A Book About Nothing

 



 



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his book is many things. There are also many things this book is not, including: in‐ sightful, meaningful, intelligent, or useful. As the title of this book suggests, there is nothing here. In reality, the content that ap‐ pears in this book is the product of yet an‐ other year spent idling in college. Slavery takes a front seat on this journey, with in‐ equity and Asia bringing up the rear (with a little be of Math thrown in for fun), making for one hell of a boring, left‐wing indoctri‐ nated journey. Yes, the liberals are running the schools, and they are openly recruiting. Perhaps “A Book About Nothing” is too harsh of a title. Yes, there are tidbits of introspection in here, and most, if not all, of the topics covered have influenced and changed my perspective on life, race, nationality, and relationships. Maybe there is something to be gained from all this; and maybe you can figure it all out. As for me, I’m happy just knowing another year is behind me, and that I’m inch‐ ing towards the finish line, my limp dick pressed between my sweaty, fat thighs. College is rough. It’s rough for an 18 year old, and it’s rough for a 33 year old. It’s even rougher when you’re trying to hold down a shitty job, pay the ever‐increasing cost of living expenses, and raise a family (i.e. a rabbit). There are times when I think, “You know, maybe this college stuff isn’t for me—maybe I should just be happy with what I have.” And then there are times when I think, “Fuck the rest of the world, I’m going to get what’s mine, and fuck over anyone who gets in my way.” And, of course, there are times when I think, “Why am I doing this? I should build a bomb or something.” Usually it’s the first. Occasionally the second. With that said, this book is really just another collection of notes, essays, papers, and study guides from my time at CSU. As it goes, the past year has been spent acing humanities and mathemat‐ ics courses. I just didn’t have it in me for anymore science. That i   

starts next year, so be prepared to see more editions of Madman Bi‐ ology (as if you wanted them). Why am I writing this? I’m essentially talking to myself. Who the fuck is going to read this? I probably won’t even read this. Is this depressing or what? Yours forever, Thomas Trotter

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i

For Black America & Africa, Spring 2013

ook backward to look forward,” writes Robin Kelley in Dreams of a New Land (Kelley 2002). The weight of this statement is felt in nearly every facet of his introduction, and carries with it the reverberations of past ten‐ ets, assuring history will not repeat itself and informing us that social evolution requires the edification of truth and the discovery of yesterday. As a nation, or country, or world I agree: we learn from those who came and acted before us. As an individual I hesitate: do I stop and allow the digressions of my forefathers to punctuate the narrative of my American sabbatical, or do I purposefully blind the peripheral and loiter around the horizon of tomorrow? Is it wise or even fair, to carry the sins of white America? After all, there is no hope for yesterday, but there is for tomorrow. White or black, an individual who looks for reason in the auspices of yesterday be‐ comes bound by it, like a steel cage masquerading as self‐discoveryii. Space is the place, as the infinitely kaleidoscopic Sun Ra put it, only because the ethereal pages of world history are wrought with moral depravity—an almost tangible cresting wave that washes over all people, regardless of race. Space is the place because space is the future. Maya Angelou certainly does not share my viewpoint. Her accidental exodus from America, while empowering in consequence, seemed encumbered by the threat of pomposityiii. She begins An African American in Ghana with an impressive, if not exhaustive, tally of fellow expatriates and their condensed résumés—a list that forces the implication that education can be positively correlated with rad‐ ical introspectioniv. What does it mean to be black in America? How about Africa? Does your phenotype give allegiance to a land? Do your genetics claim citizenship? If space is the place, why the Atlan‐ tic voyage? 1   

I understand the desire to feel ancestral connections, espe‐ cially when one’s line of ancestry is obscured by the unmitigated shit that was New World slavery. As a white man born and raised in America I can claim one of many countries as my Motherland, includ‐ ing Germany, the Netherlands, England, and Ireland. My bloodline is a homogenous mixture of white Europeans and early 20th century American immigrants. My parents and grandparents have traced my heritage along the path of least resistance, to a small village in Ire‐ land where grass‐roof cottages adorn cobblestone streets; where good, hardworking people toil in cold shafts of sunlight, filtered through the billowing ironclad batteries that so often blanket the rocky isle; and where a good few were, like those that gave meaning and life to Maya Angelou, enslaved and sent off to build an empire. The question persists: do I identify with these people? Do I look to their struggles and hope to divine, or construct the future? Do I expect others to recognize my historical revelations? Even after visiting Ireland and meeting other pallid, nearly translucent people I can firmly affix my allegiance, heritage and home to the United States of America—to Ohio, to Cleveland, to a small apartment I share with a rabbit and a wonderful woman I love. I see no value in the past; I only want to move forward in this life, preferably un‐ hitched from dead people in dead times. But that is me. Era Bell Thompson’s opening in An African American in Africa is, if anything, forthright. Her awareness and apprehension towards Africa is slowly altered as she becomes informed of Africa’s hidden history, eventually leading to an awakening in Nigeria. Unlike Maya Angelou, Thompson would probably agree with my sentiments to‐ wards the aggregation, or evolution of personal identity. Like Robin Kelley, Thompson must “look backward to look forward”, and does so sincerely. Her travels across Africa inform her of a world shroud‐ ed by misconception, and reveal to her a race of people that mirror not only her color, but her new found sentiments towards a black nation. And yet in the end she anchors herself to America. Either she sees that the ties are too strong to break, the similarities too few, or that discovering yesterday is not about a total metamorphosis of personal conviction but a granular addition to a constantly expand‐ ing world perspective. 2

Or maybe I project too much. In reality I’m just a white man trying to survive into the future. I see color and race and religion and sex all around me. I know fuck‐all about the world or the people that inhabit it. In fact, I tend to see them as obstacles. I hide my em‐ pathy with silence, and my conviction with apathy. I am a living ghost. But enough about me. After some thought I have realized that (perhaps) it is less about self‐discovery and more about rediscovery. Europeans robbed black people not only from their homeland, but also of their homeland. Perhaps the “awakening” associated with visiting Africa is nothing more than a persuasive, Afrocentric culture shock, admin‐ istered by beautiful people in a land steeped in lore and veiled histo‐ ries, invoking pathos and revealing a cultural identity that had been locked away for nearly 400 years. And perhaps the rediscovery of African history is the spark that ignites the fires of black power, pushing black Americans towards the horizon of tomorrow, where freedom is no longer just a joke on the inside of gum wrapper. After all, you can’t get to space without first lighting a fire. Maulana Karenga’s contribution to the inferno of Black Na‐ tionalism was Kwanzaa, the anti‐capitalist, anti‐white, anti‐ establishment surrogate holidayv. While the origins of Kwanzaa lie with one man whose ideas about America and Black Power eventual‐ ly led to the formation of the US Organization, its sentiments and dogmas lie with the people who practice it. In particular, the seven principles of Kwanzaa speak volumes about black power and its des‐ tination. The rise of Kwanzaa as an accepted holiday is punctuated by several key moments that span the country, including experi‐ mental gatherings led by Sister Makinya in California and the EAST Organization in New York. Yet still, after nearly sixty years since the first celebration of Kwanzaa, the majority of the country is only pas‐ sively aware of its existence or purpose (BIG Research 2004). I feel conflicted. There is an immediate assumption that Christmas and capitalism are exclusively white affairs, ignoring the fact that Christianity has proselytized people and spread its philoso‐ phy across every continent. There is no doubt that Catholicism is run by old, nearly comatose white men garbed in dresses, but the underlying message in Christian doctrine can be separated from the popes and bishops dallying through Vatican City and applied to any 3

person of any color, so long as they possess the ability to generate faith. The perversion of Christmas in America is a symptom of capi‐ talism—and a mild one at that. I enjoy receiving gifts just as much as the next person, but I gain more pleasure from giving. I do not hold faith anywhere on or in my body, but I can always appreciate the happiness propagated from charity, even if it is commercially driven. I realize that Karenga fought against popular white culture in a bid to push his ideals concerning black people in America, and that the creation of Kwanzaa was an embodiment of that, but it seems predicated on the total dismissal of the qualities of America that are positive and, at the very least, potentially race‐neutralvi. Further‐ more, the separatist approach taken by Kwanzaa seems counterintu‐ itive to equality; after all, how can a group be inclusive and exclusive at the same timevii. Former Black Panther member James Coleman said it best, “By only stressing the unity of black people, Kwanzaa separates black people from the rest of Americans. Americans must unify on whatever principles ensure we live in a safe, prosperous, God‐loving country, with the race and ethnicity of any American seeking to abide by those principles being of no consequence.” (Scholer 2001) E. Frances White explores the possible reasons why capital‐ ism and Kwanzaa should be shunned by black people in America. His article, Africa on My Mind: Gender, Counterdiscourse, and AfricanAmerican Nationalism explores the more sordid, conspiratorial as‐ pects of racial relations in America. The white bourgeoisie, as he as‐ serts, engender racist and sexist views toward black Americans and Africans via psychological warfare—a strategy primarily enforced via the control of popular opinion (dictated by the white media) and the misuse of language. I can certainly see his point concerning the media: in today’s world interests are shaped by radio, television, in‐ ternet, and various news outlets that, quite curiously, congeal as they swarm around hot‐button issues. Often times the turn is plain to see, but I still have to wonder how often people are swayed or fooled by liberal editing, fallacious anchors, or outright lies. At some point I had to stop trusting “the news” and accept that the words and images that constantly bombard me are simply advertisements con‐ cocted by a controlling class. If this can happen with gun control, missing white children, and presidential elections, then there is no doubt that the dominant image of black culture (“a model of abnor‐ 4

mality”, as White puts it) had been, or continues to be fabricated by elite old white men. However, it could also be argued that the images of Africa we are being fed in this class are similar fabrications, born from Black Nationalism and the Afrocentric movement heralded by Molefi Kete Asante and Kariamu Welshviii. In fact, the same could be true of any view held by any country/person. It is all very confusing and convo‐ luted, and getting to the truth seems insurmountable. Does this mean that Afrocentric ideals lie polar to, or conflict with Eurocentric ones? As Asante argued in Afrocentricity, Race, and Reason, the goal of Afrocentricity is not to isolate black culture from white culture, but to coexist as best as possible. In fact, there seems to be a lot of overlap when looking at the intentions of Afrocentricity and Eurocentricity. The five characteristics of the Afrocentric idea, as outlined in Asante’s article, could theoretically be applied to any group of people. The “subject‐object” relationship, however, is what really drives Afrocentricity to the forefront of the American con‐ science. There are so many threads to follow in these first few weeks that my head physically hurts. It’s like trying to put together a puz‐ zle while wearing oversized mittens. It may not seem obvious, but this reaction paper was written over span of two weeks, and the ini‐ tial apprehension and dissent conveyed near the start of it all is a recorded manifestation of the resistant force applied when conven‐ tional ideas are challenged. Even now, as I go back and read the first few pages, I feel the hesitance and chagrin from provoking an old mind set in old ways. If time permitted, and if I were only going after approval, I’d take a blowtorch to this paper and start it over. I tried to keep my reactions as unadulterated as possible, even at the risk of sounding ignorant and/or absurd. As is said, change does not come easy, and must be fought for. So keep fighting me; by the summer I may have a more pow‐ erful lens to focus the world through.

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Please Note: these endnotes often contain reactions not pertinent to the topics at hand, reactions that were cut from the original draft, and/or passages that attempt to elaborate/clarify certain talking points. I understand that their use may be unconventional, but their inclusion was a natural process involved in writing this reaction paper. ii I should clarify that “looking at yesterday”, in this context, involves people and moments not directly connected to the present—that is, the history of those that came before us. This says nothing about self-reflection, which can be a powerful tool when dealing with psychological malaise. Looking at past moments in our lives can significantly affect how we view and interpret the world. For some, I’d imagine, the act of learning history and incorporating it into their personal views has the same effect. It exists, and I’m aware of it—I’m just wondering if it improves or hastens the spread of equality. iii This is based purely on an initial reaction to her writing. I could be totally wrong (and likely am), but I’m leaving it as is. These are my reactions, for better or worse. iv This is a cut reaction: “She and her American-born, American-educated friends romanticize the discovery of intrinsic African virtue—accomplished via intermittent and exclusive gatherings—in a country that only now has raised its Human Development Rating to 130 (Klugman 2010).” There are several reasons why I decided to cut this reaction from the body of the paper: It sounds mean, it is mean, and it paints Africa in the same light that E. Frances White discusses in his article Africa on My Mind: Gender, Counterdiscourse, and African-American Nationalism. I certainly don’t want to propagate that image of Africa, but I think it is important to include my initial reactions so that I know where my preconceptions lie, and were the dysfunction in them exists. v Now, when I read that one man is responsible for the creation of a holiday I ask two questions: who is this man, and who is following him? I’m immediately reminded of more nefarious actors such as Jim Jones, preacher to the poor, promising a new nation in space to a group of well-intentioned but uneducated astronauts, or L. Ron Hubbard, the quasi-Jesus who charged into Florida armed with new age decrees to purify and cure the mind. While Karenga’s past is certainly filled with controversy, including convictions for torture and kidnapping, the intentions of Kwanzaa, including its creation and practice, appear to be genuine, and born from a polarizing movement to unify and differentiate black Americans from the white majority. vi This is in specific reference to the philosophies behind Christianity and capitalism. I understand that, as practiced in America during time Kwanzaa was invented, these two philosophies were stacked in favor of white men. However, this says nothing about the moral implications behind these two philosophies, and everything about their corruption. vii Original draft read: Furthermore, the separatist approach taken by Kwanzaa seems counterintuitive to equality; after all, if a group of people can manufacture a nationally recognized holiday whenever they choose, the idea that black and white Americans are somehow equal, or ever will be, seems trivial. How can two groups be equal if one is given the power to reinstate, subjugate or fabricate culture? The rural plains of America may be overrun by conservative white men, but its cities and borders and universities house its greatest secret: that every religious, political, racial and special interest group under the sun has a hand in shaping the country’s underlying moral fabric. If

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every group has a voice, then Kwanzaa is a god damned power ballad, sung through a bullhorn atop a ladder made of light. This reaction was cut for obvious reasons. viii I certainly enjoyed how Asante mentioned that it was Asante who first started the Afrocentric movement. My initial comments on Maya Angelou’s pomposity pale in comparison to this. While it may be true that Asante was the proverbial progenitor of Afrocentricity, self-aggrandizing the fact (when no challenge to the contrary had been issued) seems unnecessary. As is this commentary on it.

References BIG Research. 2004. 2004 Holiday Spending by Region. Report, Washington DC: National Retail Federation. Kelley, Robin. 2002. "Dreams of the New Land." In Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination, by Robin Kelley, 14-35. Boston: Beacon Press. Klugman, Jeni. 2010. Human Devleopment Report 2010. Report, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Scholer, J. Lawrence. 2001. "The Story of Kwanzaa." The Dartmouth Review.

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For Black America & Africa, Spring 2013  

he rich and intricate history of the black At‐ lantic is, in many ways, responsible for the American diaspora. From the buildup of port towns and urban centers in Africa, to Africa’s intercontinental slave trading, and eventually to the dispersal of Africans to various places across the Atlantic, these narratives aggregate and congeal into the modern sentiments that support and spread the foundation of the American diaspora. However, I have to question the validity of a vast, overreaching black diaspora existing in country that is, in my opinion, a machine that constantly churns out smaller and smaller diasporas. I think it is only right to start with the definition of “diaspora”. David Northrup, in his introduction to Crosscurrents in the Black Atlantic, describes a diaspora as, “[the] people dispersed away from their homeland by force or other circumstances” (Northrup 2008). This seems like a concise definition, and one that applies not only to dispersed black people but to any group ejected from their home‐ land. However, as pointed out later in Northrup’s introduction only a small percentage of African‐Americans are in touch with their Afri‐ can roots, and many still view Africa as a continent rife with poverty and savagery, an unconscious image perpetuated by the dominance of Eurocentric ideals. This begs the question: is a diaspora a label, an emotion, an elevated sense of identity, or a movement? Are African Americans—those who do not identify with either Africa or slav‐ ery—still part of a diaspora, despite their views being predicated on subliminal misinformation? Can we refine the definition of a diaspo‐ ra and extrapolate a more broad meaning, or is it too specific? Can I experience a diaspora in my own family? In school? In my commu‐ nity? What entails being dispersed and what constitutes a home‐ land? 9   

Stuart Hall’s rise to diasporic intellectuality was maintained and underscored by his involvement in the New Left Movement and his education in England—a place that he describes as a diaspora within a diaspora. From his interview, The Formation of a Diasporic Intellectual, it can be seen how formal European education eventual‐ ly led him to a more mature and worldly view of the diasporic phe‐ nomenon. It is interesting, then, that Hall chose to stay in England rather than return to Jamaica (or set off for Africa). Most of his black colleagues/contemporaries (many from Africa) took their white Eu‐ ropean education back home in an attempt to mend whatever politi‐ cal, cultural, or economic landscape that needed repair. Like many of us today, Hall experienced a feeling of separa‐ tion/alienation from both his home country and the country he lived in. He alludes to the idea that this is an increasingly potent part of the human condition—that as technology and human ingenuity con‐ tinue to increase, in both speed and availability, the world shrinks. Culture and customs and information bleed through satellite feeds, phone towers, and fiber optic cables, spreading across the world in‐ stantaneously. Humans move and shuffle across borders, learn new languages, share experiences, and make what is foreign known. We form our identities based on this wealth of variability. We group to‐ gether in countries, in cities, in schools, in cliques, in pairs, and even‐ tually we find ourselves alone, sitting on the precipice of self‐ awareness, wondering why we are so different from everyone else. For many, then, it seems as if such isolation outweighs the emotional thrust of being part of a focused diaspora. Hall’s situation was certainly unique, but his identity was formed, in part, by this al‐ ienation, as well as the speed of the world and its ability to pass you by—an aspect of life that affects all of us, regardless of race. In comparison to Hall, President Obama’s diasporic arousal was more succinct. He starts off chapter 15 from Dreams of My Father by contemplating the dichotomy of Africa; how the dissemina‐ tion of the Eurocentric‐led condemnation of Africa clashes with the Afrocentric, near utopian notions of black Africa. This same dichot‐ omy carries over into his physical presence in Kenya—from his wholly unimpressive arrival at the airport, to his treatment as a tourist at the market, and eventually to his sense of belonging when reunited with his family. Still, he seems conflicted at times; he real‐ izes the world has changed and that he must adapt to survive, but 10

also that the changes are so damaging to the perception of Africa and black people that he must rebel. He wants to take Africa to America, but sees the futility. He wants to feel united, but isolation still haunts him. Even his sister, who spent time in Germany, still clings to an identity that is, at times, European—and one that seems incongruent with the identities forged by the people of Kenya. He sees the sin‐ ewy connections in Africa, but knows he is an American. So again I ask: what is a diaspora, and how is it bound? If we abide by the definition given by Northrup, would Obama be part of a diaspora? How can he be dispersed away from his homeland if he is an American? Was slavery even a factor? Many paths lead back to the enslavement of Africans and their displacement across the Atlan‐ tic, but in today’s world, in today’s America, in a time when we all struggle to identify who we are, what we are, and why we are, we must first recognize the emotional buffers that shine and illuminate the patina of our individual identities before we blanket ourselves with the horrors of history. Of course, that is not to say that slavery cannot, or should not fit alongside the gears that turn identity, or that slavery is not a fun‐ damental pillar of the diaspora; it is more a question of whether or not current generation African Americans attribute slavery as a root cause for their cultural/societal detachment (if any even exists). Let me try to explain. I consider myself an average human being in nearly every facet: height, weight, wealth, education, intelligence, wit, and so on. I am a shining example that the distribution of such characteristics fit nicely within a bell curve. My knowledge of Afri‐ can slavery was one of profound ignorance—that evil (and primarily white) sea pirates sailed the Atlantic, drunk on rum, high on opium, and stole their human booty from the shores of foreign lands. These sea pirates, like most pirates of fiction, would rape and loot and murder and plunder wherever they went. They were, as guilt and race would have it, my relatives. I carried their blood in my veins and their sins in the color of my skin. I would forever be branded as such, and held responsible for the consequences of their slanted mo‐ res. Being an average human I now wonder how the perception of slavery plays out in the minds of others. Are they just as erroneous? Do they exist on a spectrum of color, where white leads to guilt and black to reproach? Is the concept, not the content, of slavery used as 11

an excuse for such learned emotions? Or is my gap in knowledge an oddity? Furthermore, can a middle‐aged white man who never cared for history class—who much preferred the cold calculations of science and math—be qualified to comment on how slavery, race, and history factor into the densely wound tendrils of the diaspora? In short, if I am average, and if I am an idiot, then so too are the ma‐ jority of Americans. We are mostly unaware of what motivates, in‐ spires, or moves us. Our identities are a heterogeneous mixture of lies, half‐truths, and straight out delusions. Stephanie Smallwood’s Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora works against my factually (and intellectually) deficient picture of slavery. Thus far, Smallwood’s book has accomplished two things: it has corrected and focused my inept sea pirate metaphor, bringing life to some aspects and killing others, and it has me wondering if Karenga was right about capital‐ ism. Philosophically speaking, and seeing as how the timeline of human ethics appears to be entirely relative, I am also wondering if Immanuel Kant was full of shit. The enslavement and commodification of people, as de‐ scribed by Smallwood, certainly provokes an emotional response— primarily that humans are severely and unabashedly fucked up—but it also illustrates how a cultural (and evil, immoral, disgusting, etc.) practice of taking slaves from warfare can be corrupted into an en‐ terprise that spans the world. Humans seem to be good at manipu‐ lating and exploiting markets, and slavery was no different. Small‐ wood meticulously walks us through the struggles Europeans faced as trading in slaves became big business, as well as the cultural and societal impact it had on the enslaved. It is a surprisingly detailed account of how, in her opinion, the American diaspora was born1. I feel a bit lost. Perhaps these events coalesce and ripple across time, like a handful of rocks being thrown into a lake that is already crowded with cresting whitecaps. Perhaps I lack the insight to see it all, or perhaps I don’t want to see it. The sea pirates found a way to turn humans into coconuts, and kinship into nihility, but how does that connect to Stuart Hall and Obama, whose own Diasporas 1

The fact that African and European slave traders/factors kept such detailed logs and diaries during this period further illustrates how human ethics takes a back seat to greed. I should stop being so surprised by this.

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had more to do with uncovering and facing personal dilemmas than with the implications of saltwater slavery? Is there some bolded thread that I’m missing? Does history channel and direct the flow of emotion over generations? I am not saying the connection to slavery is absent or trifling when considering the American diaspora, or that its existence hinges on understand and/or relating to the experiences discussed in Smallwood’s book, but more and more I wonder how many people actually incorporate saltwater slavery into their personal identities. The concept of a diaspora is clear in its meaning, but when its prin‐ ciple—that people can be neatly grouped together based on a second hand experience—takes precedence over the innate individuality and pervasive alienation in modern America, the diaspora trans‐ forms into a pseudo‐boundary between people of different racial backgrounds. We are all lost. It is part of the reason people like me (those who are not in their early twenties, who are not coming into adult‐ hood, and who think a fedora should not be worn with jeans) go to college and take history classes about things they know nothing about. We don’t know what else to do, and no one is there guide us. We are all struggling to fulfill a role in a society that neither cares nor wants us. I am one of over a hundred biology majors at Cleve‐ land State University, one of thousands in Ohio, of tens of thousands in the country, and, if karma has its way with me, in several years we will all be fighting over a single, low‐wage job in a town or city or country that only exists to bleed us of our money and privacy. The thousands of dollars I owe to the government will be paid back in small increments, each check a woeful reminder of how totally bro‐ ken our higher education system is. There is no time to sit around and contemplate slavery when contending with such immediate and pressing matters. The same, I assume, applies to many in my posi‐ tion. To put it another way: there are no slaves or slavers on a sinking ship. There are no class lines, no sexism, no racism, and no divisions among men. What you will find, however, is a bunch of brainy, fire‐wielding apes, all clinging, crawling, fighting and drown‐ ing in a deep and dark blue abyss. References 13

Northrup, David. 2008. Crosscurrents in the Black Atlantic. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's.

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For Black America & Africa, Spring 2013

s of late I have been working nearly 60 hours a week as a bookbinder in a win‐ dowless brick building, plodding along at heart‐attack‐pace to make someone in a suit another hundred thousand a year. The few moments I have at home I spend reading. I read about men and women, religion, slavery, taxes, education, racism, crime, poverty, hope, fear, heaven and hell. I read and I think, ‘what, exactly, is slavery?’ It is control or forced obedi‐ ence? Is it the denial of freedom? Is it a seizure of the psyche, or a battering of faculties? It is expressed physically or emotionally? It is all of that, or none? The more I think on this the more I come to real‐ ize: I am just an amalgamation and representation of the vastness of humanity. I own nothing. My thoughts, my genetics, my desires, my instincts are all products of the past. There is nothing original about me or any other human. I parrot talking points expressed by the culmination of human discourse, seek women, food and fighting that satiate the chemical hunger embedded in a mass a grey matter, fold‐ ed in the electric wool of neurons and synapses, and I write with the sedated aplomb of those that came before me, the Vonnegut’s and Orwell’s that I so passionately envied and mimicked. Religion still perverts my intimations of life and death, like a thin nimbus cloud inflated over a barren desert, and science casts an austere shadow over an existence that, at one point, seemed crowded with romance, mystery and creativity. And then I think, ‘I am a slave’. Immediately such a thought would be discarded as absurd. In fact, I would have to be drunk or high to make such a claim. How can my American life—one festooned with amenity and luxury— possibly compare to that of an African slave in the 18th or 19th centu‐ ry? I am neither beaten nor raped by captors. I am not chained. I 15

am not forced to work in that windowless brick building, nor am I forced to sit here and write about it. And yet I still feel throttled by this existence, as if some pair of inexorable hands were pulling me towards surrender and conformity. I feel owned; not by any one person, but by the remnants of history, by the nucleotide sequences in my genes, and by the ideas passed on via friends, family, film, and every other influential medium. To be sure, my life is neither physi‐ cally torturous nor lamentable when compared with any individual that existed during the period of African slavery, but the effects are the same. I carry with me these sentiments, and if I were selfish enough to reproduce I would pass them on to younger generations. And then I think, ‘I am a slave’. The people I read about are slaves as well. Their tales are the same. Whether originating from Meriwether’s “Proudly We Can Be Africans” or Campbell’s “Middle Passages”, these stories aggregate to form a singular narrative of misplaced obligation to Africa, no doubt spurred by common misconceptions about the continent (and its people) as well as the blindingly surreal machinations of Christiani‐ ty. William Sheppard stands as the exception to the rule; though his involvement in spreading God’s gospel remained strong until his death, the common image of Africa being populated with unenlight‐ ened savages was quelled and contorted to something more in line with the truth—that the people of Africa had their own cultures and societies, their own methods of governing, each of which was no less valid or savage than America’s, Belgium’s, or Britain’s. It is a shame that it took years of comingling with native African’s to find this uni‐ versal axiom. The other characters in this history are sheathed in grime. Delany, who thankfully left the dissemination of Christian idealism to others, reeked of self‐aggrandizement. His constant flip‐flopping on issues speaks to this, and shows he was more concerned with garnering recognition from those in high places than enacting actual change. That’s not to say a person cannot change his mind. Certain‐ ly I have had my fair share of flip‐flopping, but changing an opinion when convenient, or when opposition bares down on you, is more akin to modern politics. Yes, the Fugitive Slave Laws of 1850 pro‐ vided a prime opportunity to change opinions on emigration, but Delany would change again and again depending on where he was 16

and with whom he was in negotiations with. He would have made a very good senator or congressman. Henry Turner was at least consistent when it came to emigra‐ tion. I find it hard to villainize, or at least criticize those who hold faith in religion or God. I cannot cast aside statistics—that the ma‐ jority of humans gravitate towards some Godly explanation as to our existence and purpose—but I also cannot ignore my instincts. Turner certainly felt that what he was doing would benefit black people in Africa and America, but to what cost? I read of these in‐ trepid men and their exploits in Africa and only see cultural destruc‐ tion. Christianity has this curious ability to shape and mold cultures, to obliterate tradition, to convert innocence into sin, and to shame or kill those who stand in its way. Turner came into Africa bleating the tenets of the Bible and parroting the populist American opinion that Africa was a land shrouded in heathenish darkness, two powerful tools he used assail the native African cultures. He wanted to “uplift” the African peoples with stacks of Bibles, with the wise words of Christ, and with promises of redemption and permanent placement in some utopian afterlife. He was a slave to his beliefs, a carbon copy of every other American missionary, only louder. This, of course, assumes that Christianity, or missionaries in general, had a net negative effect on African people. If this were a manifesto I would loudly proclaim that religion always has a net negative effect on people and society; but these are not the pages of my diary, and I am neither stupid nor brave enough to swing such a sword. I find myself hung up on this point because I recognize how religion plays a part in my own world view. I cannot subscribe to religion because it delays the advancement of human civilization, but I cannot subscribe to atheism either. I cannot spout atheistic rheto‐ ric without feeling dishonest, without admitting that I’m just some know‐nothing shithead living in a malaise of intellectual laziness. I don’t know if God is dead, or if life really is a divine spark. I only know what I believe, and that makes me just as suspect as Turner and Sheppard, just as much a slave to authority and influence. Charles Joyner offers some insight into African American Christianity in “Believer I Know”. Again we find Christianity being used as a tool to subjugate and “domesticate” so‐called heathens. What astonishes me is that the slaveholder’s mission was predicated on outright lies, contradictions that can be easily traced through 17

