretty much summed up the arguments expressed by others for the passage of such a bill. The Constitution, Article 2, Section 26 provides: The State shall guarantee equal access to public service and prohibit Political dynasty as may be defined by law. To give force and effect to this provision, the playing field of the political arena should

12

Bernas S.J., Fr. Joaquin G. About Political Dynasties, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013) Id (2013) 14 Santiago, Miriam Defensor Senate Bill 2649, Fifteenth Congress First Regular session. Explanatory note. 13

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be leveled and opened to persons who are equally qualified to aspire on even terms with those from ruling politically dominant families. Philippine society, many sociologists note, revolves around the system of extended families. However, this extended family system, an otherwise beneficial concept when applied to the social aspects of human behavior, finds its pernicious effects in the political arena where public office becomes the exclusive domain of influential families and clans that are well entrenched in Philippine politics. The monopoly of political power and public resources by such families affects the citizenry at the local and national levels. The socioeconomic and political inequities prevalent in Philippine society limit public office to members of ruling families. In many instances, voters, for convenience and out of cultural mindset look up to these ruling families as dispensers of favors, and thus elect relatives of these politically dominant families.

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VI. Conclusion "Law in the land died. I grieve for it but I do not despair over it. I know, with a certainty no argument can turn, no wind can shake, that from its dust will rise a new and better law: more just, more human, and more humane. When that will happen, I know not. That it will happen, I know." — Jose W. Diokno

The foregoing analysis speaks of the need to solidify the prohibition against Political Dynasty. As Hector De Leon points out that Congress only needs to define what is Political Dynasty is. But they are not doing anything since congress is the breeding ground of this animal we call political dynasty. The perversities of Political Dynasty still subsist. We can even see the great impact of political dynasty such as we can now identify each city, province or region as belonging to a particular clan or dynastic family who rule it. We have many politicians today monopolize the politics on their respective provinces, like the Marcoses, Arroyos, Roman and Garcia of Bataan, Singson of Ilocos Sur, Garcia and Osmena of Cebu, and Zubiri of Bukidnon. They are all in their comfortable and privileged cocoon. Not funny anymore, even Pacquiao, a Filipino sport icon now a congressman of Sarangani have his wife Jinky as a candidate for Vice Governor of Sarangani province in the 2013 election. And it is not just a matter of ruling it they are even siphoning the taxes that we pay for their own personal gain so what we need are laws that will give execution to the provision of the Constitution. We need to properly put a demarcation on the provision so that it can penalize the transgressors and give leeway to those who can serve but cannot do such thing because of the dynasty and its private armies. How can we do it? 45

VII. Recommendation

How then can this provision be enforced and political dynasties ended, or at least regulated? There are four possible options as per the Retired Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban namely legislative, judicial (and quasi-judicial), sovereign and political15. First, is Legislative action? The “no-brainer” option is for Congress to enact a law defining what a political dynasty is, what offices (elective and nonelective) are covered, who may enforce the prohibition, and other details. While some senators and congressmen have perfunctorily filed bills covering these topics, not one has been seriously deliberated upon. As of the writing of this paper, three bills have been endorsed since the Thirteenth congress up until the Fifteenth congress Senate Bills and another three House Bills have been filed but no second reading transpired. On the 13th Congress

15

Panganiban, Artemio “Options to Stop Political Dynasties” Philippine Daily Inquirer Nov.24, 2012

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the then Senator Alfredo Lim filed Senate Bill 1317. For the 14th Congress Senator Panfilo Lacson filed Senate Bill 1468 and for the 15th congress Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago filed Senate Bill 2649 that is in Senate alone. In the House of Representative Bayan Muna Party list and other progressive party list group joined forces in filing for House Bills tackling the issue of Political dynasties. House bill 2493 Representatives Satur Ocampo and Teodoro Casiño sponsored it on the 14th congress. And on the 15th congress House Bill 3314 has been sponsored by the following Reps. Teddy A. Casiño, Neri Javier Colmenares, Rafael V. Mariano, Luzviminda C. Ilagan, Antonio L. Tinio, Emericiana A. De Jesus and Raymond V. Palatino. Realistically, such measures cannot be expected to be approved at this time. After all, many legislators have relatives—parents, children, siblings, and even grandparents—who serve simultaneously in Congress and in other offices.

Tired of waiting for congressional action during the last 25 years, some citizens have filed judicial petitions to compel the Commission on Elections to enforce the constitutional prohibition by denying due course to certificates of candidacies of close relatives.

