a a skin not a sweater - david marsh y paul furlong

Contents

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

x

Preface to the Second Edition

xi

Notes on Contributors

xiii

Introduction Gerry Stoker and David Marsh

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The discipline of political science: a celebration of diversity What is politics? What is it that political scientists study? What is a scientific approach to politics? Connecting to the world of politics Is there a standard method for undertaking political science? Conclusion 1 A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science David Marsh and Paul Furlong Ontology and epistemology Different approaches to ontology and epistemology Ontology and epistemology in political science: two cases Conclusion Further reading PART I

3 8 11 12 15 16 17 18 22 32 40 41

APPROACHES

2 Behavouralism David Sanders

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The rise of the behavioural movement and its core characteristics Criticisms of the behavioural approach The strengths of the behavioural approach: an example Conclusion: the behavioural legacy in the twenty-first century Further reading v

46 51 55 62 63

vi Contents 3 Rational Choice Hugh Ward The development of rational choice theory The key commitments and assumptions of the mainstream variant Criticisms of rational choice theory Developments: where is rational choice going? Conclusions Further reading 4 Institutionalism Vivien Lowndes Introduction The `traditional' institutional approach The rise of the `new institutionalism' What's new about new institutionalism? The core features of the approach New institutionalist dilemmas Conclusion Further reading 5 Feminism Vicky Randall Debates within feminism Feminism and political science Critical responses to feminist political science Conclusion: the way forward Further reading 6 Interpretive Theory Mark Bevir and R.A.W. Rhodes The importance of interpretation Varieties of interpretation An anti-foundational approach to interpretation Criticisms of interpretive theory Conclusion Further reading

65 65 68 71 84 88 89 90 90 92 94 97 101 107 108 109 110 113 127 129 130 131 132 134 139 149 151 152

Contents 7 Marxism David Marsh The development of Marxism What has Marxism to offer? Conclusion Further reading 8 Normative Theory Steve Buckler Logical positivism and the death of political philosophy Interpretive theory Critical theory and dialectics Deontological theory and value pluralism Conclusion Further reading PART II

vii 153 153 163 170 171 172 172 176 181 185 192 193

METHODS

9 Qualitative Methods Fiona Devine The role of qualitative methods in political science The epistemological underpinnings of qualitative methods Criticisms of qualitative research Illustration of qualitative research Conclusion Further reading 10 Quantitative Methods Peter John The collection and management of data The power of description Tables and inferential statistics Multivariate analysis Beyond ordinary least squares Conclusion Further reading 11 Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Melvyn Read and David Marsh Quantitative and qualitative methods: a false dichotomy? Combining research methods Problems of combination

197 197 200 204 207 215 215 216 218 220 222 225 225 229 230 231 231 231 240

viii Contents Two case studies Conclusion Further reading

242 247 248

12 Comparative Methods Jonathan Hopkin

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Introduction Theory and the comparative method Basic forms of comparative explanation Large Ns: quantitative comparative strategies Limitations of the quantitative comparative approach Small Ns: qualitative comparative strategies Quantity or quality? Quantitative versus qualitative comparative research Conclusion: challenges to the comparative method Further reading PART III

249 249 252 255 258 260 261 265 267

ISSUES

13 Structure and Agency Stuart McAnulla Introduction: structure and agency ± a problem for all? Structure and agency: what's really in it for us? The postmodern onslaught The morphogenetic approach Conclusion Further reading 14 Institutions and Ideas Mark Blyth Introduction Don't worry about the philosophy . . . Why institutions? Producing a `conventional' wisdom in political science Changing the conventional wisdom: reinventing institutions Historical and rational institutionalism Explaining change and stability: the turn to ideas Rationalism and ideas Historical institutionalism and ideas Conclusion: rival ontologies and progress in political science Further reading

271 271 272 281 285 290 291 292 292 294 296 298 300 301 303 305 307 310

Contents ix Conclusion David Marsh and Gerry Stoker

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The importance of ontological and epistemological issues The growth of diversity in the formal study of politics Beware gatekeeping A plea for dialogue

311 313 315 316

Bibliography

318

Author Index

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Subject Index

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Chapter 1

A Skin, not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science DAVID MARSH AND PAUL FURLONG

This chapter introduces the reader to the key issues that underpin what we do as social or political scientists. Each social scientist's orientation to their subject is shaped by their ontological and epistemological position. Most often those positions are implicit rather than explicit, but, regardless of whether they are acknowledged, they shape the approach to theory and the methods which the social scientist utilises. At first these issues seem difficult but our major point is that they are not issues that can be avoided (for a similar view see Blyth, Chapter 14). They are like a skin not a sweater: they cannot be put on and taken off whenever the researcher sees fit. In our view, all students of political science should recognise and acknowledge their own ontological and epistemological positions and be able to defend these positions against critiques from other positions. This means they need to understand the alternative positions on these fundamental questions. As such, this chapter has two key aims. First, we will introduce these ontological and epistemological questions in as accessible a way as possible in order to allow the reader who is new to these issues to reflect on their own position. Second, this introduction is crucial to the readers of this book because the authors of the subsequent chapters address these issues and they inform the subject matter of their chapters. As such, this basic introduction is also essential for readers who want fully to appreciate the substantive content of this book. The chapter is divided into three major sections. The first section describes what we mean by these two terms `ontology' and `epistemology' and considers briefly why these questions are important. The second section then outlines the different positions on ontology and epistemology and the arguments which have been put forward for and against these positions. Finally, we shall illustrate how these different positions shape the approaches that researchers take to their research by focusing on research in two broad areas: globalisation and multilevel governance. 17

18 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science

Ontology and epistemology Ontological and epistemological positions are related, but need to be separated. To put it crudely, one's ontological position affects, but far from determines, one's epistemological position.

Ontology Ontological questions are prior because they deal with the very nature of `being'; literally, an ontology is a theory of `being' (the word derives from the Greek for `existence'). This sounds difficult, but really it is not. The key question is whether there is a `real' world `out there' that is independent of our knowledge of it. For example, are there essential differences between genders, classes or races that exist in all contexts and at all times? A simple illustration easily makes the point. Over the last ten years John Gray's book Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus (1992) has sold seven million copies in the USA and millions more in forty countries worldwide. He argues that men and women are very different and that men and women can only understand and deal with one another better if they recognise this fact of life. This book takes a clear ontological position; there are fundamental differences between men and women that are features of their very existence. These differences persist over time and are common across cultures. This is an essentialist or a foundationalist ontological position. So, its proponents argue that there are essential differences of `being' that provide the foundations upon which social life is built. Of course, this is a contentious position; one which is strongly attacked by many, if not most, feminists. They believe that the differences between men and women are socially constructed. As such, they are not essential differences but are particular to a given culture and time. They are the product of patriarchy, in which male dominance shapes the culture and values of society, affects patterns of socialisation and perpetuates gender inequality. This argument reflects a different ontological position that is anti-foundationalist and emphasises the social construction of social phenomena.

Epistemology If an ontological position reflects the researcher's view about the nature of the world, their epistemological position reflects their view of what we can

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know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology is a theory of knowledge. Again, this sounds difficult, but the basic concerns are not too difficult. There are two key questions. Can an observer identify `real' or `objective' relations between social phenomena? If so, how? The first question itself subsumes two issues. Initially, it takes us back to ontology; if one is an anti-foundationalist, then one argues that there is not a `real' world, which exists independently of the meaning which actors attach to their action, to discover. At the same time, such an anti-foundationalist would also suggest that no observer can be `objective' because they live in the social world and are affected by the social constructions of `reality'. This is sometimes called the double hermeneutic; the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretation is interpreted by the observer (a second hermeneutic level). The second question raises another important, and clearly related, issue. To the extent that we can establish `real' relationships between social phenomena, can we do this simply through direct observation, or are there some relationships which `exist' but are not directly observable? The answers one gives to these questions shapes one's epistemological position. Of course, there are different ways of classifying epistemological positions and there is no agreement as to the best way. Probably the most common classification distinguishes between scientific (sometimes positivist) and hermeneutic (or interpretist) positions. We shall begin with a brief review of that distinction, before proposing an alternative, which distinguishes between positivist, realist and interpretist positions. Scientific versus hermeneutic approaches Social science was influenced by the ideas of science as the nomenclature clearly indicates. In particular, the empiricist tradition played a crucial role in the development of social science. David Hume argued that knowledge starts from our senses. On the basis of such direct experience we could develop generalisations about the relationships between physical phenomena. The aim was to develop causal statements which specified that, under a given set of conditions, there would be regular and predictable outcomes (on this see Hollis and Smith 1990: ch. 3). The adherents of the scientific tradition saw social science as analogous to science. In ontological terms they were foundationalists; they thought there was a real world `out there' which was external to agents. Their focus was upon identifying the causes of social behaviour. The emphasis was upon explanation and many felt that the use of rigorous `scientific' methods would allow social scientists to develop laws, similar in status to scientific laws, which would hold across time and space.

20 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science In methodological terms, the scientific tradition was greatly influenced by logical positivism that posited a very straightforward characterisation of the form of scientific investigation. As Hollis and Smith put it (1990: 50): To detect the regularities in nature, propose a generalisation, deduce what it implies for the next case and observe whether the prediction succeeds. If it does, no consequent action is needed; if it does not, then either discard the generalisation or amend it and [test the] fresh [predictions]. In contrast, there is an alternative hermeneutic (the word derives from the Greek for `to interpret') or interpretist tradition. The adherents of this position are anti-foundationalists, believing that the world is socially constructed. They focus upon the meaning of behaviour. The emphasis is upon understanding, rather than explanation. As such, in the interpretist tradition it is not possible to establish causal relationships between phenomena that hold across time and space. Positivist, realist and interpretist positions We prefer this classification because the scientific tradition identified by Hollis and Smith conflates two distinct positions, positivism and realism. Positivists adhere to a foundationalist ontology and are concerned to establish causal relationships between social phenomema, thus developing explanatory, and indeed predictive, models. The realist is also foundationalist in ontological terms. However, realists, unlike positivists, do not privilege direct observation. The realist believes that there are deep structural relationships between social phenomena which cannot be directly observed, but which are crucial for any explanation of behaviour. So, as an example, a realist might argue that patriarchy as a structure cannot be directly observed, although we can see many of the consequences of it; we return to this example later. The distinction between positivist, realist and interpretist approaches is examined in much more depth in the next section. However, the key point here is that any classification that we adopt would annoy some social scientists. We use this particular distinction because we are realists and, as such, do not like the conflation between positivism and realism involved in the first distinction. However, many other authors would question our distinction. In particular, many, like Bevir and Rhodes (see below) would want to make further distinctions within the tradition of interpretive theory. The point is that any way of classifying epistemological positions can be contested; we choose one, but are aware of the criticism of it. In addition, we shall deal with many of those criticisms when we look at the variants within the three positions we identify.

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Why are such distinctions important? In our view, ontological and epistemological concerns cannot, and should not, be ignored or downgraded. Three points are important here: 1. First, these concerns should not be put in what the Australians, with typical directness, call the `too hard basket'. Certainly, the issues involved are not easy, but neither are they difficult, if they are explained simply and with appropriate examples. 2. Second, ontological and epistemological positions should not be treated like a sweater that can be `put on' when we are addressing such philosophical issues and `taken off' when we are doing research. In our view, the dominance of a fairly crude positivist epistemology throughout much of the postwar period encouraged many social scientists to dismiss ontological questions and regard epistemological issues as more or less resolved, with only the details left to be decided by those interested in such matters. Such social scientists have tended to acknowledge the importance of epistemology without considering it necessary to deal with it in detail; positivism has been regarded as a comforting sweater that can be put on where necessary. In contrast, we would argue that epistemology, to say nothing of ontology, is far from being a closed debate. 3. Third, researchers cannot adopt one position at one time for one project and another on another occasion for a different project. These positions are not interchangeable because they reflect fundamental different approaches to what social science is and how we do it. This is the key point. As we pointed out in the introduction, a researcher's epistemological position is reflected in what is studied, how it is studied and the status the researcher gives to their findings. So, a positivist looks for causal relationships, tends to prefer quantitative analysis (for a more detailed discussion of the relationship between ontology, epistemology and methodology, see Chapter 11) and wants to produce `objective' and generalisable findings. A researcher from within the interpretist tradition is concerned with understanding, not explanation, focuses on the meaning that actions have for agents, tends to use qualitative evidence and offers their results as one interpretation of the relationship between the social phenomena studied. Realism is less easy to classify in this way. The realists are looking for causal relationships, but think that many important relationships between social phenomena cannot be observed. This means they may use quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data will only be appropriate for those relationships that are directly observable. In contrast, the unobservable relationships can only be established

22 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science indirectly; we can observe other relationships which, our theory tells us, are the result of those unobservable prelationships. We return to these issues in the next section.

Different approaches to ontology and epistemology Here we outline the positivist, the interpretist and the realist positions in more detail. We shall focus on: the major criticisms of the positions; the variations within these positions; and the way the positions have changed over time. At the outset, however, it is important to emphasise that the distinctions between the positions, and more specifically that between interpretism and realism, are not clear-cut.