Christian scripture. Follow Jesus and you’ll be a better able to serve your master. Follow Jesus and your soul, not your life, will be saved. It is amazing that black Americans were so quick to adopt and transmute Christianity, even if it contained “seeds of disorder”. The development and spread of Christianity amongst the en‐ slaved laid the groundwork for what would become a quest to save Africa from itself. If we ignore the spirit possessions, the “Plat Eyes”, and the magical shamanism (and its derivatives), we find a set of moral tenets that practically compel the most devout to lay hands of salvation on Africa. These are the sentiments that expose organized Christianity as the corrosive toxin it is. Throw some missionaries into the “heathenish darkness” and you can simultaneously save and destroy a culture. It casts aside native African society as intrinsically devoid of worth. These enslaved peoples, some of whom had been taken from Africa, quickly found faith in a religion that was able to justify the horrors of slavery, and then sought to spread it to their motherland. This truly confuses me. So, naturally, we look to history in hopes that it will illumi‐ nate the reasons for why these people were so quick to adopt and spread their ideas of civilized culture. Some historical retellings would have me believe that slavery was abolished in this country, that the land of the free finally earned its name by putting question‐ able words into law. However, there is so much evidence that points in the opposite direction. As an institution and commerce slavery may have heard its death knell, but its recession into history only opened alternate avenues of repression, control and segregation. Even Sheppard, a man celebrated among white and black communi‐ ties, could not shake the body blow delivered by Southern life. As a man who accomplished more in life than most could ever hope for, he still felt pinned under the white finger of inequality, never ques‐ tioning the white man’s position on the Congo or its problems. I find it troubling that Turner, Sheppard and Delany were so quick to adopt a culture that, for the most part, would not accept them as equals. Inequality, as a cultural cornerstone, was carried across the Atlantic by those who had been slighted. African Ameri‐ cans came to the shores of their motherland—to Sierra Leone and Liberia—with the same mentality as their white suppressors, going so far (in some cases) as to enslave native Africans, or to take em‐ ployment amongst the slaving syndicate. These immigrants were 18

not Africans, they were Americans through and through. I tend to agree with Fredrick Douglass, who positioned himself against emi‐ gration, claiming the onus was on America, his home, to enact radical change. Of course, African Americans were also carving out their own culture from the subjugating fabric of American democracy. Gomez discusses this brand of cultural development in “Talking Half Africa”, shedding light on the adoption and molding of the English language amongst enslaved populations. So we see that culture is a malleable product of human evolution, able to be plied and folded into virtually any shape. And we see that enslaved blacks, who had no choice but to integrate into American culture, affixed their own poetic flair to the language. This appropriation and metamorphoses of cultural mainstays cascaded into the religious realm as well, seeing the ad‐ vent of a distinctly African American Christian sect. Still, these slight modifications do not make up for what is, at the very core, tainted. Cultures clash and adopt various mores from one another naturally. This much I understand. I do not want to paint either American culture or African culture in any color other than clear coat. It just seems that the colonization of Africa was so violent and forceful that any cultural comingling that occurred was aberrant. I do not mean to sound opposed to interweaving cultural fabrics, but we can at least let it happen naturally via the more docile facets of culture (music, writing, photography, etc.) without the sacking of civilizations or the complete proselytization of people’s beliefs. Without turning them into slaves. This relationship America had with Africa went further than just Liberia and missionary efforts. For some it was cerebral, with Africa representing an uncivilized expanse, replete with barbarism, cannibalism and horrid disease, often attributed to supernatural forces. Other saw Africa as the shadow of a kingdom long gone, of‐ ten claiming that their blood was that of royalty. As Campbell shows, some of that is true: the Zappo Zaps often roasted and ate human flesh, disease was one of the more deadly aspects that Westerners had to contend with, and kings certainly did rule and procreate, but by and large this image of Africa was false. Chapter four in your book explores how some African Americans confronted these no‐ tions via stage plays, and illustrates how influential arts can be when assaulting a culture’s dominant discourse. Whether the plays were 19

successful or not matters little; their existence stands as a testament to a changing tide in African American sentiment, one that wiped the lens clean of white bigotry. I spoke briefly of emigration in class, and my thoughts on it are as muddled as ever. Cugoano certainly saw the predicament black people were being swayed into when the first ships sailed for Sierra Leone, and the American Colonization Society is the antithesis of a morally pristine charity, further cementing Cugoano’s fears. There was nothing graceful or humble about the intentions of those who advocated for freed blacks to emigrate from the United States, and there was nothing punctual or organized about the logistics of transportation or colonization. For all intents and purposes, emigra‐ tion and colonization were synonyms for the plunder of Africa, and both represent breeding grounds for corruption and mismanage‐ ment. As for the people that partook in emigrating, I feel as if they left one country that did not want them and found another that did not need them. It is hard for me to sit here and question their mo‐ tives for leaving America, for in the face of racism, inequality, lynch‐ ing and political marginalization I cannot fault a man or woman for seeking asylum elsewhere. In reality, I’m surprised that violent up‐ heaval was not more commonplace in the South. It would have been bloody and unnecessary, but justified. Emigration presents an interesting argument: does a margin‐ alized person flee from the land that marginalizes them, or does he or she fight to change the cultural and societal landscape, hit the problem head on, and assault those who stand opposed? It is a ques‐ tion that I am not equipped to tackle. To run, whether from defeat or in search of respite, corrodes social progress. To stay and fight strengthens the resolve of the enemy, confirms their suspicions, and forces tumult. Douglas argued that freed blacks should stay in Amer‐ ica and fight, a position that I find to be more manageable, if not more righteous, than emigrating. Sheppard and Delany (occasional‐ ly) argued the opposite. I have to reiterate: the end of reconstruc‐ tion saw the South return to slavery, if only by another name, and had those in power actively working to disenfranchise, if not eradi‐ cate, free black Americans. How do you fight that? And how can you run from it when such sentiments are firmly engrained in the Ameri‐ can psyche? 20

In the end I see no clear answer. In the mind’s eye emigration is painted with wide, disingenuous strokes, and highlighted with far‐ cical tones. It seems as if it were nothing more than a ploy to get rid of freed black people. However, proponents like Alexander Crum‐ mell and William Sheppard describe Africa as a land steeped in beau‐ ty and riches, a place ripe for cultivating a black Christian nation that could rival America. How could one deny this possibility? How could one balk at such an idealized future? In the end, however, Africa would not be transformed into some Afro‐Christian superpower; ra‐ ther, it would be divided and sectioned off, like a golden pie, and served to European countries whose sole intention was to gorge on it. It would be given to people like King Leopold and others of simi‐ lar ilk. This can be quick and dirty: King Leopold was a prick. He rep‐ resents all that is wrong with government leadership. How do such men rise to power? Why is necessary that those who lead countries be sociopathic assholes, devoid of humanity, hell bent on power and greed? What creates these men, and what festers in their soul? Honestly, he reads like some James Bond villain, or Orwell’s Big Brother, or Koestler’s No. 1. I have to constantly remind myself that I am reading historical accounts and not some political thriller. There was a lot of talk about social Darwinism during this time, and I can think of no greater antagonist to this already feeble hypothesis than King Leopold. He demonstrates that power and prestige are not won with merit, but with nepotism, deceit and murder, qualities that make him more a savage than the people he bled in the Congo. I am finding it hard to put a wrapper on this reaction paper. I have ignored large topics, including: the conditions immigrants met in Sierra Leone and Liberia, Paul Cuffe and his involvement during the infancy of the emigration movement, Thomas Jefferson and his absurdly malignant plan to “eliminate future breeders”, and I cer‐ tainly missed a prime opportunity to further explore the cartoonish‐ ly immoral American Colonization Society. On top of that I cut about a thousand words that drunkenly wobbled into the realm of philo‐ sophical bullshit, paragraphs that attempted to explore the origins of evil and the ethical principles of utilitarianism and egoism. Again, I found myself emulating others, spouting ideas that were never my own. 21

I suppose there is no logical end for this paper. The ideas that exist here will bleed into the next reaction, and I have no doubt that in a couple of weeks you’ll be reading another collection of words that attempt to cobble together this historical narrative. I apologize for the length and promise to be more active in culling the more su‐ perfluous tangents.

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For Black America & Africa, Spring 2013

am still not sure what to make of Marcus Garvey. Is he a prophet, as the Rastafarians claim, or is he a dedicated grifter, setting up pyramid schemes like the Black Star Line only to extract money from the poor? It is hard to classify a man who is so revered yet stumbled so many times. His United Negro Improvement Association certainly had de‐ signs on uplifting poor black African Ameri‐ cans, and he did firmly fix his eyes towards the Western shores of Africa, where Liberia stood on the precipice of Black Nationalism, but the methods he em‐ ployed to convey these designs were often times marred by poor leadership. However, does this detract from the message he propa‐ gated through books and newspaper articles? Are his shortcomings the epitaph for the movement, or can Garveyism transcend these faults and rally on into new generations? Garvey’s message of “Africa for the Africans” appealed to all permutations of African Americans, but his following mainly consist‐ ed of the under‐privileged. This makes his appeal for money (in the form of stocks) a bit suspect. I understand that his jail sentence and deportation was largely political, but the single instance of defraud‐ ing a man for 25 dollars seems indicative of a larger problem—that he would ask for and misspend money from people who had little to offer other than hope. The Black Star Line is one example of how Garvey was able to defraud his followers in the name of sensational‐ ism and spectacle. Garvey seems to exude this palpable bravado, never deviating from the pomp and circumstance of public demon‐ stration or from the trivial titular endowments he was so fond of (Provisional President of Africa?). His conquest for racial unity and “Africa for the Africans” seems steeped in naiveté, probably a conse‐ quence of him never visiting Africa (or from misinformation on the topic). Furthermore, his personal views concerning black people 23

seem to contradict his message; if the majority of “his” people “are in darkness and are really unfit for good society” how can they rule Af‐ rica for themselves? If his intentions were to uplift them (which, I suppose, they were), you only need to look at Liberia as an example of what black immigrants “uplifted” in a Western culture will do when tasked with colonizing their Motherland. To make matters worse, Liberia, the one foothold America had in Africa, did not want Garvey or his ideology to penetrate its borders. Garvey’s faults become even more apparent when examining his personal life, particularly his romantic endeavors. By all ac‐ counts Garvey had great taste in women: strong, independent, intel‐ ligent, motivated, and free from the mold of subservience. And by all accounts Garvey had great trouble with women: the qualities that initially sparked his attraction were moot when marriage entered the equation. Amy Ashwood, his first wife, found this out the hard way. He abandoned his second wife, Amy Jacques, when he traveled to Britain. Both women embodied the feminist movement of the late 19th to early 20th century, when cultural and social inequalities ap‐ plied to both white and black women. Ashwood’s involvement in creating and organizing the UNIA illustrates the influence feminism had over Garvey during his early years, and her intimate involve‐ ment in the organization, even after (supposedly) divorcing Garvey stands as a testament to her dedication to the cause. Aside from these criticisms, Garvey’s message to African Americans was one of profound truth. He, like other prominent black figures of the time, rightfully advocated for all forms of equali‐ ty, and his U.N.I.A. justly argued for rise of a black nation (even if Garvey’s own designs for said nation were “vague”, as Sundiata put it). Furthermore, as Vinson points out in his chapter “The Rise of Marcus Garvey and His Gospel of Garveyism in Southern Africa”, Garvey also “demanded freedom for the people of India and Ireland and all other colonized lands”. He was not afraid to rattle the cage, so to speak, which is probably why he drew so much attention from Hoover and the F.B.I. I think it is apparent that Garveyism was able to transcend the failings of Garvey. I suppose all movements are shaped in a simi‐ lar manner: via the distillation of basic principles. I am reminded of Occupy Wall Street, which despite being a failure on the frontline planted its seed in the American psyche, assuring that its sentiments 24

would live on. Garvey assured his gospel would rise above his per‐ sonal defects by basing his assertions in clear truth. His anticolonial ideologies would live on in the early Rastafarian movement, where he would be described as a prophet, his divinity second only to Se‐ lassie. Like Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois is a hard man to catego‐ rize. Early on in life he viewed Africa in burnished shades of racial divergence, advocating for “self‐segregation” and “separate but equal” treatment of blacks. To Du Bois, black Africans were crea‐ tures driven by emotion rather than logic, a quality that lent beauty and romanticism to native Africans, and one that stood out as sepa‐ rate from white men. It also reinforced the idea that skin color is correlated with expectations of cognizance, an argument that, in my opinion, only pushes the racist conceit of human speciation further into the collective white mindset. Even when working and living in Liberia, Du Bois directed most of his attention to the controlling set‐ tler class, further illustrating, if not accepting, the cavernous divide between the indigenous population and those in power. Liberia held promise for both W.E.B. Du Bois and Marcus Gar‐ vey. It served as a staging ground for the whole of Africa, and if suc‐ cessful would bolster their impassioned ideas of a successfully run black government. Early on Du Bois used religious mysticism to pos‐ it black solidarity, relying on specific scriptures and divine authority to rally supporters. It was not until later in his life when the common threads of oppression and global enslavement wound around the diaspora. This, perhaps, allowed Du Bois to see Liberia in terms of social and political terraforming—as a piece of the Motherland that, with his ingenuity and support, could be sculpted into the penulti‐ mate black nation, the last stop on the road to a unified Africa. Never mind the corruption, stemming from both the colonial government Liberia adopted and the divide between Western immigrants and native Africans. Never mind the greed, the missing funds from loans, or the complete mismanagement of assets. Let us just forget about the Firestone Rubber Company steamrolling through, effectively en‐ slaving a nation founded by the enslaved, a deal Du Bois helped to fruition. If we could only see around these innately human forms of exploitation and demoralization, we could position Liberia as the centerpiece of global black power. 25

Du Bois knew of the corruption taking place in Liberia and remained silent, evidence that he was either party to it, or indiffer‐ ent. Liberia was rife with forced slavery, rape, and open rebellion. The conditions were so amiss that American officials attempted to paint the Firestone Rubber Company as a victim of Liberia’s social decay, unable to conduct legitimate business in a country ravished by corruption. Du Bois even blamed Africans for the inception of the transatlantic slave trade, the point in time that he knew to be the framework for the African diaspora. Thankfully, George Shuyler was around to contend with Du Bois’ combative conjecture. He lifted pockets of truth from Liberia and exposed them to his readers, al‐ lowing a more transparent discussion to take place. His advocacy of colonial over indigenous rule in Liberia, while controversial in its own right, spoke to the corruption that permeated every nook of the government. In many ways DuBois and Garvey were similar. They both sought freedom from, if not the abolition of white supremacy the world over. They both conceived of a solidified black nation existing in Africa—a nation capable of self‐preservation without the support of Europe or America. They both inspired masses of African Ameri‐ cans to reinterpret their conceptions of Africa and its native people (DuBois more so). And both made considerable missteps along the way. Yet they hated each other, squabbling over ego, jabbing each other with childish insults and public mockery. The foundation of black solidarity, built and supported by both men, seems to crumble under such behavior. Here we have two giants working towards similar goals, yet unable to collaborate or even discuss their differ‐ ences in a civilized manner. It all seems silly and pointless. Du Bois describes Africa and its native people as beautiful. The popular movement to “uplift” Africa from heathenish darkness was lost on Du Bois, who viewed Africans through a lens of pride. Ethiopia’s triumph over Italy in 1896 had a similar effect on African Americans, who were able to look across the sea with contented eyes as members of their race defeated an invading white army, illustrat‐ ing how war has the ability to inspire solidarity. Similarly, when Mussolini came looking for retribution in the early 1930’s African Americans were again able to rally around Ethiopia as a beacon of racial pride. 26

James Meriwether’s “Proudly We Can Be Africans” throws so much history at you in the first two chapters that I have to wonder if each paragraph could be extrapolated into its own book. There are certainly some odd bits thrown in there: white people claiming Ethi‐ opians as members of their own race, the protracted pleas from Afri‐ can Americans as they petitioned the impotent American govern‐ ment to show support for Ethiopia, and the role of communism in reshaping the struggle for black solidarity. African Americans, it seems, met with opposition every time they moved to support Ethi‐ opia, culminating in a level of frustration I cannot even imagine. They wanted to volunteer their service to the Ethiopian army but were blocked and threatened with denaturalization or jail time. They wanted to send aid and supplies, but only a few charities were legitimate, the others existing to con people of their money (none of which were charged!?). Competing newspapers argued about the level of involvement African Americans should take in the war (if any), at least one of which doubled back on their position and then conveniently forgot the path they tread. The general lack of re‐ sponse from the American government prompted many African Americans to question Washington’s political motivations, some claiming America wanted Italy to win, effectively forging an alliance against Hitler. As Meriwether points out, the turn‐of‐the‐century idea that Africa needed European colonialism to uplift its people began to dis‐ sipate as African Americans investigated and read more about the continent. The fact that Ethiopia was able to stand united against a foe was, according to The Courier, enough to inspire African Ameri‐ cans to unite. I still do not fully understand Mussolini’s reasoning for invading Ethiopia, other than retaliatory. Was it that easy to sell war to the Italians: revenge for a battle lost nearly 40 years ago? Where was their outcry? Where was their opposition? Then the Nazis come swooping in with their notions of racial superiority. For all of America’s faults—their history of slavery, the American Colonization Society and emigration, Jim Crowism, segre‐ gation, lynching, and so on—I am honestly surprised that America did not carry Hitler’s torch as he cut swaths through Europe and Russia. I suppose it speaks to the changing mentality in the States, especially concerning racial superiority and communism, the emerg‐ ing menace to freedom. 27

So let me get this straight: America fought against fascism and communism, and today we fight against socialism. Is there any –ism we won’t fight? Moreover, in fighting against communism America decided it was better to allow European countries to keep their col‐ onies in Africa rather than let newly independent nations develop their own forms of government, some of which may have been com‐ munist. That rationale seems broken. Why would America fear the development of communism in Africa? As Meriwether points out, Washington had little interest in Africa South of the Sahara, so why the concern? For me, a lot of this information is lost in translation. I can see why Russia was a threat to our survival, just as any nuclear pow‐ er is, but communism seemed to have a place in American politics during the 30’s and 40’s, when many black activists supported Marx‐ ist interpretations. Furthermore, the fact that Washington began to question Jim Crowism only when segregation was used as anti‐ American propaganda shows how reputation took precedence over equality. Both of these chapters weave a story of African American pleas falling on deaf ears, and that the speed and moral “uplifting” of Washington was motivated solely by the machinations of politics, war, and imagined “red” threats in Africa.

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For Black America & Africa, Spring 2013

n 1948, we find the notions of white su‐ premacy transfigured into government pol‐ icy. How Malan was able to sell apartheid to anyone is disconcerting in itself; however, the fact that he nearly doubled his majority in Parliament in 1953 indicates that white South Africans were supportive of apart‐ heid’s inherent racial bias. In general, this seems like a fundamental problem arising from the construct of race. More specifical‐ ly, the (mostly) nonviolent opposition aris‐ ing from the Defiance Campaign worked against the fight for racial equality; the government was able to portray opposition to apart‐ heid as savage pro‐communism. Furthermore, America made it clear to the world that communism in any form was the real enemy to freedom and democracy, therefore providing justification for color‐ ing anyone who opposed Malan and apartheid in the most fervently anti‐democratic shade of red. America’s indifference to apartheid went beyond cold war anti‐communist rhetoric and supplanted the fundamental ideals of democracy with the need for strategic material goods. America needed uranium, and South America had plenty of it. This seems to be a problem birthed by global markets, and one no longer unique to America. America needed uranium to build nuclear weapons during the cold war, so it ignored racial inequality in South Africa as a means to obtain it. Today, America needs a variety of transitional and rare metals to produce iPhones, computers, weapons and so on, so we ignore the racial inequality, human rights violations, and vio‐ lent conflict arising from their acquisition. The convenience and im‐ mediacy afforded by these products far outweighs the destruction left in their wake. Capitalism wins again. As well, the marginalization and denial of civil rights to Afri‐ can Americans at home severely limited Washington’s willingness or 29

ability to criticize South Africa’s raced‐based legislation. America’s lack of criticism provided the Soviets with even more propaganda. African Americans were quick to respond: they argued that apart‐ heid contributed to the rise of communism in South America, and that American intervention could subdue or eliminate communist tendencies amongst the non‐white races. Still, America walked the middle ground, ignoring South Africa’s perversions of democracy in order to maintain a profitable and strategic relationship. The irony is clear: America allowed the degradation of democracy to proliferate through its African ally while at the same time presenting it to the world as only viable vessel for freedom. With this understanding, Soviet propaganda transforms into factual statements. The tragic events of Sharpeville set apartheid on a global stage, and forced America to make a public statement concerning South Africa’s treatment of Africans. Yet even in the wake of this massacre, Eisenhower reaffirmed his lackadaisical attitude towards apartheid and assured South Africa that America would continue to support white rule. This illustrates two things: that America needed colonial power in South Africa to continue unabated, and that the U.N. was/is entirely ineffectual in promoting its own mission state‐ ment. African Americans convened in several congresses to pressure Washington and the U.N. to condemn racial discrimination in South Africa. Nothing occurred. Again, the threat of communism took prec‐ edence over the freedom, welfare, and now lives of black Africans. The U.N. was complicit with this course, showing that American con‐ cern far outweighed peace and human rights in South Africa. Despite these mixed messages from Washington, and despite Sharpeville putting apartheid and white supremacy on a global stage, many African Americans still viewed Africa as a dark continent in need of uplifting. The fact that the black press continued to per‐ petuate this viewpoint during the Defiance Campaign stands as a tes‐ tament to the persuasive power of American propaganda. Thankful‐ ly, the Mau Mau and Nkrumah stood poised to challenge the status quo, forcing America’s reconceptualization of Africa, its native peo‐ ple, and her colonial interlopers. The British, in an apparent conquest to colonize the entire globe, went to Kenya and did what they do best: plant flags in foreign soil and pillage what is ripe and fruitful. As to be expected, the native inhabitants, united under the Mau Mau movement, fought back, jus‐ 30

tifiably invoking violence in place of the (mostly ineffectual) civil disobedience displayed by the Defiance Campaign. Like apartheid, African Americans framed the Mau Mau movement as an anti‐ colonial fight against white supremacy. Unlike apartheid, it adopted a militant comportment, and chose blood as its fuel. Unsurprisingly, America was hesitant to challenge colonial powers at a time when support against communism was valued more than upholding democratic principles, and chose to remain in‐ different to or supportive of Britain’s actions in Kenya. Essentially, ending white rule was deemed harmful to the fight against those commies. Furthermore, the notion that native Africans had only just come down from the trees permeated the government’s psyche, af‐ firming their belief that a colonial‐ruled Africa was far better than a native‐ruled Africa. African Americans had a different perspective, viewing the Mau Mau’s struggle for land and freedom as an anti‐ colonial endeavor, and perhaps for some, a violent parallel to their own struggle for equality. Since many African Americans saw com‐ munism as supporting racial equality, they argued that colonial rule and white supremacy in Africa necessitated the adoption of com‐ munist ideals. America, not wanting to make waves in their democ‐ racy‐for‐all kiddie pool, chose to walk the middle ground (just as they did with South Africa). Again, African American outcry went vir‐ tually unnoticed by Washington. The violence of the Mau Mau movement stands as the most glaring point of contention; after all, the violence affected more na‐ tive Africans than it did white invaders. The civil disobedience exhib‐ ited by the Defiance Campaign hindered their cause when Malan painted their opposition as evidence that South Africa needed even more race‐based legislation. The Mau Mau movement had a similar response from America; it reaffirmed stereotypical beliefs that na‐ tive Africans were barbaric heathens. Of course, America was quick to forget their own violent struggle for land and freedom from a co‐ lonial power. Still, statistics show that the Mau Mau directed most of their violence towards complicit natives rather than colonial settlers. This, perhaps, is one reason why African Americans would not open‐ ly support the Mau Mau’s militant tactics; after all, black America’s guiding imperative to end the colonization of Africa and white su‐ premacy the world over could never be measured with piles of black corpses. 31

The Mau Mau movement precipitated new ideas concerning Africa and its native people. Older notions that painted Africa as an uncivilized continent began to deteriorate as Mau Mau frustration boiled over. However, Eurocentric preconceptions of Africa would not fully wither until the Gold Coast wrestled freedom from Britain, and Kwame Nkrumah took his seat as the proverbial leader of an in‐ dependent Ghana. Ghana’s independence inspired many African Americans to refocus their mental pictures of Africa and its native people. Ghana’s history of slavery linked many African Americans to its shores, and many could trace the component lines of the black diaspora to the Gold Coast. This, coupled with the political thrust Ghana received when it achieved independence, provided African Americans with a new view of Africa, and perhaps for the first time, showed them tan‐ gible evidence of a united black nation. Nkrumah emphatically embraced Garveyism, going so far as to start his own Black Star Line and to adopt the symbol as the cen‐ terpiece for the Ghanaian flag. The ideals embodied in Garveyism stood forefront in Nkrumah’s vision for Africa, and were important factors that led many African American to immigrate into Ghana, in‐ cluding George Padmore and W.E.B. Du Bois. In particular, Nkru‐ mah’s visit to America (after becoming president) moved many Afri‐ can Americans to reinterpret their notions of Africa, and convinced others to heed the call to help build the foundation of a unified Afri‐ ca. However, America stood looming in the shadows like a jealous ex‐boyfriend, ready to sabotage any chance Ghana had for achieving its vision as if it were a date at the Olive Garden. The expatriates that came to reside in Ghana during Nkru‐ mah’s rule were unified in nearly every aspect, save for their politi‐ cal ideologies. Most had come as temporary workers, helping to build up Ghana’s woefully deficient infrastructure, but a few promi‐ nent African American figures did appear, including Julian Mayfield, Maya Angelou, William Hunton Jr., Preston King and Bill Sutherland. Most of them had similar stories: troubles in America led them to be unemployed, blacklisted, or frustrated. Ghana provided them with an opportunity to work outside the confines of American Southern rac‐ ism and white supremacy, and gave them hope for the future of Afri‐ ca. However, the political diversity of these outspoken expatriates drew the eye of America. The expatriates found themselves in the 32

perfect position to criticize America’s internal civil rights struggle, potentially providing more propaganda to the Soviets. And if we know one thing about America it is this: they love to hate com‐ munism. Communism, communism, communism. Boy, America really hated communism. It makes America look like a one‐trick pony, run‐ ning around the world giving gold stars to countries that embrace democracy, and conspiring to topple those that did not. Of course, that is assuming America really did make a concerted effort to raise opposition to Nkrumah and his idea of nationalism. That is also as‐ suming Nkrumah’s downfall was a result of American meddling, and not his own paranoia and/or abuse of power. Campbell’s chapter strongly alludes to a C.I.A. plot to foster dissent, eventually leading to the coup d’état, but makes no definitive conclusions. Either way, Ghana never fully achieved the ideals of Garveyism. The notion that Ghana provided a haven for American expat‐ riates, and therefore a breeding ground for communist propaganda, likely contributed to America’s exuberance when Operation Cold Chop succeeded. Perhaps Nkrumah would have never led Ghana into an age of a United Africa, but in this political game of chess, Ghana looks the pawn, simply changing hands from Britain to America, and never given a genuine chance to succeed. Still, Ghana’s independence became a source of pride for many Africans and African Americans. Furthermore, Ghana led the charge of African independence, seeing more than a dozen countries gain independence only three years after Nkrumah came into power. Africa certainly appeared to be on the right track. However, Ghana’s relative ease into independence stands in contrast to the Congo, where freedom from colonial rule cast the country into tumult. Meriwether is blunt about the Congo’s history: King Leopold and the Belgian government enslaved, slaughtered and suppressed the native people. The horrors of the Congo are tied directly to colo‐ nial rule, providing concrete evidence that colonization only benefits the colonizer. Even after achieving independence in 1960, colonial powers still meddled in Congo affairs, afraid that Lumumba would fall into Soviet hands. The conflict that arose from independence was a consequence of colonial rule as well; after generations of suppres‐ sion, subpar education for natives, and wholesale enslavement, the ill‐equipped Congolese grasped the reins of government and 33

promptly made of mess of things. African Americans seemed to be the only ones recognize this fundamental problem. From America’s point of view, it is the same story: do not let the fires of communism burn in Africa. To achieve this, America at‐ tempted to keep peace in the Congo via the U.N. What followed comes as no surprise: more problems. This brings up a strange con‐ tradiction I am currently struggling with: many Americans wish Washington would mind its business when dealing with foreign af‐ fairs, that we should pull support, either financially or militarily from those countries we see as potential threats, or from countries we deem to be “backwards” or in violation of our mores. Others believe America should be more involved, that our military might has the ability to keep peace, and that Washington has the bankroll neces‐ sary to buy allies and quell disorder (or something to that effect). Meriwether casts Washington in both lights: as do‐nothings and as involved meddlers, and in both situations, America looks bad. Any course America could have taken in either situation would have end‐ ed poorly, and non‐action can certainly carry the same moral weight as action. I suppose I am just trying to ascertain any semblance of reason for America acting as it did, or if it was in any way justifiable. In any event, the mid‐20th century marked many changes for both Africa and African Americans. Not only had the continent changed with the rise of independent black‐ruled nations, but Amer‐ ican sentiments towards the continent shifted more towards a posi‐ tion of hope and pride. Nelson Mandela and the defiance campaign, Nkrumah and Ghana, the Mau Mau in Kenya, and Lumumba in the Congo all challenged American misinformation concerning Africa, and corroded the cage that colonization held them in. The success or failure that any of these movements found was moot: Africa was changing, and neither America nor their cold war newspeak could change that.

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he African diaspora persists throughout modern society, serving as a perpetual re‐ minder of how the autocratic European ide‐ alism dominant during the Atlantic slave trade shaped and molded the modern insti‐ tutions that influence black identity and cul‐ ture. In particular, the comprehensive transformation of an African indentured servant to a European commodity— including the processes of capture, en‐ slavement and shipment across the Atlan‐ tic—serves not only as a microscope for viewing the enigmatic moral fabric that insulates the Western world, but also as the fundamental infrastructure from which the African diaspora is shaped and trans‐ ferred through generations. Stephanie Smallwood, in her book Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora explores the logistics and systematization that buffeted the commodification of people living on the African continent. The callous and calculated manner in which European factors stripped enslaved Africans of their cultural, social and physical identities contributed greatly to a profound sense of isolation and displacement—emotions which have since calcified into the constituent pillars of the African diaspora. It was this trans‐ formation—from prisoner to product—that exacerbated and has‐ tened the endemic practices of enslavement and warfare, two innate African divisions that ultimately drove Atlantic trade. Michael Gomez makes a similar argument in his article Talking Half African: Middle Passage, Seasoning, and Language, where he writes, “. . . the very process of enslavement directly informed the restructuring of the slave’s identity” (Gomez 1998, 154). This re‐ structuring—caused not only by the process of enslavement but also 35

by the European commodification of the enslaved—marked what would ultimately become the base of the African Diaspora, and (to some) still serves as the mechanism by which they disconnect from, or reject, the Eurocentric identity so prevalent in the Western world. Like most other commodities, the trade in human beings takes root in the simple economics of supply and demand, and finds corruption with the impending allure of greed and gold. As Small‐ wood writes, “. . . for African merchants with insufficient access to gold, ships like the San Francisco represented an expansion of oppor‐ tunity—a fresh avenue to wealth and power” (Smallwood 2007, 18). Even in today’s economic climate, where corruption seemingly knows no bounds, it is hard to imagine that this “fresh avenue” that led many African merchants toward prosperity was constructed and paid for with the social, cultural and physical deaths of thousands of captured Africans. Slaves were treated like disobedient animals: stripped naked, shackled, and forced to abandon their land, people and customs. They were branded, both physically and emotionally, and had their features and physical qualities meticulously recorded in factory manifestos and shipping logs—distinctions reserved for cattle or crates of tobacco. Upon reaching the Atlantic coast slaves were held in prisons, mixed and intermingled with other enslaved people from across the continent, further diluting their sense of community or shared heritage. Every part of their journey was marked with some kind of death; social death, which worked to as‐ phyxiate the African’s intrinsic cultural fires, took precedence over physical death, where fleeting moments of pain could end a lifetime of servitude and suffering. To the African it was the death of their old identity and the birth of a new one. It was the initiation of a social, cultural and economic metamorphosis—one that would immutably thrust them into the margins humanity. As Smallwood succinctly ex‐ plains, “[t]he Atlantic market for slaves changed what it meant to be a socially, politically, or economically marginalized person” (Small‐ wood 2007, 30). This experience of commodification had two very unique consequences: it weakened and dehumanized the enslaved African, easing their transition from person to product, and it forced an oth‐ erwise segregated population of Africans to share in an experience that, in spite of (or perhaps because of) the atrocities, inspired a sense of solidarity. Smallwood elaborates, “[the] Atlantic commodifi‐ 36

cation meant not only exclusion from that which was recognizable as community, but also immersion in a collective whose most distin‐ guishing feature was its unnatural constitution: it brought strangers together in anomalous intimacy” (Smallwood 2007, 101). It is in this warped method of forging unity and intimacy where we begin see the glinting particles of the African diaspora settle. The commodification of African people was driven by the demand of both physical and intellectual labor in South and North America. European trade facilitated the transfer of African slaves to the New World, a process that could last for months and could lead to the deaths of many captives. For the African, the horrid and humil‐ iating conditions aboard the cargo ships often eclipsed those seen on land, where such obstacles as obtaining food, water, and physical space were, at the very least, easier to tackle. The death and dirt and rape experienced by those who survived the voyage—those who reached the New World and were sold at market—only strength‐ ened the solidarity within their community. In fact, the emotional devastation was strong enough to send out a generational reverbera‐ tion, affecting the offspring of their offspring, the kin of their kin, and the multitudes of African descendants the world over. Gomez inter‐ jects with similar insight, writing, “[t]he means by which they were transported was of such violence, the anguish they suffered of such depth, that their memory was veritably seared into the conscious‐ ness of both the African and her African‐born progeny” (Gomez 1998, 164). This generational bleed‐through is evidenced in the writings of Stuart Hall, whose own struggle with isolation and identity shed light on the far‐reaching consequences of the Atlantic slave trade. Although Hall had no direct relationship with Africa, his writings and ideas about identity focus and reflect how the years of colonialism brought on by the Atlantic slave trade affected his conceptual under‐ standing of the diaspora, and how it influenced his intellectual pur‐ suits. In Hall’s interview with Kuan‐Hsing Chen, appropriately titled The Formation of a Diasporic Intellectual, he writes, “[g]radually, I came to recognize I was a black West Indian, just like everybody else, I could relate to that, I could write from and out of that position” (Chen 1996, 489). This recognition served as the base for his intel‐ lectual development while living and studying in England, and com‐ pelled him to view the African diaspora as a composite of cultural 37

duties, eventually leading to his involvement in various like‐minded organizations. Hall further expands on this concept in his article Cultural Identity and Diaspora, where he writes “. . . our cultural identities re‐ flect the common historical experiences and shared cultural codes which provide us, as 'one people', with stable, unchanging and con‐ tinuous frames of reference and meaning, beneath the shifting divi‐ sions and vicissitudes of our actual history” (Hall 1994, 393). Here, his writing clearly illustrates how black identity is fashioned from the African diaspora and its irrefutable cultural impact, a conse‐ quence of their “common historical experiences”. The African diaspora envelopes, motivates, and edifies people from every corner of this planet. Luminaries such as President Bar‐ rack Obama and Maya Angelou, both of whom reconnect with an Af‐ rica lost to slavery, stand as a testament to the objective existence of a group whose connective tissue is wrought in iron shackles and branded by the immoral enterprise of European capitalism. The practice of slavery is, in itself, a seemingly timeless part of world his‐ tory, but the methods employed during the transatlantic slave trade were so visceral and affective that the resulting diaspora was, in both its worldly breadth and cultural profundity, unparalleled. Its ability to change and alter the consciousness of the individual cas‐ cades into the political and economic realms, affecting laws, local economies, neighborhoods, and, more importantly, the dominant perceptions of race and identity. To say that slavery had an impact on the African diaspora would be a disservice to the documentation presented by Smallwood and Gomez—slavery is the reason for the diaspora, the sole progenitor, the only god it knows. Furthermore, the addendums of slavery—that is, the capture of warring tribesmen and women, the deadpan commodification of human beings, and the excremental (among other) horrors of the transatlantic voyage—firmly grasp the African diaspora and thrust it into the modern age, assailing Eurocentric preconceptions and chal‐ lenging historiographical authority. It gives the diaspora the ether needed to live and thrive, the metaphysical fuel to rocket it into the stratosphere of human consciousness, and it red‐lines humanity’s capacity for compassion and understanding. It shapes and molds the identities of everyone it touches, regardless of whether or not they recognize it. It defibrillates the intendment of the dead and enlight‐ 38

ens the living, allowing the world to glimpse truths that would oth‐ erwise remain embalmed in the archives of European history. It serves as a rough‐hewn integument for the African diaspora, collect‐ ing and unifying people into one worldly body; and like all epidermal canvases it grows calloused and strong with time, like a living, breathing scar raised on the shoulders of Atlas. It is unwavering, un‐ relenting, and perhaps for some, it is the incontrovertible definition of life itself. References Chen, Kuan‐Hsing. 1996. "The Formation of a Diasporic Intellectual." In Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, by Kuan‐Hsing Chen and David Morley, 484‐503. London: Routledge. Gomez, Michael E. 1998. Exchanging Our Country Marks. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Hall, Stuart. 1994. "Cultural Identity and Diaspora." In Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader, by Patrick Williams, 392‐ 401. London: Havester Wheatsheaf. Smallwood, Stephanie. 2007. Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 39