Secondly, Judicial and quasi-judicial actions. However, these petitions are legally untenable because the Comelec cannot legislate. Note that the Constitution prohibits political dynasties, “as may be defined by law.” True, the Comelec has the power to issue rules and regulations. However, such rules merely implement statutes. Without a law defining political dynasties, implementing rules have no leg to stand on. How about a judicial petition for mandamus to compel legislative action? I am afraid such 47

recourse would also be iffy because courts can command the execution only of a purely ministerial act, which jurisprudence defines as “a simple, definite duty… a precise act accurately marked out… If the law imposes a duty but gives the officer [upon whom it is imposed] the right to decide how or when it shall be performed, the duty is discretionary and not ministerial.” Under this test, the doubt that courts will direct Congress to pass an enabling law since the duty is not clearly defined and precisely marked out. Obviously, the constitutional ban on dynasties is not “self-executing,” unlike, for instance, the term limits on congressmen (three consecutive terms) and senators (two consecutive terms). Here, the courts and the Comelec can disqualify candidates using the bare, but clear, certain and specific constitutional limits without need of an enabling law. Otherwise stated, unlike the dynasty ban, term limits are self-executory. Sovereign action. Probably frustrated by legislative inaction, Comelec Chair Sixto Brillantes Jr. promised to start a people’s initiative for an anti-dynasty law. Now, this is very novel. No law in our country has been approved via a people’s initiative. However, there had been two unsuccessful attempts to change our Constitution via this process. In Lambino vs Comelec (Oct. 25, 2006), the Supreme Court struck down a people’s initiative to convert our presidential system to parliamentary on the ground, among others, that an initiative can be used only for simple and easy-tocomprehend matters, not for changing “basic principles, or several provisions” which “a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake.” Although this ruling involved Charter change, I believe that, by analogy, the same reason stopping a Charter revision can be used to restrain a people’s initiative for an anti-dynasty law. Being controversial, such a proposed law will need a deliberative body in which the proposal can, to borrow the language of the Lambino decision, be 48

“drafted, defined, articulated, discussed and agreed upon in a mature and democratic debate.” Political action. The fourth option, political action, may be the most doable under the present circumstances. Simply stated, let the people decide by voting down candidates who belong to the same family. Those who believe in this proposition can form political movements like the “Kamag-anak sa Politika Aayawan Lahat,” or “Kapal.” Others may use television, radio, newspapers, Internet and social media like Facebook and Twitter. US President Barack Obama effectively used the social media in his reelection bid. His young campaign organizers penetrated the voting population so systematically and so effectively, converting what was predicted to be a close poll into a one-sided Electoral College triumph.

Initiative and Referendum

Through RA 6735 (An Act providing for a System on Initiative and Referendum) I firmly believe that we can find a solution for the problem of antipolitical dynasty bill not being enacted as a law. The law explicitly provides that: Sec. 2. of RA 6735 Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. It further defines what is the scope of the initiative, "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitutions or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. There is a specific type 49

of initiative that can be used namely Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation. The law also define "Referendum" as the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose. The law further notes the requirement for the referendum on passing a law Sec. 4. Who may exercise? The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and register the same with the Commission. (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter. (c) The petition shall state the following: c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be; c.2. The proposition; c.3. The reason or reasons therefore; c.4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein; c.5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and 50

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. Having the requirements provided by law the people can now legislate without the congress.

This law was upheld and affirmed by the Supreme Court (SC) in the case of Santiago vs. Comelec (1997) that provides power to the initiative and referendum on national legislation. The doctrine underlined shows that RA 6735 has mechanisms for crafting legislation at all layers of governance – from barangay to national levels.

VIII. Bibliography "We must believe in ourselves, in our capacity to overcome hardship, in our ability to make the right decision." — Jose W. Diokno

Primary Authority

1987 Philippine Constitution Records of the Constitutional Commission Republic Act No. 6735 “The Initiative and Referendum Act” Official Gazette, Constitution Day, February 2, 2013 270 RA 106, Defensor Santiago vs. COMELEC March 19, 1997

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Secondary Authority

Bernas S.J., Fr. Joaquin G. “About Political Dynasties”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2013) Bernas, J.G. Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government: notes and cases 3rd ed. Manila: Rex Book Store

the

Agpalo, Ruben Statutory Construction, 5th edition Rex. 2003 Casiño, Teodoro Et al. House Bill 3314 15th Congress Cruz, Isagani “End political dynasties”, Inquirer (2007) Coronel, Sheila S. “The seven Ms of dynasty building” David, Randy “Warlords of a Weak State” Philippine Daily Inquirer 2009 David, Randy “The Case against Political Dynasties” Philippine Daily Inquirer David, Randy “The Future of Political Families” Philippine Daily Inquirer Defensor Santiago, Sen. Miriam Senate Bill 2649, 15th Congress Defensor Santiago, Miriam Professional Books Inc. 1999

Constitution

Annotated,

De Leon, Hector Textbook on the Philippine Constitution Diaz, Noli C. Statutory Construction Rex Bookstore Inc.

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Central

Elefante, Fil V. “How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came about”. Philippine Graphic 2012 Elefante, Fil V. “How the Constitutional ban on political dynasties came to be”. Philippine Graphic 2012 Lacson, Sen. Panfilo Senate Bill 1468, 14th Congress Lim, Sen. Alfredo Senate Bill 1317, 13th Congress Lim, Sen. Alfredo Political Dynasty: Anaethema of Democracy Privilege Speech, January 24, 2005 Panganiban, Artemio “Options to Stop Political Dynasties” Philippine Daily Inquirer Nov.24, 2012 Ocampo, Satur Et al. House bill 2493 14th Congress. Rufo, Aries “EDSA’s failed legacy: Political dynasties”.

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