Positivism The core of positivism is fairly straightforward, although of course there are variants within it: . Positivism is based upon a foundationalist ontology. So, to the positivist, like the realist, but unlike those from the interpretist position, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. . To the positivist, natural science and social science are broadly analogous. We can establish regular relationships between social phenomena, using theory to generate hypotheses which can be tested by direct observation. In this view, and in clear contrast to the realist, there are no deep structures that cannot be observed. Traditionally, positivism contended that there is no appearance/reality dichotomy and that the world is real and not socially constructed. So, direct observation can serve as an independent test of the validity of a theory. Crucially, an observer can be objective in the way they undertake such observations. Researchers from the interpretist tradition rarely accept any notion of objectivity. Realists accept that all observation is mediated by theory (to the realist, theory plays the crucial role in allowing the researcher to distinguish between those social phenomena which are directly observable and those which are not). . To positivists the aim of social science is to make causal statements; in their view it is possible to, and we should attempt to, establish causal relationships between social phenomena. They share this aim with realists, while interpretists deny the possibility of such statements. . Positivists also argue that it is possible to separate empirical questions ± that is, questions about what is ± from normative questions ± that is, questions about what should be. Traditionally, positivists thought that

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the goal of social science was to pursue empirical questions, while philosophy, metaphysics or religion pursued the normative questions. Because we can separate empirical and normative questions, it is possible for social science to be objective and value-free. Realists and, especially, those from within the interpretist tradition would reject that proposition. Many social scientists are positivists, although much of the positivism is implicit rather than explicit. The behavioural revolution in the social sciences in the 1960s, dealt with by David Sanders in Chapter 2, was an attempt to introduce scientific method into the study of society. It was an explicit reaction to political theory, which it saw as concerned with normative questions, and institutionalism, which it saw as lacking theoretical and methodological rigour. In contrast, it was based upon a foundationalist ontology and, most often, a quantitative methodology (but see below and Chapter 10). The view was that a social `science' was possible if we followed the scientific method; deriving hypotheses from theory and then testing them in an attempt to falsify them. We needed `objective' measures of our social phenomena, our variables; as such, we would focus upon `hard' data ± from government statistics, election results and so on ± rather than soft data ± from interviews or participant observation. So, for example, if a positivist was studying political participation, they would be interested in measuring the level of voting, party or pressure group membership, direct action or whatever, and relating it to demographic variables such as class, gender, race and education. The aim would be to establish the precise nature of the relationship between these variables and participation in order to produce causal models. We shall return to this example later. The key point here is that, as always, the ontological and epistemological position adopted had clear methodological implications. The criticism of positivism takes two broad forms. The first line of criticism broadly argues that, in following the methods of science, positivists misinterpret how science really proceeds. Two lines of argument have been particularly important here. First, there is the pragmatist position of Quine (1961) who develops two crucial critiques of positivism (for a fuller exposition see Hollis and Smith 1990: 55±7; they deal with a third, less important, criticism): (i) Quine argues that any knowledge we derive from the five senses is mediated by the concepts we use to analyse it, so there is no way of classifying, or even describing, experience without interpreting it. (ii) This means that theory and experiment are not simply separable, rather theory affects both the facts we focus on and how we interpret them. This, in turn, may affect the conclusions we draw if the facts

24 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science appear to falsify the theory. As such, if we observe `facts' which are inconsistent with the theory, we might decide that the facts are wrong rather than that the theory is wrong. Of course, this undermines the notion that observation alone can serve to falsify a theory. Second, there is Kuhn's view (1970) that, at any given time, science tends to be dominated by a particular paradigm that is unquestioned and which affects the questions scientists ask and how they interpret what they observe (for a fuller discussion, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 57±61). Consequently, scientific investigation is not `open', as positivism implies, rather certain conclusions are almost unthinkable. There is a `paradigm shift' when a lot of empirical observation leads certain, brave, scientists to question the dominant paradigm, but until that time, and for the most part, scientists discard observations which do not fit (obviously this fits well with the second of Quine's criticisms above) and embrace the results which confirm the paradigm. The second main line of criticism of positivism is more particular to social science. It argues that there are obvious differences between social and physical or natural phenomena that make social `science' impossible. Three differences are particularly important. First, social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of the activities they shape. So, for example, marriage is a social institution or structure, but it is also a lived experience, particularly, although not exclusively, for those who are married. This lived experience affects agents' understanding of the institution and also helps change it. Second, and related, social structures, unlike natural structures, do not exist independently of agents' views of what they are doing in the activity. People are reflexive; they reflect on what they are doing and often change their actions in the light of that reflection. This leads us to the third difference. Social structures, unlike natural structures, change as a result of the actions of agents; in most senses the social world varies across time and space. Some positivist social scientists minimise these differences, but, to the extent they are accepted, they point towards a more interpretist epistemological position. Many positivists avoid these critiques which are put in the `too hard basket'. However, the more sophisticated positivists are aware of these criticisms and the position has changed significantly as a result. Fortunately, this volume boasts two sophisticated behaviouralists who are positivists, Sanders and John. It is particularly worth examining David Sanders' view in a little more detail because it represents an excellent example of the modern, more sophisticated, positivist position. Sanders (Chapter 2) accepts he has been strongly influenced by the positivist position, but acknowledges the `ferocious philosophical criticism' to which it was subjected. He argues that `post-behaviouralists', who might also be

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called `post-positivists': acknowledge the interdependence of theory and observation; recognise that normative questions are important and not always easy to separate from empirical questions; and accept that other traditions have a key role to play in political and social analysis. As such, this post-positivism has moved a significant way from more traditional positivism, largely as a result of the type of criticisms outlined here. However, the ontological and epistemological problems have not gone away, rather they have been elided. Two quotes from Sanders illustrate the point. First, he argues (see Chapter 2: 51): Modern behaviouralists ± `post-behaviouralists' ± simply prefer to subject their own theoretical claims to empirical tests. They also suspect that scholars working in non-empirical traditions are never able to provide a satisfactory answer to the crucial question: `How would you know if you were wrong?' Later he continues (Chapter 2: 54): For modern behaviouralists, the ultimate test of a good theory is still whether or not it is consistent with observation ± with the available empirical evidence. Modern behaviouralists are perfectly prepared to accept that different theoretical positions are likely to produce different observations. They insist however, that, whatever `observations' are implied by a particular theoretical perspective, those observations must be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being posited. This is a sophisticated statement of a positivist epistemological position, but it is still essentially positivist. The aim is to use observation (of whatever type) to test hypothesised relationships between the social phenomena studied. Research from within other traditions must still be judged against the positivists' criteria: `observation must be used in order to conduct a systematic empirical test of the theory that is being posited'. Yet, that is not a standard most researchers from within an interpretist tradition could accept (even Bevir and Rhodes 1999 could only do so with major qualifications), because they do not believe that direct observation can be objective and used as a test of `reality'. Most realists would also have a problem with Sanders' position because they would see many of the key relationships as unobservable. One other aspect of Sanders' position is important here. He accepts that interpretation and meaning are important, which might suggest that the differences between positivist and interpretist traditions are beginning to dissolve. So, Sanders argues (Chapter 2: 53), in criticising prior studies of voting behaviour: `There are other areas ± relating to the way in which individuals reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, upon themselves ± where

26 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science behavioural research has simply not dared to tread.' He recognises that such factors might, or might not, be important, but emphasises that they would be difficult to study empirically. However, the crucial point is that Sanders wants to treat interpretation and meaning as intervening variables. In this view, how a voter understands the parties and their own position may affect their voting behaviour. At best, this acknowledges only one aspect of the double hermeneutic; the interpretist tradition would argue that we also need to acknowledge the subjectivity of the observer. So, positivism has changed in response to criticism. Post-positivism is much less assertive that there is only one way of doing social science. However, it still emphasises explanation, rather than understanding, and the primacy of direct observation. In our terms, it is still foundationalist and firmly located in the scientific tradition.

The interpretist position The interpretist tradition is the obvious `other' of positivism. However, it is a much broader church than positivism and much of this subsection will deal with its variants. Nevertheless, it is useful to begin with an outline of the core of the position. . In the interpretist tradition researchers reject the notion that the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. Rather, they contend that the world is socially or discursively constructed. This view is diametrically opposed to positivism, but shares certain features with some modern variants of realism. In ontological terms, then, this position is anti-foundationalist. . This means that for researchers working within this tradition social phenomena do not exist independently of our interpretation of them; rather it is this interpretation/understanding of social phenomena which affects outcomes. As such, it is the interpretations/meanings of social phenomena that are crucial; interpretations/meanings which can only be established and understood within discourses or traditions. Consequently, we should focus on identifying those discourses or traditions and establishing the interpretations and meanings they attach to social phenomena. . However, we must also acknowledge that `objective' analysis is impossible. Social `scientists' (of course interpretists would not use this term) are not privileged, but themselves operate within discourses or traditions. Consequently, knowledge is theoretically or discursively laden. As such, this position acknowledges the double hermeneutic. This position has clear methodological implications. It argues that there is no objective truth, that the world is socially constructed and that the role

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of social `scientists' [sic] is to study those social constructions. Quantitative methods can be blunt instruments and may produce misleading data. In contrast, we need to utilise qualitative methods ± interviews, focus groups, vignettes and so on ± to help us establish how people understand their world. So, for example, someone operating from within this tradition studying political participation would start by trying to establish how people understand `the political' and `political' participation The major criticism of the interpretist tradition comes, unsurprisingly, from positivists, though some realists would agree with elements of that critique. To positivists, the interpretist tradition merely offers opinions or subjective judgements about the world. As such, there is no basis on which to judge the validity of their knowledge claims. One person's view of the world, and of the relationship between social phenomena within it, is as good as another's view. To many positivists, this means that such research is akin to history, or even fiction, whereas they aspire to a science of society. It is difficult for someone in the interpretist tradition to answer this accusation, because it is based on a totally different ontological view and reflects a different epistemology and, thus, a different view of what social science is about. However, as we shall see, most researchers do believe that it is possible to generalise, if only in a limited sense. Perhaps more interestingly, Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) attempt to defend their approach against this positivist critique by establishing a basis on which they can make knowledge claims; on which they can claim that one interpretation, or narrative, is superior to another. We shall return to their argument below. Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming: ch. 2) distinguish between the hermeneutic and postmodern, or post-structuralist, strands in the interpretist position. In essence, the hermeneutic tradition is idealist; it argues that we need to understand the meanings people attach to social behaviour. So, hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of texts and actions. This involves the use of ethnographic techniques (participant observation, transcribing texts, keeping diaries and so on) to produce what Geertz (1973) calls `thick description'. As Bevir and Rhodes put it, quoting Geertz, the aim is to establish `our own constructions of other people's constructions of what they and their compatriots are up to'. However, ethnographers do generalise. They develop a narrative about the past based upon the meanings which the actions had for social actors. Then, on the basis of this `thick description', they offer an interpretation of what this tells us about the society. The point is that these interpretations are always partial, in both senses of the world, and provisional; they are not `true'. More recently, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) emphasise, poststructuralism and postmodernism have provided a powerful challenge to foundationalism in both philosophy and social science. Yet, as Bevir and

28 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science Rhodes also point out, this variant of the interpretist tradition is itself so diverse that it is difficult, if not impossible, to characterise. They overcome this problem by focusing on the work of Michel Foucault, who is perhaps the best-known writer in this broad tradition. He, like most poststructuralists and postmodernists, is a strong opponent of foundationalism and the modernisation project associated with the Enlightenment. This project argues that: the basis of human knowledge is direct experience; as such, it is possible to develop an `objective' view of the `real' world (thus, it denies both elements of the double hermeneutic); language is transparent or neutral; and that human history is inevitably progressive, with present knowledge building on past knowledge to improve our information about the world and our ability to control it. In contrast, Foucault argues that experience is acquired within a prior discourse. As such, language is crucial because institutions and actions only acquire a meaning through language. Thus, as Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) argue, for Foucault: `to understand an object or action, political scientists have to interpret it in the wider discourse of which it is part'. This means that, as Bevir and Rhodes stress, it is the social discourse, rather than the beliefs of individuals, which are crucial to Foucault's version of the interpretist position. The identification of that discourse, and the role it plays in structuring meanings, is thus the key concern of those adopting this approach (for an example of this broad approach in use see Howarth (1995). Bevir and Rhodes (forthcoming) develop their own take on the interpretist tradition. It is particularly interesting because it directly addresses the key issue raised in the positivist critique of this tradition. They argue that social science is about the development of narratives, not theories. As such, they stress the importance of understanding and the impossibility of absolute knowledge claims, but they want to explain and they defend a limited notion of objectivity. Broadly, Bevir and Rhodes are within the hermeneutic, rather than the postmodern, or post-structuralist, stream of the interpretist tradition. As such, they follow Geertz and others in arguing that it is possible to produce explanations within the interpretist tradition. However, their understanding of explanation is very different from that of a positivist. In their view, the researcher can produce an explanation of an event or of the relationships between social phenomena. But, this explanation is built upon their interpretation of the meanings the actors involved gave to their actions. What is produced is a narrative which is particular, to that time and space, and partial, being based on a subjective interpretation of the views of, most likely, only some of the actors involved. Consequently, any such narrative must be provisional; there are no absolute truth claims.

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However, Bevir and Rhodes do wish to make some, more limited, knowledge claims. They argue (forthcoming): `Although we do not have access to pure facts that we can use to declare particular interpretations to be true or false, we can still hang on to the idea of objectivity.' They suggest that a field of study `is a co-operative intellectual practice, with a tradition of historically produced norms, rules, conventions and standards of excellence that remain subject to critical debate, and with a narrative content that gives meaning to it' (original emphasis). They continue: [Practice, tradition and narrative provide] for a negotiated and dynamic set of standards through which rational debate and argumentation between proponents of rival perspectives or approaches is possible [where] these standards are historically embedded within social practices, traditions and narratives which provide `embedded reasons' . . . for judging an argument true or false or an action right or wrong. Such criteria are not universal or objective; rather, they are `shared criteria for assessing . . . knowledge claims'. To Bevir and Rhodes, postmodernism errs in failing to acknowledge `significant, grounded rationality' that is to be found in these practices and traditions. In Bevir and Rhodes' view, such knowledge claims are not selfreferential because they can be `reconfirmed' at three distinct points: The first is when we translate our concepts for fieldwork: that is, are they meaningful to practitioners and users and if not, why not? The second is when we reconstruct narratives from the conversations: that is, is the story logical and consistent with the data? And the third is when we redefine and translate our concepts because of the academic community's judgement on the narratives: that is, does the story meet the agreed knowledge criteria? Overall, they argue: To overcome this difficulty, we should conceive of objective knowledge, less as what our community happens to agree on, and more as a normative standard embedded in a practice of criticising and comparing rival accounts of `agreed facts'. The anti-foundational nature of this practice lies in its appeal, not to given facts, but to those agreed in a particular community or conversation. In addition, and of key importance, the normative, critical bite of our approach lies in conducting the comparison by the rules of intellectual honesty. These rules originate in anti-foundationalism and not in a straightforward acceptance of the norms of the relevant community or conversation.