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frica for the Africans” wrote Marcus Garvey in a poem of the same name, invoking an African nationalist pathos at a time when colonial rule dominated the continent. Though Garvey never visited Africa, his gospel carried across the Atlantic as a prel‐ ude to the anti‐colonialist movements that would redefine Africa’s role in world affairs. With Garveyism as its driving doctrine, Afri‐ ca saw the rise of nationalism and its evolu‐ tion into a struggle for independence in the early to mid‐20th century, when America’s pro‐colonial Cold War stratagems dominated world politics. Such stratagems defined these nationalist movements as anti‐democratic and pro‐communist, fur‐ ther delineating America’s need to suppress black independence movements as an artifice for world peace. As a result, anti‐colonial movements, including South Africa’s Defiance Campaign, Kenya’s Mau Mau uprising, Lumumba’s rise to power in the Congo, and Gha‐ na’s procurement of complete independence, were stifled by Wash‐ ington’s Cold War agenda. Though the inception of mass Black Nationalism and African suffrage movements point to Garvey’s unified Africa doctrine, it was Kwame Nkrumah’s ascension to political power in 1957 that truly catalyzed the transduction of colonial disunity throughout the Afri‐ can continent, extending its nationalist objective to Kenya, the Congo and South Africa. Nkrumah’s elucidation of Garveyism found its footing at the Fifth Pan‐African Congress in 1945, where he evange‐ lized a non‐violent Gandhist program that “. . . centered round the demand for constitutional change, providing for universal suffrage” (Northrup 2008, 101). In the following years, this pacifist articula‐ tion of African nationalism assailed the Gold Coast’s political arena, 41

annexed Britain’s colonial hold on the region, and heralded Nkrumah and his Convention People’s Party (CPP) as auspicious leaders of an independent Africa. Although Nkrumah’s commitment to Garveyism waned as his newly independent Ghana grew more authoritarian, the abrogation of its colonial interlopers reignited strong African American solidarity, roused prospects of a United Africa, and exem‐ plified how nonviolent political agitation can erect routes to inde‐ pendence. While Nkrumah led Ghana into the proverbial spectrum of world politics, America’s anti‐communist agenda provoked move‐ ments to asphyxiate anti‐colonial rebellion throughout Africa. Ghana soon found itself embroiled in war over political theory; the freedom it provided to American expatriates, some of whom extolled the ide‐ als of communism, roused alleged C.I.A subversion tactics, eventually leading to Operation Cold Chop, the coup d’état that fell Nkrumah’s reign as Ghana’s president for life. As James H. Meriwether writes in “Proudly We Can Be Africans”, “Ghana, the most important symbol of an ascendant Third World for African Americans, pushed black Americans away from the Cold War‐influenced anticommunist rhet‐ oric and mindset of the early 1950’s” (Meriwether 2002, 165). The purging of blind pro‐American support by disenfranchised expatri‐ ates had the potential to cultivate Soviet propaganda, and threatened Washington’s campaign for freedom and democracy. The coup not only ousted Nkrumah and the CPP, but also adjoined Ghana’s politics with America’s Cold War agenda. Anti‐America propaganda stemmed from the country’s inter‐ nal civil rights struggle, when black America’s plight for racial equal‐ ity aligned more harmoniously with the communist model, and pro‐ vided the Soviet Union with ample propaganda. James Campbell writes, “. . . the course and progress of the American civil rights movement was inextricably bound up with the global propaganda war waged between the United States and the Soviet Union. What‐ ever their private feelings about racial equality, American policy makers understood that Jim Crow undermined the U.S. internation‐ ally” (Campbell 2006, 348). The appeal of communism to black America, and to newly independent African nations, exasperated America’s involvement in African politics, reaffirming Washington’s pro‐colonial attitude. Allowing allied European nations to continue their colonial rule provided a buffer zone against an invasive Soviet 42

mindshare. As Meriwether points out, “[t]he seeming safety of back‐ ing colonial powers who were Cold War allies continued to override considerations of truly supporting African independence” (Meri‐ wether 2002, 169). Furthermore, the acquisition of strategic miner‐ als took precedence over burgeoning African Nationalism. Rich ura‐ nium deposits in South Africa and the Congo fueled America’s Cold War tactics, and suppressed any conspicuous African nationalist movements. One such movement, South Africa’s Defiance Campaign—a nonviolent offensive against apartheid—faltered after colliding with America’s Cold War objective. Echoing Nkrumah’s Fifth Pan‐African Congress, the Defiance Campaign adopted Garvey’s ambition of “Af‐ rica for the African’s” and Gandhi’s passive approach to protest. America’s involvement was minimal: Washington officials preferred colonial‐rule to native‐rule, and South Africa’s abundance of urani‐ um was a far more vital component than eradicating apartheid in the fight against communism. Furthermore, the Defiance Campaign’s tenet of racial equality and Black Nationalism posited communist bias, at least within Cold War dogma, and Washington viewed con‐ tinued colonial dominance as a blockade against a Soviet acquisition of nuclear materials. Meriwether writes, “. . . [Washington] officials maintained much more interest in securing South Africa’s support for the struggle against communism and in expanding markets for trade. At this point, and for a long time to come, strategic considera‐ tions trumped any concerns about racial polity” (Meriwether 2002, 97). Black America’s response to the Defiance Campaign was largely undivided; the fight against apartheid paralleled their own struggle for civil rights. The violent tragedy of the Sharpesville mas‐ sacre in 1960, when South African police shot and killed 69 peaceful protesters, rallied African American support and raised petitions to the UN. Washington responded, noting, “. . . that criticism voiced in the UN had the effect of aligning colored nations of the world against white South Africa while providing a useful subject for Soviet propa‐ ganda against the West. Allying with South Africa linked the United States to South Africa’s racial policies, damaging American efforts to win the hearts and minds of Third World peoples” (Meriwether 2002, 100). However, Washington’s disinterest in suppressing apartheid continued unabated, and American criticism against the 43

South African government remained muted. In the Cold War world, colonial‐rule held more strategic importance than the rise of African independence. Washington’s response to Kenya’s Mau Mau movement elicit‐ ed a similar apathetical attitude. Among the affronts of white‐rule, Britain’s colonial presence bore the theft of fertile lands, the margin‐ alization of Kenya’s native population, and sparked the violent Mau Mau movement between 1952 and 1960. Naked aggression over‐ shadowed this decidedly anticolonial uprising and divided African American opinion, most of whom subscribed to a more pacifist ap‐ proach to independence. As Meriwether explains, “[a]s black Ameri‐ cans grappled with different approaches to gaining rights and free‐ dom, most at this time did not accept, let alone embrace, violence” (Meriwether 2002, 125). Washington’s official stance swayed in fa‐ vor of Britain, an important Cold War ally, and painted the Mau Mau Uprising as trivial barbarism. The misrepresentation and/or ignorance of African culture, an American and European tradition on decline during the 20th cen‐ tury, framed the Mau Mau uprising as detrimental to the West’s Cold War front. America, not willing to jeopardize a long standing rela‐ tionship with Britain, nor lose Kenya to the Soviets, remained stag‐ nant. Meriwether agrees, stating, “American officials in the early 1950s had little desire to end white minority rule, for they saw de‐ colonization as being at odds with their overarching objective of con‐ taining communism” (Meriwether 2002, 128). America’s reluctance to criticize or dissuade British colonization drew the ire of African Americans, some of whom saw Mau Mau violence as an eleventh‐ hour melee to reclaim native lands. Petitions and conferences went virtually unnoticed by Washington. America’s active involvement in the Congolese nationalist movement stands in stark contrast to their languid attitude towards the Mau Mau uprising and South Africa’s Defiance Campaign. When Ghana’s precedent of sovereignty dominoed across the continent, taking with it Garvey’s message of a unified Africa, the Congolese re‐ sponded, reclaimed their land from Belgian’s colonial tenure and elected Patrice Lumumba as prime minister. Despite his public dis‐ missal of communism, the turmoil that followed the Congo’s inde‐ pendence prompted American officials to question Lumumba’s commitment to the Cold War platform. Like South Africa, the Congo 44

held strategic caches of uranium, and Washington officials presented Lumumba’s (perceived) slide towards communism as a threat to American interests. Embassy officials declared that Lumumba had, “maneuvered himself into a position of opposition to West, re‐ sistance to United Nations and increasing dependence on Soviet Un‐ ion,” and “to plan on basis that Lumumba government threatens our vital interests in Congo and Africa generally” (Meriwether 2002, 217). The Belgian government and American CIA assisted the Con‐ golese with imprisoning and executing Lumumba in 1961. As demonstrated by America’s strict adherence to a Cold War strategy, as well as Washington’s complete dismissal of the Atlantic Charter—a pact dedicated to the decolonization of Africa—most na‐ tionalist movements in Africa were portrayed as detrimental to Western objectives. America’s conceited view of world politics not only suppressed these movements, but also undermined the very fabric of democracy purported by its Cold War bravado. America’s tenets of justice, equality, and freedom were systematically denied to native Africans as a means to armor itself against Soviet contamina‐ tion. As well, the line between colonizer and colonized became an important barricade against communist penetration, and Washing‐ ton’s refusal to assist, or even acknowledge, nationalist movements illustrates that any interest in Africa was purely strategic. Formal relationships with Africa were relegated to colonial powers, most of whom had no interest in seeing nationalism blossom. As a result, Garvey’s message of “Africa for the Africans” stumbled, and Nkru‐ mah’s vision of a “United States of Africa” fell victim to an oppressive American regime. 45

Works Cited Campbell, J. T. (2006). Middle Passages: African American Journeys to AFrica, 1787-2005. London: The Penguin Press. Meriwether, J. H. (2002). Proudly We Can Be Africans. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press. Northrup, D. (2008). Crosscurrents in the Black Atlantic. Boston: Bed‐ ford/St. Martin's.

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he first half of this chapter explores several of the more prominent African Americans who emigrated to Ghana. The second half takes a look at the reasons behind the mili‐ tary coup in 1966. The gold coast gained independence from Britain in 1957, becoming The Repub‐ lic of Ghana. Many African Americans were moved by this, primarily due to the history of the Gold Coast. Kwame Nkrumah was also viewed as a sort of honorary American, since he spent near a decade studying at Lincoln University and the University of Pennsylvania. While studying in America Kwame was inspired by the works of Du Bois and Garvey. He would later adopt Garvey’s black star as Ghana’s national flag, and even create another Black Star Line, which still exists today. Ghana’s political stature shot through the roof when it gained in‐ dependence. The black star symbolism that Kwame adopted had materialized into something tangible. Finally, there was an inde‐ pendent black nation in Africa, one that held seats at the United Na‐ tions, and one that was seen as a beacon of hope for many African Americans, most of whom were fighting for civil rights in the States. However, Ghana’s infrastructure and economy was underdeveloped, and Kwame invited African Americans to come and help out. By 1964 more than three hundred African Americans had immigrated into Ghana. A very diverse group came to Ghana, including laborers as well as artists, writers, actors and teachers, most of whom taught at Univer‐ sity of Ghana. Politically, they were diverse as well, with com‐ munists mixing with socialists, but most supported Kwame, at least initially. This chapter explores some of the more prominent Ameri‐ can figures who settled in Ghana during Kwame’s time as president. 47

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PRESTON KING – Preston King, who was an a prominent civil rights activist, has an unusually disturbing story. He requested deferment from the draft board so he could continue his educa‐ tion in London. He was granted deferment under the assumption that he was white. When he showed up with his paperwork the draft board reversed their judgment. He was prosecuted as a draft dodger and sentenced to two years in prison. However, Ghana came to his rescue, providing him with a passport and a job teaching political philosophy. Bill Clinton pardoned him in 2000. ROBERT E. LEE – Robert E. Lee, named after the confederate general, met Kwame while both were studying at Lincoln Univer‐ sity. He would go on to graduate from dental college. Lee experi‐ enced racism throughout his whole life. When he was a child a man threw him in a river for sitting on a bench. While in the ar‐ my, which was supposedly desegregated by Truman’s executive order, he was stationed at a base in Georgia, which had segregat‐ ed barracks and mess halls. He found Georgia to be intolerable, especially the police, who continually harassed him. All of this led to his decision to move his family to Ghana. BILL SUTHERLAND – Has a similar story to Preston King. He refused induction into the military and was sentenced to four years in jail, twice the sentence given to white people. Through‐ out his life he fought for equality, but eventually got so fed up with the institution of American racism that he set his sights on Africa, and in 1953 he finally arrived on the continent. While Sutherland was living and working in Ghana the civil rights revo‐ lution was heating up in America. Sutherland often times ex‐ pressed an urge to go back and join the fight, but knew that his future was in Africa. However, he was still able to contribute to the civil rights movement. We have briefly mentioned this be‐ fore: in 1957 he traveled to the United States with Ghana’s minis‐ ter of finance for a meeting at the world bank. While there, they were denied service at a Howard Johnson’s restaurant. News of this spread across the global and eventually reached the Soviets, who were quick to use it as cold war propaganda. How can America be a beacon of freedom and democracy when African 48

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Americans are segregated and disenfranchised? American offi‐ cials were convinced that Sutherland had planned the whole or‐ deal. Upon returning to Ghana, Sutherland began to grow frus‐ trated with Kwame’s leadership, including the signing of the Pre‐ ventive Detention Act, which enabled the government to detain those deemed national security threats without trail, which is similar to our own National Defense Authorization Act, and the creation of joint African military force (Sutherland was some‐ thing of a pacifist, looking for peaceful ways to enact social change). He left Ghana in 1961, becoming the first prominent member of the expat community to do so. W.E.B. DU BOIS & WILLIAM ALPHAEUS HUNTON JR. – Kwame enticed Du Bois to Ghana with the creation of an Encyclopedia Africana secretariat. He was 93 at the time, but was still ready and willing to work on the project. He died two years later. His wife, Shirely, became one of Kwame’s most trusted confidants. The task of running the Encyclopedia secretariat was left to Wil‐ liam Alphaeus Hunton Jr. Hunton was a very outspoken anti‐ imperialist who was educated at Howard University and Har‐ vard, and was a founding member of the National Negro Con‐ gress as well as the executive secretary for the Council on African Affairs. When America revoked their commitment to the Atlantic Charter, and when fear of communism spreading was increasing, the Council came under scrutiny, and Hunton served jail time for refusing to provide the names of donors to a civil rights bail fund. This left him unemployed and blacklisted, so he decided to emi‐ grate to Africa. JULIAN MAYFIELD & MAYA ANGELOU – Julian Mayfield was an American journalist, novelist, and leading member of New York City’s black radical community. He moved to Ghana after several incidents with a renegade N.A.A.C.P. branch and became the defacto leader of the Politicals, a group of expatriates living in Ghana. Among those members was Maya Make, or Maya Ange‐ lou, who had come to Ghana by happenstance. She married a lo‐ cal representative of the Pan‐Africanist Congress within a week of meeting him, which turned out to be a huge mistake. He cheated often, saying it was his “prerogative” as an African man, 49

spent money they did not have, and did not let Maya work. After moving to Cairo, Maya left him and took a job in Liberia. En route her son broke his neck in Ghana and Maya decided it would be best to stay in Ghana and look after her son.

So the idealism Garvey contained within the Black Star, primarily that of a unified black nation in Africa, never really came to fruition. Kwame’s leadership rapidly became more authoritarian: he banned opposition parties, declared himself president for life, and held at least a thousand political opponents in prison. America was collabo‐ rating with Kwame’s opponents, and there is strong evidence sug‐ gesting that the C.I.A. had informants within the expatriate commu‐ nity, actively working to bring down Kwame. Now, at the time America was putting a spin on the civil rights movement and the fight for racial equality—essentially claiming America was on the path of progress and openness. The expatriates living in Africa posed a threat to this, as they were in an ideal posi‐ tion to slow that spin, and perhaps provide the Soviet Union with more anti‐American propaganda. The result was an effort on behalf of the American government to discredit the expats living abroad, calling them anti‐Americans and delusionists. Campbell points out the irony in this: 100 years prior to this moment black people were struggling to claim their American identity amidst movements to send them back to African, and now, after going to Africa, they were struggling against claims that they should be more American. Two events really define the expatriate’s feelings during this time. The first event coincided with the March on Washington, when the Politicals organized a march outside the US embassy in a show of solidarity. The event escalated and ended in a confrontation be‐ tween the Politicals and embassy soldiers. The second event was the arrival of Malcolm X, who was visiting a number of African countries, hoping one would introduce a resolution to bring the United States before the United Nations for is abuse of African Americans. His visit inspired many of the expatriates, most of whom saw him as the per‐ fect leader for a global black revolutionary movement. However, Ghana was already starting to fall apart by this time, and any hope that it would be able to lead this movement were deflated. The coup d’état (blow of state), dubbed Operation Cold Chop, happened on the 21st of February, 1966, exactly one year after Mal‐ 50

colm X was murdered. Going against all recommendations, Kwame boarded a flight for Hanoi, hoping to broker peace between North Vietnam and the United States. He heard about the coup as soon as he landed and quickly returned to Africa, but was unable to reenter Ghana. The National Liberation Council quickly erased all traces of Kwame’s leadership, and also affirmed their intentions to bring Gha‐ na in line with American politics, further pushing the idea that Amer‐ ica was intimately involved with the coup. Most of the expatriates had already left Ghana by the time the National Liberation Council came rolling in, and those that did re‐ main quickly fled. The only one to remain was Robert E. Lee. POSSIBLE QUESTIONS  Did the presence of the Politicals, or any of the expatriates dis‐ cussed in this chapter, benefit Nkrumah’s Ghana?  Why did so few people immigrate to Ghana when it first became independent? Ghana seemed to embody the ideals of Garveyism, which was very popular.  Did Ghana really embody the ideals of Garveyism during Nkru‐ mah’s presidency? INTRODUCTION  Assigned two article from Northrup’s book that deal with the ideas, practice and implementation of emigration in Britain and America. Although they are short articles they do contain quite a bit of insight into how emigration was being handled, how it was received, and ultimately, the end goal of it all.  All of the articles are primary sources. Article 1:3 An Account of the First Black Emigration from Britain to Sierra Leone Ottabah Cugoano  Cugoano was a slave in West Africa, the West Indies, and Britain, where he was later freed.  Essentially, this article is a snapshot of how emigration to Sierra Leone (around 1787) was being handled in Britain.  At the time, the dominant discourse was that emigration was a noble and honorable gesture—one that was extended to poor black people. 51

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Of course, and especially with government, things aren’t always as they seem. The whole process was fucked. He criticizes Brit‐ ain for not working with the Native Africans around Sierra Leone, and mentions that the plan for getting blacks in Britain to Sierra Leone was not well thought out. He mentions that ships were of‐ ten delayed, resulting in the deaths of many blacks aboard due to cold or illness or just to the general bad conditions of the ship. We’ve already read descriptions like this in Saltwater Slavery. So slavery was still occurring in Britain at the time Cugoano wrote this. The few black people that had become free were hes‐ itant about returning to Africa. He posits that many more black people would have been receptive to emigration had the fear of being enslaved again been erased. He claims that prejudice against black people among European and British traders was so strong that even British ex‐slaves who traveled to Sierra Leone were not free from their terror. Furthermore, slavery in other parts of the world, including the newly formed USA, was still go‐ ing strong, and the market for trading in slaves and in the com‐ modification of human beings was as strong as ever. So for some, returning to Africa meant that they could be captured and sold into slavery yet again. He ends the article by showing the contradictory nature of the British government—on the one hand they support creating a free colony in Africa for black people, and on the other hand they support their forts and vessels that keep slavery alive. There’s no consistency to Britain’s moral fiber.

Article 1:7 Annual Report American Colonization Society’s  So at the start of this article it is mentioned that the supporters of the American Colonization Society—a group that helped freed black people get to Africa—consisted of people who were, “genu‐ inely concerned with the welfare of black people” and also southern slave owners, who really just wanted to get rid of freed black people, fearing they would rebel and revolt, similar to the events that took place in Africa. So, despite their ill intentions, we now see slave owners acting as charitable benefactors to the people they once owned, while still owning others. 52

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This is like a newsletter to such supporters, explaining how things are going with emigration and detailing their future plans. At the beginning they mention how broke they are, but still con‐ tinue to send people over to Liberia. And they’re doing this—and it just reads this way in the report—because they genuinely care about the people who wish to return to Africa. The report details some of their accomplishments, including their purchase of more land in Liberia, the shuttering of slave markets in New Cesters and Gallinas, and the positive effects they’ve had on Liberia’s economy and welfare. In fact, the only negative point they make concerns ACS’s accumulation of debt—to the tune of 6,000 dollars, which was spent on a military operation to end the slave trade at New Cesters. They’re saying that every‐ thing is great, we just need more money. So we see that the ACS was not only concerned with getting black people to Africa, but were actively engaged in ending slavery. They go on and list even more accomplishments. And this is where some problems begin to crop up. They claim that their ef‐ forts have “brought under the canopy of Liberian law more than 80,000 hitherto wild and untutored savages . . .” What they have done is brought America to Africa—they’ve colonized Liberia with their Eurocentric arts and humanities, laws and ideas of jus‐ tice, and with their language and religion. In particular, religion is important for the ACS, as they describe Africa as, “a land shrouded in the deepest heathenish darkness”. They also show their hand towards the end of the report—that they wish to affect all of Africa in the same manner as Liberia. They wish to transform it into something else—something more understandable and relatable to white people. This is, at least in my opinion, tantamount to the cultural death that African’s expe‐ rienced during the enslavement process—as we read about in Saltwater slavery. So in the end we have a group of people who, for the most part have noble intentions, and who are actively working to erase Af‐ rica off the map and replace it with quasi black America.

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POSSIBLE QUESTIONS  Would emigration have been more popular or acceptable under different conditions? And if so, under what conditions? Emigra‐ tion, in both Britain and America, got off to a rocky start. Sierra Leone enjoyed more success than Liberia, but those who re‐ turned to Africa were faced with challenges they were not pre‐ pared for—a different climate, a native population that was not very accepting of them, and one that most viewed as “wild and untutored savages”—from Northrup introduction. Perhaps if black Americans had helmed the emigration initiative there would have been better results, or more people would have gone?  Was emigration good for either Africa or America/Britain?  Why does religion seem to be so integral to the changing scenery in Africa, and to American colonization efforts in particular? Was Christianity good for Africa?

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For Contemporary Urban Issues, Fall 2013  

It appears that industrialized nations with access to health care have always led the averages of wealth vs. lifespan. Interesting‐ ly, there appears to be some correlation be‐ tween colonized countries and the impedi‐ ment of growing wealth/health. Perhaps more interesting, countries plagued with colonial interlopers saw dramatic move‐ ment towards prosperity and health when given, or upon gaining independence. In re‐ gards to the graph, Africa still lingers towards the origin point, but continues to push upwards towards the industrialized leaders. At only 4 minutes, this video presents statistics that practical‐ ly demand our minds to conjure cursory answers; and we can draw all manner of conclusions from a simple graph. Wealthy countries can afford to implement social programs that protect its citizens from disease and poverty, while countries that lack capital and infra‐ structure continue to languish in the margins of insolvency. Im‐ proved health care is derived from advances in science and technol‐ ogy, two academic fields that, perhaps, arise and gain momentum in countries that have already stabilized their economic and social growth. We can think in terms of education; that a wealthy populace is an educated populace, and an educated populace is an enlightened populace. Regardless of the reasoning we apply, such statists only explain what is happening, not why. Framing the discussion of equity as a “gap” rather than a “disparity” plays as an argument in semantics; after all, large gaps in equity (as defined by Blackwell) create disparities in health, education, access to employment, and so on. Her assertion that a “language of dispari‐ ties” colors the issue of equity in superfluous tones of race, and that a language of equity circumvents such issues, is almost immediately 55   

debunked by the statistics she provides. The equity gap, the “exodus of fresh food”, and the zip codes deficient in opportunity are all given racial identities. The base argument here is that some have and some have‐not. This is the gap, the disparity, the discrepancy, the inequality that exists throughout all human societies. The language we use to describe the gap is equity is not always consistent, but the intent is. Closing the equity gap is one way to sustain a prosperous fu‐ ture, though I assume we should first understand why the gap exists to begin with. Why do people self‐segregate based on wealth or suc‐ cess? Why does a zip code define the parameters in which we live? Why do supermarkets fail or flee from communities rife with inequi‐ ty? Why does opportunity commute away from these pockets of dis‐ parity? These “whys” of inequity are better examined by Dr. Camara Jones, who makes a convincing argument that racism is largely re‐ sponsible for such gaps. The availability of fresh produce and healthy food can likely be attributed to the income gap. Food that is inherently healthy is often more expensive and less energy‐dense than the common fast food/junk food. If we couple that with a lack of supermarkets and fresh produce, obesity takes root, further skewing health and life‐ expectancy statistics. So we have a poor zip code, one linked to crime, sub‐par edu‐ cation, health problems, and all around inequity. As a result, or per‐ haps as a contributing factor, opportunity dries up. This made me question whether opportunity is something given, something earned, or something created. Simply being born in America can be considered a given opportunity. Inheriting wealth is a given oppor‐ tunity. But employment, at least in my opinion, is something we cre‐ ate or earn. Higher education is an opportunity we earn (though more and more it seems as if it is being given away with no fore‐ thought). I wasn’t given a job based on my zip code, but on past per‐ formance, reliability, and hard work. I earned my job, and I continue to earn it every day. The idea that our zip code is a “proxy for oppor‐ tunity” becomes less relevant when we consider how the internet and social media play into creating and finding opportunity. You can sit on your couch and search the globe for employment. If we were to factor in race, as Dr. Jones did, we’d have a better understanding 56

of how a zip code can set internalized expectations, and how oppor‐ tunity is affected by that. Like the Hans Rosling video, we are given the “what” and not the “why”. We can extrapolate the data and see the sinewy threads of connective tissue, but we first have to understand why the equity gap exists before we can address solutions. Dr. Jones’ presentation was refreshing in its honesty, and entirely on‐point. We finally get the “why” of inequity. She weaves a compel‐ ling analogy, describing the effects of white privilege, and conclud‐ ing, emphatically, that racism, particularly institutionalized racism, is responsible for the gap in equity. I agree that addressing institu‐ tionalized racism can reverberate through culture and affect both personally mediated and internalized racism, just as the inception of institutionalized racism led to their creation. To squash inequity we first have to address how the media, how the government, and how corporations perpetuate or remain willfully ignorant of institutionalized racism. We have to look at crime, culture, poverty, and education—the flower box (or zip code)—and admit that it is a response to historical injustice, and how that historical injustice malforms a person’s, or a people’s, self‐ perception and/or expectations (the internalized racism). In this light, Angela Blackwell’s discussion is illuminated. It is an issue of race. And if we want to close the equity gap we have to be honest and admit, as Dr. Jones did, that institutionalized racism affects not only the minority group, but the society as a whole. There were several points in this article that surprised/shocked me, despite the increasingly conspicuous evidence that it should not: Party politics aside, the increase in the income‐growth gap caused under the Reagan administration shows how skewed American poli‐ tics is towards the wealthy/powerful. Even when it became appar‐ ent that cost‐cutting welfare programs was increasing poverty, the Democratic opposition remained impotent, choosing to focus more on their own job security than on actual policy. Furthermore, the programs that were affected by these cuts were squarely aimed at 57

younger generations; generations less likely to vote, and who leaned blue. Intention speaks volumes, and it is impossible to decipher whether or not Reagan’s attempt to cut waste and corruption in the welfare system was done in good faith or in service of further delin‐ eating class warfare and/or discrimination of the “have‐nots”. What is evident, however, is that once it became clear that these programs exacerbated poverty, favored the wealthy, and shifted power away from poorer Americans, the government backtracked only slightly. As the article mentioned, it is difficult to reinstate funding once it has been cut. The factors that led to the recession were a consequence of global capitalism. Manufacturing jobs, which typically paid high wages to less‐educated people, slunk off to cheaper Asian markets, where profits margins were given room to grow. That, coupled with a policy that practically endorsed widening the inequity gap, gave all the money and power to the 1% of Americans whose lassitude to‐ wards social inequality served as a foundation to further increase their own wealth and influence. Their disdain for poor people, their characterization of the poor as system‐gaming thieves, served as in‐ trinsic propaganda—as ammunition to simultaneously bolster their own position and to strip the poor of their own. They started a war, not over land or oil, but over the perceptions of poverty. Some of the cuts in federal spending just didn’t make sense. As stat‐ ed in the article, 70% of all cuts were made to “entitlement” pro‐ grams. As an example, the Reagan administration made cuts to job training and place programs at the same time manufacturing jobs were fleeing the country. Where is the logic in that? As simple as this may sound, a lot of the correlations presented in this video make sense. Higher income and better education lead to longer, less‐stressful, and healthier lives. Racial discrimination in‐ creases stress, leads to disease, and shortens life expectancy. The environments we live and development in serve as the mold for our future endeavors, and set an almost tangible limit on level of educa‐ tion, income, and stress (amount of cortisol). The social determi‐ nants for health and life expectancy seem inextricably bound to in‐ 58

come, race, and social class. Biologically speaking, the neighbor‐ hoods we live in, the food we eat, the pressure we feel from subser‐ vience, and the challenge we face in providing for ourselves and fam‐ ily, are all dominant factors that either increase or decrease the wear‐and‐tear on our cells, organs, and, ultimately, our health. When the Bough Breaks The life‐course perspective, combined with institutionalized racism, appears to be the culprit for the high infant mortality rates among African Americans of all income levels. Some of this infor‐ mation was touched on in the previous video; higher levels of corti‐ sol, via stress from racial discrimination, leads to all sorts of detri‐ mental biological effects, including decreased blood flow to the pla‐ centa. This stress (from institutionalized racism) is cumulative and independent of social status. Particularly disturbing was Harvard’s study of racism, show‐ ing that black males with no criminal record were less likely to be given a job than a white male with a felony. This should serve as a wake‐up call to the 70% of white Americans who think racism and discrimination are things of the past. It is engrained in the culture, proliferated by the media and corporate conglomerates, and then passed off as extinct dogma within an alleged progressive society. Becoming American There are several interesting points within this video: Culture and community factor in greatly when comparing rel‐ ative health amongst poorer demographics. Culture acts as a protec‐ tive integument for recently immigrated Mexicans, but slowly sloughs off as they become more and more Americanized. This seems to point back to Dr. Camara Jones’ speech on personally medi‐ ated and internalized racism. As immigrants integrate into Ameri‐ can culture their internal perceptions of race begin to contort and deform into the qualities ascribed by institutionalized and personal‐ ly‐mediated racism. This, in turn, creates increased levels of stress and mental illness (depression and anxiety), which leads to an over‐ all decrease in health. That sense of community and culture degrades as more time is spent in America, and that protective integument slowly disintegrates. This leads to social isolation—or the American standard of living. Furthermore, living and surviving in America is qualitatively different than in Mexico, and puts more pressure on parents to pro‐ 59

vide adequate housing and food for their children. These children, then, develop a greater risk for mental health problems as the cul‐ tural metamorphosis takes place. Some of these entitlement quandaries were discussed in the Poverty and Power chapter. The woman who feared that acquiring a job would lead to a loss of health coverage is part of a system designed to punish the poor. Essentially, government policy teaches us that remaining unemployed and poor is a better alternative to working some minimum wage job with no benefits. If government sponsored health coverage covered such industrious people those fears would begin to evaporate. Instead, the system, which was sold as a solution to poverty, ultimately feeds into and widens the gap in inequity. You touch on a lot of topics that really stuck out to me. To see that 70% of budget cuts were aimed at the poor (excluding the elderly, who voted and supported Reaganomics), is definitive proof that class warfare was a driving force behind Republican policy. To punish the poor, and to design a system whereby staying unemployed is a bet‐ ter alternative to working, is counterproductive and illogical. You’re also right about sharing the blame. The ineffectualness of the Democratic Party speaks volumes about the true intentions of most politicians—mainly, to keep their job, their social status, and all the benefits that come with that. And yes, the poverty level was nearly the same when Reagan exited office as when he came in, but that says more about the gov‐ ernment backtracking on a lot of policy changes then it does to Reagan’s political and social ideologies. Cutting entitlement pro‐ grams was sold as a solution to poverty and government corruption, and when it backfired people scrambled to fix it. In regards to the Poverty and Power chapter: First, judging Reagan based on one aspect of his policy is inconsider‐ ate to his presidency as a whole. Second, the poorest of poor Ameri‐ cans—those who were most affected by Reagan’s budget cuts—were 60

not only stripped of their social safety nets, but also of their ability to “ally” and force meaningful change. The budget cuts, 70% of which were aimed at the poor, shifted money and power to the wealthy 1%. Those living in poverty saw the writing on the wall—getting a job and working to survive was more of a struggle than staying un‐ employed and collecting assistance. The system punished those who actually tried by taking away their safety nets, their assistance, and by partially denying the poor the social services needed to achieve equity (at least where health is concerned). Thankfully, when it be‐ came apparent that these cuts were detrimental to the poor, and ac‐ tually worsened poverty, some effort was made to reverse policy. Unemployment declined by the end of Reagan’s second term, but the shift in wealth had already taken place. Those who were poor were stigmatized, and those who were rich were idolized. The United States’ military base was indeed a casual factor in the de‐ clining health of the native Marshallese. The cultural erosion, West‐ ernized diets, and substandard urbanization of nearby islands are all a direct response to a superfluous U.S. presence—a strategic (and potentially obsolescent) base of operations whose existence seems more rooted in Cold War disposition than actual defense. As dis‐ cussed in earlier videos, culture can shield people from the adverse effects of poverty, but when that culture is abraded in favor of inte‐ gration, the protective qualities dissipate, and health declines. Emigrating has its benefits: better living conditions, better education, employment opportunities, and a system of health care that is equipped to deal with the effects of poverty. The trade‐off comes in the form of stress, one of many initiators for tuberculosis and other poverty‐related health issues. Aside from the physi‐ cal/natural differences associated with emigration, the choices the Marshallese faced when moving to Arkansas were anything but fair. Colonialism in the form of military occupation is not something the Marshallese invited or needed, and the extensive, unethical nuclear testing done on or around the islands is at best duplicitous. Having to flee your home nation because policy allows a nocuous U.S. to con‐ tinue on its path of cultural erosion is not fair or just. 61

There are several reasons why the environment we reside in im‐ pacts health. Environmental quality, including air and water, is often times worse in poorer areas. Individual choices, such as quality of food, health care providers, and availability or access to a connected community are limited by the environments in which they live. As the video clearly describes, a cycle exists whereby poorer neighbor‐ hoods stay poor. Business vanishes, tax revenue falls, school quality declines, and people move out. Furthermore, the “poverty tax” makes sustaining a healthy life (quantitatively) harder by overcharg‐ ing people for basic necessities, such as food, cars, and access to money. That such a “tax” exists is specious and counterproductive. Violence is prevalent in poorer areas, and children who mature in an environment saturated with violence are more likely to develop stress‐related health and mental problems. Stress as a trigger for health complications develops not only from violence, but from all other facets of the environment, including the quality of food, quality of air/water, and access to affordable, safe housing. The Seattle pro‐ ject described in the video seems to be an excellent way to combat all issues that relate to health and environment, and it is unfortunate that more funding is not available to communities that need over‐ hauled. There are two very different stories in this video; capitalism, free markets and globalization push companies towards higher profit margins, often at the expense of the “receding” middle class, and the loss of income has a dramatic effect on stress, depression, and death. Both of these stories support the idea that inequity is one factor that determines a person’s overall well‐being. In one instance (closing Electrolux) depression rose, stress levels increased, and death rates doubled. Additionally, unemployment zaps individual empower‐ ment and autonomy. The title, “Not Just a Paycheck” refers to how gainful employment can empower a person to live better, eat better, and decrease health risks associated with living in poverty (mainly stress and depression). The bigger the paycheck, the more empow‐ ered a person is, or can be. 62

The comparison between Sweden and the US was rather po‐ etic sophistry; universal health care and unionization are heavily panned here, socialized education is only tolerable through high school, and any increase in funding for the poor is immediately la‐ beled as a handout. Moreover, socialism appears to be the new en‐ emy to freedom, and increased taxes are only for the rich. Some of these sentiments may not make sense, but they are virally propagat‐ ed through the media until popular opinion is saturated with misin‐ formation and/or propaganda. People are convinced that socialized health care, free access to higher education, and better social safety nets are, at their core, wrong. The individualistic nature of living in America cements these opinions, and day‐to‐day life becomes a race to be a “have” while shrugging off the “have‐nots”, often times at the expense of the individual. In this video we again see how social and economic circumstances influence health. The Pima Native American tribe—one of many groups victimized by colonization—was economically marginalized by policies that favored rich white men, particularly where water was concerned. This lack of water corroded their ability to maintain both social and economic viability, degraded their culture, and forced them into a system of “bad sugar” food commodity programs. In turn, poverty, stress and obesity increased, and blood sugar began to reflect their cultural degradation in the form of type 2 diabetes. Again, the issue of empowerment is raised; when access to fresh, healthy food is removed and replaced with substandard commodi‐ ties, when a culture built on a foundation of cultivation and tradi‐ tional healthy eating is dissolved by unfair policy, when water is un‐ fairly distributed to the wealthy/powerful, a person’s empowerment and autonomy over health and well‐being is severely handicapped. Individual responsibility (when it comes to health) is not entirely abrogated by a lack of empowerment, but a person’s choices when it comes to eating healthy and exercising are limited by the social and economic environment in which they live. Thankfully, the video does end on a note of hope, not only for the return of water to the reservation, but for the future of the tribe. 63

The inculturation that occurred within the Pima tribe was the most disheartening aspect of this video, and shows that it only takes a couple generations of living under the thumb of “bad sugar” to trans‐ form a culture, cultivate disease (diabetes), and disempower a tribe. The food commodities provided by the government were/are sub‐ standard and counterproductive to the expanding health crisis expe‐ rienced by all displaced people. You draw an interesting parallel between the Marshallese and Pri‐ ma: mainly that colonization and bad policy are the primary reasons for bad health and disease (TB and diabetes). The US essentially takes over peoples’ land, forces them to adapt to a foreign culture, irradiates them with poverty and disease, and then sweeps them un‐ der the rug as a statistic. The collateral damage manifests itself not only physically, but psychologically in the form of stress, depression, and loss of identity and empowerment. To fix such a problem, which should fall on the shoulders of the US, is a problem in itself. You’re right; the environment in which we live affects our health. But it’s not just the environment quality that determines our health, but also the access to fresh/healthy food, levels of violence, and ac‐ cess to quality health care. Moreover, poorer neighborhoods tend to stay poor, as decreased taxes results in decreased funding for schools, more crime, and a whole host of other factors that deter‐ mine why “place matters”. The difference between Sweden (and most other European coun‐ tries) and America is, as you accurately describe, the pressure and responsibility of individuality. If someone falls in the gutter we as‐ sume they did something wrong. If someone is a multi‐millionaire we assume they are individually responsible. We incorrectly per‐ ceive the social ladder as a tool we climb or fall on our own, and of‐ ten neglect the factors that either prevent people from falling too far, or those that encourage people to climb farther. An individualistic 64

society is often a “for me and me alone” deal, leaving equity to lan‐ guish in the same category as charity. The history of American housing is couched in terms of “serving the greater good of society”, while subliminally forging a greater divide between our notions of class and welfare. Like most American histo‐ ry, affordable housing is planted in shallow soil, corrupt in its con‐ ception, implementation, and consequence. How does a society con‐ trol its population; how can a government benefit from the subservi‐ ence and composed‐naiveté of its people without appearing too ma‐ licious? Fight the poor and reward the rich, that’s how. Let money determine policy, and let poverty become stigmatized, fossilized within the strata of indifference and alienation. After all, a society that fuels its engines with money, rather than social liberali‐ ty/altruism, can better compete in the race towards globalization and mock manifest‐destiny. The first federal housing program was devised to benefit businesses. Factory owners had more say in federal policy than the working man. At first this makes sense: business owners drive the economy, and having a stable, sedated work forced is both beneficial and necessary for economic growth. The lie crumbles as history agi‐ tates into the present, where the war against the impoverished transcends any affordable housing debate, and goes straight to chas‐ tisement and neglect. How many millions or billions of dollars can we cut from welfare programs? How many substandard housing projects can we force people into? How far can we push people be‐ fore the glinting patina of hope fades into despondency? The equity gap was, and is still, fabricated by many iniquitous federal policies, and disingenuous housing programs only work to widen it. I look at the history of this country; I look at congress, the senate, the house, the president, the lobbyists, the democrats, the republicans, and the devoted base of proselytized voters and think, “the spirit/energy/force/emotion/whatever that drives this country forward is entirely foreign to me”. It is possible for a war on poverty to be both overt and covert? Can it be both subliminal and con‐ scious? Can the poor actually internalize the anti‐poor propaganda and hate other impoverished people? Can we delude ourselves into 65

seeing a façade of wealth, of thinking “poorness” is only a temporary detour while en route to high society? Policy, politics, and class di‐ vide us. What, exactly, unites us? Some spurious notion of ethno‐ centricity; some waning sense of nationalism when a hurricane de‐ stroys a neighborhood, or when a lunatic opens fire in public? That which divides us is written in law, and that which unites us echoes in fleeting emotional reaction. Furthermore, the individualistic nature of the American Dream asphyxiates any notion of shared responsi‐ bility, and our social principles/mores reflect that. It’s your fault for being poor, and for having a job that pays minimum wage in an economy that was tanked and exploited by the wealthy. The complexity of poverty, as well as the gap in equity, come from the chain reactions of federal programs and policies that ad‐ dress (or at least attempt to address) the factors related to being im‐ poverished. A federal housing program, promoted as a benefit to so‐ ciety, has a series of consequences that eventually influence the evo‐ lution of cities, neighborhoods, and individual lives. We have al‐ ready seen why “place matters” and why one’s zip code can be used a metric for health, and such places evolve under the strict guidance of federal and state policy. There is a design to city/town/neighborhood infrastructure, and that design facilitates a divide in wealth, class, and race. It’s amazing how the natural progression of society breeds reliance on others. Will Allen and his family did everything for themselves: hunted all manner of animal, fished for eels and turtles, slaughtered and butchered pigs, and grew vegetables and crops that fed and sup‐ ported their family. It worked back then; it kept them fed and healthy, and even though Will cultivated lima beans and animosity for picking lima beans, his early life provided the blueprints for what would eventually become his adult ambition. Compare the inde‐ pendence and autonomy offered in his early years to his struggling market in a contemporary urban environment. He witnessed the transformation of rural, agricultural areas into an overly‐reliant suburban arcadia, replete with luxury, devoid of character. He watched as policy killed off farmers, as grocery stores abandoned 66

local producers, and as fresh, healthy food fled from impoverished black communities. He saw the effects this had on friends, communi‐ ties, and neighborhoods. His struggle to maintain a greenhouse sanctuary in the face of these dramatic changes caused him to ques‐ tion his life choices, and his good food revolution was nearly a sput‐ tering defeat. Society changed so fiercely since Will Allen’s childhood that new generations living in these impoverished areas no longer have a concrete connection to the self‐determination and self‐reliance that the Allen family developed. Lack of space and soil has also made growing healthy food even harder for the poor, and an overabun‐ dance of cheap junk food and fast food has contributed to a culture of bad health. A good food revolution is just what this country needs, and I look forward to reading and discussing more about Will Allen and his plans to make that happen. “The Good Food Revolution” ties together several important contemporary urban issues into one book, and with its main focus on healthy living for impoverished people, should be read by future classes. It shows that it is not always easy to maintain health, and that disparities exist which prevent some from being able to choose a healthy lifestyle. This is a book with a solution. The solution may not work for everyone, or may be challenging at times, but the theo‐ retical payoff eclipses the grief and difficulty. Building a better na‐ tion starts in neighborhoods and with individual willing to act for change, and Will Allen, honestly and equitably, is leading the charge. The first part of this documentary reinforces the facts and themes we have already explored in this class: that health and income are tied together; that obesity and poverty are tied together; that the food we eat is fundamentally different from past generations; and the effects of eating this food has contributed to rising levels of heart disease, diabetes and premature death. I’d love to say that I’m sur‐ prised by this documentary, or that it is eye‐opening or unexpected, but I can’t. As it plainly shows, America is overweight, and percent‐ ages are up in all levels of income. All it takes to see this reality is to look at myself, my family, and the people around me. Like many people, I struggle with weight, bad eating, and habits that promote 67

an unhealthy lifestyle. Unless corrected, this will undoubtedly con‐ tribute to health complications now or in the near future. If anything, this documentary is honest in its assessments. Obesity is neither a product of genetics or environment; it is a prod‐ uct of both. Obesity has a dramatic effect on live and heart function, and a simple diet combined with exercise can reverse most negative effects. Although used for shock value just as much as for education, the comparison between healthy and unhealthy hearts serves as a palpable and vivid truth to obesity’s effect on our organs. Even more vivid: gaining 5% more body weight over the course of a couple months has powerful and tragic consequences on liver and heart function. All it takes to increase your chances of heart disease, high blood pressure or diabetes is a few fast food meals every week. Each case study presented in the second part of this docu‐ mentary illustrates just how different weight‐gain and weight‐loss is for people. In some cases it is a struggle between what is genetic and what is environmental; in other cases it is a constant battle against the factors that trigger over‐eating and bad‐eating (work life, stress, tragedy, etc.). Work places, such as my own, typically contain soda machines, and vending machines that dispense candy or other un‐ healthy foods. Healthy alternatives exist, but their availability is dramatically less than the average fast‐food joint or food truck. It seems much easier and cheaper (and tastier) to drive to the nearest McDonalds for lunch than it is to hunt out a healthy salad, or a bowl of vegetables. In respect to obesity, the way people rationalize their despair or hope seems fundamental to their success when attempting to live a healthy lifestyle. Some take control of their diet, while others ig‐ nore or refuse to change their unhealthy habits until it is too late (or nearly too late). Some even rely on relatively risky surgeries to force the weight off. In all, the biological changes that occur when a per‐ son becomes overweight/obese essentially stack the deck against them. It’s amazing that a person who was once overweight will have to work much harder to maintain a healthy weight than someone who has always been trim. What really stands out is this: American living has evolved to promote a sedentary, calorie‐dense, and all‐around unhealthy life‐ style, and the effects are both emotionally and physically traumatic. Some of the women in this documentary seem to be so emotionally 68

affected by their physical health that stress (one of the main factors that promote obesity) takes control of their eating habits. The mar‐ keting of bad‐food, including soda and other sugary drinks, domi‐ nates the consumer’s mind‐share, and provides a cheap, easy, and biologically destructive way to obtain nutrient‐deficient calories. When I’m stressed out I will constantly snack on cookies, or crack‐ ers, or candies. I’ll sit around all day just snacking, willingly oblivi‐ ous to the amount of calories I’m eating, or the effects that it will have on my health. Still, this video does demonstrate that with knowledge and determination people can change their eating habits, their health, and their lives. Don’t fall for diet fads or products that claim to melt away the pounds. Just eat right, be active, and enjoy life. The two women at the end embody this message, and their amiable attitude towards exercise and dieting should be an inspiration to anyone who struggles with losing weight. This documentary makes several salient points concerning obesity in children, and outlines a lot of issues that can lead children to become obese. Perhaps the most important factor is parental re‐ sponsibility. If a parent can limit the amount of time their child spends in front of the television/computer, can education them about food, can limit their intake of cheap/fast food, can pack their school lunches, and can encourage healthy physical exercise, then the problem of childhood obesity can be attacked at the root. Of course, parents must constantly combat the unhealthy standard set by overly‐advertised foods and substandard school lunch programs, but such a fight is essential for setting a life‐long habit of eating and living healthy. Removing or limiting advertising of bad food won’t necessarily stop parents from providing bad food to their children. Young children aren’t driving themselves to McDonalds or scrawling out shopping lists full of sugary foods. Young children aren’t buying themselves televisions and computers. The dramatic irony at play here is this: obese parents complain that their overweight children do not get enough exercise and refuse to eat healthy. With this responsibility comes reform. Parents, as well as children, need to be educated about deceptive advertising, the con‐ sequences of unhealthy eating, and the benefits of physical exercise. With this understanding the country can then tackle the capitalist disinformation, the state/federal policies that inhibit healthy choices 69

in social institutions, and counteract the cumulative effects of living and eating unhealthy. In starts in the home; children who are raised healthy will likely continue living healthy, will likely pass that habit on to their children, and will contribute to a healthier, happier coun‐ try. Your point about school lunches being unhealthy and putting al‐ ready disadvantaged children at greater risk is important, and par‐ ents who rely on the school to feed their children need to under‐ stand this. If it comes as a surprise to you, it will likely come as a surprise to parents. We all know that pizza is not a vegetable, and that prepackaged fried foods are unhealthy, but how many truly un‐ derstand that fruit juice or vitamin water contains just as much sug‐ ar as a soda? Parents have the ability to pressure schools into chang‐ ing policies, and if united they can tackle such issues on a state‐wide or federal level. Parents also need to become educated about the de‐ ceptive practices of corporate America, as such understanding will hopefully drive them to make better choices when shopping for food. The importance of “Medical Apartheid” comes from its illumination of topics in American history that are often swept under the rug. It is important to know that the history of American medicine is, much like the country, plagued with racism and inequality. It is important to understand that certain aspects of contemporary medicine still exhibit the inequity embodied by abhorrent medical practices of ear‐ ly America. There is a clear lineage of racism in this country, and as we’ve seen in other venues, the institutionalization of bigotry has had profound effects on access to and quality of health care. The idea that there are doctors who either dismiss this evi‐ dence as hearsay, or are ignorant to it, is not at all surprising. I think it is fair to question all sources of information—to overly scrutinize circumstantial evidence as a means to test its validity—but denying that racism existed in early American medicine seems woefully na‐ ïve. After all, if racism infected every other facet of American society, why not hospitals? There will always be those who deny the horrors of history, and often times there denial is a confession of racism. 70

There are many compelling stories contained within this book. The idea that eugenics was widely accepted by not only the populace and doctors, but by historically important black figures (e.g. W.E.B. DuBois) is compelling for several reasons. Anytime a so‐ ciety’s ethical code allows horrible things to happen, or justifies hor‐ rible actions as a means to an end, there exits this transparency of racial pride and superiority. Eugenics, as practiced in the early 19th century, was just an accepted and classified form of genocide, and as a country we were able to justify this behavior based on compound‐ ing historical racism. This is particularly compelling because it is not happening in secrecy. This is not an undocumented injection of plu‐ tonium, or a case of nonconsensual sterilization; it is a branch of medicine that the world viewed as progressive and beneficial. It is compelling to know that the guiding moral code of a country can be so flagrantly malicious. There are other stories in this book that both shock and amaze me. From previous readings, classes, and discussions I was aware that the history of this country has its fair share of blemishes, but the cases contained within “Medical Apartheid” go beyond what I thought was possible. The complicity of the country and the scien‐ tific community makes me question contemporary mores, and just how they will be viewed a hundred years from now. There are various reasons why prisoners are desirable sub‐ jects for medical studies, and different areas of research favor some reasons over others. As a more general reason, researchers are able to conduct follow‐up appointments without fear of the subject ab‐ sconding, as prisoners are more likely to continue participating for monetary/status gain (and, obviously, that they can’t leave). More specifically, prison populations have a higher occurrence of HIV and hepatitis C, making prisoners an easy and plentiful source of partici‐ pants for research in AIDS or hepatitis vaccines. There is also the social stigmatization of prisoners, leading to the fact that researchers were/are able to easily justify moral turpitude because prisoners are often viewed as a lower caste in American society. The issue of whether or not prisoners should be allowed to participate in medical research is certain: of course they should. The problem here is not that prisoners are used in medical research, but the frequency and type of research that is conducted. I think that we can all agree that exposing prisoners to potentially deadly viruses, 71

radioactive isotopes, or carcinogenic substances is ethically wrong. There are other avenues of research that can address these issues, and prisoners (or any person) should never be knowingly exposed to harmful or deadly tests. A set of standards should exist that pro‐ hibits this behavior. When it comes to pharmaceutical research, human testing is a necessary evil. Dr. Klingman, however, went beyond what was re‐ quired, and eclipsed the scope of not only his field of expertise, but of the moral codes established throughout history. The racial feature of his experiments is particularly troubling, and his refusal to admit that he knowingly caused harm to primarily black inmates exposes his internal racist pretext. The obfuscation caused by overly‐complex consent forms and legalese, the destruction of documents, the mis‐ representation of research statistics (such as the percentage of black participants), and the frequency of prisoners who participated in multiple studies (hence clouding the research data) all show that Dr. Klingman, and others like him, put the objectives of the pharmaceu‐ tical and cosmetic companies far above his responsibilities as a doc‐ tor, or as a rational, empathetic human being. The research conducted at the University of Pennsylvania fur‐ ther this notion, as their justification for their tests being “ethical” relies on a largely ignorant prison population understanding the risks associated with medical testing. Often times, the rewards of participating were emphasized while the risks were obscured, usual‐ ly by consent forms designed to confuse. The utilitarian argument fails as well, when a majority of these experiments fail to materialize any significant data or treatment. I think it is fair to compare the medical abuse of Nazi doctors to the medical abuse of American doctors. In both cases we see med‐ ical professionals performing dangerous and harmful experiments on an imprisoned population in the name of a greater, more power‐ ful entity. Whether that entity is the state or a corporation is irrele‐ vant. The quantity, breadth and severity of the experiments may dif‐ fer, but the underlying argument is the same. Genetically modified organisms and food have been around for quite some time, and I’ve been aware of them for several years now. The 72

controversy surrounding them has prompted most of my family to move towards a more organic diet—one that is more expensive, but also more healthy. However, this movie really depicted Monsanto as a willfully corrupt and malicious corporation to an extent that I had not known about. Like many others, I assumed that genetically mod‐ ified food was produced as a means to make food cheaper and more plentiful, and had little knowledge about the backwards patent sys‐ tem, or really that one could patent a gene or living organism. The extent to which Monsanto has infiltrated the government is anger‐ ing, and their litigious approach to family farming is shameful. I suppose, then, that it comes as no surprise that government subsi‐ dies benefit the large corporations whom seek to control the world’s food, and whom financially benefit from world hunger and starva‐ tion. It’s strange that corporate welfare is not attacked to the same degree as social welfare, especially when presented with such in‐ formation. We’re giving money to transnational corporations whom have no accountability. They could be poisoning us all with GE crops. Even buying organic is suspect, as cross‐contamination is a real threat. The “terminator” technology discussed in the film is truly dis‐ turbing, and seems like it came straight out of some dystopian sci‐ ence fiction novel. It’s like one‐time‐use DRM for food. I don’t even understand how anyone could agree to grow such a crop, or why an‐ yone would want to. I understand the (supposed) reason behind its creation, but in practice it seems insane. The only thing missing is a Monsanto‐branded chemical that needs to be sprayed on the crop every half‐hour, lest the crops explode. In a world where the exist‐ ence of genetically engineered food is justified as serving humanity, this terminator technology takes ten steps backwards, so far back that it actually begins to threaten humanity. That we allow this to happen, and that our government allows this to happen, is depress‐ ing. Food Inc. continues this narrative of multinational corpora‐ tions controlling the food and health of public. The actual produc‐ tion food is surprising, particularly when so few farms/slaughterhouses are producing the majority of our meat. That corn is integrated into a nearly all products, and is being fed to ani‐ mals that have no business eating corn is also surprising. However, I keep getting stuck on this idea that the people who we are supposed 73

to trust to make sure our food is safe to eat are the same people who have an interest in companies like Monsanto and Perdue growing larger and larger. The fact that the food industry is protected by the government, even when food products are harming or killing people, is intensely disturbing. People being fined or jailed or sued for criti‐ cizing the meat industry? I just don’t understand how or why people go along with this behavior. Is it greed? It is the pursuit of power? I feel guilty if I step on a spider in my kitchen; so how do these people live with themselves? This is a very enlightening documentary. There seems to be a lot of misconceptions out there about the value of eating a plant‐based di‐ et, particularly when it comes to eliminating meat for your diet. This movie demonstrates, quite plainly, that “going vegan” can have pro‐ found effects on your health, and that eating dairy and meat is not necessary to maintain health. The misconceptions about vegan di‐ ets, as the movie shows, comes from doctors and scientists who serve the interests of diary/meat producers, and not the interests of the public. Children are taught this propaganda and mature thinking that meat and dairy are a necessary component of a regulated diet. We are a product of a system designed to sell products that promote cancer and heart disease. Discovering these machinations of society make me glad I enrolled in this class. The idea that plants are more healthy than meat is not new, and I think we’d all agree that such in‐ formation is widely believed, but knowing that dairy and meat can actually facilitate cancer growth and heart disease is revelatory. In society’s current state, when we’re arguing about rising health care premiums and how best to manage the healthcare industry, and when the poorest people in our country suffer the greatest from obesity and heart disease, the plant‐based diet seems like a logical and tremendously beneficial answer to an ever expanding problem. Now, if we could only get plants to all corners of this country . . . Personally, I did not infer that, “that by eating a plant‐based diet one can avoid cancer”. It can lower your chances of getting cancer. At best, there is a negative correlation between eating a plant‐based, or 74

vegan, diet and the formation of cancerous cells. The mechanisms that cause cancer are not well defined, and knowing what exactly causes a cell to become cancerous, as I understand it, is incredibly complex. More work needs to be done before we can concretely conclude that diary and meat are significant sources of cancer. There is plenty of evidence out there that veganism can have a partial negative effect on health (like vitamin deficiency), or that it can cause malnutrition if not done properly. However, this movie is not about veganism, it’s about how the common American diet is making us unhealthy. A plant‐based diet is an alternative that “can” have a significant impact on one’s health and quality of life. The narrator provides evidence of this. You’re right; there are other metrics that need to be accounted for when comparing the health of two very different cul‐ tures/countries. As an opinion: It is a sales pitch, but not for a political party. It’s a sales pitch for health. Rolling conventional veganism into ve‐ ganarachism, or some other political belief is a slippery slope. I am not a vegan, nor am I partisan, and I took no political message from this documentary. 75





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he American dream is defunct; what once served as an icon of self‐determination is now a paper‐thin façade, easily crumpled by weight of reality. Such a realization is bolstered by the “Unnatural Causes” doc‐ umentary and various readings through‐ out these first few weeks of class, where the continued proliferation of inequity is shown to be both multiform and sobering, its effects encumbering individuality, im‐ portant cultural linchpins, and, ultimately, health. The cycle of poverty—the presumptuous social barricades that prevent economic ascension—ensures that those affected stay affected, and, more notably, has the ability to intrinsically alter racial and ethnological reflection. Additionally, the determinants of pov‐ erty inhabit numerous forms, including lopsided federal policy, his‐ torical injustice via colonialism, and systemic, institutionalized rac‐ ism, all of which work to perpetuate its existence and personify the impoverished as morally accountable parasites. Inequity Partisan government policy is a primary contributor to ine‐ quality in America; and its astigmatic legislature typically favors the affluent. Douglas Imig, in his book “Poverty and Power: The Political Representation of Poor Americans”, examines the asymmetrical dis‐ tribution of government resources during the Reagan administra‐ tion, and draws a convincing parallel between an increase in poverty and discriminatory budget cuts. Reagan’s budget, which was billed as a necessary measure to reduce wasteful spending and rampant corruption, targeted welfare systems designed to mitigate poverty in younger, progressive populations (food stamps, meal‐programs, etc.), while preserving welfare system designed for older, conserva‐ 76

tive populations (SSI, Medicare, etc.). As an accompaniment to budg‐ etary cuts, Reagan issued tax breaks to the wealthy, producing, “one of the quickest and most regressive redistributions of wealth in U.S. history” (Imig 1996). Additionally, Reagan’s economic policy stigma‐ tized impoverished Americans, and conflated the ideas of welfare and social‐responsibility into a universally panned perception of in‐ dolence. Ultimately, this convergence became the dominant impres‐ sion of the impoverished, and further delineated the innocuous indi‐ vidualistic nature of American society. Colonialism is another contributor to poverty and inequity. The “Unnatural Causes” documentary examined two populations that fell under American colonial rule: the Marshallese and the Pima Native American tribe. Both cases expose how living under the thumb of U.S. rule can yield expanded poverty and cultural destruc‐ tion, and how careless policies—ones designed to counteract the ef‐ fects of poverty—only further its presence. Moreover, in both cases the health effects of poverty are clear: respectively, rates of tubercu‐ losis and type II diabetes are much higher in the Marshallese and Pima tribe members, and emigration or integration into American culture only presents added health risks (California Newsreel with Vital Pictures, Inc. 2008). In essence, the artifice of colonialism works to both strip native peoples of their cultural heritage, effec‐ tively constructing diverse, interconnected diasporas, and to coax the impoverished into an adverse dependence on American subsidy, be it commodities or employment. Poverty is cyclical, and its revolutions can be outlined both empiri‐ cally and logically. A series of events cascade across an impoverished neighborhood; business’ flee poorer areas to satiate their capitalist appetite, reducing employment opportunity; taxes, both property and income, suffer in poorer areas, reducing the quality and availa‐ bility of essential social services (health care, police, schools, etc.); as sufficient education wanes, and as cultural and societal perspectives of poverty become internalized, people are less likely to either see or take the steps necessary to scale the economic ladder; violence and crime become intertwined with impoverished areas, leading to loss of business and premature death; depression and anxiety, two dom‐ 77

inant determinants of overall health, metamorphose into physical symptoms and decrease life expectancy. Furthermore, poverty is generational, and passed down from parents to children as if it were genetic. In her article, “Caught in the Cycle of Poverty”, Anna Gorman explains, “Children who are born into poverty and spend years that way are more likely to be teenage parents and remain poor as adults” (Gorman 2012). That such a cycle exists is a direct conse‐ quence of an aggressive capitalist market, poor policy‐making, and a society that favors spurious notions of individualism over economic realities. Yet another factor that influences the cycle of poverty hides within the principal fabric of American culture. Institutionalized rac‐ ism, as defined by Vernellia R. Randall, “involves polices, practices, and procedures of institutions that have a disproportionately nega‐ tive effect on racial minorities’ access to and quality of goods, ser‐ vices, and opportunities” (Randall 2008). Racism, be it overt or cov‐ ert, has the ability to affect a person’s perception of self‐worth and ability. Institutionalized racism, which manages to be both clandes‐ tine and conspicuous, contributes to the cycle of poverty by overtax‐ ing or depriving minorities of their basic human needs/rights, in‐ cluding: access to healthy food, adequate education, fair and equal job opportunity, safe and clean environments, and access to ac‐ ceptable health care. As Randall explains, “Institutionalized and sys‐ temic racism establishes separate and independent barriers to ac‐ cess and quality of health care” (Randall 2008). The status of “impoverished” is often refracted through an Americanized lens of individualism and self‐determination, views that potentially skew the societal impact of poverty, and shift re‐ sponsibility away from those in power. That idea that a person’s economic status is tied to individual choice, or that opportunity can be manifested via individual action, smacks of pseudo‐American dream naiveté. As Claire Andre and Manuel Velasquez poignantly surmise, “Americans…still have a Lockean political culture, empha‐ sizing individual freedom and the pursuit of individual affluence (the American dream) in a society with the most un‐Lockean economy and government” (Andre and Velasquez 1992). This senseless dis‐ parity between perceived economic freedom and reality (i.e. the cy‐ cle of poverty) has led to the stigmatization of poorer people, and has contributed to anti‐poverty policy‐making, class‐based denigra‐ 78

tion, and, ultimately, the contrivances that power the cycle of pov‐ erty. Poverty and health are inextricably bound together; the cycle of poverty—pushed forward and perpetuated by forced inculturation, institutionalized racism, and discriminatory government policy—not only leads to stress and depression (two important determinants for health), but can strip away the protective cultural integuments that shield immigrants from poverty‐related diseases. Such diseases manifest physical symptoms that can affect life span, quality of life, and overall health. Furthermore, the environmental conditions of impoverished areas lead to increased health risks, and that “working environments of poorer people often hold more environmental risks for illness and disability; [while] other environmental factors, such as lack of access to clean water, disproportionately affect poor fami‐ lies” (Murray 2006). Environmental quality, coupled with stress, de‐ pression, poor nutrition, and lack of adequate health care, ensures that “zip code matters”, and that people affected by poverty live a shorter, and qualitatively worse life than the wealthy. Perhaps worse, a widening income gap, a fabricated “war on poverty”, and a mirage masquerading as the American dream, all indicate that the indictment of the impoverished, and by proxy their health, will re‐ main in jeopardy. 79

Andre, Claire, and Manuel Velasquez. Creating the Good Society. 1992. http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/iie/v5n1/ (ac‐ cessed September 21, 2013). Unnatural Causes. Performed by California Newsreel with Vital Pic‐ tures, Inc. 2008. Gorman, Anna. "Caught in the Cycle of Poverty." Los Angeles Times. May 24, 2012. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/24/local/ la‐me‐natalie‐20120524 (accessed 09 21, 2013). Imig, Douglas R. Poverty and Power: The Political Representation of Poor Americans. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996. Murray, Sally. Poverty and Health. March 28, 2006. http://www.cmaj.ca/content/174/7/923.short (accessed 09 21, 2013). Randall, Vernellia R. What is Institutionalized Racism. July 03, 2008. http://academic.udayton.edu/race/2008electionandracism/race andracism/racism02.htm (accessed 09 21, 2013).