30 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science As we can see then, there are a number of variants within the interpretist tradition. However, they are all anti-foundationalist and critical of positivism. These approaches have become much more common in political science since the 1970s for a number of reasons. First, increasingly philosophical critiques have led to the questioning of positivism. Second, the postmodern turn in social science has had an affect on political science, although much less so than in sociology. Third, normative political theory has changed fundamentally. Historically, it was foundationalist; the aim was to establish some absolute notion of the good or of justice. As Buckler argues in Chapter 8, that is no longer the case. Some normative political theorists have been influenced by postmodernism, again variously defined, and more by the work of Quine and others. Now, most political theorists are anti-foundationalists or, at the very least, have a very limited conception of any universal foundations. Fourth, as Randall shows in Chapter 5, much, but by no means all, feminist thought has been strongly influenced by postmodernism; it is anti-foundationalist and operates within the interpretist tradition. As such, we can see the influence of this interpretist tradition very broadly across political science.

Realism Realism shares an ontological position with positivism, but, in epistemological terms, modern realism has more in common with relativism. The core views of classical realism are again fairly clear and owe much to Marx's work: . To realists, the world exists independently of our knowledge of it. In ontological terms they, like positivists, are foundationalists. . Again like positivists, realists contend that social phenomena/structures do have causal powers, so we can make causal statements. . However, unlike positivists, realists contend that not all social phenomena, and the relationships between them, are directly observable. There are deep structures that cannot be observed and what can be observed may offer a false picture of those phenomena/ structures and their effects (for an excellent exposition of this position see Smith, in Hollis and Smith 1990: 205±8). But, as Smith puts it, although we cannot observe those structures, `positing their existence gives us the best explanation of social action. To use a phrase familiar to the philosophy of science, we are involved in ``inference to the best explanation'' (Hollis and Smith 1990: 207). As such, to a realist there is often a dichotomy between reality and appearance. This is a very important issue because it has clear methodological implications. It means that realists do not accept that what appears to be so, or, perhaps

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more significantly, what actors say is so, is necessarily so. As an example, classical Marxism, and Marxism is the archetypal classical realism, argued that there was a difference between `real' interests, which reflect material reality, and perceived interests, which might be manipulated by the powerful forces in society. Given this view, we cannot just ask people what their interests are, because we would merely be identifying their manipulated interests, not their `real' interests. The criticisms of classical realism were of two sorts, which reflect different epistemological positions. The positivists denied the existence of unobservable structures. More importantly, they argued that positing them makes the knowledge claims of realism untestable and, thus, unfalsifiable. As such, realist claims that rely on the effect of unobservable structures have the same status to positivists as the claims of scholars from within the interpretist tradition. In contrast, authors from the interpretist tradition criticise the foundational claims of realism. In their view, there are no structures that are independent of social action and no `objective' basis on which to observe the actions or infer the deep structures. So, the realist claim that structures cause social action are rejected on ontological and epistemological grounds. In our view, contemporary realism has been significantly influenced by the interpretist critique. In particular, this modern critical realism acknowledges two points. First, while social phenomena exist independently of our interpretation of them, our interpretation/understanding of them affects outcomes. So, structures do not determine; rather they constrain and facilitate. Social science involves the study of reflexive agents who interpret and change structures. Second, our knowledge of the world is fallible; it is theory-laden. We need to identify and understand both the external `reality' and the social construction of that `reality' if we are to explain the relationships between social phenomena. Realism also has clear methodological implications. It suggests that there is a real world `out there', but emphasises that outcomes are shaped by the way in which that world is socially constructed. As such, it would acknowledge the utility of both quantitative and qualitative data. So, for example, realists might use quantitative methods to identify the extent to which financial markets are `globalised'. However, they would also want to analyse qualitatively how globalisation is perceived, or discursively constructed, by governments, because the realist argument would be that both the `reality' and the discursive construction affect what government does in response to global pressures. We shall return to this example later. Modern realism then attempts to acknowledge much of the interpretist critique, while retaining a commitment to causal explanation. The key

32 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science problem here of course is that it is not easy, indeed many would see it as impossible, to combine scientific and interpretist positions because they have such fundamentally different ontological and epistemological underpinnings, one focusing on explanation and the other on understanding (on this point, see Hollis and Smith 1990: 212). One of the main criticisms of realists has been that they often treat concepts as if they related to some fixed, or at least more or less given, `essences' or cores. It should be noted first that this is not a necessary tenet for realists; it reflects rather the philosophical traditions from which they derive. Nevertheless, the question of what a concept is for is an important one, and it affects ontology directly. If a concept cannot be tied firmly to an underlying reality, as traditional philosophy seems to imply, the concept of `being' itself may be detached from the real world of experience. This is one of the reasons why modern philosophy has considerable difficulty even recognising that there may be a subject of ontology. It should also be noted that this is one of those issues on which positivists and interpretists can find themselves temporarily in agreement, even though, as we have seen, they have fundamentally different views about knowledge and being. Any apparent agreement between them, however, has limited scope, as they have different origins and are heading for different destinations. Having considered how these categories relate to some important issues in the social sciences, we can now move on to apply the arguments to particular cases so as to illustrate their use and their limits.

Ontology and epistemology in political science: two cases The aim in this section is to examine how a researcher's ontological and epistemological position affects the way they approach empirical questions in political science. We shall focus on two areas: globalisation and multilevel governance. These areas have been chosen because they reflect a broad spread of the concerns, but, in our view, similar arguments could be made in relation to other substantive areas.

Case 1: Globalisation The literature on globalisation mushroomed in the 1990s. It has been common to distinguish between processes or aspects of globalisation: so many authors have distinguished between economic, political and cultural processes, while acknowledging that they are interrelated. In this vein, many have argued that economic globalisation has grown apace and that this process has significantly restricted the autonomy of the nation state.

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Indeed, Ohmae (1990) goes as far as to argue that only two economic forces, global financial markets and transnational corporations, will play any role in the politics of the future. In his view, the future role of states will be analogous to the current role of local councils. At the same time, other authors have focused on cultural globalisation, suggesting that world culture is becoming increasingly homogeneous: in the view of most, reflecting a growing US hegemony. Certainly, there is little doubt that the issue of globalisation in a crucial one for those interested in questions of contemporary political economy and governance. Political scientists have probably been most concerned with economic globalisation and the way in which it restricts the autonomy of the state, and have utilised a foundationalist ontology and a positivist epistemology, although, as we shall see below, some more recent work is realist. In contrast, sociologists, particularly those who focus on cultural studies, concentrate upon cultural globalisation, operating from an anti-foundationalist and interpretist position. The main debate about economic globalisation has concerned the extent to which it has increased. There are two main positions. Some authors, like Ohmae (1990), who are christened hyperglobalists by Held et al. (1999) and seen as first-wave theorists by Hay and Marsh (2000), argue that there has been a massive increase in various indicators of economic globalisation: direct foreign investment; international bank lending; transnational production; international trade and so on. In contrast, authors such as Hirst and Thompson (1999), christened sceptics by Held et al. (1999) and seen by Hay and Marsh (2000) as second-wave theorists, argue that the process is more limited. More specifically, they suggest that: globalisation is not a new phenomenon; regionalisation, rather than globalisation, is a better description of the changes that have occurred; and the only area in which there has been significant globalisation is in relation to financial markets. We are not concerned here with the detail of this argument. Our point is that both sets of authors agree about what constitutes evidence of globalisation and how we can go about studying that evidence. Globalisation is an economic process that can be measured quantitatively, indeed there is large agreement as to the appropriate measures, and which, to the extent that it exists, has an effect on patterns of governance. More recently, other authors have been, in most cases implicitly rather than explicitly, critical of this ontological and epistemological approach. The point is easily made if we return to two ways of classifying the literature on globalisation to which we have already referred. Held et al. (1999) contrast hyperglobalist and sceptical approaches to globalisation with a third approach to which they adhere: the transformationalist thesis. In contrast, Hay and Marsh (2000) identify a third wave of the globalisation literature that builds upon a critique of the first two waves. These two

34 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science `third ways' share something in common, but do differ significantly in a manner that reflects ontological and epistemological debates. The transformationalists differ significantly from the sceptics in that they share: a conviction that, at the dawn of a new millennium, globalisation is a central driving force behind the rapid social, political and economic changes that are reshaping modern societies and world order . . . In this respect, globalisation is conceived as a powerful transformative force which is responsible for a massive shake out of societies, economies, institutions of governance and world order. (Held et al. 1999: 7) Held et al. also emphasise the major way in which the transformationalist account parts company with both the other two positions (1999: 7): The transformationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of globalisation . . . Rather [they] emphasise globalisation as a long-term historical process which is inscribed with contradictions and which is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors. So, they argue that: there are `real' social, political and economic changes occurring in the world; globalisation is a cause of these changes, a transformative force; but there is no inevitable process of globalisation which, as social scientists, we can identify. This last point is especially important here. The putative development of globalisation is dependent on the actions of agents, whether individuals, companies, institutions or states; as such it is a socially constructed process. It seems clear then that the transformative position is a realist one. This position has methodological consequences. It points strongly to comparative analysis, because the emphasis is upon how different countries, and indeed different companies and markets, are affected by, and respond to, this process of globalisation in different ways. If globalisation is not an inevitable or universal process, then we need to focus on how it is differently experienced in different contexts. This point is even clearer if we turn to what Hay and Marsh call the third-wave literature on globalisation. Hay and Marsh (2000: 6) follow Held et al. in arguing that we: `shouldn't make essentialising and reifying assumptions about the effects, consequences, or even the very existence, of globalisation'. Rather, globalisation is a series of contradictory and contingent processes. More specifically, they suggest that, for many authors, especially the hyperglobalists, globalisation is a process without a subject. In contrast, they argue that it is agents who construct globalisation and, as such, the researcher should identify the actors involved and how they perceive and discursively construct globalising tendencies.

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However, Hay and Marsh go further to contend that these discursive constructions have significant effects on outcomes. So, they suggest that it is the discursive construction of globalisation that affects government economic policies, rather than the `real' processes of globalisation. As such, and taking the UK as an example, their argument would run along the following lines: . While there has been a significant increase in regionalism in patterns of trading and a globalisation of financial markets, there is limited evidence that Britain is locked into a globalised political economy which determines the economic policy which the British Government can adopt. . However, British governments, and especially the Blair Government, have argued that it is constrained in that way. It suggests that the extent of globalisation is such that the pursuit of neo-liberal policies is inevitable: there is no alternative. . As such, it is not the `reality' of globalisation that is shaping British economic policy, but the dominant discursive construction of that reality. We are not concerned here about the validity or otherwise of this argument. The crucial point for us is that this view clearly marks a break with the positivism that underpins most work on globalisation. To Hay and Marsh, there may be `real' processes at work, but the way they affect outcomes is mediated by the discursive construction(s) of these processes. This argument has both realist and interpretist elements. There is an appeal to a real world, but the emphasis is on the discursive construction of that world. This position illustrates how realist and interpretist positions interface. In our view, this position is a realist one if it recognises that there is an interactive or dialectical relationship between the `real' world and the discourses. A realist would acknowledge not only that discourses have real effects, in this case that the dominant discourse of globalisation shapes economic policy, but also that the `real' processes of globalisation constrain the resonance of different discourses. So, if the dominant discourse is at odds with the `reality', alternative discourses can appeal to that `reality deficit'. However, if it is merely the discourses that have the causal power, then, in our view, it is an interpretist position. There are other approaches to globalisation which are clearly located in an interpretist tradition. As we emphasised above, most of these approaches stress cultural globalisation. Of course, as Held et al. point out (1999: 328), the concept of culture has a long and complex history but `normally refers to the social construction, articulation and reception of meaning'. This definition immediately suggests an anti-foundationalist ontology and, most often, an interpretist epistemology.

36 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science It is possible to approach the issue of cultural globalisation utilising a positivist epistemology. So, one could focus empirically on the extent to which certain cultural icons, such as Coca-Cola, McDonald's or Madonna, have become universal, or whether colonialism was associated with a similar global culture. However, the focus of a cultural studies approach to globalisation is much more likely to be on difference. Two points are important here. First, the argument would be that there are various discourses about globalisation, none of which is `true', although at any time one discourse may be dominant. Second, while one discourse may dominate, it can be, and will always be, resisted: different agents ± citizens and researchers ± will offer different narrations of globalisation and its effects. In this way, this alternative `cultural studies' approach reflects an anti-foundationalist and an interpretist position.