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For Contemporary Urban Issues, Fall 2013

nequity, in any form, is the manifestation of institution‐ alized discrimination. The medical institution, in partic‐ ular, has long since been a contributor to the overt and covert racism and discriminatory practices respiring through the tenuous veins of American society. In her meticulously crafted book, “Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Medical Experimentations on Black Ameri‐ cans from Colonial Times to the Present”, Harriet Wash‐ ington exposes the popular conceit of an ethical Ameri‐ can medical history as erroneous, and derives that the inequity and immoral behavior of the medical estab‐ lishment is, and continues to be, produced by a deeply imbedded and historical racial bias. Like America, the history of medical research is built upon this bias, and continues to influence how society func‐ tions, evolves, and how gaps in health and healthcare—Washington’s so‐called “apartheid”—form across racial lines. To describe and compare the condition of the medical field at any point in America’s history to apartheid is sensationalist. It is also apt. Washington walks readers through a clandestine American his‐ tory that is both egregious and wonted, and asphyxiates any emo‐ tional response in the name of disclosure. Each chapter tells of an individual slighted or victimized by a medical system built from the ashes of slavery, fueled by an ethnological and racial divide, where men and women could be affixed a value based on a simple equation: white is greater than black. The experiments and utter depravity of American doctors seemingly knew no bounds: forced sterilization, genocide masquerading as eugenics, injections of radioactive sub‐ stances, exposure to syphilis, and a blatantly intrusive and racist prison‐experiment‐culture reveal how historical bigotry shaped not 81

only the moral code of the medical establishment, but also the insti‐ tutionalized racism that persists in society today. But is “apartheid” an accurate or fair term to apply to con‐ temporary medicine? Have these malicious mainstays in medical re‐ search been eradicated by the evolution of civil rights, or have they continued with a muted tonality, blanketed by a society whose fa‐ çade of progressiveness is undermined by a foundation and continu‐ ation of historical injustice? The “dark history” of medicine that Washington describes is blatantly racist, its conceit founded on the belief that black people are culturally and biologically divergent, and the disparities that exist in today’s society are repressed offspring from it. These racial disparities in the medical field manifest in vari‐ ous ways, and one metric used to expose them is the access to and quality of healthcare. As Brian Smedley describes in his book, “Une‐ qual Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care”, African American and other minorities are, “. . . less likely than whites to have health insurance, have more difficulty getting healthcare, and have fewer choice in where to receive care” (Smed‐ ley, Stith and Nelson 2003). Moreover, the quality of and access to healthcare are significantly lower than whites, and blacks are “les likely to receive even routine medical procedures” (Smedley et al., 2003). The socioeconomic differences that are typically used to ex‐ plain away these disparities are punctured by America’s “dark histo‐ ry”, where discrimination and economic differences are a direct con‐ sequence of a compounding biography of partiality and bias in a na‐ tion that politicked and inculcated its way into a system of institu‐ tionalized racism. Samuel Zuvekas and Gregg Taliaferro reach a similar conclu‐ sion in there article, “Pathways to Access”, and not only echo the sen‐ timents of inequity in healthcare for minorities, but also that such disparity, “. . . appear[s] to be growing over the past couple of dec‐ ades” (Zuvekas and Taliaferro 2003). The factors that Zuvekas and Taliaferro determined feed inequity, including income, education, insurance, and health care delivery, have been systematically cor‐ rupted by America’s engagement to medical apartheid, and the dis‐ parity exhibited in today’s healthcare system reflect an open‐ended narrative of racial discrimination. It is hard to control for racism or cultural differences when conducting scientific research, and as Zuvekas and Taliaferro concluded, “Much of the disparities among 82

blacks . . . remain unexplained even after differences in a large num‐ ber of characteristics are controlled for” (Zuvekas and Taliaferro 2003). The construct and existence of “race” as an innate characteristic that defines a group of people is entirely social and philosophical, and science has shown that biologically and genetically humans do not differ. However, “Medical Apartheid” illustrates a clear and promi‐ nent historical separation of race in American medicine, one that has fought its way into the intimations of current medical research, de‐ spite a growing sense of equality. The acknowledgement of race as a determinant for behavior, intelligence, or importance has had severe impact on how patients are treated and/or viewed in the medical field. As Robert S. Schwartz describes in his article, “Racial Profiling in Medical Research”, “. . . racial designation in the context of medical management not only defies everything we have learned from biolo‐ gy, genetics, and history but also opens the door to inequities in medical care” (Schwartz, 2001). Furthermore, and despite the se‐ verity of an immoral and depraved “medical apartheid” eroding, the construct of race, though inconsequential in terms of biology and healthcare, has continued to direct the course of medical research. Schwartz explains: Such research mistakenly assumes an inherent biologic dif‐ ference between black‐skinned and white‐skinned people. It falls into error by attributing a complex physiological or clini‐ cal phenomenon to arbitrary aspects of external appearance. It is implausible that the few genes that account for such out‐ ward characteristics could be meaningfully linked to multi‐ genic diseases such as diabetes mellitus or to the intricacies of the therapeutic effect of a drug . . . (Schwartz, 2001). Accordingly, as a factor of health, race is capricious. Howev‐ er, history has demonstrated that race will continue to be socially and culturally significant; and as genetic research tackles complex problems that affect one group more than another, the concept of race will continue to influence how medical research is conducted 83

and conveyed. Mark Kohn, in his article “This Racist Undercurrent in the Tide of Genetic Research”, undertakes the complicated issue of race in current medical research, stating that, “. . . racial science is pushing for rehabilitation on a range of fronts” (Kohn 2006). Fronts, such as medicine specifically designed for black people, are quietly and subliminally justified through America’s history as a subjugator, and Kohn, who ultimately concludes that race is relevant in disease‐ research, perpetuates the myth that race is a prevailing factor in health. Race, as a social, not a biological construct, affects all facets of life, and appropriating medical research based on race seems coun‐ terproductive to the goal of eliminating race as a de facto determi‐ nant for health. More importantly, the social stigmas associated with race seem to be the prevailing cause of poor health in minority groups, not race itself. The phenotypical differences, as Schwartz concluded, are superficial. The causes for health and healthcare disparities in America are nu‐ merous and abstruse, but one reason is obvious: mistrust in a system that has demonstrated profound racial bias. “Medical Apartheid” exposes numerous medical initiatives, including the Tuskegee Syphi‐ lis Study, as being conceived from a racist agenda. Often, the meth‐ ods employed to obtain participants were specifically designed to be confusing and onerous, relying on overly complex legalese and scien‐ tific parlance to dupe undereducated minorities into cooperating. The admission of such practices has had a penetrating effect on peo‐ ple’s trust in the healthcare system. Giselle Corbie‐Smith discusses in her article, “Attitudes and Beliefs of African Americans Toward Participation in Medical Research”, that, “For many blacks, the Tuskegee study became a symbol of their mistreatment by the medi‐ cal establishment, a metaphor for deceit, conspiracy, malpractice, and neglect, if not outright racial genocide” (Corbie‐Smith, et al. 1999). This mistrust in healthcare has ultimately led to the inequity found in today’s American society, and “can be justified by a long his‐ tory of exploitation in the name of research that dates back to slav‐ ery and continues to the present day” (Corbie‐Smith, et al. 1999). L. Ebony Boulware reaches a similar conclusion in her article, “Race and Trust in the Healthcare system”, where she concludes that, 84

“African Americans have been shown to have a greater awareness of the documented history of racial discrimination in the health care system . . . and this greater awareness of historical discrimination has been associated with less trust of clinical and research institu‐ tions” (Boulware, et al. 2003). For some black Americans, the healthcare system represents a country’s sordid history of racial prejudice and intolerance, and it can be reasoned that, for some, simply avoiding healthcare is preferable to involvement in a system that covertly conspires against them. Harriet Washington writes that her book, “documents a peculiar type of injustice in health: the troubled history of medical experi‐ mentation with African Americans—and the resulting behavioral fallout that causes researchers and African Americans to view each other through jaundiced eyes.” (Washington 2006). History, it seems, has pitted two groups against each other, separated by the conceit of race, and widened by a past littered with medical experiments that only served to justify or further a racist agenda. The implicit laws that govern medical research and researchers have long been cor‐ rupted, so much so that their existence in today’s society is clouded by a malaise of unapologetic sentiment and outright denial. The in‐ equity that people experience is directly tied to such corruption, and gaps in health and healthcare are, despite latent, innately racial. In the same breath, history can be both depressing and enlightening, and Washington’s comprehensive look at American medical experi‐ mentation certainly embodies both. Her use of the term “apart‐ heid” is absolutely sensationalist, but damned if it is not accurate. 85

Boulware, L. Ebony, Lisa A Cooper, Lloyd E. Ratner, Thomas A. LaVeist, and Neil R. Powe. "Race and Trust in the Health Care System." Public Health Reports 118, no. 4 (July‐August 2003): 358‐365. Corbie‐Smith, Giselle, Stephen B. Thomas, Mark V. Williams, and Sandra Moody‐Avyers. "Attitudes and Beliefs of African Ameri‐ cans Toward Participation in Medical Research." Journal of Internal Medicine 14, no. 9 (September 1999): 537‐546. Kohn, Mark. The Racist Undercurrent in the Tide of Genetic Research. January 16, 2006. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006 /jan/17/race.science (accessed November 5, 2013). Schwartz, Robert S. "Racial Profiling in Medical Research." The New England Journal of Medicine 334, no. 18 (May 2001). Smedley, Brian D., Adrienne Y. Stith, and Alan R. Nelson. Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care. Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003. Washington, Harriet A. Medical Apartheid: The Dark History of Meidcal Experimentation on Black Americans from Colonial Times to the Present. New York: Anchor Books, 2006. Zuvekas, Samuel H., and Gregg S. Taliaferro. "Pathways to Access: Health Insurance, The Health Care Delivery System, and Racial Ethnic Disparities, 1996‐1999." Health Affairs, March 2003: 139‐ 153.

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For Contemporary Urban Issues, Fall 2013

Health disparities are often most conspicu‐ ous in urban, impoverished environments, where access to quality food is restricted and education about health‐living is sub‐ dued. According to Case Western Reserve University’s NEO CANDO System, as of 2000, over a quarter (26.3%) of individuals, and nearly a third (32.3%) of families with children living in Cleveland, Ohio had in‐ comes below the poverty level (Case West‐ ern Reserve University, 2012). This translates to a wide gap in equity for residents living in Cleveland’s most impoverished areas, and con‐ tributes to the country’s growing health crisis. This “Call to Action” proposes the creation of a health‐focused newsletter aimed at rais‐ ing awareness about, and informing people of the dangers of living and eating unhealthy and the benefits derived from choosing fresh, healthy food. Other goals of this newsletter include: exposing read‐ ers to external content, including documentaries and scientific arti‐ cles, that detail the historical and cultural reasons for America’s de‐ clining health, pointing readers to informative, health‐centric web‐ sites, and encouraging urban residents to start small gardens, either indoors or outdoors, to help mitigate the effects of the typical urban American diet. Arming people with knowledge is, perhaps, the most effective means of infiltrating and dismantling the current system of food production in America, and this “Call to Action” aims to equip people with the insight and ability to begin making better, healthier choices, not only for them, but for the overall well‐being of the coun‐ try. Health, as a component of equity, is often skewed in urban environ‐ ments, where access to quality health care and fresh food is limited. This inequity often affects the impoverished, who typically cannot 87

afford more preferable resources, and many of whom rely on gov‐ ernment subsidies and “entitlement programs” designed to pack re‐ cipients full of processed, dense caloric foods and corn‐based sugars. This results in a growing health disparity, and emphasizes a need for change, not only in the food sold and eaten, but in the policies that guide life in urban environments. According to the Centers for Dis‐ ease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) SMART Project, over half of the residents living in the Cleveland metropolitan area and surrounding cities are either overweight or obese, and, based in BMI, only 33.7% of residents achieved a normal weight (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). Furthermore, 8.8% of residents have been formally diagnosed with diabetes, 4.9% have been diagnosed with coronary heart disease, 25.6% of residents have reported that they did not participate in physical activities, and nearly 15% of Cleve‐ land’s people lack adequate access to healthcare (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2013). These statistics present a sobering reality: the gaps in health equity are very much prevalent in Cleveland. Most of these statistics can be attributed to unhealthy eating, a byproduct of having a sur‐ plus of fast‐food restaurants, little‐to‐no access to fresh produce and other healthy products, and easy access to cheap calorie‐dense foods. Moreover, there is a lack of adequate education surrounding the topic of healthy eating, and for many, identifying which foods are good versus which foods are bad is problematic. There is little over‐ sight on how food is advertised, and often foods that are branded “healthy”, if consumed on a regular basis, turn out to be detrimental to a person’s overall health. Buzzwords and other “healthy” phrase‐ ology often embellish popular food brands, and there is little govern‐ ing policy on how slogans such as, “Heart Healthy”, or “Light” are used in packaging or advertising. Perhaps more troubling, children’s networks and shows are saturated with commercials for junk food and products that purport to be “healthy”, even when contrary evi‐ dence shows that children are more susceptible to advertising than adults. A study conducted at the Centre for Behavioral Research in Cancer Control found evidence suggesting, “that until 8 years of age most children are cognitively incapable of appreciating the commer‐ cial purpose of television advertising and are particularly vulnerable to is persuasive techniques” (Patterson, Donovan, Ewing, Roberts, & Carter, 2011). This makes it difficult for children to choose what 88

foods to eat in order to maintain health, and to understand that eat‐ ing mass‐marketed, popular foods can have a lasting negative impact on health. Access to healthy food is severely limited, particularly in the eastern section of Cleveland city and surrounding suburbs, where a large population of Cleveland’s impoverished people live. According to Google’s map data, there are only two Giant Eagle Grocery stores within a 10 mile radius east of downtown Cleveland, and only one Whole Foods store, located in a wealthy area of Cleveland Heights (Google Maps, 2013). This presents a problem for people who cannot afford to travel a long distance for food, or whom do not have the means to travel. The prevalence of corner stores, or convenience stores, where junk food, cigarettes, and alcohol are sold, is exponen‐ tially higher than the number of grocery stores, where fresh fruits, vegetables, and other healthy foods are stocked and sold. It is much easier for a resident is these areas to walk a block or two and obtain cheap, unhealthy food than it is for them to travel upwards of 10 miles to purchase healthier alternatives. Children have it even worse. Their access to healthy food is limited by what parents bring home, by what is available in the sur‐ rounding area, and by what is served to them in school. According to the National Education Association, the quality and safety standards of school food is lower than those of fast food restaurants, and, “school cafeterias are not being inspected as rigorously required by the Child Nutrition Act” (Buffenbarger, 2013). Children who rely on school as a source of nutrition are eating food that is qualitatively worse for them than the fast food they eat outside of school. Again, this contributes to the health disparity seen in the Cleveland area, and further aggravates the prevalence of childhood obesity. Children who rely on fast food and other unhealthy foods as their sole source of nutrition and energy are setting themselves up for an adult life plagued with avoidable, health‐related diseases. Therefore, having knowledge about what kind of food is healthy, as well as having access to fresh, healthy food is important if urban residents in Cleveland are to close the gaps in equity. Knowledge is, perhaps, the progenitor of healthy‐living, and an in‐ formed population is better equipped to demand change from the current system of food production and supply. With knowledge, an individual or group can begin to transform the social and cultural 89

landscapes of their homes and neighborhoods, and usher in a health‐ ier climate all can benefit from. Empowerment is derived from knowledge, and with that, access to healthier food will increase, and gaps in equity will begin shuttering. It is apparent that government policy concerning the production and distribution of food is skewed towards corporate interests, and that the health of the nation is damaged as a result. This indicates that the individual must take charge of their health, become educated about the food they eat, and learn how to live a healthy life. Infor‐ mation concerning healthy food is freely available through various sources, but acquiring or seeing such information is often hidden from popular news outlets and websites. Various documentaries ex‐ ist that explain and document how food is changing the overall health of the country, and the impact it has on individual lives, but such films do not receive the same attention or marketing that Hol‐ lywood affords its blockbusters. The mindshare of “health” is small and inconspicuous. Unhealthy living and eating, particularly in America, can be frightening, the consequences capable of destroying lives and fami‐ lies. A mother, struggling with obesity and diabetes, needs multiple expensive surgeries to replace worn joints; a father, life‐long smok‐ er, bourbon‐connoisseur, and a man who had not met an animal he would not eat, dies from cancer at 56; a sister, who struggles daily with food and body image, turns to bulimia; and a brother, hefty and seemingly careless, is diagnosed with heart disease at age 29. Such stories are found in American families; they are not unique or rare, and the dilemmas they face are largely avoidable. The information needed to steer around these health‐related pitfalls is often shroud‐ ed behind a thick veneer of American obtuseness, out‐shined by the loud prattling of advertising and entertainment, or tucked away within the folds of the country’s higher‐education system. In America, education is costly. This limits the number and type of people that receive an education post‐high school, and in many ways, creates its own gaps in equity. However, being able to afford, either monetarily or time‐wise, a college education should not be a determining factor in receiving instructions on how to live 90

and eat healthy. Taking a 13 to 15 week health course at a communi‐ ty or state college can cost hundreds, if not thousands of dollars, and can be rigorous for people not familiar or prepared to face a college curriculum. Personally, the information received in college is valua‐ ble, and paying a premium for that information is an accepted prac‐ tice in America, but affixing a price tag on what is, ostensibly, indi‐ vidual health is what initially creates gaps in equity. If one college class has the ability to awaken and diversify a person’s perspective on life, health, history, etc., as it has for me time and time again, then the information contained within that class should be freely availa‐ ble and distributable. Life in America often seems like a malaise of excess and unquestioned allegiance to corporate conglomerates, and waking someone from the clutches of this should not be limited to those who can afford it. The intent of this “call to action” is to create and distribute a 4‐page newsletter focusing on current and historical topics of health and well‐being, either through e‐mail or traditional mail, to one East Cleveland neighborhood. Particular emphasis will be put on healthy eating, including what foods to buy at a grocery or corner store, what foods can be grown indoors and outdoors, instructions for garden‐ ing, popular myths and facts about healthy food, and meal ideas for young children. Each issue will have one or two informative articles about health and food, linking recipients to scholarly articles, videos, and documentaries that are freely available on the Internet. In gen‐ eral, the newsletter will serve as a launching pad, raising awareness about important health‐related issues, and pointing readers to the wealth of knowledge that is often hidden within the pages of the In‐ ternet. This call to action will strive to achieve the following goals and SMART objectives: To increase awareness and deliver information about healthy eating and living. Specific?

To create and distribute a physical newsletter to on small neighborhood in East Cleveland. Yes, one newsletter. 91

Measurable?

Yes, one small neighborhood.

Achievable?

Yes, a neighborhood homes/apartment units

with

<

50

Time‐bound? Yes, by spring 2014

To create and distribute an electronic news‐ letter those whom sign up via social network‐ ing sites.

Specific?

Yes, one newsletter.

Measurable?

Yes.

Achievable?

Yes. Newsletter will mirror physical newslet‐ ter.

Time‐bound? Yes, by spring 2014

To include indoor and outdoor gardening tips for adults and children.

Specific?

Yes, several gardening tips.

Measurable?

Yes.

Achievable?

Yes.

Time‐bound? Yes, by spring 2014.

To include meal ideas and relatively inexpen‐ sive healthy recipes for adults and children.

Specific?

Yes, one or two recipes.

Measurable?

Yes.

Achievable?

Yes. There are many healthy recipes.

Time‐bound? Yes, by spring 2014.

To include links to external articles, docu‐ mentaries, and other material related to healthy eating.

Specific?

Yes, several links.

Measurable?

Yes.

Achievable?

Yes.

Time‐bound? Yes, by spring 2014 92

Implementing this “Call to Action” is fairly straightforward. The crea‐ tion of the physical newsletter will require a person with some knowledge of Microsoft Word and/or the LaTeX document creation system, as well as someone who is familiar with graphical design and typesetting. Writing and research can be performed in my spare time, with the formatting to be done by a volunteer or, if need be, cobbled together myself. Paper can be bought in bulk reams directly from paper suppliers or via online paper outlets. Printing of both newsletter and the postage labels can be done on a home laser print‐ er, or by utilizing the services of a copy center (e.g. CopyMax). The folding, or finishing, of the newsletter will be performed gratis by DUKE Printing, my employer, and will meet USPS standards. Mailing will be through the USPS, using first class mail postage, which is tax deductible. The electronic newsletter will require a person with knowledge of HTML and some graphical design experience. Mailing lists will be acquired through conventional means: soliciting sign‐ ups via popular social media networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, Tumblr, Google+, and LinkedIn, or by free postings on Cleveland‐ related websites. Prior to spring 2014, accounts will be made on each of the aforementioned social networking sites; their primary focus to spread a message of healthy living/eating and to solicit in‐ terested parties for email addresses. The address will be kept in con‐ fidentiality and destroyed/discarded if unsubscribed. The electronic newsletter has the ability to reach a far greater demographic of people at no additional cost, making it a more attrac‐ tive long term monthly prospect. It also has the benefit of directly linking to additional resources, making it easier for subscribers to access information. Moreover, the costs incurred from writ‐ ing/designing an electronic newsletter are negligible, while a physi‐ cal newsletter requires paper, ink, and postage. The budget to the right outlines the basic cost of producing one newsletter for ≥50 re‐ cipients. Subsequent newsletters, if produced, would be significantly cheaper, as one cartridge of generic black toner can last 2000+ pages (2000 one‐sided 8.5x11 sheets equals 500 double‐sided 11x17 sheets), and one ream of paper can produce 500 newsletters. This budget assumes the cheapest route, with all of the production work 93

done on a volunteer basis (or by myself). Additional‐ (For both physical and electronic newsletters) ly, and with permission, (Prices rounded to nearest quarter dollar) physical newsletters can be distributed at commu‐ Writing/Design/Research --nity centers, churches, Done myself and other places where Paper $16.50 1 ream of 11x17 stock people gather, cutting down on the cost of post‐ Printing/Ink $34.00 Black ink for laser printer age, and reaching a great‐ Finishing/Folding er selection of people with --11x17 folded to 5.5x8.5 little‐to‐no added cost. Postage Labels While the electron‐ $9.75 1 box of 300 ic newsletter sounds bet‐ Postage $33.00 ter in principle, the physi‐ 50 letters at $0.66 per item cal newsletter benefits by reaching those who are Coding/Design --not constantly connected Done myself or volunteer to the Internet. Though Social Media Solicitation --this “Call to Action” has Done myself realistic, short‐term, at‐ $93.25 tainable goals, a long‐term project would necessitate the use of both physical and electronic newsletters. Furthermore, the information contained within this newsletter would be culled from reputable scholarly sources, em‐ phasizing science over fad, and contain up‐to‐date, relevant infor‐ mation concerning nutrition and health. Related videos, documen‐ taries, and other external sources would all point to secure, non‐ partisan, credible websites. Information would be as non‐biased as possible, and apply to the greatest number of people. The initial creation of the newsletter template will take some time, considering the complexities involved in drafting an applicable 11x17 signature. Several layers of graphical design will need to be completed before the text can be inserted. The content of the news‐ letter should take no more than 2 weeks to complete. Therefore, a practical timeline for a full‐time student and full‐time worker is 94

spring of 2014. Listed below are viable milestones and rough dates as to when they should be completed: Begin social media blitz. Collect e‐mail address for elec‐ tronic newsletter. Gauge interest and begin research into healthy topics. Complete first draft of physical newsletter template. Graphic elements should be set in stone at this point. Complete first draft of electronic newsletter template. HTML code and graphic design should be near complete and in working order. First draft of newsletter content complete. Will include rough drafts of all content included in final newsletter, including links to extraneous content, tips for gardening, healthy recipes, informative content, and myths/facts about healthy food and eating. Final drafts of both templates and content complete. Printing, finishing and mailing of physical newsletter complete. Delivery of electronic newsletter complete.

Two and a half months should be enough time to create two templates and gather enough information/content for one 4‐page newsletter. Early March of 2014 was chosen as a favorable launching date for several reasons: (1) winter is ending and people are more conscious about their physical condition/appearance, many of whom wish to “get in shape” for the summer season; (2) as winter ends, spring begins, and the ground is once again fertile and ripe for planting gardens; and (3) aside from Easter, there are no popular holidays to distract people from maintaining a healthy diet. If suc‐ cessful, subsequent newsletters can be delivered more rapidly, at one or more every two months. The primary metric used to evaluate performance will be individual feedback. The newsletter will solicit people to leave feedback on so‐ cial networking sites, or to write a response/suggestion to the edi‐ tor. Other metrics can be used, including the number of people that initially sign up for the electronic newsletter, the amount that sub‐ 95

scribe after the delivery of the newsletter, the amount that unsub‐ scribe after receiving the electronic newsletter, and Internet traffic data for the extraneous websites/links. For example, page views on a YouTube documentary can be determined and tracked before and after the newsletter is delivered. Small upticks in average weekly page views could illuminate the efficiency of the newsletter, or, at the very least, establish a wavering positive correlation. In general, it is hard to evaluate the performance of a news‐ letter without direct feedback from its recipients. Other than directly interviewing people, or conducting a survey after the newsletter is delivered, measuring performance is restricted to voluntary com‐ ments from readers/subscribers. This “Call to Action” is designed solely to increase awareness and spread information; its hope is that, armed with this knowledge, individuals will make better choic‐ es when it comes to food and health, and be prepared to tackled larger, nation‐wide issues. By itself, the newsletter is not a measura‐ ble metric for overall health and healthy eating; it is tool that can be employed to focus and shift people’s perception of food and its effect on health. If successful, the newsletter would not change the health of Cleveland residents, it would empower them to strive for change. To increase awareness and to education people about food and healthy eating. To empower them to make better choices in their homes and neighborhoods when it comes to living healthy. By creating and distributing an informative newsletter to one neighborhood in Cleveland. Also, by creating and distributing an electronic newsletter to those who subscribe through var‐ ious social networking sites. The newsletter is targeted at impoverished residents, includ‐ ing families and children, living in an urban area. In a more general sense, the newsletter is designed to apply to anyone.

96

Buffenbarger, A. (2013). Quality of School Lunches Questioned. Re‐ trieved from National Education Association: http://www.nea.org/home/37485.htm Case Western Reserve University. (2012). Center on Urban Poverty and Community Development. Retrieved from NEO CANDO Sys‐ tem: http://neocando.case.edu Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (2013, May 9). SMART: BRFSS City and County Data. Retrieved December 4, 2013, from http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/BRFSS‐SMART/index.asp Google Maps. (2013). Cleveland Area. Retrieved from Google: https://maps.google.com/ Patterson, L., Donovan, R., Ewing, M., Roberts, C., & Carter, O. (2011). Children's Understanding of the Selling Versus Persuasive Junk Food Advertising: Implications for Regulation. Social Science and Medicine, 962‐968. 97



98

 



For Megacities of Asia, Fall 2013

rbanization affects nearly every facet of a megacity, from the lack of infrastructure and unfettered growth of urban settle‐ ments, to governance and methods of taxa‐ tion. Continuing and growing urbanization presents a challenge to sustainability, and Kötter does a commendable job outlining not only why such hurdles exist, but how to overcome them. Providing health care for a growing popu‐ lation presents its own problems, but maintaining that health care via systematic infrastructure (like sew‐ age treatment, garbage removal, and proper systems to prevent man‐made natural disasters) is a growing concern for those 1.5 bil‐ lion people living in slums. Couple that with unrestricted urban growth, poor‐to‐no planning, a high consumption of natural re‐ sources leading to all manner of ecological pollution, and an absence of reliable transportation to and from rural areas (practically forcing people to adopt city dwelling), the act of sustaining a developing megacity looks more and more like an uphill battle. Economic factors, such as housing costs, the ability to reform outdated or inefficient infrastructure, and improper/unchecked tax‐ ation methods also challenge the sustainability of developing meg‐ acities. Have enough money to sustain growth and fight poverty pre‐ sents a problem for megacities deficient in proper governance. Hopefully, Kötter’s cursory outline for addressing these issues will put developing megacities on the right track towards sustaining ur‐ ban growth. The economic benefits associated with Imperialistic rule brought several Asian countries into the modern era. British and French occupation in India contributed to improved public services and some commercial stability. Railroads and trade routes were built, buildings were erected, and a modicum of French culture was injected into the fledgling Indian culture. Opium served as an im‐ 101

portant trade good, being harvested in India and shipped off to Chi‐ na, where it penetrated and soured the upper class. As a result, Chi‐ na went to war, and equipped with new Imperial modernity, at‐ tempted to fight back its colonial intruders. This development threads deep into the 20th century, sparking war and uprising. The modernization of India by Britain and France served as the precipice for its eventual independence. Indian nationalism pushed the country over the edge and paved the way for an inde‐ pendent economic future, as well as the extinction of systemic Brit‐ ish oversight. Similar nationalist movement occurred throughout Asia and Africa in the early‐to‐mid 20th century. These movements, perhaps, would not have been possible without the modernizing ef‐ fects of Imperialism. It’s unfortunate that it took the Olympics coming to Beijing to motivate China to bolster and brace their weak anti‐pollution infra‐ structure, but some of the policies put in place before the torch was lit, while entirely foreign and unimaginable here in the US, have managed to combat pollution in dramatic ways. One such method involves the production and use of automobiles; not only have these laws cracked down on harmful emissions produced by cars and fac‐ tories (in some cases they literally closed or moved factories out of Beijing), China has gone so far as to implement a ban on automobile use. The “license plate system” was devised as a measure to cut smog for the 2008 Olympics, but has since then been implemented as a full‐time measure to combat pollution. Using license plate numbers as a control, this law effectively bans vehicles from driving on certain days of the week. It has reportedly reduced the amount of pollution in Beijing by 10% (Hays 2012). Other measures put in place before the 2008 Olympics help in the fight against pollution; coal mines were closed, power plants were modified, factories were closed or relocated, inefficient taxis were replaced with cleaner models, and pollution monitoring sta‐ tions were built to help in struggle for clean air (Hays 2012). The modest change in air quality around Beijing is a good start, but China still has a long way to go before its environmental footprint is trivial, and its megacities are no longer significant contributors to global pollution. Of the ten solutions listed in the article, only two strike me as achievable possibilities: finding and using alternate sources of drink‐ 102

ing water (such as rainwater), and the use of deep aquifers. Alt‐ hough Bangladesh is a relatively small country (148,393 km2), the amount of money needed to install purifiers, filtration devices, con‐ temporary sewage and waste disposal systems, or effective water treatment plants would likely be too high. However, provided that an international effort was made to either dilute or remove arsenic from Bangladesh’s ground water, other remediations could prove successful. Still, the most cost effect strategies for obtaining clean, arsenic‐free water for consumption would be to utilize alternate wells and rainwater, or extract water from deep aquifers. Further‐ more, the ostracization of arsenic‐contaminated Bangladeshi, cou‐ pled with excessive poverty, leads me to believe that the use of al‐ ternate sources of drinking water is a viable remedy—one that even the impoverished, or shunned can take advantage of. As stated in the article, there are several aspects of growth in Asia that can, and likely will, affect environmental resources. The unchecked growth of population, combined with urban sprawl, has had a striking influence on important natural resources, including water, air, land and biodiversity. Perhaps the most important: the release of CO2 into the atmosphere via industry and an increasing preference for automobiles is projected to have a profound effect on global warming. Over the next few decades, developing Asian coun‐ tries will continue to increase their need for energy, and as such will likely rely on cheap, infectious means to produce it. Rising global temperatures will cause an upward shift in sea level, will destroy cit‐ ies, ruin lands, and place further strain on biodiversity. Couple this with the Western world who is also projected to increase energy demand and consumption, and a global catastrophe becomes more likely. Furthermore, the polluting of land and water in Asian coun‐ tries will only hasten social and biological constriction, perhaps af‐ fecting the health of people and their ability to remain industrious and competitive in a global economy. Certainly, overly polluted wa‐ ter can destroy important reefs and oxygen‐producing animals, and deplete oceans of their globally‐important biodiversity. At first glance the SRA sounds like an exceptionally well thought‐out plan to redevelop Dharvai and provide new opportuni‐ ties for its residents. Legal, registered residents will receive a free (though incredibly small) living space in a 7‐storey building, have greater access to healthcare and education, and will have access to 103

better/more modern tools that will (hopefully) allow industry in Dharvai to grow and prosper. The project itself will be divided amongst qualified contractors, and planning includes roads, green areas, and basic infrastructure that should alleviate many problems current residents face. However, the SRA does not address the many illegal/unregistered inhabitants, and the temporary relocation of Dharvai residents could have a dramatic impact on their ability to survive while the project is being completed. Perhaps it’s a bit idealistic. Dharvia’s redevelopment would ultimately result in better living conditions for its residents, but an important question still remains: how can people who currently sur‐ vive on 1 dollar or less a day afford to live there. The rent may be free, but the utilities are not. Simply bulldozing over a neighborhood and rebuilding it does not address the real issue. , something needs to be done. If the SRA can improve living conditions for its residents, and also provide them with new em‐ ployment opportunities, then perhaps the utilitarian goal has been met. The greater issue of poverty can be tackled another day. When it comes to urban development, it seems like Japan is in a tug‐o‐war between the economic space and life space. Tokyo was able to become a world‐class city as Japan favored the economic space in the early‐to‐mid nineteenth century. Capital was received by the state and sent directly to projects that favored growth and expansion in the economic market. Consequentially, the life space was left to the private markets and suffered. People organized and fought for their rights, winning precious battles for sunlight and af‐ fordable housing in Tokyo. In the 1980’s there was a shift away from the economic space, leaning forward into the life space, where peo‐ ple could flourish. Of course, in the 90’s Japan swung back towards the economic space, and lifted or removed certain restrictions that forced Tokyo to continue serving its urban inhabitants. They built higher and higher buildings, removed social structures (bath hous‐ es) in a bid to coerce stubborn citizens out of their now‐valuable dwellings, and tweaked their state policies to allow more freedom and control to individual cities. The urban growth that occurred in Tokyo was tailored for corporate, not individual, interests. Money was funneled into pro‐ jects that purported to grow the nation’s economy, a culturally im‐ portant pillar of Japanese life. This, in turn, left the life space to rely 104

on private funds. Infrastructure was deficient in many places in To‐ kyo. It is reasonably prudent, then, to suspect that developing cities in other Asian areas would ultimately sacrifice more life space if they were to follow in Tokyo’s footsteps. We’ve already seen a great deal of sacrifice from Chinese and Indian cities, an any further neglect of the life space would ultimately lead to an even higher demand for political and economic change. There is likely a balance between the economic and life spaces, one that equally favors urban growth while at the same time preserving cultural linchpins and safeguarding all classes of inhabitants. There are various modes of transportation, each which fits a particular culture and/or city. In all likelihood, a megacity that uti‐ lizes all or many of these modes of transportation will be the most successful in moving people around and easing congestion and/or pollution. Furthermore, there are a lot of crazy, genius ideas out there (hyperloop?), and as technology continues to advance, new and exciting modes of transportation will pop up. These are cheap, environmentally friends, but require a lot of human power. There are several cities in the United States that use rick‐ shaws as a novel mode of transportation, but, ultimately, it proves impractical due to the large distances Americans travel in a day. The Asian cities that use rickshaws generally lack the infrastructure, such as subways or railways, to move large quantities of people. Cities that are equipped with such infrastructure would likely not benefit from this. Subways, like motorways, will eventually reach a limit. For Asian cities that have no underground transportation, subways would like‐ ly alleviate a substantial amount of congestion on the roadways. However, it requires a lot of investment and time to build a network of underground tubes, and in many American cities—where people own one or more personal vehicles—a subway would likely be a waste of money. With new technology, including faster, safer trams, subways could serve as a compliment to all other forms of transpor‐ tation. 105

This is perhaps the most interesting of all the modes of transporta‐ tion. Maglev trains have the ability to transport large quantities of people very quickly across large distances. Asian cities may benefit from this, provided people are commuting from far enough away to make it effective. In America, a Maglev Train would be more useful in cross‐country traveling, if anything. Building one in Cleveland would be interesting, but ultimately useless, as commuters travel to Cleveland from every direction but North. Where would the train go? Would it travel around the outer circumference of the city? Who would benefit from it? However, in Asian cities that are densely populated, having fast and reliable transportation to a megacity from a rural area could alleviate overcrowding, and afford some people new job opportunities. By far the most popular choice for Americans, the car poses several problems for megacities. Even as technology advances, and as oil‐ burning cars are becoming more efficient and less damaging to the environment, the personal automobile is a detriment for megacities. They create congestion, pollution, accidents, and other hazards. They take up a lot of space and require areas to park. Buses make more sense. In America, the car is a necessity. Most people do not live near where they work, and many do not wish to. CSU and my work are 40 miles apart, and there is no bus line, tram line, subway, maglev train, or rickshaw that would take me to both in the same day in the time required. Nor will there ever be, as the network of crisscrossing tubes, or armies of buses would be so extensive and vast it would be economically infeasible. The only other option is by car, or (at least in the summertime): Bicycles are useful, weather permitting, and can find a home in any Asian megacity or American town. Already, in many Asian and Eu‐ ropean cities, the bicycle is the dominant and preferred mode of transportation. They are cheap, virtually pollution‐free, easily ma‐ neuverable, and do not take up a lot of space. I’m reminded of Am‐ sterdam, where you can find multi‐level parking garages specifically built to house bicycles, and roadways specifically designed for bicy‐ 106

cle use. Provided the city is designed for large quantities of bikers, the bicycle is an attractive mode of transportation for any city. As mentioned in the article, there are many types of gender inequality, and almost no country exhibits gender parity. One of the more pressing issued associated with gender inequality in Asian countries is the gap in health. Generally, girls are more malnour‐ ished than boys, and women receive less healthcare than men. This, ultimately, has contributed to countless numbers of premature fe‐ male deaths, and has led to a population ratio that favors men. The sex‐based abortions that take place in Southern Asia provide evi‐ dence that gender inequality can manifest as life‐and‐death deci‐ sions. There are other concerns. Women receive less education and their function or importance to society is diminished. This has a cas‐ cading effect not only on women, but on men and children as well. Mothers who are malnourished give birth to children who, from the moment they are conceived, are at a disadvantage in health and life. The article makes the claim that empowered women are less likely to neglect their children and families, and are more likely to live a healthier life. In general, gender inequalities seem to affect health more than anything. I was surprised to see that gender inequality in Tehran was not so different than European countries. Women in Tehran struggle to compete in a society that is dominated by men, and aside from their dress, are very similar to the women in America and other Western countries, were women had to fight for equality. The inte‐ gration of religious and civil law is unique, but as several of the women discussed, the religious idolatry and regulation is on the de‐ cline. There are still issues that prevent women from achieving equality (such as social and cultural roles, and restrictions on dress and travel), but on a whole, I was stunned that Tehran, in both eco‐ nomic and social venues, is very similar to Western cities. Perhaps as religious influence wanes, the “red‐lines” and censorship will fol‐ low, and Tehran will be able to evolve in a direction that values women just as much as men. 107





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ver the past 30 years Asian countries have seen phenomenal economic growth, par‐ ticularly in China, India, and more recently, Indonesia. There are various reasons why economic growth in Asia has outpaced the rest of the world, including: the lasting ef‐ fects of colonialism/imperialism, the shift from monopoly capitalism to transnational corporate capitalism (TCC), demand from industrialized nations, physical location, populations dynamics, and effective socio‐ political components (Clark 2003). However, important economic factors—including economic reforms that led to decollectivization and a transition to TCC, policies that suppress inflation and promote macroeconomic stability, and an open‐door policy that advocates foreign investment—appear to be the most influential to Asia’s eco‐ nomic boon, and contribute to the amelioration of all other elements. The Asian market has grown considerably due to the low in‐ flation and the relative stability of exchange rates, primarily caused by highly‐resistant Asian macroeconomics. According to Douglas A. Galbi (2013) in his article “Economic Growth in East Asia”, East Asian countries—where economic growth has outpaced that of the Western world—have stabilized their inflation at around 6% a year, have kept relatively small government deficits, and have seen rela‐ tively stable exchange rates. There are various reasons why these Asian markets are committed to keeping inflation in‐check, includ‐ ing: the effects of colonial fiscal conservatism on post‐colonial eco‐ nomic policies, historical tradition, and, as is the case in Indonesia and China, an aversion grown from, “tramatic [sic] inflationary spi‐ rals that accompanied economic and political crises” (Galbi 2013). Furthermore, the stability of real exchange rates in East Asia has 109

seen a move from, “long‐term fixed rate regimes, to fixed‐but‐ adjustable regimes with occasional steep devaluations, to managed floats” (Galbi 2013). The strength of exchange rates have a positive effect on export industries, and generally work to keep inflation low, further promoting economic growth and expansion (Galbi 2013). Another important factor in Asian growth, particularly in re‐ spect to China, involves economic reforms targeted at the expansion of worker productivity, profit incentives for private businesses, and decollectivization. Prior to these economic reforms, a significant percentage of China’s population worked in collective, state‐ controlled agriculture. Zuliu Hu (1997), in his article “Why is China Growing so Fast”, explains that the decollectivization efforts and economic reforms of 1978, including the expansion of property rights and the decline in state‐owned ventures, resulted in a, “rapid growth of village enterprises [and] has drawn tens of millions of people from traditional agriculture to higher‐value‐added manufac‐ turing”. In the years following the 1978 reforms, private ownership of production increased from 2 to 10%, resulting in an abundance of non‐agricultural jobs (including jobs satiating Western consumer demand), a move from monopoly capitalism to transnational corpo‐ rate capitalism, and ultimately offered a level of economic flexibility and competition that China, or any East Asian country, had never seen (Hu and Khan 1997). China’s open door policy, beginning as part of the 1978 eco‐ nomic reform, is also largely responsible for economic growth not only in China, but in neighboring Asian countries. In respect to ex‐ ports, the Asian market prior to 1978 languished due to a “strong aversion to trade and foreign investment” (Wei 1995). The suite of economic reforms in 1978 resulted in many changes to the way Chi‐ na, and by proxy its many neighboring countries/cities (including Vietnam and then British controlled Hong Kong), viewed and con‐ ducted international business. In his book, “Economic Interdepend‐ ence in the Asian‐Pacific Region”, C.H. Kwan (1994) states that, “Chi‐ na is a now a model to follow for socialist countries in the region, helping to accelerate the reverse domino phenomenon”. This new open door policy, coupled with attractive incentives aimed at the de‐ velopment of private businesses, resulted in an annual rate of trade expansion that was, “more than three times higher than that of total world trade” (Wei 1995). Moreover, from 1978 until the present, 110

such open door policies (along with cheap, competitive labor) have ushered in a new era of transnational corporate entities, which only further the expansion of the Asian economy. In reality, it is an amalgamation of factors that has led to the Asian economic boon. Many sociopolitical factors end up influencing economic policy, and vice‐versa. Population dynamics are easily in‐ fluenced by changes to social and political policy (i.e. China’s eco‐ nomic reforms attracted many immigrants/emigrants), and the physical aspects of many Asian countries (i.e. not being landlocked) have contributed to their desirability as trade and export capitols. There is no single reason for the rise of the Asian economy; rather it was combination of many interconnected components, all designed to facilitate a social, political and economic transformation that would fundamentally change the world. Clark, David. Urban World/Global City. 2nd. New York: Routledge, 2003. Galbi, Douglas A. Economic Growth in East Asia. 2013. http://www.galbithink.org/topics/ea/ea.htm (accessed Sep‐ tember 28, 2013). Hu, Zuliu, and Mohsin S. Khan. "Why Is China Growing So Fast." International Monetary Fund. June 1997. https://www.imf.org/EXTERNAL/PUBS/FT/ISSUES8/INDEX.H TM (accessed September 29, 2013). Kwan, C.H. Economic Interdependence in the Asia-Pacific Region. New York: Routledge, 1994. Wei, Shang‐Jin. "The Open Door Policy and China's Rapid Growth: Evidence from City‐Level Data." Growth Theories in Light of of East Asian Experience , 1995: 73‐104. 111



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he state of Maharashtra, situated in the Western part of India, harbors one of Asia’s largest megacities, Mumbai. Of the twelve million people living in Mumbai, it is estimated that nearly half are living in squalor, occupying various illegal and in‐ formal slums, sustaining and deriving sub‐ sistence from unregulated, illegitimate employment (Rapid Intelligence 2012). Like many Asian megacities where a clear, inequitable divide in income and produc‐ tion exists, the formulation of Mumbai’s slums, of which Dharavi is the largest, is derived from political policies and economic reforms that favor the wealthy, unchecked and unplanned urban growth, and an overwhelmingly large influx of migrant workers, most of whom leave rural, agricultural jobs in hopes of obtaining prosperity in Mumbai’s vast industrial sector. Such aspects have (and continue to) contribute to the growing problem of poverty in and around Mum‐ bai, and have lasting consequences for not only the impoverished living in the slums, but for the environment, the country, and the world. One of the main factors contributing to poverty in Mumbai re‐ lates to unplanned urban growth. A series of social and budgetary reforms in the late 20th century spurred the economic disparities ex‐ hibited in Mumbai today and enticed millions of rural farmers to abandon their lands in search of better employment opportunities in the urban landscape. The formation of Mumbai’s informal slums, where a majority of these migrant workers live, was a consequence of such unregulated immigration, and served as a clear divider be‐ tween the opulence of higher caste members and the squalor of im‐ poverished transients (Berrebi 2011‐2013). Furthermore, the eco‐ 113

nomic reforms concentrated investment and development in finan‐ cial and computer‐related sectors, nearly ignoring the expansive (and often informal) manufacturing sector in slums adjacent to Mumbai’s affluent city center, where nearly 50% of India’s GDP is derived (Berrebi 2011‐2013). As with other Asian megacities, the adoption of transnational corporate capitalism (TCC) is tangentially responsible for a portion of the economic disparities seen in contemporary Mumbai (Clark 2003). The recent shift from monopoly capitalism to TCC—a re‐ sponse to a demanding Western market—has stimulated urban growth by making urban living more attractive to and profitable for rural inhabitants. This shift, combined with an economic policy that favors Mumbai’s urban sectors, has created (and continues to create) a large movement of migrants into the city and surrounding slums. Population growth is therefore chaotic, and urban growth responds with unregulated expansion. Attempts to address the growing poverty problem have been marred by corruption and fallacious intent. As Neelima Risbud (2003) describes in her article, “The Case of Mumbai, India”, the Ma‐ harashtra Slums Area (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelop‐ ment) Act of 1971 shifted redevelopment resources to private slum owners, who quickly misappropriated funds while carelessly evict‐ ing illegal tenants. Slums located on private lands were ineligible for national assistance, and those located on state or government‐ owned lands were only marginally improved. In particular, the manufacturing sector remained grievously deficient due to a lack of governmental investment, while the financial sector received large boosts via state and government policy (Risbud 2003). Ultimately, this ensured that Mumbai’s slums remained among the worst and largest of Asia, and effectively marginalized not only an entire eco‐ nomic sector, but a population of industrious migrant workers. The issue of unplanned urban growth and the formation of slums have indelible effects on both the environment and the people of Mumbai. As Madhura Swaminathan explains in her article, “As‐ pects of Urban poverty in Bombay”, “People living in the slums and homeless are often the worst victims of industrial pollution [and] are the worst affected by the insufficiency and poor quality of water … and in general, by unhealthy living and working environments” (Swaminathan 1995). As in other Asian megacities, urban growth in 114

Mumbai has led to air and water pollution in its slums, and has made day‐to‐day life for the impoverished difficult. In Dharavi, access to quality health care, clean water, and sanitation services is severely restricted, causing disease, violence, and the, “disintegration of communities and the social fabric” (Berrebi 2011‐2013). Further‐ more, the caste system ensures that Mumbai’s population remains divided, and creates near‐impassable economic and social barrier for the impoverished to cross. It appears that without an overhaul of state and government policies, and without closer attention paid to urban growth, Mum‐ bai’s impoverished population will continue to grow. As projects that aim to rehabilitate Mumbai’s slums come to a head, India’s larg‐ est and most prosperous city may be teetering on the brink of in‐ creased poverty and environmental loss. As with many developing Asian cities, Mumbai needs to approach the issue of rampant poverty with a clear focus on manufacturing, infrastructure, and social re‐ form. With a clear and even‐handed response, the often ignored sec‐ tors of Mumbai may very well become essential cornerstones to a regulated and planned growing megacity. Berrebi, Dario. Causes of Poverty in India: Traditions of Discrimination and Exclusion. 2011‐2013. http://www.poverties.org/causes‐of‐ poverty‐in‐india.html (accessed October 27, 2013). Clark, David. Urban World/Global City. 2nd. New York: Routledge, 2003. Rapid Intelligence. Statistics on India. 2012. http://www.nationmaster.com/country/in‐india (accessed Oc‐ tober 28, 2013). Risbud, Neelima. The Case of Mumbai, India. Report, London: Earthscan, 2003. Swaminathan, Madhura. Aspects of Urban Poverty in Bombay. Report, London: Sage, 1995. 115



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outhern Asia is home to many of the world’s largest megacities, including Jakar‐ ta, the economic and cultural capital of In‐ donesia, and Hong Kong, one of China’s largest financial capitals. These two dense‐ ly populated regions of Asia share many common features that not only delineate megacities, but also define an increasingly industrialized, expanding, and globally rel‐ evant stratum of Asian metropoles. For example, both Hong Kong and Jakarta are positioned along Pacific coastlines, making them attractive centers of commerce and trade, and both inhabit Asian countries that are moti‐ vated to provide anchorage for transnational corporate capitalism. However, for all they share in common, Jakarta and Hong Kong pos‐ sess intrinsic idiosyncrasies that cater to a similar, but ultimately distinct, culture, economy, and sociopolitical climate. In terms of raw population numbers, Jakarta and Hong Kong have managed near parity. According to the Hong Kong Special Adminis‐ trative Region Government report, “Hong Kong: Fact Sheet” (2013), the population of all districts within the region in 2012 reached 7.15 million, and achieved an annual growth rate of 1.2%, a year‐to‐year increase of 0.5%. Furthermore, the population density stood at 6,620 persons per square kilometer on Hong Kong Island, and 56,200 persons per square kilometer in the Kowloon territory, mak‐ ing Hong Kong one of the most densely populated regions not only in China, but in the world (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government 2013). In contrast, the population of Jakarta, according to the national census conducted in 2000, increased to 8.361 million, 117

and achieved an annual rate of growth of 0.12%, a paltry figure when compared with Hong Kong’s 1.2% and with Indonesia’s na‐ tional rate of 1.37% (Suryadinata, Nuridya and Anata 2003). Moreo‐ ver, the population density of Jakarta was nearly twice that of Hong Kong Island, resting at 12,649 persons per square kilometer, but on‐ ly one‐fifth that of Kowloon (Suryadinata 2013). Jakarta’s low annual rate of growth is attributed to many eco‐ nomic and social issues, including low fertility, and in fact achieved a net negative migration in the 5 year period prior to the 2000 nation‐ al census (Suryadinata 2013). In comparison, Hong Kong’s annual growth rate has increased steadily year‐to‐year, as have the crude birth rates and total fertility rates (HKSARG 2013). The disparaties in population growth are likely related to the divergent economic and sociopolitical vistas displayed in each city, and are symptomatic of local, regional and world government policy. The unique economic structure of Hong Kong, including its self‐ governing rule of law and constitution structured towards economic freedom, is primarily responsible for many patterns of growth. Chi‐ na’s suite of economic reforms in 1978, including the critical shift to an open‐door policy, opened many Chinese territories to a demand‐ ing world market, and shifted its stagnant economic structure to the more viral and globally relevant transnational corporate capitalism. Hong Kong benefited from this restructuring before and after being returned to China in 1997, quickly becoming one of the largest cen‐ ters for business and trade. According to the Heritage Foundation’s 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, Hong Kong economic freedom score of 89.3 ranks the highest in the world, and can be attributed to, “Hong Kong’s competitive regulatory regime, coupled with an effi‐ cient and transparent legal framework” (The Heritage Foundation 2013). When married with China’s open‐door policy, Hong Kong’s free‐market economy has attracted millions of immigrants, and has cemented its place as a leader in the world economy. Jakarta, by contrast, is a young upstart, and is considered part of Southeast Asia’s largest economy (The Heritage Foundation 2013). Like China and Hong Kong, Jakarta has recently adopted a market economy, inviting the footprint of transnational corporate 118

capitalism and the economic benefits it bears. After Indonesia’s de‐ parture from a Muslim‐centered autocratic rule in 1998, Jakarta was free to initiate economic reform, and adapt their regulatory policies towards a more globally‐accordant capitalist market economy, help‐ ing to elevate Indonesia into the 2013 Index of Economic Freedom’s top 150. As the Heritage Foundation explains, “Recent reform measures [in Indonesia] have put greater emphasis on improving regulatory efficiency, enhancing regional competitiveness, and creat‐ ing a more vibrant private sector” (The Heritage Foundation 2013). Such economic reforms have allowed Jakarta, and its principal prov‐ ince of Java, to become the economic and trade center of Indonesia, and has allowed for a greater berth in terms of growth and im‐ portance. In both Hong Kong and Jakarta, major economic reform has resulted in, and from, a malleable and shifting sociopolitical culture. The cul‐ tural identity of a nation or territory can have profound effects on population demographics and economic structure, and in the case of most Asian megacities, can propel them towards radical change. Hong Kong’s sociopolitical culture has seen several metamorphoses, and has only recently begun to merge with the social schemes of mainland China. As mentioned, Hong Kong is unique in that is has a “mini‐constitution” and is able to function independently from the political machinations of mainland China, a consequence of only re‐ cently reestablishing itself as part of the country. This has made Hong Kong a favorable center for global social convergence, and has attracted the signature token of transnational corporate capitalism: “Westernized and wealthy professional circles” (Pui‐tak 2001). China’s economic reforms in 1978 forever changed the social landscape of Asia, and enticed a dramatic shift away from the candor of rural living to the industrial patina of the megacity. Hong Kong, which fell under British rule until 1997, benefited tremendously from this shift, and was able to catapult its economy into the global stratosphere. Socially, Hong Kong has retained relative uniformity, and continues to exhibit a level of ethnic diversity and racial hetero‐ geneity uncommon in other Chinese cities or territories (Pui‐tak 2001). Jakarta, too, has seen an influx of rural immigrants, primarily 119

due to its rapid industrialization and growth, but has also experi‐ enced problems in social and class‐based segregation. In her article, “The Contemporary Urban Setting of Jakarta”, Putra Rizkiya (2011) contends that, “[the] Segregation problem is worse in the city’s effort to pursue the status of ‘global city’, [and] the development for elite area and poor‐middle class area is very unequal”. Essentially, Jakar‐ ta has positioned its political policy behind the elite in a bid to fur‐ ther increase economic development, leaving the poor and middle class to languish in slums and areas deficient in basic infrastructure (Rizkiya 2011). Such segregation is not uncommon in any city, but is particularly troubling in Jakarta, where the gaps in equity are con‐ spicuous and salient. In general, the introduction of transnational corporate capi‐ talism has changed politics in both Hong Kong and Jakarta, and has molded the social landscape in its inequitable image. The policies that enable these megacities to become vital contenders in a global market cascade downward to the individual, influencing social dy‐ namics and hierarchy. Political policy also has a tremendous effect on environmental issues, such as water pollution, air pollution, and the desiccation of crucial resources, which ultimately influences and guides the social and political culture. Rapid industrialization and poor policy‐making can lead to an abuse of, or neglect of, the environment, and, cumulatively, can lead to cli‐ mate change. Hong Kong has several funds and organizations, such as the Environment and Conservation Fund (EFC), the Environmen‐ tal Campaign Committee (ECC), and the Environmental Protection Department (EPD), to help mitigate climate change, pollution, and to reduce its overall environmental footprint (HKSARG 2013). Legisla‐ tion and policy are primary contributors to environmental protec‐ tion, and are responsible for the framework needed to sustain clean air and water, to reduce noise, collect and treat sewage, and to man‐ age solid waste. Still, despite a history of environmental considera‐ tion, air pollution in Hong Kong remains relatively high, and is often attributed to the burning of fossil fuels. As explained on Hong Kong’s EDP website (2013), “Motor vehicles, especially diesel vehicles, are the main sources of [pollution] at the street level in Hong Kong”. 120

Measures to combat air pollution include: stricter vehicle emissions standards, programs that incentivize a switch to liquefied petroleum gas vehicles, and tax rebates for people who purchase “green” vehi‐ cles (Environmental Protection Department 2013). Furthermore, the industrial sector and power plants contribute an appreciable amount of air pollution in and around Hong Kong. The EPD and oth‐ er government bodies work closely with heavy polluters, opening an evened dialogue in an effort to pave a clean and environmentally‐ friendly future (EPD 2013). Jakarta has significantly less legislation concerning the envi‐ ronment and climate change, and is particularly susceptible to envi‐ ronmental shock, including flooding, air and water pollution, the outbreak of disease, and the depletion of surrounding lands and re‐ sources. Past flooding events have been attributed to environmental neglect and a lack of concise government oversight, and have had a tremendous impact on all facets of life. According to the “Jakarta City Report”, prepared by Indra M. Surbakti (2010), natural disasters that occurred due to climate change not only destroy private and public infrastructure, but have also, “disrupted the fabric of social and economic conditions”. In recent years, flood disasters have in‐ creased and air pollution continues to be a problem, particularly for the impoverished, prompting the government to create programs aimed at reducing gas emissions, managing air quality, limiting vehi‐ cles use, and creating green areas for development (Surbakti, et al. 2010). Still, water scarcity, rising sea levels, heat stress, and disease are just a few of the environmental issues that Jakarta continues to face, and unless a more comprehensive policy is created, such prob‐ lems will only intensify. There are numerous problems and obstacles that a developing meg‐ acity must face: urban sprawl, environmental issues, economic growth, and the frequently arduous dilemma of transportation. As in any territory, transportation serves as the connective tissue bind‐ ing a population to the city’s economy and culture, and can provide new opportunities for rural immigrants or marginalized citizens. Often, the task of planning and developing reliable and safe trans‐ portation is daunting and marred by extreme costs and corruption. 121

Hong Kong, however, has implemented a mass transit system that not only serves its residents, but also turns a profit for the city. In his article, “The Unique Genius of Hong Kong’s Public Transportation System”, Neil Padukone (2013) explains that, “The Mass Transit Railway (MTR) Corporation, which manages the subway and bus systems on Hong Kong Island and, since 2006, in the northern part of Kowloon, is considered the gold standard for transit management worldwide”. This is primarily due to Hong Kong’s understanding of population demographics, including population density, and the val‐ ue in providing citizens and customers with affordable and reliable modes of transportation (Padukone 2013). Additionally, buses, railways, and subways not only clear congested roadways, but also work towards eliminating excessive air pollution caused by the burning of fossil fuels, the main contributor to global warming. As a developing city, Jakarta is still in the planning and im‐ plementation stages when it comes to providing adequate transpor‐ tation to its inhabitants. According to the Jakarta Local Government report (2012), “Jakarta Urban Transport Problems and their Envi‐ ronmental Impacts”, motorized vehicle usage has consistently grown over the past 5 years, and that, “Uncontrolled private vehicles using will case saturated traffic congesting in Jakarta at 2014”. Congestion caused by vehicles results in less travel, less income, and less goods and service produced in Jakarta, potentially bottlenecking economic growth. A government master‐plan has been developed to counter‐ act this problem, and includes the construction of: subways, mono‐ rails, busways, and waterways (Jakarta Local Government 2012). These developments, coupled with a more restrictive policy towards private vehicle usage, will hopefully improve Jakarta’s transporta‐ tion woes while simultaneously combating environmental issues, planting them on near‐level ground with other Asian megacities. Perhaps the most important and influential aspect of any Asian meg‐ acity is its urban planning policies. Urban planning can impact near‐ ly every feature discussed in this report, and can direct the growth of a city, its economy, and its culture. Even more important, favorable urban planning can impact the health and well‐being of a megacity’s population, provide efficient and organized communities, and can 122

help close gaps in equity. Hong Kong has had a long history of urban planning, and since the 1970’s has committed resources into devel‐ oping organizations, such as the Urban Renewal Authority and the Town Planning Board (TPB), that focus on land use, building man‐ agement, and overall urban renewal (HKSARG 2013). Studies con‐ ducted in 2007 by the TPB helped to refocus Hong Kong’s urban planning strategy into, “three broad directions of providing quality living environment, enhancing economic competitiveness and strengthening links with the Mainland” (HKSARG 2013). This con‐ centric approach to urban planning has laid the foundation for Hong Kong’s rise to a dominant Asian megacity, and has provided the framework for an industrious and balanced population. Again, as Jakarta is a newly developing megacity, their urban planning strategies still rest in the stages of implementation. The lack of urban planning in Jakarta, combined with policies tailored for the wealthy, has contributed to the large income gap present in sev‐ eral parts of the city. According to Ronna Nirmala (2012) in her arti‐ cle, “Jakarta to Plan City Through 2025”, the long‐term urban devel‐ opment plan is aimed, “to put Jakarta on equal footing with other large cities in the region, [and] would account for different scenarios involving low, medium or high growth rates”. Part of this proposal involves the aforementioned master‐plan concerning public trans‐ portation, which will hopefully be completed by 2025. However, Ja‐ karta is still a far ways off from obtaining parity with other Asian megacities, and as Nirmala describes, “The capital [Jakarta] is argua‐ bly the worst planned mega‐city in the region, particularly when it comes to public infrastructure” (Nirmala 2012). Although Hong Kong and Jakarta share many similar features, they are very much unique in their structure. In many ways, Jakarta is going through growing pains similar to what other Asian megacities went through decades ago, and is struggling to keep its population and infrastructure growth in pace with its economic growth; and in many ways Hong Kong can be viewed as a model megacity for aspir‐ ing Asian territories, setting standards in transportation, environ‐ ment protection, and urban planning. Such diversity reveals the complexity and shear difficulty in planning, developing, and main‐ 123

taining a megacity, and stands as not only a testament to human in‐ genuity, but to the future of human civilization. As these megacities continue to grow, their relevance and influence on the global econ‐ omy and culture will intensify. Currently, Asia has the largest num‐ ber of megacities in the world, and with proper policy and planning, that number will only continue to grow. Environmental Protection Department. Hong Kong's Environment. August 26, 2013. http://www.epd.gov.hk/epd/english/ envi‐ ronmentinhk/air/air_maincontent.html (accessed November 25, 2013). Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. "Hong Kong: The Facts." GovHK. July 2013. http://www.gov.hk/en/ about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/population.pdf (accessed No‐ vember 21, 2013). Jakarta Local Government. "Jakarta Urban Transport Prlbems and Their Environmental Impacts." University of Indonesia. 2012. http://www.ui.ac.id/download/apru‐awi/jakarta‐local‐ goverment.pdf (accessed November 24, 2013). Nirmala, Ronna. Jakarta to Plan City Through 2025. March 16, 2012. http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/archive/jakarta‐to‐plan‐city‐ through‐2025/ (accessed November 22, 2013). Padukone, Neil. The Unique Genius of Hong Kong's Public Transportation System. September 10, 2013. http://www.theatlantic.com /china/archive/2013/09/the‐unique‐genius‐of‐hong‐kongs‐ public‐transportation‐system/279528/ (accessed November 25, 2013). Pui‐tak, Lee. Hong Kong Reintegrating with China: Political, Cultural and Social Dimensions. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2001. Rizkiya, Putra. Contemporary Urban Setting in Jakarta and Indonesia. Project Work for Master of Urban Agglomerations Course, Frankfurt: University of Applied Sciences, 2011. Surbakti, Indra M., Izhar C. Idroes, Hendricus A. Simarmata, and Tommy Firman. Jakarta City Report: Information Related to Climate Change in Jakara City. City Report, Kakorn Pathom: Work‐ shops of Climate Change Vulnerability Assessment, 2010. 124