Case 2: Multilevel governance Multilevel governance and intergovernmentalism: realism versus positivism The term `multilevel governance' covers a variety of familiar phenomena that are normally located in the areas of regional policy and European integration. Though `multilevel governance' (MLG) is rapidly acquiring the status of a fashionable mainstream concept, it is not as established as `globalisation' in the vocabulary of politicians and commentators. Here again, the contemporary debates in large part reflect different ontological and epistemological positions. In this case study, we concentrate not on the different uses of the term, although these can be significant, but rather on the contrast between MLG and its main opponent, which is liberal intergovernmentalism. A useful definition of MLG is provided by Hunt (1999): `[According to multilevel governance theories] the policy process involves the interaction between a constellation of public and private actors located at the supranational, national and sub-national level.' This interaction is usually understood as non-hierarchical and as lacking a central, predominant authority, and similar usages can be found in Marks et al. (1996) and Armstrong and Bulmer (1998). These theorists argue against the view of the EU as an international organisation whose decision-making is based predominantly on national interests determined by member states, a view known as intergovernmentalism. The intergovernmentalist perspective is closely associated with international lawyers, but an influential political analysis is provided by Andrew Moravscik (1993), who argues that the European policy process can be

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understood as a nested game played out both in the domestic politics of member states and in the international arena of the EU's institutions. While the MLG theorists derive their frameworks from institutionalist perspectives (see Chapter 4), arguing that `institutions matter' in shaping interaction, analysts such as Moravscik generally utilise rational choice perspectives (see Chapter 3 below). Both approaches would claim to be empirically grounded, but the nature of the empirical grounding differs. Most MLG theorists are realists in epistemological terms, emphasising how the continuity of rules, norms and operating procedures, and sometimes of `deep, non-observable structures', can, and does, determine the outcomes of decision-making in the long term. As such, their logic is inductive rather than deductive. Overall, MLG is not so much concerned with the debate between neo-federalists and intergovernmentalists as with the consequences of different possible forms of integration for normative issues such as democratic participation, effective government and distributive justice. In contrast, liberal intergovernmentalists seek to identify the preferences and the parameters of the individual actors (usually member states) and show how, after the event, the outcomes can be understood as the result of rational calculated behaviour. Their logic is therefore deductive: they argue from the general to the particular. Liberal intergovernmentalism is foundationalist in ontological terms and operates with a positivist epistemology. In its treatment of European integration it is clearly unsympathetic to neo-federalism and to supranationalism. The normative underpinnings of multilevel governance and intergovermentalism MLG theorists argue that, rather than conceptualising regional policy as a national issue in which the lead role is taken by the national state institutions, it should be identified as an arena in which the European Union plays an integral role in policy-making, together with the separate regional authorities and the central national institutions. In this sense, theories of multilevel governance make a distinction between `government' and `governance'. `Government', it is argued, is too narrowly concerned with the formal structures of state authority, and with the associated processes and issues, whereas `governance' is concerned with much wider notions of politics, encompassing the production, accumulation and regulation of collective goods at all levels including the international. Power relations in multilevel governance are structured by reciprocal interdependence on each other's resources, rather than on conflict over either scarcity or fundamental values. Typically, these theories argue that relations of decision-making between the various levels should be seen as

38 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science loosely interconnected rather than as tightly nested; that is, characterised by multilateral links, and non-hierarchical in form, rather than by a hierarchical chain of bilateral links in which the national state authority has a predominant role, as is the case with intergovernmental approaches. There is thus a strong normative element in multilevel governance. From describing the increased evidence of the multiplicity of decision-making forms and levels in European integration, proponents move to arguments about the value of multilevel governance in enhancing democratic legitimacy and effective decision-making under conditions of globalised political economy. In comparison with state-centred accounts, multilevel governance is said to be `closer to the people', and therefore more acceptable, and more flexible and adaptable, so better able to respond to the rapidly changing economic climate (Marks et al. 1996). The arguments against multilevel governance, if it is regarded as a policy prescription as well as empirical analysis, concentrate on two main issues (Moravscik 1993; Scharpf 1988). The first is what is known as the `joint decision trap'. This focuses upon the danger of deadlock in decisionmaking where there are many participants, interdependent arenas and a variety of possible combinations of policy-making processes. Though multilevel governance may offer the prospect of policy-making close to the people and greater legitimacy, it risks sacrificing efficiency in decisionmaking if there is no authoritative procedure for resolving disagreements among equal participants. A second criticism denies even that multilevel governance provides greater legitimacy and argues that, when the smaller units and more local levels of decision-making are included, the greater complexity of procedures results in opacity of decision-making and, therefore, in less accountability. In practice, multilevel governance can mean obscure elite-led agreements and public incomprehension. Neoliberal arguments try to resolve these problems by emphasising how the member states in the EU remain both the focus of popular legitimacy, albeit with some rebalancing towards regional authorities, and the main guarantors of effective governmental decision-making. In response to this, Marks et al. (1996) have three main criticisms of the intergovernmental approach. Underlying these disagreements is a fundamental dispute about the nature of social reality. First, positivist explanations of societal phenomena neglect the structural constraints within which individuals operate. These are varied in kind, but the most important are generally the impact of differential allocation of resources, the culturallygiven nature of the value framework within which individuals choose and the unpredictability of external factors, such as the international economic and security climate. Second, the realist perspective emphasises how the institutional frameworks have a primary effect in shaping decision-making through their

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formal rules, their informal procedures, their value structures and their effect on office-holding and internal role-oriented behaviour. In one sense, the institutions are no more than the sum of countless individual choices, but merely to state this does not get us very far. Realists seek to find ways of characterising different institutional frameworks so as to move beyond this and to introduce other levels of analysis and explanation which recognise the weight of the long-term structural and institutional context. Third, it is argued that intergovernmentalists are insufficiently critical about what time-frames are relevant and why. The term `path dependency' used in this context (Pierson 1996) does not just refer to the given nature of resource allocations at `point zero' which the researcher takes as the start. It also directs our attention to the impact of decisions prior to point zero, and of the ways in which the institutional frameworks lock actors into particular sets of choices. This implicitly asks positivists to justify why they adopt diachronic modes of explanation, which imply social understanding as a set of discrete operations in fixed points in time, as opposed to synchronic explanations, which emphasise a more continuous and contextled understanding of the social nature of time. Despite these epistemological and methodological differences, writers such as Moravscik and Scharpf (Scharpf 1988, 1997) appear to be able to integrate some of the concerns of multilevel governance into their own perspective, so that, despite the methodological differences between the positivists and realists, we can identify these as distinct strands in the study of the European policy process, marked by an attentiveness to similar policy problems and with some of the same language. The constructivist approach This is not true of the social constructivist approach (see, for example, Jùrgensen 1998; Weldes 1996; Wendt 1994). This rejects the language of causality, with which positivists and realists are content in their different ways, and in contrast, is based upon an interpretist epistemological position. Constructivists argue that, if there is a problem of increasing complexity of decision-making associated with the decline of the nation state, this complexity must be understood as an intentional social construct on the part of decision-makers, part of a set of political projects associated with responses to perceptions of external and internal constraints. The questions which arise are concerned with political decision-making as a series of attempts to resolve conflicts over meaning and identity, understood in the broadest sense. Constructivists take issue with the positivist understanding of the nature of political choice. They argue against the acceptance of individual preference as a given and instead interrogate specifically why and how preferences come to be formed and

40 Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science how these preferences and choices relate to the strategic aims of powerful interests in society. Multilevel governance then would not be seen as a set of objectively perceived phenomena, but as a normative framework which is itself part of the political conflict between the interests associated with neo-liberal economic restructuring and those seeking a more social democratic accommodation with technological change. This locates the arguments about multilevel governance within the discussion about the nature of globalisation, which we dealt with above, and in which one of the main disputes is about the underlying realities of technological economic and social change and their relationship with the discursively constructed political uses made of them within specific political projects.

Conclusion The point here is not to attempt to resolve these disputes. Rather, what we have sought to do is to show how the different approaches in different issues relate to epistemological and methodological assumptions, and to one another. The terms introduced here can be used as signposts, suggesting how we can come to terms with the deeper implications of the theories and groups of concerns which are the focus of the individual chapters which follow. One of the temptations in so doing is to attempt to find a synthesis of all the available positions, in the hope that, at some level of analysis, agreement is possible over fundamental issues. Unfortunately, experience and logic combine to warn against this temptation. These debates have been part of the intellectual and moral climate of Western thought for centuries and continue because they reflect disagreements not just about logic or technicalities but also about the proper scope of human action in society. In other words, they are questions which relate to deeprooted moral positions that may be internally coherent, but are incompatible with one another, except in so far as they all include some appeal to intellectual and ethical tolerance of diversity. In the face of these difficulties, another strategy, alluring at least to risk-averse researchers, is to avoid the issue. Far from being safe, this position is actually rather unsafe, since it does not enable one to distinguish between good and bad research and between good and bad arguments. The least one can say about these issues is that they are of sufficient importance to warrant a genuine commitment to coming to terms with them. Coming to terms with the issues requires one to think through the different arguments separately, to compare them and to evaluate them. As we argued at the beginning of this chapter, this means identifying, as far as possible, what are the epistemological and ontological underpinnings and what these imply in

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terms of argumentation, practical research method, explanatory logic and research construction. The purpose of this chapter has been to encourage this and to attempt to provide an introduction to some of the main ideas and methods involved.

Further reading . The best introductions to the philosophy of science and social science are Chalmers (1985, 1990) and Winch (1958). . For an accessible overview of ontology and epistemology, see Hay (2002). . On the positivist approach, see Kuhn (1970), Hempel (1965, 1966) or Halfpenny (1982). . On the interpretive approach, see Bevir and Rhodes (1999). . On realism, see Sayer (1992).

Author Index

Acker, J. 125, 318 Adorno, T. 55, 318 Allen, J. 123, 318 Allison. G.T. 45, 74, 318 Almond, G. 3, 4, 318 Almond, G.A. and Coleman, J.S. 297, 318 Althusser, L. 275 Archer, M.S. 279, 285±90, 291, 318 Aristotle 172 Armstrong, K. and Bulmer, S. 36, 318 Arrow, K. 66, 318 Ashe, G. et al. 193, 318 Austen-Smith, D. 85, 318 Avineri, S. and de Shalit, A. 194, 318 Ayer, A.J. 46, 64, 174±5, 319

Budge, I. and Laver, M. 45, 321 Butler, D. and Stokes, D. 214, 321 Butler, J. 112, 321

Baldwin, D. 45, 319 Barnes, S. 266, 319 Barnes, S. and Kaase, M. 45, 319 Barrett, M. 110, 319 Barry, B. 71, 89, 319 Bates, R., Greif, A., Levi, M., Rosenthal, J. and Weingast, B. 263, 319 Bauman, Z. 152, 319 Beasley, C. 109, 319 Bellamy, R. and Hollis, M. 194, 319 Bentham, J. 135, 151 Berger, P. and Luckman, T. 135±6, 152, 319 Berlin, I. 185±6, 193, 319 Berman, S. 305±7, 310, 319 Bernstein, R. 152, 320 Bevir, M. xiii, 3, 152, 320 Bevir, M. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 20, 25, 27±9, 41, 152, 320 Blalock, H.M. 64, 320 Blyth, M. xiii, 17, 266, 277, 284, 310, 320 Boix, C. 260, 320 Bromley, S. 158, 321 Bryman, A. 232, 321 Bryson, V. 130, 321 Buckler, S. xiii, 8, 13, 30, 313, 314 Budge, I. and Fairlie, D. 45, 321

Carnap, R. 64, 322 Carr, E.H. 53, 322 Castles, F. 257±8, 322 Chalmers, A. 63, 322 Chalmers, A.F. 41, 322 Champney, L. 230, 248, 322 Charlesworth, S.J. 203, 322 Clegg, S. 101, 322 Coleridge, S.T. 135, 151 Collard, D. 79, 322 Collingwood, R.G. 135±6, 152, 322 Comte, A. 46, 322 Connell, R. 123±4, 130, 323 Connolly, W. 194, 323 Coole, D. 111, 323 Corrin, C. 109, 323 Cowling, M. 151, 323 Cox, R. 72, 258, 323 Creswell, J. 239±41, 323 Crewe, I. and King, A. 200, 209, 323 Crewe, I. and Thomson, K. 209, 323 Cutright, P. 257, 323 Daly, G. 159, 323 Daniels, N. 194, 323 Denzin, N. 203, 236, 237, 323 Derrida, J. 137, 324 Dessler, D. 291, 324 Devine, F. xiii, 15±16, 203, 197, 324 Devine, F. and Heath, S. 215, 241, 247, 248, 324 Dews, P. 193, 324 Di Palma, G. 251, 324 Diamond, I. and Hartsock, N. 117, 324 Diamond, L. 257, 259, 261, 324 Dobbin, F. 310, 324 Dogan, M. 260, 324 Dowding, K. 236 Downs, A. 65±6, 67, 73, 74, 79, 85, 324 Dreyfus, H. and Rabinow, P. 152, 324

350

Author Index 351 Dunleavy, P. 89, 245±7, 324±5 Dunleavy, P. et al. 45, 325 Durkheim, EÂ. 75 Dworkin, R. 194, 325 Eckstein, H. 92, 325 Eliasoph, N. 198, 215, 325 Elster, J. 75, 325 Eribon, D. 152, 325 Esping-Anderson, G. 124, 325 Evans, G. and Norris, P. 224, 325 Finer, H. 92, 93, 326 Finkel, S.E. and Muller, E.N. 84, 326 Finnemore, M. 310, 326 Fischer, E. 171, 326 Foucault, M. 28, 119, 123, 137±9, 141, 152, 326 Fox, C. and Miller, H. 97, 98, 326 Franzosi, R. 222, 326 Frazer, E. 194, 326 Freud, S. 82 Furlong, P. xiii Gamble, A. 107, 327 Gamble, A., Marsh, D. and Tant, T. 171, 327 Gamson, W.A. 199, 327 Garrett, G. 220, 258±9, 327 Garrett, G. and Weingast, B.R. 303±4, 306, 327 Gauthier, D. 76, 327 Geertz, C. 27, 28, 135±6, 152, 327 Giddens, A. 98, 105, 273, 278±80, 284, 285, 291, 327 Gilbert, N. 215, 327 Gilligan, C. 121, 327 Gilmour, I. 143, 327 Gintis, H. 80, 327 Goldstein, G. and Keohane, R. 303±4, 310, 328 Goodin, R. 100, 105, 108, 328 Goodin, R. and Klingemann, H. 2, 3, 5, 10, 11, 90, 91, 101, 107, 108, 328 Goodin, R. and Pettit, P. 193, 328 Grafstein, R. 82, 328 Gramsci, A. 156, 158±9, 171, 328 Grant, W. and Marsh, D. 45, 328 Gray, J. 18, 328 Green, D.P. and Shapiro, I. 71, 79, 82±3, 84, 328 Greenleaf, W.H. 136, 151, 328 Gutmann, A. 194, 328