Suryadinata, Leo, Arifin Nuridya, and Kris Anata. Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape. Singapore: Institue of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003. The Heritage Foundation. Hong Kong Economy: Popuation, Facts, GDP, Buisness, Trade, Inflation. 2013. http://www.heritage.org /index/country/hongkong (accessed 11 24, 2013). —. Indonesia Economy: Population, GDP, Inflation, Business, Trade, FDI, Corruption. 2013. http://www.heritage.org/index/country /indonesia (accessed 11 24, 2013). 125



126

For Megacities of Asia, Fall 2013

More and more people are living in urban environments. The number of megacities (cities with more than 10 million people) is ever increasing. Projected 59 by 2015. Most urbanization is taking place in de‐ veloping countries, specifically in Asia and Africa. Furthermore, most growth is taking place in poor quarters of cities. This presents many challenges for urban growth. Urbanization and megacities present environmental, eco‐ nomic, and social problems. Land consumption, air pollution, water scarcity, poverty, social segregation, and vulnerability are all prob‐ lems that urban environments and megacities must deal with. Rapid urbanization is often unplanned in developing countries, which makes these areas unsafe. The accelerated and uncontrolled growth has contributed to the ecological transformation of the cities and their immediate surroundings. The Effects and Impacts of Urbanization and Megacities: Density: megacities are very dense. This means that they serve as important centers of political and economic decisions, have a sur‐ plus of cheap labor, and have a concentration of capital stock that makes them attractive for investments. Megacities generate a lot of income and their local economies influence rural surroundings, and, increasingly, global markets. Settlement, Infrastructure, and Land Tenure: In areas that are not properly structured for urban growth, infrastructure suffers. In Asia, migrants build informal, and often illegal, settlements/housing quarters. They are labeled as “squatters”. Such settlements arise from the “land tenure system”. Socio‐economic Disparities: This is essentially the “haves” and the “have‐nots”. In impoverished are often pushed out of informal 127

settlements with deficient public facilities and infrastructure to make way for strong economic purposes and land use. Roughly, a quarter of the population of the developing countries (1.3 billion people) live in absolute poverty. The growing socio‐economic dis‐ parity within megacities and the lack of social cohesion is a serious explosive charge. Risks and Vulnerabilities: Man‐made and natural disasters are one risk of megacities. Since megacities have such high populations they consume natural resources at a high rate, which results in an ecological strain on the environment, and contributes of air, water and soil pollution. Traffic congestion also plays into air pollution. Water table lowering, rising sea levels, earthquakes, storms and land‐slides are other forms of risks associated with megacities. Governance: often, in these developing areas of the world, the governance that guides urban growth and expansion is woefully de‐ ficient. Sustainable Development: A regional settlement structure has to be designed which set up on the elements of density, mixing of dif‐ ferent land uses, polycentrality and capacity of public mass transport systems and public facilities. The priority should be to slow down urban growth and strengthen the living and economic conditions of rural lands. Strategies of Urban Development: In respects to sustainability, the integration and coordination of urban and rural areas with the central city should be a main principle. Informal settlements should be registered and made legal. Social improvements should also be made is urban development is to be sustained. Providing health care for a growing population presents its own problems, but maintaining that health care via systematic infrastruc‐ ture (like sewage treatment, garbage removal, and proper systems to prevent man‐made natural disasters) is a growing concern for those 1.5 billion people living in slums. Couple that with unrestricted ur‐ ban growth, poor‐to‐no planning, a high consumption of natural re‐ sources leading to all manner of ecological pollution, and an absence of reliable transportation to and from rural areas (practically forcing people to adopt city dwelling), the act of sustaining a developing megacity looks more and more like an uphill battle. Economic factors, such as housing costs, the ability to reform outdated or inefficient infrastructure, and improper/unchecked tax‐ 128

ation methods also challenge the sustainability of developing meg‐ acities. Have enough money to sustain growth and fight poverty pre‐ sents a problem for megacities deficient in proper governance. Hopefully, Kötter’s cursory outline for addressing these issues will put developing megacities on the right track towards sustaining ur‐ ban growth. The economic benefits associated with Imperialistic rule brought several Asian countries into the modern era. British and French oc‐ cupation in India contributed to improved public services and some commercial stability. Railroads and trade routes were built, build‐ ings were erected, and a modicum of French culture was injected in‐ to the fledgling Indian culture. Opium served as an important trade good, being harvested in India and shipped off to China, where it penetrated and soured the upper class. As a result, China went to war, and equipped with new Imperial modernity, attempted to fight back its colonial intruders. This development threads deep into the 20th century, sparking war and uprising. The modernization of India by Britain and France served as the precipice for its eventual independence. Indian nationalism pushed the country over the edge and paved the way for an inde‐ pendent economic future, as well as the extinction of systemic Brit‐ ish oversight. Similar nationalist movement occurred throughout Asia and Africa in the early‐to‐mid 20th century. These movements, perhaps, would not have been possible without the modernizing ef‐ fects of Imperialism. The world population is expanding and megacities are becoming more common. More and more people are living in urban environ‐ ments. The most rapid growth has occurred in the last 50 years, par‐ ticularly in Asia, India and Latin America. The 21st century will be an “Urban Century”. Asia is where almost half of the urban population of the world lives, and soon it will have the majority of the world’s urban population. Urbanization generally takes place with corre‐ sponding acceleration of economic growth. Urbanization is promot‐ ed by: 129

Economies of Scale in production and manufacturing. As economies of scale in production begin to take hold larger size plants become necessary, thus contributing to the need for larger settlements of people.  The existence of informal externalities  Technology development, particularly in building and trans‐ portation technology.  Substitution of capital for land as made possible by techno‐ logical developments. As technology develops and capital is substituted for land, taller buildings become possible, intensi‐ fying population density further. The historical pattern of urbanization suggests that countries tend to urbanize very slowly until they attain urbanization levels around 25 to 30 percent. The pace of economic growth and overall development then quickens, with rapid structural shifts occurring in the economy, away from agriculture to industry and services. Urbanization presents many challenges for megacities, particu‐ larly in providing adequate infrastructure and sanitation services. Access to clean water and proper health services are also problems present in urban Asian environments. Urbanization has been relatively well addressed in Asian cities and has led to an increase in living standards and quality of life of its residents. However, there are still problems, including:  Vast increase in urban population in these countries  Low per capita income  Constrained fiscal circumstances of governments, leading to low expenditure on urban infrastructure  The existence of weak local governments in must urban are‐ as. If time, review the rest of the article. 

Cities are economic and social systems of space. They are a product of deep‐seated and persistent processes, which enable and encourage people to amass in large numbers in small areas. The ur‐ ban world is distinctive in socio‐economic as well as spatial terms. Patterns of demand converge as consumerism absorbs ever more of the world’s population. Irrespective of continent or country, many 130

urban residents live their lives in broadly similar ways, with com‐ mon concerns over home, children, school and world. Although towns and cities have existed for over eight millennia, the wholesale transition to urban location and urban living is very recent in origin. Many highly successful urban civilizations existed in the past, but their impacts where both limited and localized. Major and rapid changes began in Britain in the late 18th century in response to in‐ dustrial capitalism. They the beginning of the 20th century about 15% of the world’s population was living in urban environments. Compare that with about 6 billion people today living in urban envi‐ ronments. The adoption of a world perspective on cities and urban soci‐ ety is a recent development, which was foreshadowed nearly 100 years ago, in the formative work of Adna Ferin Weber (1899) on the Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century. The urban world Weber analyzed consisted of 50 countries in which there was significant ur‐ ban development. Within urbanized countries, statistics on employ‐ ment patterns, family structures and demography pointed to the ex‐ istence of pronounced urban‐rural contrasts. Cities were places with particular socio‐economic characteristics that sustained and perpet‐ uated distinctive patters of social and economic behavior. The world economy is capitalist in formation in that it is based upon principles of private rather than state ownership of the means of production and seeks to generate profits through the ma‐ nipulation of land, labor, finance and entrepreneurship. The world economy is distinguished by the ways in which it is organized and operates. Structure and function are key defining features, rather than the worldwide scale of supply and demand, and of production and consumption. The world economy is dominated by powerful transnational corporations (TNC’s) and is regulated through global institutions. TNC’s are large, complex companies that make and sell many products in many countries around the world. They dominate and control production and consumption in key economic sectors. They also have disproportionate influence over supplies of raw ma‐ terials and manufacturing capacity, and determine/direct patters of spending through advertising and promotional activities. TNC’s are supported by banking and investment houses that manage and ma‐ nipulate global finance, and a range of organizations that provide 131

producer services in the form of management consultancy and legal, personnel and marketing advice on an international basis. The world economy is organized around and through cities. Implicit in the global approach is the view that cities much increas‐ ingly be seen as interactive and interrelated elements within an ur‐ ban hierarchy that underpins and makes possible processes of capi‐ talist accumulation and reproduction. The accumulation of wealth through manufacturing, exchange, and consumption is the primary cause of urban growth and urbanization. It leads to a concentration of population in towns and cities throughout the core and in the pe‐ riphery, so that urban development in both is an interdependent outcome of the operation of global capitalism. Spatial and temporal variations in levels of urban develop‐ ment are consequences of the ways in which capitalism has evolved and of its changing relations with areas of supply and demand across the world. Overseas resources and markets are secured and manipu‐ lated by colonization, colonialism, and imperialism. Explanations of urban development lie in the social and economic characteristics of successive forms of capitalism. The emergence of global society is made possible by advances in transport and communications that overcome barriers of inacces‐ sibility and distance and facilitate easy and cheap worldwide move‐ ments of ideas and people. Global society is reflected in the long‐ distance and instantaneous circulation of information and imagery by broadcasting, telecommunications, videos, and the Internet. The global society is reinforced by the international traffic of tourists, business travelers, migrants and workers. A strong case can be made that global society is increasingly ur‐ ban in character. Cities are points of production and reproduction of urban ways of life and culture. As major and dense concentrations of population drawn from many different backgrounds, they are places in which a diverse array of beliefs, styles, values and attitudes origi‐ nate, ferment, and flourish. Society is becoming urbanized in the sense that increasing numbers of people are being exposed to, and are absorbing the social values that arise of, and are most closely as‐ sociated with life in cities. Globalism is a contested concept, the existence and meaning of a global economy and society being widely discussed and questioned by analysts. Globalists point to 3 major areas of debate: 132

1. The central issue surrounds the extent of economic and social fusion. Globalists argue that most places are locked into worldwide economic and social networks, which transcend national and regional boundaries. They point to the unlim‐ ited reach of air travel, the mass media, and the Internet as evidence of interconnection and interdependency. The coun‐ ter argument is that many countries and parts of countries have poor transportation and communications and so can en‐ gage readily to only a limited extent with places outside the local area. They are characterized by traditional subsistence or semi‐subsistence rural economies and societies that func‐ tion interdependently of national and global relations. 2. A second area of contention surrounds the extent and mean‐ ing of global economic influences, even in areas that are well connected. It is closely related to TNC’s and their role/importance in the world economy. Globalists cite the proliferation of such companies and the spread of their prod‐ ucts/brands as evidence of global economic power and domi‐ nation. 3. The third debate is grounded in history and concerns the novelty of global perspectives. A case can be made that global relationships are not new and were well established by the end of the 19th century, thus calling into question the present preoccupation with all things global. Proponents of this de‐ bate point to the influence of the imperial powers at the time, and the free and widespread movement of capital, profits, and labor around the world. The urban world is a heterogeneous place. Important and highly significant differences exist within and between regions and coun‐ tries in the size and proportions of their populations that line in ur‐ ban places. Generalizations concerning the urban world depend on their validity upon data that relate each of the world’s sovereign states. Particular problems surround the reliability and frequency of census in many of the world’s poorest nations where, paradoxically, the scale and problems are most severe. They are especially acute in highly populated countries of the developing world, such as China 133

and India. International urban statistics are surrounded by many dif‐ ficulties of availability and reliability and must be regarded as crude estimates rather than precise measures. Detailed information on the urban world is formed of population estimates is assembled and published on a regular basis in the United Nations in its annual De‐ mographic Yearbook and in its biennial World Urbanization Pro‐ spects, which are available online. These publications incorporate data for each of the world’s sovereign states that are principally based upon national censuses. The geography of the contemporary urban world is charac‐ terized by pronounced variations in the number and proportion of people who live in urban places. Some parts of the world have huge number of urban people, in others there are very few. China, by far, has the greatest number of urban dwellers. One in five of the world’s urban people lives in China and the total population of Chinese towns and cities, at 460 million, is similar to the urban population of Africa and South America combined. Chinese cities are both numer‐ ous and large, there being 28 with populations in excess of two mil‐ lion and 46 with between one and two million. The urban popula‐ tion of India is 280 million, which is almost exactly the same as the urban population of the whole of Africa. The urban populations of China and India are so high that they completely overshadow and suppress the more subtle variations which exist elsewhere and which may be highly significant at the regional scale. The distribution of the world’s urban population is not re‐ flected in the balance of research activity in urban geography. Most research has been undertaken on the towns and cities of the USA and Europe, although the majority of the urban population lives out‐ side these areas. Until recently, China was closed to foreign academ‐ ics. It was not until the borders were opened in 1978 that urban fieldwork was possible. There is in contrast a rich and long‐ established tradition of urban geography study in India, based upon the Census of India, which traces its origins to the work of R.L. Singh at the University of Delhi. Some of the highest levels of urban devel‐ opment in proportionate terms are found in South America, the most urban continent. The population is more urban than rural in all but one of the major South American countries (Guyana), and over 80% of the population of Venezuela, Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina are 134

town and city dwellers. The proportion of the population that is similarly high in Europe, Australia, and parts of Western Asia. Unlike the Americas, where levels of urban development are uniformly high, there are however, countries in Europe and Western Asia that are predominantly rural (Albania, Moldova and Yemen). Levels of urban development are low throughout most of Southern Africa, Eastern, South‐central and South‐Eastern Asia. Only a small percentage of their populations live in urban places and these re‐ gions include many of the world’s most rural areas. The situation here is different because it contains the world’s most highly populat‐ ed countries, although the distribution of population within these countries, and in the region as a whole, is predominantly rural. With some 28% of India’s 1.1 billion people thought to be liv‐ ing in urban places, the level of urbanization is broadly similar to that in China and Pakistan. Fewer than 25% of the population of Af‐ ghanistan, Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand is urban. The number and proportion of the population that live in towns and cities are products of a country’s history, culture, and resources and are only weakly linked to its level of contemporary economic devel‐ opment. The correlation between gross national product (GNP) per head of population and the percentage of urban is 0.59. Countries with high GNP’s per head tend to have high levels of urban develop‐ ment amount countries with low GNP’s per capita (huh?). The urban population is distributed among settlements of widely different size. Urban places range from towns and cities with several thousands of people to those with tens of millions. Most would agree that settlements with populations over 100,000 are probably cities, but the status of places with around 20,000 is more questionable, especially when they have important local government and commercial functions. Most of the world’s urban populations live in small to medium‐sized urban places. According to UN esti‐ mates, some 25% of the world’s populations live in cities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants. The primary function of smaller urban settlements is to act as points of linkage between towns and country, where agricultural surpluses are exchanged for urban goods and services. A notable feature of the contemporary urban pattern is the degree to which the urban population lives in giant cities. In 2000, the UN recognized 320 cities with over a million people, who togeth‐ 135

er housed one fifth of the world’s total population (Tokyo, Sao Paulo, Mexico, New York, etc.). Not only is the urban population concen‐ trated in a small number of countries, but within many of these countries there is a disproportionate concentration in a small num‐ ber of cities. The concentration of the urban populations of countries into large cities occurs in all parts of the world. It is a pattern that is independent of region, length of urban history, and level of economic or urban development. Metropolitan dominance is most pro‐ nounced in Sought America and the Caribbean. Despite their enor‐ mous size, the world’s major cities at present are viable and stable places that represent a significant social and economic achievement. They contribute disproportionately to national economic growth and social transformation by providing economies of scale and prox‐ imity that allow industry and commerce to flourish. There are some strong indications that global economic fac‐ tors account for the way in which the population in a country is dis‐ tributed among cities of different size. Implicit in the concept of the urban hierarchy is the assumption that population is spread across a range of cities of different sizes, which interact and interdepend as a functioning urban system. In many countries there is a regular graduation of cities according to size. Generally, the second largest city was half the size of the first, and the third city a third size of the first, and so on, so that the size of any center could be predicted by simply its rank and size of the largest place. So widespread is this relationship between cities that it became known as the “rank‐size rule”. The USA, UK, Japan, China and Brazil are examples of coun‐ tries which the distribution of cities is approximately rank‐sized. The situation in some countries is, however, different in that the population is unevenly distributed among urban places. The ex‐ treme is reached where there is one excessively large primate center that dominates all others. Primate cities are not necessarily large in international terms, but they are by definition, very much bigger than any other place in the country. They are most common and most pronounced among the poorest and most sparsely populated states in the developing world. Primacy is especially prevalent in Central America and Africa. Such dominance of the primate city is some countries that it houses a disproportionate share of the na‐ tional as well as the urban population. 136

Primacy has important spatial consequences. It means that, in many cases, most the national population is concentrated in one small part of the country and the remainder is profoundly rural. Many primate cities are costal ports, so that the population is pe‐ ripherally rather than centrally located within the boundaries of the nation state. Research into city size distributions supports two broad generalizations: Rank size patters are most common among mature, well‐integrated and balanced economies, while primate distributions are a feature of embryonic urban systems and so are more common in the developing world. The degree of primacy decreases over time: as the economy matures, so the population becomes more evenly spread across all the cities. One city may remain dominant, but not excessively. Such findings suggest that city size distributions may relate in some way to the degree to which a country’s cities are inte‐ grated within the global urban network. There are 4 reasons why primacy may exist in developing coun‐ tries: 1. The first is associated with colonialism and arises because empires tend to be controlled through key cities, which, as fo‐ ci of imperial interchange, operate at a different and higher level than local indigenous cities. Primacy is thus a function of colonial control, an explanation that appears adequately to explain the existence of dominant cities in Asia. 2. Primate cities are seen as major outlets for products generat‐ ed in dependent export economies. They are the point of linkage between interior producing regions and external overseas markets. 3. Primacy may be created from within by the collapse or de‐ cline of the rural economy. Local industry and trade are often destroyed by export dependence, and this undermines the economic base of provincial centers. In this case, the largest city grows at the expense of the smallest. 4. Primacy by be a social capitalist production. Such change typ‐ ically transforms class and labor relations and, in particular, leads to a reduction in the amount of labor that is required in agriculture. Those no longer needed in farming tend to con‐ centrate in, and so inflate the size of, major cities, where there are possibilities of jobs in service activities, or opportunities for income generation within the informal sector. 137

Primacy points to the existence of a two‐tier urban system in many of the countries of the world. People either live in one of the myriad small villages or in the primate city. There are few settle‐ ments of intermediate size. Differences in size are inevitably reflect‐ ed in an imbalance of importance and role. Primate cities typically dominate their countries in economic and political terms. They are the centers in which national elites and other major decision makers and opinion leaders are concentrated. Cities with rank‐size patterns tend to be well integrated within wider networks, those in countries with primate distributions, with the exception of the primate city itself, are predominately inward‐ looking and have strongest connections with the indigenous econo‐ my. These differences suggest that the global urban system is pres‐ ently fragmented and incomplete. Rather than a coherent whole, the contemporary urban world consists of a set of loosely‐knit subsys‐ tems. The world is an urban place because towns and cities offer sub‐ stantial benefits over other forms of settlement. The advantages that people derive from clustering together are greater than when they scatter and disperse. Theories of urban formation seek to identify the forces that permit and encourage large numbers of people to concentrate in comparatively small areas. Two broadly contrasting viewpoints are prevalent: 1. Economic Benefits: Underlying economic interpretation of urban formations is a set of relationships best explained by economic theories views as two interdependent sectors: the Basic Sector and the Non‐Basic Sector, described below: Basic Sector – Consists of all those activities and employment that produce goods and services that are sold outside the city and provide the finance to enable basic requirements to be im‐ ported into the city (corn, seed merchants, agricultural advi‐ sory services, and farm machinery manufacturers, which are urban based and which serve a non‐urban market). Non‐Basic Sector – Consists of all those activities that provide goods and services for the city itself (municipal government, street cleaning services, police, fire and ambulance services, corner stores, etc.). The two sectors are mutually interdependent. Any change in the size of one sector will be associated with a change in the size of the other. It is important to emphasize 138

that cities exist because of, and at the expense of, their sur‐ rounding environments. 2. Social Bonds: The fact that urban centers are present in a wide range of economies and cultures throughout the world suggests that origins of urban living are a product of human relationships and lie in the interpersonal ties that encourage people to congregate in space. Social explanations of urban formation stress the gregarious nature of human behavior. They point to the complementary properties of links such as male and female, mother and child, sender and receiver, speaker and listener, and giver and takers, and argue that such bonds introduce strong centripetal tendencies among human populations. These arguments are most closely asso‐ ciated with the work of Adams (1966) on the emergence of cities in early Mesopotamia. The rise of cities was seen as preeminently a social process, an expression more of changes in people’s interactions with each other than with their envi‐ ronment. The novelty of the city consisted of a whole series of new institutions and a vastly greater size complexity of so‐ cial unit, rather than basic innovations in subsistence. For Lampard (1965), society evolved through a number of organ‐ izational stages, each of which is associated with different settlement forms. Emphasis was placed on “primordial” since this represents the achievement of a level of social organization that is necessary to support and sustain village life. Improvements in agriculture productivity is an essential requirement, however, the development of community structures to manage farming and ensure social stabil‐ ity is crucial to the viability of the settlement. The existence of cities, the next stage represents the achievement of a higher level of social sophistication and consensus. This is reflected in formal bureaucrat‐ ic, religions, military, and political systems. Most cities across the world have strong international links and interdependencies, but studies of city size distributions, and espe‐ cially primacy, point to many instances of weak connections with the lower order center in the domestic hierarchy. The concept of the global urban system has considerable attraction and appeal as an intellectual construct, but its substance is contested. 139

It’s unfortunate that it took the Olympics coming to Beijing to moti‐ vate China to bolster and brace their weak anti‐pollution infrastruc‐ ture, but some of the policies put in place before the torch was lit, while entirely foreign and unimaginable here in the US, have man‐ aged to combat pollution in dramatic ways. One such method in‐ volves the production and use of automobiles; not only have these laws cracked down on harmful emissions produced by cars and fac‐ tories (in some cases they literally closed or moved factories out of Beijing), China has gone so far as to implement a ban on automobile use. The “license plate system” was devised as a measure to cut smog for the 2008 Olympics, but has since then been implemented as a full‐time measure to combat pollution. Using license plate numbers as a control, this law effectively bans vehicles from driving on certain days of the week. It has reportedly reduced the amount of pollution in Beijing by 10% (Hays 2012). Other measures put in place before the 2008 Olympics help in the fight against pollution; coal mines were closed, power plants were modified, factories were closed or relocated, inefficient taxis were replaced with cleaner models, and pollution monitoring sta‐ tions were built to help in struggle for clean air (Hays 2012). The modest change in air quality around Beijing is a good start, but China still has a long way to go before its environmental footprint is trivial, and its megacities are no longer significant contributors to global pollution. Air quality in China is horrible. The good news is that the bad air quality that Beijing and most of North China has experienced for much of this year is having an impact on policy. The Ministry of En‐ vironmental Protection issued is most comprehensive and toughest plant to reduce air pollution by 2017, setting stricter limits on the levels of particulate matter. The plan targets Northern China, par‐ ticularly Beijing, Tianjin, and the Hebei province. Reducing pollution will be accomplished by the following: 1. Restrictions of vehicle usage. This includes the license plate system discussed in a previous article. 2. Increasing the number of vehicles powered by natural gas. 140



3. Beijing will close many factories and ban certain industries from opening factories in the city. 4. Replacing coal‐burning boilers in city centers with clean en‐ ergy systems. 5. Increasing the number of bicycles for rend. 6. Boost the output of natural gas power plants in order to re‐ duce pollution from coal fired plants.

The present pattern of global urban development is merely the most recent product of processes of urban change that began over 8,000 years ago. It represents an intermediate stage in the progression from a wholly rural to what will possibly be a completely urban world. The global urban pattern is changing in three different and unconnected ways: through urban growth, urbanization, and the spread of urbanism. Urban growth occurs when the population of towns and cities rise. Urbanization refers to the increase in the proportion of the population that lives in towns and cities. Urbanism is the name that is most commonly used to describe the social and behavioral characteristics of urban living that are being extend‐ ed across society as a whole as people identify and attempt to identi‐ fy and account for recent patterns of urban growth and urbanization as the global scale. Urban growth and urbanization are separate and independ‐ ent trends. Urban Growth refers to the absolute increase in the size of the urban population. It occurs both through natural increase, which is an excess of births over deaths, and through net in‐ migration. In most cities both factors operate together to reinforce each other. Urbanization measures the switch from a spread‐out pattern of human settlement to one in which the population is con‐ centrated in urban centers. It occurs with relative shift in the distri‐ bution of population from the countryside into towns and cities. Ur‐ banization is a change that has a beginning and an end, the former being when the population is wholly rural, the latter occurring when everyone is recorded as living in an urban place. 141

It is important to emphasize that, as the total population of a country consists of both urban and rural dwellers, an increase in the proportion urban is a function of both. It occurs when the urban component increases in relative size, either through faster urban growth or more rapid rural population decline. The measurement of urbanization is not without difficulties, as it depends upon the divi‐ sion of a country into urban and rural. It is affected by changes in definition and the classification of centers that are made from time to time by national census authorities. By far the most important characteristics of contemporary urban change is the sheer scale of urban population growth. Urban growth correlates strongly with overall population growth, so it is not sur‐ prising to find that greatest gains occur in highly populated coun‐ tries where large numbers were added to the national population. Urban populations are growing more rapidly throughout Africa and Southern Asia. The rates are highest in parts of sub‐Saharan African and Western Asia. Little or no growth is occurring in urban popula‐ tions throughout most of the developed world. The average annual rate of urban growth in Europe is less that 0.11% annum between 1990 and 2000. Generally, metropolitan centers are stagnant or are losing popu‐ lations, while towns and small cities are gaining. The most signifi‐ cant trends in the fall in the population of major cities. Metropolitan decline in developed countries is very much a feature of the last 30 years. Metropolitan decline is well established in the UK. All of the largest 15 cities lost population during the 1970s and again during the 1980s. Also, 13 of the largest 15 cities declined between 1991 and 2001. The UN estimates indicated that the number of cities with over 8 million people increased from ten in 1970 to 24 in 2000. The number and size of megacities are increasing most rapidly in devel‐ oping countries. In 1950, the only megacities, London and New York, were both in the developed world, while 18 of the 24 megaci‐ ties in 2000 were in the developed world. Urbanization is a cyclical process through which nations pass as they evolve from agrarian to industrial societies. Substantial shifts in the distribution of population can be expected in many countries with presently low levels of urbanization as the proportion of the population that lives in towns and cities rises to ceiling levels. 142

Urbanization is presently a developing world phenomenon. It involves the large‐scale redistribution of people in many of the world’s poorest nations that are least able to cope with its conse‐ quences. Urbanization is occurring at greatest speed in countries that score low on the UN Human Development Index—there people have the lowest level of life expectancy at birth, and the lowest levels of education and per capita income. It is however, restricted to Afri‐ ca and Asia. Little or no urbanization is taking place in South Ameri‐ ca despite generally low levels of economic development, because the wholesale switch of population from rural to urban has already taken place. In examining the overall association between urbanization and development, the World Bank estimates that urbanization is increas‐ ing three times faster in low‐and middle‐income countries than it is in high‐income countries. Because the rate is greater, levels of urban development in the developing world are catching up with, and will soon approximate, those in the developed world. Little change is tak‐ ing place in the urban and rural balance in the developed world be‐ cause, in most countries, the cycle of urbanization has run its course. Counter‐urbanization replaced urbanization as the dominant pro‐ cess of location change in the USA more than three decades ago. Be‐ tween 1960 and 1970 the metropolitan areas in the USA grew five times as fast as the rural areas. But during the 1970s the pattern was inverted with the rural areas gaining population at one‐and‐a‐ half times the rate of that in the cities. The rate of counter‐ urbanization has recently slacked across much of the developed world, including Great Britain, so it could be no more than a minor blip in an otherwise continuing process of urbanization. The expansion of the ring reflects environmental attractions of ex‐urban locations and an increase in the number of people who can afford to move out of the core. It is facilitated by major improve‐ ments, including the development of suburban rail networks and the introduction of tram and bus services. Core decline and ring growth are closely linked to rising levels of car ownership and use, which enables large numbers of people to populate the commuter belt, es‐ pecially those areas which are well away from the major radial route‐ways. A decline in the population of daily urban system, both core and ring together, distinguishes the third and fourth stages of urban development. In place of urban expansion, it is the rural areas 143

beyond the daily commuting range of the core where growth takes place. The net effect is that there is a shift, at the national scale, from a state of more concentration or urbanization, to one of less concen‐ tration of counter‐urbanization. Urban growth and urbanization at the global scale are very re‐ cent phenomena. Although towns and cities have existed since Neo‐ lithic times, a massive rise in the number and size of cities and a wholesale shift of populating from rural to urban have occurred only in the last 50 years. The world was very much a rural place in 1950, with only slightly over one‐quarter of the population living in towns and cities. The population was more urban than rural in North America and parts of Europe, South America and Australia/Asia, alt‐ hough only in the UK and the Netherlands did more than 80% live in urban places. Global urban development is a consequence of two linked pro‐ cesses:  Changes in the way in which wealth is accumulated  The evolution of the world system of nations. The mechanism involved can be explained by the interdependen‐ cy theory of global urban development, which argues that urban de‐ velopment wherever it occurs, is one of spatial outcomes of capital‐ ism. It has echoes in dependency theory, which explores and at‐ tempts to account for the links between development in core regions and underdevelopment in the periphery. The interdependency theo‐ ry of global urban development can be criticized on four grounds:  Changes in capitalism do no imply a connection to urban de‐ velopment.  Urbanization in the developing world lagged so far behind that in the developed world that it cannot be regarded as part of the same process.  Interdependency theory undervalues the rich traditions of urban development, supported by non‐capitalist economic systems that existed in many developing countries.  The foundation of interdependency theory lies not in its foundations in capitalism, per se, but in the links that it pro‐ poses between successive stages in the evolution of capital‐ ism and urban development across the world.  Stages of Global Urban Development 144

The foundations for urban development in the core, and in local‐ ized areas in the periphery, were established up to about 1780 un‐ der conditions of mercantilism. This was the economic system that originated in the 15th century and involved the accumulation of wealth through trade. Its main feature was the buying and selling of products of labor. These were primarily agricultural and craft items. Most trade followed established land or sea routes and took place with suppliers in well‐defined source areas, so the Mediterranean, the Baltic, the North Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, and central Asia emerged as distinctive trade areas. Buying, selling and consumption, however, were restricted to towns and cities, where sources of fi‐ nance trading opportunities and good communications were availa‐ ble. An important feature of mercantilism was the belief that the vol‐ ume of trade was finite, so wealth could best be accumulated by cap‐ turing supplies and markets from rivals. This competition for terri‐ tory and its products was the prime driving force being exploration, discovery and colonization in the 16th and 17th centuries. It was the process that was endorsed by national governments and was led by monarchism aristocrats and privately‐owned companies who spon‐ sored exploration and settlement in the hope that it would lead to new trading opportunities and the creation of vast wealth. Mercantilism was responsible for establishing foundations for urban development in colonial powers. IT made possible the intro‐ duction of highly profitable concentrations of wealth in cities. The process of colonialism extended over many decades and therefore led to the creation of urban patterns of varying complexity. In some territories there were existing urban structures upon which colonial influences were introduced, but mostly there was no prior urban set‐ tlement of significance and so the pattern that developed was wholly colonial in character. An important characteristic of the settlement pattern in the colo‐ ny is the linearity. Settlements are aligned along the coasts and are also located along the routes of trade that connect the coastal points of attachment to the staple producing interiors. Over time these be‐ come integrated within a functionally interdependent system of cit‐ ies. The spatial patterns of urban development that were established under mercantilism and early colonialism were accentuated and 145

compounded when capitalism and imperialism became the domi‐ nant economic and political systems in the late 18th century. Capitalism is a form of economic organization in which wealth is generated for investors through the production of saleable goods and services. Its main feature is that the capitalist employs workers directly rather than merely bargaining for the trading in the items they produce. To be most successful, it requires large inputs of raw materials and extensive markets, which are best ensured through the possession of empire. Capitalism through mass production and associated agglomeration generates urban growth and urbanization because it concentrates productive activity and all the workers and spending power that are associated with it. In addition the city con‐ tinues to serve as a center for the consumption of the profits of capi‐ talism. It is possible to trace the evolution of capitalism through distinct industrial, monopoly and transnational corporate stages since it first became the dominant economic system in the late 18th century Brit‐ ain. The individual stages are distinguished by both structure and space relations. In initial phase was industrial capitalism in which wealth was created by making rather than merely trading goods. Monopoly capitalism replaced industrial capitalism and colonialism towards the end of the 19th century. It involved the ruthless exploi‐ tation of peripheral areas and was distinguished by a vastly in‐ creased scale of economic activity and the domination of newly cre‐ ated international markets, within the state‐controlled empires, by a small number of producers in each sector. Monopoly capitalism emerged in response to the demand for products that was generated by the rapidly growing population of the industrial nations. This stimulated manufacturers to diversify from making heavy, crude products into mass production of a wide range of consumer foods and services. Monopoly capitalism in‐ volved the more ruthless exploitation of peripheral areas. The larger scale of industrial activity required the international sourcing of raw material and the international marketing of manufactured products, so the success of the core regions becoming dependent on their abil‐ ity to dominate and control overseas territories. Monopoly capitalism produced further urban growth and urban‐ ization in an expanded core, although urban development in the pe‐ riphery remained limited. 146

Urban growth and urbanization were reinforced and extended by monopoly capitalism in the late 19th century. The urban develop‐ ment that resulted was largely restricted to core areas and the costs of the empire, so that the world in 1950 was highly differentiated in urban terms. The world has recently become urban because of major changes in the distribution of population in developing countries. Urbanization became a global phenomenon in the last half‐century as a conse‐ quence of deep‐seated and far‐reaching changes in the structure and spatial relations of capitalism. Two principal developments were involved:  The replacement of monopoly capitalism by TNC capitalism  The creating of patterns of production, trade and service pro‐ vision, which, rather than being restricted to the North Atlan‐ tic, or to political empires, are truly global in extent. The organization of production and consumption under con‐ ditions of TNC capitalism within a new world system of nations is producing urban development in the developing world for two main reasons:  The first is because investment in manufacturing and services by global capitalists is concentrated in selected cities in the periphery points to growth.  Because large numbers of workers are being displaced from the land and flock into towns and cities, as traditional sub‐ sistence farming is replaced by globally oriented commercial agriculture. Africa and Asia were almost wholly rural in 1950 and it is here that subsequent transition to urban living is most market and is hav‐ ing the most profound consequences. Major urban development, measurable at the national scale, began to affect parts of Africa and the Middle East between 1950 and 1970. Urbanization began signif‐ icantly to affect the countries of Southern and Eastern Asia much lat‐ er, as most did not pass even the 20% urban mark until 1990. Urban development became a worldwide phenomenon over the last 30 years because of fundamental changes in the organization and location of production and services as TNC capitalism succeeded 147

monopoly capitalism. A new economic order has emerged, charac‐ terized by global manufacturing, and managed and controlled from the core economies by TNC’s, which is based on a new international division of labor in which management, development, and design take place in the core economies and routine production of service provision are located in the periphery. It is associated with global organization of business, finance and services. This new arrangement became possible because of and owes much of its success to the situation of relative peace and political stability at the global scale that has existed since the end of the Sec‐ ond World War. The key change is in the location of manufacturing. Over the past half‐century, an increasing volume of goods and pro‐ duction have been arranged globally rather than within the narrow confines of nation states or empires, as was the case under monopo‐ ly capitalism. Much manufacturing has shifted from the core to the periphery where the availability of very cheap labor enables stand‐ ardized production to be undertaken at very low cost. The types of production that have shifted to the periphery include:  Technology – more advanced products, such as pharmaceuti‐ cals, computers and scientific instruments.  Large‐volume, medium‐technology consumers goods, such as motor vehicles, tires, televisions, and refrigerators.  Mass‐produced, branded consumer goods such as cigarettes, soft drinks, toilet paper and breakfast cereals. Parallel changes have occurred in agriculture as supply of an in‐ creasing range of farm products have been organized on a global ba‐ sis. Exotic fruits, vegetables, flowers and poultry have joined the 19th century staples of tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, pineapples, citrus fruits and rubber. The volume of high‐value foods in global circula‐ tion has increased rapidly as consumers in core economies have ac‐ quired a taste for ethnic cuisine. The value of world trade in such products accounted for 5% of global commodity exchange in 1990 and increased by 8% per annum throughout the 1980s. Global production is principally undertaken by TNCs that have interests, affiliates and facilities in many countries. Vodaphone is reckoned to be the largest non‐financial TNC in terms of both foreign assets and the transnationality of its business as measured by an in‐ dex based upon foreign assets, sales and employment. The interna‐ tionalization of production is made possible by, and in turn gives rise 148

to, a new pattern of international finance. A global system of supply and circulation has emerged in recent years in place of the bilateral funding arrangements, tied to trading blocs and dominated by gov‐ ernments that existed in the mid‐19th century. The most important features of the global financial system are its size and spread. The global financial system is mediated by a num‐ ber of institutions, including the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which set multilateral aid for development. It is fa‐ cilitated by the development of multinational organizations, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and the Development and the North Ameri‐ can Free Trade Agreement, which seek to promote and influence trade. The system is dominated by a small number of powerful banks that rank alongside TNCs as global institutions. 13 of the largest 15 banks are based in the core economies and 4 are Japanese. The ma‐ jor banks of Europe and North America, however, handle more for‐ eign business. It is made possible by the growth of the US dollar and Eurodollars as international currencies and media of exchange. Developments in production and finance are associated with, and are in part dependent upon, the growth of international service economy. Service activities that were once domestically bound have reorganized on a transnational basis so as to serve the needs of businesses operating across the globe. The change of global opera‐ tion has been most marked in those service sectors in which the lev‐ el of international activity was historically limited (i.e., accountancy). A similar pattern applies in advertising, banking and legal services. Global business is further facilitated by means of the organization of employee services, including hotel accommodation, car hire and per‐ sonal finance, on an international basis. The emergence of a new political map of the world enabled, and in turn was made possible by, the new economic order. The key fea‐ ture was the ending of imperialism by the UK, France, Belgium and the Netherlands between 1950 and 1980; and Russia in the late 1980s. The former resulted in the creation of new nation states in many parts of colonial Africa and Asia. A vast extension of capitalism, at the expense of alternative eco‐ nomic systems, accompanied the new political geography, further facilitating the process of globalization. Imperialism effectively end‐ ed with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Communism is in 149

retreat, although China, North Korea and Cuba maintain their cen‐ trally planned economies. The new political pattern was created in conditions of relative peace in the first half of the 20th century, with its two world wars and numerous regional conflicts. Global stability since 1945 princi‐ pally arouse out of the balance of power between West and the communist bloc under which major wars were restricted to Korea and Vietnam. Sustainability was further facilitated by the creation of supra‐national and international organizations by many of the mar‐ ket economies to undertake some of the traditional roles of the na‐ tion state. The effect was to rise overall levels of international confi‐ dence and so create improved conditions for restructuring of capital, for purposes of wealth accumulation, on a global basis. The new economic order is principally responsible for the recent rapid urbanization of the periphery, which in turn raised the level of urbanization at the global scale beyond the 50% mark. Since the mid‐20th century, and especially for the past 20 years, the global economy has subsumed local and regional economies across the world, so that most of the remaining peripheral countries and terri‐ tories have been drawn into the world economic system. Urbanization is triggered by investment because economic ex‐ changes between core and periphery are spatially focused and so lead to a concentration of globally related economic activity in urban places. The urban concentration of foreign investment‐led economic activity is high across much of the periphery. Urbanization is also taking place as an indirect consequence of the impact of TNC capital‐ ism upon the economies of developing countries. The policies of post‐colonial governments stimulate urban growth by further enhancing the attractiveness of towns and cities at the expense of rural areas through:  Exaggerated bias of government expenditure on infrastruc‐ ture and services in favor or urban areas.  Higher wage rates and better employment protection that ex‐ ist in cities because urban workers are organized into trade unions.  The effect of trade tariffs on the price of goods. Settlement patters across large parts of the developing world have been transformed in recent years, as external investments have created jobs in cities and as workers, displaced from the land be‐ 150

cause of the switch from subsistence to commercial agriculture, have migrated into urban areas. Such changes are seen as consequences of the progressive incorporation of their economies within the global corporate capitalist economy.

Of the ten solutions listed in the article, only two strike me as achievable possibilities: finding and using alternate sources of drink‐ ing water (such as rainwater), and the use of deep aquifers. Alt‐ hough Bangladesh is a relatively small country (148,393 km2), the amount of money needed to install purifiers, filtration devices, con‐ temporary sewage and waste disposal systems, or effective water treatment plants would likely be too high. However, provided that an international effort was made to either dilute or remove arsenic from Bangladesh’s ground water, other remediations could prove successful. Still, the most cost effect strategies for obtaining clean, arsenic‐free water for consumption would be to utilize alternate wells and rainwater, or extract water from deep aquifers. Further‐ more, the ostracization of arsenic‐contaminated Bangladeshi, cou‐ pled with excessive poverty, leads me to believe that the use of al‐ ternate sources of drinking water is a viable remedy—one that even the impoverished, or shunned can take advantage of.

There are many socio‐economic consequences associated with the global shift in distribution of population to urban from rural places. Many countries are struggling to cope, and face major problems of employment, housing and service provision. Also health. Some think that developed nations have a humanitarian and moral re‐ sponsibility arising out of their historical exploitation of the develop‐ ing world, to intervene on a major scale and so should contribute as‐ sistance and aid to provide housing and basic infrastructure. Others think that these problems should be left to national governments and must be resolved domestically. 151



152

 



For Calculus I and Calculus II, Fall 2013

o begin with, we are going to go through a little review of some basic trigonometry. This will be used as a base for all calculus, and is instrumental in all future mathe‐ matics courses, physics courses, and some chemistry courses. Basic trigono‐ metric equations and identities are found farther into the study guide, and are more useful for calculus II then for anything else. Anyway, let’s kick this shit pile off with some definitions that apply to all math courses:

          

Unit Circle: A circle whose center lies on the coordinates 0,0 and whose radius is 1. Standard Position: an angle where the vertex is on the origin and the initial side is on the X axis. Acute Angle: any angle between 0 and 900. Right Angle: any 900 angle. Obtuse Angle: any angle between 90 and 1800. Straight Angle: any 1800 angle. Complementary Angles: 2 or more positive angles that add up to 900 (or a right angle). Supplementary Angles: 2 or more positive angles that add up to 1800 (or a straight angle). Coterminal Angles: 2 angles that share the same terminal side. Add or subtract 3600 to find the coterminal angle. Radian: relationship between the circumference and the inside degrees. Theta: a fraction of 3600, otherwise known as the angle.

155

Circumference: 2 Degrees to Radians ∗

180

°

Radians to Degrees 180° ∗ Arc Length ∗ S is arc Length. R is radius. Answer must be in Radians. Linear Speed S is arc length (in radians). R is rate (also written as V). T is time. Angular Speed R is rate (also written as W). T is time. Theta is angle (in degrees). Pythagorean Theorem 156

Sine of Theta is the Opposite Side over the Hypotenuse

The Cosine of Theta is the Adjacent Side over the Hypotenuse

The Tangent of Theta is the Opposite Side over the Adjacent

The Cotangent of Theta is the Adjacent Side over the Opposite. (Re‐ ciprocal of Tangent)

The Secant of Theta is the Hypotenuse over Adjacent Side (Recipro‐ cal of Cosine)

The Cosecant of Theta is the Hypotenuse over the Opposite Side (Re‐ ciprocal of Sine)

157

158

    



Critical Point: the point at which the derivative of f(x)=0, or where f(x) does not exist. Fermat’s Theorem on Local Extrema: If f(c) is a local min or max, then c is a critical point If restricted to an interval, the max or min can be an endpoint. It is okay if a function has no critical points, or if the critical points are endpoints. Rolle’s Theorem: Assume f(x) is continuous on [a,b], and differentiable on (a,b). If f(a)=f(b), then there exists a number “c” between a and b such that f’(c)=0 If f(x) is continuous on [a,b], then there exists at least one “c” between a and b such that



  

If f’(x) > 0, then f(x) is increasing. If f’(x) 0 F(x) is concave down if f’(x) is decreasing, or if f’’(x) < 0 If f’’(c)=0, or if f’’(c) does not exist and the concavity of f(x) changes at “c”, then “c” is an inflection point. Second Derivative Test: Plug critical points into the second derivative to determine concavity.  If f’’(c) > 0, then “c” is a local min and is concave up.  If f’’(c) < 0, then “c” is a local max and is concave down.  If f’’(c) = 0 then the test is inconclusive and you must use the first derivative test to classify the critical point.



159



If lim



→

then we can use this rule.



Is it a geometric series? If so you can use the following formula to deter‐ mine convergence/divergence: lim

If | | If | |



→ 1 Where C = a(1) and r = the ratio

1, then the series is convergent 1, then the series is divergent. Examples: Convergent Geometric Series where | | 1 1 1 15 15 1 14 15 1 15 15 1 1 1 625 625 1 6 5 1 5 5 1 1 4 4 4 1 3 4 1 4 4 2 2 2 25 25 2 3 5 1 5 5 Examples: Divergent Geometric Series where | | 10 4 1 5 2 2 9 1

1

1

Is it a p‐series? There are two types of p‐series, unbounded and infinite discontinuity. For each we can easily determine if they are convergent or divergent. Getting the value to which they converge is a bit more difficult, as it requires solving an integral. Let’s look at each of the two types of p‐ series:

160

Unbounded P-Series

1



Convergent if Divergent if

1 1



Infinite Discontinuity P-Series

1





Convergent if Divergent if

1 1

Examples: Determine whether the series is convergent or divergent. 1

lim

1

lim

→

→

1 2

lim →

1 2



1 1 2

1 2 This is an unbounded p‐series where 1. Therefore, it converges. Fur‐ thermore, it converges to ½. 0

1 .

lim →

1

lim 2

lim 2 3 →

→

2

2√3 0 √ This is an infinite discontinuity p‐series where 1. Therefore, it con‐ verges. Furthermore, it converges to √ . If the series is not a geometric or p‐series, then the first thing you should do is the divergence test. This will tell you whether or not the series di‐ verges. We do this by taking the limit as the general term approaches in‐ finity. If the limit equals any number, this series diverges. If the limit tends to “0”then the test in inconclusive and more work is needed. In general, we can use the following formula: lim →

divergence/inconclusive 161

Example: Divergent Series 4 4 , 3 2 3 2 4 4 4 lim lim lim 2 2 3 → 3 → → 2 3 4 3 0 Since the limit as n approaches infinity for the general term is 4/3, it fails the divergence test. We can therefore conclude that this series diverges. Example: Inconclusive 6 6 ,

lim

6

6

6

lim

→

lim

→

→



1



1

0



1 0 Since the limit as n approaches infinity for the general term tends to 0, it passes the divergence test. Therefore, the test in inconclusive and more work is needed. Example: Divergent Series

4

√

,





√

4



lim →

√

4

lim →

lim

4

→

4

lim →

8 7

∞

Since the limit as n approaches infinity for the general term is ∞, it fails the divergence test. We can therefore conclude that this series diverges. 162

This is yet another test to determine convergence/divergence, but only works for alternating series. That is, it only works for series whose terms alternate in + and – signs. Here we introduce the concept of absolute and conditional convergence. Understanding this concept is key to decipher‐ ing alternating series. For absolute/conditional convergence we use the following Theorem:

if

|a | converges, then

a converges.

|a | diverges, but

a converges

if

Example: Determine whether the series converges absolutely or condi‐ tionally

1



√

1



√1

1

1

1

√2

√3

√4

⋯



So, we can see from writing out the first few terms that this is an alternat‐ ing series. Now, let’s look at the absolute value of the series, which will tell us whether or not it converges absolutely or conditionally.

1



√

1



√1

1

1

1

√2

√3

√4

⋯

√





When written in this form we can see that we have a divergent, unbounded p‐series, where p=1/2. Since p < 1, it diverges. Now, since an converges and |a | diverges, we can say that this series converges conditionally. Example: Determine whether the series converges absolutely or condi‐ tionally

1 1.1



1 1

1 1.1



1 1.1

1 1.1

⋯



So, we see that this is an alternating series. Now, let’s look at the absolute value of the series.

1 1.1



1 1



1 1.1

163

1 1.1

1 1.1

⋯

.



When written in this form we can now see that we have a convergent geo‐ metric series, where the |r| < 1. Now, since an and |a | both converge, we can say that this series converges absolutely. Example: Determine whether the series converges absolutely or condi‐ tionally 1

1



1



1



2

1



3

1

⋯

4

So, we see that this is an alternating series. Now, let’s look at the absolute value of the series:

1

1 1



1 2



1 3



1

⋯

4

When written in this form we can see that we have a divergent p‐series, were p = ¼. Since |a | diverges, but an converges, we can conclude that this series converges conditionally.

If you don’t have a p‐series, geometric series, alternating series, and if you divergence test is inconclusive, the next step would be to use the comparison test. This can get a little confusing, so pay close attention to the terms and logic used. This can get a little confusing, so pay close attention to the terms and logic used. First, let’s start with the theorem:

THEOREM: Assume that there exists M > 0 such that 0 b for n M If

b

, then

a also

, then

b also

a



If

a





Essentially, what we’re going to do is compare one series with another that is either larger or smaller. If the larger one converges, then so does the smaller one. If the smaller one diverges, then so does the larger one. Let’s do a few examples and hopefully clear things up. NOTE: to use the com‐ parison test you must first check to see if the series only has positive terms. 164

Example: Determine if each of the following series is convergent or diver‐ gent

1

2

Now, if we use the divergence test we will see that the limit of the general term tends to zero, indicating that the test is inconclusive. We could evalu‐ ate this using the integral test, but let’s try the comparison test instead. First we need to find a series that is larger or smaller to compare it to. Why don’t we try the following:

2







2

1

Therefore,

2





2

1





We now have a series, an, that we know how to evaluate, so let’s do that: 1 1 2 2

Now, we already know that this is a harmonic series, which is divergent. Therefore, since an diverges, bn diverges as well based on the comparison test. Example: Determine if each of the following series is convergent or diver‐ gent

2 5

In this case the “+2” and the “+5” don’t really add anything to the series and so the series terms should behave pretty much like: 1

165

Which will converge as a series. Therefore, we can guess that the original series will converge and we will need to find a larger series which also converges. This means that we’ll either have to make the numerator larger or the denominator smaller. We can make the denominator smaller by dropping the “+5”. Doing this gives,



2 5

2





At this point, notice that we can’t drop the “+2” from the numerator since this would make the term smaller and that’s not what we want. However, this is actually the furthest that we need to go. Let’s take a look at the fol‐ lowing series. 2 1 2 2 As shown, we can write the series as a sum of two series and both of these series are convergent by the p‐series test. Therefore, since each of these series are convergent we know that the sum,

2





Is also a convergent series. Recall that the sum of two convergent series will also be convergent. Now, since the terms of this series are larger than the terms of the original series we know that the original series must also be convergent by the Comparison Test. Here is yet another comparison test that we can use if every other tech‐ nique before has failed (or if you’re feeling particularly brave). Here is the basic theorem:

THEOREM: Limit Comparison Test Suppose that we have two series, an and bn that are both ≥ 0 for all “n”. De‐ fine,

lim →



If “c” is positive (c > 0) and is finite (c < ∞), then either both series con‐ verge or both series diverge. 166

This is very similar to the comparison test. We pick a series that we know the convergence of (doesn’t matter if its smaller or larger) and then com‐ pare it to the original via the limit test. If “c” is greater than zero, and if it’s not infinity, then both series converge/diverge. Let’s look at a couple of examples: Example: Determine if each of the following series is convergent or diver‐ gent

4

√

Now, we can already guess that this series is divergent, because we can drop the +4 in the denominator, giving us a series that we know the con‐ vergence of, as seen below:



√





So now all we need to do is compare the two in limit form:

lim √ →

4



lim →

lim →



lim

4

√



4

→



1 1

4

√

0

lim →

4



Now, since c = 1 and c > 0 and c is finite, we can conclude that both series diverge.

Here is yet another test to determine convergence/divergence. This is a little more straight‐forward. Let’s start off with the basic theorem and work from there:

167

Theorem I: The Ratio Test lim



→



if

, then

a







if

, then

a





if

, then the test is



Now, what does all this mean? Essentially, we are using a ratio to deter‐ mine convergence. The ratio is obtained by dividing the general term of the series, an into a new general term, an+1, where we substitute (n+1) in for any (n) in the general term. Let’s look at a few examples, which will hopefully clear things up. Example: Ratio Test

1 5

Now, we already know that this is a geomet‐ ric series where | | < 1, and therefore con‐ verges, but let’s try the ratio test just to make sure. First, we get our two terms used to make up the ratio. 1 1 5 5

And now we set up our equation, which is based on theorem 1.

lim 5

1 lim

5 5

1 → 5 Now, since p < 1, we can say that this series converges absolutely. Easy, right? Let’s try something more difficult. →





168

Example: Ratio Test

!





Now, this one is a bit more complicated be‐ cause we have n! in the denominator. Let’s work through it step‐by‐step, staring with the two terms used to make up the ratio:



!







1 1 !



And now we set up our equation, which is based on theorem 1:

1 1 !

lim

1 1

lim

→

→

! 1

lim

∗

→

!

∗

!

1



1



Now, since p < 1 we can say that this series converges absolutely. Remember that (n + 1)! = (n + 1)n! Example: Ratio Test

3 7





First, let’s get our two terms used to make up the ratio. This one should be fairly straight‐forward:



3 7









3 1

And now we set up our ratio equation, which is based on theorem 1:

169

7

3

1 3

lim →

7 7 lim →

3 3

7 8

∗

3 ∗ 1





Now, since p = 3 and p > 1, we can say that this series diverges. Let’s do another. Example: Ratio Test

2 !





Again we have an n! in the denominator, so let’s work through this carefully. First, let’s start with getting the two terms we’ll use to make up the ratio: 2 2 ! 1 !

And now we can set up our ratio equation, which is based on theorem 1:

2 lim →

2

1 ! ! lim

! 1 !

→

0 ∗ 2

∗

2 2



Now, since p = 0 and p < 1, we can say that this series converges absolutely. 170

The root test is very similar to the ratio test, and, again, is used to test for convergence/divergence. Like before, let’s start with the basic theorem and then build upon it. Theorem II: The Root Test

lim →

if

|

, then

| a







if

, then

a





if , then the test is





Now, the rules for determine convergence/divergence are exactly the same as in the ratio test. We should be able to apply them easily. Let’s do a cou‐ ple of examples: Example: Use the Root Test to Determine Convergence or Divergence

7 10

9



By the look of it this series is a perfect candidate for the root test: lim →

9

7 10



lim

7 10

9

→

lim →

9

7 10

Since L = 1/9 and is < 1, we can conclude that this series converges absolutely. Example: Use the Root Test to Determine Convergence or Divergence

1 9

1



By the look of it this series is a perfect candidate for the root test:

171

lim

1 9



lim

1

1 9

lim

1

1 9 Since L = 1, we can say that the root test is inconclusive.

→



1

→

→

1

The power series is one of the more involved and complicated chapters this semester (or at least for this test). There are several different topics we have to tackle, including finding the interval of convergence, the radius of convergence, and creating/finding power series from a given function. Let’s start with finding the interval and radius of convergence, as that is somewhat less complicated. We’ll look at a few examples:

Example: Determine the interval of convergence of the power series cen‐ tered at x = ‐2



2 4





lim →

2 1 4 |



Step 1: Use ratio test 4 ∗ lim → 2 2| lim →

4

4

|

2 ∗

4 4 16

1 4

|∗

Step 2: Get preliminary interval of convergence

According to the ratio test, this series will converge when: 1 | 2| 1 4 Therefore, we can set up the equation: 1 2 1 1 4 4 2 4 This is our new interval of convergence. However, there is one more step.

Step 3: Check endpoints.

We can check the endpoints by plugging them into the original series and then checking for convergence/divergence using whatever test we need.

172



4



4

This is an alternating series. Remember, for an alternating series to be convergent it needs to be decreasing and the limit must be 0. So we can see that the series is definitely decreasing, but the limit needs checked:

4

lim

lim

4

→

→

4 4 4

lim →

1 4

0

So, when x = ‐6, the series converges. Let’s check the other endpoint.

4 4

4



1 4

4 4 After simplifying, we see that we have a divergent p‐series, where p=1. Since p ≤ 1, this series diverges when x = 2

Step 4: Interval of convergence

We now have our interval of convergence. It will not include x=2.

,

The radius of convergence is: 2 6 right endpoint left endpoint 2 2

Example: Use the ratio test to determine the values of x for which the power series below converges:

3

Step 1: Use ratio test

lim →



1

3 3

1

lim →

173

∗

3



3

lim →

1





Step 2: Get preliminary interval of convergence

According to the ratio test, this series will converge when: 1 3 Therefore, we can set up the equation: 1 3 This is our new interval of convergence. However, there is one more step. 1





Step 3: Check endpoints.

We can check the endpoints by plugging them into the original series and then checking for convergence/divergence using whatever test we need.



1

This is an alternating series. Remember, for an alternating series to be convergent it needs to be decreasing and the limit must be 0. In this in‐ stance, the series is not decreasing and the limit does not equal 0.

So, when x = ‐3, the series diverges. Let’s check the other endpoint.

1





After simplifying, we see that this is a divergent series.

Step 4: Interval of convergence



We now have our interval of convergence. It will not include either end‐ point.

,

The radius of convergence is: 3 3 right endpoint left endpoint 2 2



174

Example: Find the interval of convergence for the power series: 4

!

3

!

Step 1: Use ratio test



4 lim →

1 ! 1 ! 4 ! !

3 3

lim

4

1 ! 1 !

→

|

3

3| lim →

1 1

∗

4 4 4 ! ∗ 4 !

! !

3

|

3| ∗ 0 ∗ ∞

0

Step 2: Get interval of convergence



Since p=0, this series converges everywhere, giving us the interval of convergence:

∞, ∞

Furthermore, it has a radius of ∞.

In this section we will look at a few basic examples of parameterization. These should be fairly simple and to the point.

SEGMENT

Parameterizing a segment can be somewhat confusing, but if you follow these general formulas you should be okay. Most questions will come in the form of: find the parameterization of the segment joining (a,b) and (c,d) over [0,1], where a,b,c, and d are real numbers. Parameterizing a segment basically means you adjust the coordinates of (a,b) so they fit into (c,d). We can do this by using the following formulas:

And generally,

,

Let’s look at a few examples, which will hopefully clear this up: 175



Example: Segment Parameterize the segment joining (1,3) and (4,1) over [0,1].

4 1 1 1 3 3 And therefore: ,



Example: Segment Parameterize the segment joining (1,1) and (2,3) over [0,1]

2 1 1 3 1 1 And therefore: ,



CIRCLES AND VARIATIONS

Parameterizing circles is easy, provided you know the following general equations:



,



,



Use Multiplication “r” to scale the size/radius of the circle Use Addition “+c” to adjust the position of the circle’s center.



TANGENT SLOPE

The slope of the tangent at a given point, “a”, can be calculated by the fol‐ lowing equation:



SPEED

Instantaneous Speed can be calculated using the following equation:



ARC LENGTH

Arc length over a given interval can be calculated using the following equa‐ tion:





176







SURFACE AREA

Surface over a given interval can be calculated using the following equa‐ tion:

















CYCLOID CURVE

What is the surface area of the cycloid curve, c(t) = (t‐sin(t), 1‐cos(t)) over [0, 2π]?



2

2

1

cos



2

1

cos

2

2

1

cos

2 1



1

:1

cos

1 1

2 cos

cos

2

8



8



2 2





2 cos



cos 2

4

2













2

2 :

177



sin

2



si



2

2

sin

cos









Example: Cartesian to polar Conversion

Convert (1,0) from rectangular (Cartesian) coordinates to polar coordi‐ nates:



1

0 √1 1 0 ∅ tan tan 0 0 1 Therefore, the polar coordinates for (1,0) are: (1,0) Example: Cartesian to polar Conversion Convert (5, 0) to polar coordinates

0 √25 5 0 0 ∅ tan tan 0 5 Therefore, the polar coordinates for (5,0) are: (5, 0) Example: Cartesian to Polar Conversion Convert 9, to polar coordinates 5

√

9



∅

9 √3 tan



81



9 √3 9

81 3

√81 1

tan

√3

Therefore, the polar coordinates for 9,

27

√108

6 √

are:

,

√

Example: Polar to Cartesian Conversion Convert (5,0) to rectangular coordinates

5 cos 0 5 sin 0

5 0

Therefore, the rectangular coordinates for (5,0) are: (5,0) 178

Example: Polar to Cartesian Conversion Convert 9, into rectangular coordinates

3 0 2 3 9 sin 9 2 Therefore, the rectangular coordinates for 9, (0, -9) 9 cos

are:

For a simple problem, we use the following equation:





Where f(x) is the top function and g(x) is the bottom function, over the in‐ terval [a,b]. Or, for vertical curves,





Where g(y) is the right‐most curve and h(y) is the left‐most curve, over the interval [c,d]. This type of problem involves functions in respect to “y”, so you will need to switch variables. See example below. Example: Determine the Area between the Curves

,

,









3

2 3



3 179



3

3 1

1 3

0





There are two methods for volume of revolution problems, as seen below:

For standard problems, with one function, and rotated about the x‐axis:

∶







For problems involving two functions, rotated about the x‐axis:

:







For standard problems, with one function, rotated about the y‐axis:

:

2



cos 2 cos 2 sin 2

1

2 1

2 sin





2 cos

1 2

1 cos 2 2

1 2

1 cos 2 2

1



1





180