Habermas, J. 55, 182±5, 193, 328 Hague, R. et al. 267, 329 Halford, S. 125, 329 Halfpenny, P. 41, 64, 329 Hall, P. and Taylor, R. 95, 96, 106±7, 108, 329 Hall, P.A. 102, 103, 263, 300, 310, 329 Hammersley, M. 152, 232, 236, 240, 329 Hanson, R. 64, 329 Hargreaves-Heap, S., Hollis, M., Lyons, B., Sugden, R. and Weale, A. 71, 329 Harrop, M. and Miller, W.L. 74, 329 Hartsock, N. 115±16, 329 Hay, C. 8±9, 41, 156, 272, 276, 280±1, 284, 285, 291, 330 Hay, C. and Marsh, D. 33, 34±5, 330 Hay, C. and Wincott, D. 106, 330 Hayek, F.A. von 70 Hayward, J. 3, 330 Heath, A. 53, 330 Heath, A., Jowell, R. and Curtice, J. 45, 53, 330 Helco, H. and Wildavsky, A. 200, 330 Held, D. 193, 330 Held, D. et al. 33±4, 35, 330 Hempel, C. 41, 46, 52, 54, 64, 330 Hicks, A. 264±5, 330 Hindess, B. 89, 330 Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. 33, 330 Hix, S. 86, 330 Hobbes, T. 67 Hollis, M. and Lukes, S. 193, 331 Hollis, M. and Nell, E. 72, 331 Hollis, M. and Smith, S. 19±20, 23, 24, 30, 32, 331 Honig, B. 194, 331 Hopkin, J. xiii, 16, 312 Horkheimer, M. and Adorno, T. 182, 331 Howarth, D. 28, 282±3, 331 Huff, D. 230, 331 Hume, D. 19, 173±4, 331 Hunt, J. 36, 331 Huntington, S.P. 99, 297±8, 331 Husserl, E. 136, 331 Immergut, E.

102, 331

Jackson, J. 248, 332 Jackson, S. 156±7, 159, 230, 332 Janda, K. 256, 332 Janis, I.L. and Mann, L. 80, 332

352 Author Index Jay, M. 193, 332 Jenkins, K. 152, 332 Jessop, B. 55, 107, 157, 162, 171, 280±1, 283, 284, 285, 291, 332 John, P. xiv, 15±16, 24, 92, 103, 232, 316 Johnson, N. 92, 93, 332 Johnston, J. and Dolowitz, D. 156, 158, 332 Jones, K. and Jonasdottir, A. 130, 332 Jordan, G. and Maloney, W. 84, 332 Kaletsky, A. 165, 332 Kathlene, L. 125±7, 333 Katz, R. 260, 333 Kautsky, K.J. 155 Kavanagh, D. 145±6, 333 Kenney, S. 128, 333 Kenny, M. 158, 333 Keohane, R. 45, 87, 315, 333 King, A. 45, 285, 333 King, G. 64, 227, 228, 333 King, G., Keohane, R. and Verba, S. 64, 217, 333 King, G., Tomz, M. and Lee, J. 220, 333 Kingdon, J. 310, 333 Kiser, L. and Ostrom, E. 101, 334 Klein, N. 166±7, 171, 334 Kolakowski, L. 193, 334 Kuhn, T. 24, 41, 64, 334 Kukathas, C. and Pettit, P. 194, 334 Kymlicka, W. 193, 334 Lacan, J. 137, 334 Lacey, A. 64, 334 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C. 153, 162, 283, 334 Lakatos, I. 50, 69, 334 Lane, J.-E. and Ersson, S. 261, 334 Lane, R. 113, 334 Laslett, P. 172, 334 Laver, M. 89, 335 Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. 83, 335 Layder, D. 279±80, 291, 335 Leftwich, A. 9, 335 Lenin, V. 158, 171, 335 Levi, M. 263, 335 LeÂvi-Strauss, C. 275 Lewin, L. 72, 79, 335 Lewis, D.K. 76, 335 Lichbach, M.L. 266, 335

Lijphart, A. 258, 260, 335 Lipset, S.M. 250±1, 256±7, 259, 335 Locke, J. 67 Lovenduski, J. 124, 335 Lowndes, V. xiv, 5, 99, 108, 114, 296, 299, 313, 314, 335±6 Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H. 89, 336 LukaÂcs, G.S. von 155 Lupia, A. and McCubbins, M.D. 86, 336 Lyotard, J.-F. 137, 194, 336 McAdam, D. 198, 336 McAnulla, S. xiv McCarthy, T. 193, 336 Machiavelli, N. 156 MacIntyre, A. 180, 336 MacKay, F. 122, 130, 336 Mackie, T. and Marsh, D. 267, 336 Maclean, I. 89, 336 McLellan, D. 171, 336 McNamara, K.R. 310, 336 McNay, L. 152, 336 Mainwaring, S. and Scully, T. 256, 336 Mansbridge, J.J. 72, 79, 80, 89, 336±7 March, J. 72, 337 March, J. and Olsen, J. 74, 94, 96, 99, 103, 105, 108, 337 Margolis, H. 79±80, 337 Marks, G., Hooghe, E. and Blank, K. 36, 38, 337 Marquand, D. 146±7, 337 Marsh, D. xii, xiv, 8, 233, 337 Marsh, D. and Furlong, P. 11, 12, 159, 232, 240±1, 250, 285, 295, 311 Marsh, D. and Read, M. 243±5, 337 Marsh, D. and Rhodes, R.A.W. 94, 96, 97, 102 Marsh, D., Richards, D. and Smith, M. 246±7, 337 Marsh, D. and Stoker, G. xi, xii, 272 Marx, K. 30, 53, 153±5, 162, 171, 182, 305, 337 Mason, J. 202, 215, 248, 337 May, E. 244 Meehan, J. 193, 338 Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. 96, 338 Miles, M. and Huberman, A. 236, 338 Miliband, R. 158, 171, 338 Mill, J.S. 135, 252±5, 265, 338 Miller, W.L. 230, 248, 338 Moe, T.M. 72, 338

Author Index 353 Moller Okin, S. 120, 338 Monroe, K.R. 72, 89, 338 Moore, B. 251, 261±3, 338 Moore, M. 257, 338 Moravscik, A. 36±7, 39, 338 Morgenthau, H. 53, 339 Morrow, J. 89, 339 Mouffe, C. 194, 339 Mueller, D.C. 89, 339 Mulhall, S. and Swift, A. 194, 339 North, D.C. 103, 310, 339 Nozick, R. 194, 339 O'Donnell, G. et al. 251, 340 Oakeshott, M. 135±6, 143, 340 Offe, C. 100, 340 Ohmae, K. 33, 340 Okin, S. 194, 340 Olson, M. 66, 79, 299, 340 Ordeshook, P.C. 77, 89, 340 Ostrom, E. 73, 84, 87, 102, 340 Ostrom, E., Gardner, R. and Walker, J. 73, 340 Outhwaite, W. 193, 340 Padgett, D. 239±40, 340 Panebianco, A. 252, 340 Pareto, V. 53, 340 Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. 45, 340 Pateman, C. 121, 194, 340±1 Pattie, C. and Johnston, R. 243, 341 Pennings, P., Keman, H, and Kleinnijenuis, J. 230, 248, 267, 341 Peters, G. 92, 95, 96, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 108, 252, 253, 341 Phillips, A. 120, 129, 130, 194, 341 Pierre, J. 100, 341 Plant, R. 193, 341 Plato 2, 172, 174 Polsby, N. 93, 341 Popkin, S. 85, 341 Popper, K. 48, 50, 52, 161, 341 Poulantzas, N. 156, 161±2, 171, 341 Powell, R. 69, 341 Pridham, G. 251, 342 Pridham, G. and Lewis, P. 251, 342 Pringle, R. and Watson, S. 117, 342 Przeworski, A. 74, 342 Przeworski, A. and Teune, H. 254, 257, 258, 265, 342 Putnam, H. 295±6, 342

Quattrone, G.A. and Tversky, A. 82, 342 Quine, W. 23±4, 30, 342 Ragin, C. 252, 264, 342 Randall, V. xiv, 5, 9, 10, 14, 30, 312±13, 314, 342 Randall, V. and Waylen, G. 130 Rasmusen, E. 89, 342 Rawls, J. 67, 186±9, 194, 342 Raz, J. 194, 342 Read, M. xiv Read, M. and Marsh, D. 16, 314 Rhodes, R.A.W. xiv, 91, 92, 93, 94, 108, 152, 342±3 Rhodes, R.A.W. and Bevir, M. 11±12, 233, 236, 281, 312 Rhodes, R.A.W. and Dunleavy, P. 94, 343 Rich, A. 111, 343 Riker, W. 77±8, 343 Riker, W. and Ordeshook, P.C. 89, 343 Risse-Kappen, T. 310, 343 Rittberger, V. 96, 102, 343 Robinson, N. 163, 343 Robson, W. 92, 93, 343 Rokkan, S. 262, 343 Rorty, R. 137, 194, 343 Rosenau, J. 45, 343 Rosenau, P.M. 152, 343 Rosenberg, S. 80, 343 Roseneil, S. 198, 215, 343 Rothstein, B. 93, 100, 102, 103, 344 Rubin, G. 111, 344 Ruddick, S. 111, 344 Rudner, R. 63, 344 Rueschemeyer, D. et al. 261±2, 344 Sahlins, M. 79, 344 Sandel, M. 189, 194, 344 Sanders, D. xv, 14, 23, 24±6, 45, 201, 219, 235, 311±12, 313, 316, 344 Sapiro, V. 116±17, 344 Sarlvik, B. and Crewe, I. 53, 344 Sartori, G. 254, 344 Saussure, F. de 274±5 Savage, M. and Witz, A. 125, 130, 344 Sayer, A. 41, 291, 344 Scharpf, W. 39, 344±5 Schlick, M. 64, 345 Sears, D.O. and Funk, C.L. 79, 345 Self, P. 72, 345

354 Author Index Sened, I. 87±8, 345 Shepsle, K. and Bonchek, M.S. 87, 89, 345 Sikkink, K. 266, 345 Silverman, D. 152, 215, 248, 345 Simon, H.A. 72, 80, 171, 345 Skinner, C. 230, 345 Skocpol, T. 75, 346 Smelser, N. 261, 346 Smith, A. 67, 144 Smith, M.J. 278, 314, 346 Smith, S. 30, 315, 346 Soros, G. 165±6, 346 Spencer, H. 151 Squires, J. 127, 129, 130, 346 Steinmo, S. 102, 263, 346 Stoker, G. xv, 346 Stone, D. 310, 346 Strange, S. 171 Tanenbaum, E. and Scarbrough, E. 228, 230, 346 Tant, T. 159 Taylor, C. 193, 194, 346 Taylor, M. 75, 347 Thomas, D. 63, 347 Thompson, J. and Held, D. 193, 347 Tronto, J. 121±2, 347 Tsebelis, G. 263, 347 Tsebelis, G. and Garrett, G. 86, 347 Tufte, E. 230, 248, 347 Ullmann-Margalit, E. 76, 347

Vanhanen, T. 251, 257, 260, 347 Verba, S., Schlozman, K. and Brady, H. 222, 347 Walby, S. 121, 348 Walt, S.M. 83, 348 Walzer, M. 194, 348 Ward, H. xv, 5, 235, 277, 302, 313, 314 Waylen, G. 130, 348 Weale, A. 260, 348 Weaver, R. and Rockman, B. 102, 348 Weber, M. 53, 149, 155 Weingast, A. 86, 348 Weldon, T.D. 175, 177, 179, 348 White, H. 137, 348 White, S. 193, 348 Whiteley, P. and Seyd, P. 46, 56±62, 349 Whiteley, P., Seyd, P. and Richardson, J. 84, 349 Willetts, D. 144, 349 Williams, M. and May, T. 202, 203, 349 Wilson, G. 45, 349 Wilson, W. 93, 349 Winch, P. 41, 63, 77, 177±80, 193, 349 Wittgenstein, L. 176±8, 349 Wittman, D. 80, 349 Wonnacott, T. and Wonnacott, R. 230, 349 Young, I.

194, 349

Zey, M. 72, 349 Ziegler, J. 310, 349

Subject Index

abortion 120, 242, 244, 288 aesthetics 46, 51 Africa 292, 297 agencies 246 agents 298, 300, 301, 305, 306, 309 Agreement on Investment 167 altruism 73, 79±80, 83, 84 disguised forms of self-interest 80 reciprocal 80 American Political Science Review 249 Analytical Narratives (Bates et al. 1998) 263, 319 anthropology 135, 136, 139, 142, 197, 275 anti-foundationalism 5, 7, 8, 9, 11±12, 15, 18±19, 20, 26, 29±30, 33, 35, 36, 139±48, 155, 193, 232, 233, 236, 314 appearance and reality 154 Ashdown, J.J.D. (Lord Ashdown) 210, 211 assertion 294 attitudes 45, 207 Australia 124, 168 authority 175, 179, 184

black economy 259 Blair, A.C.L. 35, 198, 209, 211 Boolean algebra 264±5 bounded rationality 72±3, 82, 84 brand names 36, 166 Brazil 164 Britain see United Kingdom British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) 147 British Election Surveys (BES) 207±8, 214, 224 budgets 98, 100, 299 Bush, George W. 271

banking 33, 158, 164, 238, 300 behaviouralism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13±14, 15, 23, 24, 25±6, 45±64, 65, 90±1, 94, 107, 132, 137, 176, 235, 236, 263, 313 philosophical origins 64 theoretical concepts and empirical indicators 60 see also post-behaviouralism beliefs 95, 131, 132±3, 134±5, 139, 140, 141, 149±50, 154, 179, 180, 188, 200, 306 tripartite distinction 303 Berlin Wall 273 bias 117, 201, 204, 205±6, 219, 307 selection bias 265 binary opposition 282 biological determinism 111, 127 reductionism 111

cabinet 100, 145 capital 90, 160, 162, 166 financial 166 industrial and banking 161 capital punishment 244 capitalism 78±9, 110, 115, 122±3, 142, 147, 153, 154, 157, 161, 166, 167, 181, 182, 256, 298, 305±6 advanced 55 Asian 164 casino 165, 171 contemporary 163 contradictions 155, 171 exploitative 171 global 8 internationalisation 157 US-style 164 case studies 32±40, 75, 81, 106, 130, 207±15, 242±7, 263 cathexis 124 causality 21±2, 23, 30, 31, 47, 63, 78, 107, 154, 160, 178±9, 182, 184, 223, 224±5, 232, 253, 257, 258, 263, 264, 273, 274, 276±7, 305, 306, 312 see also explanation central conflation 279 central government 99, 200, 246 change 293, 301±3, 304±9 chief officers (local government) 125 children 111, 115, 117, 120, 130, 168, 212

355

356 Subject Index China 262 church 121, 134, 139 citizens 36, 76, 85 civic groups 198, 215 civil association 143 civil servants 238, 299 civil service/bureaucracy 67, 86, 93, 94, 124±5, 133, 145, 147, 218, 245±7, 262, 277, 298, 299 civil society 101, 119 class 7, 11, 74, 78, 102, 112, 116, 117, 118, 123, 124, 133, 138, 150, 154, 155, 156±7, 161, 167, 178, 181, 184, 209±10, 213, 219, 251, 284, 294 climate change 286 Cold War 296 aftermath 164 collective action 66, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 87, 96, 104±5, 299, 302±3, 304, 308±9 collective benefits 57, 58, 59, 60 collective values 163 collectivism 136, 144 Colne Valley 213 Colombia 260 common sense 90, 92, 136, 221±2, 273, 274 `common-pool resource' (CPR) problems 301 communism 95, 150, 153, 163, 262, 298 Communist Manifesto (Marx and Engels 1848) 171, 337 Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 158 communitarianism 188±90, 192, 194 comparative methods/analysis 16, 34, 40±1, 101, 102, 104, 108, 142, 151, 249±67, 297, 312 case studies 75 `method of agreement' 253, 255 `method of concomitant variables' 253±4 `method of difference' 252±3 `most similar' and `most different' 254±5 qualitative comparative strategies 260±1 quantitative comparative strategies 255±60 quantitative versus qualitative 261±5 `conceptions of the good' 188, 190, 191 `conceptions of the right' 188, 190 conceptualisation 259±60

consensus 97, 99, 143, 145, 185, 186, 189, 191±2 end of 145±8 Conservative Party 58±9, 60, 61, 77, 143, 144, 200, 208±14, 244, 289±90 consistency 141, 142 constitutions 4, 5, 90±1, 93, 102, 183, 296, 308 constraints 233, 235, 238, 243, 275±6, 279, 280, 291, 300, 301 constructivism 39±40, 310 content analysis 218, 219, 235, 237, 238 context 218, 221 contract 134, 186 conventional wisdom 296±9, 310 conventions 78±9 `core executive' studies 94 critical realism 7, 285 critical theory 180, 181±5, 192, 193 Cuban Missile Crisis 74 cultural conditioning 288, 289 elaboration 288, 289 reproduction 288, 289 culture 18, 103, 111, 115, 116, 121, 125, 147, 160, 166, 180, 190, 192, 197±8, 256, 266, 282, 287±90, 291, 312 currency/foreign exchange 165, 259, 264 customs 103, 104 data

29, 52, 58, 81, 84, 88, 149, 202, 204, 205, 207, 217, 221, 224±5, 230, 232, 234±5, 239±40, 241, 242, 245, 258±9, 260 binary 264±5 collection 15±16, 218±20 field notes 198 quantitative and qualitative 21±2, 31 `soft' 247 decision-making 80±1, 82, 96, 98, 100, 103, 116, 273 deconstruction 150, 203 deductive approach 37, 62, 95, 232, 234 democracy 13, 37, 45, 66, 76, 85, 87, 92, 95, 118, 123, 146, 179, 183, 256, 262 Democracy and Participation programme 215 democratisation 250±1, 256±8, 259±60, 262 Denmark 131±2 deontological theory 184±5, 193 and value pluralism 185±92

Subject Index 357 description: power of 220±2 Designing Social Inquiry (King, Keohane and Verba 1994) 217, 333 determinism 106, 121, 123, 154, 155±6, 157, 159, 161, 162, 167, 170, 263, 267, 272±3 development 292, 297±8 developmental state 147±8 devolution 94±5 Devon West and Torridge 212 dialectics 155, 181±5, 278±81, 285, 288, 290, 291 strategic±relational approach 280±1 structuration theory (Giddens) 278±80 dialogue 316±17 dictatorship 250, 256, 257, 262, 297 difference 190±1 disability 168 discourses 26, 28, 35, 36, 51, 77, 131, 138±9, 140, 141, 159, 161, 164, 165, 170, 233, 235, 282±5, 312 discursive conditions 192 construction 159, 160±1 selectivity 284 division of labour 124 domestic 125 sexual 115 division of powers 102 divorce 242 dogmatism 294, 295 domestic violence 120 dominant ideology thesis 288 double hermeneutic 19, 26, 28 economic crisis 155 depression/recession 273, 301±2, 305±6 development 250±1, 256, 259±60, 262, 263 liberalisation 279 structure 251 economics 65, 299, 314, 317 economism 154, 155±6, 157, 159, 161, 162, 170, 171 economy 209, 211, 213, 218, 229, 238, 256, 271, 272, 305 education 167, 168, 169, 210, 211, 212, 213, 223, 224, 237, 238, 255, 257, 260, 286, 298 fee-paying 168

elections 216, 224 electoral systems 100, 216, 258 electorates 93 eleventh of September (2001) 165, 290 elites/elitism 45, 77, 110, 112, 169, 183, 197 emancipatory knowledge (Habermas) 183±4 empirical institutionalists 96±7 questions 25 theory 47 empiricism 6, 11, 13, 20, 22±3, 25, 45±7, 49, 50, 51, 52±4, 56, 58, 61±6, 71, 79, 81, 83±4, 86, 88, 95, 109, 157, 173, 175±6, 177±9, 184, 185, 197, 202, 203, 205, 232, 234, 250, 252±5, 257, 259, 262, 265, 272, 291, 293, 295, 310 employment 191, 279, 281, 286 white-collar 158 enabling 233, 279, 301 enterprise association 143 environment 66, 87, 271, 272 epiphenomena 276, 288 epistemes (Foucault) 138, 140 epistemology xi, 1, 4, 11, 12, 17±41, 48, 71, 108, 109, 131, 154, 172±3, 197, 200±4, 215, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 237, 239, 240±1, 242, 245, 247, 265, 282±3, 292, 293, 294±5, 300, 307, 308 approaches 22±32 case studies 32±40 conclusion 311±17 definition 18±19 feminist critique 114±18 importance 21±2 Marx 159±60 scientific versus hermeneutic approaches 19±20 `a skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311 equality 98, 186, 190, 191 essentialism 18, 111, 112, 115, 127, 140, 148, 154 strategic 130 ethic of care 121±2, 130 ethic of justice 121 ethical principles 184 ethical solidarity 188 ethics 46 ethnocentricity 312 ethnography 27, 117, 137, 152, 197, 206 four main characteristics 136

358 Subject Index ethnology 135±7, 150 Europe 158, 256, 265, 300, 313, 314 East and Central 95 Eastern 163 European Commission 86 European Community 303±4 European Court of Justice 279 Cassis de Dijon ruling (1979) 304 European Parliament 86 European Single Market 303±4 European Union (EU) 36±7, 37±8, 45, 86±7, 164, 211, 213, 258, 279 evolution 73, 80 expected utility 81, 84 experience 111, 115, 121, 138±9, 140, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 207, 283±4 explanation 47, 50, 54±5, 55±6, 75, 84, 87, 88, 120, 131±2, 136, 148, 149, 151, 180, 201, 232, 234, 252, 254±5, 264, 272, 282, 284, 290, 296, 304 see also causality fairness 186±7, 191 false consciousness 77, 180 falsifiability 6, 48±50, 63, 71, 83, 103, 150, 161, 174, 204, 217, 265, 295, 312, 316 see also testing family 79, 119, 120, 154, 213, 288 fascism 150, 262, 305 feminism 1, 5, 7, 9, 10±11, 12, 15, 18, 30, 109±30, 156±7, 158, 185, 191, 194, 273, 278, 314 general: gendering the state 122±7; internal debates 109, 110±13; methodology and epistemology 114±18; `not bold enough' 128±9; race 112; reconceptualising politics 118±22 types: black 112, 115; cultural 117, 121; liberal 110, 112, 116, 117, 118, 120, 123, 312; Marxist 110±12, 114, 115, 118±19, 122±3, 156±7, 312; materialist 159; postmodern 116, 124; post-structuralist 117, 130; Radical 110±12, 115, 117±23, 312; second-wave 111, 114±15, 120; socialist 110, 118, 123, 157; standpoint 114, 115, 116, 117, 313

femocrats 124 `file drawer problem' 227, 228 financial crisis (global 1997±) 164 financial markets 31, 33, 35, 300 financial sector 158 Financial Times 167 focal points 304, 306 focus groups 15, 27, 197, 198±9 foundationalism 11, 18, 20, 23, 28, 30±1, 33, 37, 137, 154, 187, 188, 189±90, 202, 232, 236, 315 see also positivism France 93, 102, 168, 262, 263, 265, 313 free markets 144, 146, 147±8, 164, 165, 254 market forces 163 free trade 253±4 free will 272±3 freedom/liberty 143, 175, 186, 187, 190 Freedom House 257 Freedom Summer project 198 functional analysis 76 functional responses 87 functionalism 92, 161, 300, 308±9 funding 226, 234, 235±6, 242, 265 game theory 66, 71, 74, 80, 83, 85, 88, 89, 263, 299 evolutionary 73 strategy equilibrium 68±9, 70, 85 games 176±7, 178 gatekeeping 315±16 Gates, B. 166 `gender' 111 gender 18, 74, 111, 112, 116, 117, 123, 124±5, 155, 156±7, 158, 161, 167, 168, 169±70, 178, 191, 233, 314 `gender regime' (Connell) 123±4 general trends (academic Holy Grail) 249 generalisability 207, 241, 248, 255, 263, 312, 317 generalisation 263 geographic location 74 Germany 93, 131±2, 168, 181, 262, 265, 313 Social Democratic Party (SPD) 305±6, 307 glass ceiling 275, 283 globalisation 31, 32±6, 40, 157±8, 160, 235, 238, 258, 271, 286 cultural 33, 35±6 economic 32±3

Subject Index 359 first-wave theorists 33 markets 165 political economy 38 protesters 166±7 sceptics 33±4 second-wave theorists 33 third-wave theorists 33±4 governance 33±4, 37, 92, 100, 170 Governing the Economy (Hall 1986) 263, 329 government 37, 92, 136, 144 advisers 238 coalitions 83 structures 90 governments 9, 10, 31, 35, 243, 299, 300 marginal seats 224 Great Depression 296, 308 Green Party 208 Greenham 198, 215 gross domestic product (GDP) 257, 259, 261 groups 272, 276, 278, 286±7, 288 guillotine (House of Commons) 243 habit 103±4 Hansard 243 health 102, 168, 210, 211, 213, 238 hedge funds 165 Hegelianism 139 hermeneutics 19±20, 27, 28, 51, 132, 135±7, 139, 150, 152, 293 heuristics 69, 72, 73, 81, 235 Himmler, H. 131 historical institutionalism 92, 94, 96, 101, 104, 105, 106, 261, 263, 265, 293, 299, 300±1, 302±3, 304, 309, 310, 313 ideas 305±7 historical materialism 294 historicism 92 history 86, 116, 121, 124, 129, 132, 135, 138, 145, 151, 181, 273, 313, 317 end of 164 historical stories 148 Marxist theory 155 History of the Human Sciences (journal) 193 Hitler, A. 131, 305, 306 holism 261 holistic approach 199, 202 homosexuality 113, 242, 244, 289±90

House of Commons 169, 242±5 filibustering 243±4 Second Reading debates 243, 244 Third Reading debates 244 House of Lords 243, 290 households 220 housework 259 human agency 77, 105, 106±7, 138, 139±40, 141, 154±5, 160, 161±2, 170, 187 Mrs Thatcher 146 see also structure and agency human condition 182, 188, 189, 192, 291 Human Development Index (UNDP) 257 human/civil rights 133±4, 198, 257, 303, 313 Hungary 158 hyperglobalists 33, 34 hypothesis 22 ideal speech situation (Habermas) 183 ideal types 149 idealism 27, 135, 145, 155 ideas 2, 9, 131, 135, 151, 155, 162, 234, 266, 283±4, 285, 287±90, 291, 292±310 explaining stability and change 301±3 historical institutionalism 305±7 rationalism 303±4 role in explaining political phenomena xi see also institutions and ideas Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) 303±4, 310, 328 identity 56, 61, 77, 78, 83, 95, 100, 112, 124, 127, 189±90, 192, 194, 281 ideology 56, 57±8, 60, 61, 76±8, 85, 120, 122, 123, 133, 136, 143, 150, 161, 165, 180, 181, 182, 262, 275, 288, 299, 306 end of 164 idiographic studies 249, 252, 263 incentives 95, 100 income 168, 169 independent definition 48±9 India 137, 262 indicators 59±61 individual benefits 57, 58, 60, 61 individual costs 57, 58, 60, 61

360 Subject Index individualism 144, 163, 308±9 methodological 75 possessive 147 reductionist 147 individuals 10, 66, 70, 76, 78, 80, 84, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 188, 189, 191, 255, 256, 258, 272, 274, 276±8, 281, 283, 286±7, 288, 294, 302, 306, 307, 309 Indonesia 164 inductive reasoning 37, 83, 232, 234 inductivism 52, 54 industrialisation 257, 262, 300 inequality 157, 161, 162, 163 inflation 67, 133, 146, 149, 238, 252, 281 information 84±5, 85±6, 95, 299, 301 false disclosure 85 private 85 instinct 277±8 Institute for Social Research (Frankfurt 1923±) 181, 193 institutional theory 314 institutionalism 1, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 23, 37, 90±108, 296±7, 313 descriptive±inductive method 95, 102 examples 93 historical±comparative method 92±3 old 296, 308, 317 see also new institutionalism institutions 2, 8, 9, 16, 38±9, 84, 86±8, 98±9, 100±1, 101±2, 103±6, 108, 110, 129, 132, 145, 149±50, 154, 170, 258, 263, 272, 276, 286 formal and informal conceptions 98±9 genesis and transformation 104±6 holistic and disaggregated conceptions 100±1 and ideas 292±310 international 271 not independent, but embedded 101 static and dynamic conceptions 99 see also institutionalism; new institutionalism instrumentalism 123 intellectual imperialism 293 intellectuals 156 intentionalism 106, 276±8, 279, 285, 287±8, 290±1 `inter-coder reliability scores' 219 interaction: institutions and individuals 102

interest groups 10, 45, 86, 244, 273 pressure groups 102, 289 interest rates 132±3 interests 31, 53±4, 94, 95, 100, 117, 121, 188, 281, 286 intergovernmental relationships 100 intergovernmentalism 36±9, 86 international institutionalism 96 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 165 international relations (IR) 53, 66, 81, 85, 87, 96, 102, 291, 303, 310, 314 gatekeeping 315 International Studies Association (USA) 315 internet 167, 227 interpretation 25±6 see also hermeneutics interpretive theory 1, 5, 11±12, 19±20, 20, 21±5, 26±30, 31±3, 35±6, 39, 41, 71, 114, 131±52, 160, 176±80, 193, 201, 241, 295±6, 312±17 intersubjectivity 70±1 interviews 15, 23, 27, 197±200, 201, 205±6, 207, 208±15, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238±9, 240, 243, 246, 247, 275, 281, 283 irrationalism 141 IR see international relations Islam 68 Italian Socialist Party (PSI) 256 Japan 164, 168, 255, 258, 262 Jews 131±2 joint decision trap 38 journals 84, 217, 220, 226±8, 230 judiciary 93 justice 13 juvenile delinquency 113 Kennedy, J.F. 74 Keynesianism 102, 147 kin altruism 80 Kinnock, N. 209 kinship 275 knowledge 167, 170, 296 see also epistemology labour 90, 161, 166, 181, 184, 300 Labour Government (1977) 243 Labour Party 58±9, 60, 61, 132, 169, 200, 208±14, 244, 254

Subject Index 361 language 28, 138, 176±9, 183, 184, 256, 265, 275, 282 games 177, 178, 179 gendered 234, 235 racially inspired 235 terminology 64 Language, Truth and Logic (Ayer 1936/1971) 174 Latin America 114, 164, 256±7, 297 law/legislation 87, 92, 102, 132, 154, 236, 296, 308, 313, 317 law-courts 94, 169 laws (scientific) 6, 12, 232, 251±2 lawyers 36, 92, 94 leadership 45, 209, 211, 213, 275 legal systems 90 legislative coalitions 66 legislatures/parliaments 93, 94, 145, 147, 169, 224, 246, 305 lesbianism 111 Liberal Democrat Party 208, 210±14 liberal democratic reformism 93 liberal universalism 150 liberal±communitarian debate 194 liberalism 67, 77, 144±5, 153, 186, 191±2, 194 libertarianism 189, 194 life expectancy 257 life histories 235 life-chances 9 life-saving 277±8 lifestyle 286 linguistics 275 literacy 257 Liverpool 210 local government 125, 147, 200 Local Government Act (1988), Section 28 289±90 logical empiricism see logical positivism logical positivism 46, 172±6, 177, 179, 185, 192, 193, 314 lone parents 168 Long-Term Capital Management Fund (LTCMF) 165 Madeira 255 Major, J. 209, 213 majority, size of 233 manufacturing 158, 259 March of Dimes (USA) 302 marriage 24, 134, 138

Marxism xi, 1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 31, 66, 139, 153±71, 181, 184, 273, 275, 294±5, 305, 307 classical 153±6 contemporary 159±63 economic, social and political change 157±9 `flexibility' 163 importance 163±70 `irresolvable dualism' 155 surviving collapse of communism 163 theoretical critiques 156±7 utility 167 see also feminism; neo-liberalism masculinity 130 material reality 149±50 materialism 154±5, 155±6, 157, 159, 161±2, 170 mathematics 173 mean values 221 meaning 62, 77, 116, 131, 134±5, 136, 138, 151, 170, 175, 176, 177, 180, 184, 199, 207, 232, 316 see also understanding media 14, 86 newspapers 222, 292, 293 media information 199 median (middle observation) 221 Members of Parliament 218, 242±5, 289 Men are from Mars and Women are from Venus (Gray 1992) 18, 328 mentalities 141 meta-narrative (world-view) 155 meta-theoretical concepts 287 metaphysics 23, 46, 174±6, 179, 181, 184, 193 methodological individualism 88 methodology 15±16, 30±1, 34, 83, 90, 92, 235, 240±1, 247, 293, 294±5 conclusion 311, 312, 314 economics 65 feminist critique 114±18 see also comparative methods; qualitative methods; quantitative methods micro-practices (Foucault) 119, 139, 141 microeconomics 67 Microsoft 166 middle class/bourgeoisie 133, 210, 214, 262 miners 210 ministers 238, 243 misogyny 113±14

362 Subject Index Mississippi 198 mode (most frequent value) 221 models 11, 12, 69±70, 73, 75, 78, 79±80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 102, 105, 178, 217, 299 bootstrapping 229 bureau-shaping (Dunleavy) 245±6 general incentives 56±7 linear additive 58 logocentric 185, 191 male breadwinner 124 masculine behavioural 118 non-parametric 217 regression 225, 228 social±economic status (SES) 222, 224 spatial 83 Westminster 147 modernisation 262, 298 modernism 202 monetarism 102, 146 money 167, 170 monists 295 Monte Carlo simulation 229 moral arguments 51 moral nihilism 192 morphogenesis 285±90 morphostasis 287 multiculturalism 191±2, 194 multilevel governance (MLG) 36±9, 39±40 multinational corporations 33, 45, 166±7, 171 multiple regression 223 multivariate analysis 216, 224, 225±8 Murdoch, R. 165 Mussolini, B. 158 narratives 28, 29, 134, 142, 143±8, 199, 312 Nash equilibria 73 nation states 32±3, 36±8, 39, 45, 55, 96, 266, 303±4 nationalisation 210 natural law 179, 188 natural liberty (Adam Smith) 144 natural selection 73 natural structures 24 Nazis/Nazism 131±2, 305 neo-functionalism 86 neo-institutionalism 74 neo-liberalism 35, 38, 40, 67, 70, 164±7, 235, 315

neo-Marxism 90±1, 288 neo-realism 315 nested games 37 Netherlands 168, 313 network institutionalism 96, 97, 99 New Conservatism 144 new information 81 new institutionalism 86, 90±108, 299, 308, 313 approach 94±7 contribution to `multi-theoretic research' 108 core features 97±101 dilemmas 101±7 `epistemic gain' 108 `organising perspective' rather than a `theory' 107 points of departure 97 varieties 95, 96, 102 see also institutionalism New Labour government (1997±) 118 new public management 93±4 New Right 70, 146, 163 New York: Waldorf Hotel 280 New Zealand 168 News International Group 165 Next Steps agencies 99, 246 nihilistic irrationalism 139 nobility 262 nomothetic studies 249, 263 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 166±7 non-positivism 232, 233, 235, 239, 240±1, 242, 245, 316±17 normative institutionalism 95±6, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105 compatibility with rational choice approach 106±7 normative theory/approach 1, 6±7, 8, 13±15, 22±3, 25, 30, 37±9, 40, 51, 67, 72±3, 79, 80, 82, 83, 92, 95, 121, 123, 132, 172±94, 313, 314 norms 10, 75±6, 95, 96, 103, 105, 182, 183, 184, 190, 192, 266 conventional forms of behaviour 75 non-instrumental 193 Northampton North 210±11, 212 Northern Ireland 292 Norway 168 objectivity 22, 26, 28, 29, 116, 139, 142, 149, 159, 174, 175, 184, 185, 201, 205±6, 236

Subject Index 363 observation 22, 23±4, 25±6, 30, 45, 46±7, 52, 53±4, 54±5, 59, 197, 200, 237 occupation 178 One Nation Toryism 143, 144 ontology xi, 1, 4, 8±9, 11, 17±41, 70, 71, 103, 107, 111, 154, 197, 232, 234, 240±1, 247, 265, 266, 287, 292±6, 300, 301, 302, 304, 306 approaches 22±32 case studies 32±40 conclusion 311±17 definition 18 facilitates adjudication between competing theories 307 importance 21±2 positivist, realist and interpretist positions 20 progress in political science 307±10 scientific versus hermeneutic approaches 19±20 `a skin, not a sweater' 17, 21, 311 social 106 open government 200 operationalisation 59, 61, 62, 201 opinion 85±6, 135, 199 opinion polls 198, 199, 213, 238 oppression 111, 116, 189, 190, 191 ordinary least squares (OLS) 217, 225±8 disadvantages 228±9 multivariate regression analysis 244 r-squares 225, 228 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 167, 261 organisations 97±8, 101, 117 outcomes 35, 37, 57, 68, 69, 74, 87, 111, 160, 162, 167, 170, 203, 257, 262, 263, 266, 272, 286, 293, 298, 304 Oxbridge 168 Oxford West and Abingdon 211 parliamentary procedures 296 parliamentary systems 102 participant observation 23, 27, 197±8, 201, 206, 235, 237, 239 path dependency 39 patriarchy 18, 20, 110, 115, 118, 120±1, 122±3, 273, 275, 283 male domination 115 male power (entrenched) 112 pauperisation 294 peasant communities 75, 262

pension systems 299 personal economic expectations 238 phenomenology 132, 135 philosophy 23, 30, 32, 82, 132, 151, 174±8, 272, 282, 314, 317 permanent task 186 philosophy of history 152 philosophy of science 41, 63 pluralism 66, 153, 162, 167, 190, 194, 277, 278, 293, 314±15, 316 policy-making 14, 100, 102, 128, 160, 245±6 path-dependent 101 policy networks 94, 99 polio 302 `political', the 109, 118, 130, 296 political activism 46, 56±62 business cycle 67 context 56, 58, 60, 61 correctness 204 `dispossessed' 203 efficacy 57 participation 23, 237, 316 parties see political parties philosophy see political philosophy science see political science Political Man (Lipset 1959) 250±1, 256±7, 259, 335 political parties 45, 53, 73, 77, 83, 85, 93, 156, 205, 208±15, 218, 219, 220, 233, 254, 256, 257±8, 300, 301, 305 discipline 242±3 emotional attachment 57 governing 238 manifestos 216 membership 200 officials 200 voting behaviour in House of Commons 244±5 political philosophy 6±7, 13±15, 179, 180, 186, 188, 193 `death' 172±6 political science xi, 1±16, 197, 251 approaches 1, 6±7 basic questions 3 boundaries of discipline 119, 122, 125, 128, 129 conclusion 311±17 dialogue 4, 12, 14, 316±17 diversity (broad church) 3±8, 311, 313±15 internationalisation 2

364 Subject Index political science (cont.) mainstream critique of rational choice theory 82±4 meta-theoretical challenges 2, 9 methods 2, 15±16 scientific approach 11±12 subject matter 8±11 theory and practice 12±15 see also politics Political Science Association (USA 1903±) 2 Political Studies Association (UK 1950±) 2 politics 215 avoidance 198, 215 connecting to the world of 12±15 feminist perspective 118±22 practice of 6±7 see also political science positivism 11±13, 19±20, 20, 21, 22±6, 28, 30±3, 36±7, 38, 39, 41, 46±8, 51, 52, 64, 114, 116±18, 135±7, 159±60, 161, 173, 182, 200±2, 216, 232±5, 239±42, 245, 247, 248, 250, 265, 266, 295 conclusion 311±17 criticism of interpretist position 27 criticisms 23±4 reformulation in light of interpretist critiques 24±5 post-behaviouralism 24±5, 51, 54, 62±3 post-positivism 24±6 post-structuralism 27±8, 117, 132, 135, 137±9, 139±41, 150, 151 feminist 112, 115, 116 postmodernism 27±8, 29, 30, 116, 124, 132, 135, 137±9, 139±41, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 189±92, 194, 202±4, 236, 290±1, 314 `structure±agency' debate 281±5 poverty 164, 168, 169 power 9, 10, 37, 91, 95, 97, 100±1, 102, 104, 106, 110, 113, 119, 123±4, 129, 130, 145, 146, 147, 157, 167, 170, 200, 203, 234, 278, 288 systemic 90 prediction 201 Preface to the Critique of Political Economy (Marx 1859) 154 preferences 134±5, 234, 306 presidential systems 102 privacy 120

private property 87±8, 154 private sector (economy) 120, 164 privatisation 94±5, 146, 209 probability 225±6, 228 production 33, 157, 184 means/mode of 138, 154, 155 professions 118, 125 prospect theory 81 protectionism 252±3 protest movements 167, 273 riots 45 psychology 65, 79±82, 121, 228, 271 public administration 90, 93 choice theory 66±7, 277 corporations 93 opinion 10 policy 257, 258, 299, 310 ±private partnerships 210 ±private spheres (of life) 5, 7, 110, 118, 119±20, 121, 122, 128, 129, 157, 191: `personal is political' 9, 10±11, 119 sector 120, 146, 158, 164 spending 218, 238, 245, 247 qualitative methods xi, 2, 15, 21±2, 27, 31, 48, 58±9, 64, 197±215, 216±17, 218, 221±2, 223, 227, 229, 251, 263, 264±5, 267, 294, 314 case study 207±15 comparative strategies 260±1 criticisms 204±7, 214±15 generalisability 207 interpretation 206±7 objectivity and bias 205±6 representativeness and reliability 205 quantitative methods xi, 2, 15, 21±2, 23, 27, 31, 48, 64, 116, 128, 173, 200±1, 202, 204, 205, 207, 215, 216±30, 251, 263, 264±5, 267, 312, 314 comparative strategies 255±60 quantitative and qualitative methods (combined) 231±48 false dichotomy? 231±5 modes 239±40 move towards methodological pluralism 235±6 triangulation 237, 238±9 why and how 237±40 questionnaires 198, 201, 220, 233, 234, 238, 317

Subject Index 365 race 112, 117, 124, 133, 155, 161, 167, 168±9, 169±70, 190 ethnic categories 256 racism 221, 282 randomness 225, 229 rational choice institutionalism 95±6, 97, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104±5, 300±1 compatibility with normative approach 106±7 rational choice theory 1, 4±5, 6, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 37, 56±7, 61, 65±89, 90±1, 94, 95, 132, 137, 224, 234, 235, 263, 266, 277, 293, 294, 298±9, 300±1, 302±3, 304, 306, 307, 308±9, 313±14, 317 cooptation of ideas 310 feminist critique 116 information 84±6 institutional 86±8 psychologists' critique 79±82 Rawls 186±8 sociological critique 74±9, 88 rational institutionalism 300±1 rationalism 136, 263, 301, 303±4 rationality 139, 140±1, 185 Reaganomics 67 real world 5, 11, 18, 19, 28, 35, 62, 63, 149, 154, 156, 159±60, 163, 177, 203, 236, 283, 297, 299, 305, 308 realism 11±12, 20, 22±3, 25, 26, 30±2, 33, 34, 35, 36±7, 38±9, 41, 154, 159±60, 233, 247, 292, 313, 314, 316±17 critical 160 criticism of interpretist position 27 modern critical realism 31 reductionism 70±1, 88, 93, 94, 103, 185, 285, 287±8 economic 149, 150 Referendum Party 212 reflexivity 24, 31, 105, 160, 170, 206, 232, 280±1 regime theory 91 regional policy 36 regionalisation 33 regionalism 35 regression analysis 235 relations of production 275 relativism 30, 54, 141±2, 160, 180, 185, 193, 204, 233, 241, 248, 265, 282, 296 epistemological 62 religion 23, 74, 177, 190, 244, 252, 284, 292

replicability/replication 56, 227±8, 230, 248, 250, 251, 265, 266, 317 research `good' and `bad' 203±4, 247±8 see also qualitative methods; quantitative methods research design 311, 312 researchers 17, 18±19, 21, 36, 40, 56 crisis of legitimation 203±4 crisis of representation 202±3 resources 9, 38, 39, 278±9 retroduction 62 revolution 133, 181, 264, 298, 305 rights 121, 183, 184 risk 68, 81, 141 Robertson, P. 290 Rotherham 203 Rowntree Inquiry into Income and Wealth 168 rules 10, 75, 78±9, 86, 88, 92, 95, 96, 97±8, 100, 121, 146, 178, 275, 278±9, 280, 297 informal conventions 98, 99, 103, 104 standard operating procedures 103±4 ruling class 154, 155, 181, 288 rural areas 262 Russia 164, 255, 260 sampling 205, 207, 215, 219±20, 233, 239, 242, 246, 258, 317 Scandinavia 252, 313 Scargill, A. 210 sceptics 103 science 11, 22, 24, 41, 132, 134, 159, 173, 176, 177, 178, 200, 201, 224, 232±3, 250, 265, 312 scientific approaches 19±20 claims 6±7 realism 295 Scotland 122, 290 Seattle 167 Second International 155, 156 Second World War 296 aftermath 300 Selections from the Prison Notebooks (Gramsci 1971) 158±9, 171, 328 selectivity strategic (Jessop) 162 structural (Poulantzas) 161±2 self-esteem 141

366 Subject Index self-interest 68, 77, 78, 79±80, 83, 87, 90, 102, 116, 143, 188, 189, 191, 277, 299, 300±1, 302±3, 304, 305, 307 senior managers (local government) 125 sense experience 173, 174, 177 service sector 259 sex 112, 126 sex categories 124 sex±gender system (Rubin) 110, 111 sexual conduct 138 sexuality 111±12, 121, 190 signalling 85 significance tests 225±6, 227, 228 Single European Act (1986) 279 slavery 296 small business 300 snowball sampling 205 social aggregates 45 atoms 70±1, 78 capital 101, 114, 222 change 158 choice theory 66, 79, 86, 87 consciousness 154 construction 18, 20, 22, 26±7, 31, 34, 35, 39, 124, 127, 266, 314 constructionism 111, 112 constructivism 233 context 189 contract 175, 179 contract theory 88 democracy 40, 258, 305 forces 162 and human sciences 2, 5, 20, 22±3, 24, 41, 137, 193, 197, 201, 202, 232±3, 236, 240, 247, 248, 249, 271, 274, 277, 278, 282, 295, 312, 314, 317 interaction 286, 287 justice 185±8, 191 life 178, 179, 182 mobility 168 movements 84 obligations 189 reality 183, 274, 275, 283 revolution 75 status 288 stratification 262 structure 24, 30±1, 38, 74±5, 83, 88, 140, 158, 180, 184, 259±60, 284: see also structure and agency theory 180 welfare 76

Social Democratic Moment (Berman 1998) 305±7, 310, 320 Social Democratic Party (SDP, UK) 200, 211 Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore 1966) 251, 261±2, 338 socialisation 18, 116±17, 213, 308 socialism 155, 213 Socialist tradition 146±8 society 163, 178 Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child (SPUC) 244 socio-cultural interaction 288, 289 sociological institutionalism 95, 96, 107 sociology 30, 33, 65, 70, 86, 88, 116, 117, 129, 135, 153, 197, 198, 200, 215, 263, 291, 313, 314, 317 `arbitrary boundary' with political science 119, 122 critique of rational choice theory 74±9 sociology of knowledge 152 sociology of organisations 125 soft science 136 software 166, 217, 220, 222, 223, 226, 230, 234, 235 AMOS 224 LISREL 224 SPSS 228 STATA 223, 229 South Africa 95 South Korea 164 Soviet Union 158, 163 Spain 259 stability 293, 301±3, 304, 306, 308±9 Stalin, J. 158 state xi, 94, 111, 113, 120, 121, 130, 139, 141, 142, 143, 147, 154, 164, 175, 179, 280, 305 British 276 feminist critique 122±7 power 251 redistributive 187 `relative autonomy' 157, 161, 162 theory 156±7, 298±9, 300, 308: Marxist 161±2 State and Capitalist Society (Miliband 1969) 158 State and Revolution (Lenin 1917) 158, 171, 335 statistical techniques 15, 48, 52, 61, 204

Subject Index 367 statistics 23, 134, 201, 208, 217, 218, 219, 221±2, 227, 229, 230, 232, 234, 235, 236, 238, 239±40, 242, 244±5, 256, 258, 260, 264, 265 inferential 222±5 structural equation models (SEM) 224 strategic relational approach 280±1, 291 structural conditioning 286, 287 elaboration 286, 287 forces 53 functionalism 297±8 reproduction 286 structuralism 91, 92, 107, 132, 154, 155±6, 157, 159, 161, 162, 170, 266, 274±6, 285, 287±8, 290±1 as a `movement' 274±5 as tendency 276 structuration 88, 278±80, 291 structure and agency 271±91 structured inequality 157, 167±71, 233 UK 167±9 USA 169±70 structures 93, 95, 106±7, 160, 170, 273 corporatist 161 subjectivity 27, 139±40, 201, 204, 232, 236 superstructure (Marxist) 154, 155 surveys 201, 220, 235, 237, 240, 258 Sweden 102, 131±2, 260, 263, 265 Swedish Social Democrats (SAP) 305, 307 Switzerland 102 tautology 49, 50, 51, 83, 103, 104 tax and benefit systems 100 tax burden 102 taxation 88, 211±12, 213, 218 Taxation and Democracy (Steinmo 1993) 263, 346 technical rationality 182 testing 47±8, 58, 62, 63, 102, 174, 217, 222, 223, 249, 250±2, 263 see also falsifiability Thailand 164, 255 Thatcher, M. 168, 209, 210, 252, 301 Thatcherism 67, 77, 132, 142±8, 312 theology 46, 188 theory 22, 23±4, 25, 31, 47±8, 50, 52, 54±5, 56, 59, 60, 61, 62±3, 92, 134, 136, 160, 201, 226, 232, 249, 250±2, 262, 265, 266, 272, 306, 307, 311±12, 315

thick description (Geertz) 27, 136±7 Third World/developing countries 130, 250 time 18, 87, 138 time and space 20, 24, 28, 101, 155 Times, The 165 Toryism 143, 144 trade 33, 160, 303 trade unions 125, 210, 211, 252, 299, 306 tradition 103, 136, 140±1, 143±8 Liberal 144±5 Socialist 146±8 Tory 143 Whig 145±6 transformationalism 33±4 transitivity 68, 82 transparency 227, 230, 301 Treaty of Rome 304 triangulation 237, 238±9 uncertainty 73, 81, 82, 84, 85, 102, 105 underclass 168 understanding 312, 316±17 see also meaning unemployment 149, 150, 229, 238, 256, 259, 274, 281 United Kingdom (UK) 3, 35, 56±62, 87, 93±4, 99, 102, 111, 118, 125, 129, 136, 142±8, 160, 163, 200, 219, 254, 255, 262, 263, 265, 289, 300, 313, 314 civil service (changing structure) 245±7 economic decline 276 economy 157±8, 300, 301 Ministry of Defence 98 Parliamentary Select Committees 104 political participation 234 prime ministership 145, 233 private members' bills 242±5 structured inequality 167±9, 170 United States of America (US/USA) 65, 67, 83, 89, 93, 102, 111, 129, 164, 168, 217, 242, 254, 258, 260, 262, 263, 265, 290, 302, 313, 314 Congress 71, 86±7, 169, 233, 289 hegemony 33 international relations 315 Presidency 233, 271 Reagan±Bush Snr administrations 277 state legislative committees 125±7 structured inequality 169±70 Supreme Court 170

368 Subject Index universal claims 313 universal moral vision 184, 187, 188, 189, 193 universalism 127 universities xi, 147, 168, 281 urban areas 262 urbanisation 257 utilitarianism 67 utility maximisation 95, 96, 98, 99 value judgement 173, 174, 175, 185 value pluralism 185±92 values 6±7, 10, 12, 13±14, 18, 23, 37, 38±9, 45, 54, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99±100, 102, 104, 105, 116, 122, 198, 200, 207, 216, 266, 288 variables 61, 237±8, 244, 250, 251, 253±4, 255±7, 260, 261, 264, 267 independent and dependent 222±3 Verstehen 149 veto points 102 Vienna Circle (1920s) 46 vignettes 27, 235, 239 Vocabulary of Politics (Weldon 1953) 175, 348 voluntary activity 102, 222±4, 225 voting 45, 49±50, 53, 58±9, 60, 65, 66, 74, 76, 79, 82, 83, 86, 116, 132±3, 178±9, 197, 198, 199, 205, 207±15, 218, 219, 223, 229, 235, 255, 256 general election (1992) 59, 210±14 general election (1997) 208±15 general elections 61 sample (1997) 208 tactical 212±13 see also electoral systems

war 264, 301±2 wealth 167, 257, 259, 280 UK 167±8 USA 169 and voluntary activity 222±4, 225 wealth inequality 294 wealth redistribution 189 web sites 167 Weberianism 156, 162, 170 welfare 210, 211±12, 259 welfare state 93, 119, 121, 124, 161, 168, 169, 252, 264±5 public patriarchy 124 well-being 9, 67, 79, 132, 238 Whig tradition 145±6, 147 Wirral West 209 `woman' 111, 112, 130 women 5, 18, 158 168±9, 191, 275, 283±4 `stereotypical and sexist understandings' 14 see also feminism women's culture 121 women's experience 111, 115, 121, 122, 126 women's initiatives 125 workers' councils 156 workforce 168 working class/proletariat 133, 168±9, 181, 210, 213, 214, 254 World Bank 165 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 167 world-views 180, 181, 182, 191, 201, 297, 303 youth

209, 213, 214, 234, 238